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IMMEDIATELY upon our
arrival we went to the castle. It was one o'clock in the morning. It was
with the greatest difficulty that the Emperor was awakened and persuaded
to get up; Caulaincourt himself had to go into his room and shake him
somewhat roughly. The fact that he was able to sleep so soundly in such
a. situation would seem to denote that he was either perfectly
indifferent, or that he possessed a mind calm beyond that of ordinary
men.
He appeared at length,
and thanked us for the efforts we had made. He said that the defection
of Marmont's corps must necessarily have had great influence upon the
determination of the allies. In that he was not mistaken, for in the
second interview the Emperor of Russia had spoken to us, upon all that
concerned our mission, in a much more haughty and decided tone than in
the first. In speaking of Napoleon personally, although, as I have said,
his attitude was solemn, yet he made with much grace the offer o
receiving him into his dominions.
When we came to this
special point the Emperor asked how he and his family would be treated,
and expressed a high opinion of the character of Alexander. He said that
he knew him sufficiently well to feel certain that, had he not been
worried and imposed upon by the allies, and above all by the influence
of England, Alexander would have treated with him, and would have
maintained his sovereignty and his dynasty in France. He added that the
Empress had written to him from either Blois or Orleans to be of good
courage; that she was sufficiently convinced of the affection her father
bore her to be persuaded, as she also wished him to be, that the Emperor
Francis would never Live his consent or permission to the dethronement
of his son-in-law; that she herself was determined to share his fate, be
it what it might, that no human power should keep her from him, and that
she was preparing to join him.
'You do not know the
Empress,' he said; 'she is a Princess of strong character. If necessary,
she would play the part over again of Maria Theresa when she exhibited
her son to the Hungarians.
We, however, knew how
much this feminine influence had been worth during the campaign of 1813,
for during the armistice and the negotiations at Prague she had
guaranteed, so the Emperor told me, the neutrality of her father. But
Napoleon, as is universally known, liked to cherish illusions.
We tried to brush away
the frivolous hopes with which the Empress encouraged him; the strongest
proof that she was mistaken was to be found in the violent opposition to
us that had been openly displayed by the Generalissimo Prince
Schwartzenberg, and certainly he would not have acted as he did without
formal orders from the Emperor of Austria, who was at Dijon, and whom he
represented in the councils of the allies.
Napoleon could not help
admitting that our observations contained some truth, but, suddenly
leaving aside politics, the destiny of France and of the army, and only
thinking of what was personal to himself, he came back to the offer made
by the allies, and inquired whether we had discovered what was meant by
the 'island of Elba or something else.' We answered in the negative, and
after a few moments' reflection he said:
'It is probably the
island of Corsica, and they would not name it in order to avoid the
pun.* Very good, I choose the island of Elba. Do any of you gentlemen
know that island? Is there a palace, a castle, a suitable or even
tolerable dwelling there?'
We had none of us ever
been there.
In that case, seek
through the army for an artillery or engineer officer. There must be
some who have served there.'
He gave immediate orders
to that effect.
He again spoke of
Marmont's defection.
'It is I,' he said, 'who
am probably the cause of it. I wished to know whether you had passed the
outposts of the allies without difficulty, and also to talk with the
Duke of Ragusa. I sent several officers in succession to summon him to
give me an account of your journey. He had gone with you. His generals,
who knew everything, and had had a share in the treaty of desertion,
became uneasy at my repeated messages. They supposed that I knew all,
and, fearing arrest, they took away their troops without even sending
warning to the surrounding regiments whom they thus compromised and
almost demoralized. The news upon this subject is very bad ; it kept
arriving, and it would appear that even the officers and generals are
not quite free. Unfortunately we could provide no remedy; however, I
ordered the echelons to advance and occupy the lines of Essonne.'
He had guessed correctly.
He spoke of Marmont with great moderation, and we explained to him that
he had been at first led away by indirect overtures from persons
attached to him by friendship and bound to him by gratitude. Unhappily,
having listened to these overtures, he made the mistake of answering by
some counter-propositions, which he did not think were of a nature to be
accepted ; they were, however, and already were when we reached Essonne.
But the actual catastrophe in nowise depended upon his will, for when he
came with us to Paris he left stringent orders with his generals that
whatever happened they were to await his return, which would take place
early next morning.
This event was the more
annoying to him because he had arranged with Prince Schwartzenberg, at
Petit-Bourg, that, notwithstanding their private agreement, his corps
should not be sent into Normandy, should not be separated from the rest
of the army, and should be included in any arrangement made by our
negotiation. Fate, however, willed otherwise.
Under the particular
circumstances the Duke of Ragusa could only be accused of culpable
thoughtlessness; ,under others it would no doubt have been a crime of
high-treason. But under existing circumstances what had he to hope for
or to gain, raised as he was to the chief dignity in the army, to the
most distinguished social title? Office? He practically held it already.
The Emperor did not pursue the subject; he was only dissimulating, as
was made evident by a proclamation issued the following year on the
occasion of his fatal return from Elba.
We begged the Emperor to
take immediate steps to have the necessary instructions regarding so
much of the negotiations as was personal to him and his family drawn up.
He promised to send them to us next day, and thanked me personally for
my behaviour and services. We retired, after again begging him not to
delay, as there was a chance that the events at Essoniie might increase
the downheartedness of the army, and set an example to others. It was
also necessary not to allow the goodwill and interest that the Emperor
of Russia had displayed towards him and his family to cool.
During the morning we saw
some of our colleagues, the Marshals, and a number of generals and
superior officers. There was much excitement abroad, and, as a
consequence of the discouragement in the army, opinion seemed to lean
towards a change of government. We therefore had reason to apprehend
partial and private desertions, and they occurred, notwithstanding all
our efforts to prevent them. We pointed out that our strength lay in our
unity; that by preserving our attitude, which was still formidable to
the allies, we should awe them and obtain better terms; that it would be
cowardice to abandon Napoleon, who was still their chief, and to leave
him at the mercy of his enemies at home and abroad. Some regret was also
expressed that he did not take the desperate step of fomenting a rising,
and dragging the remains of our army to certain destruction, or, to
crown our misfortunes, to civil war I cannot quite remember whether it
was now, or at our first starting for Paris, that we made over the
command of the army to Marshal Berthier, Prince of Neuchâtel, Vice-
Constable and Major-General. The exact moment does not matter, for
although we were the Emperor's envoys, we bore also the title of
Commissioners of the Army, and it was only in the latter quality that
the allies would receive us. We therefore agreed and instructed the
Prince of Neuchâtel that he was to carry out no orders of Napoleon
respecting movements of troops, and that he was to be guided entirely by
the orders that we, the Commissioners, would give him to support our
negotiations. This arrangement was concluded; all promised and bound
themselves to conform to it ; you will see shortly how that promise was
kept. Nevertheless, we never ceased repeating that upon our unity, and
the firm and imposing attitude of the army, depended the success of our
mission.
I commanded five army
corps, including that of the Duke of Reggio, who was again under my
orders. In my absence I delegated this command to the Duke, and gave to
General Molitor that of the corps of which I was titular chief; but for
the sake of unity I placed it also under the instructions of the
Marshal.
After this long
conference, at which many unnecessary things were discussed, we went to
the castle. The bases of the treaty were prepared, arid, furnished with
plenary powers, we took leave of Napoleon, who appeared more resigned to
his ultimate fate. He desired us to hasten matters, and bring about a
speedy termination. We reached Paris late at night, and sent to apprise
the Emperor of Russia, who postponed the interview until eleven o'clock
next morning.
When we arrived,
Alexander already knew that Napoleon had accepted the sovereignty of the
island of Elba.
We were very graciously
recived, hut on the one hand there were personal considerations, on the
other Alexander was secretly very glad to see the satisfactory
conclusion of a struggle that the allies feared might still be
prolonged. They would not now have had to fight the remnants of an army,
but an armed population. A large number of the inhabitants of the Vosges
and Lorraine had formed themselves into bodies of francs-tireurs, and
were doing great mischief to the communications of the foreign troops.
The Emperor Alexander had told me, and has since repeated to me, that in
those departments alone they had lost 3,000 men without meeting a single
French soldier!
The great majority in the
capital was in favour of Napoleon, and the entire National Guard were on
his side. The allies did not feel very safe there. The armies that had
evacuated Spain, the frontiers of Italy and Piedmont, were still at
liberty, and might unite with ours ; the garrisons on the Rhine and on
the Meuse might form a considerable force, and support insurrections
which, from being partial at first, might come to be very serious
general risings ; the energy of Napoleon, although weakened by so many
reverses, might reawaken, and give a great impulse to France. All that
was realized, and was, no doubt, the mainspring which rendered the
Sovereigns so obliging, and the Provisional Government so uncomfortable,
so weak, and so obsequious.
The first point for
consideration was that of an armistice for an indefinite length of time,
and a line of demarcation. The Emperor of Russia said that, to give us a
token of his esteem, he authorized us to fix it. We hesitated an
instant; then I spoke, and asked for the left hank of the Seine.
Alexander replied that he would willingly consent, but pointed out that
Paris would thus be cut in half, that meetings between the troops, who
must necessarily cross the river on business, or for their wants, or
simply from curiosity, might produce results disagreeable to the
capital, and that it would be better to avoid any contact between the
troops on either side. Moreover, he thought that the allies would never
consent to withdraw their advance-guards from the positions they
occupied militarily.; that it would be better and preferable to leave
the troops outside rather than to fill the town with them, where they
would be a hindrance to the inhabitants and to business.
We admitted the justice
of these arguments, and did not insist. Thereupon the Emperor Alexander
offered me a pencil. which I begged to he allowed not to take; but he
insisted with so much kindness upon my drawing the line that I at last
gave way. It went round the outside of Paris, on both banks of the
Seine, starting from the outposts of the foreigners, leaving to us on
the left bank all the places not occupied that day by their troops. A
map of France lay upon the table, and the outline was soon made. The
armistice included all the armies and all the places which in France or
abroad were still holding out. Officers from both sides were to he sent
to all points to stop hostilities but as it was impossible to regulate
from Paris the distant demarcations, we agreed that each side should
keep the positions they might be holding at the moment when the envoys,
who were to travel with the utmost speed, should arrive.
The line of the Seine was
the most important; it described, from the mouth of the river at Essonne,
'a semicircle round the outposts of the allies to below Paris. The
Emperor of Russia, after examining and approving this outline, gave
orders to Prince Schwartzenherg to have copies made of it, and to send
out instructions for the immediate cessation of hostilities. He then put
us into communication with the ministers representing the allied Powers,
to draw up the articles of the treaty, of which he undertook to secure
the acceptance of the terms by the Provisional Government, in return for
the receipt of the act of abdication.
The most urgent matter
was the notification of the suspension of hostilities. As soon as we
were informed that the Austrian staff had finished making a clean copy
of the line of demarcation, we went to Prince Schwartzenberg to receive
our copy, to read over our respective instructions to the officers
hearing the notification of the armistice, to learn their names, and
arrange for their departure.
While toy colleagues were
settling these matters, I thought that I would verify the copy of the
line of demarcation, and it was a very fortunate idea of mine to do so,
for, either by accident or design, our line, instead of beginning at the
river at Essonne, had been pushed hack to beyond Fontainebleau. The
result of this would have been that the Emperor Napoleon must have
quitted the castle, and our troops have retired to Nemours, and that
very precipitately, for the convention upon this Point was to be carried
out within twenty-four hours.
What made me think then,
and keeps alive my suspicion now, that this was not merely done by
mistake, was the obstinacy with which the Austrian staff and the Prince
himself declared that the original had been exactly copied. I demanded
to see it, so as to compare it with the copy; it could not be found.
They declared it had been returned to the Emperor of Russia; we insisted
upon their sending for it, but they made objections.
At last, taking up my
hat, I announced that I was going to the Emperor. Seeing my
determination, and that my colleagues intended to support me by going
with me, the Austrians yielded, and sent, or did not send, for the
original map; but at the end of an hour or two, without producing this
map, Prince Schwartzenberg told us that the Emperor of •Russia said that
we were right upon every point, and the copies were accordingly
rectified.
When these points were
settled to our satisfaction, my colleagues thanked me for the precaution
I had taken of comparing the line of demarcation, which we were to send
immediately to Fontainebleau. What disappointment and annoyance would
have been experienced at the French headquarters if we had received this
map without examining it, as a start must have been made without delay!
While writing these lines I still tremble to think of what the
consequences might have been, for we should not have yielded. This was a
fresh proof to us of the honour of the Emperor Alexander.
I must retrace my steps a
little to mention a circumstance which had escaped me. On our return to
Paris, while at dinner with Marshal Ney, one of his aides-dc-camp
entered in a state of great joy, and said to him
'The Emperor of Russia
was very pleased indeed with your letter, and here is the proof,' he
continued, showing round his neck a decoration with which that Sovereign
had just honoured him. He added that Monsieur de Talley- rand, President
of the Provisional Government, thanked the Marshal for the important
news he had given him. We all showed our surprise, and asked what this
meant. Ney, much embarrassed, stammered out that on leaving the
conference we had had with Napoleon the previous night, and fearing
lest, in spite of his acceptance of the conditions proposed, he might
commit some folly, he, Marshal Ney, had considered it his duty to send
an account of what had passed to the Emperor of Russia, so that the
allies, being forewarned, might take their measures accordingly!
We observed that he had
no business to take such a step without consulting us, as his position
as Commissioner lent great weight to his actions. To reassure us he said
he would show us copies of his letters. He summoned his secretary, who
at first said he could not find them, and then came back to say that the
minutes had been scratched out and altered, so as to be illegible. At
that moment we received notice from the Emperor of Russia that he would
receive us at eleven o'clock next morning. We thought we were going to
inform him of Napoleon's acceptance of Elba, but he already knew all
that had passed from Marshal Ney's letter, of which I have never heard
the details.
Even without the sudden
arrival of the tell-tale aide-de- camp, we were destined to know of this
incident, for, before we were announced to the Emperor of Russia, we met
Monsieur de Nesselrodc, his Foreign Secretary, who paid some compliments
to Marshal Ney upon his letter, and shortly afterwards the Emperor
thanked him for it affectionately. As for Monsieur de 'l'alleyrand, he
was malicious enough to cause the letter he had received to he printed
in the Moniteur, but whether in part or in lull I know not.
This explains why Marshal
Ney gave his personal adhesion to the new order of things unknown to us,
and while we were still actually negotiating and why, later on, after
the signature of the treaty, he quitted us, and would not accompany us
back to Fontainebleau. No doubt the Aloniteur would have found its way
thither, and he thus avoided the direct reproaches that Napoleon would
not have failed to heap upon him.
Caulaincourt told me
that, after being appointed one of the Commissioners, Ney had gone back
to Napoleon, and told him that he had not sufficient money for the
expenses of his mission. Napoleon had answered that he had only small
funds remaining at Fontainebleau, that he had ordered the recall of the
treasure that was with the Empress, but that meanwhile he promised him
15,000 francs (600). Caulaincourt added that he had received this sum on
our first return from Paris, and probably after he had written the
letters to the Emperor of Russia and to Talleyrand. However, we wanted
for nothing; we were driven in Napoleon's carriages, and the Duke of
Vicenza paid in his name the expenses of hiring post-horses. But I have
always heard that it was a custom of the Marshal whenever he was sent
upon a mission to object that he had no money, and that Napoleon
supplied him.
In relating this episode
I am not moved by any animosity against Marshal Ney, whose bravery I
have admired more than other people, and I was one of those who helped
to name him the 'Bravest of the brave.' Besides, I am only writing for
you, my son ; this episode will simply serve to let you know the truth
of what may be published concerning the letters to the Emperor of Russia
and Monsieur de Talleyrand, when you are old enough to hear about, and
understand, the momentous events in which I have been an actor, and
which I witnessed. |
