DEPARTURE FOR CHILOE--PREPARATIONS OF THE
ENEMY--CAPTURE OF FORT CORONA--FAILURE AT FORT AGUY, AND SUBSEQUENT
RETREAT--RETURN TO VALDIVIA--CAPTURE OF OSORIO--RETURN TO
VALPARAISO--ENTHUSIASTIC RECEPTION--CHAGRIN OF THE
MINISTRY--IMPORTANCE OF CONQUEST OF VALDIVIA IN A POLITICAL POINT OF
VIEW--PROMOTION OF OFFICERS UNDER ARREST--EMPLOYMENT OF INDIANS BY
THE SPANIARDS--CAREER OF BENAVIDES--MUTINOUS SPIRIT OF THE SEAMEN IN
CONSEQUENCE OF THEIR CAPTURES BEING APPROPRIATED BY
GOVERNMENT--RESIGNATION OF MY COMMISSION--REFUSAL THEREOF--RENEWED
OFFER OF AN ESTATE--THIS AGAIN DECLINED--SEAMEN OBTAIN THEIR
WAGES--PRIVATE PURCHASE OF AN ESTATE--GOVERNMENT GIVES NOTICE OF
TAKING IT--APPOINTMENT OF FLAG CAPTAIN AGAINST MY WISHES--ANNOYANCE
GIVEN TO ME BY MINISTER OF MARINE--RENEWED RESIGNATION OF THE
COMMAND--OFFICERS OF THE SQUADRON RESIGN IN A BODY--GOVERNMENT BEGS
OF ME TO RETAIN THE COMMAND--MY CONSENT--GENERAL SAN MARTIN--THE
SENATE--ZENTENO--CORRUPTION OF PARTIES IN THE ADMINISTRATION.
Having provided for the safety of the city and province of Valdivia,
by establishing a
provisional government, and left Major Beauchef with his
own troops to maintain order--on the 16th of
February, I sailed with the
Montezuma schooner, and our prize the
Dolores, for the island of
Chiloe, taking with me two hundred men, under
the command of Major
Miller, my object being to wrest Chiloe from
Spain, as I had done
Valdivia. Unfortunately, the services of the
flag-ship, the O'Higgins,
were not available, there being no way of
rendering her seaworthy,
without tedious repairs, for which there was
no time, as our success
depended on attacking Chiloe before the
Governor had leisure to prepare
for defence. Neither of our vessels being
armed for fighting, I
depended altogether upon Major Miller and our
handful of soldiers to
oppose a thousand regular troops, besides a
numerous militia; but having
been informed that the garrison was in a
mutinous state, I calculated
that by judicious management, they might be
induced to join the patriot
cause.
Unluckily, our design had
got wind, and the Spanish Governor,
Quintanilla, a judicious officer, had managed
to conciliate them. On
coming to an anchor on the 17th, at
Huechucucay, we found a body of
infantry and cavalry, with a field-piece,
ready to dispute our landing;
but drawing off their attention by a feigned
attack upon a distant spot,
and thus dividing them into two parties, Major
Miller got on shore, and
soon routed them, capturing their field-piece.
A night attack being
decided upon, the troops, a hundred and seventy in
number, moved on under the direction of a
guide, who, wilfully or
treacherously, misled them, the men thus
wandering about in the dark
throughout the whole night. At dawn, they
found their way to Fort
Corona, which, with a detached battery, was
taken without loss. Halting
for a short time to refresh the men, Major
Miller bravely, but too
precipitately, moved on Fort Aguy, in broad
daylight; this fort being
the stronghold of the enemy, mounting twelve
guns, with others flanking
the only accessible path by which entrance
could be gained, and being
garrisoned by three companies of regulars, two
companies of militia, and
a full proportion of artillerymen. The fort
stood on a hill, washed on
one side by the sea, and having on the other
an impenetrable forest, the
only access being by a narrow path, whilst the
means of retreat for the
garrison was by the same path, so that the
attack became for the latter
a matter of life and death, since, in case of
defeat, there was no mode
of escape, as at Valdivia.
In spite of these odds,
and the spectacle of two fanatical friars on the
ramparts, with lance in one hand, and crucifix
in the other, urging on
the garrison to resist to the death the
handful of aggressors--the
indomitable courage of Miller did not allow
him to remain in the forts
he had already taken till nightfall, when he
would have been
comparatively safe by attacking in the dark. Choosing out of his
small band a forlorn
hope of sixty men, he perilled his own safety, upon which
so much depended, by leading them in person;
every gun and musket of the
enemy being concentrated on a particular angle
of the path which he must
needs pass. As the detachment reached the
spot, a shower of grape and
musketry mowed down the whole, twenty out of
the sixty being killed
outright, whilst nearly all the rest were
mortally wounded. Seeing their
gallant Commander fall, the marines, who were
waiting to follow, dashed
through the fire, and brought him off, with a
grape-shot through his
thigh, and the bones of his right foot crushed
by a round shot. Another
dash by the force which remained brought off
the whole of the wounded,
though adding fearfully to their numbers. This
having been accomplished,
Captain Erescano, who succeeded to the
command, ordered a retreat; the
Spaniards, animated by success, and urged on
by the friars, following
just within musket-shot, and making three
separate attacks, which were
on each occasion repelled, though from the
killed and wounded, the
pursuers were now fully six times their
number. Nevertheless one-half of
the diminished band kept the enemy at bay,
whilst the other half spiked
the guns, broke up the gun-carriages, and
destroyed the military stores
in the forts captured in the morning, when
they resumed their march to
the beach, followed by the Spaniards as
before.
The marines who, with affectionate fidelity,
had borne off Major Miller,
had been careful to protect him from fire,
though two out of the three
who carried him were wounded in the act; and
when, on arriving at the
beach, they were invited by him to enter the
boat, one of them, a
gallant fellow named Roxas, of whom I had
spoken highly in my despatches
from Valdivia, on account of his distinguished
bravery, refused, saying,
"No, Sir, I was the first to land, and I mean
to be the last to go on
board." He kept his word; for on his Commander
being placed in safety,
he hastened back to the little band, now
nearly cut up, and took his
share in the retreat, being the last to get
into the boats. Such were
the Chilenos, of whom the mean jealousy of the
Minister of Marine,
Zenteno, refused to allow me a thousand for operations at
Callao--which could
have been conducted with ease, as Valdivia had been captured with
less than a third of that number.
Our force being now
seriously diminished, and feeling convinced that
the fanatics of Chiloe were devoted to the
cause of Spain, there was
nothing left but to return to Valdivia, where,
finding that the
Spaniards who had been dispersed in the neighbourhood were
committing excesses,
I despatched Major Beauchef with 100 men to Osorio to secure
that town, the relief being accepted with
great joy even by the Indians,
of whom, wrote Major Beauchef to me, "I have
embraced more than a
thousand Caciques and their followers. They
have all offered their
services to fight in the patriotic cause; but
as circumstances do not
require this, I have invited them to return to
their own lands, and have
received their promises to be ready if the
country should call for their
services." The Spaniards being driven from
Osorio, the flag of Chili
was, on the 26th of February, hoisted on the
castle by Major Beauchef,
who returned to Valdivia.
There being nothing
further to require my presence, I placed the
O'Higgins under the orders of my secretary,
Mr. Bennet, to superintend
her repairs, and embarked in the Montezuma,
for Valparaiso, taking
with me five Spanish officers who had been
made prisoners, amongst whom
was Colonel Fausto De Hoyos, the Commandant of
the Cantabria regiment.
On my departure, the
Spaniards, elated by their success at Chiloe,
combined with those who had been driven from
Valdivia, in an attempt to
recover their lost possessions, but Major
Beauchef, having timely
intelligence of their intention, set out to
meet them. A number of
volunteers having joined the patriot force,
Major Beauchef on the 6th of
March encountered the enemy on the river Toro,
and instantly attacked
them, when, in about an hour, the Spanish
officers mounted their horses
and fled in a body, leaving the men to their
fate. Nearly three hundred
of these immediately surrendered, and Major
Beauchef--having captured
the whole of the arms and baggage--returned in
triumph to Valdivia.
On the 27th of February, I arrived at
Valparaiso, in the Montezuma,
amidst the most lively demonstrations of
enthusiasm on the part of the
populace, and warm expressions of gratitude
from the Supreme Director.
But my reception by his ministers was wholly
different. Zenteno, through
whose orders I had broken, declared, that the
conquest of Valdivia "was
the act of a madman! that I deserved to have
lost my life in the
attempt; and even now ought to lose my head for daring to attack
such a place without
instructions, and for exposing the patriot troops to such
hazard;" afterwards setting on foot a series
of intrigues, having for
their object the depreciation of the service
which had been rendered, so
that I found myself exposed to the greatest
possible vexation and
annoyance, with not the slightest indication
of national acknowledgment
or reward to myself, officers, or men.
The chagrin of Zenteno and
the bad passions of his adherents were
further enhanced by the congratulatory
addresses which poured in on both
the Supreme Director and myself from all
parts, the people declaring,
contrary to the assertions of Zenteno, that I
had acted, not from any
feeling of personal vanity, but from a
conviction of the national
utility of the act; and that by its
accomplishment the valour of the
Chilenos had been so displayed as to shew that
they had the utmost
confidence in their officers, and hence possessed the moral as well
as physical courage
necessary for further achievements.
Notwithstanding the
envious dissatisfaction of Zenteno, the government
was compelled, in deference to the popular
voice, to award medals to the
captors, the decree for this stating that "the
capture of Valdivia was
the happy result of the devising of an
admirably arranged plan, and of
the most daring and valorous execution." The
decree further conferred on
me an estate of 4,000 quadras from the
confiscated lands of Conception,
which I refused, as no vote of thanks was
given by the legislature; this
vote I finally obtained as an indemnification
to myself for having
exceeded my orders; such being necessary after
Zenteno's expressions of
ill-will towards me on account of breaking
through instructions.
Situated as Chili then was, it is impossible
to over-rate the importance
of this acquisition--the capture of a noble
harbour protected by fifteen
forts, and the magazines with their vast
amount of military stores,
being even secondary to the political
advantages gained by the Republic.
The annexation of this
province, at one blow conferred on Chili
complete independence, averting the
contemplated necessity for fitting
out a powerful military expedition for the
attainment of that object,
vitally essential to her very existence as an
independent state;
because, so long as Valdivia remained in the hands of the Spaniards,
Chili was, in her moments of unguardedness or
disunion, in constant
danger of losing the liberties she had, as
yet, but partially acquired.
The resources of the
province of Valdivia, together with those of
Conception, had contributed the means whereby
the Spaniards maintained
their hold upon the Chilian territory. Not
only were they deprived of
these resources--now added to those of Chili--but
a great saving was
effected by exonerating the Republic from the necessity of
maintaining a
military force in the southern provinces, as a check upon both
Spaniards and
Indians, who, at the moment of our conquest of Valdivia, were being
let loose in all directions against the
Chilian patriots.
Setting aside, therefore, the removal of
danger, and the complete
establishment of independence, the money value
alone of the conquest
was, to a Government of very limited means, of
the first importance, as
doing away with the necessity of military
expenditure, estimated by
competent judges at a million of dollars,
merely to attempt the
accomplishment of an object, which, without
any additional cost, I had
effected with a single ship, so unseaworthy
that she had to be left
behind.
But the advantage of the
conquest did not end here. Had it not been for
this capture, the Spanish power in Chili,
aided by the Indians, would
have found it easy to maintain itself in such
a country for a protracted
period, despite any military force Chili was
in a condition to bring
against it; so that no effective co-operation
with the people of Peru
could have been undertaken--as common prudence
would have deterred them
from entering into distant revolutionary
projects, so long as the
Spaniards were in possession of any part of
the Chilian territory;
whilst the necessity of defending herself
through a protracted civil
war, would have prevented Chili from aiding in
the liberation of Peru,
which would thus have remained a permanent
base of operations for the
Spaniards to annoy, if not again to recover,
the Chilian provinces.
A further advantage was
the successful negociation of a loan of one
million sterling in England, which was
accomplished solely on account of
what had been achieved, every attempt at this
having failed so long as
the Spaniards were in possession of the most
important harbour and
fortress in the country, from which, as a
basis, they might organize
future attempts to recover the revolted
provinces.
Notwithstanding these advantages, not a penny
in the shape of reward,
either for this or any previous service, was
paid to myself, the
officers, or seamen, nevertheless the Government appropriated the
money arising from
the sale of the Dolores, and the stores with which she
was loaded; neither was there any account
taken of the value of the guns
and the enormous amount of ammunition left in
the forts at Valdivia.
The men who performed this achievement were
literally in rags, and
destitute of everything, no attempt being made
by the department of
Marine to lessen their sufferings--for to this
extent was their
condition reduced.
In place of reward, every encouragement was
offered to the officers to
disobey my orders. Two of these I had marked
for punishment, for
deliberate murder. Ensign Vidal having captured two Spanish officers
in Fort Ingles, they
surrendered their swords, receiving the gallant
youth's pledge of safety; but Captain Erescano
coming up, immediately
butchered them. Another case was even worse:
Ensign Latapia, who had
been left in command of the castle of Corral,
after my departure to
Chiloe, ordered two of his prisoners to be
shot; and four officers would
have met the same fate, had not my secretary,
Mr. Bennet, taken them on
board the O'Higgins. For this I placed Latapia under arrest, making
the necessary declarations for a
court-martial, and conveyed him as a
prisoner to Valparaiso, where, in place of
being punished, both he and
Erescano were promoted, and taken into the
liberating army of General
San Martin.
I have spoken of the aid
afforded to the Spaniards by the Indians. On
the 10th of March General Freire, afterwards
Supreme Director, wrote me
a letter congratulatory of my success against
Valdivia, which he
concluded by informing me that its capture had already caused the
Indians of Angol, and their Cacique, Benavente,
to declare in favour of
Chili, and that he did not doubt but that this
would shortly be followed
by a similar declaration on the part of the
Indians throughout the
province; General Freire not being aware that
I had already produced
this effect by distributing amongst them an
immense quantity of trumpery
stores and gewgaws, accumulated by the
Spaniards in the magazines at
Valdivia, for the purpose of rewarding
murderous inroads into the
Chilian territory.
It will be interesting
briefly to note the employment of Indians by the
Spaniards. Their agent, or leader, in this
horrible warfare, was a
wretch named Benavides, who may fairly lay
claim to the distinction of
being the most perfect monster who ever
disgraced humanity. He had
originally been a common soldier in the Buenos
Ayrean army, and,
together with his brother, had carte blanche from the Spaniards to
commit the most fearful atrocities on the
Chilian patriots, who could
not defend themselves against the stealthy
cowardice of Indian warfare.
His invariable practice was, whenever a
village or estate could be
surprised, to sew up the leading inhabitants
as tightly as possible in
raw ox-hides stripped from their own cattle,
when, being laid in the
burning sun, the contraction of the hides as
they dried caused a slow
and lingering death of perfect agony, which it
was the amusement of
himself and the savages whom he led to enjoy
whilst smoking their
cigars. When any persons of influence fell
into his hands, he cut out
their tongues, and otherwise horribly
mutilated them--a bishop and
several other gentlemen surviving as witnesses
of his atrocities.
Valdivia was this man's point d'appui,
whence he drew his supplies,
and when we took the place a small vessel fell
into our hands, laden
with arms and ammunition for his disposal
amongst the Indians. She was
destined for Arauco, and had on board two
Spanish officers and four
non-commissioned officers, sent for the
purpose of rendering the Indians
still more formidable by indoctrinating them
into European modes of
warfare.
The wretch Benavides was
afterwards bought over by General San Martin,
and sent to Conception for the orders of
General Freire, who told him to
his face that he would have nothing to do with
such a monster; whereupon
Benavides left Conception, and commenced a
desolating warfare upon the
inhabitants of the coast, even refining upon
his former barbarities. The
country getting too hot for him, he again
offered his services to the
Spaniards, and was on his way to Peru in a
small vessel, when, being
compelled to go ashore for water, in the
vicinity of Valparaiso, one of
his men betrayed him, and he was sent to
Santiago, where he was hung.
The seamen were becoming
mutinous, in consequence of neither receiving
pay nor prize-money, every promise given being
broken, as well to them
as to myself. As they looked to me for the
vindication of their rights,
and, indeed, had only been kept from open
outbreak by my assurance that
they should be paid, I addressed a letter of
expostulation to the
Supreme Director, recounting their services
and the ill-merited
harshness to which they were exposed at the hands of his Ministers,
notwithstanding that since their return they
had aided the Government in
the construction of wharves and other
conveniences necessary for the
embarkation of troops and stores to Peru--a
military expedition to that
country being now decided on.
The fact was, that the
proceeds of the captures were appropriated by the
Government, which, to avoid repayment,
declared that the conquest of
Valdivia was a restoration! though the place
had never been in
possession of Chili. On my refusing to allow the stores I had
brought from thence
to be disembarked, unless as a compensation to the seamen,
it was alleged as a reason for the course
pursued that even if Valdivia
had not belonged to the Republic, Chili did
not make war on every
section of America. It was therefore put to my
liberality and honourable
character whether I would not give up to the
Government all that the
squadron had acquired?
These views were written
by Monteagudo, afterwards the willing
instrument of General San Martin in Peru. I
asked him, "Whether he
considered that which had been advanced as
just, or according to law?"
The reply was, "Certainly not, but I was
ordered to write so!" Finding
that I would surrender nothing, it was next
debated in the Council
whether I ought not to be brought to a court
martial for having delayed
and diverted the naval forces of Chili to the
reduction of Valdivia,
without the orders of Government!
No doubt this course would
have been decided on but from the unsettled
condition of the Republic and fear of the
populace, who denounced the
views of the Ministry as heartily as they
advocated my proceedings.
As nothing in the shape of
justice could be obtained for the squadron,
on the 14th of May, I begged His Excellency
the Supreme Director to
accept the resignation of my Commission, as,
by retaining it, I should
only be instrumental in promoting the ruin
which must follow the conduct
of his advisers; at the same time telling him
I had not accepted it to
have my motives misconstrued, and my services
degraded as they had been
on account of objects which I was unable to
divine, unless, indeed, a
narrow-minded jealousy, such as that which
designated the capture of
Valdivia, its "restoration," though it had
never before passed from
under the dominion of the Spaniards.
This course had not been
anticipated, though it was not adopted in any
spirit of intimidation, but from repugnance to
the heartless ingratitude
with which important national services had
been met. The Ministers were,
however, thus brought for a time to their
senses, the justice of my
complaints being acknowledged, and every
assurance given that for the
future the Government would observe good faith
towards the squadron. An
estate, as has been said, had been offered to
me as a reward for my
services, which was declined for reasons
already adduced. The offer was
now renewed, but again declined, as nothing
but promises were as yet
forthcoming to the service, and the only hold
upon the seamen was my
personal influence with them, in consequence
of my unyielding advocacy
of their rights--a hold which I was not likely
to forego for a grant to
myself. In place, therefore, of accepting the
estate, I returned the
document conveying the grant, with a request
that it might be sold, and
the proceeds applied to the payment of the
squadron; but the requisition
was not complied with.
Seeing that I was
determined not to be trifled with, and shamed by my
offer of applying the estate to the payment of
the men, General San
Martin, who was appointed to command the
military portion of the
expedition to Peru, came to Valparaiso in
June, and on the 13th of July,
the squadron was paid wages in part only, but
as I insisted on the whole
being liquidated, this was done on the 16th;
but without any portion of
their prize-money. My share alone of the value
of captures made at and
previous to the capture of Valdivia was 67,000
dollars, and for this I
received the assurance of the Supreme Director
that it should be paid to
me at the earliest possible moment; upon which
I accepted the estate
which continued to be pressed upon me, the
grant expressing the purpose
for which it was given, adding as a reason
that "my name should never
cease from the land." This estate, situated at
Rio Clara, was, after my
departure from Chili, forcibly resumed by the
succeeding Government;
and the bailiff, whom I had placed upon it for
the purpose of seeing how
it could be improved by culture and the
introduction of valuable
European seeds, was forcibly expelled from its
supervision.
On my first refusal to accept the estate--for
the reason before
assigned--in order to convince the Chilians how great was my desire
to be enrolled
amongst the number of their citizens, I purchased a hacienda
at Herradura, about eight miles from
Valparaiso. The effect produced by
this upon the Ministry was almost ludicrous.
It was gravely argued
amongst them as to what I, a foreigner, could
intend by purchasing an
estate in Chili? The conclusion to which they
came being, as I was
credibly informed, that as the whole
population was with me, I must
intend, when opportunity served, to set myself
up as the ruler of the
Republic, relying upon the people for support!
Such was statesmanship at
that day in Chili.
It so happened, that soon
after purchasing this property I pointed out
to the Government how much better the Bay of
Herradura was calculated
for a naval arsenal, than the ill-protected
Bay of Valparaiso; offering
at the same time to make them a gratuitous
present of all the land
required for the establishment of a naval
arsenal and marine depot. This
offer was, no doubt, construed into an act, on
my part, to gain
additional popularity--though this, perhaps, would have been no easy
matter; and a notice was served upon me not to
make any improvements, as
the Government intended to appropriate the
estate--but would not
reimburse any outlay, though they would repay
me the purchase money, and
also for any improvements that had already
have been effected!
I instantly solicited an explanation of the
Supreme Director, and
received an apology, attributing the whole
affair to the officiousness
of the Attorney-General, who had founded his
proceeding on an old
Spanish law; and there, for a time, the matter
dropped, but for a time
only--viz. so long as the necessities of the
state required my services.
A new source of annoyance
now arose, in all kinds of attempts to lessen
my authority in the navy, but as I was always
on the alert to maintain
my position, these resulted in nothing but
defeat to their concoctors.
At length an overt act was committed in the
appointment of Captain Spry
as my flag captain on board the O'Higgins,
which had been repaired at
Valdivia, and was now come down to Valparaiso.
An order to this effect
was sent to me, which I promptly refused to
obey, adding that Captain
Spry should never tread my quarter-deck as
flag captain, and that if my
privilege as an admiral were not admitted, the
Government might consider
my command as at an end, for so long as I
continued in command of the
squadron, I would not permit an executor of my
orders to be forced upon
me. The point was immediately conceded, and
Captain Crosbie was
appointed flag captain.
The nomination of Spry
was, no doubt, meant to control my efforts in the
future expedition to Peru, the credit of
which, if any, was to be
reserved for the army. As far as I knew
anything of Captain Spry, I had
no personal objections to him, but, restricted
as I had been by the
Minister of Marine Zenteno, I had great doubts
as to the motives for
appointments of his making, being convinced
that his principal aim was
to prevent me from doing anything beyond
keeping the Spaniards in check,
an operation to which I was by no means
inclined to accede, as had been
evinced by the recent conquest of Valdivia, in
excess of his
instructions.
Encouraged by the annoyance given to me by the
Minister of Marine and
his party, one or two of my captains thought
themselves at liberty to
manifest a disregard to my authority, which,
as their admiral, I did not
choose to tolerate. The most influential of
these was Captain Guise,
who, having been guilty of several acts of
direct disobedience and
neglect of duty, was, by my orders, put in
arrest, pending a demand made
by me that the Government should institute a
court martial for the
investigation of his conduct. This act greatly
irritated Zenteno, who
desired to support him, and refused consent to
the inquiry; thus
establishing a precedent for the captain of any ship to consider
himself independent
of the admiral.
Such an act of folly in violation of the
discipline of the navy, no less
than of personal insult to myself, determined
me to have nothing more to
do with the Chilian administration, and on
July 16th, I once more
transmitted to the Government my resignation,
at the same time demanding
my passport to quit the country, notifying to
the officers of the
squadron that on the receipt of the same I should cease to command.
A meeting was
immediately held amongst them, and on the same day, I
received--not a valedictory address, as might
have been expected--but
two letters, one signed by five captains, and
the other by twenty-three
commissioned officers, containing resolutions
of abandoning the service
also, at the same time handing in their
commissions. To this proof of
attachment, I replied, by requesting that they
would not sacrifice their
own positions on my account, and recommended
them not to make their
resolutions public till they had further
considered the matter, as it
might be seriously detrimental to the
interests of the country.
The following letter was
addressed to me on this occasion by the
officers of the squadron:--
"On board the Independencia,
July 18, 1820."
My Lord,
The general discontent and
anxiety which your Lordship's
resignation has occasioned amongst the
officers and others of
the squadron, afford a strong proof how much
the ungrateful conduct
of the Government is felt by those serving
under your command.
"The officers whose names are subscribed to
the enclosed resolutions,
disdaining longer to serve under a Government
which can so soon
have forgotten the important services rendered to the State,
beg leave to put in your hands their
commissions, and to request
you will be kind enough to forward them to the
Minister of Marine.
At the same time that we are thus forced to withdraw ourselves from
the service, our warmest wishes will be
offered up for the prosperity
and liberty of the country."
"Signed by 23 Commissioned
Officers."
The following resolutions accompanied this
letter:--
"Resolved--1. That the honour, safety, and
interest of the Chilian
navy entirely rest on the abilities and
experience of the present
Commander-in-Chief."
"2. That, as the feelings
of unbounded confidence and respect which we
entertain for him cannot be transferred to
another, we have come to the
resolution of resigning our commissions, and
of transmitting them to
Government, through the hands of our admiral."
"3. That our commissions
shall be accompanied by a letter expressive of
our sentiments, signed by all whose
commissions are enclosed."
"Signed by 23 Officers."
Pending the acceptance of
my resignation by the Government, the
equipment of the squadron was carried on with
the greatest alacrity, so
that there might be no ground for complaint
that the termination of my
command had caused any remissness in our
duties. I, however, withheld
the commissions which had been enclosed to me
by the officers of the
squadron, lest the measure should excite
popular dissatisfaction, and
thus cause a danger for which the Government
was unprepared.
The only captains who did not sign the
resolutions were Guise and Spry,
the former being in arrest, and the latter
being offended with me on
account of my refusal to accept him as flag
captain. There is no doubt
but that he immediately communicated to
Zenteno the resolutions of the
officers, for on the 20th I received from him
the following letter:--
"Valparaiso, July 20th,
1820."
"My Lord,"
"At a moment when the
services of the naval forces of
the State are of the highest importance, and
the personal services
of your Lordship indispensable, the Supremacy,
with the most
profound sentiments of regret, has received your resignation, which,
should it be admitted, would involve the
future operations of the
arms of liberty in the New World in certain
ruin; and ultimately
replace in Chili, your adopted home, that
tyranny which, your
Lordship abhors, and to the annihilation of which your heroism has
so greatly contributed."
"His Excellency the
Supreme Director commands me to
inform your Lordship that should you persist
in resigning the command
of the squadron which has been honoured by
bearing your
flag--the cause of terror and dismay to our enemies, and of glory to
all true Americans; or should the Government
unwisely admit it,
this would indeed be a day of universal mourning in the New
World. The Government, therefore, in the name
of the nation
returns you your commission, soliciting your re-acceptance of it,
for the furtherance
of that sacred cause to which your whole soul is
devoted."
"The Supremacy is
convinced of the necessity which obliges
your Lordship to adopt the measures which
placed Captain Guise, of
the Lantaro, in arrest, and of the justice
of the charges exhibited
against this officer; but being desirous of
preventing any delay in
the important services in which the ships of
war are about to
proceed, it is the request of His Excellency the Supreme Director
that his trial be postponed to the first
opportunity which does not
interfere with the service of the squadron, so
important at the
present epoch."
"(Signed) JOSE IGNACIO ZENTENO."
In addition to this
communication from the Minister of Marine, I
received private letters from the Supreme
Director and General San
Martin, begging me to continue in command of
the naval forces, and
assuring me that there should be no further
cause for complaint.
On receipt of these letters I withdrew my
resignation, and returned to
the officers of the squadron their
commissions, at the same time
setting Captain Guise at liberty, and
reinstating him in the command of
his ship. I would not have done this but from
a feeling of attachment to
the Supreme Director, General O'Higgins, whose
amiable disposition--too
easy to contend with the machinations of those
around him,--- was a
sufficient assurance that he was neither an
actor in, nor even privy to
the system of annoyance pursued towards me by
a clique of whom Zenteno
was the agent. Like many other good
commanders, O'Higgins did not
display that tact in the cabinet which had so
signally served his
country in the field, in which,--though General San Martin, by his
unquestionable powers of turning the
achievements of others to his own
account, contrived to gain the credit--the
praise was really due to
General O'Higgins. The same easy disposition,
after the elevation of the
latter to the Supreme Directorate, induced him
to consent to the
establishment of a senatorial court of consultation, conceding to it
privileges altogether incompatible with his
own supremacy; and it was
with this body that all the vexations directed
against me originated--as
has been asserted by writers on Chili, at the
instigation of General San
Martin; but having no documentary evidence to
prove this, I shall not
take upon myself to assert the fact,
notwithstanding that the subsequent
conduct of the General gave more than
probability to the generally
received opinion.
There was, however, no
doubt but that General San Martin had been privy
to much of the annoyance given to the squadron
and myself, as, upon my
accusing him of this, he replied that he only
"wanted to see how far the
Supreme Director would allow a party spirit to
oppose the welfare of the
expedition;" adding, "Never mind, my lord, I
am general of the army, and
you shall be admiral of the squadron." "Bien,
milord, yo soy General
del exercito, y V. sara Almirante de la
esquadra." His allusion to the
complicity of the Supreme Director I knew to
be false, as His Excellency
was anxious to do all in his power both for
the squadron and his
country; had not the Senate, on which he had
conferred such
extraordinary powers, thwarted all his endeavours.
General San Martin was,
however, much surprised when I shewed him the
letters and returned commissions of the
officers, he having no
conception of their determination not to serve
under any command but my
own; this step on their part being fraught
with the greatest danger to
the equipment of the contemplated expedition.
The Senate just noticed
was an anomaly in state government. It consisted
of five members, whose functions were to
remain only during the first
struggles of the country for independence; but
this body had now assumed
a permanent right to dictatorial control,
whilst there was no appeal
from their arbitrary conduct, except to
themselves. They arrogated the
title of "Most Excellent," whilst the Supreme
Director was simply "His
Excellency;" his position, though nominally
head of the executive,
being really that of mouth-piece to the
Senate, which, assuming all
power, deprived the Executive Government of
its legitimate influence, so
that no armament could be equipped, no public
work undertaken, no troops
raised, and no taxes levied, except by the
consent of this irresponsible
body. For such a clique, the plain, simple
good sense, and thorough good
feeling of the Supreme Director was no match;
as, being himself above
meanness, he was led to rely on the honesty of
others from the
uprightness of his own motives. Though in every way disposed to
believe, with Burke,
that "what is morally wrong can never be politically right,"
he was led to believe that a crooked policy
was a necessary evil of
Government; and as such a policy was adverse
to his own nature, he was
the more easily induced to surrender its
administration to others who
were free from his conscientious principles.
Of these the most
unscrupulous was Zenteno, who, previous to the
revolution, had been an attorney at
Conception, and was a protege of
General San Martin--carrying with him into
State Administration the
practical cunning of his profession, with more
than its usual proportion
of chicanery. As he was my bitter opponent,
obstructing my plans for the
interests of Chili in every possible way, it
might ill become me to
speak of him as I then felt, and to this day
feel. I will therefore
adduce the opinion of Mrs. Graham, the first
historian of the Republic,
as to the estimation in which he was generally
held:--"Zenteno has read
more than usual among his countrymen, and
thinks that little much. Like
San Martin, he dignifies scepticism in
religion, laxity of morals, and
coldness of heart, if not cruelty, with the
name of philosophy; and
while he could shew creditable sensibility for
the fate of a worm, would
think the death or torture of a political
opponent matter for
congratulation." I was his political opponent, as wishing to uphold
the authority of the
Supreme Director, and hence, no doubt, his enmity to
me; his influence even extending so far as to
prevent the Supreme
Director from visiting me whilst in Santiago, on the ground that
such a course on his
part would be undignified!
At this distance of
time--now that Chili is in possession of a
Government acting on more enlightened
principles--there is no necessity
for withholding these remarks, without which
the subsequent acts of the
Chilian Government towards me might be liable
to misconstruction as to
my representations of them. So long as Chili
was in a transition state
from a corrupt and selfish Government to one
acting in accordance with
the true interests of the country, I forbore
to make known these and
other circumstances, which, having now become
matters of history, need
not any longer be withheld.
Writing in this spirit, I
may mention a reason, notorious enough at the
time, why the squadron was not paid even its
wages. The Government had
provided the means, but those to whom the
distribution was entrusted
retained the money during their pleasure,
employing it for their own
advantage in trading speculations or in usury,
only applying it to a
legitimate purpose when further delay became
dangerous to themselves.
One great cause of the hatred displayed
towards me by these people, was
my incessant demands that the claims of the
squadron should be satisfied
as regarded wages. As to prize-money, not a
dollar was ever conceded by
the Government either to myself, officers, or
men, so long as I remained
in Chili; but I had the satisfaction to see
that the constant watch
which I kept on those financial disorders, was
the means of ameliorating
the system, though with the additional dislike
to myself of those whose
short-sighted policy I was thwarting, and
whose avaricious speculations
were thus curtailed.
In spite of his enmity,
the Minister of Marine had been officially
compelled to write me the following letter:--
"My Lord,"
"If victories over an
enemy are to be estimated
according to the resistance offered, or the
national advantages
obtained, the conquest of Valdivia is, in both senses, inestimable;
encountering, as you did, the natural and
artificial strength of that
impregnable fortress which, till now, had
obstinately defended itself
by means of those combined advantages. The
memory of that
glorious day will occupy the first pages of Chilian history, and the
name of Your Excellency will be transmitted
from generation to
generation by the gratitude of our descendants."
"His Excellency the
Supreme Director, highly gratified by that
noble conquest, orders me to inform you (as I
have now the
satisfaction of doing), that he experiences, in his own name, and in
that of the nation, the most heartfelt
gratification at that signal
achievement. The meritorious officers,
Beauchef, Miller, Erescano,
Carter, and Vidal, and all the other officers
and soldiers who, in
imitation of your Excellency, encountered such
vast dangers, will be
brought to the notice of Government, in order
to receive a decorative
medal, in gratitude for their gallantry, and
in proof that Chili rewards
the heroes who advocate her cause."
Our national flag has been
displayed amidst the most festive public
demonstrations, above those of Valdivia and
Cantabria, in proof of the
subjection of our enemies.
"I beg, with the greatest
gratification, the honour to announce to you
your letter of the 3rd instant, transmitting
those of Major Beauchef and
Major Miller."
"God preserve your
Excellency many years."
(Signed) JOSE IGNACIO
ZENTENO.
"The
Vice-Admiral commanding the Chilian Squadron."
It is difficult to see how
a man who could have written the above
letter, even officially, could have become my
worst enemy; the reasons
for which will, however, develop themselves as
we proceed.
As the estate which was conferred upon me at
Rio Clara was afterwards
taken from me, without reason assigned, I will
here give the letter
conveying it, as this will again have to be
alluded to. The
attorney-like cunning of Zenteno prevented its conveyance by any
more formal document
than the decree conferring it.
"My Lord,"
"A Decree of this date has
been issued by His
Excellency the Supreme Director, of which the annexed is a
copy:--"
"Desirous to expedite,
without loss of time, the gift of 4000
quadras of land, which, by decree of the
Senate, was assigned to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Squadron,
Vice-Admiral Lord Cochrane,
as a demonstration of public appreciation for
his distinguished
services in the 'Restoration,' of the important fortress of
Valdivia; the said
4000 quadras are assigned on the lands of Rio Clara, in
the province of Conception, being part of the
confiscated estate of
Pablo Furtado, a fugitive Spaniard."
"'The present deed shall
serve as a sufficient title to the property in
favour of the Vice-Admiral, being communicated
to the Minister of
Finance, in order to the accustomed formalities, to receive
possession and enjoy
the benefits.'"
"I have the honour to communicate the above,
by Supreme orders, for your
information."
"God preserve your
Excellency many years."
"(Signed) JOSE IGNACIO
ZENTENO.
Administration of Marine,
Valparaiso, August SO, 1820.
Published by order of His Excellency."
* * * * *