and the Scottish army south to
Worcester. Scotland was then practically conquered, and a body of
English commissioners were sent to administer affairs. Steps toward
an entire union were taken, and in 1654 the Council of State passed
the "Ordinance of Union," which made provision for England and
Scotland becoming one Commonwealth, with one Parliament, to which
Scotland was to send thirty members. Parliamentary union was
accompanied by commercial union. Trade between the two countries was
freed from all restrictions, as James had endeavoured to secure, and
further, all restraints of exports or imports, all tariffs and
customs were made the same for both countries. The countries were
therefore united for six years as closely as they were after the
final Union of 1707. The conditions were, however, very different.
Scotland in 1654 was a conquered country, and the union was proposed
by England, and its terms drawn up and enforced by an English
government. On these grounds it was resented by Scottish national
feeling, but it was also economically unsuccessful. A devastated and
wasted country, weighed down by heavy taxation, could not within the
short space of six years adapt itself to new trade regulations and
tariffs. The old courses were blocked, there was not sufficient
recuperative power nor encouragement to turn into new channels, and
so Scotland remained inactive and poverty stricken.
The country in the
south was laid waste by the Scots before the battle of Dunbar, and
all the Lowlands by the English forces after their victory. Nicoll,
a diarist of the period, writes: "so, to end this yeir of God 1650,
this Kingdome was for the moist pairte spoyled and overrun with the
enymie, evin from Berwik to the toun of Air, their being Inglische
garisounes in all quarteris of these boundis, and land murning,
languisching and fading, and left desolat." In the next year, he
says: "this pure land. was brocht to oppin confusioun and schame,
the Inglische airmey ramping throw the king-dome without oppositioun
destroying our cornes, and raising money quhairevir they went for
maintenance of thair airmy and garisoune." Glencairne's rising and
Monk's expedition against him still further laid waste the land.
Monk said that the people were £200,000 poorer by this rebellion,
"because of the greate destruction and waste made by the Enemy, and
of what wee found necessary to destroy that they might be deprived
of sustenance." Complaints regarding the poverty of the country
continue throughout this period. Baillie, a well-known Presbyterian
minister in Glasgow, wrote in 1656: "deep poverty keeps all ranks
exceedingly under; the taxes of all kinds are so great, and trade so
little, that it is a marvel if extreme scarcity of money end not,
ere long, in some mischief." Later it was said that: "povertie and
skaircetie of money daylie increst be ressoun of the great burdingis
and chargis imposit upone the pepill, quhilk...constraynit thame to
sell...evin their household geirs, insicht and plenisching, and sum
thair cloathes." Cromwell himself bore witness to the condition of
the country: " I do think the Scotch nation have been under as great
a suffering, in point of livelihood and subsistence outwardly as any
people I have yet named to you. I do think truly they are a very
ruined nation." There are many more accounts of a like nature,
continuing until the Restoration and also for some time after it.
The country took many years to recover from the effects of this
period of civil war and Cromwellian rule.
The burden which
pressed most severely upon the country was the very heavy taxation
imposed to support the English government and garrison, far heavier
than had ever been raised before. In 1652 a general assessment of
£10,000 a month was levied on Scotland, from which abatements of
£2000 or under might be made in districts which had suffered by the
war. This was to be based on valuations made in 1629, 1644-5 and
1649. In ascertaining the assessment, Scotland was to be considered
" as well in its integrity and intrinsic value before the late wars,
as in its present poverty through devastation and spoil by the
wars." It never seems to have been possible to raise the whole of
the sum, and after Glencairne's rising Monk declared that he could
not raise more than £7300 a month. The assessment was not fairly
made, for Scotland, in proportion to her resources, was more heavily
taxed than England. Of this Monk complained, writing to Secretary
Thurloe in 1657 about a new assessment to be levied on the three
kingdoms: "I must desire you will consider this poore country which
truely I can make itt appeare that one way or other they pay one
hundred pounds out of fower for their assessment.. .and unlesse
there be some course taken, that they may come in equality with
England, itt will goe hard with this people....And since wee have
united them into one Commonwealth, I thinke itt will bee most equall
to bring them into an equality." As a result of this and other
remonstrances from Monk, the assessment in Scotland was fixed at
£6000 in 1657, and this amount continued to be levied till the
Restoration. This was also much heavier than had ever before been
raised in Scotland, and there were numerous complaints against it.
In spite of this
heavy taxation, Scotland was far from being self-supporting. In
1654, the total expenses of the troops and garrisons in Scotland
were £41,235 monthly. At that time only £4000 monthly could be
raised because of the "broken condition of the country," so that
£37,000 had to be supplied from the English Exchequer. In 1659 a
statement was made to Parliament by a Committee for inspecting the
Treasuries. This shews not only the national bankruptcy which
contributed to the ruin of the Protectorate government, but also the
share of Scotland in creating the deficit. The debt to the forces in
Scotland was £93,827. 135. 0|d, and to the citadel at Leith £1800.
The annual issue for the pay of the same forces was £270,643. 45.
2d, and Scotland only contributed £135,835 to the income of the
three kingdoms. The annual deficit therefore amounted to £134,808.
4s. 2d, without reckoning the debt, or contributing anything towards
the navy or civil list expenses. The deficit in the total revenues
of the three kingdoms was £1,468,098. 12s. 2d Scotland's
incorporation was certainly of no financial value to England, and
this knowledge was probably a principal reason on the English side
for the separation of the two countries in all but name after the
Restoration.
The remainder of the
revenue was raised from the Excise and Customs. These were not made
to conform to the English rates until 1655. Monk anticipated that
there would be some trouble in raising the new excise. "I intreate
your Lordship to spaire us another regiment of Horse...for the
Excise being to bee set on foote here, people may be a little
troublesome Uppon that occasion." The excise was farmed at £2481
monthly for the first four months of its existence, but afterwards
increased, and in 1659 amounted to £47,444. 135. 4d The method of
collecting both excise and customs was reformed, not, apparently,
without need. Thomas Tucker, an English revenue official, who
visited Scotland in 1656 and drew up an interesting report as to the
state of the trade, etc., said that "untill of late...there was
nothing either of method or forme discovered in any of them" (i.e.
in either the customs or the excise). "The Collectors received very
uncertainly....The masters of ships, neither Inwards nor Outwards,
were called upon to declare any contents of theyr vessells...noe
goods were ever weighed at landing, little notice was taken of what
was shipped out." Each collector "pursued his owne way," a way which
produced more for himself than for the State. This branch of the
revenue seems to have increased somewhat during this period, which
was partly no doubt to be attributed to the better method of
collection, and partly also to the increase in the customs rates,
due to the adoption of English tariffs. This was complained of by
the Convention of the Royal Burghs, who sent a copy of the old book
of rates to London to be compared with the new, in order that "the
vast difference betwixt the two being sein and considderit...the
great prejudice the estait of burrowis with this natione may
susteine thairthrow may be represented to his Hienis the Lord
Protector."
Another grievance of
the same nature was the prohibition of the export of certain raw
materials, especially wool, hides and skins. These restraints were
made in the interests of English industries. They were able to use
their own raw materials in manufactures, and so prohibited their
export. But the Scots manufactures had never been able to use all
the raw material of the country. At this time too, their industries
had been interrupted and sometimes ruined by the wars, and there was
no money in the country with which to set up new manufactures. The
export of wool, hides, etc. had also been a great part of their
foreign trade. England was at last able to make use of the Scottish
wool supply, as she had tried to do under James
VI. The government in Scotland were often urged by the
English authorities to encourage and establish manufactures. As the
Burghs pointed out, however, this could not be done without money;
money came by trade, and there could be little trade as long as the
export of their principal commodities was prohibited. The
Commissioners "considderit ane act .. .discharging the exportatione
of skin wooll hyd and utheris suche commodities...and ordaining the
samyne to be maid use of at home in manufactories to be erected for
that effect...and withall considdering the low conditione of this
natione...and that the exportatione of thes commodities wes the
onlie means quhairby their tread subsisted in the natione and
forrane commodities and money imported without the which they ar
altogether unable for erecting of the manufactories." The difficulty
was that if the two countries were to be completely united, there
could not be different restraints for each. Scottish industries were
not as well developed as English, and her principal exports were raw
materials, whereas English exports were chiefly manufactures.
Therefore, as the regulations for export were made in English
interests, they pressed hardly upon the Scots. Nor was this the time
when Scotland could be forced to become a manufacturing country, for
she was a conquered country with exhausted resources. It was not
until after the Restoration that she began to encourage and develop
manufactures, and not until these had made some progress was she
really convinced of the necessity for an incorporating union with
England.
By freedom of trade
with England in one commodity, salt, the Scots were the gainers.
There had for some time been an import of Scottish salt into
England. About 1637 it was agreed that the import of Scots salt into
England should be restricted to 8000 wey yearly, but this
restriction does not seem to have lasted very long. The duty on
Scots salt was higher than that on English, but not so much as that
on foreign salt. The manufacturers complained of the Scottish
competition, and in 1647 the duty on English salt was removed
altogether. The manufacturers, however, were not satisfied, and in
1649 Scots salt was made to pay as much as foreign salt, i.e. three
half-pence per gallon. But at the same time, an excise of one
half-penny per gallon was levied on English salt. The result was
that "the Scottish salt undermined the English," and a hundred and
sixty saltworks had to be given up. The salt-workers, we are told,
hoped for some relief when the Rump Parliament was dissolved by
Cromwell, but "met with the quite contrary," for by the Union of
1654 Scots salt could pass into England without paying any duty at
all. The salt-makers in the north of England at once declared that
their industry would be totally ruined. Salt, they said, could be
made much more cheaply in Scotland, as the people there could be
paid in kind instead of in money. In a debate in Parliament on the
Union in 1656, it was urged that some extra excise should be placed
on Scots salt, to save the Newcastle salt-works from ruin. But no
tax was imposed, for three reasons. Firstly, that for three years
already there had been free trade in salt, and the English works had
not suffered. Secondly, for the statesmanlike reason that "if you
make an union you must allow them as much priviledge as your selves,
and be as much concerned for their good and advantage as your
selves." And also because salt from Scotland might make Newcastle
salt cheaper, which would be "a generall good to the Nation and a
generall good is to be preferred before a particular," an
interesting assertion for the period from the point of view of
economic theory. The import of cheap Scots salt did as a matter of
fact injure the English makers, for about this time some eighty
salt-works in the north had to be shut down. A little later, it was
the turn of the Scots to complain. Their troubles arose from the
connection of the salt manufacture with the coal-works. These
produced two kinds of coal, great and small. The former were as a
rule exported, and the latter employed in the salt-works. But if
anything hindered the sale of the great coals, no small were
produced, and the salt manufacture was then at a standstill. Now in
1656, a duty of 4s. per ton was imposed on great coal exported in
British ships, and 8s. on coal exported in foreign ships. Both coal
and salt owners complained, declaring that" the trade of Coales and
Salt (the best staple commodityes of this Nation) must be utterly
ruined." The "intrinsick value" of the coal, they said, was only 4s.
per ton. English coal could more easily bear the tax than Scottish,
as a great deal of the Newcastle coal was used in England, and was
therefore not liable to the tax. Also the Dutch found English coal
indispensable in their iron-works, but Scottish coal was only used
in the Netherlands for soap-works and brewing, and was not
absolutely necessary. Indeed coal from Luyck was already being
substituted for it. It was to the Netherlands, too, that most of the
Scottish coal was sent. Twenty thousand people were said to be
affected by a decline in the prosperity of the coal- and salt-works,
while the revenue would suffer greatly from the loss of the customs
on these two commodities. After these remonstrances, the duty was
temporarily reduced in 1658 to 2s. 6d. and 5s. per ton, but seems to
have been increased again, for in 1660 the Burghs asked that the "extraordinarie
imposition upon coall and salt may be moderated." The advantage of
the Scottish over the English salt-works was therefore only
temporary.
There does not seem
to have been much increase in the amount of trade with England, in
spite of freedom from restraint. The principal commodities brought
from Scotland were, as before, coal, salt, plaiding, linen, hides
and some wool. In addition, efforts were made to secure supplies of
masts from the north of Scotland, because the trade with the Baltic
had been interrupted by the Navigation Act. Several persons were
sent north at different times to get masts, and to examine the state
of the forests, but the timber was probably not sufficiently
well-grown, and Scotland did not become a source of supply. During
the Dutch and Spanish wars, the trade increased. While the war with
Spain (1656-8) was going on, nearly all Scots ships confined their
trade to English ports, finding it unsafe to venture further.
Little trade to the
plantations in America was carried on as yet. Tucker, in his Report,
says that some from Glasgow had ventured as far as Barbadoes, but
they sustained such losses from coming back late in the year that
the trade had been given up.
Foreign trade did
not, on the whole, prosper under Commonwealth and Protectorate
government. The poverty of the country, decay of manufactures, and
prohibition of the chief exports doubtless partly accounted for
this. Import trade was also affected by the enforcement of English
regulations and restraints, especially by the Navigation Act of
1651, which forbade the import of goods into any of the Commonwealth
dominions except in native ships, or in ships belonging to the
country whence the goods were brought. The Scots had lost a number
of ships, and could not carry on their trade without the help of
foreigners. They begged for permission to transport their coal and
salt to "whatsomever places within or without this Island in what
boddomes the merchant may be best served with for their advantage."
They also desired to import goods from France and Spain in foreign
ships. Foreign salt was necessary for the fish-curing, and they had
some difficulty in securing a sufficient supply in their own ships.
There were, too, some prohibitions of import of goods which "wee
cannot subsist without." French wines were amongst these goods, and
they had long been a principal import into Scotland, in exchange for
Scots salmon, herring and plaiding.
During the war, the
Scots lost a number of ships, especially in 1650 and 1651. In June
1650, the Scottish Parliament wrote to Lord Fairfax and to Sir
Arthur Hazelrigge complaining of the seizure of Scots ships by
English vessels. Two months later Admiral Deane commissioned Captain
Penn to seize all the Scottish ships he should meet with, and to
deliver them into the hands of the collectors of prize goods. After
the Dunbar defeat, orders were given that all the boats of the ports
round Edinburgh should be seized, "for serving the Inglisches thair
demandis." A number of ships belonging to Dundee and the Fife ports
were taken too, as the English army gradually established its hold
over the south of Scotland. These vessels do not seem to have been
restored after the declaration of union, for after the Restoration
many complaints were made as to the seizure of ships during the
"late Usurpation." Privateers and other enemies had also reduced the
number of Scots ships, so altogether there can have been but few
left with which to prosecute trade. The Scots had never built many
of their own ships, they generally got them from the Dutch. Now
difficulties were put in the way of their buying ships, by a duty
levied on all such purchases. The Burghs complained that "the
commissioners for the customs excys doe exact the 20 peny of custome
and the 20 peny of excys of all schippis bocht from straingeris and
brocht home for the necessarie service of the natioun and increas of
tread which exactionis doe much frustrat and hinder the restoring of
the decayed and lost schipping of this cuntrie." Together with
English shipping, but probably more in comparison with its value,
Scottish trade suffered from the disturbed and unsafe state of the
seas at this time. The Channel, the Straits and in fact all the
coasts were infested with numerous enemies, Royalist privateers,
Dutch and Spanish men of war, and pirates. Some efforts were made to
guard the Scottish coasts, but with little effect. In 1656 Lord
Broghill wrote to Thurloe: "Indeed, sir, it is a sad thing that all
Scotland should be without one man of warr to guard the cost, when
our next neighbours are our open ennemies, and take our ships dayley,
and within this ten dayse a rich vessell of Aberdeene, which has
almost broake that toune, which began to trade. 'Tis not here as in
England, wher a loss does at most ruin a person: heire it does the
whole trade. We have often complayned of this. I beseech you, Sir
get us som speedy redress." An appeal for convoys was one of the
demands of the Royal Burghs, which, with demands for the free export
of wool, etc., permission to use foreign ships, the maintenance of
the staple port at Campvere, the lightening of the burden of
taxation, were reiterated to the Parliament in London almost every
year until 1660. There was so little trade that many sailors were
out of work. In 1656 " many skipperis and maryneris wer takin to sea
to serve the Inglisches. Mony of thame without compulsioun wer
content to tak on and serve, thair being lytill or no imployment for
thame utherwayes in tred or merchandice, the seas being foull with
pirattis and robberis."
There were also
special hindrances to particular branches of Scottish commerce. She
had had more trade with Holland than with any other country, and the
Commonwealth wars with that country damaged their connection there
very much, and also hindered their correspondence with other
countries. It was suggested that the staple port at Campvere should
be given up, partly no doubt in pursuance of the Cromwellian policy
of freedom from regulation. The suggestion was not, however, carried
out. The English authorities were also jealous of the Scottish trade
with Holland, their great rival. The Council of State wrote to the
Lord General on the subject: "We are informed of the great
inconveniences and mischiefs upon this Commonwealth by the freedom
of Trade driven into Scotland by the Dutch...they get the main trade
into their own hands, and beat out the English ...their commodities
may as well be furnished by the people of this nation from
hence...we judge it would be advisable to forbid the importation of
any goods into Scotland Jby the Dutch." The Council were struck by
the ingratitude of the Scots in allowing this trade; "their
malignancy is such, notwithstanding all the favours they have
received from you...that they will buy nothing of the English if
they can have it from the Dutch."
Some Scots merchants
seem to have joined in the trade from England to the Baltic. The
English Eastland merchants at Dantzig petitioned the Council of
State in 1651 to " Debarr all Scots Malignants and Forraigners any
Trade from England to this place." "Divers of ye Scottish Nation,"
they say, are "great Traders for London."
The war with Spain
also hindered trade. "The Spanish warre has wracked many of our
merchants." The privateers from Dunkirk were especially dreaded, so
much so that the Scots chiefly traded with England during the war.
When they ventured further afield, it was "under the covert and
pretext of being Dutch, in whose ports they enter theyr shippis, and
sayle with Dutch passes and marineris, or else bring home theyr
goods in Dutch bottomes which are made over by bill of sale, and soe
become the shipps of the nation when they arrive there, but once
unladen they depart, and are then Dutch bottomes againe." This close
Scottish connection with the Dutch, and the evasion of the
Navigation Act, must both have been most distasteful to the English
authorities.
The complete union of
England and Scotland at this time was of but short duration, and it
is therefore difficult to justify or condemn the project. But the
elements of failure, in circumstances rather than in the actual
scheme, are so obvious that one can hardly imagine ultimate success
attending the experiment. Scotland was a conquered country, she was
poverty stricken and desolate, she was far behind England in
economic development, her chief commercial connections were with the
Protectorate's greatest rivals. The union was forced upon her by
England, again her national enemy. It had to be maintained by a
garrison and an army of occupation; and for their support Scotland
was heavily taxed. English commercial regulations were disastrous to
Scottish commerce, and she had neither wealth nor time enough to
reconstruct and reconstitute her industrial system. From the English
point of view Scotland was a great financial burden, and a source of
danger to her commercial system by her connection with the Dutch,
and her infringement of English commercial legislation. Therefore it
is not surprising that after the Restoration separation was desired
by both countries. Nor it is hardly to be wondered at that nearly
fifty years should elapse before a union was finally established.
Cromwell's Scotch Campaigns 1650-51
By W. S. Douglas (1898)
Oliver
Cromwell
By John Buchan (1941)
Life of Oliver
Cromwell
Lord-Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland
(1743)
