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While in the thick of these
preparations, I heard at one and the same time of the declaration of
war, of the loss of a battle, of the retreat of the Army of Italy, and
received orders to advance immediately, leaving garrisons in such forts
and fortresses as I proposed to retain in the two States, and especially
taking steps to keep possession of Rome. My foresight had been of the
utmost service. I only needed to recall the divisions concentrated in
the provinces of Lecce and Bari and the flying columns. I hastily
summoned the members of the Neapolitan Government, who were
terror-stricken on hearing of what had happened on the Adige and of my
marching orders. I begged them to remain at their posts under the
protection of the forts and of the national guard. Not one of them, not
one even of my own men, had divined the secret of my preparations. I am
not now sure if I even confided them to Abrial, the Government
commissioner.
The troops returned by
forced marches to camp. Scarcely had those who held Brindisi left it,
when the French man-of-war, the Généreux, which had escaped from the
fatal battle of Aboukir Bay (1798), came to cast anchor there, feeling
convinced that it was yet in our hands. She tried to force an entrance,
and was fired upon by such guns as had not been rendered useless. The
firing was heard by our retiring troops ; they turned back immediately
and saved the ship, which set sail again at once, and the troops reached
their destination, followed, however, by large crowds of insurgents, who
compelled them to face about several times. The latter collected at
Avellino, but their proximity was so dangerous for Naples, and kept the
camp so constantly on the alert, that I determined to attack them. I did
so. They made no resistance, and were speedily put to flight. This is
the site of the ancient Caudine Forks, where a Roman host laid down
their arms and passed under the yoke.
Meanwhile we were
hurrying on the victualling of the castles of Naples, and the fortresses
of Capua and Gaëta, of the Castle of Sant'-Angelo at Rome, of
Civita-Castellana, and of Civita-Vecchia and Ancona. A certain amount of
baggage and artillery, and a pontoon train and other encumbrances, were
forwarded to Rome.
I received dismal
intelligence of the .results of the battle of the Adige, and of the
retreat of the Army of Italy, of risings in the Cisalpine Republic, in
Tuscany, in the Roman States, and in the Abruzzi provinces. Every
despatch, while informing me of these occurrences, exhorted me to hasten
my movements. I was, of course, most anxious to do this, but I could not
make greater speed. I had already sent forward some troops into Tuscany,
echeloning them from Rome to Florence. A number of empty ammunition-waggons
under convoy had started through the Marches for Italy; they were
compelled to retire upon Rome. Many of my orders were rendered nugatory,
or were misunderstood by other Generals, especially by the one in
command in the Roman States. No one considered or thought of anything
but his own immediate business, without any regard for unity of plan.
Instructions had been
issued to the commandants of all the strongholds and castles, which
prescribed for them carefully their conduct in every extremity. I told
them that they could only he invested, and not attacked, as there were
no regular troops to fear, and the Neapolitan artillery had been
assembled at Capua. I further told them to collect all the provisions
they could about them, and, as far as lay in their power, to be careful
how they were used. I added that I would soon come to their relief,
imagining that France was about to make great efforts to help the Army
of Italy, and that by our junction we ought to be soon able to regain
our preponderance and repulse the enemy.
With this object, in the
event of our being victorious, or of my being prevented from passing
into Tuscany, I had taken endless pains to form a pontoon train,
wherewith I could cross the Garigliano and Volturno, after defending the
ground inch by inch. My one fear was that I might be unable to effect my
junction with the Army of Italy. This army had been repulsed in
Piedmont, and the risings, fomented by the enemy, were increasing.
General Gauthier, commanding in Tuscany, had but few troops, and the
detachments that I had been able to send up were but very feeble
reinforcements. My instructions to him were to fall back upon me in case
he found it necessary to evacuate the territory.
Having thus provided for
the garrisons charged with the double task of ensuring the safety of our
numerous sick and wounded, and of providing me with places of retreat in
case I were beaten back, I crossed the Volturno, and marched in two
columns on Rome, having with me only twenty-four battalions and
squadrons. The right column met with severe resistance at Lisola, but
succeeded in forcing its way; the left rounded the Pontine Marshes,
which I myself crossed, and we reached Rome, whence troops were
continually starting for Florence. There I learned that the Army of
Italy hoped to make a stand UOfl the Ticino, which encouraged me; I
learned at the same time that a strong detachment which was evacuating
the Abruzzi by way of Sulmona had had much difficulty in forcing its way
past Rocca d'Anzo. I think it had lost three hundred men, together with
artillery, baggage, and provisions; the bridges had been destroyed, and
the roads encumbered with obstacles of all kinds that had only been
surmounted with difficulty.
I was in a state of
terrible anxiety and worry, owing to the position in which I had left so
many French people in the State of Naples, so many persons devoted to
our cause, who would be exposed to the vengeance of the Court, now in
exile in Sicily, if our efforts were to fail. In Rome difficulties of
organization occupied me several days, though they did not retard the
march of my troops. The risings in Naples had extended over the entire
Roman States, as over Tuscany, and, in fact, the whole of Italy was
disaffected. Despite my letters and apparent confidence, I had good
reason to fear that we should he stopped on the road by this state of
things ; for our communications, already interrupted on the right bank
of the river Po, were interrupted also between Florence and Genoa. I at
length quitted Rome, after encouraging the French authorities, as well
as those of the Republic, to show a bold face in these times of
difficulty. I left a garrison, a small one I admit, together with a few
Roman troops, upon whom I did not count, especially if they once met
with a reverse. I left there the pontoon train, baggage, and various
things which only encumbered my march. A party had preceded us Without
an escort, among whom were the family of Méchin. They had all been
seized on the road by the insurgents.
General Monnier, who
commanded the district of Ancona, the only man who did his duty, had
sent to me for instructions. I merely answered:
'You know what honour
requires and what the law demands; I leave it to you.'
On the supposition that
all my efforts were going to fail, and that I was going to be completely
stopped on my march, I intended to occupy a strong position, and to keep
the enemy in check as long as I could, for I felt sure that they would
never dare to venture into the Roman and Neapolitan Republics as long as
the Army of Italy was not obliged to recross the Alps. In the contrary
event, I determined to dispute every foot of ground, falling back
gradually upon Rome and the Neapolitan forts, to defend myself to the
last gasp, convinced that France would spare no efforts to reinforce the
Army of Italy, and attempt fresh diversions in order to set us free.
General Moreau, on his
side, tried to check the enemy, but mere pluck could do nothing against
forces superior in number and flushed with victory. His communications
being hampered, he ought, in my opinion, to have managed to stretch out
a hand towards me while falling back upon Genoa. This junction could
alone have enabled us, if not to resume the offensive, at any rate to
await assistance from France; but he preferred to maintain his
communications through Piedmont, which was already disturbed, instead of
by the Cornice road. This last plan could have served the double purpose
of covering that road and of preventing any obstacles being placed in
the way of our junction in Tuscany. Instead of executing a manoeuvre at
once so simple, so natural, and so useful to our cause, finding himself
compelled to abandon the Ticino, he threw himself into Piedmont in
order, as it was said, to attract thither the Austro-Russians, and to
return by a forced march from Ceva to Genoa, I believe. The latter place
capitulated to a band of insurgents, so that, deprived of this outlet,
he was obliged to abandon part of his equipment, and to make his way
over the mountains.
I had left Rome in the
hope that the Ticino would be held long enough for me to effect a
junction, and on reaching Florence, or on my way thither, I learnt the
position into which the Army of Italy had been thrown. My plan had been
bold, hazardous perhaps; but it was of the kind that often succeeds in
war. I had never shown all my hand. Communication between Florence and
Genoa had been cut off, and it was not safe to trust to the sea; no ship
was ready at the port of Lerici, in the Gulf of Spezzia. I knew also
that Mantua was, in all probability, invested ; it was a very strong
position, well garrisoned, I had reason to believe, well provisioned,
and commanded by General Latour-Foissac, father of the present
Major-General of that name.
I made for Pistoia, and
my first proceeding was to take up a position on the Apennines and guard
all the passes. I made an attack on the enemy at Sarzana and Pontremoli.
Both places were carried, and communication with Genoa re-established.
General Dessole, chief of the staff of the Army of Italy, separated, I
forget how, from General Moreau, gave me all the sad details just
related. Montrichard and Victor had posted their divisions, one at
Bologna, and the other not far from Genoa. I had matured my undeveloped
scheme, which was to bring about a junction between the two, if they
were placed under my orders, and to precipitate myself from the summit
of the Apennines against the enemy's left wing, which was posted in the
valley of the Po at the foot of the passes, and the principal body of
which was covering Modena.
I communicated this plan
to General Dessole, and he approved it, at the same tune, however,
advising me to suspend its execution until the arrival of General Moreau
at Genoa, an event which was shortly to take place. The operation, if
successfully carried out, would paralyze the left wing of the enemy, if
it did not utterly destroy it, and would separate it from the main army
by cutting off its communications with it, and driving it across the Po.
Proceeding up the right bank of the river, threatening to proceed to
raise the siege of Mantua, I hoped by that means to disengage the Army
of Italy by forcing the enemy to retreat along the left bank, after
which I should have effected my junction with Moreau at Parma or
Piacenza.
Meanwhile, I had made
preparations to suppress a rising in Arezzo, but postponed it, as I
required all my forces.
It might perhaps have
been better to effect the junction by the Cornice; at any rate, it would
then have been managed without obstacles, as it eventually turned out;
but I think I have already explained that there were not sufficient
ships in the harbour of Lerici to transport all the artillery and
baggage to Genoa, and the Cornice was then nothing but a mule-track.
However, in proceeding to carry out the other plan, we did not neglect
to supply plenty of transports in case of defeat, which later on saved
our most precious war- material.
If, on the other hand,
the expedition succeeded it would bring about results of even greater
importance. The gain of a single battle would enable us to reconquer all
we had lost, and would put a stop to the insurrections, which would no
longer have the countenance and support of the enemy; but to prevent
failure, the simultaneous action of both• armies was necessary, albeit
at a great distance apart. The sequel will show how it failed owing to
Moreau's irresolution.
All our reports tended to
prove a determination on the part of the enemy to keep their position
before Modena, and to prevent the Army of Italy from quitting the passes
of the Apennines. Montrichard's division, stationed as I have said at
Bologna, as well as Victor's, at Pontremoli, I think, were placed under
my command. General Lapoype, with 3,000 or 4,000 men, was at Bobbio. The
important matter was to retain Florence and Leghorn in my absence, and
the State of Tuscany, being almost in arms, necessitated the presence of
a force sufficiently imposing to maintain order and give us security.
General Gauthier took the command. [I think I have made a mistake in
quoting the Ticino for the Bormida. It was behind the latter river that
Moreau had retired, and whence he was driven during my march from Rome
to Florence. It will not seem strange to you, my son, if, writing as I
do from memory, after so many years crowded with events, you find here
and there little slips that you can easily correct by examining my
journals and correspondence, which I have not by me, and which, even if
I had them, are in such confusion that they would he no real help to me.
Moreover, I am writing for you alone, to give you a sketch of my
military career. I shall presently be compelled to have recourse to some
of my old journals, because an important event which took place soon
afterwards, the Battle of the Trebbia, has given rise to much
controversy, and will require more detail. —Note by Marshal Macdonald.]
General Moreau, unaware
of these exigencies, and imagining that I was marching with all my
troops, expected that I should collect about 40,000 men, including those
belonging to his army, from Tuscany and Genoa, that is to say, with
Montrichard's, Prignon's, and Victor's divisions; but of the Army of
Naples I left in that kingdom and in the Roman States from 14,000 to
15,000 men, including sick, and 4,000 or 5,000 in Tuscany. General
Pérignon's division could not act with me, for it was only later, on
reaching Piacenza, that I heard that the small body belonging to General
Lapoype at Bobbio would be at my disposal. The Army of Naples was now
able to take the offensive, as with Montrichard's and Victor's divisions
it reached the total of 25,000 men, well equipped.
After so long a forced
march as that from Brindisi into Tuscany, the need of a few days' rest,
and for repairs to material, clothing, harness, ironwork, etc., etc.,
will be easily understood. The army therefore took up a position. I had
only very doubtful information regarding the strength and position of
the enemy, and it would have been imprudent to risk anything.
We expected, and hoped,
that the Mediterranean squadron, commanded by Admiral Bruix, was on its
way with a reinforcement of 15,000 men ; if this were the case, and they
could be disembarked either at Spezzia or Genoa, and there joined to all
the men whom Moreau could collect round the town, we might hope for some
success, and look forward to repairing our losses ; but these rumours
were unfounded.
I learned at the same
time news that had better foundation in fact, namely, the appearance off
Ancona of a Turco-Russian fleet, conveying troops to he disembarked; but
I was quite at ease, knowing the promptitude of General Monnier.
Besides, the Italian business would have to be settled before the
reduction of that town, which would take several months. I thought that
I might place the same reliance upon the commandants left in the kingdom
of Naples, but shortly after my departure they allowed themselves to be
intimidated by masses of insurgents, supported by some English
detachments, and yielded one after another. What was not the least
unfortunate part of the matter was that they abandoned Fort Sant'-Elmo,
giving U their compatriots to the vengeance of their sovereign, and
Admiral Nelson did not hesitate to tarnish his glory and reputation by
causing the unfortunate Admiral Caracciolo to he hanged at his own
mast-head. Other patriots were courageous enough to blow themselves up
in the little fort called, I think, the Maddalena, near Naples, on the
road to Castellarnare. I have never heard that after the French
reoccupied this kingdom, which became that of Joseph Bonaparte and Murat,
any steps were taken to honour this act of devotion.
While the troops were
taking up the positions assigned to them, the work of making and
distributing necessary articles was pushed on as fast as possible;
provisions were collected, either to cross the Apennines or to fall back
upon Genoa. I discussed with General Dessole the advantages and
drawbacks of an offensive movement; if Moreau returned to Genoa with the
rest of his troops, and we acted in concert, we might count upon a force
of about 60,000 men. In any case, I urged upon General Dessole the
advisability of sending all ships at his disposal from Genoa to Spezzia,
and I sent thither all mine from Leghorn. The event proved that this was
a wise precaution.
I had just heard that the
citadel of Ferrara had capitulated, and that Fort Urbino was about to be
attacked. General Montrichard was at Bologna. I did not know him
personally, but presumed he was a man of talent and courage, as he had
appeared to possess a reputation upon the banks of the Rhine, a
reputation no doubt usurped, as I learned to my cost. I had praised him,
never dreaming that he had been the principal cause of the loss of the
Commander-in-chief, Schérer, on the Adige, that he had retired from
Legnano almost without a blow, thus leaving the passage open to the
enemy. This had compelled the unlucky Schérer to retreat, and his
original acceptance of the command had been severely commented upon
without justice. He was reproached with severity, even with harshness, I
know not on what ground. I have never found cause in him for anything
but praise, and certainly his misfortunes did not arise from want of
skill. During his ministry he had quarrelled with General Bonaparte, and
consequently with the Army of Italy. When the latter started for Egypt
with its chief, and was replaced by other troops from the Rhine and the
interior, the hostile feeling remained, and took root in the Italian
soil.
My troops continued their
march to take up their position at the mouth of all the passes of the
Apennines, and I established my headquarters at Lucca, after deciding
with the commandant and the Government Commissioner at Florence upon the
best means for keeping open communications in Tuscany. This had become a
difficult matter, owing to the partial insurrections, particularly that
at Arezzo.
I think I have already
said that Pontremoli had been retaken. I caused Sarzana to be occupied,
so as to help and support communications with Genoa. I received good
news from Naples, but none from any of the fortresses. The squadron
under Admiral Bruix, which I believed to be holding the Mediterranean,
was at Toulon without any troops. Porto-Ferraio, in the island of Elba,
was besieged and clamouring for help, but I had none to give. I begged
the General commanding in Corsica to see to it Want made itself
universally felt, even at Genoa. I visited Leghorn. Victor's division
came to Sarzana to replace the troops from Naples. I had not been warned
of this movement, which necessitated a change of position. The civil
agents with the two armies [The divisions of Montrichard and Victor, put
provisionally at the disposal of Macdonald, had not ceased to belong to
Moreau's army. They kept alive a spirit of dangerous rivalry with the
Army of Naples.] could not agree. Worn out with these quarrels as much
as with my work, and considering it hopeless to bring all parts of the
service into harmony —it even seemed impossible to keep a friendly
feeling between the Generals of the two armies owing to their jealousy—I
explained the situation to the Directory, proposing to it to unite the
two under one Commander, that of the Army of Italy, at the same time
offering to resign and serve in the line. I thus sacrificed myself to
the public good, but it was long ere my offer of patriotic devotion
reached its destination and I obtained an answer. Meanwhile, the crisis
was becoming more acute; something had to be done to stop the advance of
the enemy and the constant risings of the people. |
