It is one of those strange accidents of history that
the four major organisations in Scottish banking should have been
founded in different ways. Since 1695 commercial banking in Scotland has
produced more than 100 banks—of these only three remain—the Bank of
Scotland, Royal Bank of Scotland plc and Clydesdale Bank PLC. Also since
1810 the savings bank movement has produced a similar number of banks
and of these only four remain.
In 1695 an Act of the Scottish Parliament constituted
the Bank of Scotland as a legal entity. This gave it power to sue and be
sued in its own name, and it was also generally agreed that the Act
conferred limited liability upon the shareholders. This meant that if at
any future time the Bank had to be wound up then the shareholders could
not be forced to pay any more than that part of the authorised capital
for which they had subscribed.
The same benefits were obtained by the Royal Bank of
Scotland when it was founded in 1727, but this time the constituting
document was a Royal Charter rather than an Act of Parliament. When the
British Linen Co. (later British Linen Bank) was set up in 1746 it too
was constituted by a Royal Charter. The fact that all three concerns had
limited liability made their shares very attractive to the investing
public because most businesses in the 18th century were organised as
partnerships. The law of partnership meant that any one who invested
money in such an organisation became a member of it and was therefore
liable for all of its debts, i.e., if the business's liabilities
exceeded its assets when it was being wound up then the personal assets
of the partners could be sold to pay the debts of the business.
Not all banks, however, were organised and
constituted in such a way that the benefits of limited liability were
conferred upon them. In fact most of the banks which were founded in the
18th century were partnerships. There were two different kinds of these
banks. Firstly the private banks in Edinburgh of which there were about
twenty, many of which failed in the crisis of 1772. These were mainly
very small non-note issuing banks who borrowed money from the Bank of
Scotland and Royal Bank which they then lent to their own customers at a
slightly higher rate of interest. Very little is known about these
concerns but it does not seem that they were of great significance to
Scottish economic development. Possibly the sole exception to this
generalisation was the house of Sir Wm Forbes, James Hunter and Co.
which grew to some prominence as a deposit gatherer and then began to
issue its own notes in order to further extend its business.
Of much more importance to economic progress were the
provincial banking companies of which forty-five were formed in the
period 1747-1825. These tended to be much larger than the private banks
although smaller than the Bank of Scotland or Royal Bank. They were set
up as partnerships, ranging in size from six to eighty partners, in all
of the larger burghs and some of the smaller ones. By 1800 there were
provincial banking companies in Glasgow, Dundee, Aberdeen, Stirling,
Perth, Ayr, Paisley, Greenock, Falkirk and Leith and others followed in
the 19th century. Many of these concerns were set up before the large
Edinburgh banks had extended their operations to include a branch system
so that when branches were set up they often had to face competition
from one or more of the banking companies. Competition was therefore a
major feature of the evolving Scottish banking system and the result was
a service which was certainly more efficient and probably cheaper than
its English counterpart.
In England the Bank of England had been set up in
1694 largely as a result of the efforts of the Scot William Paterson. It
was not England's first bank as several London goldsmiths had evolved
the banking functions of deposit, note issue and lending earlier in the
17th century. Nevertheless, the Bank of England soon came to dominate
the English banking scene from its London base. An Act of 1708 which was
passed to defend the Bank's monopoly of joint-stock banking in England
and Wales enacted that no other bank in these countries could have more
than six partners. By 1750 there were about twelve country banks in
English provincial areas but all were restricted by the legislation of
1708. The result of this restriction was that England and Wales were
deprived of a system of banking commensurate with a period of rapid
economic growth.
Of course in 1750 the Scottish people were much
poorer than their English counterparts and were very conscious of this
fact. If they were to catch up with their southern neighbours it was
absolutely essential that they develop a system of banking which would
create credit and mobilise savings in as efficient a way as possible. As
we shall see the Scottish banking system, within the British Isles,
pioneered in an extensive way several major developments including
joint-stock organisation, deposit taking with interest, note exchanges,
branch banking and cash credits (the forerunner of overdrafts). Scotland
was very fortunate in that the Government left the system free of
restrictive legislation so that it could develop in line with the
requirements of its customers. The path to the achievement of this
highly effective banking system was not, however, always very smooth.
It is a perfectly natural phenomenon in human
relations that well established individuals will be suspicious of new
arrivals until they either prove that they are not a threat or can be
controlled in some way—and so it is in business; especially when the
rival organisations are constituted differently. In the mid-18th century
the Bank of Scotland and Royal Bank of Scotland, after initial distrust,
had settled into relatively peaceful co-existence. Their peace was
shattered, however, when, from 1747, the provincial banking companies
began to be formed. Initial attempts by the Edinburgh banks to control
these new arrivals failed and a period of considerable hostility ensued
before peace was restored in 1771 when the Edinburgh banks decided to
set up a note exchange and forced the provincial banks (nine in number)
to join. The effect of the exchange—the first of its kind—was to place
proper limits on the amount of notes which a bank could keep in
circulation. From then on banks could only keep in circulation those
notes which their customers required for daily transactions. Other notes
had to be retired, either over the counter or through the exchange.
The following year there occurred one of the worst
commercial crises that Scotland has ever seen. Several of the small
private banks in Edinburgh failed as did Douglas, Heron and Co. (the Ayr
Bank), the largest of the provincial banking companies. The crisis might
have been even more serious had it not been for another innovation,
i.e., the preparedness of the Bank of Scotland, the Royal Bank and,
to some extent, the British Linen Company to act as lenders of last
resort by lending cash to some of the provincial banking companies,
whose business was otherwise sound, but who had problems of providing
adequate liquid assets to meet the demands of their customers. In other
words the Edinburgh bankers were prepared to develop at least some of
the functions nowadays normally associated with a Central Bank.
The willingness of the Edinburgh bankers to act in
this way brought considerable stability and confidence to the Scottish
banking system. Thereafter commercial crises were never experienced with
such intensity as they were in other parts of the British Isles. The
preparedness of the banks to help one another meant that the banks were
better able to help their customers through difficult times. Nowhere was
this more evident than in the crisis of 1825-6 when sixty country banks
in England failed with considerable loss to the public who held notes or
deposits with the failed banks. In Scotland only two of the smaller
provincial banks failed but their difficulties were of long standing.
Despite this there was no loss to the public and all debts were paid in
full. This experience reinforced the writings of Thomas Joplin, a
Newcastle merchant, who had published a pamphlet in 1822 decrying the
English banking system and extolling the virtues of the Scottish banks.
Joplin's arguments were highly polemical and therefore sometimes not
terribly accurate but there was sufficient truth and perceptive comment
in his writings for them to carry a certain amount of political weight.
A Parliamentary enquiry was set up specifically to enquire into the
issue of bank notes in Scotland and Ireland but, more generally, to
enquire into the whole system of banking. The Government planned to
abolish the right of Scottish banks to issue notes under £5—a right
which they had always enjoyed. Such was the clamour from Scotland that
Parliament appointed the committee of enquiry which found that Scottish
banking was—
"a system admirably calculated to economise the
use of Capital to excite and cherish a spirit of useful Enterprise,
and even to promote the moral habits of the people, by the direct
inducements which it holds out to the maintenance of a character for
industry, integrity and prudence."
The result was that the Scottish banks were allowed
to keep their note issues. But this enquiry also lent considerable
weight to Joplin's argument and legislators in London became
increasingly aware of the Scottish system of banking and its successes
compared with the English system and its weaknesses.
In Ireland too, where the system had emerged like
that of England, with a monopolistic Bank of Ireland in Dublin and a
series of small country banks, there had developed pressure for change.
Several pieces of legislation between 1824 and 1833 gradually removed
the restrictive legislation in Ireland and England and enabled these
countries to develop banking systems on the Scottish model. In this way
began a general exodus of Scottish bankers into other parts of the
British Isles and eventually to other parts of the world.
Pressure for change had built up in England and
Ireland as a result of developments in the economy and this pressure was
also manifest in Scotland. It was a period of considerable growth and
large scale developments in building, iron steamships and railways
placed increasing demands upon the banking system. The result of this
pressure was that the provincial banking companies were replaced by a
series of joint-stock banks. These new arrivals were very similar to the
provincial banking companies but differed from them in the important
respect that they were very much bigger. They had a larger capital base
and whereas the provincial banks usually had only local branch networks
many of the new joint-stock banks developed banking systems which were
national in scope and which soon came to rival the Edinburgh banks.
Several of these new joint-stock banks like the Commercial Bank of
Scotland and National Bank of Scotland were Edinburgh-based while others
were based in the other major cities, e.g., the Glasgow Union
Bank (later Union Bank of Scotland) and Clydesdale Bank in Glasgow, and
the North of Scotland Bank in Aberdeen. These joint-stock banks and the
Edinburgh banks gradually took over the provincial banks until by 1864
when the Royal Bank took over the Dundee Banking Company only the
joint-stock banks and the three Edinburgh public banks remained. By this
time both the Commercial Bank and the National Bank had obtained Royal
Charters but neither had managed to obtain the privilege of limited
liability which remained the prerogative of the three oldest Scottish
banks.
Such had been the success of the Scottish banking
system that many writers attributed to the banks a large portion of the
credit for the rapid development of the Scottish economy. From being a
poor neighbour of England in 1750, Scotland had, a century later, a
national income per capita which was probably at least the equal
of England's. Numerous factors were of course responsible for this and
the extent to which the Scots had evolved a banking system which
pioneered in so many ways is a sure indicator of the importance of
banking to the development of the economy.
One other aspect of this development was the Savings
Bank movement which began in a very small way at Ruthwell in
Dumfriesshire in 1810 when the Rev. Henry Duncan founded a parish
savings bank. The idea was basically to gather the savings of the poorer
classes of society and to deposit them en bloc in one or other of
the commercial banks who, being keen to encourage the savings movement,
offered a slightly higher rate of interest than was normal on deposits.
The movement spread rapidly throughout the British Isles. Under Acts of
1817 and 1828 English Savings Banks were enabled to invest their funds
in Government Securities. By an Act of 1835 this facility was extended
to Scotland. Banks which registered under this Act (e.g., the
Savings Bank of Glasgow) became Trustee Savings Banks, i.e.,
their management was vested in a board of trustees. Savings banks placed
their funds between the commercial banks and the Government.
There was from then on a complementarity between the
savings banks on the one hand and the commercial banks on the other. One
result of this was that the latter seldom attracted deposits direct from
those parts of society below the middle class income range. This
situation prevailed for over 100 years.
All of these new developments in banking, however,
were not achieved without some difficulty. In the 1830s and early 1840s
there were a number of failures of joint-stock banks in England and, in
addition to this, it was a period which experienced several commercial
crises and some inflation. The Government blamed the banks for
destabilising the economy by creating too much credit and for a number
of years a great debate ran its course between the Government and its
supporters (Currency school) on the one hand and the bankers (Banking
school) on the other. The bankers believed that so long as each credit
they extended was to meet the legitimate needs of trade then there could
be no inflation. The debate itself was rather inconclusive but in 1844
the Government acted on its beliefs and passed the Bank Charter Act
which was intended to limit the growth—particularly the note issues—of
the banks. The Act separated the banking and note issuing functions of
the Bank of England and tied the note issue to the supply of gold in the
country; in effect to the balance of payments. As far as joint-stock
banks (in England and Wales) were concerned no new bank could have a
note issue and existing issues were to be limited to the average of
their issues over a three-month period in 1844. If any banks merged or
opened an office in London they were to lose their note issue. These
last provisions were critical for eventually all banks came into one or
other of these categories and so lost their note issues. In this way the
Bank of England eventually gained a monopoly of all note issues in
England and Wales.
Similar legislation was proposed for Scotland and
Ireland but such was the outcry from these countries that they were
treated differently. The note issues were limited to the average of the
year preceding the passing of the Act in 1845 and any excess issue
beyond these authorised limits had to be backed by gold. The Scottish
and Irish banks were not however forced to lose their issue if they
merged with another bank or opened a London office. The result of this
has been that both Scottish and Irish banks have retained their rights
to issue notes to the present day. (Irish banks, of course, now only
issue in Northern Ireland.)
The legislation had the desired effect of limiting
the ability of all banks in the British Isles to issue notes but it did
not cure the problem of instability and inflation. Indeed the Act of
1844 had to be relaxed in the crises of 1847, 1857 and 1866. The
difficulty was that the banks had begun to develop payments by cheque
thus obviating the need for bank-notes, i.e., deposits and
deposit creation were becoming more important as bank liabilities than
notes. The legislation had not taken account of this development.
In the second half of the 19th century the banks
concentrated increasingly on attracting deposits and it was generally a
period of substantial growth in the economy and in banking. In the
period between 1850 and 1873 Britain can be said to have been the
"Workshop of the World" and although there were difficulties after 1873,
as other countries began to industrialise behind substantial tariff
barriers, it was nevertheless an era of development especially in
Scotland which experienced the growth of much of the heavy industry,
including shipbuilding, for which the country became so famous.
This growth in the scale of industry and trade posed
challenges to the banking system. The major challenge was that
individual customers now required more substantial advances from their
bankers than had been normal in the past. Most banks appear to have met
this challenge in a highly effective way although this is an area in
which much research requires to be done so that we may learn more about
the techniques of lending.
There was, however, one notable failure to meet this
challenge and this was the City of Glasgow Bank. This concern had become
too heavily committed to a few firms most of which were owned by the
Directors of the Bank. In a desperate effort to extricate themselves
from their difficulties the Directors had begun to falsify the accounts
but this was all to no avail and the Bank failed in 1878.
The liability of the shareholders was unlimited and
several calls were made upon them to pay the debts of the Bank. Only 254
of the 1,819 shareholders remained solvent when the affairs of the Bank
were finally wound up. All the creditors were paid in full.
The failure of the City of Glasgow Bank was a severe
jolt to the confidence and self esteem of the rest of the Scottish
banking system but the bankers were quick to learn the lessons and took
steps to prevent the possibility of such a disaster ever happening
again. Within a very short space of time after the closure the other
banks had moved to have their shareholders appoint auditors who would
report annually on the state of the accounts. This was the origin of
independent auditing and acted as a control by the shareholders on the
intromissions of the Directors.
A more vexed question was that concerning the
liability of the shareholders for the debts of their bank. Many believed
that unlimited liability was a good thing and that to limit liability
would be damaging to a bank's image. This view ignored the fact that the
three oldest banks had always had limited liability. Such was the fear
engendered by the failure of 1878, however, that most banks favoured the
view that limitation of liability was in the best interests of their
shareholders. All seven unlimited banks registered with limited
liability and added "limited" to their names from 1882. The principle of
limited liability had been available to bankers generally since 1862.
In England and Wales banks met the challenge of
increased demands from customers with a merger movement. There were
numerous amalgamations amongst banks in the late 19th century and one
result of a merger of several banks was the emergence of Barclays Bank
in the 1890s.
There was limited scope for further mergers in
Scotland where the average bank was still larger than its English
counterpart. At the dawn of the 20th century there were ten note-issuing
banks north of the border and an as yet unquantified number of savings
banks. The note issuers were:
This was not, however, a stable situation for in
1907-8 the Caledonian Bank was taken over by the Bank of Scotland. Also
in 1907 the two Aberdeen banks amalgamated. Meanwhile in England the
merger movement continued apace and some of the, by now very large,
banks began to look outside England for acquisitions.
The first success in this sphere was the purchase in
1918 of the shares of the National Bank of Scotland by Lloyds Bank
although the arrangement that the two banks were to maintain separate
identities was to characterise this type of activity. By this time of
course the average Scottish bank was much smaller than any of the
English "Big Five". The Scots were therefore vulnerable to takeover bids
and some actively encouraged them seeing advantages in economies of
scale from an affiliation with an English clearing bank. In 1919
Barclays Bank acquired the share capital of the British Linen Bank and
the Clydesdale was acquired by the Midland Bank which also purchased the
North of Scotland Bank in 1923.
The Scots were not without their responses to this
movement and in 1924 the Royal Bank acquired the small but prestigious
Drummond's Bank which retains its very singular identity. This was
followed in 1930 by the acquisition of Williams Deacons Bank, based in
the north-west of England, and in 1939 by Glyn, Mills Bank which was
based in London and the south-east of England. Drummond's was
assimilated into the Royal Bank but the other two retained their
identities forming, with the Royal, the "Three Banks Group". The Royal
also took over the London West End branch of the Bank of England in
1930.
By 1939 there were eight Scottish banks—four
independent and four "affiliated" with English banks. In the post-war
years the pressure for rationalisation and economies of scale dictated
the need of further mergers, as it had in other sectors of the economy.
In 1950 the Midland Bank merged its two Scottish banks to form the
Clydesdale and North of Scotland Bank (later abbreviated to Clydesdale
Bank). Agreement on a merger was reached between the Bank of Scotland
and Union Bank in 1952. In 1958 the Commercial Bank and National Banks
merged, with Lloyds Bank (owners of the National) getting a 37 per cent
stake in the new National Commercial Bank of Scotland which immediately
became the largest Scottish bank.
In the late 1960s mergers again became fashionable.
The National Commercial Bank absorbed the thirty-six English branches of
the Irish-based National Bank in 1966. In 1969 it was announced that the
Royal and the National Commercial were to merge. The English
subsidiaries Williams, Deacons and Glyn, Mills were then merged to form
Williams and Glyns Bank.
Also in 1969 the union was announced between the Bank
of Scotland and the British Linen, with Barclays Bank (owners of the
British Linen) taking a 35 per cent stake in the new Bank of Scotland.
By then the Scottish banking system was reduced to three banks—Bank of
Scotland, Royal Bank of Scotland and Clydesdale Bank.
The last twenty years have also been a period of
rapid change in other areas of banking. In the mid-1960s the Trustee
Savings Banks decided that they would expand their business beyond the
traditional savings and investment accounts by offering current accounts
with chequeing facilities and encouraging people to have salaries paid
into these accounts as was already the practice in the commercial banks.
This development was obviously designed to make the Trustee Savings
Banks more competitive with the commercial banks for the business of
personal account customers. It was a move which foreshadowed the
developments of the 1970s.
The Committee to review National Savings reported in
1973. The recommendations of the Page Report expressed the view that the
Trustee Savings Banks should be permitted to develop as a "third force"
in British banking and since then the T.S.Bs have taken several steps to
expand their services. A Central Trustee Savings Bank was set up in 1973
to co-ordinate and control activities and in 1976 application was made
to join the London Bankers Clearing House. Most of the banks have merged
with some of their neighbours so that there are now eighteen regional
T.S.Bs in Britain. Since then the T.S.Bs have gradually shaken off their
close contacts with Government and have been integrated into the
commercial banking sector under the supervision of the Bank of England.
In 1982 the four Scottish T.S.Bs established a
Steering Committee to manage the arrangements for a merger of the four
banks with effect from May 1983—the new bank to be called T.S.B.
Scotland.
Just as competition for the commercial banks has
emerged from a source which was once complementary to their operation so
it has also emerged from organisations entirely new to Scotland.
Merchant banks specialising in portfolio management and corporate
financial services had long been a feature of the London financial
scene. Several London-based merchant banks opened Scottish offices in
the late 1960s and early 1970s and there was also some Scottish
initiative—notably Noble, Grossart in 1969. Some of these new arrivals
were shaken out in the banking crisis of 1973-4 and retired to their
London base but others remained to provide a range of services which
were both competitive with and complementary to those provided by the
commercial banks. Co-operation was particularly marked in the area of
North Sea Oil finance.
Competition also came from the finance companies—some
of whom had been in existence from the inter-war years but the network
of offices expanded greatly in the 1960s and 1970s. It came too,
although only in a limited way, from branches of overseas banks and the
English clearing banks establishing offices in Scotland.
Beyond the banking sector was the non-bank financial
sector including the building societies, insurance companies, investment
trusts and national savings. All of these had been around for a long
time but changes in policy dictated that all should be more competitive
in the search for deposit and investment money. This meant more
competition for the banks. The age of competition was fostered by the
Bank of England when in 1971 it published "Competition and Credit
Control".
The banks responded to this new surge of competition
by buying up controlling interests in finance houses and hire purchase
companies and by setting up their own merchant bank subsidiaries. It was
not of course possible to buy up building societies but banks met the
competition by themselves offering mortgages at increasingly competitive
rates.
In short the period from about 1955 to the present
was one which presented a whole new range of challenges to the banking
system. An editorial in the Bankers Magazine in 1976 concluded
that—
"this phase in our economic history offers a
challenge as great, and in its way as exhilarating as that provided
by the breakthrough in our industrial revolution."
The result was a series of changes of outlook,
structure and function in the banking system which was just as dramatic
as that which occurred during the industrial revolution. Yet the
consequences for the economy could be even greater, for the challenge
which faced the bankers 150 years ago was of how to finance a buoyant
and expanding economy whilst that which faces the banker today is the
much more difficult problem of how to prevent secular decline and put
the economy back on an even growth path.