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I HAD concerted a plan with
Moreau whereby our armies should join at Parma or Piacenza; he was to
follow in person Victor's division, which would debouch near Fortenuovo.
My entire army advanced
towards Modena, each column having orders to be in position by the 22 or
23 Prairial (10 and 11 June, 1799). Montrichard's and Rusca's division.,
escorting the artillery, were to follow the high road to Bologna. I
followed Ollivier's division by Pistoia and Formigine. Orders had been
previously given for a simultaneous attack upon the enemy stationed at
Modena, with a view to cutting off their retreat. This attack was to
take place on the 24th. On the previous evening they attacked our
advanced posts at Formigine, and were beaten back.
The troops were full of
ardour, and on the morning of the 24th, at a meeting of all the
Generals, an action was decided upon. I had no news of Montrichard's and
Rusca's divisions, and it was difficult to communicate with them. Their
cannon ought to have foretold their approach; I heard it in the
direction of Fort Urbino. Then I ordered a charge; a furious combat
began; my left wing even gave way a little; I sent reinforcements, and
then ordered a simultaneous charge of cavalry and infantry. The enemy
were routed and dispersed; several regiments laid down their arms. We
entered Moderia pell-mell with them, encumbered with baggage.
The results of this
affair nearly cost me my life. My troops, unable to resist the
attractions of the baggage, threw themselves upon it, and began to
pillage. I knew by experience that if we halted in our pursuit we should
restore courage to the terrified enemy, and make them turn again. Some
few shots were to be heard at the other side of the town, almost at the
gate; by dint of prayers more than by threats I succeeded in getting
together a handful of troops to follow me, and drove off the Austrian
sharp-shooters. I was on the road to Bologna; no trace of the divisions
coming from that direction. What could have become of them? I sent out a
reconnaissance of fifty men, followed by another troop of the same
number, to support them if necessary. just as the latter were starting
off at a trot, I heard a cry:
''The enemy's cavalry'
I looked round, and to
the right perceived a thick cloud of dust on a cross-road, with deep
ditches on either side, leading into the Bologna road. This body was cut
off, and was being pursued by some of our cavalry. I sent the
Adjutant-General, Pamphile Lacroix, to summon them to yield, promising
them that they should not be harmed. At the same moment a body of my
grenadiers issued from Modena; I had only to cry, 'Halt! Front!' in
order to bar the road. My 'guides' (guards attached to the
Commander-in-chief) deployed at right angles with this battalion, but
unfortunately without observing that a broad ditch separated them from
the road, along which the enemy's cavalry were advancing; the guides
thought they could attack it in flank. When my battalion was drawn up, I
ordered them to present arms, but not tire without my orders, and
mechanically passed in front of it, studying the map.
I had advanced a few
yards, when I suddenly saw Lacroix throw himself backwards, and fall
from his horse. The enemy's detachment was advancing at a rapid trot,
whether animated by the courage of despair, pursued from behind, barred
in front, with large ditches on either flank, or whether they had not
noticed this latter obstacle, I know not. They continued to advance, and
were only at a short distance from me, when I wished to turn my horse,
and get behind my battalion, so as not to be in their line of fire, and
to draw my sword; but a double incident occurred. I was accustomed to
carry a stick with a spike at the end, a leather thong passed round my
wrist, and the spike resting on my foot; but the case for the spike had
been lost, so that, not to wound my foot, I had thrust the end of the
cane into my stirrup; thus encumbered, the thong entangled round my
right arm, and the left occupied in holding my horse, I could neither
reach nor draw my sword, and, in spite of my orders, a shot was fired
from the left of the battalion; that sufficed to produce a discharge,
though the bayonet would have been enough to do the work.
There I was, therefore,
midway between my own troop, which was firing, and the advancing hostile
cavalry. My horse was struck, and the shock of the charge threw it with
me on its back, and at the same moment I received two sabre-cuts—one on
the head, and the other across the right thumb. I was thrown senseless
to the ground, and there trodden under foot. I heard afterwards that not
one of the cavalry had escaped; they had all been either killed or made
prisoners; and such must have been the case, for my guides, having
advanced and discovered the obstacle presented by the ditch, had
immediately turned and drawn up behind the grenadiers, who were then
fighting with the bayonet, and, inspired by the sight of my danger, were
giving no quarter. The most surprising-nay, almost miraculous—part of
the circumstance is that, although I was the fifth or sixth to pass
along the line of fire, only one captain of engineers attached to my
staff was killed. Not one of the others was touched, not even by the
enemy who collected round me, perhaps as a means of safety, perhaps
because I was recognised, as I was wearing the full uniform of a
Commander-in-chief.
The attentions that were
lavished upon me restored me to consciousness. On opening my eyes I
found myself in a house, surrounded by Generals, among them being
Montrichard. I believe this was some three hours after the action. I was
suffering horribly, not so much from my wounds, as I had lost a quantity
of blood, and was, in fact, covered with it, as from the trampling of
the horses, the combat having raged over me.
'This is your doing,' I
said to General Montrichard. Had your troops taken part in the action,
this mischance would not have befallen me; and not an enemy could have
escaped had my combinations been carried out.'
His excuse was that, on
reaching Fort Urbino, the regiment at the head of his column had no
cartridges; that the train of artillery, at the end of both divisions,
was still at Bologna, and that they had waited for it to come up.
'What!' I exclaimed,
'regiments campaigning without cartridges? Why did you not discover it
sooner? Were they all without them?'
'No; only the leading
company.'
'Why did you not throw it
aside and let the others take the lead? A little more, and we should
have been driven back,' I added; 'and it would have been your fault
entirely, as you could and should have made an important diversion.'
He dropped his eyes and
made no reply. I should have done well to withdraw his command from him
then and there. We should have been saved many disasters caused by him;
but he belonged to the Army of Italy, and was only for the time being
under my orders. Moreau was vexed afterwards that I did not take this
prudent step.
They informed me that the
enemy were being followed, and prisoners brought in every moment. I gave
orders regarding our position, and was transported to my headquarters at
Modena. I was suffering greatly from the bruises caused by the trampling
of the horses. The Generals-of-Division had followed me; I felt that I
was not in a condition to continue in command and to lead the army; I
offered the succession to the senior among them, who declined, and then
to the others in turn. The position beyond doubt was difficult. It was
pointed out to me that the main body of the enemy was still distant ;
that, according to the plan for the junction of the Armies of Italy and
Naples, which ought to take place in a few days, and according to the
marches calculated both to Parma and Piacenza, they would naturally have
a chief in Moreau that I could be just as easily transported to Genoa by
Bobbio as by the route we were now following, and even by the valley of
the Po, as our success would be assured after this junction. These
arguments decided me, and orders were given to continue the movement. We
pushed on, therefore, towards the places of rendezvous, manoeuvring on
the right towards the Po, and spreading a rumour that we were going to
raise the siege of Mantua, and that we were gathering forces for that
purpose; this was done in order to attract the enemy to the left bank.
Embarrassed by the
prisoners, among whom were some of superior and many of inferior rank, I
caused them to be conducted to our outposts at Ferrara, after exacting
from them a promise not to serve until an agreement could be arrived at
for an exchange of prisoners; the baggage, in order to relieve us, was
sent to Fort Urbino. I even gave the officers some pecuniary assistance,
although they were at no great distance from their own troops; but far
from observing the engagement promised, the Austrians had the bad faith
to keep as prisoners the detachment of cavalry sent to escort their
officers to a place of safety.
They followed me, having obtained some reinforcements for their broken
ranks, but without causing me much trouble. I felt sure that, sooner or
later, they would fall into our hands after our junction was effected,
which would certainly give us a decisive victory.
General Victor had
debouched near Castelnuovo, making for Parma or Piacenza, and driving
before him an Austrian division which had taken up a position on the
Tidone. It was between these two towns, if I remember rightly, that this
General sent me a letter from Moreau, stating that he was still in doubt
as to the direction of the rest of his army —whether it should follow
Victor, or whether it should debouch near l3obbio, or near La
T3occhetta. The day even of his departure for either place was
uncertain; but he said it would probably take place on the 20 or 21
Prairial, and it was now the 26th, so that allowing for twenty four
hours' delay, according to our calculations, and for the possible local
difficulties of the march—for he had no enemies in either of the former
directions—our junction ought to take place at latest on the 27th or
28th either at Parma or Piacenza.
The only obstacles were
on my side; but I had declared positively, perhaps somewhat rashly, that
I would surmount them, and I had succeeded, inasmuch as I had defeated
the hostile body that awaited me at the outlet of the Apennines without
the hell) of the two divisions that were coming Lip from Bologna. While
waiting for the arrival of the Army of Italy, I rapidly continued my
march towards the Trebbia and Tidone, and gave orders that our position
should be occupied there without engaging in hostilities, as I had two
divisions behind, manoeuvring on the Po, which 1 had called UI) in order
to bring them into line.
The enemy had sent a
detachment into the citadel of Piacenza. We had to guard the entrance,
and leave on our side of the town a rear-guard to stop the remains of
the combatants at Modena from following us.
My sufferings were
severely increased by the movement of the carriage in which I was laid.
I anxiously expected Moreau, and could get no news of him. I hastened
the advance of the two detached divisions, ordering them to come into
line with all speed on the Tidone. It was on the 29th that the others
took up their position. Victor's regiment, already in position, had
exchanged a few volleys; unfortunately, he had remained in person at
Piacenza, where I was myself, but without informing me of the
circumstance. He had charged his Brigadier-General, Charpentier, with
the care of settling his position. Dombrowski's and Rusca's regiments
arrived soon afterwards. All had orders not to light; Rusca,
notwithstanding the remonstrances of General Charpentier, insisted upon
trying to force the passage of the Tidone; he partly succeeded, but was
soon repulsed, in spite of the support of the two other divisions, who
were compelled to take part in this unfortunate skirmish. All three were
thrown into disorder.
As I was unable to mount
a horse, I had given the command of the four divisions drawn up in line
to General Victor, with orders to take up his position on the Tidone and
drive the enemy to the other side; but this General had remained at
Piacenza, unknown to me. Thence forward all was confusion, and the
disorder that followed the engagement may in great part be attributed to
this cause. I could hear the firing at Piacenza, but without being able
to foresee or to fear the consequence, as the great allied army could
not yet be entirely united, and ought to be harassed on its right flank
and rear if Moreau had attacked those points. This was what he most
likely had done, as lie did not appear on our left, and I had no news
either of his march or his direction; the junction was always intended
to be the chief object of our movements, especially of mine, with a view
to attracting the enemy to me, and distracting their attention when in
Piedmont. This junction was made—at least, virtually—when I arrived in
Tuscany; and had it not been for the difficulty attending the transport
of baggage by sea, the troops might have marched together along the
Cornice road to Genoa, as has since been done. But the operations in the
valley of the Po would have been far more important if the movements of
the two armies had been simultaneous, according to the original
agreement; and I am still convinced, although it is twenty-five years
since the events, that our success must have been infallible had it not
been for Morean's hesitation.
By an inversion of the
marching order, the reason for which I have now forgotten, General SaIm,
who commanded the advance-guard, found himself behind the other
divisions that were occupying positions on the Tidone, and which, when
routed, fell back upon him and disordered his lines. He had the presence
of mind to throw his men to the right of the road, and drew up there in
order of battle; the enemy, pursuing eagerly, thus found themselves
exposed to a flank fire, which compelled them to retreat. On receiving a
report of these events, I ordered them to take UI) a position between
the 'I'idone and the Trebbia; but it was urged against that proposal
that there was no place suitable, and that it would be better to recross
the Trebbia, as a large number of fugitives had already done. I
consented, although this could only be a rallying position ; the torrent
was wide and fordable everywhere. SaIm, however, received orders to
remain where he was, to cover the army, form his advance guard, and send
out scouts. Montrichard and Ollivier, still behind, were desired to
hasten their advance, and to come and put themselves into line and
Support us. It was clear that the enemy, too, had made forced marches,
and mustered on the l'idone. But where was the Army of Italy? In what
direction? I could not tell.
Until the junction was
effected, prudence commanded me not to risk a battle with such unequal
forces. I had no choice but to retire ; but if I went away, and the Army
of Italy debouched from the mountains in the expectation of finding that
of Naples, it would in its turn be isolated and exposed to certain loss.
What excuse could I give if I did not venture it? Of course, the cry of
'treason' would have been raised. But that would not have been all. It
was, indeed, stated in the Army of Italy that I had given battle before
the junction from motives of personal ambition. It will be seen from
these writings how devoid of foundation was this idea, and, besides, my
own condition would have sufficed to prevent that. I passed a wretched
night, tormented by the fear of being attacked next morning before all
our forces had come up, and also lest we should not he able to repair
the disorder that had been caused that evening.
Day broke at last. Acting
upon the reports received from the reconnoitring parties, I had myself
carried to Borgo Sant'-Antonio, near the Trebbia, and thence along my
line, which I found drawn up in good order. General SaIm and the other
Generals came to make their reports and observations. I made a few
alterations, such, for instance, as changing the position to he occupied
by the advance-guard if it were compelled to retreat; the two divisions
behind, which I summoned back by means of a forced march, were to remain
in reserve.
All appeared tranquil,
and our troops seemed prepared to give the enemy a good reception. I
intended to be beforehand with the enemy as soon as my two other
divisions arrived, and unless they previously made an attack. General
Salm, trusting in his troops and his position, which I wished to
preserve as far as possible, had strict injunctions not to engage alone;
immediately the first serious demonstrations were made, he was to fall
back and take his place in the line. So much did he trust in the
apparent tranquillity of the enemy, that he asked my leave to go and
spend a few hours in Piacenza; I was less confident, refused permission,
and did rightly, for shortly afterwards, through my telescope, I
perceived at some distance a mounted troop on the look-out. SaIm
declared that it was a mounted reconnaissance that he had sent out; I
answered that it was facing us, and that if the detachment belonged to
us it would naturally turn its back to us; but he would not be
convinced. I even sent out to reconnoitre, although I was almost certain
of what 1 had seen.
'Make haste!' I said
shortly afterwards to him. 'Gallop to your position; that reconnaissance
is advancing, and another troop is coming up behind it. You are going to
be attacked; be ready to fall back.'
He went.
Firing soon began, and as
from the wooded nature of the ground it appeared that the whole force
opposed to us had not appeared, Saim sent to ask me for a company of
grenadiers, declaring that with their help he could maintain his
position. I took a different view of the matter, and in sending him the
battalion askcd for, which was to draw up in echelon and support him, I
also sent him repeated orders to retire. This, unfortunately, he only
did at the last extremity, which very nearly caused us serious loss. At
the first gunshot my men were under arms. Our vanguard at length retired
; the firing increased. I saw five large columns and a large body of
cavalry approaching hehini our troops Wounded and fugitives came in in
crowds. Salm, hard pressed, continued to retire, fighting as he came;
being wounded, he made over the command to General Sari'asin, who,
wounded in his turn, gave it to the brave Colonel Lahure, who soon
shared the same fate, The men, finding themselves without a leader, and
not knowing what position in the line they were to take up, recrossed
the Trebbia in disorder at another point, and covered the artillery and
musketry that should have Protected them. If the enemy, whose advance
was continuing, had made an effort at this moment, I know not what would
have become of us.
At length my lines got
clear, and my batteries opened fire. The Austro-Russians made a vigorous
onslaught on my line, and renewed it several times without causing us to
move; their strength was great, and their cries and howls would have
sufficed to terrify any troops except French ones. At length they drew
off; the artillery fire gradually slackened on either side, and ceased
entirely about ten or eleven at night.
We had already a large
number of wounded. The close proximity of the armies required the utmost
watchfulness; we passed the night under arms. The two rear divisions
arrived; they required rest. They stopped for the time in the second
line, while the first reformed and prepared to take the offensive, if
opportunity offered, instead of continuing on the defensive.
Daybreak found the two
armies facing each other on either bank of the Trebbia. A cannonade
began, but without much effect ; it sensibly diminished after a few
hours, and finally ceased altogether on both sides. We piled arms, as
though a truce had been agreed upon. During the night I had decided upon
taking the offensive, regardless of the superior strength of the enemy.
My troops were excellent, and the French character lends itself better
to attack than to defence. My plans were laid and orders given for nine
o'clock in the morning, so that only one signal would have been
necessary; but it did not take place until noon, for, notwithstanding
repeated orders, it was impossible to get the Montrichard division out
of its bivouacs. It did come up at last, but without its General, who
remained behind.
At the first movement to
arms, the enemy formed a line of battle, and the firing began. My
columns boldly crossed the Trebbia and scattered the first line.
Unluckily, the Montrichard division, having no leader, sent out a party
of sharpshooters, flanked by some cavalry. The enemy's horse, weak at
that particular point, made a sally to drive back this body, which was
causing it inconvenience; the latter, terror- stricken, fell back upon
the division and paralyzed its fire. Montrichard's cavalry, although
superior, fell back, and returned in disorder, followed by the enemy,
and the whole division was thrown into confusion. I deployed my reserve
of infantry to protect them, but the cavalry reserve, having failed to
take up the positions indicated for them, so that they might support our
weak points, lost time in coming up; the enemy took advantage of this to
rally and make a charge. The gap made by the retreat of Montrichard's
division, which I stopped and formed up at the edge of the river, left
Ollivier's division exposed to a flank attack. It was compelled in its
turn to retreat, as was also General Vatrin on the extreme right, but
the movement was effected in good order, and it recovered its position.
The same movement was executed upon the left, commanded by General
Victor, who had surprised the Russians and thrown them into great
disorder.
Meanwhile our cavalry
reserves had come up and joined the fray. The confusion into which the
enemy had been thrown gave us time to rally and to form up again into a
line of defence. The enemy soon renewed the attacks of the previous
evening, but found only an immovable wall of steel. Their loss of men
was enormous, but unavailing; and at length, wearied and worn out, they
ceased their attack and retired to their positions. Night fell, but the
cannonade continued on both sides, lest either should forget the
presence of the other; but at length it ceased. I received disastrous
accounts of our losses. Nearly all our Generals and superior officers
were more or less seriously wounded; our loss of men, in killed and
wounded, was enormous for so weak an army. Not the least serious part of
it was that nearly all our ammunition was exhausted. These events
occurred on the 29 and 30 Prairial, and 1 Messidor (June 17, 18, 19,
1799). |
