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IT was in the month of
April, 1813, that I started for Saxony to take up the command of the
11th corps of the Grand Army. [Macdonald's nomination as
Commander-in-chief of the 11th corps was dated April 10, 1813.] The day
following my arrival at the Emperor's headquarters, I had orders to
attack Merseburg, which I carried, or rather stormed, after a stubborn
resistance; as I knew that the place was defended by Prussian troops who
had served under my orders during the preceding campaign, and that they
were commanded by the same General, my onslaught was the more vehement.
We marched upon Lutzen
and Leipsic. I was in position between these two points; the allies were
in front of us on the left bank of the Elster. The name of that river,
which a few months later was so nearly fatal to me, has remained
engraven on my memory. The Emperor, believing that all the enemy's
forces were collected at Leipsic, sent thither General Lauriston, who
commanded the left. He came up to me, and gave me orders to support him
if necessary; but at that moment he received intelligence that the
allies, who had debouched from Pegau, were advancing towards us. The
Emperor would not believe it, because he was firmly convinced that their
main force was at Leipsic. Marshal Ney, who was with him, confirmed him
in that idea, and declared he had noticed nothing unusual on the luster.
However, firing began,
and was directed against the very point occupied by the Marshal's corps;
it increased in violence, and approached rapidly then the Emperor
despatched the Marshal, and shortly afterwards followed him. Warnings
came in apace; but, notwithstanding them, the Emperor left Lauriston in
difficulties near Leipsic, and me in position to support or protect him;
but scarcely had he reached the central position, when he changed my
destination, and ordered me to march straight ahead towards the Elster.
I had not started, when a second order came, I telling me to go more to
the right; but, as the enemy continued to advance, a third order
directed me to march straight on to their guns.
We went at the double,
and it was full time, for the enemy's cavalry had already slipped in
between me and Marshal Ney, who had lost much ground. The enemy, having
realized my movement, turned to retreat; but I had had time to point
thirty pieces of cannon, and they galloped rapidly through my grapeshot.
We continued to advance
on their right flank, and forced them into a position covered by a
little artificial canal used for floating wood. After crossing—not
without loss—a little valley, we crowned the heights; the plain lay
outstretched before us, but without cavalry it would have been 'unsafe
to venture there.
Suddenly the fire ceased
all along the front of the army, and was directed at us; the enemy sent
forward their cavalry reserves, composed of the Guards of the sovereigns
of Russia and Prussia. Thrice they attempted to break our squares, but
in vain; each time they were driven back with loss, and the third time
in such confusion as must have given great advantage to our cavalry had
we possessed any. Only a few squadrons covered our left, commanded by
the Marquis de Latour Maubourg, [When this gallant officer lost a leg
during this campaign his soldier servant was greatly concerned. 'Why,
you stupid fellow,' said the General (who had only just undergone
amputation), to encourage him, you will have one boot the less to polish
every day.'] who wished nothing better than to charge. I sent to beg him
to do so; but the Viceroy, under whose orders he was acting, refused, in
spite of my entreaties, as he did not wish to risk the little body of
brave nien who were our only resource. The battle was gained by the
infantry and the artillery. It took a second time the name of Lutzen.
The battle-field, our
front especially, was strewn with dead and wounded, whom, for want of
means, we had been unable to move. Early next morning the Emperor paid
us a visit. He was very pleased. He praised us for our energy of the
previous day, and for the vigour of our attack, which had stopped the
victorious march of the enemy, and turned the scale in our favour.
During the day, after we
had crossed the Elster, which the enemy did not defend, the Emperor
generously distributed rewards, promotions, decorations, pensions,
titles, majorats, etc., to my army corps. My reward was the command of
the advance guard.
The enemy did not long
occupy Dresden; they blew up the bridge, and only defended the Elbe long
enough to protect their retreat by the right bank. While means for
rebuilding or mending the bridge were being sought, my infantry got
across the breaches by means of ladders; as soon as it was sufficiently
repaired, the artillery crossed. The Emperor, who, on this occasion, had
taken upon himself the functions of baggage-master, stopped all
vehicles; but I obtained an exemption for some of those belonging to my
corps, and that evening took up my position on the heights above
Dresden.
Next day I followed the
traces of the enemy, but we had no affair of importance till Bautzen. I
thought that I was being followed by the remainder of the army; but it
had been allowed to rest, and I found myself isolated in presence of
that of the enemy. In order to impose upon them, I spread out my troops
like a spider's web, and waited the arrival of the other corps.
Successive summons made them hasten their advance. A single step
backward on my part would have exposed us to certain destruction; I
therefore preferred to run the risk of staying where I was, pretending
to advance, and lighting at night fires scattered among the different
lines, so as to make believe that the whole army was present.
I thus passed several
days, until at length our supports came up. We attacked at Bautzen,
crossed the Spree, and I took a considerable share in the Battle of
Wurschen, which brought us into Silesia, after two sharp skirmishes, at
Bischofswerds, and before reaching Lowenberg. The former of these towns
caught fire during the engagement; I believe the fire was the act of
marauders after we had occupied it. An armistice was concluded during
the action at Jauer, and after the occupation of Breslau. We went into
cantonments; I took the district of Löwenberg for my army corps.
We had done enough to
retrieve the honour of our arms after the terrible misfortunes of the
preceding campaign. France and the army earnestly longed for peace.
A Congress met at Prague,
but it was obvious that none of the Powers were acting in good faith.
Austria was the soul of the Congress; she had in reality remained
neutral since the reopening of hostilities, hut, as afterwards
transpired, she had bound herself by treaty with Russia and Prussia as
early as the previous February. A significant proof of this was given by
the manner in which the enemy retired before the armistice; they grouped
themselves at the foot of the mountains of Bohemia, instead of
xecrossing the Oder. Driven into the position they had taken up, they
could have no choice but to lay down their arms, supposing always that
Austria meant to make her pretended neutrality respected; that was
apparent.
The negotiations fell
through, and hostilities recommenced, the allies being reinforced by the
Austrians, and soon afterwards by the defection of the Bavarians. Before
the truce was broken off, I had orders to reconnoitre all the outlets
from Bohemia, from the Saxon frontier as far as the Bober, which was the
line of demarcation on my front, while my right extended to the
mountains. At the same time the allies entered Bohemia. They moved
thither their principal forces, and attacked me two or three days before
the expiration of the armistice. They expected to take me unawares, but
I was ready for them, as, instead of cantoning my troops, I had formed
camps sufficiently near each other to be able to concentrate promptly on
any threatened point.
The day after my return
to Löwenberg I received news that the enemy were attacking. I went,
half-way to the point indicated, but could neither see nor hear
anything. The enemy's movements were concealed by hillocks and other
obstructions on the ground. As 1 received no further news, I concluded
that the post attacked had been forced, and that the detachment which
defended it had been unable to fall back upon Lowenberg according to
their instructions.
In order to clear up this
doubt, and while my breakfast was preparing, I took a picket of cavalry,
and rode out slowly and carefully to the point whence news had reached
me that the enemy were advancing. On reaching it I found all quiet, and
learned that the enemy had advanced, but had immediately retired again.
Information had been sent to me by an orderly; I never received it, as
the man must have lost his way or got drunk.
I had ridden three
leagues out to this point, and as many from Lowenberg, in my first
reconnaissance our horses needed rest as much as we did ourselves. I
accepted a meagre breakfast, heartily offered, with alacrity.
Just as I was remounting
my horse to return, an officer galloped up as fast as he could ride, to
tell me that the enemy had crossed the Bober at the very point I had
quitted, that the attack had been so sudden that there had not been time
to harness my carriages, which were probably taken; he was not certain
about this, because, as soon as the enemy appeared, he had hastened away
in search of me. I concluded that it could be only a brush at the
outposts, and decided to return but ere I had ridden half a league,
fresh information and fugitives confirmed what had first heard. I was
thus cut off from the principal point, and from almost all my forces.
I waited a few hours more
for the return of the scouts whom I had sent out; their reports all
tallied. At last I decided to make a great detour, and bring in my
outposts; we marched all the rest of the day and through the night, and
reached Lowenberg worn out with fatigue. There I learned what had
occurred. Lauriston's corps, which had joined me the previous day, had
attached itself, to my troops, and together they had driven the enemy
back across the Bober. They had had some losses, and my carriages were
gone.
In consequence of the
account of this event that I sent to the Emperor, he hastened up with
some reserves and the Guard. We had taken some prisoners, and learned
that the principal attack of the allies was to be made on the left bank
of the Elbe. The Emperor, nevertheless, thought that he would still have
time to force the passage of the Bober; we did achieve it, took Ban tzcn,
and pushed on as far as Goldberg.
The Emperor returned to
Dresden. On his way he heard that the Emperors of Austria and Russia had
debouched from Bohemia, and were marching upon that town. As he
descended the mountain overlooking it, he could see the position of the
allies. He was just in time to heat them and force them to retire, but
unfortunately they were not pursued with sufficient vigour. The Emperor
only sent Vandamrne with his corps against them, and he, believing
himself supported, pushed on boldly, and entered the defile of Töplitz.
As one of the enemy's
corps had become cut off, the allies returned and attacked Vandamme, who
was soon attacked also from behind by this same corps, which was only
seeking a way out. Thus taken between two fires, in this sort of funnel,
Vandamme surrendered, was made prisoner, and nearly all his troops with
him. [Battle of KuIm, August 30, 1813. The Battle of Dresden, won by the
Emperor, had been fought three days previously, on August 27. Vandainme,
surrounded by forces ten times his own, refused to surrender; and,
placing himself at the head of his only two available battalions,
charged into the midst of the enemy in the hope of finding his death
there. His horse was killed, a strong body of Russians flung themselves
upon him, and he was taken prisoner. On the enemy's side, generals,
officers, and privates admired Vandamme's courage, and felt the greatest
esteem for him ; but, incredible as it may seem, the kind treatment
ceased, and was replaced by insults when the prisoner was taken to
Prague. The Emperor of Russia and his brother, the Grand Duke
Constantine, addressed him in abusive language, and the Grand Duke
actually even snatched away his sword. Vandamme indignantly exclaimed,
"My sword is easy to take here: it would have been braver to have come
to fetch it on the battlefield ; but you seem to like your trophies
cheap." Thereupon the Emperor Alexander in a rage ordered the arrest of
Vandamme, calling him "plunderer" and "brigand." Vandamme retorted,
looking Alexander defiantly in the face, "I am no plunderer or brigand ;
and, any way, history will not reproach me with having murdered my own
father." Alexander turned pale at this allusion to the assassination of
Paul I., and the French general was taken to the frontiers of
Siberia.'—Baron de Marbot's "Memoirs," vol. ii., P. 375 (Eng. edit.).]
The Emperor, it was said, was unwell, and had returned to Dresden with
his reserves and his Guard while this disastrous event was in progress.
As usual, Vandamme got all the blame, but this time he had only been
guilty of an excess of zeal.
After the Emperor had
quitted me and returned to Dresden to fight the allies, as I have
related, he sent for me; and after telling me that he had need of
Marshal Ney, put under my orders Ney's own army corps, together with
that of Lauriston and General Sebastiani's cavalry. Ney and Sebastiani
were carrying on operations in the neighbourhood of Leignitz, and, I
know not through what misunderstanding, had retreated. The Emperor spoke
to me of the immediate necessity of a diversion, and told me that it was
with this object that he was uniting these four army corps, including my
own, under my orders. He instructed me to advance rapidly with them, and
threaten Breslau and the outlets of Bohemia into Silesia.
I immediately returned to
my corps, and we started without delay. We met some cavalry near
Goldberg, and a brush that ensued was disadvantageous to us;
notwithstanding the efforts of Generals Reiset and Audenarde, my horse
gave way. I hastened to rally them, and put myself at their head to lead
a charge. I started them, and believed myself followed, when the enemy's
cavalry came to meet me; as I knew that my men had retreated, I could do
nothing but retreat too.
My infantry debouched,
and passed through a deep ravine. General Meunier was beginning to form
a square, which at that moment bore a striking resemblance in shape to
an egg. Seeing me pursued and hard pressed, he proposed that I should
join him; I refused, and passed near him. The enemy did not expose
themselves to his fire; they were only anxious to mask their own
retreat. We followed them eagerly, but were obliged to draw rein to give
General Souham, who was commanding Ney's corps, and General Sebastiani
time to come up.
The former received
orders to leave the point where he was and make for Jauer, and to turn
the enemy's right, while I made a front attack upon them at the Katzbach;
General Lauriston commanded my right.* General Sebastiani arrived,
driving before him a strong detachment of cavalry, that had become
placed between two fires. it escaped us, however, by a rapid flank
movement.
It had been steadily
raining ever since the previous day.
From the heights whence
the enemy retired we thought we could make out the leading columns of
General Souham's army; I ordered some squadrons and light artillery to
make a reconnaissance, and meanwhile I went myself to the right of my
line at some distance away, and told Lauriston to send some light troops
across the Katzbach to feel the strength of the enemy upon his left.
These orders were all clearly given, and yet not one of them was
properly carried out. General Souham, for instance, who had received his
early in the day, failed to execute the movement intended to turn the
enemy's right. His corps marched behind Sebastiani's cavalry, which were
still advancing to the heights, although I had simply ordered a few
squadrons forward merely for reconnoitring purposes. It was on returning
from my right wing that I learnt these counter-movements. The enemy,
whose centre was rapidly retreating, but who were not uneasy for their
right, retired, and I saw their artillery coming into position.
Among other movements,
the great fault was committed on our side of taking a number of guns to
the heights. The ground was already soaked, and they could only he moved
with extreme difficulty. I ordered most of them to come down, but the
road was encumbered with other guns, and with the cavalry who were going
up. I instantly foresaw what would happen, and, as a precautionary
measure, sent forward a division of infantry to protect the two bodies
on the plateau. The rain still continued; the men could not use their
muskets. I went down in person and freed the base of the hill. The road
was not more than twelve or fifteen feet wide; it was impossible to
turn, the only thing to be done was to let all those who had started
gain the summit, turn there, and come down again; and that took time.
While we were in this
dilemma, the enemy deployed a large body of cavalry, protected by the
artillery, and the infantry followed in columns. I had no news of
General Souham, I did not even know if he had received my orders; the
movements of the enemy were proof positive that, if he had received
them, he had done nothing to put them into execution. Without his corps
I could do nothing, much less give battle, although the enemy were
already calling this affair by that name. Meanwhile, Lauriston, yielding
a little on his left, crossed the river with a portion of his trdops,
and made a charge with all his cavalry.
In the centre our guns,
sunk in the mire up to the axles, could not be moved ; the artillery
soldiers and gunners unharnessed them, and brought back the horses; the
enemy dared not descend. I have already said that the infantry could
make no use of their weapons; posted on the slope of the bill, they were
safe from the attacks of the cavalry. Then the front column of Souham's
corps came up to make bad worse, and to still further encumber General
Sehastiani's position. The latter was in despair at the loss of his
guns. Souhain stammered out some reasons why he had failed to operate
upon the points I had indicated.
It was getting late ; the
rain fell unceasingly, the ground was soaked, the ravines were filling,
the streams overflowing; in such a disheartening state of affairs I
ordered a retreat to Goldberg. A night march under such circumstances
occasioned great disorder; the rain never ceased. Lauriston was anxious
to take the road by which he had crossed the mountains. I remarked that
it would most likely be impracticable; he insisted and I yielded, the
more readily that the continuity of our retreat would thereby be
rendered easier. But what I had suspected proved to be the case; he
found the roads flooded, and was compelled to retreat. One of his
divisions flanked him, receiving orders to follow such a direction as
would eventually bring about its junction with him and us ; we had to
protect Lauriston's line of communications. At one very bad place
several carriages were driven off the road, and got into the fields,
where they remained, mine among others. I came up at this moment; the
ammunition waggons were unloaded so that they might be more easily
moved, but nevertheless we lost some. We gained a fairly sheltered
place, where we posted the cavalry.
Near there we expected to
meet General Lauriston's covering division that had flanked his corps;
it was not to be seen; inquiries and searches were instituted, but there
was still no news of it. All the troops were marching in disarray, wet
to the skin, and, as Lauriston's and my corps were retiring on Löwenberg,
we learn that the bridge over the Bober had been dismantled, as the
river had overflowed, and thus that our means of passage was cut off. In
con- sequence of the floods, which were out in all directions, I was
unable to communicate with Souham or Sehastiano, who were retiring upon
Bunzlau, where there was a wooden bridge already very rickety; the
engineers did their utmost to preserve it.
I waited four-and-twenty
hours for Lauriston's division the cavalry sent me word that they could
no longer hold the position where I had posted them, and their searches
for the division had been fruitless. Meanwhile, although water covered
the road leading to Bunzlau, along which Souham and Sebastiani were
marching, a rumour spread among the troops that the road was
practicable, as there was only water on it up to the knees; thereupon,
without orders, they started off in confusion, as it was impossible to
restrain them. I therefore let them go. I was compelled to recall the
cavalry, and to abandon the wandering division, convinced that it would
find its own way out of the difficulty somehow; but I afterwards had the
grief of learning that, owing to the slowness of the General* in
command, it had been obliged to surrender.
The rain had ceased, and
the sun reappeared; we made a forced march, and eventually reached
Bunzlau, where I found Generals Souham and Sebastiani. A large portion
of their corps had crossed the bridge, as the two others had done, and
continued a disorderly march to Bautzen; I sent orders to them to rally
there. I could not gauge our losses; with the exception of the artillery
on the heights of Jauer, and the little division, they were
inconsiderable. Having rallied all the troops, I took up my position. I
had sent a report of all these circumstances to Dresden. The Emperor, to
whom the loss naturally appeared great, imagined that it was greater
even than it was; he expected to find the troops demoralized and in
disorder, and was agreeably surprised at finding them reunited and in
good spirits.
The enemy had followed
us, but on seeing our position appeared unwilling to risk an attack. The
Emperor gave them no alternative. Having arrived with his reserves and
his Guard, and saying nothing to me except that my news to him had been
bad, he ordered me to advance and attack. We were soon ready, and
marched forward eagerly; the enemy were driven back by our cavalry,
which had been placed for the time under the command of Murat; but they
made a good stand on the mountain of Hochchellenberg.
While we were attacking
them there, the Emperor, seeing General Sebastiani near me, came towards
us, and addressed him in the most violent language. I was indignant, and
showed it. His complaint against the General was not the loss of his
artillery on the plateau at jauer, but that of his last cannon.
Sebastiani, as I then learned from the Emperor, had sent him, without
informing me, a private report; he interrogated the aide-de-camp who
brought this report, pressed him with questions, and was told by him
that his General, who had only one gun left, which he feared to lose,
had sent it on with the baggage waggons, which, by another misfortune,
had fallen into the enemy's hands. The Emperor added that the loss of
artillery was the fortune of war; but that what irritated him was the
seizure of that particular piece, seeing that artillery was provided for
the protection of the troops, and not to be defended by baggage waggons.
I warmly and heartily stood up for Sebastiani, The Emperor departed,
leaving the command to me, with orders to follow the enemy.
Sebastiani was furious,
and with reason, for he had not been spared even in presence of his own
men. He wished to blow his brains out, cause himself to be killed, or
send in his resignation. With great trouble I succeeded in calming him.
The enemy rapidly
retreated, and our pursuit did not tarry. They crossed the river Queiss,
which I left between us; as fresh reinforcements reached them they tried
to turn us. My orders were not to expose myself to any serious action;
in my turn, therefore, I retired, but slowly; we thus continued
alternately advancing and retreating. They also did not seem very
anxious to attack, unless they could feel certain of getting the best of
it; but as they displayed numerous forces, I fell back to within a few
leagues of Dresden. We were very badly off for provisions and forage.
The detachments which I was compelled to send out to search the villages
were often obliged to come to blows, and soldiers who went out singly
generally fell I into the hands of the enemy. We were thus being slowly
under- mined, but the moment was not far off at which decisive
operations would put a limit to this state of things; the allies were
preparing for it. |
