REMONSTRANCE AGAINST DECREE OF PRIZE
TRIBUNAL--SETTLEMENT OF PRIZE QUESTION BY THE EMPEROR--HIS
MINISTERS REFUSE TO CONFORM TO IT--OBSTACLES THROWN IN THE
WAY OF EQUIPMENT--MY SERVICES LIMITED TO THE DURATION OF
WAR--MY REMONSTRANCE ON THIS BREACH OF FAITH--MINISTERS
REFUSE TO PAY THE SQUADRON ANYTHING--A FRESH INSULT OFFERED
TO ME--OFFER TO RESIGN THE COMMAND--MY RESIGNATION
EVADED--LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER--LETTER TO THE MINISTER
OF MARINE.
On the 1st of January, 1824, I communicated to the Minister
of Marine
the contents of a despatch received
from Captain Haydon at Pernambuco,
in which he apprised me of a plot on
the part of the revolutionary
Government to seize his person and
take possession of the Imperial brig
of war which he commanded; the latter
intention having been openly
advocated in the Assembly.
On the 6th, I
addressed to the Minister of Marine the following
remonstrance against the
before-mentioned regulation of the Admiralty
Court, that vessels captured within a
certain distance of the shore
should not be prize to the captor;
this regulation being evidently
intended as retrospective, with a view
of nullifying the captures which
had already been made:--
As I have before
endeavoured, by anticipating evils, to prevent
their occurrence, so in the present
instance, I feel it my duty to
His Imperial Majesty to place you, as
Minister of Marine, on your
guard against countenancing any such
measure in regard either to
the vessels captured in the blockade
of Bahia, or to those taken
in the colonial possessions, and under
the forts and batteries
of the enemy--and also in the case--if
such there should be--of
vessels captured on the shores of
Portugal.
It is quite clear that these cases of
capture are distinct from
those in which protection is afforded
by independent states to
belligerents approaching within a
certain distance of neutral shores.
But you must be perfectly aware that,
if enemy's ships are not to
be prize--if captured navigating near
the shore no blockade can be
effective, as there will be no right
to disturb them; besides which
the mass of the people engaged in a
naval service will certainly not
encounter toil and hazard without
remuneration of any kind beyond
their ordinary pay.
Should such a
decree be really in contemplation, there is nothing
to hope from the naval service useful
or creditable to the state;
and this opinion is founded on more
than thirty years' unremitting
experience of seamen--that where there
is no premium there is no
permanent zeal or exertion.
(Signed) COCHRANE
& MARANHAO.
On the 10th of January, I communicated
to the Government the contents of
another despatch from Captain Haydon,
at Pernambuco, reporting that the
new Junta there had seized the
Imperial ship of war, Independencia ou
morte, and had removed the officer in
command, at the same time
threatening to treat Captain Haydon as
a pirate.
The revolt was now becoming serious,
and His Majesty--anxious to
expedite the equipment of the
squadron--on the 12th of February, 1824,
sent for me to consult on the subject.
Having told His Majesty the
course which had been pursued by the
prize tribunal, he said he would
see justice done in spite of faction,
and asked me to make a moderate
valuation of the prize property taken
in the late campaign,
ascertaining, at the same time, if the
seamen were willing to accept a
specific sum in compensation of their
claims? On asking His Majesty what
assurance could be given that the
administration would carry out such an
arrangement, he replied that he would
give me his own assurance, and
ordering me to sit down beside him,
wrote with his own hand the
following proposal--now in my
possession:--
"The Government is ready to pay to
the squadron, the value of the
prizes which have been, or may be
judged bad, the value thereof being
settled by arbitrators jointly chosen,
and to pay the proprietors
their losses and damages; that in the
number of the said prizes, the
frigate Imperatrice is not included,
but the Government, as a
remuneration for her capture, will
immediately give from the public
treasury the sum of 40,000 milreis to
the captors; that the value of
the prizes already declared bad, shall
be immediately paid, this
stipulation relating to all captures
up to the present date, February
12th, and that henceforth captures
shall be adjudged with more
dispatch, the Government being about
to decree a provisional
arrangement, remedying all errors and
omissions that may have
occurred."
Nothing can be
more clear than the above stipulations in His Majesty's
own handwriting, to pay the squadron
immediately the value of their
prizes despite the Court of Admiralty,
to pay 40,000 milreis for theImperatrice,
and that even the value of the prizes adjudged bad
should be paid, His Majesty thus
rightly estimating the conduct and
motives of the Court of Admiralty.
Not one of these conditions was ever
complied with!
On the 1st of
March, His Majesty, through his minister, Francisco
Villela Barbosa, informed me that he
had assigned 40,000 milreis in
recompense for the acquisition of the
frigate Imperatrice; stating
that, with regard to the other prizes
made at Para, they must be
sentenced by the tribunal, in order
that their value might be paid by
the public treasury--the said treasury
taking upon itself to satisfy all
costs and damages on captures judged
illegal; but that with regard to my
assertion, that there were amongst
them no illegal prizes, the
Government could not itself decide the
question.
That His Majesty gave the order for
payment of 40,000 milreis, as
compensation for the Imperatrice,
there is no doubt; but not a
shilling of the amount was ever paid
by his ministers, nevertheless even
within the past few months the present
Brazilian Ministry has charged
that sum against me, as having been
received and not accounted for! It
is quite possible, that, in ignorance
of the practices common amongst
their predecessors of 1824, the
present ministers of Brazil may imagine
that the orders of His Majesty were
complied with; but if so, the 40,000
milreis never reached me or the
squadron. Had it done so, nothing can be
more easy than to find my receipt for
the amount, which I defy them to
do.
Considering our
difficulties in a fair way of now being settled, I
willingly undertook to conciliate the
seamen, and having made the low
calculation of Rs. 650.000 milreis--a
sum scarcely one-fourth the
value of the prize property--reported
to the Minister of Marine the
willingness of the squadron generally
to accept 600,000 dollars (about
L.120,000) in compensation of their
full rights; agreeing, moreover, to
give up all claim on the Imperial
Government on payment of one-half, and
security for the remainder.
Notwithstanding
this easy mode of arrangement, solely brought about by
my personal influence with the men,
not a milrea was allotted, His
Majesty's ministers deliberately
evading the Imperial wishes and
promises. On the contrary, the more
His Majesty was determined to do the
squadron justice the more was the
Portuguese faction in the ministry
bent on frustrating the Imperial
intentions--notwithstanding that, by
the revolutionary proceedings in the
North, the integrity of the empire
was at stake. I may indeed go farther
and state with great truth, that
whilst His Majesty was most anxious
for our speedy departure, in order
to suppress the revolution at
Pernambuco, his ministers were, day by
day, addressing to me letters on the
most insignificant subjects, with
the apparent object of delaying the
squadron by official frivolities,
the necessity of replying to which
would prevent my attention to the
fulfilment of the Imperial wish. The
best proof of this is the fact
which will be apparent in the course
of this chapter, viz.--that
although the province of Pernambuco
was in open revolt, the
Administration contrived to delay the
sailing of the squadron for six
months beyond the events just
narrated.
On the 24th of
February, the following extraordinary portaria was
transmitted to me by the Minister of
Marine:--
Desiring to give a further testimony
of the high estimation in which
the Marquis of Maranhao, First Admiral
of the National and Imperial
Armada, is held, by reason of the
distinguished services which he
has rendered to the state, and which
it is hoped that he will
continue to render for the
independence of Brazil, I deem it proper
to name him Commander-in-Chief of all
the naval forces of the empire
during the present war. The Supreme
Military Council is hereby
informed thereof, and will cause this
decree to be executed.
Palace of Rio
Janeiro, the 23rd of February, 1824. Third of the
Independence of the Empire, with the
Rubrica of His Imperial
Majesty.
FRANCISCO VILLELA
BARBOSA,
Secretariat of State,
27th February,
1824.
(Signed) ANASTASIO DE BRITO,
Acting Chief
Secretary.
The audacity of
this portaria--setting
aside the stipulations of His
Majesty and his late ministers in my
commission, thus rendering it null
and void without my consent--was only
equalled by its hypocrisy. As a
"further testimony of the high
estimation in which I was held,"
&c.--His Majesty's ministers were
graciously pleased to annul my
commission, in order that they might
get rid of me at a moment's
warning!
The document
transmitted to me did not bear the Rubrica of the
Emperor, though falsely asserted so to
do. If the reader will take the
trouble to compare it with my two
commissions, he will agree with me in
the inference that it was written by
Barbosa without the Emperor's
knowledge or consent, with the object
of terminating my command--the
Imperial patents notwithstanding, as
will be evident from the
expression, "during the present
war;" the war being already ended by
my expulsion of the Portuguese fleet
and army.
No time was lost in remonstrating
against this insidious decree. After
pointing out to the Minister of Marine
the agreements which had been
made with me by the late ministers,
and ratified by the Imperial sign
manual, I addressed His Excellency as
follows:--
The late decree inserted in the
Gazette of February 28th, instead of
increasing my official rank and
authority--as it professes to do--in
effect circumscribes it, because
there was no limitation of time in
the offer which I accepted from His
Imperial Majesty. But by this
decree, my official rank and authority
are limited to the duration of
the present war. Now, if I could
believe that the idea of this
limitation originated with his
Imperial Majesty himself, I should
respectfully and silently acquiesce;
but being satisfied--from the
gracious manner in which he has been
pleased to act towards me on all
occasions--that it did not so
originate, I can only consider it an
intimation of an opinion prevalent in
the councils of the state, that
myself and services can very well be
done without, as soon as the
independence of Brazil shall be
decided or peace restored.
As no man can be
expected to dedicate his professional services
to a foreign country, without having a
prospect of some recompence
more durable than that which such a
limitation as is expressed in the
document in question seems to
indicate, I am naturally led to inquire
whether it is the intention of His
Majesty's advisers that, on the
termination of the present war, my
pay is to cease with my
authority? or whether I am to receive
any permanent reward for
services, the consequences of which
will be permanent to Brazil?
Because--if no recompence is to be
received for public services
--however important and lasting in
their effects those services may
be--it is a duty to myself and family
to consider how far I am
justified in farther devoting my time
to a service from which so
little future benefit is to be
expected; a consideration the more
interesting to me, in consequence of
repeated solicitations from the
Chilian Government to resume my rank
and command in that state.
In saying thus
much, you may consider me of a mercenary
disposition; but I have received from
Brazil no recompence whatever,
beyond the honours conferred by His
Imperial Majesty. If
you will peruse the accompanying
papers, you will find that when I
left Chili I had disbursed of my own
monies, 66,000 dollars, to keep
the Chilian squadron from starving,
which sum, in consequence of
my leaving Chili, and accepting the
offers of His Imperial Majesty,
has not been repaid. This amount His
Majesty and his ministers
agreed to repay on my acceptance of
the command; but I declined
to seek reimbursement at the expense
of Brazil, "unless I
should perform greater services to the
Empire than I had rendered
to Chili; but in the event of such
services being rendered to
Brazil, and of Chili continuing its
refusal to pay me, then--and
not otherwise--I should hope for
indemnification." To this
stipulation the late ministers gave
their assent.
It is no proof of an avaricious
disposition that I at once
acquiesced in the proposition of His
Imperial Majesty, that 40,000
dollars only for the Imperatrice,
which is not one-third of her value,
should be apportioned to her captors.
(Signed) COCHRANE
AND MARANHAO.
I might have added that the squadron
had received no emoluments of any
kind whatever, notwithstanding the
spontaneous stipulations of His
Imperial Majesty to pay everything,
there not being even an indication
of handing over to them the 40,000
dollars awarded by His Majesty for
the frigate captured at Para. On the
contrary, I had been condemned in
costs and damages to a great amount
for having captured Portuguese
vessels in pursuance of His Majesty's
orders; so that had the Court of
Admiralty been in a position to
enforce these, I should not only be
unpaid but be mulcted of a very large
sum, as the price of having
accepted the command of the Brazilian
navy!
So far from the 40,000 dollars awarded
by His Majesty for the capture of
the frigate Imperatrice having been
paid according to the Imperial
directions, I received from the
Minister of Marine a letter dated
February 27th, implying that the above
sum--one third the value of the
vessel--was when paid, to be
considered as the sole reward of the
squadron. This violation of His
Majesty's agreement was at once
repudiated, and an explanatory letter
from the Minister of
Marine--almost as ambiguous as the
former--assured me that I had
misconstrued his intention, which,
however, was not the case, for the
40,000 dollars were never paid.
On the 19th of
March, a direct insult was offered me by Severiano da
Costa, now first minister, by an
intimation to attend in the Imperial
chapel for the purpose of assisting at
the ceremony of swearing to the
Constitution, but I was distinctly
told that I should not be permitted
to swear; the reason no doubt being,
that, by a clause therein
contained, military officers who swore
to it, could not be dismissed
without trial, and sentence of court
martial; so that the not permitting
me to swear--coupled with Barbosa's portaria
limiting my command to
the duration of the war--indirectly
gave power to the Administration to
dismiss me at their option, whenever
they might deem it expedient so to
do. That such desire would arise the
moment an opportunity might
present itself, was certain, nor
should I have waited for its
expression, but from respectful
attachment to His Majesty, and from the
expectation of obtaining justice for
the squadron, which relied on me
for procuring satisfaction of their
claims.
To have accepted an invitation of this
public nature, under
circumstances so insulting, was out of
the question. I therefore joined
Lady Cochrane at the island of
Governador, and sent an excuse to the
minister expressive of my regret at
being prevented by unavoidable
circumstances from sharing in the
honour of the august ceremony.
In consequence of
the insulting conduct of the Administration, and the
impossibility of obtaining
compensation for the squadron,
notwithstanding His Majesty's orders
to that effect, I made up my mind
to quit a service in which the
authority of the adverse Ministry was
superior to that of the Sovereign.
Accordingly, on the 20th of March, I
addressed to the Minister of Marine a
letter, from which the subjoined
is an extract:--
If I thought that
the course pursued towards me was dictated by His
Imperial Majesty, it would be
impossible for me to remain an hour
longer in his service, and I should
feel it my duty, at the earliest
possible moment, to lay my commission
at his feet. If I have not done
so before--from the treatment which,
in common with the navy, I have
experienced--it has been solely from
an anxious desire to promote His
Majesty's real interests. Indeed, to
struggle against prejudices, and
at the same time against those in
power, whose prepossessions are at
variance with the interests of His
Majesty, and the tranquillity and
independence of Brazil, is a task to
which I am by no means equal. I
am, therefore, perfectly willing to
resign the situation I hold,
rather than contend against
difficulties which appear to me
insurmountable. I have only to add,
that it will give me extreme
satisfaction to find that Your
Excellency is enabled to rear an
effective marine out of the materials
which constituted the fabric of
the old marine of Portugal--or any
Brazilian marine at all, without
beginning on principles totally
opposite to those which have been
pursued since my return to this port.
(Signed) COCHRANE
AND MARANHAO.
This proffer of resignation was met by
an assurance that I had
misconstrued both the acts and
intentions of the Administration, and the
expression of a hope that I would not
think of abandoning Brazil for
which I had done so much. The real
fact was, that although the
Administration was endeavouring to
delay the expedition for the
suppression of revolution in the
North, they were afraid of its results,
dreading that a republican
Government might be established, as was
indeed imminent. It was only from a
conviction of not being able to meet
such an emergency, otherwise than
through my instrumentality--that my
resignation was not accepted.
Determined to
pursue the course I had now begun, I addressed the
following letter to the prime
minister:--
Rio de Janeiro, March 30, 1824.
Most Excellent
Sir,
The late Prime Minister, Jose
Bonifacio de Andrada
e Silva, was pleased to express a
desire that I should communicate
directly with him in all extraordinary
difficulties with respect
to the naval service. If I have not
had recourse to your Excellency
until the present juncture, it has not
been from any doubt of your
readiness to accord me similar
indulgence, but because the evils
of which I had to complain were so
palpable, that I conceived a
remedy would--of necessity be applied
in the ordinary course of
things. But now that a system is
adopted which must very soon
bring the naval service of His
Imperial Majesty to utter insignificance
and ruin, I can no longer abstain from
calling on your
Excellency as Minister of State for
the internal affairs of the
empire, to interfere before it is too
late.
Here follow complaints of the wretched
state of the squadron--its
want of repairs--the neglect of
pay--the illegal imprisonment of
officers for months without trial and
on untenable grounds, &c. &c.
By the promises
held out last year of punctuality in payment, and of
other rewards, foreign officers and
seamen were induced to enter the
service--believing in the good faith
of the Government. The
result--in the short period that has
elapsed--has been the complete
expulsion of the enemy's forces, naval
and military; all of whom
would have been still in arms against
the independence of Brazil, had
it not been for the assistance of the
foreign officers and seamen.
In the course of
these important services, various captures were
made and sent for adjudication to Rio
de Janeiro, under the
authority of His Imperial Majesty's
orders to make war on the
subjects and property of Portugal. The
captures made in prosecution
of the war were--according to the
engagements under which the
expedition proceeded--to be the reward
of the captors in return for
the benefits derived by the empire for
their exertions.
Judge then, Sir,
of the astonishment of the officers and seamen
at finding on their return to this
port eight months afterwards, that
the Court of Admiralty (chiefly
composed of natives of Portugal)
pretended to be ignorant whether the
nation was at war or peace!
Under this plea they have avoided the
adjudication of the
prizes--have thrown every impediment in the way of
the captors--by giving
sentences equally contrary to law,
common sense and justice.
Great quantities
of goods in the captured ships have decayed or
wholly perished from lapse of
time--great quantities more have
been stolen--whilst whole cargoes, by
the arbitrary authority of an
auditor, have been given up without
trial, to pretended owners,
without even the decency of
communication to the captors or their
agents. In short, nothing has been
done in furtherance of the
gracious directions of His Majesty,
given on the 12th ultimo, that
the prize affairs should be instantly
adjusted.
It is certainly a hardship to the
Portuguese gentlemen in the
Court of Admiralty, to be under the
necessity of condemning
property that belonged to their
countrymen, friends, and relations;
but if they have undertaken the duties
of such an office, they ought
not to be permitted to weigh their
private feelings against their
public duty--nor to bring upon the
whole Government that character
of bad faith, which has been so
disgraceful, and has proved so
injurious to all the Governments which
have hitherto been
established in South America.
Even the payment
of wages was not made to the Pedro Primiero
till nearly three months after her
return, when the seamen--
irritated by the evasion of their
dues--had nearly all abandoned the
ship; and if the crews of the Nitherohy
and Carolina did not follow
their example on their return to port,
it was entirely owing to my
perseverance before their arrival in
procuring this tardy justice.
It was a maxim of
the Emperor Napoleon, that "no events are
trifling with regard to nations and
sovereigns, their destinies
being controlled by the most
inconsiderable circumstances,"--
though circumstances which have the
effect of causing the Imperial
marine to be abandoned, ought not--in
a national point of view--to
be regarded as inconsiderable; but
whether this be of importance
or not, the consequences of such
abandonment by men who have so
faithfully performed their duty, will
be far from beneficial to those
short sighted and vain individuals who
imagine that the employment
of foreign officers is an obstacle to
their own advancement.
If the present foreign officers are
compelled to abandon their
situations an explanation must be
given of the cause, and public
indignation must inevitably fall on
the unreflecting heads of the
prejudiced or selfish authors of such
impolitic injustice.
I have heard it
stated, as a motive for the delay in condemning
the prizes, that the Government--in
case of a treaty of peace--
might be called upon to refund the
value to the original owners.
But, Sir, let me ask such wretched
statesmen, what would have
been the situation of Brazil, if
foreign officers and seamen had
refused to enter the service--as would
have been the case, had no
prize money been promised? In that
case, it is true, the vessels
in question would not have been
taken--but it is equally true that
the enemy's troops would not have been
starved into the evacuation
of Bahia, nor their squadron have been
intimidated to flee from
these shores. Military warfare would
still have raged in the
interior, and the hostile fleet might
now have been engaged in the
blockade of Rio de Janeiro itself.
Would it not be infinitely better
that the Government should have to pay
the value of these prizes
even twice over--than that such
calamities should not have been
averted?
But how can it be
argued that the Government may be required
to restore to the enemy prizes
lawfully taken in war? Is it possible
that the victors can be compelled to
make humiliating terms with
the vanquished? Certainly not--unless
the means by which victory
was obtained are insanely sacrificed,
by permitting the squadron to
go to ruin and decay. The results
which have been obtained could
not have been accomplished by any
other measures than those
adopted by the wisdom of His Imperial
Majesty. Is it then
justifiable, to suffer the engagements
which produced such results
to be evaded and set at nought? Still
more monstrous--decrees
have been passed, both by the Auditor
of Marine and the Court of
Admiralty, to punish the captors for
the execution of their duty,
and by means of pains and penalties to
deter them from the performance
of it in future.
It is even more
unjust and inconsistent, that although His
Majesty's late ministers held out that
ships of war were to be prize
to the captors, they are now declared
to be the property of the state!
Do those narrow-minded persons who
prompted such a decree,
imagine this to be a saving to the
country? or do they expect that
seamen--especially foreign
seamen--will fight heartily on such
terms? The power which the British
navy has acquired arises
from the wisdom of the government in
making the interests of the
officers and men identical with the
interests of the state, which
gives bounties and premiums even in
addition to the full value of
the prizes; whilst the insignificance
and inefficiency of the navies
of governments which adopt opposite
principles, sufficiently
indicate whether such liberality, or
the want of it, is the best policy
in maritime affairs.
Having said thus
much on public matters, I shall very briefly
trouble you with respect to myself, by
stating that, as regards all
which does not depend on the
uncontrolled exercise of the Imperial
functions--there has been no respect
paid to the written stipulations
entered into with me on accepting the
command of the Brazilian
navy, and that since my return from
freeing the Northern provinces
and uniting them to the Empire, every
promise--written and verbal--has
been evaded or set at nought, which
facts I am prepared to
prove beyond the possibility of
contradiction.
My nature is not
suspicious, nor did I ever become doubtful of
promises and professions of friendship
till after the third year of
my connection with Chili--when, having
swept every ship of war
belonging to the enemy from the
Pacific, the Chilian ministers
imagined that they could dispense with
my services. They had
not, indeed, the candour which I have
experienced here, for, after
appointing me to a command without
limitation as to time, they did
not publicly restrict the duration of
that command to the earliest
moment that they could dispense with
me. It was their
plan--while openly professing kindness and
gratitude--to endeavour, by secret
artifices, to render me odious to the
public, and to transfer to me
the responsibility which they
themselves incurred by bringing the
navy to ruin, and causing the seamen
to abandon it, by withholding
their pay, and even the provisions
necessary for their subsistence.
As for the rest, my remonstrances
against such conduct were treated
in Chili just as my representations
have been treated here. Like
causes will ever produce similar
effects; but as there was no hostile
or Spanish party in the Chilian state,
four years elapsed before
the mischiefs could be accomplished,
which, by the machinations of
the Portuguese faction, have been here
effected in the short space
of four months.
Truths are often
disagreeable to those who are not in the habit
of hearing them, and doubly offensive
after long experience of the
homage of blind obedience and
subserviency. I have, nevertheless,
always felt it my duty to the
Governments under which I have
served, not to abstain from uttering
truths under any dread of
offence, because I have ever been
impressed with the conviction
that speaking truth is not only the
most honourable mode of
proceeding, but that the time seldom
fails to arrive when those who
are warned of a wrong line of conduct
feel grateful to the man--who
at the risk of personal inconvenience,
or even punishment--dared
to apprise them of their danger.
In England--where
mischiefs were heaped upon me for opposing a
ministerial vote of parliamentary
thanks to an undeserving
officer--the people at once saw the
propriety of my conduct, and the
Government has since virtually
admitted its justice. In Chili, the
ministers who hated me, because they
knew me to be aware of their
deceitful and dishonest acts, were
succeeded by others who have
solicited my return. And the worthy
and excellent Supreme Director
(O'Higgins, whom those ministers, by
their wickedness and folly,
brought to ruin) found at last, and
acknowledged--but too late to
attend to my warnings--that I had
acted towards him, in all cases,
with honour and fidelity.
The error and fate
of the excellent and eminent person whom I
have just named--affords a proof of
the folly and danger of the
notion--that ministers who have
forfeited the confidence of the
public by breach of faith and evil
acts, can be upheld by military
force against public opinion,
especially in Governments recently
constituted. The people respected
their Supreme Director; but
when he marshalled his troops to
uphold his evil ministers, he fell
with them. Had he adopted the policy
of Cromwell, and delivered
to justice those who merited
punishment, he would have saved
himself.
Permit me to say,
in conclusion, that the Ministers of His Imperial
Majesty are identified with the Court
of Admiralty, and with
the officers whom they maintain in the
different departments.
Let them--I repeat--take heed that the
operation of similar causes
does not produce like effects; for if
the conduct of these individuals
shall cause the naval service to be
abandoned, and shall thereby--as
a necessary consequence--occasion
great disasters to the Empire,
I am convinced that in a short period,
all the troops in Rio de
Janeiro will not be able to repress
the storm that will be raised
against the factious Portuguese.
It is my fervent
hope--that His Imperial Majesty, by gloriously
adhering to the cause of independence
and to Brazil, will save and
unite the largest portion of his royal
patrimony in defiance of the
blind efforts of Portugal, and in
spite of the cunning intrigues of the
Portuguese faction here, to prolong
civil war, and create dismemberment
and disunion.
I have the honour
to be,
&c. &c.
COCHRANE AND MARANHAO.
His Excellency
Joao Severiano Maciel de Costa,
Chief Minister of State, &c. &c.
One effect of the
preceding letter was--that the Court of Admiralty
requested my consent to give up
certain prize property, the object being
to construe my acquiescence as
regarded a small portion--into a
precedent for giving up the remainder.
This was firmly refused on the
ground of its being a fraud on the
captors. |