INTRODUCTION

The origin and early history of Glencairne’s rising is traced in the preface to Scotland and the Commonwealth (pp. xlii-lii). It is recounted at length in Dr. Gardiner’s History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate (ii. 389-420).

The year 1654 opened with the defeat and the capture of the Earl of Kinnoul (p. 9) though he succeeded in escaping from his imprisonment in May (p. 113). In a skirmish with the English troops Colonel Wogan was mortally wounded, whose loss was greatly lamented by both English and Scottish royalists (pp. 40, 68,120). Colonel Morgan :was successful in a skirmish in Cromar and captured Kildrummy Castle. Colonel Daniel took a small garrison established at Dunkeld, and at Aberfoyle the English garrison of Stirling gained another trifling success (pp. 43, 47,67,74). On the other hand, the young Earl of Montrose, Lord Charles Gordon, the Earl of Mar, Lord Forrester, Lord Dudhope and the Earl of Selkirk joined Glen-cairne (pp. 13,15,19, 41,67, 82). The hopes of the insurgents rose high as rumours of the breaking off of the negotiations between the Protector and the Dutch reached Scotland, and the conclusion of peace between England and Holland (April 5,1654), was a great blow to them (pp. 20, 42, 51, 65, 75, 82, 90). With the landing of Middleton at the end of February 1654, the insurrection spread rapidly (pp. 52, 56). ‘They rise very fast, and there are risings in all countries in considerable numbers,1 wrote Lilburne to the Protector. On March 23rd: ‘ It will be necessary that provision be made for the worst that can happen.1 ‘Within these fourteen days/ he added, on April 1, ‘more are broke out in rebellion than have done all this winter. If the English forces had been defeated anywhere the most of the nation had been about our ears/ and a general national rising was to be feared (pp. 59, 63, 67, 74). Lilburne complained bitterly of the want of ships both on the east and west coast (pp. 16, 24, 57, 90), of the insufficient number of troops at his disposal, and especially of the want of cavalry (pp. 14, 24, 74). Whalley’s and Lambert’s regiments of horse had been ordered to march to Scotland, but were slow in arriving (pp. 40, 42, 49). However, one troop of dragoons reached him from England (p. 24), and he raised another by mounting some of his foot soldiers (pp. 14, 18, 41, 49). After Middleton’s landing he demanded more infantry, and suggested that some regiments should be sent from Ireland, or, if that were impossible, men sufficient to set free the garrisons in the western islands and enable them to take the field (pp. 49, 56, 64, 76). It was not only the deficiency in his numbers of which he complained. Many officers were absent in England on leave and showed no signs of returning (pp. 24, 49, 52). Moreover, the pay of the army was many months in arrear, and the soldiers were unable to provide themselves with shoes and clothes for the campaign (pp. 13, 20, 56, 59).

In spite of these difficulties he drew together a force of about 2500 men under Colonel Morgan, whom he sent north to prevent Middleton from marching southwards, and to bring him to a battle if possible. Morgan advanced as far as Tain, but finally took up his position at Dingwall, as being a place which has more command of the pass by which Middleton must go with his forces if he comes southward ’ (pp. 56, 80, 83, 88, 91).

Meanwhile the forces at the disposal of the royalist leaders rapidly increased. In January the total number in arms was estimated to be 4300 men (Thurloe, ii. 27). Lilburne estimated the forces of Glencaime and Middleton in April at 4000 men, besides 1300 or 1400 under Montrose and Lorne and other scattered parties, while at the end of the month Monck estimated Middleton’s army at 5000 men (pp. 74, 92). Captain Peter Mews, a royalist agent who accompanied Middleton, and drew up a valuable narrative of the early part of his campaign, says that Middleton got together between 2000 and 3000 at his first rendezvous in Sutherland, and that when the whole of Glencairne’s forces joined them they would make a body of 6000 (pp. 119, 125). A sanguine estimate drawn up by some royalist about July or August estimated the total of the levies raised for the king at more than 11,000 (p. 172).

Monck arrived at Dalkeith on April 22, 1654, and reported at once to the Protector that the design of the insurrection was more universal than he expected, and that the people of the country were generally engaged in the rising and assisted the insurgents as much as they dared (pp. 90, 93). He demanded more forces; asking for six men of war, in addition to the four he had already, another regiment of horse, and a regiment and a half of foot. In answer to his letters, he was sent during the early summer Colonel Pride’s regiment of foot and seven companies of Sir William Constable’s and Colonel Hacker’s regiment of horse, in addition to those of Whalley and Lambert, which had been previously sent (pp. 93, 94, 99, 100, 103 ; cf. Thurloe, ii. 413, 476). Equally urgent were his demands for money, which, unlike Lilburne’s, met with immediate attention (pp. 90, 93, 103, 106). The Protector also arranged to send 1000 foot from the north of Ireland to land in the Western Highlands (pp. 104, 106, 111, 113). Till these reinforcements arrived, and till the grass was sufficiently grown to provide forage for his cavalry, Monck contented himself with guarding the passes which led from the Highlands to the Lowlands, making the fords impassable, burning the boats on the lochs, and preventing fresh parties from the south of Scotland swelling Middleton’s forces (pp. 93, 95, 97,100,105,107, 111).

By the beginning of June Monck was ready to take the field, and set out from Perth on June 9, with two regiments of horse and three and a half of foot. About the same time Colonel Brayne and 1000 men from Ireland landed and established themselves at Inverlochy, where it was intended to establish a permanent garrison (pp. 139, 144, 149). Colonel Morgan and another brigade met Monck in Glenmoriston on June 24, and Monck’s plan was to catch Middleton between his forces and Morgan’s, and force him to fight one or the other. In his march through the Highlands he burnt houses and destroyed crops, partly to punish the clans which had taken up arms, partly to render the districts he passed through unserviceable for the enemy’s quarters during the next winter. 4 We have followed the enemy these five weeks,’ he wrote to Cromwell on July 17, and have now dispersed them into many several parts, having marched them from 3000 to 1200, and [they] are now dispersed so many several ways into such an inaccessible country that we are not able to follow them, but as soon as they gather together again we shall give them little rest, but be after them with one party or another. We have burnt such parts of the Highlands where they were utterly engaged against us, and the enemy have burnt some of the Marquis of Argyll’s country, and do threaten to bum the rest that will not join with them, so that the whole Highlands, in all probability, will be laid waste’ (p. 145). Four days later William Clarke, who accompanied Monck during the campaign, wrote to Thurloe, that the general intended to give the troops with himself4 easy motions after our hard marches,’ and 4 to drive Middleton’s almost tired forces on Colonel Morgan, who was fresh in Ruthven’ (Thurloe, ii. 483). This was effected on July 19. Middleton, who had with him about 800 horse, and whose foot, some 1200 in number, were about five miles distant, came suddenly on Morgan’s forces about Dalna-spidal, at the head of Loch Garry. He ordered his men to face about and endeavoured to make an orderly retreat, but Morgan at once charged and broke his rearguard, routed the main body also, and pursuing them about six miles, forced them to disperse in three separate directions (pp. 156, 172, 402; cf. Military Memoirs of John Gwynne, etc., p. 183). Neither Middleton nor any other royalist commander subsequently succeeded in getting together more than a few hundred men, though isolated parties kept the field in different parts of the Highlands till the spring of 1655.

The question of the route taken by Monck during this campaign in the Highlands is one of considerable interest. The chief authorities on the subject are Monck’s own narrative (pp. 149, 153), and the letters written by him during the campaign (pp. 105, 107, 111, 113, 133-8, 143-8). There are in addition a certain number of letters from Monck and other officers printed in Thurloe’s State Papers, ii. 388, 438, 465,475, 483, and a number of newsletters inMercurius Politicus. The Narrative of the Earl of Glencairnds Expedition, printed with The Military Memoirs of John Gwynne in 1822, throws very little light on the subject, while the newspaper extracts printed in the appendix to that work, and in the second volume of the Spottiswoode Miscellany, stop short about April 1654. Mr. William Mackay in the Highland Monthly for May 1892 printed Monck’s narrative with a map on which his route was marked. Dr. Gardiner in his History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate (ii. 418) makes this map the basis of his own, making, however, some changes and amendments for different reasons. Mr. Mackay, at my request, has been good enough to go into the question again, to reconsider the evidence, and to construct the map given at p. 149. In the following letter he explains the reasons which have led him to modify his earlier views, and sets forth the points in which his own conclusions differ from those of Dr. Gardiner:

"I have read the proofs of Scotland and the Protectorate, and very carefully considered the lines of Monck’s various marches, in view of the most interesting new information therein contained.

The result is that I have found it necessary to modify the map which I published in 1892.

"I have laid down what I am now satisfied are the correct lines on the map which I now send you. It differs from Dr. Gardiner’s in several respects.

‘1st. Dr. Gardiner makes Monck turn off from the Edinburgh and Stirling road—at a point at or near Falkirk—westward to Dumbarton and Cardross. The letters and Narrative, however, show that he went direct from Dalkeith to Stirling; that from Stirling he went direct to Cardross, taking, not the Edinburgh road, but the shorter route by 44 the passes ” leading into the Highlands; that from Cardross he marched eastward to Kilsyth ; and that from Kilsyth he doubled, back to Buchanan on Loch Lomond, whence he returned direct, and by the shortest route, to Stirling.

"2nd. Dr. Gardiner takes Monck back to Balloch, and round by Blair Atholl, on his way from Garth to Ruthven. The probiability is that he followed the shorter and more direct road from Garth to Inchnacardoch.

"3rd. It is very unlikely that Monck went from Cluny across the mountains to the head of Glenroy, as shown on Dr. Gardiner’s map. He must have struck Glenroy at the foot of the glen, on the road from Cluny to Inverlochy.

"4th. The old road from Fort Augustus to the Braes of Glen-moriston and Kintail did not go round by Invermoriston, as Dr. Gardiner shows, but across the ridge separating the district of Fort Augustus (or Kill-Chumin) from Glenmoriston. This was the road taken by Dr. Johnson at a later period, and it was much shorter than the Invermoriston route.

"5th. From Glenmoriston Dr. Gardiner sends Monck direct down Glenshiel to Kintail, where he expected to find Middleton. But the Narrative shows that from Glenmoriston he made a wide detour southwards by Glenquoich, coming down upon Kintail by the steep and narrow pass immediately to the south of the present Shi el Hotel, thus taking two days to do a journey which, by the Glenshiel route, would not have taken one. By approachiug Kintail through the wild and uninhabited country lying beyond Glenquoich, he evidently intended to take Middleton by surprise. Glenshiel was inhabited up almost to its march with Glenmoriston. Monck must have been guided by one who knew the country well.

"6th. Dr. Gardiner takes Monck direct from Kintail to Loch Long, whence he proceeded by Glenstrathfarar, Strathglass, and Glen Urquhart, to Dunain, near Inverness. By this route Monck would not have touched Loch Alsh. But he himself states that when he came to Kintail on 26th June, he found that Middleton had gone to Glenelg, which lies to the south of Loch Duich, and that on the 27th he (Monck) proceeded to Loch Alsh, where the enemy had just been, and had left powder and provisions behind them 44 for haste.’’ It is, therefore, certain that from Kintail Monck followed Middleton along the southern shore of Loch Duich until he came to Loch Alsh, where he very nearly overtook him. It did not suit Monck to follow Middleton into the wild country lying to the south, which had for centuries been known as Garbh Chrioch (the Rough Bounds), and he retraced his steps along the shore of Loch Duich, from which he marched towards Inverness by Loch Long, Glenstrathfarar, etc.

"7th. The old road from Inverness to Ruthven and Perth does not run round by Grantown, as shown on Dr. Gardiner’s map.

"8th. Dr. Gardiner’s map does not show the march from Glen Dochart to Glen Lyon on 20th July, nor Major Bridge’s route from Glen Lyon towards Loch Rannoch.

|My own old map is incorrect in the Perthshire marches, and in Glenstrathfarar and Strathglass. I have, since receipt of your last letter, had consultations with Lord Lovat, who owns Glenstrathfarar, and with his factor and his forester, and you may accept the line of march from Kintail to Inverness, as shown on the enclosed map, as correct. It follows the ancient track from Kintail, which is still used as a 44 drove road.” Lord Lovat has the Queen Elizabeth coin which, as I informed you some years ago, was found on Monck’s camping ground at Brouline in 1892, and which was probably left there by one of his soldiers.

‘Between Lon Fhiodha (see note 3, p. 150) and Brouline is Coireich, the Corrie of the Horses. Has this any reference to Monck’s lost horses? ’

Middleton’s want of success was not caused by any want of zeal or energy on his part. In spite of Lilburne’s prophetic fears, and the general disaffection of the country to the English Government, the prospects of the insurgents were by no means promising when Middleton landed in Scotland. ‘ I do not think ever any man took up a game at so great disadvantage,’ wrote Captain Mews to Hyde, adding that if Middleton had not come 4 things had mouldered into their first principles (pp. 121, 123).    41 did meet with a strange miscarried business, wrote Middleton himself to the King in May 1654 (p. 109). Like all the rest of the royalist leaders, he urged the King either to come himself to Scotland or to send the Duke of York, without which there is little probability of carrying his business. His Majesty’s presence,’ wrote the Earl of Atholl, will not only draw in many people to the service that have not yet appeared, but will also give more spirit and vigour to those that are engaged than all things else can do.’ 4 If he will not move till there is no danger,’ wrote Captain Mews, 4 he must resolve never to enjby his kingdoms’ (pp. 109, 116, 126, 129). Charles had premised to come to Scotland at a proper season, but delayed until Middleton’s defeat rendered his coming useless and dangerous (pp. 6, 26, 196). Royalist rumour credited Hyde with Opposing the King’s coming (p. 26), but, according to him, }t was from Charles himself that the opposition came. When the Chancellor represented to his master the desirability of going to Scotland, His Majesty discoursed very calmly of that country, part whereof he had seen; of the miserable poverty of the people, and their course of life, and how impossible it was for him to live there with security or with health; that if sickness did not destroy him, which he had reason to expect from the ill accommodation he must there be contented with, he should in a short time be betrayed and given up.’ He went on to tell him an anecdote of David Leslie, who had arrived, according to his Majesty, at that melancholic conclusion,’ that a Scottish army, how well soever it looked, would not fight.’ After confiding this historical libel to Hyde Charles concluded 4 that if his friends would advise him to that expedition, he would transport himself into the Highlands, though he knew what would come of it, and that they would be sorry for it, which stopped the Chancellor from ever saying more to that purpose ’ (Clarendon's Rebellion, xiii. 62; xiv. 109).

One consequence of the King’s absence was apparent in the dissensions amongst the royalist leaders, and the quarrels which his presence would certainly have tended to compose. From the first there had been a great difference of opinion between Lords Balcarres and Glencairne as to the military and political measures to be adopted in the management of the insurrection, in which Sir Robert Moray and others supported the policy advocated by Balcarres (pp. 5, 12, 50, 209; cf. Scotland and the Commonwealth).

Balcarres arrived in Paris about the end of April 1654 to represent the views of his party, and to persuade Charles to come to Scotland (pp. 263, 360; cf. Lives of the Lindsays, ed. 1840, i. 275, 282; Clarendon’s Rebellion, xix. 108). He met with no success in his mission, and never returned to Scotland. Lord Lome, in spite of his zeal for the King’s cause, was thoroughly distrusted both by Glencairne and many of his followers, and was even accused - of plotting against Glencairne’s life. In consequence of personal affronts and other discontents, he left the royalist camp for a time, though he returned to it after Middleton’s arrival (pp. 42, 53, 126, 209; Thurloe, iii. 4). When Middleton took command he gave the post of major-general and second in command, •which Glencairne had expected, to Sir George Monro. This was done in accordance with his private instructions from the King, who directed him to choose professional soldiers as his general officers, but Glencairne was not unnaturally dissatisfied (p. 29). The appointment was exceedingly unpopular amongst the royalists (pp. 122, 170), and the discontent of Glencairne led to a duel between him and Monro. According to the generally received story its ostensible cause was a disparaging remark made by Monro about the forces raised by Glencairne; but another report asserts that the quarrel began about Glencairne’s ill-treatment of Monro’s brother (p. 89; cf. Gwynne, p. 175). The result of the quarrel and the duel which grew out of it was a breach between Glencairne and Middleton (pp. 179-184). Glencairne left Middleton and went to the south to raise more horse, but never rejoined the main body of the royalist army, and, on their defeat at Loch Garry, gave up the cause for lost, and hastened to make terms (pp. 168-9). Quarrels between Glengarry and Atholl, Kenmure and Middleton, Glencairne and Sir Mungo Murray are also mentioned (pp. 46,89, 171).    4    Never    think,’    wrote Charles to Glencairne,

"I can hope to prevail against enemies so united with friends who cannot agree amongst themselves,’ and it was a very just summing up of the position (p. 181). Even if the royalist leaders had been agreed, the ill-equipped and disorderly levies they got together were ill fitted to encounter the properly organised troops of Monck. 4 Middleton,’ wrote a royalist, 4 could not order affairs as he intended, it being beyond his power to bring their levies to join with one another to make up any considerable army, or to bring them under any discipline. . . . Even those of their small running army did come and go at pleasure, for if they were eight hundred to-day, to-morrow most of them dispersed to the hills, pretending to see one friend or other, so that six hundred would not meet again for a long time, so that they themselves nor their neighbours could ever tell what strength they had’ (p. 170). Added to this, the scarcity of supplies made it very difficult for Middleton or any one else to keep an army together in the Highlands. Monck’s soldiers had then daily rations of cheese and biscuit, carried in their knapsacks or on baggage horses, while captures of sheep and cattle provided them with an occasional change of diet. Middleton had no magazines of victuals to draw upon, and was obliged to live on the country (pp. 121,150, 175). He had hoped to draw supplies of arms and other necessaries from Holland, but the conclusion of peace between England and the United Provinces in April 1654 put an end to hopes of Dutch aid, and set the English navy free to assist Monck’s operations. 4 That peace,’ wrote Middleton to Hyde in October 1654, 4 did strike all dead ’ (p. 196).

These difficulties, the absence of the King, the divisions of the royalist leaders, the deficiencies of the royalist army, and the loss of the expected foreign aid, made Middleton’s success practically impossible. Some writers have blamed his strategy, on the ground that he should have chosen some carefully selected position in the Highlands, and there given battle to Monck. But his object was to avoid any decisive encounter, and to prolong the war in the hopes of new foreign complications, and of a diversion to be effected by a royalist rising in England. ‘I shall not need,’ wrote Charles to Middleton, about the time when the campaign began, to advise you to be very wary how you engage with the rebels, if you can handsomely avoid it, since there is reason to hope that their condition will impair in the winter, and yours improve ’ (p. 131). As it was, Middleton’s defeat at Loch Garry proved irremediable. Monck and Morgan set to work systematically to devastate those parts of the Highlands in which it seemed possible for the insurgents to maintain themselves during the coming winter. We are now destroying this place,’ wrote Monck from Aberfoyle, on August 17, which was the chief receptacle to the enemy the last winter.’ Morgan, he added, was pursuing Middleton into Caithness, and I suppose, though Colonel Morgan meet him not there, yet he will destroy the country, and prevent the enemies having shelter there this winter ’ (pp. 154, 190).    Affairs are quiet in the Lowlands,’ he wrote on October 24, 4 and are like so to continue, the enemy having but few horse, and their foot not being able to live but upon the Highlands among their friends, whose ruin is a convenience rather than a disservice to us. Besides, they not having other subsistence than from the country there, whom it behoves to fight also for keeping their provisions, or else they will be in danger of starving, they already seem to begin to fall out among themselves on that score ’ (p. 201).

One after another the isolated bands who remained in arms were defeated or driven to capitulate. Sir Arthur Forbes was taken about the end of August, Lords Dudhope and Kinnoul in November (pp. 173, 214). The first to make terms was Atholl, whose capitulation is dated August 24, and five days later Glencairne followed his example (pp. 158, 165). Lord Forrester submitted on September 9, Lord Kenmure on September 14, and the Marquis of Montrose on the 23rd of the same month (pp. 175, 177). Middleton opened negotiations with Monck in December, but failing to agree about terms, broke them off in February, and left Scotland about April 1655 (pp. 224, 233, 246, 249, 262, 268). Seaforth’s treaty is dated January 10, 1655, Loudon’s, March 12 (pp. 234, 254). The rest nearly all capitulated in May: Lord Lorne, Colonel Macnaughton, and Lochiel on the 17th, the Lord Reay on the 18th, the Earl of Selkirk on the 19th, and Macleod of Dun-vegan on the 29th (pp. 269-288). Last to come in was John Graham of Duchray, 4 who, indeed,’ says Baillie, 4 was among the most honest, stout, and wise men of them all. The English gave tolerable terms to them all, and by this wisdom has gotten them all quiet’ (Letters, iii. 287). In these papers Graham’s capitulation is dated July 17, and he is described as 4 Laird of Duffra ’ (p. 291). Glengarry, whose faithfulness Middleton praises in the highest terms (p. 129), remained with Middleton till his departure from Scotland, and accepted the terms offered him on June 8,1655 ; but there is no copy of the articles amongst these papers {Mercurius Politicns, pp. 5420, 5437, 5483).

On the whole, the English Government used its victory with comparative moderation. By the Act of Grace and Pardon, as it was termed, which Monck was charged to proclaim on arriving in Scotland, the estates of twenty-four persons, mostly Peers, were confiscated (with the exception of a provision for their wives and children), and fines varying from i?14,000 to J?500 were imposed on seventy-three others; but the pecuniary penalties imposed on the defeated royalists in England and Ireland had been far more severe and universal. Monck had issued, at his first coming, a proclamation imposing fines on parents whose sons had joined the insurgents, and parishes from which volunteers had gone forth, but they do not appear to have been exacted. The same proclamation offered a reward of J?200 to any one killing or taking prisoner Middleton, Seaforth, Kenmure, and Dalziel (Thurloe, ii. 261). ‘Such a vile sum will be contemned in the Highlands,’ wrote Hyde to Middleton, and the offer served to amuse the royalists (p. 132). As Monck’s mission was not merely to subdue the insurrection, but to complete the union of England and Scotland, the adoption of a conciliatory policy was imperative. The proclamation of the Protector at Edinburgh, which took place on May 4, 1654, was followed by the publication of a series of ordinances designed to finish the work of the Commissioners sent to Scotland in 1651, and the negotiations which the sudden dissolution of the Long Parliament had interrupted. The ordinance passed by the Protector and his Council on April 12, 1654, for uniting the people of Scotland with the people of England into one Commonwealth, and under one Government, was published in Edinburgh on May 4 (pp. 17, 19, 44, 95, 99, 100, cf. Scobell, Acts of Parliament, ii. 293; Nicoll’s Diary, p. 124). This ordinance was confirmed and converted into an Act by Cromwell’s second Parliament in 1656. A speech delivered in its second reading is printed on p. 333. By its provisions Scotland was to be represented by thirty members in the Parliament of the three nations, and a second ordinance, passed June 27, 1654, settled the electoral districts for which these members were to serve. As a matter of fact, those chosen were in most cases officers or government officials (p. 331). The Union ordinance also abolished feudal tenures and heritable jurisdictions, while a supplementary ordinance, passed on April 12, and likewise confirmed in 1656, established popular baron courts in each district, with authority to determine suits up to the value of forty shillings (Scobell, p. 295 ; cf. Mackay, Life of the first Lord Stair, p. 60; Burton, History of Scotland, vii. 60, ed. 1874). To conciliate the royalist party in general, an Act of Pardon and Grace was published (May 5, 1654), by which forfeitures and pecuniary penalties, imposed in consequence of the late wars, were annulled. By the exceptions, however, the estates of twenty-four leading royalists were confiscated, whilst fines varying from J?14,000 to JP500 were imposed on seventy-three others. Those engaged in the present insurrection were also excepted from the benefit of the Act; but, taking all these drawbacks into account, it marked a considerable improvement in the condition of the royalist party as compared with the state of things which had existed for the last three years (Scobell, ii. 288; cf. Cal. State Papers, Horn. 1655, pp. 70, 89,116,129, 134, 202). The estates thus forfeited were vested in seven trustees, of whom Sir John Hope of Craighall and William Lockhart the younger were two (Scobell, ii. 296). Besides this, in answer to the repeated suggestions of Lilburne and Monck, the severity of the laws against debtors was mitigated, and creditors were ordered to receive land instead of money in satisfaction of their claims (pp. 15, 19, 98, 106 ; Nicoll’s Diary, p. 129).

As to the persons concerned in Glencairne’s rising, Baillie’s opinion as to the leniency of the terms accorded to the leaders has already been given. As a rule, they were on their submission included in the act of amnesty, and the fines which had been imposed upon them reduced or annulled (pp. 167, 175, 235, 283). Monck’s proclamation against the four principal contrivers of this rebellion,’ as he called them, did not prevent him from giving good terms to Seaforth and Kenmure, offering terms to Middleton, and granting a pass to Dalziel (pp. 132, 176, 195, 234, 268). Monck proposed the erection of a special court to try some of the chief prisoners taken in arms, and an extension of the powers of courts martial, to enable them to punish mosstroopers and persons taking up arms again after once submitting. But neither request was granted by his Government (pp. 113, 204, 244, 269, 291). The only persons capitally punished for their share in the rising were royalist intelligencers, English deserters, and prisoners of war who had broken their engagements (Nicoll, pp. 124, 127, 149).

On their capitulation, the royalist leaders were obliged to give good security for their peaceable living in the future, while subordinate officers and privates signed a personal engagement to the same effect (pp. 159, 166). Of the prisoners taken in arms during the rising a certain number were transported to Barbadoes to work in the plantations, as the prisoners taken at Dunbar had been (cf. Carlyle, Cromwell, Letter clxxxiv.). About five hundred seem to have been sold into servitude in this way, but possibly more (pp. 81, 100, 154, 244, 299). Many, however, were released by the capitulation made with their leaders (pp. 160, 167). Some escaped by bribing the merchants to whom they were sold, and others by the help of friends in the Colonies (pp. 82, 153, 247). Monck’s instructions empowered him to transport 6 to any foreign English plantations such of the enemy now in arms in the Highlands as shall be in your power, as often and in such numbers as you shall think fit’ (p. 80). The Protector’s Government subsequently contemplated the wholesale transportation to the West Indies of ‘all master-less, idle vagabonds, and robbers, both men and women’ (Thurloe, iii. 497; iv. 129). This scheme was abandoned when Lord Broghil pointed out that ‘the General, and all other knowing men, are of opinion, if you offer to press men for that service, it will put the whole country in a flame ’ (Thurloe, iv. 41).

Military service supplied a better way of getting rid of turbulent and disaffected spirits, and of the broken men with whom the country abounded (pp. 194,226,303)To give leave to some officer to enlist the prisoners taken during the rising for the service of any foreign power in amity with England, was an expedient which Lilburne strongly recommended to the Protector (pp. 47, 65). Monck repeated the proposal, urging it not only as a means of getting rid of prisoners, but as a way of relieving the country of its superfluous population, ‘the people here being generally so poor and idle that they cannot live unless they be in arms, so that the transporting of five or six thousand of them would tend much to the settling of the country’ (pp. 100, 155, 222). Accordingly, in the treaties made with the royalist leaders by Monck, they were frequently given the right of raising a regiment for foreign service, and recruiting it at stated intervals. This privilege was granted to the Earl of Atholl, the Earl of Glencairne, the Laird of Lugton, Lord Kenmure, the Marquis of Montrose, Sir Arthur Forbes, Colonel Alexander Macnaughton, and the Earl of Selkirk, by the terms of their capitulations (pp. 159,164, 167, 178, 189, 272, 276, 283). Charles it. perceived the object which dictated these permissions, and wrote to the Earl of Leven in August 1652, telling him that he regarded all such undertakings as prejudicial to his service and mischievous to the kingdom. Leven was bidden to decline such offers himself, and dissuade his friends from accepting them (p. 297). It was doubtless owing to this prohibition that none of the above mentioned noblemen appear to have availed themselves of the privilege granted to them. On the other hand, Lord Cran-stoun, who was strongly recommended by Lilburne to the Protectors favour, obtained, in February 1656, a licence to levy one thousand men for the service of the King of Sweden, but had great difficulty in transporting his mutinous levies to Poland, and lost many by desertion (pp. 44, 80, 321, 352). Another officer, Colonel Thomas Lyon, who obtained leave to raise a regiment for the French service about December 1654, wrote at once to the king, saying that he had only undertaken the design in order to do him better service, and meant to choose loyal men for his officers (p. 244). If Charles n. had possessed larger financial resources, he might have got together a considerable army from the Scottish and Irish regiments in foreign service. As it was, he did induce a number of Irish soldiers to leave the French service, and put themselves under his orders in the Spanish Netherlands. The object of Middleton’s mission to Dantzic in 1656 was not only to get money ‘for making such preparations as are necessary for any expeditions to Scotland, and for the redeeming of our good subjects there from the oppression and slavery they live under,1 but also to get together Scottish officers of experience serving the Swedes or Poles to officer the king’s intended levies. It failed because the money which it was hoped the Scottish merchants in Poland and the town of Dantzic would be willing to provide was not forthcoming (pp. 336-344, 353, 355).

To provide against any royalist expedition to Scotland, or the possibility of a new insurrection, Monck kept himself constantly informed by his spies of any suspicious movements amongst the Scottish royalists. The arrangements he made for this purpose are set forth in his letters in Thurloe’s State Papers, but some few of the documents printed in this volume illustrate his care in that respect (pp. 182, 257, 328, 347, 353, 413).

Though the letters contained in this volume throw very little light on the nature of the police system, by which Monck established such excellent order both on the borders and in the Highlands, his order-books supply the defect of his letters. Throughout Scotland a system of passes was enforced, by which persons going from one district to another, or from Scotland to England, were obliged to obtain permits signed by the general or his officers (cf. p. 321). Similar permits were required for leave to carry firearms, and even a fowling-piece necessitated a written licence.

'21 Dec. 1654.—Indorsed on a letter from Mr. James Sterling concerning a robbery committed by Donald MacGriggar at the house of Alexander Sumrell, in Kilsayth. The Deputy-Governor of Sterling is desired to have the business within mentioned examined by a Court Martiall, who are (after examinacion therof), to order and cause reparacion to be made to the petitioner of his losses sustained by the robbery within mencioned, by the contributing of the parish where the robbery was committed, or of the recepters of the robbers, as the Court Martiall shall thinke fitt/

‘23 Nov. 1654.—Order to Capt. Roger Hatchman, Governor of Peebles, that whereas at a Court Martiall held by him at Peebles, have ordered that for making satisfaction to Jo. Johnston, James and Jo. Bannatine, for a robbery committed at the Brig-house, in the parish of Linton, Rob. Purdy (in whose house it was committed) paye £8, John Scot pay 10s., James Hamilton, Laird of Anleston [?] 40s., Hugh and James Graham and Wm. Davison 10s. a peece, and the remainder of the parishes of Linton and Dunseire £8, 19s. That the said Captain Hatchman be authorised and desired to levy and pay the said summes accordingly.’

On the borders all persons were prohibited by proclamation from harbouring or assisting mosstroopers, under penalty of punishments to be determined by courts-martial, and ministers were required to publish these orders to their congregations.

‘Nov. 11, 1654.—Whereas the mossers and vagabonds in the borders between England and Scotland could not continue these depredations and evill doeings in the country unlesse they were harboured by some of the people thereof, for prevention of the mischiefs thereby arising, these are expressly to inhibit all persons from harbouring, abetting, or sheltering any of the said mossers, vagabonds, or idle persons or travellers, who cannot give a good account of some lawfull occasions of their passing the country, under pain of such amercements and penalties as shall. bee adjudged fit by court martiall, who are hereby authorised to take cognisance of those crimes, and lay such fines and punishments upon the said harbourers or abetters of mossers as they shall think fitt. And you are to cause this to bee publiquely reade to all such congregacions in your shire at theire respective parishe churches or publique meetinge places on the Lord’s day.’

Then follow the names of twelve persons, Armstrongs most of them, whom people are warned against relieving and sheltering.

Small detachments of cavalry were posted in the districts invested by mosstroopers, and kept ready to pursue them at a moment’s notice.

‘12 July 1659.—Order to Captain John Coventry, that there being some Mosse-troopers uppe in the country hee doe on sight send a corporall and 10 stoute men to Langham, where they are to quarter and pay for their grasse 2d. day and night, and in the night they are to take uppe their horses and cutt grasse for their horses and keepe them in the house, and their horses to bee sadled, and the men to lie in their clothes, and by day to keepe two horsemen with their armes by them to watch their horse, and the corporall and the men are to observe such orders as they shall receive from the Lord Blantire for the time they stay there, and after the 14 dayes they are to returne to their colours, and his Lordshippe will take care for others to bee sent in their places, and if they take any of the Mosse troopers in armes, they are to give them noe quarter.

Well-affected landowners were authorised to raise the forces of the neighbourhood to pursue mosstroopers, or given leave to maintain armed men for their own defence and for the suppression of malefactors.    ,

‘Nov. 24,1654.—Warrant, That whereas the General is informed that the parts about Kelsay and the Borders, both on the English and Scotch side, are much infested with theeves and robbers, which (amongst others) doe daily infest, spoyle and rob the tenants of Ro. Ker, Esq., Laird of Graden, to authorise him to raise such of his tenants and other inhabitants of the parts about Kelsay, as from time to time hee can gett, and with their assistance to pursue all such theeves and robbers either uppon the English or Scottish borders, and having apprehended them to send them in safe custody to the next Sheriff in Scotland, to be forthwith proceeded against according to justice, or else to secure them in the Castle of Sessford for that purpose/

‘Nov. 26, 1660.—These are to certifie all whome these may •concerne, that the twelve men which were raised by Andrew Ker of Sinlis during the time of my command in Scotland were raised onely for the suppressing of Mosse-troopers and robbers uppon the Borders and imployed by him to noe other purpose butt that, and securing himself against the violence of such theeves and robbers by reason hee had caused some of them to bee brought to justice and punished according to law for their offences.

A similar system was adopted for the maintenance of order in the Highlands. Heads of clans were allowed by the terms of their capitulation to keep arms for the defence of themselves and their tenants, on giving bonds that neither they nor their tenants would disturb the public peace (pp. 235, 270, 273, 277, 281). Chiefs were required to be responsible for the conduct of their clansmen. Lochiel, for instance, undertook that 6 what robbery shall be committed by any of the Laird of Lochiel’s servants or tenants that belong to him, he shall be engaged either to produce the robbers, or give satisfaction to the people injured in case it be required’ (p. 279). An entry in Monck’s order-book will illustrate the working of the system.

18 Sept. 1658.—‘ Lettre to Major Hills, that his Lordshippe understandes for certaine, that there are about 18 men that are in armes in the Hills, and robbe and steale from the country, his Lordshippe knowes the names but of three or fower of them vizte., The 3 Gildoes, in English Black-boyes, and the Webster in Glencoe, and some of the McFersons. His Lordshippe desires hee will send for the Cheif of the Clan that lives in Glencoe, and lett him know, that his Lordshippe would have him endeavour to call for those men, and that the men give securitie for their peaceable living, or else to apprehend them, and in case they doe nott doe this, acquaint them that they shall bee answerable for all the thefts they committ. His Lordshippe understands some of them belonges to Loughyell. His Lordshippe alsoe desires hee will acquaint him heerwith, and that if hee can light uppon them itt will bee a piece of good service. His Lordshippe desires him alsoe to send to the Governour of DunstafFenage that hee speake with McNachten, that if hee will undertake to apprehend those men who are lurking about Glencoe, his Lordshippe will take itt as an acceptable service, and consider him for his paines in itt.

In some cases, when the chief of a clan declined to bring his followers to justice, or to give satisfaction for their crimes, neighbouring chiefs were authorised to attack him and bring him to order.

'Nov. 12, 1659.—Order to Major John Hills governor of Inver-loughee, that whereas his Lordshippe is informed that some of the Laird of Glengarie’s clan are broken out in armes, and have rob’d and spoyld divers of the country people who have lived peace-ablie, to authorise him to imploy such persones as hee shall think fitt, either the Laird of Loughyell, Conage, or any other clan, and to give them power to suppresse the said robbers or any others who shall hereafter disturb the publique peace.

‘Order to Ewen Cameron of Loughyell, That whereas his Lordshippe is informed that some of the Laird of Glengaries clan are broken out in armes, and have rob’d and spoyl’d divers of the country people who lived peaceablie, to authorise him to raise such men of his clan as hee can gett together in armes for the suppressing of the said par tie or others who shall disturb the publique peace, and to seize and apprehend Donald McDonald Laird of Glengary, in caise he shall abett or countenance the said Robbers. The like to McEntoshe of Conage.’

Sometimes Highlanders of doubtful reputation were taken into the pay of the government, and employed to catch malefactors of their own kin or of other clans.

‘13 June 1655.—Letter to Col. Reade. That understanding that there are several sums of money due to Col. McGriggor for keeping a guard upon the Breas of Stirlingshire, his lordship desires that he will speak to the gentlemen of the shire that the same may be paid, being the payment of it may engage him to live peaceably.

‘Sept. 9, 1659.—Order to Lieut.-Col. Donald McGriggor to authorise him to secure any of the name of McGriggor or any other broken men that are robbers or disturbers of the publique peace, and to send them in prisoners to the governor of St. Johnston’s, and to pass with his party in the hills with their armes (not exceeding 20), or other parts where he shall have occasion to follow broken men.’

A more common method was to allow the gentlemen of the counties on the edge of the Highlands to raise a certain number of men for their defence, a reduction being generally made in the assessment of the county to provide for their maintenance (see p. 147, and Scotland and the Commonwealth, p. 175).

September 30th, 1659.—* Order uppon the request of the gentlemen of Perthshire, informing that the Highlanders are broken out, and by their theiving are like to destroy their tenants and poore

people by the taking away their cattell. His Lordshippe doth therby give libertie to the said gentlemen to keepe such men in armes as they shall thinke fitt (nott exceeding the number of 30) for the defence of themselves and tenants against the said broken men and Highlanders in the Brayes of Atholl, Stormonts, and Strathardle, they being answerable for the men they imploy and those that command them, that they shall doe nothing pre-judiciall to the publique peace, and that they bee maintain’d and paid by such as imploy them.’

These vigorous measures, consistently pursued from the suppression of Glencairn’s rising to the time when Monck marched into England, produced the desired result. ‘At no time,’ writes Burnet, ‘ the Highlands were kept in better order than during the usurpation’ (Own Time, ed. Airy, i. 108). ‘A man,’ boasted an English official, ‘ may ride all Scotland over with a switch in his hand and J?100 in his pocket, which he could not have done these five hundred years’ (Burton’s Parliamentary Diary, iv. 169). Much was due to the instrumentality of the new Justices of the Peace, established in 1655, in imitation of the English system. The scheme seems to have originated with Monck. A week after he entered upon his government he wrote to Lambert: ‘ If his Highness and Council would think fit to give power to appoint Justices of Peace and constables in Scotland it would much conduce to the settling the country, especially the Highlands, where the next to the chief of the clan might be appointed a Justice of Peace, which would probably keep them in awe or divide them (pp. 98, 106). Monck’s suggestion was carried out about the end of 1655 or the beginning of 1656. A list of justices appointed in the several counties, unfortunately not complete, is given on pp. 308-316, and an abstract of their instructions in the appendix (pp. 403-405). A letter from an English officer in the Highlands, written in the following April, says the business prospers so well that in a short time the Highlands will contend for civility with the Lowlands (p. 321).

FORT AT INVERLOCHY

Even more effective and more wide-reaching was the influence of the garrisons permanently established in the Highlands. In a letter pressing the Protector’s Council for money, Monck dwelt'on their supreme importance: 4 Unless your Lordship please to give us this allowance for carrying on our business, we must be forced to quit some of our Highland garrisons, which will open a gap for these people to break out again, and for the Lowland people to repair to them; whereas now they are so much curbed by our garrisons that we have as much command of the hills and Highlands, nay more, than ever any Scots or English had before, and as long as you enable us to keep those garrisons, there is little doubt but Scotland will be kept in peace1 (p. 304).

The most important of these garrisons, so far as the Highlands were concerned, were Inverlochy and Inverness.

The garrison at Inverlochy was established in the summer of 1654. A thousand men from the English army in Ireland landed in Lochaber in June, and by August a fort was in process of construction at Inverlochy. ‘The place,1wrote Monck to the Protector, ‘ is of that Consequence for the keeping of a garrison there for the destroying of the stub-bornest enemy we have in the hills (that of the Clan Cameron’s and Glengarry’s, and the Earl of Seaforth’s people) that we shall not be able to do our work unless we can continue our garrison there for one year’ (pp. 144, 165).

By 1656 or earlier the fort was practically completed, though, owing to the severity of the climate, the houses of the garrison needed frequent repairs (p. 299). The plan given on the opposite page probably represents the fort as it stood in 1656. Monck, while thoroughly realising the importance of the position, proposed in December 1657 to replace it by a smaller and stronger citadel which could be held with a smaller force (p. 367). Its normal garrison during these years consisted of nine or ten companies of foot. Service at Inverlochy was regarded as more severe and more unpleasant than service in any other garrison (cf. Letters from Roundhead Officers in Scotland (pp. 134, 136). In addition to the remoteness of the place and its absence of resources, the difficulty of obtaining fuel was an additional hardship (pp. 279, 293, 299). For these reasons the garrison was composed of a company selected by lot from each regiment of foot in Scotland, so that there might be no suspicion of favouritism.

January 1, 1658.—‘ Letter to Col. Cobbett, that to the end the officers and soldiers of that companie of his regiment that are to goe this summer to Inverloughee may bee in a readinesse to march about the beginning of June next, his Lordship desires him to agree with the regiment or to cast lots which companie shall go to relieve those now at Inverloughee/ (Followed by the like order to four other officers.)

These companies were changed annually, and the relief of the garrison, which necessitated elaborate preparations, was in peace-time the chief military event of the year.

June 3rd, 1659-—‘ Order to Major John Hills, Governour of Inverloughee, that with all convenient expedition hee make his repaire to S. Johnston’s, soe as to bee there by the 10th day of June instant, where hee is to meete att that time with Captain Benjamin Groome’s company of his Lordshippe’s owne regiment of foote, Captain Thomas Gwyllym’s company of Colonel Talbott’s regiment, Captain George Collinson’s company of Colonel Wilke’s regiment, Major Richardson’s company of Colonel Mich ell’s regiment, Captain Hugh Gosnell’s company of Colonel Reade’s regiment, and Captain John Roger’s company of Colonel Fairfax’s regiment, where hee is to see them supplyed with seaven dayes provisions, which Major Heath will deliver to them (wherof five dayes to bee carryed by each souldier in his knapsack), which said companies hee is to take into his charge and march with them to Ruthven Castle (if hee thinkes itt the best way), where Colonel Cobbett’s owne company are to meete him the 15th of June, and then hee is to march with them to Inverloughee, and to releive the companies now there, and to order them to march to their severall regiments, and to appoint an officer to take charge of those companies that march back to S. Johnston’s. And soe soone as hee comes to Inverloughee, hee is to cause the tents and baggage horses, which those companies have that now goe thither, to bee delivered to those companies that come back; and if any horses die in the service the officers in cheif with the companie is to give a note under his hand, that they may bee paid for, and bee is to give orders to the companies, that the captaines deliver the horses to the right owners when they come back, or in case they bee lost, itt will light uppon the companies that loose them, and each company is to deliver those baggage horses they have to the companies of the same regiment that are to march home; and hee is alsoe to take a note of each company of those who are to come back, of what tents they have, which they are to deliver to the storekeeper att S. Johnston’s, except that company of Colonel Fairfax’s regiment, which may send their tents to Aberdene, to bee laid uppe against next yeare. Hee is alsoe to give orders to the Captaines that goe to pay the countryman 18d. a day for each man and horse, the countryman paying for the grasse and shooing, which monie is to bee allowed to them by him in their march thither, and the severall Captaines who returne back are to take care that the same allowance bee given which shall bee reimburst to them by order from his Lordshippe.

‘P.S.—Hee is to take notice that that company of Colonel Fairfax’s that returnes are to deliver their baggage horses to the company of Colonel Cobbett’s regiment, and that company of Colonel Cobbett’s to Colonel Fairfax’s in regard of the alteration of quarters.’

April 1st, 1659.—'Lettre to Colonel Reade, that there being 8 companies out of severall regiments appointed to releive those companies now att Inverloughee, his Lordshippe desires him to appoint that companie of his regiment whose lott itt is to goe thither to bee in readinesse to march, and in order therto to bee att St. Johnston’s the 10th day of June next, where the officer that commands is to observe such orders as hee shall receive from Major Hill’s, or hee that commands the partie that goes for Inverloughee. His Lordshippe desires him alsoe to supply the Captaine with 8 baggage horses, with a saddle, crookes, and a sack to each horse, and to pay the countryman 18d. a day for each man and horse forward and backward, the countryman paying for the grasse and shooing, which monie soe disbursed his Lordshippe shall take order shall bee repaid. And the officers are to take their horses out of such parishes as did nott furnish any the last yeare (or the yeares before), "and if any of the said baggage horses die in the service, the owners of them producing a certificate under the hand of the officer that imployed them, his Lordshippe shall give order for the payment of itt. That his Lordshippe hath sent an order to Major Heath to supply the officer that commands the company with 7 dayes provisions, and his Lordshippe desires him to lett the company carry with them what monie is received for them, and that each souldier may have his bandaleers full of powder, and 12 bulletts, and the company besides to carry as much powder as may fill them once more if occasion should bee. That his Lordshippe hath sent an order to the storekeeper to deliver 14 tents for the use of the company, which hee is to order the officer that goes with the company to deliver to the officer commanding that company of his regiment now att Inverloughee to bee made use of by that company att their returne, and to take the officers’ receipt for the same, and the officer to deliver the tents to the storekeeper att Sterling, and hee is to order the Captaine to come himself or send an officer in the beginning of June to receive mony for the companie.

P.S.—His Lordshippe desires him to give order to the officer that commands his company to try if hee can hire horses himself for his company, att the rate of Is. 6d. for each man and horse, before hee send into the country, and if hee cannott, then to send to the country for horses, otherwise hee neede nott send to the country for horses.’

At the first establishment of the garrison at Inverlochy there had been some hard fighting with the Camerons, and about seventy of Brayne’s men were killed by them (p. 149). In the life of Lochiel by John Drummond, a very exaggerated account of the importance of these hostilities is given (Life of Sir Ezven Cameron, pp. 113-132). By Monck’s treaty with Lochiel in May 1655 peaceable relations were established between the garrison and the clan, which continued up to the Restoration (p. 279). Lochiel took part in the proclamation of Richard Cromwell, and was on excellent terms with the English Government (p. 384). The paper given in the Appendix to Lochiel’s life (p. 385), and there attributed to Lauderdale, headed ‘A true information of the respective deportment of the lairds of Makintoshe and of Evan Cameron of Lochzield,’ hardly exaggerates much when it describes him as entering into a cstrict league and friendship with the usurpers.’

The good understanding thus established was largely due to the tact and ability of Colonel William Brayne, the first governor of Inverlochy, who afterwards became commander-in-chief in Jamaica, and died there in September 1657. His instructions empowered him to use 4 all good and convenient means to bring the inhabitants of the said bounds to a more civil life and conversation.’ A tax of sixpence was levied on every hundred pounds rent in Scotland for the expenses of maintaining a police, and divided between the governors of Inverlochy and Inverness. Lochaber, Glencoe, Glenorchy, and other adjacent districts were erected into a separate jurisdiction under his government (Thurloe iii. 497, 522; iv. 129). In January 1656, John Drummond, in a letter to Thurloe, describes Brayne as 4 an excellent wise man,’ who had done more than any one to settle peace in the Highlands and Lochaber, 4 where there was nothing but barbarities, that now there is not one robbery all this year, although formerly it was their trade they lived by to rob and steal’ (Thurloe, iv. 401). Another able officer was Major John Hill (of Colonel Fitch’s regiment), who was governor of Inverlochy in 1659. In 1690, when Major-General Mackay wished to establish a garrison at Inverlochy, Hill was summond from Ireland, and became the first governor of Fort William (.Memoirs of Major-General Hugh Machay, pp. 90, 98, 105 ; Leven and Melville Papers, pp. 415, 468, 522, 564). He was the officer subsequently concerned in the Glencoe massacre, though the life of him in the Dictionary of National Biographyomits his early career.

Next in importance to Inverlochy as controlling the Highlands came Inverness. The citadel built there was planned and begun by Major-General Deane about May 1652 (<Scotland and the Commonwealth, p. 358). On May 27,1653 the Council of State having received a letter from Colonel Fitch, asking for ^30,000 for the purpose of making the fortifications projected, required him to send in a detailed estimate of the expenditure required. At the same date Cromwell was asked to send Joachim Hane, the engineer, to Inverness to take care of laying the foundations of the works to be raised there (Cal. State Papers, Dom. 1652-3, p. 335). But Hane was in England most of the summer, and employed in France during the autumn, so that John Rosworme or some other engineer must have been employed (p. 163; cf. Scotland and the Commonwealth^ pp. 28, 154, 157, 161). Local labour was employed for digging, but the skilled artificers required were most of them brought from England (pp. 67, 303). In August 1655 the citadel was still unfinished. 6 Inverness,’ wrote Monck on August 21, 4 will cost a great deal of money before it be done, though I gave them orders twelve months since to begin no more new buildings, but to finish what they had begun.’ A few days later he estimated that the works would cost £500 a month for the next two years, that is, an additional <£12,000. It is probable, therefore, that the citadel was completed in the summer of 1657, and it may well have cost £50,000, or perhaps the £80,000 mentioned by the minister of Kirkhill.

The two contemporary descriptions which follow will help to explain the plan.

Richard Franck, in his Northern Memoirs, thus describes it (p. 201):

‘North and by east, near the forcible streams of the Ness, stands the fortress or pentagon, drawn out by regular lines, built all with stone, and girt about with a graff that commodes it with a convenient harbour. The houses in this fair fortress are built very low, but uniform; and the streets broad and spacious, with avenues and intervales for drilling of foot or drawing up horse. I must confess such and so many are the advantages and con-veniencies that belong to this citadel, it would be thought fabulous if but to numerate them : for that end I refer myself to those that have inspected her magazines, providores, harbours, vaults, grafts, bridges, sally-ports, cellars, bastions, horn-works, redoubts, counterscarps, etc. Ocular evidence is the best judg, and gives the

FORT AT INVERNESS

plainest demonstration ; which, without dispute, will interpret this formidable fortress a strength impregnable; and the situation, as much as any, promises security by reason it’s surrounded with boggy morasses, standing in swamps on an isthmus of land that divides the Ness from the Orchean Seas.’

More detailed and more intelligible is the account given by the minister of Kirkhill, under the date of 1655, which is printed at length by Carruthers in the Highland Note-Book, 1843, p. 97 :

f 1655. The Citadel of Inverness is now on a great length, almost finished. They had first built a long row of buildings made of bricks and planks upon the river-side to accommodate the regiment, and ramparts and bulwarks of earth in every street of the town, and also fortified the castle and the bridge and the main court of guard at the Cross. They bought a large plot of ground from the burghers, called Carseland, where they built the citadel, founded May 16, 1652, and now finished, a most stately scene! It was five-cornered with bastions, with a wide trench that an ordinary barque might sail in at full tide; the breast-work three storeys, built all of hewn stone limed within, and a brick wall. Centinel-houses of stone at each corner, a sally-port to the south leading to the town, and on the north a great entry or gate called the Port, with a strong drawbridge of oak called the Blue Bridge, and a stately structure over the gate, well cut with the Commonwealth’s arms and the motto “Togam tuentur arma.” This bridge was drawn every night, and a strong guard within, Ships or shallops sailing in or out, the bridge was heaved to give way. The entry from the bridge into the citadel was a stately vault about seventy feet long, with seats on each side, and a row of iron hooks for pikes and drums to hang on. In the centre of the citadel stood a great four-square building, all hewn stone, called the magazine and granary. In the third storey was the church, well furnished with a stately pulpit and seats, a wide bartizan at top, and a brave great clock with four large gilded dials and a curious ball. . . . South-east stood the great English building, four storeys high, so called being built by English masons, and south-west the Scotch building of the same dimensions, built by Scotch masons. North-west and north-east are lower storeys for ammunition, timber, lodgings for manufactories, stablings, provision and brewing houses, and a great long tavern with all manner of wines, viands, beer, ale, and cider, sold by one Master Benson, so that the whole regiment was accommodated within these walls. All their oak planks and beams were carried out of England in ships to Kessock Roads; all their fir logs and spars were sold out of Hugh Fraser of Struy’s woods : I saw that gentleman receive 30,000 merks at once for timber. Most of their best hewn stone was taken from Chanonry—the great cathedral and steeple, the bishop’s castle, were razed—also from the Church and Abbey of Kinloss and Beauly, the Greyfriars' and St. Mary’s Chapel at Inverness, and many more; so that it was a sacrilegious structure, and therefore could not stand.

'At the digging of the trenches every man got a shilling sterling wages a day, so that all the country people flocked to that work, and hardly could you get one to serve you, and the soldiers made more money attending it than their daily pay amounted to. This great work was finished in the fifth year ; and Commissary Coup, who advanced the money to masons, carpenters, and others, told me that the whole expense amounted to about eighty thousand pounds sterling. There was a thousand men in the regiment—Colonel Thomas Fitch, governor. They brought such store of all wares and conveniences to Inverness that English cloth was sold near as cheap here as in England : the pint of claret went for a shilling. They set up an apothecary’s shop with a druggist’s: Mr. Miller was their chirurgeon, and Dr. Andrew Moore their physician. They not only civilised but enriched the place.1 They fixed a garrison at Inverlocliy, and carried a bark driven upon rollers to the Loch end of Ness, and there enlarged it into a stately frigate to sail with provisions from one end of the loch to the other—Mr. Church, governor, and Lieutenant Orton, captain of this frigate, and sixty men aboard of her, to land upon expeditions when they pleased. I happened myself, with the Laird of Streachin, to be invited aboard by Orton, when we were civilly treated. It were vain to relate what advantage the country had by this regiment. Story may yet record it, but I only set down in the general something of what I was eyewitness.’

The garrison of Inverness generally consisted of seven companies of foot, that is, from seven hundred to four hundred and ninety men,' as the strength of the company varied at •different dates. The regiment referred to in the foregoing extract was that of Colonel Fitch, which was stationed there during the whole period from 1652 to the Restoration. Defoe, in his Tour in Scotland, states that at the disbanding which followed that event many of the English soldiers c settled in this fruitful and cheap part of the country,’ and supposes them to have introduced new methods of agriculture there.

Beside these two there were three other greater forts built during the English occupation, at Ayr, Perth, and Leith. That erected at Ayr was planned and begun by Major-General Deane in 1652. This took place about April 1652 (Whitelock, iii. 413; Heath, Chronicle, p. 310). c Major-General Deane,’ says a letter dated Berwick, April 4, 1652, 4 is now returned, having first planted a very useful force and a strong garrison in Ayre in the Western Sea, which is convenient for Ireland and Liverpoole ’ (Several Proceedings in Parliament, April 8-15, p. 2073). Letters in Mercurius Politi-cus give the following accounts of the progress of the work :—

A letter from Ayr dated July I, 1652, says :

‘The Citadel here goes forward apace ; it will be of very large extent, and not finished yet this 12 moneths. ’Tis made of six main bulwarks, and in regard of its sandiness, must be walled with lime, within side and without; and then being well victualled, it may be judged impregnable* (Mercurius Politicus, July 8-15, 1652).

Another letter, dated Aug. 11, adds:

'Our fortification here goes on fast. After we gett the foundation laid, we are very much troubled with water, and have no earth but a shattering sand, that as we dig in one place, another place falls upon us; but we hope before winter come upon us to gett all or most part of the foundation laid. When it is finished it will be a place of as great strength as will be in England or Scotland: the fresh water will be 7 or 8 foote deepe about two partes of it, and the sea and river about the other parte * (Mercurius Politicus, Aug. 26-Sept. 2, 1652).

Lilburne wrote to Cromwell in October 1653, saying that he found the fort at Ayr 4 in very great forwardness and the outworks completely built: it is a most stately thing and will be very strong, only I conceive it is a great deal too large, and will put the State to much charge in maintaining it ’ (p. 257). In August 1655 it was still unfinished, but Monck thought it would be finished by the following summer, till which date it would be necessary to spend £250 per month upon it (p. 303). The plan of the town and citadel given in this volume is dated 1654. On the back of the original there is a rhyming inscription by the engineer and author of the plan:

'When Major General Richard Deane, in chief did rule Scotland,
And Matthew Allured, Colonel, this West part did command,
Hans Ewald Tessin, Architect, was sent this to erect,
Against England’s foe for England’s Friend, whom ever God protect.

The garrison of Ayr in July 1657 consisted of seven companies of foot, that is 490 men not counting officers (p. 370, cf. Thurloe, vi. 472). Amongst the papers in this volume are several describing a riot which took place at Ayr in 1656 between the soldiers of the garrison and a regiment about to embark for Jamaica (p. 323).

Of another citadel, that built at Perth, much less is known.

'East from the town,’ says Richard Franck in his Northern Memoirs, p. 145, 4 lie those flourishing meadows they call the Ince, where a citadel was erected and surrounded by the navigable Tay that washes those sandy banks and shores.’ There is no plan of this fortification amongst the Clarke mss., but a newsletter, dated March 17, 1652, shows that it was planned by Richard Deane, and begun during his government. 4 Yesterday Majorgenerall Deane returned to Dalkeith from Dundee, where he had bin settling severall affairs, but the building of a cittadell there is deferred.’ . . . From thence he went to St. Johnston’s, where 4 uppon advice it was held fit to erect a cittadell to containe 500 men, which is already gone about and ground set out for it being 80 perches long and so much broad’ (Clarke mss. xxii. 49). The progress of this erection is mentioned in Scotland and the Commonwealth, p. 199, and the fire by which it was partially destroyed is described in the present volume, p. 331. The citadel is said to have been still defensible with no great care or change ’ in 1715 (J. Murray Graham, Annals of the Earls of Stair, i. 278).

Leith, the fifth of these great forts, was the last to be built. When the town had been first occupied by the Parliamentary forces, it had been judged by them very insufficiently fortified. £ The seventh of this instant,’ wrote Colonel Overton in September 1650, £ with four regiments of foot wee entered Leith, the most considerable port of Scotland: wee found in it mounted upon platformes 37 guns, some shott and ammunition, great store of wealth, which as yet remaines (for ought I know) untoucht. The place hath a regular draught or lyne about it, but farre from finishing, nor indeed is it fesible with earth, the foundation being so sandy’ (Mercurius Politicus, Sept. 19-26, 1650, p. 266). Monck complained of the unsatisfactory condition of the fortifications of Leith in August 1655 : £The place is very considerable but ill fortified, and indeed, the works being earth, it falls down daily, insomuch that the repairing of it will cost, one month with another <P100 monthly; there is a great deal of the works lately fallen down, and much more like to fall ’ (pp. 293,303). As the town contained a very important magazine, Monck feared a possible attempt to surprise it, and advised that Scottish ministers should not be allowed to preach there, until a citadel was built to secure the town, for fear of the crowds they might attract (p. 318). Next summer the erection of the citadel he recommended was begun.

‘The Protector and Counsall of England, with his Heynes Counsell sittand heir at Edinburgh for the governament thairof, haiffing intentioun to big a Citidaill on the north syde of the brig of Leith, they delt with the toun of Edinburgh, ather to big that Citidaill, or ellis to lois thair libertie and superioritie of Leith. The Toun of Edinburgh, not willing to tyne thair superioritie, did agrey with the great Counsall sittand heir at Edinburgh for the governament to advance thriescoir thowsand pundis Scottis, twitching the bigging of the Citidaill; and so the Inglisches began to cast the trinches, and entir to that work on the north syde of Leith, upone Monday the 26 of Maij 1656’ (Nicoll’s Diary, p. 179).

By February 1657 cPl3,500 had been received and expended on the work, and it was estimated by the engineer that ^28,000 would be necessary to complete it. An account of the progress of the works is given by Colonel Timothy Wilkes, the governor of Leith, in a letter to the Protector, dated 23 February 1657 (Thurloe, vi. 70). Monck wrote urgently for money, to expedite its progress. ‘ I hope your highness will find, that this worke will be more advantageous to you than all the rest in Scotland, when itt is once finished, being itt will keepe in awe the chief citty of this Nation, and will be so convenient, in case you should have occasion to send any forces, that you may have a place for provisions for them, which as itt was before could not be kept under 3000 men, and that nott with safety neither, if any considerable enemy should come before itt 1 (Thurloe, vi. 79).

In another letter Monck enlarged on the merits of the new citadel, asserting that it could be held with a garrison of 600 men, and could always be relieved by sea, while the works were so strong that batteries would be unable to breach them. 6 If he be a man that understands his business that commands it in a time of danger, I do not see how any enemy can take it.1 The total cost of the citadel, according to his computation, would be about ,P30,000, and it might easily be finished by the end of the summer of 1658 (p. 361).

Unfortunately the Clarke Papers contain no plan of Leith Citadel, and Franck in his Northern Memoirs gives no description of it. At the time of his visit it was 6 huddled in dust and ruinous heaps,1 but it is quite possible that these words refer to the older fort, and that it was not yet built (p. 248, ed. 1821). John Ray saw it in 1661, and thus describes it:

'At Leith we saw one of those citadels built by the Protector, one of the best fortifications that ever we beheld, passing fair and sumptuous. There are three forts, advanced above the rest, and two platforms. The works round about are faced with freestone towards the ditch, and are almost as high as the highest buildings within, and withal thick and substantial. Below are very pleasant, convenient, and well-built houses for the governor, officers, and soldiers, and for magazines and stores; there is also a good capacious chapel, the piazza or void space within as large as Trinity College (in Cambridge) great court. This is one of the four forts. The other three are at St. Johnstones, Inverness, and Ayre. The building of each of which (as we were credibly informed) cost £100,000 sterling; indeed, I do not see how it could cost less. In England it would have cost much more (Lankester, Memorials of John Ray, 1846, p. 156).

In addition to these five chief forts or citadels, there were over a score of smaller forts and garrisons. The table given in Scotland and the Commonwealth (p. 110) enumerates the names of the places garrisoned in 1653. Another list printed in Thurloe’s State Papers (vi. 472), and dated July 1657, should be compared with this, as it shows the changes in the disposition of the troops in Scotland made in consequence of Glen-cairne’s rising. The list given by Monck (p. 370) represents not the actual state of things existing at the time he wrote, but the arrangement of forces proposed to be made when Leith citadel was completed, and the projected fort built at the head of Loch Ness (p. 367). Of these minor garrisons the majority were old castles or houses, in which certain alterations had been made to render them more defensible or more commodious. The works hastily thrown up at Kirkwall are described in a letter from Colonel Overton to Cromwell (Scotland and the Commonwealth, p. 36). A very rough and unfinished plan among the Clarke Papers shows some fortifications made at Stornoway, probably in 1653 (see Scotland and the Commonwealth, p. 221). Stornoway was not permanently garrisoned, but Duart or Do wart Castle, in the Isle of Mull, which was occupied about the same time, remained a garrison throughout the period (pp. 64, 370, 413; cf.Scotland and the Commonwealth, pp. 187, 221, 309). Dun oily Castle, which was occupied in 1652, was abandoned in 1654 (p. 40; cf. Scotland and the Commonwealth, p. 57). Dundee and Dun-keld, both garrisons in 1653, have disappeared from the list of garrisons by 1657.

Monck’s letter of October 15, 1657, explains the strategic importance of the different garrisons he proposed to maintain in Scotland. With proper fortifications they could be held by a comparatively small force, and it would then be possible to get together a larger field force. He calculated that if his plan were adopted four and a half regiments of foot, two regiments of horse, and two troops of dragoons could be drawn out of Scotland for service if any sudden necessity arose (p. 371). In December 1659 he actually took with him on his march into England four regiments of horse and six of foot, which he could not have done but for the support he received in Scotland.

The army maintained in Scotland during the period covered by these papers varied in size at different times, and was gradually diminished between 1655 and 1658. In 1653, when Glencairne’s rising began, Lilburne had in Scotland a force of about twelve thousand foot and two thousand horse {Scotland and the Commonwealth, pp. xxxii, t). By the establishment of July 1655, the force to be stationed in Scotland was fixed at thirteen regiments and one company of foot, seven regiments of horse and four companies of dragoons. In October 1655 the thirteen infantry regiments were reduced to eleven. By the establishment of December 1657, the seven regiments of horse were reduced to five (p. 373). During the same year the strength of the regiments themselves was greatly reduced. The company of foot, which had contained a hundred privates in 1653, was reduced to eighty in July 1655, to seventy-four in October 1655, and to seventy in December 1657. The troop of horse, which had consisted of only fifty troopers in 1653, was reduced to forty-eight in 1657, while the company of dragoons sunk from sixty to forty-eight.

The object of these changes was to lessen the cost of the army in Scotland, and consequently to diminish the amount to be remitted by the English treasury. It was so far attained that the monthly pay of the forces in Scotland, which in June 1654 amounted to nearly =P36,000, was reduced at the end of 1657 to rather less than i?21,000 (pp. 217, 381). The Government of England found it very difficult to raise the money required, and the pay of the soldiers was nearly always some months behindhand (pp. 13, 64, 146, 156, 217, 307). Monck continually complained that the regiments in Scotland were ,not paid as regularly as those stationed in England, and insisted on the necessity of equal treatment. In December 1657 he even threatened to resign unless this inequality were redressed (pp. 289, 373). Malcolm Laing, in his History of Scotland (iii. 490, ed. 1819), asserts that the regiments stationed in Scotland were frequently recalled by Cromwell, who was jealous of Monck’s ascendency over them; and were replaced by others, of whose dangerous fanaticism he was apprehensive in England. As a matter of fact, however, the infantry regiments which were in Scotland in 1653 remained there till 1659, while the cavalry regiments alone were changed. The usual practice was to relieve two regiments every summer, so as to give all the horse an equal turn of duty. Monck, in 1655, advised the Protector to settle permanently in Scotland the regiments intended for its garrison, and this solution was no doubt a compromise adopted in answer to his recommendation (p. 306).

The papers in this volume throw a good deal of light on the state of political feeling amongst the troops in Scotland during the Protectorate. Like the soldiers in England, they presented Cromwell with an address approving his acceptance of the Protectorate (p. 11). But towards the close of 1654 disaffection began to spread amongst the officers, and letters of a seditious nature from officers in England to their friends in Scotland were discovered by Monck (pp. 213, 215, 234). The officer most suspected was Major-General Overton, Monck’s second in command (p. 192). In December 1654 Overton and other officers were arrested on suspicion of being concerned in a plot to seize Monck and march the army into England to overthrow the Protector. Several officers were cashiered by court-martial, and Overton was sent to England to stand his trial (pp. 238, 240, 247, 250-3). Overton had certainly permitted meetings to be held at which a eircular-letter of a seditious kind was drawn up, but there is no evidence that he did anything more (p. 240). Of the plot for seizing Monck and exciting a general mutiny, he was probably ignorant. Its real author seems to have been a private named Miles Sindercombe, the same who attempted to assassinate Cromwell in January 1657, and afterwards committed suicide in prison (p. 243). After this episode no further signs of discontent appeared amongst the troops in Scotland. In May 1657 Monck issued orders against the circulation of a petition against kingship amongst the regiments under his command, and during the Protector’s last illness he ordered his officers to keep a sharp eye on c discontented spirits ’ (pp. 354, 383). But in neither case was there any outward sign of the agitation against which he took these precautions. However, the spread of Quakerism in the army caused some anxiety to its superior officers (pp. 350-2, 362).

Of the civil government of Scotland during this period these papers supply many illustrations, but not much new information. In the summer of 1655 a Council for Scotland was appointed, which relieved Monck of a large part of the business of administration (pp. 306, 347-9). The correspondence of the president of that body, Lord Broghil, which is printed in Thurloe’s State Papers, and the documents calendared in the Domestic State Papers, supply a full account of the measures they adopted. As Monck was a member of the Council as well as commander-in-chief, a number of his letters on military questions contain references to its work, and his letters before the time of its appointment refer still more frequently to civil affairs.

The weak point of the government Cromwell established in Scotland was its costliness. Baillie’s Letters are full of complaints of the poverty of the country, and of the crushing burden of the taxation imposed upon it (iii. 288, 318, 387). Monck’s letters fully bear out these complaints. The greater portion of the revenue of the government was derived from the monthly assessment {Scotland and the Commonwealth, p. xxx). Under Lilburne the assessment amounted nominally to £10,000 per month, though not more than £8500 was really levied. The devastation and the decay of trade resulting from Glencairne’s rising, and from the measures taken to suppress it, rendered it quite impossible to raise the sum previously obtained. Monck never ceased to represent this to his government (pp. 162, 190, 195, 202). In November 1654 he wrote that Scotland was at least <£200,000 the worse by the late war, and that £7300 was the utmost that could be raised per month (p. 212). In July 1655, however, he thought it would be possible to raise £8000, but his estimate was evidently too high (p. 295). Two years later he wrote to Thurloe complaining of the insupportable burden of the assessment, which was comparatively heavier in Scotland than either in England or Ireland. 4 Unless there be some course taken that they may come in an equality with England, it will go hard with this people; and it will be one of the greatest obligements they can have to the present government, to bring them into an equality. And since we have united them into one Commonwealth with England, I think it will be most equal to bring them into an equality; and then, in case they be not quiet, I think it were just reason to plant it with English ’ (Thurloe, vi. 330). The government recognised the justice of these complaints, and on June 10, 1657, Parliament voted that the assessment of Scotland should be ^6000 per month, at which figure it remained until the Restoration (Commons' Journal, vii. 554, 628).

Monck’s objection to the attempt to exact the full amount of the old assessment was partly dictated by political reasons :

‘If the whole ten thousand should be laid on, it must come, from the boroughs, who are so impoverished through want of trade and the late troubles that it will break them, and they are generally the most faithful people to us of any people in this nation ’ (p. 195). The inhabitants of Glasgow ‘ being a good people,’ he was anxious to give them abatements if possible (p. 219). Leith was to be supported in its perennial struggle against Edinburgh, on the further ground that it was to some extent an English colony (pp. 239, 248). His maxim was, as he expresses it in one of his letters to the Protector, that the burghs in general ought to be ‘ tenderly and carefully cherished ’ by the English government (Thurloe, vi. 529).

After the monthly assessment, the most important branch of the Scottish revenue was the excise. Monck recommended the imposition of an excise in March 1655, and it was actually established in the following October (p. 260). The difficulties attending its establishment are frequently mentioned in Monck’s letters (pp. 294, 305, 348). At first it produced rather less than i?30,000 per annum, but by 1659 this had risen to about i?45,000 (p. 371; Commons' Journal, vii. 628). Thomas Tucker’s ‘ Report on the settlement of the Revenue of Excise and Customs in Scotland, 1656,’ printed by the Bannatyne Club in 1824, gives a full account of both sources of revenue at the date named, supplemented for the later years of the period by the documents printed in Thurloe (iv. 531, vi. 445).

'There were also certain smaller taxes for military purposes, which M'onck often mentions. Fire and candle money for the garrisons appears to have been partly levied on the country round them, partly an allowance made out of the assessments (pp. 279, 300, 359, 361, 378 ; cf. Thurloe, vi. 470). .Forage was also requisitioned from the country, for the use of the cavalry, at fixed rates (pp. 302, 364). In 1655 Monck also levied a contribution intended to provide bedding and other necessaries for the garrison (p. 259).    r

A considerable number of papers refer directly or indirectly to the Church, and to ecclesiastical questions. From the first preparation for the rising the king had relied upon obtaining the support of the clergy (see Scotland and the Commonwealth, pp. 47,293). In February 1654 he wrote to the Moderator of the Commission of the Kirk, urging him and other 4 godly and well affected ministers ’ to assist Glencairne and Middleton with their prayers, and send 4able, faithful, and discreet ministers ’ to the royalist forces (pp. 28, 29, 32). Hyde sent Middleton a special form of prayer, probably for the success of the king’s arms, which was used in royalist congregations at Paris, and was sanctioned by Charles himself. But he wisely left Middleton free to use it or not,4 since it may be thought there that the king’s directing forms of prayer is not agreeable to the liberty of the kingdom of Jesus Christ ’ (p. 33). In a second letter from the king to the Scottish clergy, written in October 1654, Charles boldly expresses the hope that4 the memory of my conversation and behaviour amongst you will preserve me from the scandals of all kinds which my enemies will not fail to raise against me,’ adding some very edifying reflections on the necessity of becoming (at times) all things to all men, and on the uses of adversity (p' 198). Middleton, less gifted than his master, found it very difficult to draw up a declaration to satisfy the clergy, and the English royalists who accompanied him detested 4 the Presbyter ’ (pp. 122, 128).

In reply to the king’s appeal, the ministers in general encouraged the rising, preached sermons in its favour, and contrived, in spite of prohibitions, publicly to pray for Charles n. (pp. 43, 80). Lilburne reported to the Protector that they were ‘trumpets of sedition’; adding, fiI know not well how to behave myself in these cases with these strange creatures, but should be glad to receive your Highness’s commands ’ (p. 62). The Protector hoped to come to an understanding with the heads of the Remonstrants, and for that purpose sent for Gillespy and two others in March 1654 (p. 57). On May 6 he summoned Robert Blair and two more to London to discuss with him ‘the discomposed condition both of the godly people and ministers in Scotland’ (p. 102). A couple of letters refer to the instructions given by the Protector to Gillespy, and to Gillespy’s attempt to carry them out on his return from London (pp. 211, 219).

Monck’s own policy in ecclesiastical matters was simple enough. Like his predecessor Lilburne, he regarded assemblies of ministers as dangerous. His order-book contains a warrant to Lieutenant-Colonel Gough (of his own regiment), dated August 19, 1654, ‘That whereas many ministers from divers parts of the nation are mett together at Edinburgh, and considering these assemblies have of late bin made use of for the unsetling and discomposing of the mindes of the people of the nation, rather then any way for the spirituall good of ministers or flock, that hee goe to the meeting place and lett them know that they must departe the towne within six houres after warning, and that such as shall bee found in the towne after that time bee secured, and that if they doe meete againe without leave from the Com-mander-in-Cheif, that they shall bee secured.’ His letters show that he regarded ‘ the Protesting party ’ as ‘ better to be trusted than the other party, which are called the General Revolution men’ (p. 345). He also encouraged as much as he could the Independent congregations, some few of which were established in garrison towns and elsewhere (pp. 185,193,

242). But the policy of the Government in ecclesiastical matters was mainly determined by Lord Broghil, President of the Council established in 1655, and his letters in Thurloe’s State Papers explain and set forth that policy at length. Broghil succeeded in persuading the clergy to refrain from praying publicly for Charles n. (October 1655). A letter from a Scottish royalist to Charles n. explains the reasons of the ministers for yielding, and gives specimens of the methods by which they continued to pray ‘ in such terms as the people who observe might find where to put in their shoulder and bear you up in public prayer ’ (p. 321). Other papers refer to the refusal of the clergy to observe the fasts and thanksgivings ordered by the Protector’s government (pp. 191, 332, 349), their protests against the toleration of sectaries (pp. 364, 382), the spread of Quakerism in the army (pp. 350, 352, 362), and the measures taken to prevent the spread of Catholicism in Scotland (p. 329).

Amongst the miscellaneous papers, the most interesting arfe those relating to the administration of justice. On.November 23, 1654, Monck recommended Sir Andrew Bruce to be appointed a commissioner for the administration of justice (p. 214). After Cromwell’s death, and during the changes of government which took place in 1659, there was an intermission in the sitting of the courts, which gave rise to great complaint (p. 391; cf. Nicoll’s Diary, p. 242). Another paper belonging to the year 1659 is, ‘ An Account of the principal Judicatories in Scotland, and the officers belonging thereto,’ which is of considerable value, though clearly biassed by the desire of the author to get his own friends put into office (p. 385). The papers relating to the institution of Justices of the Peace have been already mentioned (pp. 98,106, 308, 321, 403). One of the duties assigned to the justices was the fixing of the rate of wages, and the Appendix contains ah assessment of wages for the shire "of Edinburgh, made in March 1656 (p. 405). For a copy of this document the Society owes its thanks to Mr. W. B. Blaikie, and to Miss Balfour-Melville of Pilrig, the owner of the unique broadside from which it is derived. Very few English assessments of this period are in existence, and, to the best of my knowledge, no other wages assessment for Scotland is in print. The importance of these assessments for the study of economic history is set forth at length by Professor Thorold Rogers, and this one may be compared with those given in his History of Agriculture and Prices, v. 617; cf. Hamilton, Quarter Sessions from Elizabeth to Anne, p. 163; Hewins, English Trade and Finance in the Seventeenth Century, p. 82.

Amongst documents of personal interest, Lilbume’s letter on behalf of Sir John Scot of Scotstarvet (p. 45), his panegyric on William Clarke (p. 21), Sir James Turner’s vindication of himself (p. 356), and two letters of Cromwell’s deserve special mention (pp. 102, 353). The relations of the Marquis of Argyll to the Cromwellian governors of Scotland are illustrated by two of his own letters, and many references in theirs (pp. 37, 60, 104).

Argyll discouraged his friends and clansmen from taking part in Glencairne’s insurrection, had some of his lands burnt in consequence of his opposition, and raised men, who received pay from the government, for the defence of Argyllshire. Lilburne, in March 1654, praised him as giving 6 real testimonies of his good affection, both in words and actions,’ and recommended him to the Protector’s favour (p. 61). In May following, Monck reiterated this recommendation (p. 110). In September, after one of Monck’s ships had been captured at Inveraray by Lome’s followers, without any opposition from the officers of the Marquis, he still held the Marquis himself blameless. 61 cannot find but that the Marquis of Argyll is righteous, though the country more incline to his son than to him ’ (p. 177). But between 1655 and 1659 Monck’s views entirely altered. 6 In his heart,’ wrote Monck in March 1659, 6there is no man in the three nations does more disaffect the

English interest than he’ (p. 411). Argyll’s attempt to get paid to him a debt of £12,000 owing him by the government, he answered by showing that in reality Argyll was its debtor for about £35,000 (p. 414). One reason for this was hi& discovery of Argyll’s double dealing in 1652, when the Highlanders captured the English garrisons in Argyllshire (p. 412). Another motive seems to have been the belief that Argyll had played a double part in 1654 (p. 411)* At the same time, certain informations received by Monck during 1656 and 1657 convinced him that Argyll was still opposing the government in an underhand way, and perhaps in secret relations with the royalists (Thurloe, v. 604; vi. 295, 341). The animosity which Monck showed to Argyll, and his willingness to supply evidence against him after the Restoration, are thus easy to account for.

The documents printed in this volume, like those in Scotland and the Commonwealth, are mainly taken from the papers of William Clarke in the Library of Worcester College, Oxford, and from the Clarendon Papers in the Bodleian Library. Several others have been added from the Egerton mss. in the British Museum, a letter of Cromwell’s from the Carte mss., in the Bodleian, and Monck’s instructions from the Domestic State Papers in the Record Office.

As the letters and papers printed from Clarke’s collection are in most cases derived from rough copies, they contain many errors, and it has often been necessary to supply omitted words or suggest corrections (cf. Scotland and the Commonwealth, p. liii). Editorial insertions of this kind are distinguished by square brackets. Names of persons and places are frequently disfigured and transformed, either through the want of knowledge of the original writer or the carelessness of the clerk who entered them in the letter-book. In the index an attempt has been made to identify the persons and places referred to, but it is not always possible to do so with certainty. For any errors committed in the attempt, the editor can only ask the indulgence of the reader and of the Society. In conclusion, he desires to thank Mr. T. G. Law, Mr. William Mackay, and Mr. W. B. Blaikie, for their liberal help. The Index is the work of Mr. Mill, who has also given the greatest assistance in the identification of the names it contains.

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