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No news arrived of Moreau,
nor of the Army of Italy, nor of the detachment from Bobbio, which ought
to have come up behind the enemy's right. It was clear from the position
of the Austro-Russians in front of us that they felt no uneasiness as to
their rear. We had been very much weakened; we had scarcely any general
or commissioned officers left, hardly any ammunition, 'a formidable army
before us, the batteries of Piacenza, as well as another considerable
one on the other side of the Po, barring our road (the survivors of the
battle at Modena, reinforced by some troops from the blockade of Mantua,
who had come up on our rear near Piacenza)—such was our situation. We
must infallibly be attacked next morning, and if we were beaten, all
would be lost. I had done my utmost to effect a junction; my efforts
were fruitless. We had to preserve the remaining two-thirds of the army
in order to get out of this very awkward position, and try our fortune
elsewhere. It was, of course, painful to leave a battlefield where the
Army of Naples had so much distinguished itself, and acquired so much
glory; but its safety was the first consideration. The Generals having
explained to me their fears, the superiority of the forces opposed to
them, the want of ammunition and provisions, I reluctantly decided upon
retiring from this bloody field, and orders were given for the movement
to be made at midnight precisely, on the 2 Messidor (June 20).
Our army was to march in three columns,
leaving behind the main-guard and outposts to form a curtain to cover
their movement, until the enemy attempted to advance, when they were to
fall hack upon their respective corps. Montrichard's division was sent
forward to open up the road that we were to follow towards Parma and
Modena. It was necessary to avoid the battery on the Po and to get round
Piacenza; a road was made during the night. After I had assured myself
that all my orders had reached their destination and would be fully
carried out, the army moved noiselessly at midnight precisely to recross
the Nura the point at which the three columns were to join was Cadeo.
Scarcely had Montrichard's division gone a few miles ahead of us,
scarcely had the right and centre columns passed the Nura and formed up
beyond it, when the main-guard appeared, as well as the small body that
was observing the castle of Piacenza, followed by the leading troops of
the enemy. It would have been very fortunate for us if we could have
passed this defile without being harassed; but unhappily Victor's
division, which, with the flank company of General Calvin, made up the
third column, only started at six in the morning, instead of at
midnight. Thus they lost a start which would have been as valuable to
them as it was to the others, and also the precious advantage of putting
the defile of the Nura between them and the enemy; the bridges could
easily have been defended by a few troops. The enemy, as yet unprepared
to attack, noticed this retrograde movement, pursued the column, and
discovered that there were only a few scouts left along the whole line.
General Victor was pursued and hard pressed,
as I could hear plainly, being only a short distance off; but I imagined
that the battle was taking place on both banks of the Nura An
aide-dc-camp from the General came to beg me for help. In order to
rescue him, I caused the whole centre column to recross the river, half
to drive back the enemy in front, and the other half to execute a flank
attack on their left. We succeeded. Being thus freed, both crossed the
Nura once more, and continued, Without being much harassed, their
movement upon Cadeo, where the threecolumns were to join. Those of the
right and centre arrived there, but the left tarried; however, hearing
no firing, I concluded that the movement was being quietly carried out.
Our troops were resting, when some horsemen appeared at full gallop from
the direction of the left column, followed by a crowd of fugitives in
such terror that I preferred allowing them to go by to attempting to
stop them. A staff-officer of General Victor at length rode up to ask
for help. I immediately sent my reserve, but on reaching the point
mentioned, it found neither friends nor enemies, only all the artillery
abandoned by the column. The troops had been scattered and fled, some
into the mountains, carrying alarm to Genoa, others, as I afterwards
heard, to Castel Arquato.
One of the regiments lost its flags ; I have
forgotten how. On hearing of this incident, I sent out a number of
artillery horses, and rescued all the guns belonging to the column,
which were brought back to me by the reserve sent to the assistance of
General Victor, who was nowhere to he found. Then we continued our march
without further annoyance till the morning.
General Montrichard, who led the march,
informed me that the enemy were in front of him, but not stationary. It
was important to secure the passage of the Taro, and I sent him word to
hasten his advance. At length I had intelligence from General Victor,
who stated briefly that his troops, sorely pressed by the enemy, had
dispersed, that the rout had begun, and that, to his great regret, he
had lost his artillery; that, unless he received contrary instructions,
he should make for Borgo San l)onino. That was the very place for which
I was bound. 'Set
your mind at rest,' I replied, 'as to your artillery. The detachment
that I sent to your help, when you begged for it at Cadeo, where I then
was, reached the spot where you ought to have been, and found neither
friends nor foes; but I caused your guns to he brought in without
opposition. I will restore them to you the first time we meet.'
This remark cut General Victor [Victor
Perrin, created Marshal of France in 1807, and Duke of Belluno in 1808,
after the Battle of Friedland.] to the quick, and I do not believe he
has yet forgiven it.
I have never received a satisfactory
explanation of this curious event. One grave fault was that of not
quitting the battlefield at midnight, which would have given him six
hours' start of the enemy. It seems that later on, while crossing the
Nura, some disorder had occurred which had not been repaired, and that
the appearance of a few Cossacks had sufficed to increase and turn it
into a rout; for, although we were but a short distance away, we heard
no sound of musketry. I have since heard that Moreau only came down from
Genoa by the Bocchetta on the 2 Messidor, the very day on which I was
leaving the Trebbia, that the AustroRussians retreated from the Nura,
only leaving General Ott with a division, and possibly another small
troop, to follow us. If the men of the third column were really as
fatigued as General Victor declared, there were certainly no symptoms of
it evident in their flight, and they would have been much safer had they
held their ground.
On reaching Borgo San Donino, whither Victor had preceded me, I drew UI)
fresh instructions for continuing our retrograde movement. The latter
General was to return to the Apennines by the pass through which he had
come, and troops were successively to hold all the outlets, menace the
flank of the enemy that was pursuing me, and thus cover the march of the
rest of the army, which was to make for Modena and Bologna with the
baggage, place the guns taken from the enemy in Fort Urbino, draw thence
fresh ammunition and provisions, take from the two principal towns
sufficient food to last them for the five or six days necessary to cross
the Apennines, and go to Pistoia and Lucca. It was the more important to
guard the mountain passes, as it was indispensable that our junction
should he effected near Genoa, and, if these passes were left
undefended, the enemy, by taking possession of them, might reach
Pontremoli and Sarzana before us, and again cut off our communications
by superior forces. True, they might have forced these outlets, and thus
isolated me from the Army of Italy I had foreseen this possibility, and
determined to defend myself inch by inch. By my marches and movements I
should have attrated a large body of troops to me in Tuscany, in the
Roman States, even as far as Naples, by relying upon the strongholds. It
was with this object that I had brought with me, and left in Rome, a
pontoon train to enable me to cross the Garigliano and Volturno.
This movement, however, of the enemy's
forces was not much to be feared, for the Army of Italy was certain to
be doing something somewhere, and it was not likely that Generals
Souvorof and Mélas, leaders of the Allied Armies, would risk themselves
between two French armies; prudence, nevertheless, necessitated these
dispositions; nothing should be left to chance, and, as time was
precious, I lost none in having them carried out.
I sent for General Victor
in order to have information from him first, as to why he had been so
late in starting from the field of the Trebbia; and secondly, upon all
that had taken place on each side of the Nura. He answered that he was
busy settling his men in camp, and that he would come later. I wished
also to communicate my new instructions to, and to come to a clear
understanding with, him, as we were about to part. An hour or two having
passed without his arrival, I sent again. He replied that he was tired,
and had gone to bed. It was very obvious, therefore, that he wished to
avoid a disagreeable explanation upon all that he had done. My
instructions were therefore conveyed to him, and we continued our march;
but scarcely had I left San Donino when an aide-dc-camp came up at full
gallop to tell me that the division was attacked. We were not far away,
and he begged me to suspend my movement, and even to come back to their
help. General Vatrin, who was beside me, said
''Nonsense! it is only a few Cossacks, like
the other day.'
This speech was repeated to General Victor as coming from me, and
contributed not a little to increase his ill- humour. A few minites
later I was told it was only a skirmish ; a piquet had kept a bad
look-out, and had been surprised by the enemy.
I therefore answered merely, 'General Victor
has his instructions; let him keep to them,' and continued my route.
I have, forgotten to say that we were
constantly followed by a large and ever-increasing number of waggons,
which added to our difficulties, notwithstanding my repeated orders to
do away with them. Those who drove them, guessing that prompt measures
would probably he taken, hastened to unharness and unload, and even to
burn them.. Nearly all our wounded had becn deposited at Piacenza, and,
as usual, recommended to the enemy's kindness; some few had, however,
followed us. I had ordered that each baggage- waggon and cart should
take one or two, and this had at first been done, but the proprietors of
these vehicles had left the poor fellows in the places where we stopped
for the night. I was indignant at this. Several of them were put under
arrest, but nothing could be proved against them at the inquiry. They
declared that the wounded could not bear the jolting of the waggons,
and, unluckily, now it was too late to verify this statement. The
burning of these carts freed us somewhat, and it was the real owners who
suffered but it was a necessary sacrifice, because of the trouble they
caused us. We kept, however, a few for the transportation of our wounded
as far as the nearest towns.
The army continued its movement, occupying
the Apennines, or marching with the baggage along the highroads. We had
to seize Reggio, and fight at Modena and Sassuolo. Had we not been
compelled to obtain provisions to take us over the Apennines, I should
have avoided every engagement at these last places; but as the Ajennines
offered no resources, I took up my position at Modena, after opening the
road to Reggio. The enemy, who had at first displayed but few troops,
attacked my entire line with a force superior to mine, and menaced the
road to Pistoia, where General Calvin was. However, they made no stand,
and retired into the mountains. My aide-de-camp, Lacroix, followed them,
and carried Sassuolo at the Point of the bayonet, an affair which gained
him much honour; he compelled 600 men to lay down their arms, took two
flags and two pieces of cannon, and thus opened the communication for us
who were engaged at Modena. We also gained a victory there, and
maintained our position. Meanwhile, we collected provisions, and levied
a contribution (which brought in very little) to punish the town for a
rising that had taken place, in which many soldiers had been
assassinated and pillaged; some of them could thus be indemnified. The
combat finished at nightfall. The enemy had passed the river Crossolo at
three or four points, but had always been repulsed. We also made a few
prisoners. Before
daybreak the aririy continued its march, leaving its positions to return
to the Apennines. Montrichard's division, passing by Bologna, was to
bring away the ammunition from Fort Urbino, and to leave there the
artillery and military chests taken from the enemy. I do not remember
what became of the prisoners; they were perhaps returned, to the number
of 500 men, for on such a march they were a serious inconvenience, as
they had to be watched and fed. (They were meant to have been exchanged
later on for a similar number of our men.) We thus regained our former
positions in the Apennines, without being molested, although we were
followed. My headquarters were established at Pistoia while waiting for
news of General Montrichard and the Army of Italy, whom I presumed to
have made a movement towards Tortona, as they had not debouched on the
side where I expected them.
We succeeded in reopening communications
with Moreau and the Army of Italy. The latter had descended the
Apennines by the Bocchetta, and had, at the foot of the mountains, a
battle with one of the divisions of the great Allied Army on the very
day upon which I retreated from the Trebbia. Had they come down sooner,
it is probable that all the forces of Generals Souvorof and Mélas would
not have attacked me, as they would have feared for their right flank,
placed between two fires, as it would have been had the corps under
General Bellegarde been forced.
General Moreau has never explained his
conduct, although I have often pressed him to do so by word of mouth, by
letter, officially, and by public summons. Why these delays? I am sure
there was no ill-will on his part, but merely hesitation, which was part
of his nature. I cannot say the same for his advisers. Among them was
one man in particular who had great influence, and was inspired by an
unjust animosity—it was more than unfriendliness— against me. It was
this man, I have since been told, who principally contributed to augment
this natural tendency to delay. What matters any detriment to the public
weal, so long as private spite can be gratified An explanation of this
will corrie in good time, and I will not anticipate it. Moreau returned
to the positions whence he had started, having been warned that Generals
Souvorof and Mélas were retracing their steps with a portion of their
forces in order to effect a junction with General Bellegarde.
While at Lucca I received a note from the
Commandant of the fortress of Mantua, informing me that he was
blockaded, but not attacked; that he had a strong and courageous
garrison, and that the place was sufficiently well provisioned to stand
a long siege. I hastened to communicate this reassuring report upon the
condition of a place so important to us. We continued our retreat in
order to concentrate ourselves with the Army of Italy within the
boundaries of Liguria. All our baggage was embarked at Lerici, on the
Gulf of Spezzia; the infantry and cavalry passed over the Cornice road,
and I vent to Genoa, whither I had been summoned by Moreau to consult as
to our future operations, although I was under his orders.
My health was at this time in a very bad
state; my wounds were not yet healed, I spat blood, I had violent pains
in my chest, and a sort of general inflammation, caused by the vexations
and annoyances to which I had been abandoned, by long nights and
excessive work, under most difficult circumstances; and I was worried by
many different events which, with a little goodwill, loyalty, and
honesty, could not have failed to be productive of the best results.
The concentration of the two armies in the
neighbourhood of Genoa was decided upon. It was not without keen sorrow
that we found it necessary to abandon to themselves the garrisons of the
territories of Naples and Rome, to evacuate Elba, Tuscany and Lucca.
Instead of sending us the reinforcements of which we stood so sadly in
need, a fresh army was formed on the Var or at Chambry, under the
command of General Championnet. It was called, I believe, the Army of
the Alps. I insisted more strongly than before upon the fusion of the
two armies, and upon the necessity of leave of absence to recruit my
health. |
