This article
first appeared in
Canadian
Military History,
Volume 7, (1998).
"WITHIN OURSELVES...':
THE
DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH LIGHT INFANTRY
IN NORTH AMERICA DURING THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR
"I am convinced, that
till we have everything necessary, for carrying on the War here, within
ourselves, Independent of Aid from this Country, we shall go on very
slowly..."
Lord Loudon to the Duke of
Cumberland, August, 1756.
INTRODUCTION
The first British regulars to appear in North
America were those accompanying a small British expedition to wrest
Manhattan from the Dutch in 1664. Colonel Richard Nicolls' troops landed
on Long Island August 25, 1664 at the exact site where General William
Howe's troops would disembark over a century later. After a swift Dutch
capitulation, Nicolls' redcoats and subsequent garrisons of British
regulars would maintain a solid presence in New York for a virtually
uninterrupted period of 119 years. [Dallas Irvine, "The
First British Regulars in North America", Military Affairs, Vol.X,
(Winter 1945), 337-353.]
It has been suggested by one American
historian that this factual record has been conveniently overlooked by
most of his colleagues in order that "the dismal episode of Braddock's
defeat" can figure prominently in history books as the first appearance of
British redcoats on the North American scene. Thus "they could be made to
appear as stupid brutes led by an eighteenth century Colonel Blimp while
American militia simultaneously appeared as a keen and valiant yeomanry
led by that paragon of all virtue and destined military hero of the fight
for American liberty, George Washington." [Ibid.,
345]
His accusation is a valid one, but not very
surprising, as much of early American history has become firmly embedded
in myth, legend and folklore. "Braddock's Defeat", "The Massacre at Fort
William Henry", "The Boston Massacre" and even "George Washington's
Cutting Down the Cherry Tree" have all served a variety of purposes down
through the centuries. All have become part of the "usable past" and have
been extensively deployed in any discussions of one of those favourite
themes of North American historians -the conflict between European and
colonial values and methods. Inevitably European warfare vs. North
American warfare (la petite guerre) has been drawn into the mythic vortex.
[The "la petite guerre" or "der kleine Krieg" of eighteenth century
military terminology existed alongside the regular European warfare which
saw large armies manoeuvring over open terrain between cities utilizing
Frederician tactics. La petite guerre or “irregular war” comprised those
offensive operations conducted or carried on in the intervals of
preparation and build-up between battles, "the secondary aims present in
all wars by means that are small in relation to the overall effort"
according to Clauswitz. These secondary aims were to be gained by
patrolling, raiding, ambushes of troops and supply convoys, and the
capture of prisoners, all essential activities for any army contemplating
in moving through unfamiliar wilderness.]
Canadian historian I.K. Steele writes that
"North American pride in the ways of the New World has often led to the
assumption that, in warfare as in everything else, the new men of the New
World were better than the history-laden men of the Old". Braddock's
defeat more than any other engagement of the Seven Years' War has, "with
some misrepresentation" been used as key evidence to support this
assumption of superiority. [Ian K. Steele, Guerillas
and Grenadiers: The Struggle for Canada, 1689 - 1760, (Toronto, 1974),
132.] Stanley Pargellis
reinforces this view:
Military historians hold that Braddock's
defeat taught a lesson badly needed for the time: you cannot employ parade
ground tactics in the bush. To almost everyone who in one connection or
another remembers Braddock, this episode stands as a conflict between Old
World and New World ways, with the outcome justifying the new. [Stanley
M. Pargellis, "Braddock's Defeat", American Historical Review,
Vol.XLI, (1936), 253.]
However, many historians led by Pargellis, with Paul Koppermans, Ian
Strachan, and Steele in close support, stress that Braddock's defeat can
no longer be perceived or used as such. [Pargellis,
253-269; Paul E. Kopperman, Braddock at the Monongahela,
(Pittsburgh, 1977), 93-121; Hew Strachan, European Armies and the
Conduct of War, (London, 1983), 28; and Steele, 85-6.]
While broad generalizations about the utility of close-order formations in
woods or the cunning and ruthlessness of Indian tactics or the command
abilities of the young Washington may all be still true, they are not true
as inferences from Braddock's defeat. The general consensus now is that
Braddock's debacle was precipitated in large part by his critical neglect
on the day of battle to observe the fundamental rules of war laid down in
the European manuals of the day. His leadership lapse and complacency
once nearing his objective meant that his soldiers were never given a
chance to demonstrate that Old World methods, properly applied, might have
very well won the day. [Pargellis, 269; and Russell F. Weigley, History
of the United States Army, (Bloomington, 1984), 23-4.]
His column from the day it launched into the North American wilderness
adopted well-conceived and generally well-executed security measures as
per the manuals. On the day however, these careful measures were
inexplicably not ordered nor implemented by Braddock and his staff and
their absence was enough to ensure the ruin of their army and give British
officers a reputation for ineptitude under frontier conditions.
[Braddock's orders to his men demonstrate his awareness of the danger of
surprise attacks and his reliance on current European tactics to respond
to the problem. Camps were heavily guarded by sentries supported by armed
detachments, and, while on the march, one third of the force was employed
in flanking parties. See "General Braddock's Orderly Book," in Will H.
Lowdermilk, History of Cumberland, Embracing an Account of Washington's
First Campaign ... Together with a History of Braddock's Expedition...,
(Washington, D.C.: 1878), viii, lii-liii; Winthrop Sargent, The History
of an Expedition against Fort Duquesne in 1755, (Historical Society of
Pennsylvania, 1855), 296.; and Robert Orme, "Captain Orme's Journal",
Ibid., 317-318, 339-340, and 348-350.]
This reputation is undeserved, for British
regulars took especial care to prepare themselves for the American
theatre, including Braddock and subsequent commanders. After Braddock's
defeat no inferior guerilla force would ever overcome any substantial body
of British regulars during the Seven Years' War in North America.
**************************************************************************************
“BB”
- BEFORE BRADDOCK
The first English settlers in Virginia and New
England arrived with a minimum of professional military support. In 1607,
the Jamestown settlers heeding Captain John Smith's advice formed " ...
immediately into three groups: one to erect fortifications for defence,
one to serve as a guard and to plant a crop, a third to explore." [Weigley,
4.] They encountered hostile Indians almost immediately and, for many
decades, had to rely on standing militia forces.
Ironically, this ancient British tradition of
the militia, on the decline in England since Oliver Cromwell's time, took
on a new vitality in America. Each colony, as it became established, was
obliged to create its own militia for protecting and extending its
frontiers. Cooperation amongst the militias of the various colonies was
confined to specific expeditions in which two or more colonies had a
mutual interest. Organized into units by county or township, the militia
rarely fought as formed units. Instead, the local unit served as a
training and mobilization base from which individuals could be selected
for active operations. [Each individual militiaman was expected to provide
his own weapon - usually a smoothbore musket - and ammunition, clothing
and food for a short expedition, much the same as British men of arms in
feudal times. For really long campaigns, the colonial government would
take charge, the assembly appropriating money for supplies of muskets with
ammunition for those too poor to buy them, appointing supply officers and
contractors to handle purchasing and distribution. See Weigley, 5-12.]
Old Woodcut Credit:
Library of Congress
The effectiveness of the colonial militias
varied from bad to very good, their prowess increasing proportionately to
their proximity to the Indian frontier and the no-man's land between New
England and New France. The seventy year struggle for the North American
continent commencing in 1689 consisted, in fact, of four separate wars.
The first three: the War of the League of Hapsburg (1689-97), the War of
the Spanish Succession (1702-13) and, the War of the Austrian Succession
(1744-48), were fought by the colonists of both mother countries using
colonial methods and military resources to hand. The French utilized
their Indian allies from the outset and armed them with muskets. The
American frontier militias were thus forced to assimilate the best
features of Indian tactics in order to effectively counter their enemy:
small-unit operations, loose formations, informal dress, swift movement,
fire discipline, ambush and surprise attack. Aided by a greater
population base and their own Indian allies, many American frontiersmen
became adept at marksmanship, a skill which increased as more accurate
weapons were developed. [In the eighteenth century, Swiss and German
craftsmen on the Pennsylvania frontier developed the Pennsylvania rifle, a
far more accurate firearm than any musket and a much lighter and less
cumbersome weapon than any of its kind in Europe. It spread so rapidly
over the frontier that it is better known as the Kentucky rifle. Its
users earned so impressive a reputation for marksmanship during the
Revolution, that Washington urged American soldiers to clothe themselves
in the frontiersmen’s buckskin costumes to play upon the British soldiers'
supposed fear that all Americans were sharpshooting marksmen. See Maurice
Matloff, American Military History, (Washington, 1985), 38-39 and
J.F.C. Fuller, British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century,
(London, 1925), 127-9.]
Russell Weigley, an American military
historian, states, however, that "as the frontier receded, the inhabitants
of older communities gradually lost their skills in shooting, forest lore,
and Indian fighting. More and more the militia of long-settled
communities had to rely not on frontier experience but on European
military manuals to guide them in their training." [Weigley, 9-10.]
Orthodoxy advanced to such an extent that at the outbreak of the Seven
Year's War (The French and Indian War to the Americans), militia
commanders were being advised by Colonel Washington to study war from
Humphrey Bland's Treatise on Military Discipline, the leading
English tactical manual of the day. These recommendations were no doubt
based on Washington's less than charitable opinions of colonial militiamen
as expressed in 1755:
Militia, you will find ... never answer
your expectations, no dependence is to be placed on them; they are
obstinate and perverse, they are egged on by the officers, who lead them
to acts of disobedience, and when they are ordered to certain posts for
the security of stores, or the protection of the inhabitants, will, on a
sudden, resolve to leave them, and the united vigilance of their officers
can not prevent them. [Quoted in Ibid., 16.]
Washington was not under any illusions either
of their utility in forest warfare against the French Indian auxiliaries.
He wrote that "without Indians, we shall never be able to cope with those
cruel foes to our country. Indians are the only match for Indians; and
without these, we shall ever fight on unequal terms." [George Washington,
The Writings of George Washington, ed. by John C. Fitzpatrick,
Vol.II, (Washington,1931-44), 302.]
Lt. Col. George Washington, Virginia Regt.
His views on colonial
militia pre-dated one British writer who wrote in 1758:
Our people are nothing but a set of farmers
and planters, used only to the axe and hoe - [the Canadians] are
not only well trained and disciplined, but they are used to arms from
their infancy among Indians; and are reckoned equal, if not superior in
that part of the world to veteran troops... These [Canadians] are
troops that fight without pay - maintain themselves in woods without
charges march without baggage - and support themselves without stores and
magazines ... [Quoted in Steele, 72.]
In general, the colonial militias before
Braddock were not useful unless fighting directly in defence of their own
homes and families. Colonial expansion was mostly accomplished by simple
appropriation and settlement - or dubious purchases and deals rather than
through any coordinated military action by militias. Weigley concludes
that "in general, the colonial militias were not a reliable instrument of
offensive war distant from their own firesides.... Militia training did
not prepare them for extended campaigns, nor did militia organization
befit the maintenance of long expeditions." [Weigley, 12.]
Thus, a long campaign to distant fields that
also involved meeting Indian tactics of stealth and ambuscade, was one for
which colonial militias (except ranger units recruited exclusively from
frontiersmen) were eminently unsuited and, moreover, one in which they
were unwilling to participate. Governor Robert Dinwiddie, however, knew
where to find men to meet the challenge. He wrote to his friend James
Abercromby in England: "I am still of Opinion without force from Home, we
shall hardly be able to drive the French from the Ohio; we want Military
Men, and particularly Ingineers." [Governor Robert Dinwiddie to Abercromby,
August 15, 1754, in The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie,
Lieutenant-Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751-1758..., Vol. 1,
(Richmond, 1883), 286.]
Were
the "Military Men", the British regulars, equal to the task? Were they
capable of waging protracted campaigns in a virtual wilderness against
elusive adversaries well-versed in all aspects of irregular warfare? Some
perhaps were not prepared for the ruthless savagery of scalping and
cannibalism encountered, but many soldiers and their officers were well
inured to irregular warfare and skirmishing either from experiences in
Scotland or on the battlefields of Europe.
Various scholars argue that the modified
integrated infantry tactics that came to dominate European battlefields
from the middle of the 1790s were primarily an organic European
development extending over the previous century. These developments
slowly but gradually combined the techniques of linear formations with
those of irregular auxiliaries (Pandours, Croats, Rangers et al),
with regular specialists in open order who were already members of the
line (light companies) and with elite units such as jaegers and
chasseurs. Colonial experience, they argue, tended only to reinforce
existing trends already in train and not to initiate them. [See Peter
Paret, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, 1807-1815, (Princeton,
1966), 36-39; Michael Howard, War in European History, (London,
1976), 75-8; and John Childs, Armies and Warfare in Europe, 1648-1789,
(New York, 1982) 18-20.]
The historical record bears this out, though
it will be seen that all three developments simultaneously occurred within
the British infantry in North America during the Seven Years' War. The War
of the Austrian Succession (1740-8) and the Jacobite Rebellion (1745-6)
were the training grounds for most of the British officers who served in
North America during the Seven Years War. It was the former war in which
irregular troops were first employed on a large scale by modern armies.
[For fuller details see Fuller, 46-49; Childs, 27-34; and Howard, 75-78.]
In 1740-41, the young Austrian Empress, Maria
Theresa, mobilized her Croatian and Hungarian military borders (or buffer
zones) created to protect her empire from the Ottoman Empire. The
Serb-Croat and Pandour troops thus generated were then moved to the
central front for the first time in an attempt to eject Frederick the
Great's troops from Silesia.
They performed invaluable service in every
campaign and by 1744 Field Marshal Traun had successfully forced the
Prussians out of Bohemia by constant attacks on Frederick's supply lines
and by harassing his forage parties. Over 40,000 Serbo-Croatian "Grenzer"
would serve in the Hapsburg armies during the War, increasing to about
88,000 during the Seven Years War. These fierce "irregulars" were usually
dispatched on independent operations against enemy outposts, supply
centres and lines of communication, but sometimes played a small part on
the battlefield as sharpshooters posted on the flanks. [Fuller, 18-20;
Strachan, 17.]
The French army adapted to this new aspect of
warfare from the outset. The Bohemian campaign brought Maurice de Saxe to
the fore, a subordinate general who, based on his extensive experience
with light troops in Eastern Europe and as an author of the first modern
treatise to deal with the subject, raised a number of compagnies
franches or "free companies" of the French Army in 1744. He
eventually commanded five regiments of light troops during the campaign,
each combining infantry and cavalry operating together. At Fontenoy in
1745, Saxe used his light troops on the battlefield itself, sending a
screen of skirmishers against the British centre while he deployed his
army. He also stationed Monsieur de Grassin's new 1200-strong Regiment
des Arquebusiers on his left where their deadly independent fire or feu
de chasseur repulsed a British attempt on that flank.
Maj. Gen J.F.C. Fuller writes that "Grassin's
troops were the first true light infantry of modern times, behaving
splendidly at Fontenoy and deciding the battle of Mesle. [I use the term
"irregular" to denote light troops without extensive formal training such
as Croats, Indians, coureurs de bois etc. Light infantry I define
as formally trained light troops or regulars, rather than militia or
auxiliaries. (Harrisburg, 1944) were written in 1732 and circulated in
manuscript well before they were published as a book in 1757. Saxe deals
extensively with irregular infantry and cavalry tactics on pages 40-1, 48
and 50.] Saxe also used them at Lauffeldt, against the British, who
quickly gained a great deal of respect for this eighteenth century
commander and studied his writings on war carefully. [The Marechal de
Saxe's Reveries on the Art of War, trans., Thomas R. Phillips,]
Professionals in all armies recognised that by
the end of the 1740s, irregular light troops and regular light infantry
had a role in wartime, if only to defend one's own forces against those of
the enemy. The British forces in Flanders were, therefore, directly and
continuously exposed to these new tactical developments as practised by
ally and enemy alike.
The Jacobite Rebellion of 1745-6 presented the
British Army with some very special problems of fighting in mountainous
terrain against a very agile, mobile and hardy adversary. Highland clans
were well-versed in the guerilla raid, stealth and surprise and many
British commanders including Wolfe and Bland were complimentary about
their warlike skills and tactical acumen. Fuller goes so far as to say
that the Black Watch in their first iteration were an "irregular police"
who, wise in the ways of the Highlands, were the best-equipped light
troops to deal with Highland raiders and robbers. [Fuller, 53.]
By Fontenoy, however, the Black Watch were a
regular heavy infantry regiment of the line, albeit equipped with a
uniform that allowed them greater mobility as well as broadswords and
Highland pistols for close-quarter fighting. [It is interesting to note
that The Black Watch while participating in their first set-piece at
Fontenoy, deployed troops forward of their main line, driving in Saxe’s
heavy screen of skirmishers. Archibald Forbes in The Black Watch,
(London, 1896), 25, notes that “a detachment of Highlanders acted in
support of some Austrian hussars hotly pressed by French light troops who
were promptly repulsed with loss, and the Highlanders were taken notice o
for their spirited conduct.” ]
It was open field tactics at Falkirk and
Prestonpans by the Highlanders, however, and not the irregular warfare
that flared up on the periphery of the Rebellion, that defeated the
conventional British infantry of the day. In early 1 746, British forces
found themselves engaged in constant irregular warfare; the Chevalier de
Johnstone, a Jacobite staff officer who served with the Marquis de
Montcalm at Quebec, remarked that "Lord Loudon with his (Highland) corps
frequently harassed and annoyed us ... keeping us continually on the
alert."
However, Jacobite general Lord George
Murray's counter moves drove Loudon's men away from their base at
Inverness allowing Murray to emerge and launch a series of surprise
attacks on Cumberland's outposts and supply lines. Johnstone believed that
"this bold enterprise had a very good effect, and made such an impression
on the English that, conceiving themselves insecure everywhere, they were
obliged to redouble their service in the midst of winter." [James
Johnstone, A Memoir of the '45, ed, by Brian Rawson, (London,
1958), 110-11.]
Many Highlanders however soon came to respect the ability of the English
infantry or "red soldiers" to function in mountainous terrain and the
professional behaviour of its commander. On one occasion, General Bland,
author of the widely-used Treatise on Discipline, marched
with a force of regular horse and foot, screened with a force of "Campbells
before him" as well as "the Laird of Graunt [sic] and 100 of his
followers". Surrounded by fog, Bland received word back of a possible
ambush ahead. He halted his column, took up defensive positions and sent
a heavily-armed detachment forward to investigate. On the "all clear",
Bland went forward again assuming his previous march discipline. [Quoted
from "Memoirs of the Rebellion in Aberdeen and Banff," in Walter Biggar
Blaikie, ed. Origins of the '45 and Other Paers Relating to that Rising,
Vol.11, (Scottish Historical Society Publications [1916]), 153. Wolfe was
an ardent admirer of Bland's Treatise and presented his own
personal copy to one of his ensigns in the 20th Foot, William Delaune
(later the Light Infantry commander of the "Forlorn Hope" at Quebec, 1
759). The latter officer wrote in the frontispiece that Wolfe "enjoin'd
me particularly to study General Bland's manual and I had an opportunity
to discover later what a prime favourite this Book was with him... for
Bland's general principles and observations he had nothing but praise and
I am convinced that these guided his own Conduct and Dispositions - more
perhaps than he would acknowledge at Louisbourg and Quebec," Stanley
Pargellis, who personally examined this original manual (now in The New
Brunswick Museum's J.C. Webster Collection), observed that "in the chapter
which deals with marching in territory where attacks are to be expected,
there is frequent underlining of just such maxims as Braddock neglected".
Stanley Pargellis, "Braddock's Defeat", 264n.]
Credit:
Fort Ticonderoga Museum
*********************************************************************************
“AB” -
AFTER-BRADDOCK
British commanders after Braddock found that
war in North America was essentially one of geography with such vast
problems of communication and supply that their principal task of
generalship was simply in moving a force of moderate size into contact
with the enemy. With the French on the strategic defensive, it was the
British and Americans who had to penetrate hundreds of miles into
trackless and unsettled country.
American historians, John Shy and Pargellis
have underlined the problems of administration and logistics throughout
the War, and agree that the aptitude of a few individuals for strategy and
tactics cannot be an adequate explanation of success or failure in the
North American conflict. Shy observes that "the forces of nature were so
nearly overwhelming that the French and Indian War had to be a war of
organization and administration. It was a siege on a grand scale.” [John
Shy, Towards Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of
the American Revolution, (Princeton, 1965), 88.]
Essential auxiliaries needed by any general
aspiring to take New France by the Lake Champlain route included “battoemen”,
artillery and, especially, engineers. In Pargellis’ estimation, the
requirement also included “a small mobile force of trained officers and
men, with enough reserves to garrison captured posts and maintain a
lengthening line of communication. In brief, the British needed a small,
highly trained army of experts, some of whom could only be found in the
colonies." [Pargellis, Military Affairs in North Arnerica 1758-1763:
Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle,
(London and New York, 1936), XV.]
Amherst’s Army shooting the rapids on the St Lawrence River,
1760.
Credit:
National Archives of Canada
This, then, sets the stage for the arrival of
Braddock who has already been discussed and provides our starting point.
Shy notes that "American conditions weighted the classic tension of
warfare -boldness versus caution, surprise versus security- in favour of
the cautious approach. Only bad luck could nullify the natural English
superiority, and only rashness or faulty logistics could enhance the
possibility of bad luck." [Shy, 89.]
Braddock had crippling supply problems, then lost his battle through a
single careless act. To future commanders the message was clear: leave
nothing to chance and take no risks.
Braddock's successor was John Campbell, Earl
of Loudon, a Highlander officer well-versed in irregular warfare from
service during the Jacobite Rebellion. Loudon's immediate task was to
build a serviceable army from the remains of Braddock's regiments,
garrison soldiers, provincials, and new units from Britain, as well as
creating a logistical system during 1756-7 that would form the basis of
ultimate victory.
John Campbell, Lord Loudoun
Credit: Library
of Congress
With Braddock's defeat fresh in everyone's
memory, Loudon was deeply concerned with how his troops would fare in "the
Bush fight in which the [French] have so great an advantage by their
Canadians and Indians." Loudon was of the opinion in late 1756 that "it
is impossible for an Army to act in this Country without Rangers”, the
latter a group of experienced frontiersmen raised by William Shirley the
year before for reconnaissance and patrolling duties. [Loudon to
Cumberland, October 17, 1757, in Pargellis, Military Affairs,
400; Loudon to Cumberland, 1756, quoted in Shy, 29.]
Led by Robert Rogers, the Rangers were Americans, but must not be confused
with the American provincial or militia regiments. Pargellis writes :
It is an easy fashion today to imagine that
every colonial was an adept in Indian warfare, or that if they could not
all follow a trail with Deerslayer's adeptness at least they knew some
tricks of the woods and could take care of themselves. That is a fond
delusion. Loudon would have been only too glad if it had been true, if he
could have depended on colonial woodsmen to provide for his command in
America what British troops could not provide - a knowledge of the region
and of Indian fighting .... But most of the provincial army came from
long-settled communities which had never seen an Indian in war-paint...
[Pargellis, Lord Loudon in North America, (New Haven, 1933), 98.]
Loudon's gloomy letter crossed one from the
Duke of Cumberland advising Loudon to "teach your troops to go out on
Scouting Parties; for 'till Regular Officers with men that they can trust,
learn to beat the woods, and to act as Irregulars, you will never gain any
certain Intelligence of the Enemy." [Cumberland to Loudon, 22
November-26 December, 1756, in Pargellis, Military Affairs,
255-56.] Loudon decided to use a
combination of regulars and rangers. Regulars were trained to face both
French regulars and irregulars (Canadians and Indians).
Of particular note is Loudon's surviving 1756
training directive to his four battalion commanders of the Royal American
Regiment (60th Foot), a new regiment raised in America of which he was the
first Colonel-Commandant. The Royal Americans were ordered to dress
exactly like line regiments of the British army less regimental lace but
to train specifically for their proposed role in forest warfare.
Instructions included firing “at Marks, and in order to qualify them for
the Service of the Woods, they are to be taught to load and fire, lyeing
on the Ground and kneeling. They are to be taught to march in order, slow
and faste in all sorts of Ground. They are frequently to pitch & fold up
their Tents and to be accustomed to pack up and carry their necessities in
the most commodious manner.” [Ibid., 292-3, 327-30, and 335-41.]
Bush tactics and dress were soon put into
practise. British soldiers acting as a covering party or vanguard learned
to march in single file; if they fell into an ambush, the command "Tree
all" was given and every man found a tree and looked out for himself.
Various suggestions were made from time to time to make the regular troops
better fitted for the American milieu: George Scott of the 40th (and later
Amherst's and Wolfe's commander of Rangers at Louisbourg and Quebec
respectively) devised plans to lighten equipment and reduce firing
motions; James Prevost another Swiss-born Royal American battalion
commander who shared with countrymen Henri Bouquet and Frederick Haldimand
a penchant for "la petite guerre", went so far as to advocate the
formation of strictly American regiments, clothed for the wilderness,
armed with short, light guns, trained to swim, run and leap obstacles in
obedience to the blast of the whistle, and to be accompanied by dogs for
chasing the Indians. [Pargellis, Lord Loudon, 300.]
Loudon, acting on Cumberland's advice, sent 56
volunteer gentlemen from all of his regular regiments to Robert Rogers for
intensive training on ail aspects of irregular warfare and "bush
fighting". According to Rogers, Loudon ordered him to instruct his
charges "to the utmost of my power in the ranging discipline, our methods
of marching, retreating, ambushing and fighting, etc, that they might be
the better qualified for any future services against the enemy we had to
contend with....” [Robert Rogers, Journals of Major Robert Rogers,
ed. by F.B. Hough, (Albany, 1883), 80.]
Loudon's intentions in training British
regular soldiers was to turn them into a regular "light infantry corps"
according to Pargellis. [Pargellis, 304-5. ]
Major General James Abercromby, Loudon’s
second-in-command and destined to succeed him a few months later, was
openly supportive of the plan. He wrote that "the present Rangers...
might be reduced or brought down to reasonable terms of pay if a light
infantry Corps was established which I am confident would discharge all
the functions of Rangers in a short time, better than those in your
present pay." [Quoted in Shy, Towards Lexington...,129-30.]
In December 1757, however, Loudon substituted
this plan with the creation of a regiment of lightly-armed infantry,
"Gage's Light Infantry" or the 80th Foot. Pargellis writes:
The importance of this move in
the history of irregular warfare is very great; it was. the natural and
inévitable failure of the provincial rangers to fulfil the function of
acting as irregular troops. Gage's regiment constituted the first
definitely light-armed regiment in the British army; the firelocks issued
to them were "cut shorter and the stocks dressed to make them lighter"
Composed as far as possible of woodsmen , it was officered by men who
[were trained in] Rogers' methods and were also trained in regular
discipline. After two years experience with local devices, the British
army took partly into its own hands the function deemed to be most
peculiarly American. [It is interesting to note that the 80th was
never used as a battalion but regularly detached its light companies in
support of the regular brigades. It was the closest the British in North
America ever came to emulating the company-sized "colonial regulars" or "Compagnies
franche de la Marine" of the French that were so adept at small
unit tactics and specialists in "la petite guerre". While Pargellis
states it was "composed as far as possible of woodsmen" its officers were
British and Loudon also permitted Gage to draft a nucleus of sergeants,
corporals, and "good active healthy young men” from the other British
regiments in theatre. Some rank and file were recruited in the colonies
but, for the most part, were made up by drafts from Ireland. Pargellis,
305.]
Loudon fell from grace at the same time as
Cumberland did in England and was replaced by Abercromby in the winter of
1757-1758. William Pitt knew Abercromby to be weak and thus ensured the
Commander-in-Chief was well-seconded by the dynamic and well-loved
Brigadier Lord George Augustus Howe. Howe was described by Wolfe as "that
great man" and "the best soldier in the British army." [James Wolfe,
The Life and Letters of James Wolfe, ed. by Beckles Willson, (London,
1909), 392, 403.]
American historian Francis Parkman claims it
was Howe that "broke through the traditions of the service and gave it new
shapes to suit the time and place.” Howe studied forest warfare and
joined Rogers's Rangers on several raiding parties, sharing all their
hardships and making himself one of them. The reforms he introduced were
the fruits of this rough imposed schooling. British officers and men were
ordered to "throw off all useless encumbrances, cut their hair close, wear
leggings to protect them from briers, brown the barrels of their muskets,
and carry in their knapsack 30 pounds of meal." Until his untimely death
during the approach march on Ticonderoga in 1758, this veteran officer of
Flanders (and de facto ground commander of troops in North America)
effectively used rangers and light infantry to reconnoitre enemy
positions, screen the advance of heavy columns, protect those columns
while preparing for the assault, and in guarding the retreat. [Francis
Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol.11, (London, 1899), 94.]
General Jeffery Amherst replaced Abercromby in
autumn 1758 after the Ticonderoga debacle, and, like Loudon and Howe, he
formed and used light infantry units and continued to adapt the arms and
equipment of the regulars to wilderness conditions. He ordered all
regular battalion commanders in the winter of 1758-1 759 "to practise
their men at firing at marks, whenever the weather permitted; to form a
company of men from each regiment, and those to be the most active, with
Proper Officers: These to be called the light infantry of the regiments
they belonged to..." They were also to be "dressed agreable [sic] to the
pattern given by the General, and armed with a carbine and bayonet only.”
[Rogers, 111- 16; J.W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army,
Vol. II, (London, 1899-1930), 324-29; and Fuller, 91.]
Amherst's younger brother and ADC, William Amherst, admired the active
professionalism of these particular regulars and wrote in his journal that
the "Light Infantry are certainly of great use & should always accompany
than Army in this country, as these troops drive them out of their
shelter, harass them continually& treat them in their way." [William
Amherst, Journal of William Amherst in America 1758-1760, ed. by
J.C. Webster, (Toronto, 1931), pp.15-16.]
By spring 1760, such was the high calibre of
training and skill of these troops that General Amherst confidently sent
his newly-promoted brother to the forefront of his force to command these
elite troops on the advance to Montreal. The young Amherst proudly wrote
that on one forward reconnaissance-in-force "we lost our way [back] & did
not reach the Camp until after dark, through swamps & the thickest wood we
could meet with." He confessed to be glad of it "as it shewed the temper
of the Corps, expecting to lay out all night, without any covering or
anything to eat or drink. The bon volonté and cheerfulness I had
before met with amongst them still subsisted, & I conceive they know no
difficulties. It is a pleasure serving with such a Corps." [Ibid.,
63.]
Major General James Wolfe, who served as one
of Amherst's brigadiers at Louisbourg, shared his superior's belief in the
utility of light infantry in North America. Wolfe was an energetic
reformer in dress, tactics and training of regulars to meet the irregular
warfare he knew would plague the peripheries of his siege camps around
Quebec. Wolfe ordered that the ad hoc companies of light infantry,
first started at Louisbourg by Amherst, remove their lace for his pending
campaign against Quebec. In addition, their heavy redcoats were to be
discarded in favour of their waistcoats with the sleeves of their frock
coats sewn on as well as extra pockets for ball and flint. Knapsacks were
to be carried higher and fastened with "a strap of web over the shoulders,
as the Indians carry their pack." Cartridge boxes were to be carried hung
under the left arm, powder horns issued and slung on the right, and
tomahawks hung from the belt. The Light Infantryman's large tricorn hat
was to be cut down into a cap "with as much black cloth added as will come
under his chin and keep him warm when he lies down." [John Knox, The
Siege of Quebec and the Campaigns in North America, 1757-1760, ed. by
Brian Connell, (Mississauga, 1980), 118-9.]
Wolfe's professionalism and common sense was
born of experience in Germany and Flanders where he served from 1742 to
1745. In 1746 he saw action at Falkirk and Culloden and had held a small
independent command in hostile territory of the southern Highlands.
Returning to Flanders the following year, he was wounded at Lauffeldt and,
when subsequently promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel of the 20th Foot, found
himself with his regiment on garrison duties in Scotland and southern
England. During that time he established himself as one of the best
trainers in the contemporary British army for men and officers alike.
Whereas most British regiments attached little importance to target
practise, Wolfe was a firm believer in marksmanship being a decisive
combat multiplier before ever setting foot in North America; in 1755, he
wrote from Scotland to a friend:
We fire bullets continually, and have great
need of them .... Marksmen are nowhere so necessary as in a mountainous
country; besides, firing balls at objects teaches the soldier to level
incomparably, makes the recruit steady, and removes the foolish
appréhension that seizes young soldiers when they first load their arms
with bullets. We fire first singly, then by files, 1,2,3, or more, then
by ranks, then lastly by platoons; and the soldiers see the effect of
their shot especially at a mark, or upon water. We shoot obliquely, and
in different situations of ground, from heights downwards and contrarywise.
[Wolfe, 255.]
Wolfe was a new breed of British army officer
who had made a thorough study of his military profession, reading
classical works, engineering and drill texts, Marshal Saxe and,
especially, the latest French contemporary treatises on "la petite
guerre". Writing in 1756 to a friend seeking expert advice and
instruction for his brother entering the army, Wolfe recommended the
aspiring officer to read, amongst others, "the Comte de Turpin's book [Essai
sur l'Art de la Guerre, Paris, 1754]... and a little volume entitled "Traite
de la petite Guerre", that your brother should take in his pocket when he
goes upon out-duty and detachments." [Ibid., 295-96.]
Major General James Wolfe
Credit:
National Archives of Canada
Wolfe, on his return from Louisbourg, was told
by Pitt that he would command the Quebec Expedition and immediately set
about gathering a cadre of experienced officers for his Light Infantry
Corps. He wrote to Lord Sackville:
Carden the American has a great deal
of merit, but wants bread to eat. He is an excellent fellow for the
woods.... He is bold, circumspect and more artful than his appearance
bespeaks - has experience in the method of the American war beyond anybody
that I can hear of; I hope we shan't lose such a subject so particularly
adapted to this sort of work. [Carden
became a light infantry company commander in Wolfe's Light Infantry which
was commanded by Viscount Howe's youngest brother, William. The younger
Howe would later became Commander-in-Chief in America during the American
Revolution. The middle brother, Richard Howe, would second his efforts as
the senior naval officer on station. Ibid., 360.]
From the time Wolfe's army landed on the lle
d'Orlean and established fortified camps around Quebec, the army's
movements were well-protected and screened by light infantry and rangers.
Wolfe's orders to his light infantry were explicit and succinct and, as
the summer progressed, the intensity of the irregular warfare increased to
a point where Brigadier George Townshend wrote that it was "A Scene of
Skirmishing, Cruelty and Devastation. It is War of the Worst Shape."
[Townshend to his wife, Sept.6, 1759, in A.G.Doughty and G.W. Parmalee,
eds., The Siege of Quebec and The Battle of the Plains of Abraham....,
Vol.V, (Quebec, 1901), Vol.V., 195.]
Wolfe's Light Infantry were also instrumental
in assisting the main body to get up and onto the plains of Abraham to
conduct the main battle. They landed first, took Vergor's Camp and the
Samos battery (both guarding the Foulon Cove) in reverse then, guided the
main body to the battlefield. These important duties completed, they
spent the rest of the battle guarding the vulnerable rear (Bougainville's
force of 2000 men was at Cap Rouge) of Wolfe's army and actually taking
post in the line on the embattled left flank where a cloud of Canadien and
Indian irregulars harassed the British army with great success.
Wolfe’s Army Landing at Quebec, 1759
Credit:
National Archives of Canada
After the collapse and complete rout of the
French regulars from the field, this same group of French irregulars
inflicted numerous casualties on the British line regiments who broke
ranks to pursue their regular adversaries. It was only when the Light
Infantry moved forward and the line regiments reformed into company-sized
groups that they were finally able to clear this last menace from the
battlefield." [For a complete discussion of irregular and regular tactics
used by the British and French armies during the battle see Ian McCulloch,
"The King Must Be Obeyed", The Beaver, Vol.72:5, (Oct/Nov 1992).
For the best contemporary accounts by actual battle participants, see
Knox, 190-200; Extracts from a Manuscript Journal ... kept by Colonel
Malcolm Fraser, (Literary and Historical Society of Quebec, 1868),
20-4; James Johnstone, A Dialogue in Hades, (Literary and
Historical Society of Quebec, 1868), 41-4; and for the best secondary
account of the battle see, C.P. Stacey, Quebec, 1759: The Siege and the
Battle, (Toronto, 1959), 128-155.]
Thus during the Quebec campaign, we have the
synthesis of the "trained" light infantryman - a disciplined, regular
soldier - proficient in all aspects of irregular warfare but capable of
falling back into line during a set-piece battle. This multi-talented
British light infantry under Howe and Wolfe at Quebec anticipated by three
decades the French light companies of the Napoleonic period, the latter
described by Peter Paret as "a new all-purpose infantry, in which each
soldier could fight in the line, in column, as a skirmisher, and on
detached missions.” [Peter Paret, "Colonial Experience and European
Military Reform at the End of the Eighteenth Century", The Bulletin of
the Institute of Historical Research, Vol.XXXVII, (May 1964), 55.]
The last refinement and proof of the
developmental progress of the British light infantry during the Seven
Years War was to occur at an obscure spot in the Pennsylvanian
wilderness. At Bushy Run, a small force of regular soidiers comprising
the light and grenadier companies of the Black Watch, Royal Americans and
Montgomery's Highlanders under Colonel Henri Bouquet decisively routed a
much larger Indian force utilizing company manoeuvre and small unit
tactics.
Colonel Henry Bouquet, 60th Foot (Royal Americans)
Their commander was an experienced Swiss
officer, recruited from the Dutch service to be one of the four original
Royal American battalion commanders. Bouquet had devoted his training
abilities to "combining the qualities of a scout with the discipline of a
trained soldier" in all soldiers coming under his command. During his
seven years in theatre he had strived to develop his men literally as
"hunters" (a direct translation of the German "Jaegers") so they would be
as adept as their Indian and coureur de bois adversaries.
Bouquet reminded readers in his personal
account of the Bushy Run engagement and subsequent campaign that there
wasn't "anything new or extraordinary in this way of fighting which seems
to have been common to most Barbarians" and offered numerous examples, not
only from antiquity, but from his own personal experiences in Europe,
pointing to light infantry formations such as those raised by Marshal de
Saxe and Frederick the Great." [Quoted in R.B. Asprey, War in the
Shadows: The Guerilla in History, Vol.1, (New York, 1975), 96.]
Fuller wrote that Bouquet "studied Indian
warfare not to copy it ... but to discover its nature so that he might
devise a system of tactics whereby he could destroy it". [Fuller, 102.]
Bouquet identified general maxims that could apply to all Indians and
coureur de bois. First they always " ... surround their enemy. The
second, that they fight scattered, and never in a compact body. The third
that they never stand their ground when attacked, but immediately give
way, to return to the charge." It followed then:
1st. That the troops destined to engage
Indians must be lightly cloathed, armed and accoutred.
2nd. That having no resistance to
encounter in the attack and defence, they are not to be drawn up in close
order, which will only expose them without necessity to a greater loss.
And, lastly, that all their evolutions must be performed
with great rapidity; and the men enabled by exercise to pursue the enemy
closely, when put to flight, and not give them time to rally.
[Asprey, 96.]
Bouquet's training program gave specific
attention to items such as clothing, arms, training, construction of camps
and settlements, logistics and tactical manoeuvres to meet most
contingencies. Under his tutelage, the company replaced the battalion as
the unit of manouevre, troops learned snapshooting, to fire from the prone
and kneeling positions, wheeling on the run over broken terrain, swimming,
marching on snowshoes, etc. An American provincial observing Bouquet's
training regimen in 1758 before the march by General Forbes on Fort
Dusquesne wrote: "Every afternoon he exercises his men in the woods and
bushes in the manner of his own invention, which will be of great service
in an engagement with Indians." [Joseph Shippen to his Father, August 15,
1758 in G.H. Fisher, "Brigadier-Generai Henry Bouquet", The
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography , Vol.111, No.2,
(1879), 127.]
It was not until Bushy Run in 1763 during
Chief Pontiac’s Indian uprising, however, that he got his chance. Quickly
forming a disciplined defensive perimeter on the first day, Bouquet
feigned a weakness in his line on the second day to lure the Indians
forward. Then, utilising terrain - a gully of dead ground - Bouquet
sent two light companies up to hit the massing attackers from the right
flank. Completely surprised, the Indians were driven at the point of the
bayonet across the frontage of two other companies waiting in ambush - who
opened fire with deadly precision. The Indians were completely routed.
Counter-attack of the 42nd Black Watch & Montgomery’s
Highlanders, Bushy Run,
1763
Credit: National Archives of Canada
Bushy Run was a decisive action, in spite of
the small numbers engaged, as it proved to be the turning point in putting
down Pontiac's Uprising. It had a powerful dampening effect on the
involved Indian tribes' fighting ardour and no further major actions or
attacks were mounted during the rebellion. Bouquet's success at Bushy Run
still stands in the annals of British military history as "one of the
fiercest ever fought with Indians" with a codicil by Fortescue as to
Bouquet's military genius stating that "had any man of less experience
in such warfare been in command (emphasis mine), its issue
might well have been disastrous." [Fortescue, Vol.III,
18.]
Fuller, a well-read military historian, is
also explicit, stating that Bouquet's tactics and manoeuvre against "a
savage foe is probably the most ingenious and effective that the history
of irregular warfare has to record." [Fuller, 110.]
Fortescue generously gives the soldiers equal billing when he states: "the
final stratagem whereby success was won reflects equal credit on the
resource of the commander and the perfect steadiness of the men." [Fortescue,
18.]
Bouquet modestly attributes all to his men,
predominantly Highlanders of the 42nd and 77th
Regiments of Foot; "I cannot sufficiently express my admiration for the
cool and steady behaviour of the troops who did not fire a shot without
orders, and drove the enemy from their posts with fixed bayonets. The
conduct of the officers is much above my praises." [Quoted in Lewis
Butler, The Annals of the Kin-g's Royal Rifle Corps, Vol.1 - "The
Royal Americans", (London, 1913), 164.]
CONCLUSION
The new light infantry tactical organizations
and skills acquired by the British army in North America during the French
and Indian War went the way of all new innovations when peace was
achieved. "As must needs be at the close of every war, the [Prime
Minister's] first duty was the reduction of the army to peacetime
establishment,” wrote Fuller, “which was effected by disbanding or dooming
to disbandment all Infantry of the Line junior to the 70th Foot and all
Cavalry junior to the 18th Light Dragoons." [Fortescue, 10.]
Thus the 80th Regiment of Light Armed Foot
(Gage's Light Infantry) disappeared, though they had a year's grace when
Pontiac's Uprising broke out and Amherst, desperate for troops, kept them
on strength for the duration of the conflict. The 60th Foot (Royal
Americans) survived and became the principal guardians of the frontier,
but were broken up into small detachments garrisoning myriad, small forts
"in the wilderness, hundreds of miles from any civilised settlement,
ill-fed, ill-provided, ill-cared for - in a word forgotten". [Ibid.,
13.] One might add ill-exercised and
ill-trained.
In 1763, all the light companies in the
British army were disbanded. The tactical system of Frederick the Great
was still in place and still exerting its pervasive influence. Fuller's
distress as a modern military man vice historian is evident when he wrote:
Military pedants in London, having grown
fat on the stiff mechanical drill of Prussia, could not and would not
bring themselves to believe, in spite of the late wars, that light troops
were not only an aid, not only a necessity, but an integral part of all
skilfully organised armies.... Nevertheless, a change was taking place,
for as in France, so also in England, pipe-clay, hair-grease and the
clockwork manoeuvres of the drill square, though they cramped the efforts
of the few able soldiers who still sought to carry on the traditions of
Wolfe and Amherst, of Howe, Bouquet and Rogers, they could not completely
cripple them. [Fuller, 112, 124.]
In 1771, a company of light infantry was
re-introduced to every battalion throughout the line regiments, though
some had unofficially maintained a flank company in addition to the
grenadier company known as the picket or Highland company. [Robin May,
The British Army in North America, 1775-1783, (London, 1993), 5,15 and
32.] Fuller believes that this addition
of "light companies" at this time, however, was little more than nominal
"window-dressing" as most light companies were "looked on as penal
settlements and were filled with the worst characters of the battalions."
[Fuller, 124.]
It was
recognized in 1774, just one year before Lexington, that these "light
companies" were so poorly trained and ignorant of their duties that
General William Howe, on the order of King George III, was obliged to form
a camp at Salisbury Plain for the instruction of seven companies of light
infantry in certain manoeuvres of his own developed while commanding
Wolfe’s Light Infantry. [Ibid., 125.]
Shy, in his excellent study of what role the
British army played in the coming of the American Revolution, has more
than adequately pointed out that the army and its political masters in
Whitehall were confused as to what their actual new role was to be in
their newly acquired American empire. He asks:
What was
(Shy's emphasis) the army doing in
the colonies? No one seemed to know. Defense - as is so often the case
when no one is attacking - looked a little ridiculous. The plan for
Indian management, not quite defense in the usual meaning of the word, was
difficult to grasp.... And there was always the hint of duplicity - that
the British government wanted an army not to defend but to control the
colonists. The hint concealed a grain of truth, but what seemed a
half-hearted attempt to garrison the backcountry led Americans to suspect
more was there. [Shy,
Towards Lexington..., 423-24.]
The disbandment of the light infantry
organizations which were best suited to act as a potent gendermarie on the
fringes of a wild and unpredictable frontier left the typical Frederician-style
heavy infantry battalions concentrated mainly in urban and well-colonised
areas of the Thirteen Colonies and the former New France. Thus, an
accumulated wealth of light infantry tactics and expertise specific to the
North American theatre, carefully cultivated at first by Loudon, Rogers,
Howe and Amherst, then honed to a fine degree by Wolfe and Bouquet, was
lost by the absence of a clearly defined role for the infantry in
America. From overseas, a new peacetime political administration meant a
return to orthodoxy and adherence to Frederician tactics to maintain the
status quo.
This confusion of role coupled with economic
restrictions are the main reasons why well-trained and effective light
infantry was not readily available as it might have been in the British
army at the outbreak of the American Revolution more than a decade later.
During this latter conflict, the tactical successes gained by the
Americans were nearly all in irregular fighting, which have been seized
upon by American historians as proof of war-waging superiority.
By the middle of the war, British light
infantry had re-invented itself and along with light cavalry had become
the equal or betters of the American backwoodsmen and sharpshooters,
Fuller writing that "during the last three years of [the war] the English
had so well adapted themselves to its nature, that they were in no way
inferior to their opponents" [Fuller, 127-28.]
Despite tactical successes of the Americans in irregular warfare fought on
the periphery, it was George Washington's Continental Army, however,
assisted by French troops and the French navy using standard European
tactics and siege warfare of the day, that defeated the British army
strategically in North America.
Steele is correct in noting that "North American
pride in the ways of the New World has often led to the assumption that, in
warfare as in everything else, the new men of the New World were better than
the history laden men of the Old". Many American historians have used the
defeat of Braddock and the Americans’ later successes in the American
Revolution Revolution "with some misrepresentation ... as evidence of this
superiority.” [Steele, Guerillas and Grenadiers...,132.]
What is very clear that the British army came
and forced its kind of war on the Northern American wilderness in the Seven
Years' War and adapted very quickly to its peculiar brand of partisan
warfare. The majority of its commanders were aware of, and, in certain
cases, innovators and experts in irregular warfare, quickly creating ranger
units, light infantry companies and battalions (with parallel improvements
in dress, equipment and tactics) to effectively counter the Indians,
Canadians and the French with skill and confidence.
The myth of American superiority of arms in irregular warfare and its
overall contribution to the Americans' ultimate victory during the
Revolution has been highly exaggerated. This "misrepresentation", as Steele
has termed it, serves to partially explain why the achievements of British
commanders in developing a highly effective light infantry during the Seven
Years' War in North America have been ignored or given scant attention by
American historians. To recognize the facts would explode the "superiority"
myth. |