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The first part of 1917 was
eventful. In January of this year Mrs. Dollar and I attended the annual
meeting of the Foreign Trade Council at Pittsburg, Pennsylvania. There
was a large attendance, those who registered numbering twenty-five
hundred. It was not so much the number, as the high class of men who
attended. They represented the big commercial and banking institutions
of the United States, which showed conclusively that the country had at
last awakened to the necessity of foreign trade. It was as enthusiastic
and as earnest a body of men as I had ever seen together. Splendid
addresses on the various subjects that affect foreign trade were
delivered. Mr. Bernard N. Baker was to have addressed the meeting on,
"The Necessity and Importance of an American Merchant Marine." At the
last minute he notified the assembly that he would be unable to attend,
so the committee asked me to take his place, which I did. The following
is a stenographic report of my talk:
Report of the Merchant
Marine Committee of the National Foreign Trade Council, Presented by
Robert Dollar, Chairman
It goes without saying
that the Fourth National Foreign Trade Convention desires to consider
the American Merchant Marine from a business, rather than from a
sentimental standpoint.
If any delegate desired
to enter into a new business he would not wrap himself m the Stars and
Stripes and make a speech. He would calmly analyze the chances of
success in the particular field and then estimate his own resources and
necessities. Let us consider, therefore, why the United States desires
to go more extensively into ocean shipping. The National Foreign Trade
Council has declared that an American merchant fleet should discharge
the following functions: First: Increase the national income and
domestic prosperity, through greater facilities for the sale abroad of
products of the soil and industry of the United States; the importation
of materials indispensable to life and industry; and, through freights
collected from world commerce. Second: To maintain under the flag,
communication with distant possessions. Third: To aid the national
defense and maintain commerce during war, whether the United States be a
belligerent or a neutral.
The world shipping
outlook may be summarized as follows:
The position as far as
the future of merchant shipping is concerned may be summed up under four
heads:
1. War loss of tonnage.
2. Steps taken to remedy the decrease of tonnage.
3. Nationalization of merchant shipping in relation to international
traffic.
4. Participation of American shipping in international trade after the
war.
War losses
According to available
statistics, England has lost some 12% of her deep sea shipping as a
result of the war; while Germany has lost about 7.5% of hers, through
mines or otherwise. The 13.4% of German tonnage now in the hands of the
Allies has not been wiped off the register, nor is it necessary to take
into consideration the 39.1% of German tonnage laid up in neutral
harbors. In the case of Norway, the loss of shipping due to the war has
been even greater than that sustained by England. The merchant shipping
of the world to-day is probably only 85% or 90% of what it was when the
war broke out, taking into consideration all the new tonnage built
during the past two years, which is the smallest amount built for almost
a generation.
Collectively, with this
process of destruction, we must include some four and one-half million
tons of shipping laid up to avoid the risk of capture, while at least
another twelve million tons is in constant use by the Allies, in
connection with the transport service. Altogether, it has been estimated
that only slightly more than 50% of the whole mercantile fleet of the
world is now available for peaceful trade, so that no great effort of
the imagination is needed to understand the position as regards both the
present level of freights and the prices which neutral ships ate
commanding in the sale market. This will give you a general idea as to
why freights are so high.
Remedying the Losses
The next question in
order is, the nature of the steps taken to remedy the loss of that 10%,
more or less, of the world's tonnage which has been destroyed as a
result of the war. It is here that the greatest difficulty will be found
in arriving at anything like comprehensive figures, upon which to base
positive deductions.
In 1913, for instance,
British shipyards turned out, approximately, 1,975,000 tons of shipping.
Last year the output was reduced to 580,000 tons; but, concurrently,
there was a proportionate increase in other countries, particularly in
the United States, where, including the tonnage built on foreign
account, some 560,000 tons of shipping were launched. In Holland,
France, Norway and Denmark, last year's output was slightly reduced,
owing to the difficulty of securing material; while little is known of
what is going on in German shipyards. Japan and Holland, together,
turned out about as much tonnage as the United States, and. adding the
British total to that of all other countries, the total for 1916 is
slightly above 1,820.000 tons of new ships —which is less than the
output of the United Kingdom for the year 1913. The output of new
tonnage throughout the world has been reduced by 50% since the beginning
of the war.
According to the figures
compared by the Bureau of Navigation of the United States Department of
Commerce, not less than 1,428,000 tons of steel ships had been ordered
from American shipyards on December 1, 1916; and, in the United Kingdom,
according to the figures of Lloyd's Register, approximately 1,180,000
tons of shipping were in various stages of completion, and could be put
into service within a few months, should the cessation of hostilities
permit the employment of sufficient labor to push the work on these
ships.
Figures are lacking as to
the amount of tonnage under way in Germany, France, Italy, Japan and
Holland; but, it is known that this tonnage is considerable and amounts
to at least as much as has been ordered in this country; so that there
is every reason to believe that, should hostilities terminate this year,
the mercantile marine of the world, after another year, would show a net
loss less than is now anticipated. In other words, it would have
suffered from arrested development, a condition open to various
interpretations, for the reason that, in years past, trade depressions
were followed by terrible slumps in the shipping industry, so that any
slackening in the movement of international traffic resulted in
depriving ordinary cargo ships, or tramps, of a living wage, and forced
many of them into idleness. This surplusage, therefore, will have been
wiped out by the destruction wrought during the war and the slackening
of shipbuilding operations, making the exploitation of overseas
transports a less precarious industry than it has been since the last
boom period of 1900, which was then brought about, wholly, by the
enormous requisition of tonnage by Great Britain for the transport of
troops and supplies to the seat of war in South Africa.
Government control of
shipping
It would be extremely
rash, however, to venture predictions concerning the maritime traffic
situation of the world as ;t will find itself at the end of the war;
chiefly, because the ultimate result is still a matter of speculation.
At such times as these, when international trade is, as during the
Napoleonic wars, a period held subordinate by the belligerents to the
measures thought necessary to secure the advantage in war, the future is
so dependent upon the future course of events, as to warn us to exercise
the utmost caution, when venturing predictions based upon past events.
The war has been, and is
still, a great benefit to the shipping of neutral countries. Thus, we
have seen in our own trade, scores of Japanese, Greek. South American
and other vessels, that formerly never ventured beyond the coast line of
their own countries, arriving at our ports in search of coal, grain,
foodstuffs arid other essential necessities. Similarly, our own
so-called '"Coastwise" vessels have been eagerly chartered for the
overseas trades and, a few days ago. two steamers, built for the
Atlantic Coast trade, were chartered by a British steamship company to
work on the New York and River Platte line, in the place of British
tonnage that had been commandeered by the British Government.
One question which has
been foremost in the minds of those who have recently participated in
international ocean traffic, has been, the probable attitude of the
belligerents toward neutral shipping when the war ends. It has been
hinted that the system of government control of shipping now in force in
the warring countries, would be continued after peace is declared, and,
that steps would be taken by the Allies to exclude from their trade the
ships owned by their former enemies.
It is idle to conjecture
what is really at the bottom or what will be the result of the trade
pact signed by the Allies at Paris, last year; but, it is
inconceivableable that the nations which are now, in their own words,
allied for the defense of civilization, will use the eventuality of
victory for the purpose of enforcing a system of domination of the seas
which, though once claimed as a right worth upholding, if necessary by
force of arms, was given up voluntarily as a handicap upon the accretion
of national wealth, through greater participation in international
trade.
Restriction of the
liberty of navigation must be paid for by those who would seek to drive
others from the sea: and. historians are agreed, that it was only
through her renouncement of the doctrine of Sovereignty of the Seas, and
the repeal of the monopolistic Navigation Laws, that England secured for
her shipping that position of superiority which it enjoyed at the
beginning of the war.
Effect of controlled
skipping
An object lesson n the
practical working of nationalization of shipping is in evidence to -day.
It is undeniable, that much of the tonnage scarcity existing in certain
trades has been artificially created by the action of officials in
control of shipping, who have ordered ships to proceed from one end of
the world to another, unmindful of the fundamental principle that the
proper function of shipping is to serve both ends of the trade routes:
and, that ships cannot be shunted to and fro like locomotives, over the
shortest circuit, without causing profound disorganization in the system
of international transport which has been evolved by the natural process
of operation of the law of supply and demand. Signs are not wanting that
the public of the allied nations is beginning to understand that.
Government control does not necessarily imply efficient handling.
In this country, we have
heard the echo of Government control of shipping through the enactment
of the Shipping Act, with its concomitant appropriation of $50,000,000
of public funds for the purpose of acquiring vessels. In this case, one
problem will be the judicious expenditure of so large en amount of
public money, without incurring the risk of a tremendous depreciation of
the initial investment when conditions have returned to normal,
American shifting
The last phase of the
problem of rehabilitation of merchant shipping after the war, is that
which has to do with the probable amount of traffic that will be
available when the guns are silenced, and the legitimate share of such
traffic which may accrue to the American merchant marine.
The nations at war have
piled up such a heavy burden of debt, that, for a long time, they will
probably continue to impose upon themselves the program of retrenchment
al present in force.
Of late, the percentage
of American foreign trade carried in American vessels has increased
materially, and the urgent question at the moment is, the devising of
means, not only to the end of reserving for American shipping the
percentage of American international trade which it has won; but also of
strengthening its position in order that if the end of the war witnesses
keener competition for maritime traffic, the American merchant marine
will continue to enjoy that share of the world trade which it has
already conquered.
This phase of the
question is that which concerns us most deeply, both because an American
merchant marine is required for national needs, and as a source of
revenue for our people; and, because it is a vital element of the
shipping problem, that no one section of it be developed without due
regard for the economic conditions which are likely to influence its
existence. The new American merchant marine, which is new in process of
evolution, has not, perhaps, developed as rapidly as circumstances
seemed to justify; but, it is well worth remembering, that the natural
desire of the American public to venture more extensively into ship
owning has been somewhat dampened by legislation which, although
ostensibly conceived for the general benefit of the community, has
nevertheless been interpreted as likely to handicap the chances of
American shipping. The Seamen's Act is a case in point.
In all countries, a
similar upward trend in the cost of ship labor has been witnessed and,
for the time being, high rates have neutralized the disadvantage imposed
upon American vessels; but, if it is desired that the American ships
which are now exploiting some of the American trade routes reafirm in
these trades after the war, it will be necessary that, after rigid
inquiry, steps be taken to place the American ship on a footing of
equality with any competing ship in the same trade. Such functions
appear to have been delegated by law to the recently created Shipping
Board and, if by reason of the Board's existence, it becomes possible
for American shipping to trade on equal terms with the foreign ships
that come in ballast to these shores to seek cargoes for distant
markets, there will have been set in motion machinery that will prevent
the recurrence of that period of stagnation existing before the passage
of the Panama Canal Act, when the arrival of an American ship at any
port in South America south of the Spanish Main, was enough of an event
to draw comment from the vernacular newspapers.
Peculiarities of the
American traffic
When studying the
merchant marine problem in its particular relationship to the ownership
and operation of tonnage under the American flag, t must not be
overlooked, that there exists, in our foreign trade, a serious
deficiency from the traffic point of view, m the fact that the normal
tonnage of American exports is about twice that of imports, so that
there exists, at all times, a greater demand for tonnage to carry
exports, than is usually to be found disengaged m the ports of the
United States.
In general, it can be
predicted that, as soon as our imports of raw materials have increased
in such volume as to solve the vexed problem of return cargoes, there
will have been evolved a condition, that will not only be of great help
in the development of the American merchant marine, but of many of our
competing industries as well; for the reason that, the greater volume of
imports will be a guarantee of the steady flow hither of a large number
of ships which will be available at lower rates of freight than has been
the case in the past, when so many ships had to make the voyage to these
shores in ballast in order to load our exports.
It may be regarded as
axiomatic that, even when under such circumstances, traffic will be
found for an American merchant marine only if it is able to offer both
exporters arid importers the same service for the price at which foreign
ships are willing to undertake it. This traffic will not of necessity be
regularly to and from the United States, because on several of the trade
routes over which our exports travel, no return cargoes of any kind are
available, so that American ships will serve the commercial interests of
other nations as well as of ours. Obviously, it is impossible for any
nation to trade exclusively in its own bottoms, because. ;n such a case
there would be no return cargoes and the ships voyaging empty on one leg
of the journey could not perform the service for the same price as when
the cost of transportation is figured on the assmuption of carrying
paying cargoes both ways. Therefore, American traffic stands peculiarly
in need of the "'tramp," the very nature of whose existence is to serve
the commerce of all the world, carrying cargoes for whatever destination
is offered, in order to avoid the deadening expense of returning home in
ballast. Normally, about 40% of the carrying power of the British
merchant marine is employed constantly in service between foreign ports,
wholly outside the United Kingdom; and, in average years, only about 55%
of the entries and clearances at British ports consisted of British
tonnage.
England's example may
serve as an illustration of the great economic fact that, no nation can
transport all of its foreign commerce in its own vessels, for we must
always reckon with the unnatural desire on the part of our foreign
customers, like ourselves, to possess a merchant marine, so that, in all
cases, care will have to be taken to allow such foreign ships a
sufficient margin of traffic from our coasts; especially in view of the
fact that such of that which we export is the property of the foreign
purchaser even before it has left this country.
Vast tonnage needed
From these premises it
has been adduced that, there is every reason to put forward efforts
enabling an American merchant marine to carry from 50% to 60% of our
total foreign trade—speaking in terms of bulk, not value. It has also
been calculated in a statement submitted in May, last year, by the
National Foreign Trade Council to the Merchant MarLie Committee of the
House of Representatives, in connection with the passage of the Ship
Purchase Bill, that between six million and ten million tons of ships of
all sizes and types would be needed to discharge such functions as have
been alluded to above. This by no means implies that such an amount of
tonnage is tc be created anew. In the first place, the capacity of the
shipbuilding industry of the whole world would not be sufficient to
provide so many ships in a decade, but, it. does mean that, provided
inducements are offered Americans to operate tonnage under their own
flag, there is traffic already in sight at our very doors, for a fleet
approximating half that of England when the Great War broke out.
To sum up, this is the
situation: The traffic is here, and more traffic may spring up as a
result of more intensive exploitation of our coal mines, increased
imports of ore and nitrates, and greater expansion of our export trade
in manufactured goods. From the transportation of about one-half of this
traffic, not only can our people derive a very large revenue, which will
be a welcome addition to out national wealth, but the ability of the
nation to defend itself against foes will also be well served by the
ownership of so large a fleet. The investment that would be represented
in such a fleet amounts to probably ten times the $50,000,000
appropriated by the Shin Purchase Act.
Therefore, the duty which
lies before the Shipping Board, created by the same law, is not so much
the expenditure of that appropriation under the dangerous conditions
existing at present, but, the evolution of a policy enabling American
ships to compete on equal terms with those that have in the past carried
the preponderating share of our foreign commerce.
Somebody must pay
Either by the leasing of
the government owned vessel to private enterprise or by government
operation, the Shipping Act embarks the United States in an industry,
normally costing more to conduct in the United States than under foreign
flags. Under normal conditions of peace it can scarcely be expected that
private companies will undertake the operation of government ships,
unless the rate of lease or charter is sufficiently lower than the
market to offset higher American operating cost. Somebody must pay the
difference, and under the proposed policy 't will be the taxpayer, just
as surely and completely' as under a subsidy policy. If, then,
government aid is extended only through the leasing of government owned
vessels, the American flag m foreign trade may become a government
monopoly, except for such exporting enterprises as may desire, as a
matter of policy and protection, to own and operate vessels for the
carriage of their own goods.
It is not generally
realized that the authorization for a $50,000,000 bond issue to give
effect to the Shipping Act is the most unrestricted appropriation ever
made by Congress, for no regulations are laid down. A Public Building
bill always specifies the location and limit of cost of post offices and
customs houses. A River and Harbor bill does the same for engineering
works. But, the Shipping Board is empowered to build, buy or lease
vessels, and to lease or sell them, and with the funds thus derived, it
may build, buy and lease more, and again lease or sell them. The way is
open for the government to assist private enterprise by chartering
vessels to individuals or companies at less than the market rates, but,
a distrinct danger lurks in the possibility of political influence being
exerted to determine the recipients of such aid. The Shipping Board will
require a maximum of independence and vision to resist such influence,
for it is unlikely that the public will ever consent to sufficient
appropriations for the government construction or purchase of the six
million to ten million tons, necessary to render American commerce
reasonably independent of foreign transportation.
The government control of
European shipping during the war has led to some projects for a similar
control during the reconstruction period, and permanently thereafter;
this has created a rather academic apprehension that European merchant
fleets may not, with the return of peace, be again so thoroughly at the
service of American commerce as before the war, but, that by some
co-operative policy, the various belligerents will use their shipping
only for the encouragement of their own commerce. This overlooks two
important facts—First, that transportation from, aud exportation to, the
United States, will be the most important element of European commerce;
and, second, that when ships, now impressed in government service and
immobilized, are released, there will probably be more ships than
freight, and unrestricted competition will serve the rational interest
of all countries, better than European government control.
The first duty of the
Shipping Board, obviously, is to acquaint the American people with the
fundamentals of ocean transportation, especially as relates to American
foreign commerce. And its second duty is, to make recommendations to
Congress which will permit the development, by private enterprise, of a
merchant fleet sufficient to give the United States what, for many
years, economic and legislative construction have denied it—A share in
the ocean carrying trade of the world.
A policy consisting of a
few government steamship lines will not be a solution of the problem, in
which probably, above all others, the American people are interested.
The United States
Shipping Board will be accompanied in its labors by the earnest wishes
of the American business public, that its labors may result in a broad
and constructive policy. To this end it is the duty of every American
citizen engaged in foreign trade, to give his cordial co-operation and
best information to the Board.
Commercial and industrial
organizations should be encouraged to study this question in his
broadest aspects as an industrial proposition.
The Merchant Marine
Committee of the National Foreign Trade Council is conducting a
continuing work of investigation: the results of which, from time to
time, are made public. Pending the organization of the Shipping Board,
and an indication of its interpretation of the Shipping Act and the
policy it proposes to pursue, the Committee at this time deems it
inadvisable to make further recommendation than that all business
interests co-(operate to the best of their ability with the Shipping
Board, and that the Board itself lay the foundation for a policy which
will encourage the private endeavor which alone can produce and
permanently maintain, a fleet adequate for the carriage of a greater
share of our own and the world's commerce.
Committee of the Merchant
Marine, National Foreign Trade Council.
Robert Dollar, Jamfs A.. Farrell, P. A. S. Franklin.
This ends the Report of
the Committee, but I have a few-remarks to make that I think might be of
interest. As to the personality of the Board, I would say this: I know
them. They are all men of the highest reputation and the highest
character; but, when I want to get a suit of clothes, I don't go to a
shoemaker. There is a lawyer on the Board, there is a lumberman and
there is a railroad man, and there is one shipping man and one vacancy.
The Seamen's Union has done its utmost to prevent the ratification by
the Senate of the shipowners' appointee, for the reason, they say, that
he would know too much about shipping; and they don't want him. The
difference between our Shipping Board, and the Shipping Board in London
that controls more than half the steam tonnage of the world, is this:
there, they appoint men who are actively engaged in shipping; while our
men had to quit the business they were in before they could qualify- for
a position on the Shipping Board. They recently appointed a man there,
who is one of the largest shipowners in Glasgow; and he and another
shipowner are practically running the entire shipping business of
England.
Mr. Chairman, whenever I
have talked long enough, you tell me to sit down. I should like to speak
of the conditions previous to the war. after the war is finished, and
present conditions. As I said, anybody can run a ship to-day and make
lots of money out of it, but I am going to take you ahead to the time
when we are going to get down to the keenest competition the world has
ever seen.
1 want to say to you
that, in foreign shipping, we are in competition with the whole world,
and we meet the keenest and sharpest men in the whole world in our
competition. It is certainly a man's job.
Just to show you the
handicaps American ships have. In talking at New Orleans, I didn't speak
of this and some of the members-—especially those from the Middle West—
said they would like to have known about the handicaps. I have not time
to go into them at any length, because there is a whole, string of them
put in by the Government.
Take the extra
measurement of a ship—The Americans measure the capacity of a ship
larger than does any other nation. Therefore, when our shipping goes to
a foreign country, it pays from 20% to 30% more tolls to the foreign
government than any other ship. That amounts, in a ship of 8,000 tons,
dead weight, to about $5,500 a year.
The extra cost of
inspection—We have to lay up our vessels to have them nspected. In
foreign countries, they say this: "We want to inspect your vessel, are
you ready? What have you ready?" We tell them what we have ready, and
they give us a Certificate of Inspection for a certain part; we pass on
to the next port to have the inspection completed. This is done so that
there will be no delay. But, with our Government, they say: "Stop and
wait until we can inspect your ship." I had a ship in Honolulu at one
time on which the inspection certificate had expired. The ship was held
up. There was no Inspector in Honolulu, the one nearest being at San
Francisco. After telegraphing to Washington and waiting for some time,
we finally obtained the consent of the authorities to have them send the
Inspector to Honolulu. In the meantime our ship and crew were waiting
for the Inspector at a cost of about $3,000 a year.
Then. the difference of
wages—I took three ships, I have the records in my books; one was an
American ship, one a British ship and the other a Japanese ship. The
Japanese ship we chartered, but the other two I owned. The wages on the
American ship were $39,240 a year; the wages on the British ship were
$15,696 a year; and the wages on the Japanese ship were $9,324 a year.
So there is a difference in the wages; and, when we get right down to a
keen competition, there is the kind of competition that we are going to
meet along with the other handicaps we have.
Mr. Furuseth, in planning
the Seamen's Bill, said his plan was to get every sailor that came to an
American port to desert from his foreign ship, and then hire him over
again, at the American wages. In theory that was fine, but in practice
it wasn't worth a cent. He forgot that if a sailor deserts a Japanese
ship in a foreign port, when he returns home he is put into jail for a
year. Now, Mr. Furuseth made the proviso in the Bill, that the sailors
of each nationality should ship on vessels of their own nation, or they
would he taken up by our immigration authorities and deported; but,
those who would ship on a Japanese vessel and go back to Japan, would go
straight into the calaboose on arrival.
Now, what I have to say,
is this—The shipowners do not want any subsidy. Because, a subsidy, as
you know, to Congress, is like showing a red rag to a bull; but, if
other nations are paying their sailors $20.00 a month and the American
wage is $50.00 a month, then let the Government pay the sailors the
$30.0(1 a month difference-—to every American who ships. That will not
be a subsidy—that will only be a little help to the poor men.
For the benefit of you
men not in the shipping business, I will say this: when you hire a man.
the bargain is just between you and him; you hire him and he works for
you. Not so in shipping. When we hire a crew for a ship, we have to take
the men before a United States Shipping Commissioner, who explains to
the men the agreement, and each man signs the shipping articles. Then,
when it comes to pay him off. we are not permitted to pay him. We take
the money and give it to the Shipping Commissioner, and the Shipping
Commissioner pays him. You see, gentlemen, that the Government comes in
between to keep the wicked shipowner from "doing up" the poor man.
A question that you
gentlemen no doubt have often asked yourselves is: What difference does
it make to us whether we ship our goods in a foreign or an American
ship, provided the rate of freight is the same? It shouldn't make any
difference; but, I will tell you where the difference comes in. Take a
shipowner running a ship from an American port; he is the best drummer
of trade you can get, because, as I have explained to you, he will go to
any extreme to get a cargo that will bring his ship back to his own
port, and to try and help the commerce of his port. But, if I were
living in London or Liverpool, do you think I would be pulling for this
United States? Not at all! It is only because I live in this country
that I am a drummer for the trade of this country, and try to keep my
ships going. As an illustration. I cited a case where .we sent a ship
clear around the world to get back to our own country. That is the great
advantage of having our own ships.
Another thing—if a ship s
to come back in ballast, you gentlemen are going to pay just about
double the amount for the freight going outwards. A return cargo would
cut your freight pretty nearly in two.
Now, the Emergency Act
was about the only thing that was passed by Congress that amounted to
anything at all in the way of helping American shipping, and that was
drafted by a committee of this organization. But, the ink had hardly
gotten dry on the President's signature, when down came the La Follette
Bill, which practically crushed us out of existence. I have not time to
go into the La Follette Bill; it would take half an hour to tell you
about 1% and you would be tickled to death with the explanation, if I
only had time to give it. That was by way of helping the American
Merchant Marine—Over the left.
I will read the figures
from the Report of the Department of Commerce, of last May—just try and
keep them in your mind.
Before the war began the
American tonnage of the Pacific Coast was 26.10% of the whole tonnage.
In May 1916, after the beneficial La Follette Bill had gotten in its
deadly work, it was 1.97%. Shall I read those over? Before the war,
26.10%, and after, 1.97%; after—you know what.
The Briiish tonnage
before the war was 29.38%, and now, in May, it: was 37.09%.
The German tonnage was
18.47%, and of course that was wiped out.
Then Japan- -I want you
to take particular notice of this, gentlemen, and take it home with you,
if you will just make a note of it. Japan, before the war, did 26.05% of
the Pacific trade, and in May last, 50.90%, That is the effect of the
Seamen's bill. You will notice that the Americans went down to 1.90%,
and the Japanese ran up to 50.90%; and, if I had the statistics up to
the first of January, it would show an increase for the Japanese up to
over 60%. It would not show any decrease for the Americans, because we
were right down to nothing.
Then the Dutch came in.
Before the war they didn't do a thing; but, after the war, they are
doing 10% of the business.
These figures are very
significant, taken in connection with the legislation that is now going
on.
I want to say to you
gentlemen, that I am not making a political speech. The Republicans did
their worst to hurt the American Merchant Marine, and the Democrats were
only successful because they were better at figuring—and, they were able
to do us up worse than the others. You see, there is no politics in this
at all.
I will give you just one
more illustration. The old Pacific Mail Company paid no dividends for
thirteen years. How would you like it? Thirteen years between drinks.
Think of it! Then the Seamen's Act came down on it, and if it had stayed
in business, it would have had to pay out $600,000 more a year.
The new Pacific Mail
Steamship Company had an experience which illustrates more clearly the
operation of the Seamen's Act. The company employed on a ship an
American crew. The act compels the captain to pay the men half the wages
they have earned at every port. The first port being Honolulu, the men
got their money and forgot to come back to the ship, thereby delaying
the sailing a day. At Yokohama, the same thing was repeated, and the
ship had to sad without a full crew and had to pay some of their fares
on the railroad to take them to Kobe. A reception was being held on the
ship to Japanese merchants, when a free-for-all fight occurred from the
effects of whiskey. This so exasperated the company that it hired a
Chinese crew and paid the passage of the Americans back home. So much
for the people making laws, when they have no idea of what the results
will be. The British laws are most favorable to shipping, and as a
result you will find British ships in every large port of the world,
whereas the American ship is only-conspicuous by its absence.
The Japanese. I will just
say. are advancing their trade to South America, it having increased
during the past year about 50%.
There is just one thing
more, and that is this: With the abnorrmally high freight rates now
being paid, where shipowners are making money as never before, the
Americans are out of it and the other nations are in it. Japan has
increased her wealth so much,—her balance of trade had about
balanced—that every steamer leaving San Francisco has practically, from
a million to two millions of gold, the balance of trade now being very
much in her favor. Gentlemen. I thank you. |
