THE Sepoy Mutiny, which broke out within a year after
the passing of the Widows’ Re-marriage Act, naturally retarded, if
it did not completely stop the course of domestic and social
legislation. Yet when disturbances were at their worst, and the
North-West Provinces had been lost for a season, the Council found
time to consider a Bill which, though it did not become law till
1859, did much to protect the tenants and under-tenants from the
oppressions and exactions of the Zamindars and Talukdars in Bengal
and Behar. This law was, practically, the redemption of the pledges
given to the whole body of the tenantry by Lord Cornwallis some
sixty years before. The statute has been popularly termed the Magna
Charta of the ryot. It did not interfere with the vested rights and
privileges of the landholders, while it gave stability and
permanence to a very valuable class of agriculturists, to whom are
due the clearance of the jungle, the spread of cultivation, and the
introduction of the highest kinds of produce. The time of the
Council was also devoted to bills arising out of the Mutiny;
desertions, offences against the State, courts-martial, and the
enrolment of volunteers. Lord Canning also found it necessary
himself to preside at one sitting of the Council, and to urge the
prompt passing of a law, enabling the Executive Government to deal
vigorously with disaffection and disloyalty, and the license of the
Press. In all these measures Grant took an active part, and he gave
his support to other steps adopted by the Governor-General for the
restoration of order and the security of property and life. A detail
of these proceedings may be found in the histories of the Mutiny,
and in narratives published at the time or afterwards, and they do
not come within the scope and object of this chapter.
But the time had now come when an old and familiar
adage was to be reversed, and the gown had to give way to the sword.
In the hot weather of 1857 the Mutiny burst upon us, as it has been
aptly remarked, “like a bolt from the blue,” and put an end, for the
time, to a good many projects of legislation and internal reform.
Grant, at the close of this memorable year, was
afforded an opportunity of doing service to the State in what was,
to him and to many other civilians, a new and unfamiliar field of
action.
It is needless to give even a summary of the
disastrous events by which, in 1857, we lost district after
district. The average reader may be credited with a general
knowledge of the evolution of the Mutiny. But it is necessary to
show the precise state of things at the beginning of August, the
extent of our authority, and the towns and cities which we had
managed to coerce and to keep in hand, up to the Doab of Hindostan.
August was, indeed, according to the opinion of nearly every one
then in India, the most anxious month of an iron time. The massacres
of Cawnpore and Futtehghur had taken place. Lucknow had not been
relieved. Delhi had not fallen. The English regiments sent out from
England were anxiously expected, and were only just beginning to
arrive. Mr John Colvin was confined to the Fort of Agra, with
thousands of non-combatants and a small force. Whatever civil
functions could be discharged in the districts that remained to us
at one end of the North-West Provinces, were performed by John
Lawrence, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. Benares owed its safety
to General Neill, and to such energetic civilians as H. C. Tucker,
the Commissioner of Division, and F. Gubbins, the Magistrate and
Judge. The Fort at Allahabad, at the junction of the Ganges and
Jumna rivers, was preserved for us by Havelock and Brasyer’s Sikhs.
On the other hand, the neighbouring districts of Azimgurh and
Jaunpur had been occupied by mutineers, and the civil officers had
retired, not without some loss. All the Doab of Hindostan had
returned to chaos. Oudh was swarming with Sepoys and with a rabble
eager for plunder. Gorakhpur, a very important district bordering on
Nepaul, which, it was hoped, might have been saved by the Gurkhas,
had been abandoned; and there were troubles and trials in Behar,
Arrah, and Patna; that is to say, below Benares, and even in the
peaceful districts of Lower Bengal.
“The condition of the country,” the Governor-General
wrote to the President of the Board of Control, “about Allahabad and
Benares, where we are recovering our own, but where every man is
acting after his own fashion and under no single authority nearer
than Calcutta, has made it necessary to put some one in the
temporary position of Lieutenant-Governor; all communication between
Agra and those districts being indefinitely cut off. There is no man
in whose capacity for the task of re-establishing order I have so
much confidence in as Mr Grant, and certainly none who will act more
in harmony with the military authorities. I have therefore sent Mr
Grant there in the character of Lieutenant-Governor of the Central
Provinces. He will exercise precisely the powers which Mr Colvin
would exercise if the latter were not shut up in Agra, without means
of communicating with those parts of his government, and this will
continue till Mr Colvin is set free.”
Sir John Kaye, at page 191 of the third volume of his
“ History of the Sepoy War,” has made some remarks to the point. The
historian, while commenting on the departure to the Upper Provinces
of Sir James Outram and Grant, writes of the last named, that—
“His great abilities had not, up to this time, been
much tested in situations of exceptional responsibility, demanding
from him strenuous action in strange circumstances. But although his
antecedents, and to some extent, indeed, his habits, fitted him
rather for the performance of sedentary duties, as Secretary or
Councillor, there was a fund of latent energy in him, and he was
eager for more active employment than could be found for him in
Calcutta. When, therefore, the state of affairs in the Upper and
Central Provinces was seen to be such as to require closer
supervision and more vigorous control than could be exercised in
such a conjunction by the existing local authorities, and Lord
Canning determined to despatch a trusted officer of high rank with a
special commission to the disturbed district beyond the limits of
the Lieutenant-Govemorship of Bengal, he found Mr Grant quite
prepared to undertake the work at any sacrifice to self, and to
proceed at once to the scene of action.”
It was obvious that Lord Canning could not himself
leave Calcutta, and the position of public affairs, at this crisis,
proved beyond any doubt or question the paramount necessity of
retaining for the seat of Government an easy and rapid communication
with the seaboard. From this point of view alone the
Governor-General can only reside permanently at one of two places—
Calcutta or Bombay. It has been thought possible to localise the
supreme and central authority at Nasik in the Bombay Presidency, or
at Jabalpur in the Central Provinces. Experience has dispelled these
illusions. Simla may, of course, like Ecbatana in the Persian
Empire, be the summer residence of the Viceroy. But in times of war
or rebellion there must be close communication with the coast
Grant left Calcutta by steamer on the 7th August, and
assumed what was termed the Government of the Central Provinces at
Benares about the last days of August. He remained at the Holy City
till the end of December, and then spent a month at Allahabad. Lord
Canning, by that time, was enabled to leave the Presidency and to
direct the affairs of the North-West Provinces on the spot; so
Grant’s Special Commission came to an end, and he returned to his
seat in the Supreme Council This brief historical retrospect is a
necessary introduction to explain the line taken by Grant in
preserving tranquillity, restoring order, and regaining what we had
lost; and above all, in keeping up communication on the Grand Trunk
Road with Allahabad, as well as with the Lower Provinces. My sources
of information, besides Blue Books, Histories, and published papers,
are supplied by a volume of demi-official letters which have never
been published, and of which copies were carefully taken at the
time. It should be noticed that the border line of Grant’s authority
was occasionally difficult to define with precision. For instance,
Captain Willoughby Osborne, the political agent at Rewah, one of the
Bundelkhand States, was under the orders of the Governor-General in
the Foreign Department, yet during the weeks that this gallant
officer remained at his post, cut off from friends and beleaguered
by enemies, open or concealed, the only authority with which he
could hold communication was the Government of the Central
Provinces.
It was surmised in some quarters that friction was
likely to occur between a civilian Lieutenant-Governor and the
various military officers in charge of mixed bodies of troops;
jealous of interference, and not unnaturally disposed to think that
men wearing black coats were rather out of place, and unlikely to
give much useful aid or advice. But no such mischief resulted from
the course followed by Grant. Though the exact spot where political
considerations ended and strategy had to begin, was not easy to hit,
Grant kept in touch and harmony with colonels and captains of
different views and idiosyncrasies; and no difficulty arose between
him and Sir Colin Campbell, the Commander-in-Chief, who, like
William III., according to Macaulay, was prone to regard the
uncalled-for advice and intrusion of gownsmen with “more than the
disgust ordinarily felt by soldiers on such occasions.”
During his progress up the Ganges the steamer
touched, besides other stations, at Monghyr, Patna, Dinapur, and
Ghazipur; and Grant kept Lord Canning fully informed of everything
that occurred, and gave his own views and those of Outram on
precautionary measures and apprehended difficulties.
Gunboats manned by sailors might be distributed along
the river. The Commander-in-Chief doubted whether Madras Sepoys
would be of much use without English troops to lead them. Irregulars
accompanying the Commissioner, Mr George Yule, had behaved very
well. Gurkhas would not cover more than six miles in a day’s march.
The abandonment of Gorakhpur was very unfortunate, and it might have
been preserved by three thousand Gurkhas who were available for the
duty. An energetic planter who offered his services must, Grant
wrote, “be a Government servant” if the offer were accepted, but he
could not be allowed to fight for his own hand, like the Gow Chrom
in the “Fair Maid of Perth”; and more to the same effect Soon after
the arrival at Benares the correspondence took a wider range. To H.
C. Tucker, after a forcible seizure of coal, he wrote that if coals
were wanted for river steamers, the individual owning them must be
paid the full price for the article. If any magistrate was not up to
“rough and very difficult work,” he would very soon be replaced by
some one who was.
To the same Commissioner he writes for information
about the beheading of sixty-eight persons in one village, adding
that he will hold the magistrates responsible for all burnings and
slaughterings not done in battle. That portions of mutinous strong
holds were levelled was all very right, but it was absurd to sow the
ground with salt Mr Samuells, the just and energetic Commissioner of
Patna, is informed that he will soon have 200 English soldiers, who
ought to make the station of Chapra quite secure. Then follow
comments on some soldiers of Her Majesty’s fighting 10th Regiment
who began by attacking the natives, and ended by pulling a major out
of his buggy because, they said, he had spoken ill of their corps. A
magistrate was allowed to raise 100 Sowars if he thought that they
could be turned into a body of fighting police. One Hingan Khan, a
Muhammadan, who had behaved well and deserved much, would be better
rewarded by a jagir or rent-free life tenure of land than by a
pension in money. If it was right to cut off the sixty-eight heads
alluded to in a previous letter, it could hardly be right now to
pardon everyone who had still his head on his shoulders. The raising
of a new corps of native Christians is deprecated for what appears a
very sound reason. On this side of India they were too few in number
to be of real military importance, and yet just sufficient to expose
us to misconstruction, and to make enlistment in the police
unpopular with the ordinary Muhammadan and Hindu. The most absurd
and improbable stories were finding credence at that time, and
anything like a marked division of creeds was sure to add to the
difficulty of division of races. It seemed to Grant the highest
policy to raise no new question of religion, because prudent men
should beware “ of novelties into which this element enters.” The
general rule for the guidance of executive officers was severity and
sharpness with the guilty, and mildness and encouragement with the
innocent; and in all cases, discrimination. Such a matter as the
formal reception of native noblemen and gentlemen was not overlooked
when the tide was turning in our favour; and it was suggested to the
Commissioner who was to hold the Durbar, that a better political
effect would be produced by the reception of two Nepal princes and
the Raja of Benares, on two separate days, as loyal friends to
Government, than by a general levee at which all and sundry could be
present, and which would be sure to raise inconvenient questions of
relative precedence and rank. Praise is awarded to an officer who
had stuck to a post where his presence was required, and where he
might be of use, and who had sent away those whose presence was not
required, and who might be incumbrances. In writing to a Political
Agent at a small Principality, he conceals his meaning by
transliterating his English into the Greek character. This
composition might not, perhaps, satisfy a pundit or a Board of
Examiners, but it doubtless had the effect of not letting a native
know that, just then, not a single English soldier could be spared.
One district official, who had been warned that he must look into
his Intelligence Department, was consoled by being told that a
similar warning had been sent to the Head of a neighbouring district
The employment of active and well-paid natives might prevent
credence being given to reports which either exaggerated or
minimised the numbers of the plunderers and mutineers. The Foreign
Secretaryship at that period was filled by Mr G. F. Edmonstone, a
man of high character and attainments, who had done some excellent
work in the Punjab; and he is told, “ If you give me an order which
is meant to look pretty but not to be enforced, then, unless you
give me a wink at the same time, we shall both come to grief.” To
the Viceroy it is suggested that we should make a good parade of our
troops, and not in a mere technical sense. It is necessary that the
natives should see English soldiers in masses, and not merely hear
about them. “They believe nothing they don’t see. They will not
credit the fall of Delhi, and they know that we have come away from
Lucknow.” Native folly and incapacity luckily took another
direction. A Subahdar or Naik, with dash or daring, might have cut
the wires between Allahabad and Benares, and blown up the bridge at
the former place; and even though, “ by delays and other causes, we
had given,” Grant said, “longodds to the cowardice and folly of our
adversaries, it was twenty to one we did not lose in the end.” More
than once did Grant, like others at that time, remark on the
non-appearance in Oudh and the Doab of any single leader of marked
merit. Such a one, with vast numbers of trained Sepoys at his
disposal, might have besieged Allahabad, captured Benares, and
raided on Behar. But, in this tract at least, there was no fatalis
dux,though many a dux turbidus set our Adria in commotion. Koer Sing
in Gaya, Tantia Topi, the weaver-artillery-man in Central India, the
Rani of Jhansi, and the well-known Maulavi, did show some evidence
of strategy, and gave much trouble till they were put down. But the
mutiny gave birth neither to a Sivaji nor to a Hyder Ali. The days
of “rugging and reiving” had returned. But military native genius,
happily, had been crushed out by our rule, though the Sikh, the
Gurkha, and the Pathan were and are as ready as ever to follow where
the English officer cleared the way.
There are divers remarks and suggestions of a similar
kind in the correspondence which went on unceasingly with
Commissioners and Magistrates; and in all such matters Grant wrote
from a position of distinct and recognised authority. Zeal had to be
moderated. Vigorous efforts, apt to extend themselves in a wrong
direction, had to be directed towards practical and possible ends.
Harmonious co-operation was pointedly enjoined, and occasionally
warnings were given to subordinates who neglected their own duties
and meddled with operations entrusted to others at a distance. But
on the whole, Grant was very well served by the civilians of the
North - West Provinces, and I have found no instances of defiance,
disobedience of orders, or irreparable mistakes. That in such a
crisis, with administration rudely interrupted or at an end, there
should be some diversity of opinion, was to be expected, nor did
thousands always flee at the rebuke of one man. Still, it was
happily remarked by one historian of the Mutiny, that our supremacy
in India was justified by the final result We put down the
rebellion, because we had a right to be there.
At that period the Punjab was separated from the
Lower Provinces by an impassable gulf, and the communications of
Lawrence with the Viceroy on several occasions were carried on by
the Valley of the Indus, and by Sind and Bombay. Grant had occasion
to ask the opinion of John Lawrence as to the best mode of
recruiting the native regiments, so as to avoid the previous
mistakes which had fostered disloyalty and intrigues. It is almost
needless to say that even among military experts, few could be found
whose opinions on such a point were more worthy of attention than
the Civil Ruler of the Punjab; and as there was a slight difference
of opinion between Grant and Lawrence on the recruiting question, it
is as well to quote a large portion of Grant’s letter. It shows how
cautiously the writer proceeded when discussing such a subject with
one whose knowledge of the Punjab was second to none. On the 7th of
September Grant had written to Lawrence, informing him that a Sikh
of distinction had been appointed Commandant of a police corps for
the Central Provinces, modelled on the Punjab Police; and asking if
a thousand Sikhs could be sent down from that Province. In this
letter Grant hazarded the opinion that mixed corps or regiments,
composed, say, of Pathans, Brahmans, and Hindostanis, had been
failures, and that what was wanted were corps composed of separate
castes. To this Lawrence had sent a reply, drawing attention to
three points, which Grant discussed in the following friendly
language, in a letter of 30th October:—
“As to , I am sorry that the appointment is not
thought wise by you, than whom none know better what is prudent and
imprudent in regard to the great Punjab families. It was not
suspected in Calcutta that you would have a special objection to the
family, if serving away from the frontier. Edmonstone was entirely
in favour of the appointment I do not expect that will set the Indus
on fire, and he will have less chance with the Ganges. At this
distance he could hardly play us a trick if he wished to do so;
however this may be, the deed is done. It was impossible to consult
you by post beforehand.
“I entirely agree with you as to the necessity of
caution, lest we overdo the raising of the Sikhs. After the lesson
the Hindostani family has given us, it would be madness to put
ourselves in the power of any other military family. But though I
think this a very practical question with you in the Punjab, where
you have an immense mass of Sikh soldiers collected, it does not
seem to me a practical question with us here, where we have hardly
any, and where it is only proposed to employ, comparatively, a very
small number. Indeed, in the way I look at the question, it should
on your principle, in which I fully concur, be a prudent measure of
precaution to transfer some of your excessive proportion of Sikhs to
this place, and elsewhere, at a great distance, where the proportion
of the same class is, and will be, smaller. In these Central
Province divisions, viz. Benares, Allahabad, and S£gar, there will
certainly be hereafter not less than seven European regiments with
European artillery. I think it will be quite safe to have, in the
same provinces, three Sikh regiments without artillery. It seems to
me that if the number of Sikhs, on the whole, and in every province,
are decidedly less than half the number of Europeans (including
amongst Sikhs both police and military corps), we shall obtain the
high military qualities of that race, as well as that of their
hatred of Hindostanis, without running any risk whatever. Indeed,
though the sentiment may sound strangely now, I think it possible
that occasions may arise when we shall be very glad to have in India
some moderate proportion of real soldiers, not Europeans. Unless we
commit the old folly of officering these native regiments as if they
were Grenadier Guards, such regiments will be, at all times, a real
saving, and the great inconvenience of having no native troops is at
this moment patent to us. In all this you will not differ. Now as
yet, instead of three, I only know of two Sikh corps contemplated
here: local police corps and the general military corps, which I
understand is to be raised at Allahabad. On reading your list of
your Sikh force, I am inclined to think it is already too large, and
that it might be gradually reduced. But I do not see why we should
not have our share of them here. As to your third point, I am afraid
I differ from you, though, after explanation, perhaps you will not
think my idea fundamentally different from your own. We both re*
nounce the old notion of one mixture, of which the whole army is to
be composed. I recommend a variety of sorts, each regiment being
composed of one sort of men. You, I infer, recommend all regiments
to be of one sort, each to be composed of different sorts of
companies, every company being composed of one sort of men. I adhere
to my preference, in general, to the principle of different sorts of
regiments, but I will not inflict a discussion on you. Only, I will
say that if you and I were talking the matter over, I believe we
should finish with very little difference of opinion. I am ready to
have some sorts of regiments composed of a variety of sorts of
companies, though I should prefer it otherwise, because I think the
more separate we can keep the several races and classes of soldiers,
the less likely we are to have any large portion of our army
subject, at one and the same time, to one and the same
quasi-mesmeric influence. For my present purpose there can be no
objection to having one police corps composed of one class of
foreigners. Composed of Sikhs, it will be unique, and cannot be
mischievous. I see from a note of poor Colvin, written to George
Campbell a month before his death, that he was alive (as I am) to
the risk of Punjabi Muhammadans, after being some time in Hindostan,
forgetting their Punjabi qualities and becoming mere Muhammadans.
Oddly enough, since I received your letter, three Punjabi
Muhammadans deserted from the Ludiana Sikhs, and set off to fight
for Din (the faith). They had money, but no arms or uniform.
“Then there is the case of a plot at Allahabad, in
which Punjabi Muhammadans were concerned with Hindostani Muhammadan
conspirators. The end of this is, I should prefer none but Sikhs and
Hill Rajputs, and even this mixture I take in the hope of making two
regiments of them eventually. After we are supplied with a moderate
proportion of Sikhs, we should still have plenty of employment for
the other classes you point out; for we must have a considerable
proportion of native Irregulars, and we must have organised police
forces in considerable number. It is very uphill work, but I am
doing all I can in the way of experiment My one rule is to have
neither Pandy nor Pandy’s cousins; with that one restriction, I am
open to all comers. At Benares, I am raising a small police levy of
the middle class, commencing just below akirs, who are Pandys, and
troublesome ones. I have about 300, the levy being fixed at 400 and
odd; little fellows, and not strong, and not as yet promising, but I
am confident that we shall get better men when the people see the
thing is really intended. At Fatehpur, we are raising an auxiliary
temporary police force of Lodies, chiefly under a rich Lodi Zamindar.
Mayne, of Gopiganj, is raising a police force of impure castes.
Captain Bruce at Cawnpore has had real success with Sweepers. On the
Juanpur frontier we are subsidising friendly Zamindars, each of whom
brings a hundred of his own men as an auxiliary fighting police. The
pressure for fighting men who are practically available for the
protection of life and liberty, not to speak of revenue where
military honours are not to be gained, is so extreme, that you need
not fear our being over nice. Pray, therefore, as fast as possible,
send me 1000 Sikhs and Hill Rajputs for my police corps. If you can
send men already trained in your levies it would be a great
advantage, and if a bonus will induce such men to come, it will be
well bestowed. Can you send me, as a loan or otherwise, two infantry
Punjabi levy corps here for present service, and about 400 cavalry?
The road will be clear enough.”
This interchange of ideas between two men of widely
different experience and administrative training can hardly fail to
be interesting. Grant’s views as to the policy to be pursued in
keeping open communication, and recovering our lost ground, appear
sound and politic. More than once he strongly deprecates every
attempt to recapture Stations which had been once lost, unless it
was quite certain that they could be permanently held. To re-occupy
a town or district with a moderate force, and then to be compelled
once more to abandon it, would do more harm than the original loss.
The captured station, the plundered treasury, the ruined houses, the
chaotic district, might be left till we had force sufficient to set
up once more the civil administration, complete, permanent, and
stable. Some civilians were for making rapid raids, with a small
military force, into the interior of districts bordering on the
Grand Trunk Road, to disperse bands of Sepoys or insurgents. The
Lieutenant-Governor’s answer was that the primary consideration must
be the retention of the high roads for the passage of troops and
supplies, and that the dispersion of armed bodies, unless they
threatened the line itself, was comparatively of small importance. I
have already intimated that Grant was most careful to leave the
execution of any plan, suggested and recommended—to the discretion
of the officer in command of each detachment, whoever he might be;
and how this was effected can only be shown by extracts from the
correspondence. To Lord Canning, he ventured, without so much as one
word of disapproval of the Commander-in-Chiefs strict and excellent
orders against distant and military expeditions, to express an
opinion that the force occupying the fort at Allahabad might be
quite equal to secure such a position against any force short of an
army with siege guns, and also to detach a movable body sufficient
to clear the neighbourhood of the fort and town, returning within a
fixed number of days and hours. Two hundred and fifty men, Sikhs and
Englishmen, might surely, he thought, prevent the intrusion into the
district of any adventurer from Oudh who chose to take a number of
villages in the Doab and call them his own. And it would be a
military as well as a civil disgrace if a set of Peons or orderlies
were to cut the communications between Calcutta and Allahabad within
sight of the Fort Sir Colin Campbell's orders alluded to were surely
never intended to prevent our dispersing such a rabble by a good
rush and a well-planned sally. There was a question how to treat
some 250 Sepoys who had stuck to their officers when the rest of the
regiment had mutinied, but whose loyalty had to some extent given
way after a longer trial. Grant writes to Colonel Gordon that such
men should not be harshly treated, and that to deprive them of their
arms would be contrary to the wishes of Sir James Outram and the
Governor-General. Could not these men be sent somewhere out of
temptation’s way? And then Grant adds pointedly : “ Clearly, I have
no right to interfere.
[It is just as well to describe the system under
which the native regiments are now recruited. After the Mutiny there
was, not unnaturally, a dislike to have too many Pandys, as they
were called, collected together. From information kindly supplied by
the authorities of the India Office, the following is the present
composition of our Native Army in India.
With a very few exceptions, all the Cavalry of the
Indian Army is class squadron : two troops of one class in a
regiment of 8 troops. Of the 60 regiments in Bengal only 20 are
class company corps. Of 33 regiments in Madras all but one are class
company, and so are the whole of 29 regiments in Bombay and 6 in
Hyderabad. Thus there are 87 class company regiments of Indian
Infantry, and 41 class regiments, and of these 41 regiments 12 are
composed of Gurkhas.
Practically, all the Cavalry and Infantry of the
Native Army are now organised either as class regiments, or on the
class squadron or troop or company system. Most of the Bengal and
Panjab Infantry Regiments fall into the former category. The
remainder of the Army fall into the latter, with one or two
exceptions. Some of the cavalry squadrons are split into halves.]
If I think a regiment with arms dangerous to the
peace of the country, I may go a great way in recommending a measure
of precaution. But if a military man desires to take a precautionary
measure with a military levy, I have no right to interfere, Colonel
Otter, a distinguished and very capable officer, had arrived at
Allahabad to command the force there, but discovered, to his dismay,
that such a command would entail the abandonment of his post as
Assistant Adjutant-General. Grant could not take on himself to ask
the Commander-in-Chief to allow Colonel Otter to hold both
appointments for a few months, but he urges the Viceroy to see if
this could not be arranged, as the Military Chief “should be a man
with a good head.” Though Sir Colin Campbell did not see his way to
adopting the suggestion, Grant hastens to assure him that it was
impossible “not to recognise the perfect soundness and wisdom of
your Excellency’s conclusions on the larger considerations which you
have been so obliging as to point out” Colonel Wroughton, who was to
command a combined force of Queen’s soldiers and of Gurkhas from
Nepal, under Colonel Pahlwan Sing, is asked to take with him “ three
regiments to Jhusa, leaving one at Juanpur,” and he is informed that
much importance is attached to clearing off the insurgents, and
recovering a part of the Allahabad district up to the Oudh frontier.
“You must be aware of the urgent want of troops in advance;
nevertheless, the Commander-in-Chief has concluded that to clear off
the rabble which threatens our communications is a primary object To
make this a complete affair, his Excellency looks for the
co-operation of the Gurkhas, and I am confident that no want of
exertion on your part and that of Colonel Pahlwan Sing will be
wanting. You can tell them that the 93rd are brother-Highlanders. I
believe they have brought their kilts.” To Captain, afterwards Sir
William Peel, Grant suggests that, as the Gurkhas have two good
guns, and a nice little Howitzer, it would be a great favour if
sailors or others could be spared to work them, as no real artillery
men had come from Nepal. “ I mention this without, in the least,
knowing whether it can properly be done. The Gurkhas are extremely
brave little fellows, and are great at a rush, when they use their
kookeries (knives) in a very ugly manner. They say, however, they
are hard to keep in hand. I trust that the opposition
Lieutenant-Governor will stand to be made an example of. It is not
yet quite cool enough for Gurkhas who are more tender in the sun
than seasoned Europeans. They will be knocked up, many of them, on a
long day. This I think makes a body of Sikhs, who stand anything,
desirable supports to Europeans, but you are the judge of this.”
About the Madras Sepoys, the Viceroys is informed that Captain
Pinkney, an officer of “ ability and sound sense,” was somewhat
doubtful of their fighting powers when opposed to revolted Bengal
Sepoys. The best plan would be, to send the Madrassees with some
supports of English and others, and guns, through Rewah to the
S.igar and Narbada territories, where they could secure the road to
Bombay, punish rebellious, and support and encourage loyal chiefs.
The second subject of Captain Pinkney’s letter, Grant
tells the Viceroy, is confidential. “I can vouch for the
truthfulness and public spirit of the writer. Your Lordship should
see what is said of ——. I have always known him for one of the most
offensive, quarrelsome, and ill-conditioned men going, but I don’t
know anything more about him.”
To Sir W. Mansfield, who was then the
Commander-in-Chiefs right-hand man, Grant gives an account of an
affair in which the Gurkhas suffered a loss of 12 killed and 49
wounded. “The enemy had many mutineer Sepoys amongst their infantry,
and their guns were well served by mutineer artillerymen, who were
cut down at their guns. The Gurkhas, never having stood before
well-served guns until this occasion, are very sulky, and say they
will not fight again unless supported by Europeans. Depend upon it,
Sir Colin has no cause to regret the little force he was so
considerate as to allot to the frontier. Colonel Longden has not
arrived one day too soon. He will march to the frontier to put the
Juanpur Gurkhas there into spirits again, and then probably along
the frontier to Azamgarh, where another attack is threatened; and I
have no doubt the sight of the 10th will efface the recollection of
the 12-pounders.”
Colonel Bushe, who was about to leave the station of
Ghazipur, is asked if he could not postpone his departure for a few
days.
“I presume that your orders are not so peremptory,
and that your presence with the Gurkhas is not so pressing as to
disable you from a compliance with this request I find that a very
uneasy feeling exists at Ghazipur, both among the civil officers and
the native population, in regard to the men of your regiment—not, I
fancy, with much special reference to the individuals, but with
reference to the general body of which they form a part. I find,
too, that your ability to keep them to their duty is universally
spoken of in the highest terms, and I may say, in confidence, I am
told that the reliance which is felt in you by the unmilitary
public, whose safety more or less depends on the conduct of your
men, will no longer be felt if the command is left to the chapter of
accidents.” And in a letter written to the Viceroy at the same time,
and on the same subject, Grant goes over the same ground as to the
uneasy feeling of the residents of Ghazipur, and says that the
incapacity of the officer on whom the command of the station would
devolve in the absence of Colonel Bushe was “notorious and
unquestionable.” And he then adds that nothing short of the general
disarmament of the 65th Native Infantry, “who were supposed to have
an eye to the Treasury, would satisfy the reasonable and
well-disposed residents, if Colonel Bushe were allowed to
leave.Colonel Longden is commended for “his admirable judgment in
not having thrown away the lives of the few Europeans” for no
adequate result, and for not having gone out of his way to attack
some insurgents at Chanda in their own position, considering their
strength in men and guns. “ They do us no harm as long as they stay
there. It is an object with us to put off time so long as we can
keep our own districts from injury. Luckily for us, the enemy, whose
object ought to be the reverse, don’t know the value of time to
either party.” The policy in all these incidents was not to advance
if there were any risk of falling back. Congratulations to Sir Colin
Campbell on the final relief of the Lucknow garrison in November are
coupled with a hope that Outram would be able to hold his own at the
Alumbagh, just outside the city. It is well known that this gallant
officer did keep his position in an entrenched camp, until the
return of the Commander-in-Chief with an overwhelming force in March
1858.
To a Brigadier he writes that he has provided for the
accommodation of a good many wounded men, and that he has ordered a
plan of a spring ambulance cart to hold two men, to be sent for his
approval and for any suggestions. The cart was to cost 200 rupees,
but would effect a saving in the end. Complaints had been made,
rather hastily in some quarters, that Civil Government did not
promptly follow the establishment of military power at Cawn-pore;
and this was so late as the 26th of December. This complaint forced
Grant to explain matters to Sir Colin in the following measured but
candid language:—
“I hope your Excellency will not think me
inconsiderate. I know that your military means are limited, and that
until the great wants are supplied the smaller must wait But, in
justice to the civil officers, it must be remembered that they have,
and can retain at this moment, no fighting police —no man who will
stand against insurgents in arms; they can only look for support to
the regular troops. Therefore, until there has been a demonstration
by a military party, however small, through every part of the
district, punishing bad villages, dispersing all parties in arms,
and elsewhere supporting the Magistrates in seizing strong criminals
and mutineers lying in their own villages, and encouraging the
well-affected, nothing really effective in the way of civil
reorganisation can be expected of a Magistrate, however able and
zealous, in districts which have been so long in the enemy's hands
as Cawnpore, Futtehpur, and part of Allahabad. On this frontier of
Oudh all is now abundantly secure, thanks to your Excellency's
reinforcements. Indeed, for defensive operations, which are all we
are concerned with, the force must be admitted to be more than
enough. If a regiment is wanted, I am pretty sure that General
Franks will be able to spare one.”
And tfien General Franks is offered the services of
two or three civilians to assist his soldiers in civil business —
“Mr Jenkinson, a very energetic young fellow, who has done great
things in getting native Sowars together, Mr F. O. Mayne, an
excellent and most active officer who knows every village in that
tract,” and one or two others. At the same time, the General is
informed that at the end of December 1857, there is still “ an
enemy’s picket within three miles of Allahabad, though the mutineers
prudently keep the other side of the river.” And at the beginning of
the next year a Nawab Nazim, as he styled himself, had “just in
homage, treated the Fort to a serenade of an hour and a half.”
However, within a week Grant was enabled to inform General Franks of
a raid, admirably managed by Brigadier Campbell, in which 300 of the
enemy were killed, with, on our side, one man killed and four or
five wounded. This was owing entirely to having the Sowars in the
first part of the day, and a few horse artillery as cavalry in the
last part “ It shows what the effect of a mere handful of cavalry is
with these runaway fellows.” By another letter about this date,
written to Edmonstone, the Foreign Secretary, General Franks is
described as clearly understanding himself and Pahlwan Sing, the
Commander of the Gurkhas, to be ostensibly in the same position as
Lord Raglan and Marshal Canrobert. Then Jung Bahadur objects to his
Gurkhas being on the two flanks in camp and in the field, very much
as the Chief of the Macdonalds at Culloden objected to the position
assigned to his clan in the army of the Pretender. It would be very
easy to give more extracts from this correspondence with military
men, but I must close this part of the subject with Grant’s emphatic
declaration in a letter to the Viceroy, that “ since his arrival at
Benares he had not had the slightest approach to a difference with
any military officer, in any position, anywhere.” Grant’s treatment
of one other matter at this crisis cannot be passed over. He was
anxious about sufficient provision for carriage, transport, and
supplies. At an early stage the paramount necessity of feeding and
transporting a large force had his constant care. In September 1857
a Commissioner of Division is told to consider means, difficulties,
and prospects, and his subordinates are warned against seizing grain
and bullock carts by force, instead of paying for them at once. “
This is the way to drive grain into Oudh.” And a few days afterwards
Grant, in a letter to Lord Canning, expressed a fear that “ neither
the Commissariat nor the civil officers have their eyes open to what
is really before them.” “ Within a month or six weeks about ten
times the number of Europeans that of late years has ever been at
one time in the North-West Provinces, may be expected to pass
through this part of the country.” On the question of supplies, he
writes to the Commander-in-Chief:—
"I have been long attending to the terribly important
business of carriage and supplies for the immense European force
thatwill pass this wayin the course of the coming season, a duty
which always falls, in practice, on the Civil Department. The result
is, that I believe that it will be enough to start in December with
a stock of food for man and beast, calculated for two months' supply
of 24,000 men. We shall be able to do it as to food and all country
articles. Groceries and shop stores are wholly in the hands of the
Commissariat I venture to suggest an early looking after this, for,
to my mind, it appears as if the stock was nothing at all. For
carriage I can promise fully enough for 20,000 men. But then for
stores, guns, engineering parks, there will be little left. Yet I
think we may expect all that may be wanting to be supplied from the
country ahead as it gradually opens, and from the Bengal carriage of
such of the troops as must be marched up here. On the whole, since I
completed my calculations, I felt easier on this head than I felt
before. . . Within the Oudh frontier appearances appeal* to indicate
that the Regulars—that is the mutineers and the retainers of the
chief men against us—have been recalled into the interior. For the
moment the rabble only are left to trouble us.”
The same fears are shown, and the same activity and
exertions are enjoined on soldiers and civilians all through the
autumn. Eight hundred carts might perhaps suffice for two English
regiments, and a few elephants and camels and bullocks might enable
such a force to move with a couple of batteries; and at repeated
intervals similar warnings are dealt all round. One thousand hackeries (bullock
carts) had been supplied at Benares. Does Sir James Outram’s column
for the relief of Lucknow procure its own fodder as it moves onward?
Can one bullock, elsewhere, be found for every soldier? Will Captain
Osborne send carriage as well as sheep from Rewah? The
Commander-in-Chief may rely on it that, by December, he will have a
stock of food for man and beast, for 24,000 troops, to last two
whole months. There would be no use in numbering separately the
carts furnished by each district They are all for the use of
Government to be paid for under one list, and under one set of
numbers. Evidently, this was not the time to multiply the forms,
headings, and statistics so precious to the official mind. Sir
William Mansfield may be sure of having the number of 2000 carts
which had been promised him, and they will be sent on at the rate of
200 a day.
The system of supply thus organised by Grant was
maintained after his departure by the Commissioners and District
Officers, whose strenuous exertions to meet the wants of the troops
pouring along the Grand Trunk Road, to the relief of Lucknow were
completely successful. How considerable was the effort this involved
will be understood, when it is stated that, in the end, a larger
force was under the command of Lord Clyde for the final conquest of
Lucknow than what had enabled Lord Hardinge and Lord Gough to drive
the Sikh and Akali in headlong rout across the Sutlej ; and four
years afterwards was sufficient for Lord Gough to end the second
Punjab campaign by the crowning victory of Gujarat In illustration I
give the following statistics, kindly furnished me by a military
officer of high position and of great experience. In round numbers,
Sir Colin had under his command, at the capture of Lucknow in March
1858, 31,000 troops of all sorts—British, Native Army, Naval Brigade
(nearly 500), and Nepalese (6000 to 7000) with a total of 164 guns,
including in this total, mortars, siege guns, etc. Of the Nepalese
troops, some 5000, under Jung Bahadur, did not reach camp till the
attack had gone on for four days, was fully developed, and was nigh
conclusion.
At Sobraon, Lord Gough’s force was 17,000 strong,
with 75 to 80 guns.
At Gujarat he had 25,000 and about 75 guns; rather more than less.
Only one other episode of this trying period remains
for notice.
It had been gravely stated in several newspapers
published in England, that 150 of the Cawnpore mutineers and rebels,
seized by General Neill on his march, had been pardoned and set at
liberty by the Lieutenant-Governor; and some English papers went on
to say that the same authority had punished with death some English
soldiers who had assaulted the mutineers. For this story there was
not even the slender foundation which, in troublous times, now and
then induces an excited and bewildered community to lend an ear to
reports discreditable to the English character and name. Not one
mutineer had been captured by General Neill. No one had been
pardoned by Grant; nothing of the kind had happened anywhere. Grant
had had no correspondence with the General on any one subject; had
never criticised any one of his measures; and had never spoken of
Neill, alive or dead, but with the admiration for his soldierly
qualities which he had always felt The author of this contemptible
and mischievous lie was never discovered,, and in India men first
heard of it on the arrival of the English mail. History, or
pseudo-history, it has often been said, repeats itself at critical
periods. The exploded fiction of the Cawnpore mutineers has not
prevented slanderous calumnies about our soldiers in the Soudan.
With the preparations for the relief of Lucknow as
far as Civil Administration could be of use, the residence at
Benares and Allahabad comes to an end. Lord Canning takes up his
quarters in the house occupied by the Lieutenant-Governor, which had
been made fairly comfortable by an engineer officer. “It is large
and comfortable, but will only accommodate two of your staff (four
of us live in it, however), so that tents must be pitched for the
rest.” The house, it was believed, was the property of some man in
Lucknow, probably in rebellion, and would be liable to be
confiscated. The agent who received the rent for the absent man had
prudently absconded; so with a mixture of judicious policy and
equity, the Commissioner was devoting a part of the rent to repairs,
and retaining the balance of 120 rupees for the person entitled to
the same, if he should ever claim it. |