ATTEMPT TO CUT OFF THE ENEMY'S
SHIPS--DISOBEDIENCE TO ORDERS--LETTER TO THE PRIME
MINISTER--WORTHLESSNESS OF THE MEN--THEIR
TREACHERY--BLOCKADE ESTABLISHED--EQUIPMENT OF
FIRESHIPS--ENEMY'S SUPPLIES CUT OFF--PORTUGUESE
UNTRUSTWORTHY--DEMONSTRATIONS OF THE ENEMY--HIS PRETENDED
CONTEMPT FOR US--THE ENEMY RETURNS TO PORT--THEIR
CONSTERNATION AT THE FIRESHIPS--PORTUGUESE CONTEMPLATE
ATTACKING US--FLAGSHIP RECONNOITRES ENEMY AT
ANCHOR--EXCESSIVE ALARM AT MY NOCTURNAL VISIT--PROCLAMATION
OF THE COMMANDANT--CONSTERNATION IN THE CITY--THE
AUTHORITIES DECIDE ON EVACUATING BAHIA--INSTRUCTIONS TO THE
BRAZILIAN CAPTAINS--WARNINGS ADDRESSED TO THE
AUTHORITIES--ENEMY QUITS BAHIA--READINESS FOR CHASE--NUMBERS
OF THE ENEMY--CAPTURE OF THE CONVOY--PRIZES
DISABLED--ATTEMPT OF TROOPS TO ESCAPE--PRIZES SENT TO
PERNAMBUCO--PURSUIT DISCONTINUED--REASONS FOR GOING TO
MARANHAM--REASONS FOR NOT TAKING MORE PRIZES--ADVANTAGES TO
THE EMPIRE.
On the 3rd of April, we put to sea with a squadron of four
ships only,
viz. the Pedro Primiero, Captain
Crosbie, Piranga, Captain Jowett,
Maria de Gloria, Captain Beaurepaire,
and Liberal, Captain
Garcao--two others which accompanied
us, viz. the Guarani, Captain de
Coito, and Real, Captain de Castro,
were intended as fireships. Two
vessels of war, the Paraguassu and the
Nitherohy, being incomplete
in their equipment, were of necessity
left behind.
The Nitherohy, Captain Taylor, joined
on the 29th of April, and on the
1st of May we made the coast of Bahia.
On the 4th, we made the
unexpected discovery of thirteen sail
to leeward, which proved to be the
enemy's fleet leaving port with a view
of preventing or raising the
blockade. Shortly afterwards the
Portuguese Admiral formed line of
battle to receive us, his force
consisting of one ship of the line, five
frigates, five corvettes, a brig, and
schooner.
Regularly to attack a more numerous
and better trained squadron with our
small force, manned by undisciplined
and--as had been ascertained on the
Voyage--disaffected crews, was out of
the question. On board the
flagship there were only a hundred and
sixty English and American
seamen, the remainder consisting of
the vagabondage of the capital, with
a hundred and thirty black marines,
just emancipated from slavery.
Nevertheless, observing an opening in
the enemy's line, which would
enable us to cut off their four
rearmost ships, I made signals
accordingly, and with the flagship
alone gave the practical example of
breaking the line, firing into their
frigates as we passed. The
Portuguese Admiral promptly sent
vessels to the aid of the four cut off,
when, hauling our wind on the larboard
tack, we avoided singly a
collision with the whole squadron, but
endeavoured to draw the enemy's
ships assisting into a position where
they might be separately attacked
to advantage.
Had the rest of
the Brazilian squadron come down in obedience to
signals, the ships cut off might have
been taken or dismantled, as, with
the flagship I could have kept the
others at bay, and no doubt have
crippled all in a position to render
them assistance. To my astonishment
the signals were disregarded, and--for
reasons which will presently be
adduced--no efforts were made to
second my operations.
For some time the
action was continued by the Pedro Primiero alone,
but to my mortification the fire of
the flagship was exceedingly
ill-directed. A still more untoward
circumstance occurred in the
discovery that two Portuguese seamen
who had been stationed to hand up
powder, were not only withholding it,
but had made prisoners of the
powder boys who came to obtain it!
This would have been serious but for
the promptitude of Captain Grenfell,
who, rushing upon the men, dragged
them on deck; but to continue the
action under such circumstances was
not to be thought of; and as the enemy
had more than double our
numerical force, I did not consider
myself warranted in further
attempting, with greater hazard, what
on a future opportunity might be
accomplished with less. Quitting the
enemy's ships cut off, we therefore
hauled our wind, to join the vessels
which had kept aloof, and to
proceed to the station previously
appointed as the rendezvous of the
squadron, whither the fireships were
to follow. In this affair no lives
were lost.
Extremely annoyed
at this failure, arising from non-fulfilment of
orders, and finding, from experience
on the voyage, that we had been
hurried to sea, without consideration
as to the materials of which the
squadron was composed, a rigid inquiry
was instituted, which gave me
such cogent reasons for losing all
confidence in it, that on the day
following I considered it expedient to
address the following letter to
the Prime Minister, Andrada, pointing
out that if prompt steps were not
taken to add to our strength, by
providing more efficient crews, the
result might be to compromise the
interests of the empire, no less than
the character of the officers
commanding.
(Secret) H.I.M.S. Pedro Primiero, at
Sea,
May 5, 1823.
MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,
Availing myself of
your permission to address you
upon points of a particular nature,
and referring you to my public
despatches to the Minister of Marine,
I beg leave to add that it
was not only unfavourable winds which
retarded our progress, but
the extreme bad sailing of the Piranga
and Liberal. Neither these
ships nor the Nitherohy, which sails
equally ill, are adapted to the
purposes to be effected, as from their
slowness, the enemy has an
opportunity to force an action under
any circumstances, however
disadvantageous to this undisciplined
squadron. The Real is no
better, and her total uselessness as a
ship of war, has determined
me to prepare her as a fireship, there
appearing no probability of the
others joining.
From the defective
sailing and manning of the squadron it
seems, indeed, to me, that the Pedro
Primiero is the only one
that can assail an enemy's ship of
war, or act in the face of a
superior force, so as not to
compromise the interests of the empire
and the character of the officers
commanding. Even this ship--in
common-with the rest--is so
ill-equipped as to be much less
efficient than she otherwise would be.
This letter, you
will observe, is not intended to meet the public
eye, but merely to put the Government
in possession of facts
necessary for its information.
Our cartridges are
all unfit for service, and I have been obliged
to cut up every flag and ensign that
could be spared, to render them
serviceable, so as to prevent the
men's arms being blown off whilst
working the guns, and also to prevent
the constant necessity of
sponging, &c. which, from the time it
consumes, diminishes the
effective force of the ships fully one
half.
The guns are without locks--which they
ought to have had in
order to their being efficient.
The sails of this
ship are all rotten--the light and baffling airs on
our way hither, having beaten one set
to pieces, and the others
are hourly giving way to the slightest
breeze of wind.
The bed of the
mortar which I received on board this ship was
crushed on the first fire--being
entirety rotten; the fuzes for the
shells are formed of such wretched
composition that it will not take
fire with the discharge of the mortar,
and are consequently unfit
for use on board a ship where it is
extremely dangerous to kindle
the fuze otherwise than by the
explosion; even the powder with
which this ship is supplied is so bad,
that six pounds will not
throw our shells more than a thousand
yards, instead of double that
distance.
The marines
neither understand gun exercise, the use of
small arms, nor the sword, and yet
have so high an opinion of
themselves that they will not assist
to wash the decks, or even to
clean out their own berths, but sit
and look on whilst these
operations are being performed by
seamen; being thus useless as
marines, they are a hinderance to the
seamen, who ought to be
learning their duty in the tops,
instead of being converted into
sweepers and scavengers. I have not
yet interfered in this injurious
practice, because I think that reforms
of the ancient practice of the
service, ought to form the subject of
instruction from the Government
--and also, because at this moment,
any alterations of mine
might create dissatisfactions and
dissensions even more prejudicial
to the service in which we are
engaged, than the evils in question.
With respect to
the seamen, I would observe, that, in order to
create an effective marine, young
active lads of from fourteen to
twenty should be selected. Almost the
whole of those who
constitute the crews of these
vessels--with the exception of the
foreign seamen, are not only totally
unpractised in naval profession,
but are too old to learn.
I warned the
Minister of Marine, that every native of Portugal
put on board the squadron--with the
exception of officers of known
character--would prove prejudicial to
the expedition, and yesterday
we had a clear proof of the fact. The
Portuguese stationed in the
magazine, actually withheld the powder
whilst this ship was in the
midst of the enemy, and I have since
learned that they did so from
feelings of attachment to their own
countrymen. I now inclose
you two letters on this subject--one
just received from the officer
commanding the Real, whose crew were
on the point of carrying
that vessel into the enemy's squadron
for the purpose of delivering her
up! I have also reason to believe,
that the conduct of the Liberal
yesterday in not bearing down upon the
enemy and not complying
with the signal which I had made to
break the line--was owing to
her being manned with Portuguese. The
Maria de Gloria has also
a great number of Portuguese, which is
the more to be regretted,
as otherwise her superior sailing,
with the zeal and activity of her
captain, would render her an effective
vessel. To disclose to you
the truth, it appears to me that one
half of the squadron is
necessary to watch over the other
half: and, assuredly, this is a
system which ought to be put an end to
without delay.
A greater evil is,
that this ship is one hundred and twenty seamen
short of her complement and three
hundred short of what I should
consider an efficient crew, whilst the
bad quality and ignorance of
the landsmen, makes the task of
managing her in action no easy
matter, the incessant bawling going on
rendering the voices of the
officers inaudible. Had this ship
yesterday been manned and equipped
as she ought to have been, and free
from the disadvantages stated,
there is no doubt whatever in my mind,
but, that singly, we could
have dismantled half the ships of the
enemy.
On the whole, Sir, you must perceive
that I have not been supplied
with any of those facilities which I
requested to be placed in my
hands. I am, however, aware of the
difficulties under which a new
Government labours, and am ready to do
all in my power under
any circumstances. What I have to
request of you is, that you will
do me the justice to feel that the
predicament in which I am now
placed, is somewhat analogous to your
own, and that if I cannot
accomplish all I wish, the deficiency
arises from causes beyond my
control; but I entreat you to let me
have--at least this ship--
well manned, and I will answer for her
rendering more efficient
service than the whole squadron
besides--constituted as it now is.
You will perceive
by my public despatch addressed to the Minister
of Marine, that although we passed
through the enemy's line, and,
I may add, actually brushed the
nearest vessel, which we cut off--yet
nothing really useful was effected,
notwithstanding that the
vessel we touched ought to have been
sunk, and those separated to
have been dismantled or destroyed. I
am quite vexed at the result--which
was such, however, as might have been
expected from the bad
manning of the squadron.
I have determined
to proceed forthwith to the Moro San Paulo,
and to leave there the ill-sailing
vessels. I intend to remove all the
effective officers and seamen from the
Piranga and Nitherohy, into
this ship, and with her alone, or
attended only by the Maria de
Gloria, to proceed to Bahia, to
reconnoitre the situation of the
enemy at their anchorage, and obtain
the information requisite to
enable me to enter on more effectual
operations.
I have the honour, &c.
COCHRANE.
Ill. Exmo. Senor JOSE BONIFACIO
D'ANDRADE Y SILVA,
Ministro e Secretario d'Estado.
A rigorous
blockade was nevertheless established, in spite of our
deficiencies or the efforts made to
raise or evade it--though the enemy
were bold in reliance upon their
numbers, and none the less so, perhaps,
from considering our recent failure a
defeat. They did not, however,
venture to attack us, nor were we yet
in a condition to meddle further
with them.
The blockade of
the port was not calculated to effect anything decisive,
beyond paralysing the naval operations
of the enemy's squadron. Even
this would not prevent the Portuguese
from strengthening themselves in
positions on shore, and thus, by
intimidating all other districts within
reach,--enable them to bar the
progress of independence. I therefore
determined, as a force in our
condition was not safe to hazard in any
combination requiring prompt and
implicit obedience, to adopt the step
of which I had apprised the Prime
Minister, and took the squadron to
Moro San Paulo, where, transferring
from the bad sailing frigates to the
flagship, the captains, officers, and
best petty officers and seamen,
the Pedro Primiero was rendered more
efficient than the whole
together; and with her and the Maria
de Gloria, I resolved to conduct
further operations against the
enemy--leaving the Piranga, and
Nitherohy, together with all the other
vessels, in charge of Captain
Pio--the two senior captains having
been transferred to the flagship, in
charge of their officers and men.
There was,
however, another reason for leaving the remainder of the
squadron at Moro San Paulo. Before
quitting Rio de Janeiro, I had urged
on the Government the necessity of
immediately forwarding fireships, as
the most reliable means for destroying
a superior force. These had not
been supplied; but in their place a
quantity of inflammable and
explosive materials had been sent. As
several prizes had been taken, I
determined to convert them into
fireships, as well as the Real
schooner--a useless vessel, the crew
of which had shewn that they were
not to be depended upon; so that the
remaining ships of the squadron,
though unreliable in other respects,
were well employed in carrying
these objects into execution.
In order to
protect the ships and men thus engaged, I directed a body of
marines to be landed, for the purpose
of making a show by forming and
manning batteries to repel any attack,
though, had such been made,
neither the batteries nor their
defenders would have been of much
service.
The flagship,
together with the Maria de Gloria, now proceeded to
cruize off Bahia, with such success
that all supplies were cut off by
sea, notwithstanding repeated attempts
to introduce vessels from San
Mattheos with farinha--a dozen of
which fell into our hands, in spite of
the enemy's superiority.
As the Carolina
had now joined us, I directed her to take under convoy
the captured transports with
provisions, whilst the Guarani was sent
to scour the coast, with orders to
avoid approaching the enemy's fleet,
and to bring me information as to the
progress of the fireships, upon
which I now saw that I must mainly
rely.
On the 21st, I considered it expedient
to address the following private
letter to the Minister of Marine:--
Off Bahia, N.W. 12
miles,
May
21, 1833.
Most Illustrious Sir,
In addition to my
official letters of the 3rd and
4th inst. I beg to acquaint you that,
being convinced--not only
from the conduct of the crew of this
ship during the attack on the
4th, but from what I observed in
regard to the other vessels--that
nothing beneficial to His Imperial
Majesty's service could be
effected by any attempts to combine
the whole squadron in an
attack against the enemy--but, on the
contrary, from the imperfect
and incongruous manner in which the
vessels are manned--
consequences of the most serious
nature would ensue from any
further attempt of the kind. I have
therefore determined to take
the squadron to Moro San Paulo, for
the adoption of other measures
essential under such circumstances,
viz. to take on board such officers
and men from the bad sailing vessels
as will render the Pedro
Primiero more effective than the whole
squadron as now constituted.
In the first
conversation I had with you, I gave you my opinion
as to the superior benefit of
equipping one or two vessels well--
rather than many imperfectly, and I
again beg to press on your
consideration the necessity of such
efficient equipment of all
vessels, whether many or few. I must
also remind you of the great
danger that arises from the employment
of Portuguese of the
inferior class in active operations
against their own countrymen,
because they neither do nor can
consider that the dispute between
Brazil and the Portuguese Government,
bears any similarity to warfare
as ordinarily understood. I have had
sufficient proof since
leaving Rio de Janeiro, that there is
no more trust to be placed in
Portuguese, when employed to fight
against their countrymen, than
there was in the Spaniards, who, on
the opposite side of this continent,
betrayed the patriot Governments, by
whom they were employed.
I shall press this point no further
than to say, that so long as His
Imperial Majesty's ships are so
manned, I shall consider them
as not only wholly inefficient, but
requiring to be vigilantly watched
in order to prevent the most dangerous
consequences.
Since making my arrangements at the
Moro, where I left all
the squadron except this ship and the
Maria de Gloria, I have been
constantly off the port of Bahia, but
could see nothing of the
enemy's squadron, till the 20th, when
I learned from an English
vessel that they had been as far down
as the Abrolhos shoals, for
what purpose I know not. They consist
of thirteen vessels, being
the number which we encountered on the
4th. I am watching an
opportunity to attack them in the
night, in the hope not only of
being able to damage them materially
by the fire of this ship, but
also in the expectation that, if they
are not better disciplined than
the crews of this squadron, they will
occasion as much damage
amongst themselves, as they would
sustain if they had an equal
force to contend with. In the meantime
we are as effectually
blockading Bahia, as if the enemy did
not dare to remove from his
anchorage--for both this ship and the
Maria de Gloria outsail them
all. We have captured three Portuguese
vessels, and from the
letters found therein, many more are
expected from Maranham and
other ports to leeward, as well as
from San Mattheos.
Should the enemy's
squadron return to port before I can obtain
a favourable opportunity of assailing
them at sea, I shall endeavour
to attack them at their anchorage, and
the Government may be
assured that no exertion shall be
wanting on my part, or on that of
the officers now in this ship, to
effect their destruction.
I may fairly
ascribe the prepared state of the enemy, and the
great force in which they appeared on
the 4th, and still exhibit--to
the information carried by the British
ship of war Tartar, which
was permitted to sail from Rio so
early after our departure for
Bahia, and thus served them as
effectually as though she had been
expressly hired for the purpose.
I have the honour,
&c.
COCHRANE.
To the Minister of
Marine.
On the 22nd we captured another
vessel, and reconnoitred the port of
Bahia, the Portuguese squadron being
there at anchor. Finding this to be
the case, I returned to the Moro to
expedite the fireships--leaving the
Maria de Gloria to watch the enemy's
movements.
On the 26th the Portuguese Admiral
again appeared in full force, and
approached towards us at the Moro San
Paulo, when we prepared for
action, but the hostile squadron
withdrew. The same demonstration was
made for several days, the enemy not
venturing on an attack, whilst,
from the causes previously alleged, we
were in no condition to take the
initiative.
On the 26th I
apprised the Minister of Marine that, when the enemy
returned to port, I should make an
attempt on them on the first dark
night with the flagship alone, pending
the equipment of the fireships.
At the same time I addressed the
following letter to the Prime Minister,
De Andrada:--
Moro San Paulo,
26th May, 1823.
MOST ILLUSTRIOUS
SIR,
With regard to the transactions of the
squadron, I beg to refer you
to my despatches to the Minister of
Marine, but solicit your
attention to a few particulars which
appear to me of importance.
In the first
place, you will observe from the enclosed Bahia
newspaper, that the maritime force of
the enemy is contrasted with
that of the squadron under my command.
I should be well content were
the real disparity of the respective
forces no greater than the
statement has set forth, but
unfortunately, the Brazilians, who have
never before been at sea, are of
little or no use, from their total
want of discipline, and of any kind of
nautical knowledge; whilst
the Portuguese seamen in the squadron,
are not only useless--but a
great deal worse, for the reasons
stated in my former letters.
The enemy in Bahia
are in want of all kinds of fresh provisions
--though they have been using every
means to procure them. Some
supplies they have lately had from
Buenos Ayres, and even from the
Cape de Verds; but the most surprising
fact is that the Brazilian
Governor of San Mattheos, near the
Abrolhos, and the chiefs of other
small Brazilian ports in that quarter
have been loading vessels for
the enemy's use--under the simulated
destination of Rio de Janeiro.
Permit me to suggest that an
investigation into this matter is
highly essential.
From all the
information which I can collect, the enemy at Bahia are
considerably distracted in their
councils, which dissensions cannot
fail to be increased by seeing their
vessels taken in the very mouth
of the harbour, and their look-out
ships driven under the guns of
the batteries by those of His Imperial
Majesty, I may, indeed, say
by two ships alone, because in the
state of the other vessels and
crews I have not deemed it prudent to
trust them in the
neighbourhood of a port occupied by
the enemy.
I have no doubt of succeeding--by some
means or other--in effecting
our object, and that in as short a
time as can reasonably be
expected--for it is not to be supposed
that I should all at once
accomplish objects of such magnitude
with a force so inferior, and
in great part so inexperienced and
heterogeneously composed. On
this subject I beg to call your
attention to the low opinion
entertained of our squadron by the
enemy, as expressed in the
enclosed Bahia Gazette (No 65), which,
on that point, is in
conformity with my own opinion as
previously expressed.
I have the honour,
&c. COCHRANE.
To the Prime Minister.
The following
proclamation from the Bahia Gazette will shew the
nature of these vapourings
deliberately inserted by the Bahia
authorities:--
Last week the wind
was Southerly, with rain, which has rendered
it impossible for our squadron to get
at the Rio squadron, to decide
whether Brazil shall remain in the
fetters of the usurper of Rio--
or enjoy constitutional liberty. Had
they credited me more, we
should not have seen on our bar, an
enterprising man who ruined
the commerce of the Pacific, and now
thinks to regain the glory he
lost. The conduct of Lord Cochrane
verberates in our ears--
examine his conduct in the Pacific,
and observe that he lost all, and
was obliged to abandon everything to
the Spaniards in Peru, afterwards
losing his little force in attacks and
tempests. The Ministry
of Rio sent for him, giving him the
pompous title of "Admiral of
the Brazils," and great
promises--thinking that he would bring
with him a squadron to help the
Imperial fraudulence. This is
the great wonder, who has come to
carry fire and blood to the
trusty Bahia, bringing with him
vessels manned, for the most part,
with Portuguese sailors--and not
leaving in Rio a single vessel,
from which he did not take even the
negro sailors.
It is only the
Pedro Primiero that is manned with the adventurous
foreigners, so that we shall fall upon
the 74, and by beating
her, decide the business of Brazil.
Our squadron is superior in
physical force, having at their head
brave officers, with plenty of
troops. It is commanded in chief by an
Admiral who has success
before him, and who wishes to regain
the opinion of the public, so
that we may all wait a happy result.
Commerce--the
strong pillar which upholds the Constitutional
edifice--has promised great recompense
to the victorious fleet and
their chief, and has precious gifts
for those who will shew their
gratitude to Bahia, and defend their
liberty. Officers who distinguish
themselves, will have a medal
representing their victory,
which will make them known to the
citizens of Bahia, who will not
be ungrateful.
Citizens of all
classes are ready at a moment's warning to decide
the great cause of our liberty, and
will measure the greatness of our
triumph by the sacrifices made.
Constance, courage, and union,
and we shall see the despotic monster
raging and tearing himself to
pieces.
All we look to, at
this moment, is to destroy the Rio squadron.
The usurper who rules in that Capital
thinks that, reaching the bar
with the squadron of his imaginary
Empire, we should be attacked
on all sides, and compelled to make a
shameful capitulation. How
much you are mistaken--new-born
monster! We have abundant
force at our disposal; but in the
meantime we must overthrow the
plans of the enterprising Cochrane,
and wait the result of maritime
prowess.
Notwithstanding
that the Portuguese opinion of the Brazilian squadron,
as expressed in the official gazette,
is couched in terms of contempt,
as compared with the efficiency of
their own squadron--yet most
inconsistently, they did not venture
to attack us. The fact was,
however, most painful to me, being
aware of its truthfulness, and I
wrote to the Minister of Marine,
begging him to enable us to intercept
the numerous vessels expected at
Bahia, by procuring three fast-sailing
American clippers, armed with 18 or
24-pounders, in lieu of the useless
schooners with which we were
encumbered. In addition to the professed
contempt of the Portuguese authorities
for the ships blockading
Bahia--the proclamation in which these
expressions were contained,
termed His Imperial Majesty a "Turkish
despot,"--his Prime Minister a
"tyrannical vizier," and myself "a
coward;" so that I had at least the
satisfaction of being maligned in good
company.
On the 2nd of June, to my great
satisfaction, the Portuguese returned to
port, and I felt certain that so soon
as the fireships in preparation at
the Moro San Paulo were ready, the
destruction of the whole was
inevitable--the Portuguese naval
officers being of the same opinion,
whatever might be the official boasts
of the military Commandant.
According to the secret correspondence
which I had established with
Brazilian patriots resident within the
city, the Admiral's consternation
on learning that fireships were nearly
equipped was excessive--and being
in nightly expectation of a repetition
of the scene in Basque Roads; or
at least of that which little more
than a year previous had been enacted
before Callao--every precaution was
taken against surprise. He was
quite right in the conjecture as to
what was intended; but did not
calculate--as I was obliged to do--on
the general want of experience of
such matters in the Brazilian service.
Our preparations
being, on the 8th of June, reported to be favourably
progressing, I determined to put the
attack in execution so soon as the
tide flowed late enough in the evening
to prevent the enemy from
perceiving us in time to disturb or
defeat our operations. The
difficulty was to find competent
persons to take charge of the
fireships, so as to kindle them at the
proper moment--the want of which
had rendered most of the fireships
ineffective--as such--in the affair
of Basque Roads in 1809, and had
formed one of the principal obstacles
when attacking Callao in 1821. Of the
explosion vessel I intended myself
to take charge, as I had formerly done
in Basque Roads.
On the 9th of June
information arrived that the enemy had resolved on an
attempt to destroy the fireships in
the Moro San Paulo, and that the
second division of their army was
being embarked in transports for that
purpose. Preparations were at once
made to receive them by ordering in
the vessels scouring the coast, and by
such other precautionary measures
as were necessary for the defence of
that important station.
It was, however,
difficult to make a proper defence, for, with the
exception of Portuguese--who could not
be trusted--there were no
Artillerymen in the Brazilian squadron
who had any practical knowledge
of their duty, even if the guns on the
Moro could be made to contribute
to its defence, for the place was
open, and commanded by heights, of
which, as we had no troops, the enemy
could possess themselves by night
or by day. In case they did so, before
adequate preparations could be
made, I directed the guns to be
spiked, that they might not be turned
against the ships. No attack was,
however, made, the enemy being
doubtless deterred by the apparent
promptitude in anticipating their
movements.
On the 11th of
June further information was received that the
contemplated attack on the Moro had
been abandoned, and that the enemy
were seriously deliberating on
evacuating the port before the fireships
were completed, I therefore ordered
the Maria de Gloria to water and
re-victual for three months, so as to
be in readiness for anything which
might occur, as, in case the rumour
proved correct, our operations might
take a different turn to those
previously intended. The Piranga was
also directed to have everything in
readiness for weighing immediately,
on the flagship appearing off the Moro
and making signals to that
effect. The whole squadron was at the
same time ordered to re-victual,
and to place its surplus articles in a
large shed constructed of trees
and branches felled in the
neighbourhood of the Moro.
Whilst the other
ships were thus engaged, I determined to increase the
panic of the enemy with the flagship
alone. The position of their fleet
was about nine miles up the bay, under
shelter of fortifications, so
that an attack by day would have been
more perilous than prudent.
Nevertheless, it appeared practicable
to pay them a hostile visit on the
first dark night, when, if unable to
effect any serious mischief, it
would at least be possible to
ascertain their exact position, and to
judge what could be accomplished when
the fireships were brought to bear
upon them.
Accordingly,
having during the day carefully taken bearings of the high
lands at the mouth of the river--on
the night of the 12th June, I
decided on making the attempt, which
might possibly result in the
destruction of part of the enemy's
fleet, in consequence of the
confused manner in which the ships
were anchored, and from information
received that the chief officers were
invited ashore to a public ball.
As soon as it
became dark, we proceeded up the river, but unfortunately,
when within hail of the outermost
ship, the wind failed, and the tide
soon after turning, our plan of attack
was rendered abortive;
determined, however, to complete the
reconnaissance, we threaded our way
amongst the outermost vessels, but
dark as was the night--the presence
of a strange ship under sail was
discovered--and some beat to quarters,
hailing to know what ship that was?
The reply being "an English vessel,"
satisfied them, so that our
investigation was made unmolested. The chief
object thus accomplished, we succeeded
in dropping out with the ebb
tide, now rapidly running, and were
enabled to steady our course
stern-foremost with the stream anchor
adrag, whereby we reached our
former position off the mouth of the
river.
Finding from the reconnaissance, that
it would not be difficult to
destroy the enemy's vessels, huddled
together as they were amongst a
crowd of merchantmen, I hastened to
Moro San Paulo, to expedite the
completion of the fireships. Returning
immediately to Bahia, and again
anchoring off the entrance of the
harbour, I now learned that the alarm
created by our nocturnal visit was
excessive; indeed, my informants
stated that the exploit had the effect
of determining the Portuguese
admiral to remove as quickly as
possible from a locality in which he
could no longer consider himself safe.
On the 29th of
June, information was again forwarded to me, by persons
favourable to the Imperial cause, that
a council of war had been held,
at which it had been resolved to
withdraw the fleet to St. Catherine's
or Maranham, and not the fleet alone
but the troops also--thus
abandoning the city and province of
Bahia to the Imperial squadron; the
council judging that I should be well
content to permit them to pass to
another part of the coast, as their
departure would result in the
Imperial occupation of Bahia.
The subjoined
proclamation issued by General Madeira will shew the
straits to which the blockading
squadron had reduced the city and
garrison:--
INHABITANTS OF
BAHIA,
The crisis in which we find ourselves
is perilous,
because the means of subsistence fail
us, and we cannot secure the
entrance of any provisions. My duty as
a soldier, and as Governor,
is to make any sacrifice in order to
save the city; but it is equally
my duty to prevent, in an extreme
case, the sacrifice of the troops I
command--of the squadron--and of
yourselves. I shall employ
every means to fulfil both duties. Do
not suffer yourselves to be
persuaded that measures of foresight
are always followed by disasters.
You have already seen me take such
once before. They alarmed
you, but you were afterwards convinced
that they portended nothing
extraordinary. Even in the midst of
formidable armies measures
of precaution are daily used, because
victory is not constant, and
reverses should be provided against.
You may assure yourselves,
that the measures I am now taking, are
purely precautionary, but it
is necessary to communicate them to
you, because if it happens that
we must abandon the, city, many of you
will leave it also; and I
should be responsible to the nation
and to the King if I had not
forewarned you.
(Signed) IGNACIO
LUIZ MADEIRA DE MELLA.
Were it dignified
to allude to the cowardice imputed to me by the same
authority, it would be easy to refer
to the above enumeration of
distresses caused by our two ships
having captured all their provisions
in the face of thirteen, in every way
better manned and equipped.
The consternation
caused by my nocturnal visit, which decided the
evacuation of the city, was described
as almost ludicrous. As I had been
correctly informed, the Portuguese
admiral and his officers were at a
ball, and information of our
appearance amongst the fleet was conveyed
to him in the midst of the
festivities. "What"--exclaimed he--"Lord
Cochrane's line-of-battleship in the
very midst of our fleet! Impossible
--no large ship can have come up in
the dark." We, however, did find our
way in the dark--and did not retire
till our reconnaissance was as
complete as darkness would permit.
The lamentations
caused by General Madeira's proclamation were no doubt
faithfully chronicled in the Bahia
newspapers, one of these declaring
"in the last few days we have
witnessed in this city a most doleful
spectacle that must touch the heart
even of the most insensible. A panic
terror has seized on all men's
minds--the city will be left without
protectors--and families, whose
fathers are obliged to fly, will be left
orphans--a prey to the invaders," &c.
&c. A prognostication not at all
in accordance with my mode of carrying
on warfare, which, as Portuguese
families afterwards found, both at
Bahia and elsewhere, was to protect
the defenceless and unoffending.
The
before-mentioned resolution of the council was precisely
what I
wished, as the evacuation of the port and province by the
troops as well
as the fleet, must prove more
favourable to the Imperial cause than if
the fleet alone had been destroyed and
the military force remained. As I
had, however, every reason to believe
that it was General Madeira's
intention to remove the troops to the
Northern provinces, which would
only have shifted the scene of war to
another locality, I was determined
at all hazards to prevent such
movement.
On the 1st of July, information was
brought, that, as the fireships were
now known to be in readiness for the
attack, the Portuguese admiral had
hastily embarked the whole of the
troops in transports, and that a
number of merchantmen were also filled
with persons who wished to leave
Bahia under his protection. As it was
clear that the total evacuation of
the province by the enemy was
preferable to an attack which might only
end in destroying the ships and
driving both naval and military forces
on shore to renew their operations--I
determined not to interfere with
their retreat, till they were clear
out of the harbour, when a vigilant
pursuit would prevent them from again
taking shelter in Brazil.
The following
order was therefore issued to Captain Beaurepaire, of the
Maria de Gloria, Captain Taylor, of
the Nitherohy, and Captain.
Thompson, of the Carolina, these being
the only vessels on which I
could in any degree depend:--
Having received
information that the enemies of the independence
of Brazil are about to evacuate the
city, and quit the
port of Bahia--taking under the
protection of their ships of war
numerous transports in which the
military force and stores are
embarked, together with all the
moveable property, public and
private--not excepting even the sacred
vases appropriated to
religious uses--and as it is highly
expedient that the progress of
the enemy should be interrupted and
impeded as far as is
practicable--you are required to be
particularly vigilant in watching
their escape, and are to endeavour to
cut off such of their vessels as
you can assail with safety, and are to
continue in the execution of
this duty so long as you can keep
sight of the enemy.
COCHRANE.
Given on board the
Pedro Primiero this 1st of July, 1823.
To Captain Taylor,
of the Nitherohy, I gave further instructions to
continue the chase as long as he
considered it practicable to capture or
destroy the enemy's vessels, using his
utmost endeavours to disable all
having troops on board; and as it was
necessary to occupy Bahia after
its evacuation, I directed Captains
Beaurepaire and Thompson, after
having captured or disabled all they
could, to return forthwith to
Bahia, and take possession; for which
purpose the following order was
issued to Captain Beaurepaire:--
After having
executed the previous order, you are to return to
the port of Bahia, taking upon
yourself the command of the naval
department afloat in my absence, and
it will be your duty to
ascertain the nature of the cargoes of
the neutral ships now in the
port of Bahia, or which may afterwards
enter, as there are many
neutral ships said to have embarked
property to a large amount,
which has been illegally transferred
to such neutrals since the
blockade, for the purpose of
fraudulent concealment. All such
vessels and all such property ought to
be detained and subjected to
legal investigation in the prize
tribunals of His Imperial Majesty.
You will have a perfect right to
require this investigation, and
though the neutrals may clamour, they
cannot lawfully oppose your
proceedings therein--advisedly taken.
A Portuguese
frigate being daily expected at Bahia, as well as
other vessels from Portugal and the
Portuguese colonies, it will be
advisable, for the better opportunity
of capturing the same, to
arrange with the General and
Commander-in-Chief, that the
Portuguese flag shall be displayed at
least on the outer fort or
battery on the appearance of such
Portuguese vessels, or of others
whose nationality is doubtful.
You are to
continue on the service above pointed out until further
orders from me, or from the Minister
of Marine, with whom you are
to communicate, and convey to him a
copy of the present order.
COCHRANE.
Having learned
that a great number of the more influential inhabitants
were about to quit Bahia with the
fleet--and not wishing to involve them
in the consequences of war--I
addressed the following caution to the
Junta of Bahia:--
GENTLEMEN,
Understanding that
it is in contemplation to abandon the town of
Bahia, without any security being
given not again to resume
hostilities against the subjects and
territories of His Imperial
Majesty, and as you may not be aware
of the difficulty of
retiring--whilst hopes may have been
held out to you that this is
practicable--I must, for the sake of
humanity, caution you against
any attempt to remove yourselves by
sea, unless I have a perfect
understanding as to the future
intentions of the naval forces which
may accompany you, but to whom I have
nothing to suggest.
I tell you
however, that it is in my power to take advantages which
may be fatal to your escape, and if,
after this notice, you shall
sail, you must not lay anything to my
charge in the destruction of
passengers, for in the obscurity of
night it is impossible to
discriminate ships in which they may
be embarked. If, after this
notice, you embark, or continue
embarked, it will be to me a subject
of great regret, because I have ever
desired that the dangers of war
should be confined to the military and
naval profession.
COCHRANE.
To the Junta,
Bahia,
To General Madeira, commanding the
Portuguese troops, I wrote as
follows:--
Understanding that
you are about to embark the military forces
under your command, with a view to
proceed to some of the Northern
provinces, humanity compels me to
declare to you my duty, however
painful, to take all measures within
my power to dismantle whatever
transports may attempt to sail from
Bahia under convoy of the
ships of war. That I have the means of
performing this duty, in
defiance of the ships of war which may
endeavour to obstruct
my operations, is a fact which no
naval officer will doubt--but
which to you as a military man may not
be so apparent. If,
after this warning, I am compelled to
have recourse to the measures
alluded to, and if numerous lives
should be sacrificed thereby, I
shall stand acquitted of those
consequences which would otherwise
press heavily on my mind.
(Signed) COCHRANE.
Gen. MADEIRA.
To the Portuguese
Admiral I addressed the following note:--
Sir,
I have written to
the Junta and the General commanding
the military force, relative to
particulars which I have felt it my
duty to submit to their consideration.
To you, as a professional
man, I have nothing to suggest or
request--but merely to express
my conviction that, for the sake of
humanity, you will give that
professional opinion on the subject of
my letters--should they be
referred to you--which may be expected
from a naval officer of your
experience.
(Signed) COCHRANE.
The Admiral of the
Portuguese Squadron.
On the 2nd of
July, the whole Portuguese force, naval and military, got
under weigh, and steered out--the
troops being embarked in the armed
transports and large merchantmen,
whilst other vessels were filled with
Portuguese families and their
property--everything moveable being put on
board--with the utmost confidence in
the protection of their fleet. As
only the flagship and Maria de Gloria
were present, we made no attempt
to attack them whilst issuing from the
mouth of the river, they no doubt
ridiculing my warnings as communicated
to the Junta and the commanding
officers.
In this, however,
they were mistaken; as every thing was in readiness,
both on board the flagship and the
Maria de Gloria, for immediate
chase, so soon as the whole were clear
of the port; though I had no
intention--as they no doubt
interpreted my letters--of attacking
thirteen ships of war and numerous
armed transports, with two ships
alone, so long as they remained within
the harbour; but when once out,
the superior sailing qualities of
these two ships would safely enable us
to harass them with impunity.
As the merchant
brig, Colonel Allen, which had conveyed us from Chili,
was still with us, and as she might be
made useful in looking after the
prizes, I adopted her into the
Brazilian navy under the name of the
Bahia, appointing her master, Captain
Haydon, to the rank of
captain-lieutenant.
Whilst the
Portuguese were passing out, I wrote and despatched by the
Liberal schooner, the following letter
to the Minister of Marine at
Rio de Janeiro:--
Pedro Primiero,
off Bahia,
July 2nd, 1833.
MOST EXCELLENT
SIR,
I have the satisfaction to acquaint
your Excellency
that the enemy's squadron have this
day evacuated Bahia, their
resources by sea being no longer
available. Their ships of war,
consisting of thirteen sail of
different sizes, and many large
merchantmen filled with troops, are
now standing out of the bay.
It is my intention to pursue them as
long as it shall appear
beneficial so to do. This ship and the
Maria de Gloria are the only
two in sight of the enemy, the
Carolina having been obliged to
return to the Moro, in consequence of
having lost a topmast, and
the Nitherohy not having joined. I
hope in my next to be able to
give you some account of the ulterior
objects the enemy have in
view, which, whatever they may be, I
shall endeavour to frustrate.
(Signed) COCHRANE.
To the commanders
of the other ships, I sent the following order on
their joining the pursuit:--
It being improper
to weaken the squadron, and impossible to
officer and man the vessels which may
fall into our hands, you are to
adopt the following plan to secure
them, viz. to send with the boats
crews which board the enemy's vessels
a sufficient number of
crowbars, for the purpose of breaking
up their water casks, leaving
only water enough to carry them, on
short allowance, into Bahia, to
which port you are to order them
immediately to return.
Their papers being
essential to the justification of this or any
other hostile act, the boarding
officer will take especial care to
secure them.
COCHRANE.
In addition to
this, the masts of all troopships which might be
boarded, were directed to be so far
cut away as to prevent their
escape--a written order instructing
them to return forthwith to Bahia,
on pain of being treated with great
severity if found on any other
course. Singular as the order may
appear, it was in most cases obeyed,
and thus the captured vessels
navigated themselves into our hands.
The Portuguese
squadron consisted of Don Joao, 74; Constitucao,50;
Perola, 44; Princeza Real,28; Calypso,
22; Regeneracao, 26;
Activa, 22; Dez de Fevereiro, 26;
Audaz, 20; S. Gaulter, 26;
Principe do Brazil, 26; Restauracao,
26; Canceicao, 8; with
between sixty and seventy merchant
vessels and transports filled with
troops.
As soon as they
were clear of the port, we fell upon the rearmost ships,
disabling their main and mizen masts,
so as to render it difficult for
them to sail otherwise than before the
wind, which would carry them to
the Brazilian coast, and ordering them
back to Bahia. The flagship and
the Maria de Gloria then resumed the
pursuit, but the latter being
employed in looking after the prizes,
on the following morning we were
alone amongst the enemy's convoy.
The next day, July
3rd, the Carolina and Nitherohy came up, as did
also the Colonel Allen. The frigates
captured a number of merchantmen
mostly filled with Portuguese
families--these unfortunate people finding
to their cost that my warnings were
not empty threats, though they had
no doubt been led to ridicule the
remonstrance by a misplaced
confidence in the protection of their
national squadron. Many prizes
were taken, and as evening closed the
frigates dropped out of sight with
the captured vessels.
It would have been
easy for the flagship also to have taken prizes, but
about this I cared nothing,--my great
object being to prevent the enemy
from landing troops elsewhere, and
with this view I determined on
closely following the ships of war and
transports--leaving the Brazilian
frigates to exercise their own
discretion in disabling the convoy. It
may be considered an act of temerity
for one ship of war thus to chase
thirteen; but, encumbered as they
were, and, as I knew, short of
provisions, I felt assured of
accomplishing my object.
The enemy--being
greatly annoyed at our perseverance in following, and
still more so at the loss of so many
of the convoy--on the morning of
the 4th, gave chase to the flagship
with the whole squadron,
endeavouring to hem her in, and at one
time we were pursued so closely
inshore, that there was some danger of
getting embayed, but the handling
and superior sailing qualities of the
Pedro Primiero enabled her to
out-manoeuvre them and get clear. On
seeing this, the Portuguese
squadron, finding further chase
unavailing, gave us a broadside which
did no damage, and resumed its
position in the van of the convoy, to
which we immediately gave chase as
before, and as soon as night set in,
dashed in amongst them, firing right
and left till the nearest ships
brought to, when they were
boarded--the topmasts cut away--the rigging
disabled--the arms thrown
overboard--and the officers compelled to give
their parole not to serve against
Brazil until regularly exchanged--an
event not likely to happen.
Keeping well up
with them on the 5th--as soon as night set in, this mode
of attack was repeated, when we took a
Russian vessel filled with
Portuguese troops, and disabled her in
like manner. Of the merchantmen
within reach we took no notice, as it
was impolitic to weaken the crew
of the flagship by manning prizes,
whilst, as we saw nothing of the
remainder of the Brazilian squadron,
there was no other means of
preventing their escape.
The prudence of
preserving the crew of the flagship entire, was now well
exemplified. After taking possession
of the Russian transport, at dusk,
I observed half-a-dozen large ships
detach themselves from the main body
of the convoy, and suspecting some
valid reason for the movement,
immediately gave chase. Though they
crowded all sail, we came up with
them on the following morning, and
singling out a large frigate-built
ship, filled with troops, we fired
upon her till she brought to. On
boarding, we found her to be the Gran
Para, containing--with the
others--a division of several thousand
troops, destined to maintain
Portuguese authority in the province
of Maranham--as, indeed, I had been
informed at Bahia. The private signals
and instructions of the
Portuguese admiral--obtained by
Flag-Lieutenant Grenfell from her
captain--put me in possession of the
whole arrangement, which was thus
luckily frustrated.
As it was of
importance not to let any of these troopships escape,
Captain Grenfell was ordered to
disable the Gran Para, cutting away
her main and mizen masts, throwing the
arms and ammunition overboard,
taking possession of the regimental
flags, and compelling the officers,
as before, to give their parole not to
serve against Brazil. This
done, the other transports were
successively boarded and disabled, so
far as was consistent with not leaving
them positive wrecks on the
water; for with my single ship, to
have made prisoners of so numerous a
body of troops was manifestly
impossible.
The brig Bahia having opportunely hove
in sight, I seized four of the
vessels carrying troops, and ordered
Captain Haydon to convoy them to
Pernambuco, to the President of which
province I addressed the following
letter:--
Pedro Primiero,
July 7th, 1823.
ILLUSTRIOUS AND
EXCELLENT SIR,
The abandonment of
Bahia by the enemy, in
consequence of the rigours of
blockade--and the capture of half of
his army, ensigns, artillery, and
stores, are events which you will
be gratified to learn. Part of the
captured officers and troops I
send in for your disposal, having
engaged that they shall be treated
after the manner which may justly be
expected from the high
character of the Government of His
Imperial Majesty, and the
customary practice of all European
states. I have to request that
you will be pleased to order their
disembarkation without delay.
We require seamen
to finish the war. If you will be pleased to
grant the bounty of 24 dollars per
man, as at Rio--charging the
same to the Government--you will
render an essential service to
your country. I do not mean Portuguese
seamen--who are enemies;
but able seamen of any other nation,
and I need scarcely say, that
from my knowledge of the character of
the men, I should prefer
British seamen to all others.
I shall probably
have the honour of shortly making myself known
to you, but that depends on
circumstances over which I have no
control. If we can come in, permit me
to observe, that it would be
conducive to the health of my crew to
have ready a supply of fresh
provisions and fruits, especially
lemons and oranges. I hope you
will excuse my freedom in mentioning
these things, as the health
of the men is as conducive to the
interests of the empire as are
the ships of war themselves.
I have the honour,
&c.
COCHRANE.
Sent by the Balia,
Captain Haydon.
By the same
opportunity I despatched the following to the Minister of
Marine:--
ILLUSTRIOUS SIR,
I have the honour
to inform you that half the
enemy's army, their colours, cannon,
ammunition, stores, and
baggage, have been taken. We are still
in pursuit, and shall
endeavour to intercept the remainder
of the troops, and shall then
look after the ships of war, which
would have been my first object,
but that, in pursuing this course, the
military would have escaped
to occasion further hostilities
against the Brazilian Empire.
Such of the
enemy's colours as we have had time to take away
I have the honour to transmit, and to
lay them at the feet of His
Imperial Majesty, and shall shortly
forward the remainder.
The vessels taken
are large and beautiful ships, fast sailers, and
resemble, in their appearance, ships
of war.
The Portuguese squadron, and other
vessels armed for war, I
have every reason to believe are on
their route for Lisbon. I have
also fully ascertained that the
troopships which separated from their
squadron during the night were
destined for Maranham.
I have the honour,
&c.
COCHRANE.
The Minister of
Marine.
The pursuit was now resumed, but the
weather becoming hazy, we saw
nothing of the enemy till the 11th,
when they appeared to have recovered
the Gran Para. As it became calm,
nothing could be done till the 14th,
when we crossed the Equator in Long.
33-30, making straight for the
ships of war, but finding them well
together, considered it prudent to
defer an attack till they should
become separated.
On the 15th they
continued united, giving us no opportunity for
mischief, yet not venturing to attack
us, though only one ship to
thirteen. At 3 A.M. on the 16th, we
crowded sail and went in amongst
them, firing a broadside within half
musket shot at one of the frigates
with evident effect, as, from the
damage caused, they did not return our
fire. Whilst tacking to give them the
other broadside, our mainsail
split in two, and night setting in, we
relinquished the pursuit in 5
degrees North latitude.
My object in so
doing was--that as we had only taken part of the
troopships destined for Maranham, it
was quite possible--as that port
lay to leeward--that the remainder
might even yet reach their
destination; and as the Portuguese
authority still existed in that--as
throughout all the Northern
provinces--they might again be armed and
equipped. The instructions of the
Portuguese admiral were, moreover,
that, in case of separation, they were
to rendezvous at the island of
Fernando de Noronha, near which they
were fallen in with some days
afterwards; so that there were good
grounds for anticipating the
possibility of their yet reaching
their original destination. Instead,
therefore, of following the enemy's
squadron farther, I thought we
should better serve the interests of
Brazil by proceeding direct to
Maranham, with the double purpose of
being beforehand with the enemy's
troops, should the attempt be
made--and, if practicable, reducing the
province to the authority of the
Emperor; a proceeding which, though not
within my orders, was, as I conceived,
nevertheless of great importance.
Accordingly, quitting the Portuguese
fleet and convoy, during the
obscurity of night, we made straight
for Maranham.
Thus were the Northern provinces
entirely rescued from the designs of
this armament, which--luckily for the
consolidation of the empire--I had
been enabled to frustrate; so that the
cause of independence became free
to develop itself throughout its whole
extent. It is satisfactory to
record the fact, that the whole
military force was captured or
dispersed, and its objects averted--by
a single ship--without the loss
of a man on our part--or the
additional cost of a dollar to the Imperial
Government; though, when we left Rio
de Janeiro, it was believed that
such objects could only be effected by
costly naval and military
expeditions combined.
During this chase,
as I have said, it did not appear a national object
to make captures, though many were
secured--as officers and seamen must
have been detached for the purpose,
thereby diminishing our efficiency
for the annexation of those provinces
where the Portuguese authority was
still intact; to accomplish
which--though such result was not expected
by the Government--I had formed plans
during the pursuit. Considering
that zeal for Brazilian interests
would be better shewn by expelling the
enemy which remained, I therefore
refrained from taking possession of
many valuable ships, otherwise
completely at our mercy, though not
having done so--then (previous to my
experience of the Court of
Admiralty) seemed a heavy pecuniary
loss to myself, the officers, and
crew. Such sacrifice should have
secured us better treatment than we
subsequently endured from the
Administration of a country whose entire
independence was thus obtained by our
personal sacrifices.
The means of
intimidation employed for the expulsion of the Portuguese
from Bahia--the pursuit of the enemy's
fleet--and the disabling of the
troopships destined for Maranham--acts
altogether in excess of the
Imperial instructions--not only freed
the Northern provinces from the
enemy, but, as before stated, saved
the Brazilian Government the delay,
expense, and uncertainty of powerful
expeditions.
These services--undertaken solely on
my own responsibility--were
productive of the most beneficial
consequences to the future career of
the Brazilian Empire, the integrity of
which they secured at a blow, or
it may rather be said, without a blow,
for none of any magnitude was
struck; the dread of the fireships and
the certainty arising--from the
nocturnal visit of the flagship on the
12th of June, that my plans for
making use of them were
completed--having determined the Portuguese
Admiral to save his fleet by
evacuating Bahia. |