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PICHEGRU, the new
Commander-in-chief, being ill, had retired to Brussels, and the command
was meanwhile made over to Moreau, the senior General-of-Division; the
latter's division was added to mine, which extended my command from Fort
St. André to Urdingen, where I joined the left of the Army of the Sambre
and Meuse, now in position on the Rhine. We took advantage of this
interruption of operations to revictual our troops and reorganize them,
and to train and discipline our recruits.
We had no means, no
possibility of crossing the Waal, a considerable river, whose right bank
was defended by fortified dykes. The forts of Knodsenburg, opposite
Nimeguen, and Kekerdam, opposite Kronenburg, were well armed. We
constantly exchanged shots along the entire line; from one point of view
this meant a considerable waste of ammunition; from another, however, it
gave us a valuable chance of familiarizing our new recruits with the
lire of the enemy.
The frost came to our
assistance. I had the ice sounded two or three times a day. As regards
provisions we were unfortunately situated; our communications with our
stores at Antwerp and 13ois-le-Duc were cut off, the bridge had been
destroyed, and the country between the Meuse and the Waal was exhausted,
while we could only get very slender resources from our right towards
Cleves. I myself was reduced to regimental bread and cheese, and that
only irregularly. The Nimeguen shopkeepers had closed their doors, as we
could only offer them assignats, [paper money] which they would not
accept. We were compelled, therefore, to leave our present quarters and
cross the river in search of plenty.
All my preparations for
crossing the river were made, and instructions given to start at the
first signal. The ice was thickening, and we observed that the enemy
were making ready to retire, as we imagined, when I suddenly received
intelligence that they had evacuated Thiel, opposite Fort St. Andre. I
saw with my own eyes a cannon being removed from the right bank. Never
doubting that a retreat had been determined upon, the General in command
at that point received orders to cross the river, now sufficiently
frozen, and to follow the enemy, who had taken the direction of Arnheim.
I signalled to the rest of the troops that they were to attempt the
passage at the points indicated. All the columns moved forward
simultaneously at break of day, and crossed the river, almost without
resistance, somewhat above and below Nimeguen. The stream had not frozen
in the middle of the town. As soon as I could distinguish through the
fog the head of the first column nearing the fort by the dyke, I caused
several skiffs that I had previously prepared to be launched, and
crossed to the other side with two companies of grenadiers' The fort had
just been evacuated. I ordered my men to pursue slowly, so as to give
time for all our columns to come up with us, and for the cannon to pass.
That was the difficulty. The small ordnance was brought up without
trouble, then the larger, and finally the howitzers.
During this operation we
heard a violent explosion, which made the very ground tremble. It was,
as I imagined, the enemy blowing up their magazines and setting their
camp on fire. Fearing lest this terrible explosion might astonish the
troops, I sent the Generals, who had come to take my orders, to their
posts, desiring them to explain this event, which signified the absolute
retreat of the enemy, and to watch our right, while I took upon myself
the charge of the centre.
They arrived just in
time, for a hot and well-sustained fire had broken out. My troops were
engaged and attacked by a considerable force. The right division had
only succeeded in putting one regiment across, and was repulsed on the
left bank of the river; but the General who had provisional command of
this division arrived with two other brigades, rallied the first, and
finally, after a severe struggle, broke the enemy's ranks. The
intermediate division, which was mine, had left its place, and so had
the centre, where I was we were without news from the left. I advanced
my lines as far as the Linge, the point which I had named in my orders
as that at which we were to concentrate.
This day brought about
two important results : first, it facilitated the invasion of Holland by
separating her cause from that of her allies, who were forced to
evacuate the country; secondly, it put into our hands at least a hundred
pieces of cannon, with which the dykes and fort of Knodsenburg, which
served us as a Tete de point [Works covering the approach to a bridge.]
were armed, besides ammunition and a large number of prisoners.
This event proves that in
war it is necessary on many occasions to trust to chance; for I repeat
now what I said at the time, that I owed more to luck than to wisdom,
although success is generally supposed to depend upon plans, schemes,
and arrangements. On this occasion the evacuation of Thiel seemed to me
the evident result of a retrograde movement, whereas in reality that
movement was caused by a misunderstanding. The General commanding my
left wing had conscientiously carried out his instructions, and begun
his march, when he met the evacuating body, who, having notified their
retreat, received injunctions to return to the post they had quitted.
But it was too late— the place was already occupied. The two bodies
marching in contrary directions met, and an engagement was the result;
but, notwithstanding the numerical superiority of their adversaries, our
men kept their ground. The successful crossing of the Waal above and
below Nimeguen, together with the advantages gained by my extreme right,
which took the offensive after its first brigade had been repulsed,
checked the enemy who were opposed to them and broke their lines. Our
success was complete. Shortly afterwards the enemy's corps sent to Thiel
was recalled to Arnheim. This is a very simple explanation of the
reasons that caused my left to remain stationary; it could not come up
or set out for the Linge until the following day.
I went to Nimeguen to
make my report. The Cornrnander-in-chief and the Commissioners came to
meet me. I was almost ashamed to receive their congratulations, because
chance had had a much greater share in the success of the day than my
combinations, which, as a matter of fact, were founded upon the apparent
retreat of the forces opposed to me, who in reality had no idea of such
a thing; but the manner I had adopted in spreading out my lines, and the
various points I had attacked, had made the enemy believe that they were
bearing the brunt of the whole French army, while their own was
scattered over a wide extent of territory.
Next evening, towards
dusk, we made a reconnaissance in the direction of Arnheim. The noise
and shouting that we heard, combined with the accounts of some deserters
and country folk, confirmed our unanimous opinion that a general retreat
was going on, and the Commander-in-chief gave his orders in consequence.
We were, however, too weak to pursue the enemy, invade Holland, and
surround the strongholds at one and the same time. This condition of
affairs was explained to the Commissioners, and they were requested to
write to their colleagues with the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, to
which we had now come very close; while our Commander-in-chief asked his
colleague to lend him for the time two divisions to replace those under
my command. This request, approved by the Commissioners, was granted
without delay, and I quitted my position in order to strengthen my left.
A general movement had
been caused on the one side by the enemy's retreat, and on the other by
the general advance of the army. I crossed the Leek at Amerungen without
meeting any enemies, and advanced towards Amersfort, after having turned
the lines of the Greb, armed with two hundred guns. The Dutch troops
were drawing away from their allies, but being too weak to make a stand
against us, they retired into fortresses or distant provinces.
None of our corps
remained long bivouacked. They only needed a few hours' rest, for great
emulation existed as to who should first reach and take Amsterdam. I did
not waste any time, but I had a diagonal line to follow, while the
others could march straight ahead. The floods were out and the roads
under water, but that was no obstacle, on account of the frost. I
arrived in front of Naarden, one of the strongest places in Europe, on
the ice. This is the masterpiece of Cohorn, emulator and rival of Vauban;
but the water, the principal defence of the place, was now useless. I
invested it, and ordered the gates to be opened. The garrisons had
orders to commit no act of hostility, to offer no resistance, and to
make the best terms possible. They therefore parleyed with us.
The cold was very sharp,
and we warmed ourselves at our bivouacs on the ice. My injunctions were
to agree to everything, provided that the place were handed over to me
on the spot. The articles of capitulation were at length signed, and I
took possession of the town. As I reached the gates, a Dutch officer,
who had just been replaced by one of ours, and who was drunk, threw
himself at the feet of one of my aides-dc-camp, exclaiming:
'Brave republican, I owe
you my life!'
Observe that we had fired
neither cannon nor musket, and that we had not even drawn our swords
from their scabbards!
At sunrise next day,
leaving a strong garrison at Naarden, I started for Amsterdam, and on
the road learned that the capital of Holland had been occupied by our
troops the previous evening. Mine thus became useless, so I sent them
into cantonments, going myself to Amsterdam to take the news of the
capitulation of Naarden, and to receive fresh orders. On arriving in
presence of the General in command, I presented him with the signed
articles. He answered jokingly:
'I pay no attention now
to anything less than the surrender of Provinces!'
As a matter of fact, and
since the general capitulation of the Netherlands, with the exception of
a few places still held by the enemy, my conquest decreased in
importance, whereas under other circumstances it would have redounded to
the credit of the General who had succeeded in subduing it. It was
against this very place that Louis XIV., himself there in person, in the
zenith of his power, had failed.
I received orders to move
upon the Yssel, to occupy Harderwick, Kampen, ZwoIle, Zutphen, Deventer,
and to replace the troops of the Sambre and Meuse Army at Amheim. The
enemy retreated at our approach.
The weather had become
milder during my short stay at Amsterdam, and the thaw had begun. It was
thawing rapidly when I reached the Yssel, and the ice had broken in
several places, causing a dyke to burst. The bridge of boats at Kampen
could not be removed, and the ice accumulated round it. Half my men had
already crossed; the remainder had halted, on learning from the
inhabitants that they could only cross at imminent risk, as the bridge
must infallibly be carried away. At this moment I came up. Reflecting
that the troops already on the other side ran a great risk of falling
into the hands of the enemy, I determined to chance it, and gave orders
to advance, rapidly crossing the bridge, which was already much
strained; The bridge bore us because the waters that had carried away
the dyke on the right bank had found an outlet, and were spreading over
the country; but then we incurred another danger, that, namely, of
inundation. However, all my men got safely across; we reached higher
ground, and escaped with nothing worse than wet feet.
Having thus carried out
my orders, I received fresh ones to drive the enemy out of the provinces
of Frisia, Groningen and Drenthe. This portion of the campaign was very
difficult because of, the thaw; the roads were shocking, and for the
most part under water. The country through which we were marching was
perfectly flat. We had to redouble our speed and activity, so as to
prevent the enemy from fortifying and victualling Groningen, 1)elfzyl,
and Coevorden. Frisia, owing to its situation, had been already
evacuated, but the inhabitants of Groningen came to me, imploring me to
hasten our march, and to deliver them from our common enemies, as they
expressed it; in making this request they were almost asking for a
change of enemies, although my troops kept most rigorous discipline. My
advance-guard entered the town as the enemy quitted it. We pursued,
overtook, and defeated their rear-guard near Delfzyl. At the same time I
heard that Coevorden had opened its gates, and I extended my line as far
as the Ems, which the enemy had recrossed. We respectively took up our
positions on either side of the river, having, both of us, great need of
rest.
While I was inspecting my
lines, I was informed of the march of the Prussian army, and shortly
afterwards a messenger with a flag of truce brought me a letter
announcing that the latter Power had just concluded the Peace of Basic;
[The treaty of peace between France and Prussia was signed on the 16
Germinal, year iii. (April 5, 1795).] but as I had no official
notification, I at once communicated with the Commander-in-chief; who
was also in ignorance of the event. I asked for large reinforcements,
and meanwhile kept a very strict look-out. Two fresh divisions were sent
to join and precede me, and these would not have been too many had the
first news of this unexpected peace proved untrue, because the Prussians
would have effected a junction with the allied army that I already had
in front of me. We at length received confirmation of the news, to the
joy of both sides.
The line of demarcation
laid down by the treaty followed the right bank of the Rhine and the Ems
to its mouth; the Prussians took the place of their former allies on
this bank, while we occupied the left. Territorial divisions were
formed, of which I had command of the first, composed of the provinces
of Drenthe, Frisia, and Groningen, and I established my headquarters in
the town of that name.
After three months' rest,
of which we all stood in great need, I was called to the command of the
provinces of Overyssel and Gueldres, and later on to Utrecht and
Holland.
Zealand being at this
time threatened by the English, I was ordered to go either to Middleburg
or Flushing, whichever I preferred, in the island of Walcheren, and a
most unhealthy country. Five-sixths of my men were soon down with fever,
and I was so violently attacked that, in fear of my life, I was ordered
back to France to recover. All the events I have just described occurred
in the years 1794-5. It was towards the end of the latter year that I
returned to France, where my fever, which had been somewhat checked
before I left Flushing, seized me again at the end of six weeks.
By the end of the summer,
1795, I had recovered, and was ready to return to my duty, when I had
the pleasure of greeting Beurnonville, who had just been exchanged and
restored from his captivity. The command of the army in Holland had been
given to him. He offered to exchange with me. I refused from a mistaken
sense of delicacy, on account of our friendship, fearing lest this
preference should prejudice other Generals against him.
Scarcely had I returned
first to Flushing, and then to Middleburg, when, coming back from a tour
of inspection round the island, I was again seized with fever, and
notwithstanding all the measures employed, especially quinine in large
quantities, it could not be subdued until the following spring, when the
doses were trebled, and I was removed from that horrible climate.
My friend Beurnonville
had his headquarters at Utrecht. He summoned me thither to recover. I
had to diet myself very severely; but my relapses, though still acute,
were but the prelude to a fresh attack, which I believe has remained
unparalleled. Beurnonville was away at the time. On hearing of the
danger I was in, he hastened back at once. At length skill and
perseverance checked the fever, and I was sent to pass my convalescence
at Deventer, in Overyssel, where troops were assembling for the
manoeuvres at Gorssel. They were put under my command. I spared no pains
to instruct and train them, and thus got much exercise, which was good
for my health. l3eurnonville came to inspect us. |
