REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT PROCLAIMED AT
PERNAMBUCO--ITS CONCORDAT----THE PRESIDENT CARVALHO--THREAT
OF BOMBARDMENT--A BRIBE OFFERED TO ME AND REFUSED--THE
REVOLT ADMITTED OF PALLIATION--IT WAS FAST BECOMING
GENERAL--INTIMIDATION INEFFECTUAL--THE REVOLUTIONISTS EXPECT
FOREIGN AID--PERNAMBUCO TAKEN POSSESSION OF--PAYMENT OF
PRIZE MONEY--THE ACCOUNTS RENDERED IN DUE COURSE--ORDERS TO
PUT DOWN REVOLT AT PARA--CHARACTER OF THE
REVOLUTION--DIFFICULTY IN FINDING PROPER GOVERNORS--REVOLT
AT CEARA--STEPS TAKEN TO SUPPRESS IT--THEY PROVE
SUCCESSFUL--THE INSURGENT LEADER KILLED--MEASURES FOR
PRESERVING TRANQUILLITY.
On the 2nd of August, 1824, the
Imperial squadron again quitted Rio de
Janeiro, the rendezvous being
appointed at Jurugua, where we arrived on
the 13th, and on the 16th landed a
body of twelve hundred troops under
General Lima, at Alagoas, seventy or
eighty miles from the seat of
revolt! this notable step being taken
in pursuance of strict orders from
the Administration at Rio de Janeiro.
On the 18th, the
squadron reached Pernambuco, falling in, near the
entrance of the port, with a number of
Portuguese vessels quitting the
city with passengers; but in
consequence of the prize tribunal having
decreed damages for the seizure of
enemy's ships within a certain
distance of the coast, they were
permitted to pass unmolested.
We did not reach
Pernambuco too soon, for proclamations had been
issued by Manuel Carvalho Paes de
Andrade, the revolutionary
President--denouncing Don Pedro as a
traitor, whose aim it was to
abandon Brazil to the Portuguese;
which denunciation, though right in
one sense, was wrong as regarded the
Emperor, whose views were
thoroughly national--though the object
of his ministers was as
thoroughly Portuguese. Had the
Pernambucans been aware of the want of
concord between the Emperor's
intentions and those of his ministers, who
had forced themselves upon him--the
probability is that they would have
supported, instead of denouncing his
government.
The revolution had, however, now taken
vigorous root, and the democratic
spirit of the Pernambucans was not to
be trifled with. A republican form
of Government had been proclaimed, the
views of which were on a more
extensive scale than was commensurate
with the abilities of those
propounding them; it being their vain
hope to constitute all the
equatorial provinces into a
federation, on the model of the United
States, a project fostered--if not
originated--by Americans resident in
the city. To further this object, an
appeal was made to the other
Northern provinces to repudiate the
Imperial authority, and to form with
Pernambuco an alliance, under the
title of "Confederation of the
Equator;" the consequence being, that
a large proportion of the
inhabitants of Parahyba, Piahuy, Rio
Grande do Norte, and Ceara,
declared in favour of the measure.
The annexed is the
Concordat of the revolutionary provinces:--
In the year of Our
Lord 1824, third year of the Independence of
Brazil, and the 3rd of August in that
year, in the Hall of Session of
the Government of the Province of
Pernambuco, there being present,
the Brazilian citizen, Quaresma
Torreao, on behalf of His Excellency
the President, Carvalho Paes de
Andrade, and the Illustrious and
Reverend Francisco da Costa Leixas;
Jose Joaquim Fernandez Barros,
and the Citizen Jose Joaquim
Germiniano de Moraes Navarro, on behalf
of the province of Rio Grande del
Norte, by diploma dated August 16,
1824, and also the Illustrious
deputies commissioned by His
Excellency the Governor of the
Province of Pernambuco to treat on
behalf of his Government, with a view
to extinguish dissension in
political opinions, which has so
greatly retarded the progress of
Brazil, and of independence and
liberty; and, at the same time, to do
their endeavour to banish a servile
spirit which tends to enthral
Brazil by a pretended Constitution,
domineering over the Brazilian
nation like that of the Grand Seignior
of the Ottoman Porte.
The Commission of
the Government of this province, and the
illustrious deputations
before-mentioned, having maturely considered
these subjects, agree--
First,--That these
provinces of Pernambuco and Rio Grande
unite in a fraternal league, offensive
and defensive, to assemble
all their forces against any
aggression of the Portuguese Government,
or that of the Government of Rio de
Janeiro, to reduce these
provinces to a state of thraldom.
Secondly,--That
the said league shall extend to the establishing
constitutional liberty throughout the
said provinces, and to supplant
the servile spirit with which they are
infected, and thus avert civil
war, engendered by the intrigues at
Rio de Janeiro, the influence of
which now pervades the whole of
Brazil.
Thirdly,--That to
insure the effect of this compact, the Government
of Rio Grande must form a body of
troops, and place them on
the borders of the province of
Parahyba, to be employed as necessity
requires.
Fourthly,--That
this body of troops shall be supported by the
province of Pernambuco, but shall be
afterwards supported by the
"Confederation of the Equador." And
that the same may be
carried into immediate effect, this
Concordat shall have full force,
after being signed and ratified by
their Excellencies the Presidents
of the said provinces of Pernambuco
and Rio del Norte.
(Signed)
P. FRANCISCO DA COSTA LEIXAS. JOSE JOAQUIM FERNANDEZ BARROS. JOSE JOAQUIM GERMINIANO DE MORAES
NAVARRO. BASILIO QUARESMA TORREAO. MANOEL DE CARVALHO PAES D'ANDRADE,
President.
Printed at the National Press.
Carvalho, however,
was not the man to carry out such a scheme, his
enthusiasm being without prudence or
daring; hence, on our arrival--in
place of union, the contending
factions were engaged in destroying each
other's sugar-mills and plantations,
whilst Carvalho himself had taken
the precaution to station a vessel at
the island of Tamarica, for the
purpose of escaping, if necessary,
from the turbulence which he had
raised, but could not control. On
learning this, I felt it my duty to
despatch a corvette to seize her,
though at the risk of four-fold
damages, according to the regulations
of the Admiralty Court!
Knowing that it
would take some time for the troops to come up, I
determined to try the effect of a
threat of bombardment, and issued a
proclamation remonstrating with the
inhabitants on the folly of
permitting themselves to be deceived
by men who lacked the ability to
execute their schemes; pointing out,
moreover, that persistence in
revolt would involve both the town and
its rulers in one common ruin;
for, if forced to the necessity of
bombardment,--I would reduce the
port and city to insignificance. On
the other hand, I assured them that
if they retraced their steps, and
rallied round the Imperial throne,
thus aiding to protect it from foreign
influence--it would be more
gratifying to me to act the part of a
mediator, and to restore
Pernambuco to peace, prosperity and
happiness--than to carry out the
work of destruction which would be my
only remaining alternative.
In another
proclamation I called the attention of the inhabitants to
the
distracted state of the Spanish republics on the other side
of the
Continent, asking whether it would be wise to risk the
benefits of
orderly government for social and political confusion;
entreating them
not to compel me to proceed to
extremities, as it would become my duty
to destroy their shipping and block up
their port, unless within eight
days the integrity of the empire were
acknowledged.
These threats were held out in the
hope that by intimidation a struggle
might be prevented, but they failed to
produce the desired effect. One
result was, however, not a little
curious, as originating an offer to
myself from the revolutionary
President, of a bribe of 400,000 milreis,
to be shipped immediately on board the
English packet anchored off the
port, if I would abandon the Imperial
cause, and come over to the
Republicans; this offer alluding, in
strong terms, to the "infamous
treatment with which my services had
been met by the administration at
Rio de Janeiro, and warning me that,
by adhering to it, I should meet
with nothing but continued
ill-treatment and ingratitude."
The subjoined is
the revolutionary President's letter:
MY LORD,
Frankness is the
distinguishing character of free men, but
Your Excellency has not found it in
your connection with the
Imperial Government. Your not having
been rewarded for the
first expedition affords a justifiable
inference that you will get
nothing for the second. I therefore
use the freedom to assure Your
Excellency the amount of 400 contos of
Reis, as an indemnification
for your losses.
The services
required from Your Excellency are to take up the
cause of the "Confederation of the
Equator," as adopted by the
majority of the Northern provinces,
whose limits will be the river of
Francisco da Norte.
I have the honour
to be
Your
Excellency's most humble servant,
MANUEL DE CARVALHO
PAES D'ANDEADE.
The letter
contained, in addition, an argumentative justification of
therevolt,
but as it abounds in abuse of the Emperor, couched in the
most
indecorous language, I will not sully these pages by
printing it entire.
The result
predicted by Carvalho--as I had learned by experience--was
not improbable, but it did not follow
that, because the Brazilian
ministers were unjust and hostile to
me, I should accept a bribe from a
traitor to follow his example. I
therefore transmitted the following
reply to his impudent proposal:--
Pedro Primiero,
Off Pernambuco, Aug. 26, 1824.
SIR,
If I shall have an
opportunity of becoming personally known to Your
Excellency, I can afford you proof to
conviction, that the opinion
you have formed of me has had its
origin in the misrepresentations
of those in power, whose purposes I
was incapable, on principle, to
serve.
I have, &c. &c.
COCHRANE AND MARANHAO.
His Excellency M.
DE C. PAES D'ANDEADE.
On the 19th, the
Junta requested the interposition of the English and
French consuls to induce me to give
further time for consideration. This
I refused, from the dangerous nature
of the anchorage, by which the
safety of the ships was imperilled.
Unwilling,
however, to injure this fine city, I sent in proposals for
capitulation, giving permission to the
revolutionary leaders to depart
unpunished, together with their
property, provided they quitted the
Brazilian territory--demanding in
return the surrender of the forts,
ships of war, gunboats, &c. as well as
of all public property. In order
to prevent waste of time in
correspondence, I proposed to Carvalho to
meet me on board any neutral ship of
war, pledging my honour as to his
being permitted to return in safety;
he nevertheless declined the
interview, proposing in return to meet
me on shore on an island near the
town but--as after his insulting
proposal, I could have no confidence in
his honour, this was of course
declined.
Still anxious to avoid
extremities--from which, after the threats made,
I could not consistently refrain--I
again wrote to Carvalho, that, had
he possessed the means of
distinguishing between the intentions of the
Emperor, and the proceedings of a
foreign faction, he would not have
been in arms against His Imperial
Majesty, by adherence to whom Brazil
could alone be saved from that anarchy
and confusion into which Mexico
and other South American States had
fallen through individual rivalry
and the ignorance of their popular
assemblies. I further pointed out to
him, that if, by procrastination I was
compelled to bombard the city,
the popular clamour against the
insurgent authorities might be followed
by melancholy proof to himself how
quickly political adventurers may be
abandoned or betrayed in the hour of
danger, and that he had better
yield to reason, what he could not
prevent my effecting by force.
By writers who
could not have known anything of the circumstances--which
exist only in my own documents--I have
been blamed for this tone of
moderation towards the revolutionary
President. There were two valid
reasons for this course; first, that
the conduct of the Pernambucans
admitted of great palliation, seeing
that the distractions resulting
from the Portuguese faction in the
administration at Rio de Janeiro had
been ignorantly construed into acts of
His Imperial Majesty--so that the
injured people argued that it would
have been better for them to have
remained a colony of Portugal, than a
colony of the Government at Rio de
Janeiro--this mode of reasoning not
being very far wrong. Secondly--and
this fully accounts for the moderation
complained of--I knew, from the
most authentic sources that, in case
of attack on the city, Carvalho had
determined to retire into the
interior, there to carry on civil war by
enlisting the negro population under
his standard; to avert which, I
considered that moderation was the
best course to induce him and his
partisans to quit the empire, which
would thus have been well rid of
them.
It was folly,
therefore, to consider the rebellion local, as had been
represented to the Imperial
Government, or that its actors and
instigators were few and
insignificant, for, in truth, as has been said,
it had already extended far and wide
into the adjacent provinces, I
therefore wrote to the Minister of
Marine, that "although it might not
be difficult to put down the
revolution in the city, which, even the
land forces could have already
accomplished, had they not been landed at
a distance--yet that without great
circumspection, the prevention of
further revolution in the interior
would be a work of time, trouble, and
expense; and that even all these would
be thrown away, unless the causes
which had led to the rebellion, were
removed or explained."
The time given
having expired without acceptance of the terms, it became
necessary to make at least a shew of
enforcing them, though the water
was too shallow to admit vessels of
large burden to approach with
safety, and the small vessels were ill
adapted to the purpose; still I
determined to make a demonstration,
and as a preparatory step ordered
Captain Welsh, of the Paraguassu, to
shift into the flagship all the
English petty officers and seamen; but
a heavy swell set in, and as the
anchorage was bad, I considered the
risk imprudent.
The schooner
Leopoldina was therefore ordered to try the effect of a
few experimental shells; but the
mortar so shook the vessel, that she
had to be withdrawn, it being evident
that nothing further could be done
till the weather would permit the
approach of ships, or that rafts could
be constructed--for which purpose
timber had been ordered from Bahia.
Little damage was effected by this
experiment, for the wealthiest
inhabitants had fled into the
interior, taking with them all their
valuable property.
Heavy weather
having now set in compelled the flagship to run to Bahia
for safety, the outer road of
Pernambuco being at this season
exceedingly dangerous from the
coralline nature of the bottom, as was
practically proved by the fact that
the Pedro Primiero lost every
anchor but one, so that to remain was
certain destruction, and there was
no alternative but to make for Bahia
to procure anchors.
Nothing had been
heard of General Lima's force since its debarkation, I
was therefore anxious to know what had
become of it, and how far it was
in a condition to cooperate, the
speedy possession of the place being
nautically an important point--for,
whilst blockading we had intercepted
a Portuguese vessel, only forty-three
days from the Tagus, and learned
from her letters that a large force
was preparing at Lisbon, consisting
of sixteen ships of war and numerous
transports, their destination
being Pernambuco; this forming
sufficient proof that the Portuguese
Government counted on the recovery of
those disorganised provinces which
had alike revolted against the mother
country and the Emperor of Brazil.
On the 4th of
September, the flagship left for Bahia, first visiting the
island of Alexo, where the Cacique and
Maranhao were at anchor. From
them we learned that General Lima's
head-quarters were at Leimham, his
advance guard having joined the troops
at Mogado, on the banks of a
river near Cape St. Augustine, the
revolutionary forces occupying the
other bank.
On reaching Bahia,
we received information that the rebel Government at
Pernambuco was in immediate
expectation of several fast sailing vessels,
ordered by the revolutionary President
from North America, and also of
two steamers from England. I therefore
wrote to the Minister of Marine
to send me some superior sailing
vessels, as, if the anticipated
expedition from Lisbon, or those
expected from England and America, made
their appearance, four at least of our
force would, from their bad
sailing, run the risk of being
captured on the first appearance of the
enemy.
On learning the
panic which had been created in Pernambuco, by the show
of bombardment, and its anticipated
repetition in earnest on my return,
General Lima pushed forward towards
the capital with no more formidable
opposition than a few desultory
skirmishes; and on the 11th of
September, with the co-operation of
the naval officers and seamen there
left, took possession of the city,
Carvalho retreating into the
suburbs, where, breaking down the
bridge which united them, he
entrenched himself. On the following
day, it was said that General Lima
found in the treasury 400,000 dollars;
perhaps the same which Carvalho
had offered to me as a bribe to join
the republican party.
The Piranga
arriving at this juncture with a convoy bringing eight
hundred additional troops,
preparations were made to attack Carvalho;
but the insurgent president, making
his escape on a fishing raft, took
refuge on board the British corvette
Tweed, and afterwards got to sea.
During the
interval which elapsed between my departure for Bahia and my
return to Pernambuco, the distribution
of prize money amongst those
entitled to it took place, the
flagship and the Maria de Gloria being
paid at Bahia, and the rest at
Pernambuco. As His Imperial Majesty had
left me altogether unfettered by
orders or instructions, and as he had
given the 200,000 dollars to be used
in furthering the Imperial objects,
I determined not to regard the
advances which had been made at Rio de
Janeiro, as forming any portion of the
reward, especially to the
flagship, which had, unaided, achieved
the more important results of the
late campaign, and was therefore
entitled to a share commensurate with
the arduous exertions of the officers
and crew, now again under my flag.
The subjoined
extracts from the log of my secretary will shew the
periods at which the distribution took
place:--
Sept.10th. Made distribution of prize
money in silver. Sept.15th to 16th.
Went on board the Maria de Gloria, and paid
prize money. Sept. 17th. Paid
Capt. Crosbie, 10,400 dollars in specie. Paid
other officers 5750 dollars. Sept. 18th. Paid
Admiral 4750 dollars. Sept. 27th. Paying
prize money to the Paraguassu and others. Sept. 28th.
Similarly employed. Sept. 30th. Paying
prize money. Oct. 1st to 5th. Paying prize money.
The following were the amounts
disbursed on these occasions, as far as
they appear in my private
memoranda--some doubtless having been lost:--
Dollars.
Disbursements at Rio de Janeiro 70,750 (Paid Squadron as per account, made up
Sept. 23, 1824.) To petty officers and seamen of
flagship, in classes
numbered A to Y, as per pay books
transmitted
by Piranha 18,289 Paid Captain
Crosbie 10,400 "Captain-Lieutenants Carvalho, Grenfell, and
Shepherd, 2250 dollars each 6,750 "Capt. Grenfell,
on account of captures at Para 2,750 "Seven
Lieutenants, at 1500 dollars each 10,500 "Two Lieutenants
at 1000 dollars each 2,000 "Six Lieutenants
at 750 dollars each 4,500 "Lieutenant Ross
as prize master 500 "Maria de Gloria
2,483 "Nitherohy, Carolina, and Paraguassu,
noaccount,
say the same 7,500 "Brig Bahia 274 "Officers and men
of the Piranga 7,053 "Mr. Dean, purser
600 "Lieutenant Ayre 480 "Florencia Jose
da Costa 140 "Gratifications to artisans 419 "To Admiral 4,750 "Secretary, for distribution 5,000 "May and Lukin, prize agents, as per
balanceof
account, July 15, 1824 5,324 Original amount 200,000 Balance to be accounted for 39,538
The above were not
the whole amounts paid, but they are all that a
search amongst my numerous papers at
present furnish; and as the
original accounts, as has been
previously stated, were sent to Rio de
Janeiro, a more precise balance cannot
here be drawn; but even this is
sufficient to carry conviction to any
reasonable mind, that the sums
above stated were disbursed in
ordinary routine, and should make the
Brazilian administration ashamed to
say, that "the First Admiral never
sent in his accounts of the 200,000
dollars entrusted to him," thus
inducing an unworthy inference that
they were not disbursed; though any
man possessed of common understanding
could never believe that a
squadron, constituted as the Brazilian
Marine was, would obey orders and
cheerfully act in unison with me,
knowing that their prize money was on
board--of which I unwarrantably held
possession!
These explanations are more
humiliating to the Brazilian administration
than to myself--though for so many
years the subject of unmerited
obloquy from their denial of accounts
which must unquestionably have
been in the possession of the
Administration of 1825. But I must carry
these explanations yet farther. With
the exception of 4750 dollars for
my own necessities, I took none as my
share, though entitled to an
eighth in all cases, and to a fourth
in the absence of other ships
whenever important services were
performed by the flagship alone.
Neither had I received from the
Imperial Government a single dollar of
the customary emoluments due to me,
though, had these been honestly paid
according to the usages of nations and
the stipulations of the Emperor's
decree of December 11, 1822, my share
ought to have been more than
double the whole amount entrusted to
me to man the ships and satisfy the
officers and men. Still I did not
appropriate the 39,000 dollars which
remained, after paying the men, but
determined to withhold it till I saw
what course the prize tribunal at Rio
de Janeiro intended to pursue;
and, if that course were not
satisfactory, then to appropriate it as a
right, although it was wholly
inadequate to the services rendered, for
which I had been loaded with Imperial
honours and national thanks,
without a shilling of emolument,
notwithstanding the capture of a
hundred and twenty bona fide enemy's
ships--the expulsion of their
fleet and army--and the annexation of
more than one half the empire. But
more of this in another place.
On my return to
Pernambuco, I found General Lima in quiet possession of
the city, and as the Piranga had
brought me instructions from His
Imperial Majesty, that, as soon as
order was restored, a force should
proceed to Para, and depose the,
General-at-Arms there nominated, I
applied to General Lima for a small
military detachment to effect that
object; but he declined--on the
ground, that in the present state of
affairs in Pernambuco, it was not
practicable to diminish his force.
It was not at Para
only that irregularities prevailed: even at Maranham
serious disturbances had broken out,
with the avowed intention, on the
part of the insurgents, of deposing
the Governor acting under the
authority of His Imperial Majesty--to
whom this new attempt at
revolution was as yet unknown. In
short, the order to depose the
General-at-Arms at Para had
unexpectedly resolved itself into the
necessity of tranquillizing the whole
of the Northern provinces, which
were only waiting the result of
Carvalho's measures at Pernambuco,
openly to declare against the Imperial
authority.
The dissatisfaction in the Northern
provinces originated solely in the
anti-Brazilian system of Government
pursued at Rio de Janeiro, which in
the estimation of all at a distance
was Portuguese rather than
Brazilian. As they were either
ignorant, or did not believe, that the
patriotic intentions of the Emperor
were overruled or thwarted by the
Portuguese faction in the
administration, which, holding in reality the
reins of power, left to His Majesty
little more than nominal authority.
It was not, then,
to be wondered at, that the inhabitants of these
distant provinces, who, only a year
before, had welcomed me as their
liberator from Portuguese oppression,
and as the representative of
constitutional authority, should now
be dissatisfied with what they
rightly considered an unnational
system of government--preferring to
submit to a bad government of their
own choosing rather than to one thus
arbitrarily imposed upon them.
To avert
revolution required able presidents, well skilled in the
management of public affairs; but, in
place of these, men of an opposite
character had, for the most part, been
chosen by the administration.
It was no less
essential that the Generals-at-Arms, or military
commandants, should be temperate and
unprejudiced; but those placed in
this responsible position used their
authority in the most obnoxious and
arbitrary manner. It was, no doubt,
difficult to find proper men; or, if
they existed amongst the Brazilians,
the jealousy of the Portuguese
party in the administration prevented
their elevation to power; the aim
of that faction being disorder, as
auxiliary to their anti-imperial
views. This had been strikingly
evinced by the instructions given to
disembark General Lima's force at
Alagoas, instead of near the seat of
disturbance; thus entailing loss of
time and a difficult and tedious
march, which might have ended in
failure, had it not been for the
distraction caused by the threatened
bombardment of Pernambuco by water,
and the demonstration made to shew how
easily it would be effected, when
means for a destructive attack were
complete; the result was,
that--knowing my return from Bahia,
with everything in readiness for an
attack in earnest, could not be
delayed beyond a few days, no serious
opposition was offered to the
occupation of the city by the force under
General Lima.
The reports of
increased disaffection in the Northern provinces becoming
daily more precise, it was necessary
to take advantage of the panic
which the recovery of Pernambuco had
occasioned; the more so, as serious
commotions had arisen, whilst a strong
disposition to revolt was almost
universally manifested. As General
Lima had refused me a military
detachment--and as the Pedro Primeiro
and Piranga could render him
no further assistance, I considered it
more in conformity with His
Majesty's interests to visit the
Northern ports with these ships; taking
also the Cacique and Atalanta, for the
performance of services to
which the larger vessels were not
adapted. The mere presence of these
off the disaffected ports would, I
knew, suffice to restore order, by
affording inferential demonstration
that, if force were required, it was
ready to be applied.
Accordingly,
leaving at Pernambuco the remainder of the squadron, we
sailed on the 10th of October for Rio
Grande do Norte, where great
confusion prevailed amongst the
inhabitants, threatened by the
insurgents in the adjacent province of
Ceara, on account of their
abandonment of revolutionary designs
in consequence of events at
Pernambuco.
Arriving off the
Rio Grande on the 12th, I requested information from
the President, relative to the state
of the maritime towns and provinces
between Rio Grande and Para,
especially with regard to Ceara. The
nature of the reply determined me at
once to proceed to the latter
place, though regretting the necessity
of going farther to leeward, on
account of the time which would be
occupied in getting back to Rio de
Janeiro; yet feeling assured that it
would not be satisfactory to His
Majesty, were we to return without
ascertaining more particularly the
condition of the North, and without
contributing to the restoration of
tranquillity.
Arriving off Ceara
on the 18th, I sent a communication to the President,
requiring him to make known my arrival
for the purpose of restoring
order, and promising that all
disaffected persons who, within fourteen
days, should return to their
allegiance, would be permitted to retire
quietly to their homes, and would not
in any way be molested on account
of their previous acts or opinions.
A deputation of
the inhabitants came off to the flagship, asking me to
land as large a force as I could
spare, but as General Lima had declined
to supply a military detachment, it
was out of my power to comply; for
the roadstead being unsafe, and the
flagship nearly aground, I could not
dispense with the English seamen,
whilst the Portuguese portion of the
crews was not to be trusted. Besides
which, the foreign seamen were not
adapted to garrisoning a town.
The application
was, therefore, evaded; but with an assurance to the
President that, should the insurgents
advance, we would render effectual
assistance; reminding him, however,
that the inhabitants ought to be
induced to adopt amongst themselves,
measures for their own protection
and preservation of tranquillity,
which results were perfectly within
their power; and would render
unnecessary the presence of military.
I however landed a
small detachment for the purpose of ascertaining the
means of defence, as well as in the
hope of exciting the authorities on
shore to some degree of activity in
their own cause. In case of attack,
I promised to disembark for their
assistance the whole of the men who
could be spared; at the same time
giving permission to withdraw to the
ships in case of sudden emergency,
which might not admit of
communication with me in time.
This offer
produced the best effect in the city, giving confidence to
the well-affected, whilst, as the
discontented were ignorant of the
extent of aid that could be afforded,
they deemed it wisest to keep
quiet. On the following day, the
inhabitants returned to their
allegiance, the officiating President
hoisting the Imperial flag on the
ramparts with his own hands, amidst
every demonstration of general
satisfaction.
I next caused
despatches to be sent to all quarters of the province,
announcing the return of the city to
its allegiance, promising oblivion
of the past to all who followed the
example, and this was succeeded by a
general acknowledgment of the Imperial
authority. Confidential agents,
entrusted with similar despatches,
were likewise sent to the
revolutionary forces headed by Bizarra,
the rebel General-at-Arms, the
whole of whose troops abandoned him;
whilst, by similar agency, the
corps, under the immediate command of
the revolutionary president,
Araripe, was reduced to a hundred
men--even the Indians, without
exception, abandoning his standard.
As one of the
first steps towards the pacification of the province, I
had published not only a general
amnesty, but also a particular amnesty,
offering to the insurgent leaders
themselves especial pardon, from
which, in ordinary general amnesty,
they might otherwise imagine
themselves excluded, I had, in my own
mind, determined upon this as a
general course to be pursued, as I
could not but see that, in the outset
of the revolt, both insurgents and
leaders had good cause to be
dissatisfied with the central
Government at Rio de Janeiro. I had even
addressed a letter personally to the
revolutionary president, Araripe,
remonstrating upon the folly of the
course he was pursuing, and
promising my protection to himself, as
well as to the other
revolutionary leaders, if they would
return to their allegiance. He
chose rather to withdraw into the
interior, with the discontented who
adhered to him, intending, no doubt,
to wait till the naval force had
retired. Foreseeing the danger of
this, I issued a proclamation,
offering a reward for his capture,
sufficient to induce the Indians who
had previously been his supporters to
proceed in quest of him, the
result being that he himself was
killed, and the whole of his followers
captured. The Indian chiefs, as well
as their dependants, were of great
service in the restoration of order,
combining superior bodily strength
and activity, with energy, docility,
and unfailing power of endurance
--forming, indeed, the best specimens
of the native race I had seen in
South America.
Previous to this I
had succeeded, without much trouble, in restoring
tranquillity to the province of
Parahyba, which had also been disturbed
by the mandates of Araripe; the
inhabitants complying with his orders,
from the immediate danger to which
they were exposed by his violence,
and being under the impression that
Rio de Janeiro was too far distant
to afford them succour. Their delight
at finding a squadron at hand was,
therefore, immediately followed by a
repudiation of the insurgent chief,
and a return to unqualified
allegiance.
My next endeavour was to organise an
effective force at Ceara, and this
was accomplished by the embodiment of
more than a thousand men, though
we had not a soldier in the squadron.
Various corps were also raised
in the towns and villages of the
province, and were active in pursuit of
the scattered remains of the
republican army.
Having thus
assured myself of the complete restoration of order in the
capital and province of Ceara, and
addressed a proclamation to the
inhabitants, pointing out to them the
folly of being misled by designing
persons, who could have no accurate
knowledge of matters which formed
the ground of complaint against the
Imperial Government, we sailed on
the 4th of November for Maranham,
which province was found in a state of
even greater anarchy than had
prevailed at Ceara. |