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An Unofficial Alliance

Scotland and Sweden 1569-1654



Alexia Grosjean



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AN UNOFFICIAL ALLIANCE

THE NORTHERN WORLD

North Europe and the Baltic c. 400-1700 AD
Peoples, Economies and Cultures

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AN UNOFFICIAL ALLIANCE

Scotland and Sweden 1569-1654

BY

ALEXIA GROSJEAN



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ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations used frequently (full source references in the bibliography):

<i>AOSB</i>	Axel Oxenstiernas Skrifter och Brevvexling
<i>APC</i>	Acts of the Privy Council of England
<i>APS</i>	Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland
<i>BHG</i>	Briefwisseling van Hugo Grotius
<i>BM</i>	British Museum
<i>CSPD</i>	Calendar of State Papers, Domestic
<i>CSPS</i>	Calendar of State Papers, Scotland
<i>CSPV</i>	Calendar of State Papers, Venetian
<i>DBBTI</i>	Documenta Bellum Bohemica Tricennale Illustrantia
<i>DCJS</i>	Diplomatic Correspondence of James Spence
<i>DDA</i>	Danish Data Archive no 1573
<i>DNB</i>	Dictionary of National Biography
<i>DRA</i>	Rigsarkivet Denmark, Danish National Archives
<i>EHR</i>	English Historical Review
<i>KCFB</i>	Kong Christian den Fjerdes Egenhaendige Breve
<i>KGAS</i>	Konung Gustav II Adolfs Skrifter
<i>KGR</i>	Konung Gustav I's Registratur
<i>KRA</i>	Krigsarkivet, Swedish Military Archives
<i>NRA</i>	Riksarkivet Norway, Norwegian National Archives
<i>RAOSB</i>	Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas Skrifter och Brevvexling
<i>RPCS</i>	Register of the Privy Council of Scotland
<i>PRO, SP</i>	Public Record Office (London), State Papers
<i>SAÄ</i>	Svenska Adelns Ättartavlor
<i>SBH</i>	Svenskt Biografiskt Handlexicon
<i>SBL</i>	Svenskt Biografiskt Lexikon
<i>SGS</i>	Scottish Gaelic Studies
<i>SHR</i>	Scottish Historical Review
<i>SJH</i>	Scandinavian Journal of History
<i>SRA</i>	Riksarkivet Sweden, Swedish National Archives
<i>SRL</i>	Earl of Stirling's Register of Letters
<i>SRO, GD</i>	Scottish Record Office (Edinburgh), Gifts and Deposits
<i>SRP</i>	Svenska Riksrådets Protokoll
<i>SSNE</i>	Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern Europe 1580–1707 database
<i>TKUA</i>	Tyske Kancellis Udenrigske Afdeling

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CONVENTIONS

The Swedish spelling for the Vasa monarchs and many place names is used here, with the exception of Gothenburg for Göteborg. In terms of these Scots' personal names, it was decided to standardise their names to the Scottish original, except where they only appear once in source material. For example John Maclean was variously known as Hans Maculeer, Macklier, Mackler, etc in Sweden. However, he had been known as John, or Iain in the Gaidhealtachd, for many years before arriving in Sweden, and would have continued to be known as such amongst Scots. Official Swedish records contain Swedish or Germanic forms of Scottish names such as Hans, Johan and Jakob, but this is no reason to assume that the Scots suddenly "lost" their given names and assumed a new identity when they settled into one of the established Scottish communities abroad, particularly as so many of them were called over by family and/or friends.¹ A confirmation of this lies in their signatures on their letters — the name signed would depend who they were written for. Obviously, when communicating with fellow Swedish or other foreign nationals in their trade, the Swedish form of the name would usually appear, but when contacting Scotland they would revert to their given names.

The issue of value of seventeenth century currencies is not straightforward. Given the constant warfare, currencies were not stable, and least of all Sweden's, whose persistent drain on her economy was reflected in the frequent revaluations of her currency. This was also tied into the copper industry. It is therefore impossible to give a concrete exchange rate for either Scottish or English pounds to Swedish daler, or to their value as regards the riksdaler. In Sweden there were three types of money: the Swedish daler, kopparmynt and silvermynt. From 1628 to 1630 the value of the riksdaler fluctuated in terms of its Swedish equivalent. On 20 May 1628 it was noted

¹ For example, even the Stuart ambassador, Henry Vane, is referred to by the Swedes as "Hindrick Wain", certainly not a variant that Vane himself would have used, 4 August 1635, Axel Oxenstierna to Queen Kristina, *RAOSB*, first series, XIII, 445.

that 1 riksdaler was worth $6\frac{1}{2}$ kopparmynt, which by July 1629 had risen to 15 kopparmynt.² By August 1630, however, it was feared that 1 riksdaler would equal 3 daler in kopparmynt.³ This was soon settled into an exchange rate of 1 riksdaler to 14 kopparmynt by 1632, thereby returning to the 1629 value.⁴ In terms of equivalent British value, it is known that in October 1627 1 daler was equal to 3 English shillings.⁵ By 1630, when discussions were ongoing for a Swedish-British alliance, the sum of 120,000 pounds sterling was noted as equal to over 480,000 riksdaler, which would imply a ratio of 1 pound to 4 daler.⁶

With regard to the dating of documents, these have been left as they were found in the original, normally only containing the one date, but sometimes (particularly those written in England) containing two. Sweden, like Scotland and England, used the Julian calendar.

² 20 May 1628, *SRP*, I, 74, and 8 July 1629, *ibid.*, 174.

³ 12 August 1630, *SRP*, II, 30.

⁴ 14 February 1632, *SRP*, II, 140. For a full discussion of Swedish monetary types and values see E. Brännman, *Frälseköpen under Gustav II Adolfs regering* (Lund: 1950), 311–354.

⁵ Spens letters 415.

⁶ 28 February 1630, *RAOSB*, first series, IV, 135.

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INTRODUCTION

From marauding mercenaries to wealthy merchants and distinguished noblemen, the Scots who lived in seventeenth century Sweden have had a varied press.¹ In order to obtain a fresh perspective on this particular group of emigrants extensive research was required into the migration of that period from the British Isles and Ireland to Sweden. This investigation was initially expected to confirm the view that only a few high-profile Scots made the journey and integrated successfully. Indeed, even a pro-English weighting, in terms of numbers of migrants and particularly the role of diplomats and other influential individuals, was thought likely to emerge. The results found hitherto, however, reveal a very different history.

Undertaking this study proved an interesting, and sometimes frustrating, exercise in discovering the impact of the use of labels, or more often their mis-use. Over the last two centuries completely disparate interpretations of the word 'Britain', and 'Britishness' in particular, have been propagated by elements of both the Scottish and English establishments. The result is that the general confusion regarding those terms already apparent in the seventeenth century has largely been maintained. This is not a problem isolated to English-language scholarship as many European academics equally have major difficulties in appreciating the difference between Scottish and English, not to mention British, at any time period, let alone in the seventeenth century. King Gustav II Adolf's sometimes haphazard use of nomenclature for particular ranks of authority and specific units in his army is a typical example of this (see chapter Three). There is a wealth of accessible material available highlighting the almost decade-long debate in the Swedish government regarding the state of the British kingdoms and their respective positions of importance. It is perhaps an interesting comment on academic prejudices and stereotyping on historical, linguistic, and cultural bases that this information had remained hidden and forgotten. In our era of supposed European

¹ For example, depictions of Scottish soldiers in S. Lagerlöf, *Her Arnes Penningar* (Stockholm: 1904) as violent and thieving rogues or Walter Scott's Dugald Dalgetty in *A Legend of the Wars of Montrose* (Edinburgh: 1995) have had a persistent impact.

bonhomie and moves toward economic and political union it is refreshing to highlight an example of actual and successful integration on both a political and cultural level.

Of course migration is neither an exclusively Scottish nor a particularly modern activity: the search for better opportunities is simply a human characteristic. Scholars often seek definitive answers to the “why?” and “how many?” questions, in an attempt to develop exact models of history based on specific patterns of behaviour. Research into this present example of exodus from a relatively small population base has a lengthy pedigree. Several works on the activities of seventeenth century Scots in Scandinavia were published between the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. The most comprehensive survey of the Scots in Sweden was compiled by Thomas Fischer, who had already investigated the flow of Scots to Germany and Prussia.² The interest in the field has produced a gentle but steady output of books dealing with the Scots, or sometimes more generally ‘the British’, and their removal to or links with Sweden (which included Finland) in the early modern period.³ The fact that most of the earlier publications were concerned almost solely with

² T. Fischer, *The Scots in Sweden* (Edinburgh: 1907). See also by him *The Scots in Germany being a contribution towards the history of the Scot abroad* (Edinburgh: 1902) and *The Scots in Eastern and Western Prussia* (Edinburgh: 1903).

³ For example O. Donner, *A Brief Sketch of the Scottish families in Finland and Sweden* (Helsingfors: 1884); J. Grant, *The Scottish Soldiers of Fortune* (Edinburgh and London: 1890); A.F. Steuart, ‘Scottish officers in Sweden’, *SHR*, I, (1904); G.A. Sinclair, ‘Scotsmen serving the Swede’, *SHR*, IX, (1912); B. Steckzén, *Svenskt och Brittiskt* (Stockholm: 1959); J. Dow, ‘Ruthven’s army in Sweden and Esthonia’, *Kungliga Vitterhets historia och antikvitets akademien historisk arkiv* (Stockholm: 1965); W. Brockington Jr., ‘The Usage of Scottish mercenaries by the anti-imperial forces in the Thirty Years’ War’, unpublished Master’s thesis, University of South Carolina, 1968; J. Fallon, ‘Scottish Mercenaries in the Service of Denmark and Sweden 1626–1632’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Glasgow, 1972; A.M. Stewart, ed., *Scots in the Baltic, report on a conference* (Aberdeen: 1977); W.S. Brockington Jr., ‘Scottish Mercenaries in the Thirty Years’ War’, *Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association* (1986); A. Åberg, ‘Scottish soldiers in the Swedish armies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries’, in G.G. Simpson, ed., *Scotland and Scandinavia 800–1800* (Edinburgh: 1990); N. Andrén et al., *Sweden and Britain: A Thousand Years of Friendship/Sverige och Storbritannien: Tusen år av vänskap* (Stockholm: 1997); M.E. Ailes, *Military Migration and State Formation* (Nebraska: 2002); A. Grosjean, ‘Scotland: Sweden’s closest ally?’ in S. Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years’ War 1618–1648* (Leiden: 2001); A. Grosjean, ‘Royalist soldiers and Cromwellian allies? The Cranstoun regiment in Sweden 1655–1658’, in S. Murdoch and A. Mackillop, eds., *Fighting for Identity, Scottish Military Experience c. 1550–1900* (Leiden: 2002); and A. Grosjean, ‘A century of Scottish governorship in the Swedish empire 1574–1700’, in S. Murdoch and A. Mackillop, eds., *Military Governors and Imperial Frontiers c. 1600–1800, a study of Scotland and empires* (Leiden: 2003).

Scottish individuals was indicative of the numerical prevalence of Scots in comparison to other British Isles nationals in Scandinavia. Often the focus of such works has been on the career of a specific individual such as Robert Douglas, John Hepburn or Donald Mackay.⁴ When not discussing the individual's career as a form of iconography, the emphasis has tended to be on a particular family's involvement in an episode of Scottish-Swedish relations, such as that of John Maclean of Gothenburg.⁵ Additionally, in nearly all the assessments of Scottish migrants, the emphasis has been martial in nature and the people have often been portrayed as mercenary in character. These works make frequent mention of "the Scots" serving during the Thirty Years' War, but usually the central protagonist is presented as the only significant Scottish officer, despite the existence, as we now know, of a host of captains, colonels, lieutenant-generals and even field-marsals in the Swedish army, in addition to the common soldiers. The autobiographical memoirs of Sir James Turner and Robert Monro's chronicle of Mackay's regiment also present highly specific accounts of personal activity in the Swedish army and by their nature suffer from a biased perspective.⁶ Useful insights can be obtained from these sources but it must be remembered that they were generally written for a specific reason and aimed at a particular and contemporary audience. Although the works cited serve as important contributions toward revealing the extent of the Scottish military diaspora, they often lack a political context for this phenomenon. Rarely is any explanation offered for Scottish enlistment in service abroad other than mercenary, or the flight from poverty.⁷ Steve Murdoch has already questioned this

⁴ A. Douglas, *Robert Douglas en krigaregestalt från vår storhetstid* (Stockholm: 1957); J. Grant, *Memoirs and Adventures of Sir John Hepburn* (Edinburgh and London: 1851); J. MacKay, *An Old Scots Brigade, being the history of Mackay's Regiment now incorporated with the Royal Scots* (Edinburgh: 1885); I. Grimble, *Chief of Mackay* (London: 1965).

⁵ For such an article written around John Maclean see J.N.M. Maclean, 'Montrose's preparations for the invasion of Scotland, and Royalist missions to Sweden, 1649–1651', in R. Hatton and M. Anderson, eds., *Studies in Diplomatic History* (London: 1970).

⁶ See Sir James Turner, *Memoirs of his own life and times* (Edinburgh: 1829); Robert Monro, *His expedition with the worthy Scots regiment (called Mackay's regiment)* (London: 1637). See also another Scottish military memoir, T. Ameer-Ali, ed., *Memoirs of Sir Andrew Melvill (translated from the French), and the wars of the seventeenth century* (London: 1918).

⁷ An example is N.F. Holm, ed., *Det Svenska Svärdet* (Helsingfors: 1948). This general history of twelve decisive Swedish battles from 1471–1808, presents Scottish soldiers as an amorphous mass, mere cannon-fodder in the Swedish army. Intriguingly, at least the actual number of Scots serving is mentioned, as opposed to the German mercenaries who were simply noted as making up "the rest". See Holm, ed., *ibid.*, 66 and 119.

approach in reference to the Scots who served in a variety of armies during the Thirty Years' War period.⁸ This view is tested here with regard to the Scottish officer corps in Sweden in conjunction with the arrival of other Scots who integrated into the higher echelons of Swedish society.⁹

The quantity and quality of the publications covering the subject aside, to date there have been few attempts at studying the huge Scottish influx into Sweden through a political lens.¹⁰ An obvious reason for this is the lack of any formal document stating that a political relationship existed, although signed contracts are of course not *de rigueur* for these kinds of relationships. There are several ways in which such a connection can be maintained without certification, albeit this leaves the involved parties with an element of risk, as the alliance is dependent on trust. The difference becomes apparent in the contrast afforded by the ephemeral nature of the official Scottish-Scandinavian alliance, that is the ties between the House of Stuart and the Danish House of Oldenburg.¹¹ That bond, based on marriage and blood, was no guarantor for mutual political, diplomatic and military support between Scotland and Denmark-Norway. Scotland and Sweden, on the contrary, enjoyed the benefits of a positive informal confederation for almost a century — approximately 1569 to 1654, and hence the dates for this book — and ironically it was not until attempts to formalise it that the situation changed.

The well-worn concept that “the Scots had no permanent tradition of service with Sweden” can finally be discarded.¹² Even the few persistent claims that the first Scottish military involvement in Sweden occurred in 1563 needs to be re-evaluated, as investigation has revealed that there were significant martial enterprises before

⁸ S. Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart 1603–1660* (East Linton: 2000), 208 and 214; Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, intro, 15–16 and various contributors to the same volume, *passim*.

⁹ The *Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern Europe 1580–1707* database [hereafter *SSNE*], compiled by A. Grosjean and S. Murdoch, reveals the extent of Scotland's influence in Scandinavia at a level not previously appreciated and highlights the paucity of English and Irish engagement. See [www/abdn.ac.uk/ssne](http://abdn.ac.uk/ssne).

¹⁰ A hint at there being more than simply a martial relationship can be seen in E. Furgol 'Scotland turned Sweden: the Scottish Covenanters and the military revolution' in J. Morrill, ed., *The Scottish National Covenant in its British Context 1638–51* (Edinburgh: 1990).

¹¹ The benchmark book on this subject is the aforementioned Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*.

¹² Fallon, 'Scottish mercenaries', 6.

that date.¹³ What is often overlooked is the fact that Sweden, unlike many other European states, had regular armies in place before the seventeenth century. This was due to a combination of factors: a) that King Gustav I Vasa actually established the machination necessary to conscript soldiers, and b) that Sweden was largely at war from the time of Gustav I's reign onwards and thus had a constant requirement for armies. Another question which perturbs many scholars in the field concerns the actual process of recruitment. There appears to be a quest for a model of recruitment, in much the same manner as a model of migration is sought. However, it has already been highlighted by Fallon not only that "no definite order of procedure was formalised" regarding the actual levies, but also that "Scottish sources are surprisingly silent on many aspects of recruiting", and these findings have been substantiated by the present author.¹⁴ The slightly unsystematic, or at least informal, arrangements that characterised recruitment are probably to blame for the lack of definitive numbers of men who entered Swedish service. However, the absence of an exact method of recruitment does not detract from the impact that Scottish individuals made on Swedish society through their service for the Swedish crown.

Several problems arise in identifying foreigners in Scandinavia. Most obviously there were some Scottish names common to Scandinavia, such as Anderson, Peterson, Davidson (albeit spelled differently). Additionally, many of the names were often altered by local scribes or record-keepers (or perhaps the foreigners did this intentionally to better integrate), making it hard to distinguish a Scot from a German, Dutchman or local Scandinavian in contemporary records. These provisos aside, the military involvement of Scots in Sweden can be seen to gain momentum from the 1570s onward before reaching its peak during the Thirty Years' War.

The Scots in fact performed outstandingly on behalf of Sweden during this period. This, coupled with their integration into civic society and the nobility, placed them in a position where they could test exactly how their service was valued by their host (and in many cases adopted) nation. When Scotland and the neighbouring kingdoms plunged into a period of civil war between 1639–1651, Sweden actively supported various Scottish factions in their causes, including

¹³ Fischer, *Scots in Sweden*, 47; Ailes, *Military Migration*, 8.

¹⁴ Fallon, 'Scottish mercenaries', 42 and 115.

the Covenanters and the Montrosian Royalists. This was a remarkable development. When the Irish sought similar help in their own cause they found to their cost that the frequent provision of manpower to a foreign nation did not constitute an alliance in itself. Indeed the Irish were effectively abandoned by the nations they had militarily supported for so long.¹⁵ In contrast the Scots found that their consistent loyalty in Swedish military service was rewarded by the Swedes in spite of the political consequences that might result from their support for what could be deemed a rebel nation. The Scottish-Swedish alliance may have been unwritten, but unspoken it was not. The Swedish Regent and Chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna himself, acknowledged the existence of a 60 year old special relationship between the two countries in 1640 (see Chapter Six).¹⁶ Some might argue that a 'special relationship' does not an alliance make, but in actions as well as words, there was, in effect, an unofficial alliance between the political movers within the two countries.

The course of Scottish-Swedish political relations became complex after the Union of Crowns between Scotland and England in 1603. The school of research investigating the definition of 'Britain' and 'Britishness' in the seventeenth century is well developed, albeit not universally understood.¹⁷ In fact it appears that this approach to political interpretation — where modern concepts tend to be applied retrospectively — has clouded our view of the actual history of Scottish-Swedish relations. When King James VI and I formally declared the

¹⁵ See J. Ohlmeyer, 'Ireland Independent: confederate foreign policy and international relations during the mid-seventeenth century', in J. Ohlmeyer, ed., *Ireland from Independence to Occupation 1641–1660* (Cambridge: 1995), 108.

¹⁶ *SRP*, VIII, 98.

¹⁷ The existence of a uniformly recognised concept of a 'British' entity in the first half of the seventeenth century is a hotly debated issue. For origins of British identity formulating among a particular cadre of Scottish officers in Sweden see S. Murdoch, 'James VI and the Formation of a British Military Identity', in Murdoch and Mackillop, eds., *Fighting for Identity*, 3–31. For general discussion of 'Britishness' see J. Wormald, 'James VI, James I and the identity of Britain', in B. Bradshaw and J. Morrill, eds., *The British Problem, c. 1534–1707: State Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago* (London: 1996), 152 and 155. See S.J. Connolly, ed., *Kingdoms United?: Great Britain and Ireland since 1500: integration and diversity* (Dublin: 1999); R.G. Asch, ed., *Three nations a common history? England, Scotland, Ireland and British history circa 1600–1920* (Bochum: 1993); Morrill, ed., *The Scottish National Covenant in its British Context*; C. Russell, 'The British Problem and the English Civil War', in *History*, vol. 72, no. 236 (1987); A. Grant and K.J. Stringer, eds., *Uniting the Kingdom? The making of British history* (London: 1995).

existence of a British state (initially with neither Scottish nor English parliamentary backing) in 1604 it was largely to Scottish acclaim and significant English opposition. Although the effect of James' declaration on his diplomacy has been ignored until recently, the impact abroad was quite dramatic. All diplomatic agreements signed with the house of Stuart were made in the name of the king of Great Britain and Ireland and not with either Scotland or England.¹⁸ Despite this, Scotland and England each retained their own apparatus of government. This meant that the Scots in particular often acted in a way which seemed to run independent, even contrary to the will of their sovereign. Over time these non-regal relations took on far more significance than official state relations. The unofficial Scottish-Swedish alliance outweighed any diplomatic or military assistance that the Swedish Vasas received from the combined British kingdoms. Thus when the Swedes were placed in a position where they had to decide whom to support — the Covenanters or Charles I and his followers — they had only to reflect on who had most consistently co-operated with them. The choice was quickly made and the unofficial alliance between the two nations enjoyed its most controversial period when Sweden reciprocated with military support for Scotland. The degree of influence the Scots wielded in Sweden in order to effect this remarkable demonstration of collaboration was neither incidental nor accidental. It was a result of a steady increase in Scottish migration to the country in military, naval and civilian spheres.

This book is divided into two parts. The first, *Scotland and Sweden*, focuses on the Scottish military and naval contribution to the Swedish crown; this is followed by a reflection on the integration of Scots into Swedish civic society and government. The second part, *Sweden and Scotland*, details the other side of the coin. Starting with the first request for help from the Scottish Covenanters it follows the Swedish reaction as evinced in the subsequent debates in the Swedish Riksråd. After securing the initial support, the Scots pressed for a closer alliance throughout the 1640s, one in which they wished their brethren in England to participate. It is from the little-known (outwith Sweden) perspective of the Swedish government that events are considered, such as the attempts to secure a full Swedish alliance with the Solemn League and Covenant, and the obtaining of Swedish support for the Scottish-led Montrosian expedition of 1650. The aftermath of the failed

¹⁸ Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 1–2, 8–12 and 20.

Montrosian campaign in fact led to the effective collapse of any further Swedish interest in the politics of Scotland. The survey concludes with an account of the rise of English relations with Sweden and the subsequent formal alliance that followed between Oliver Cromwell and Karl X. Sweden's public declaration of recognition of the Protector as ruler of the British Isles put an end to what remained of the once vaunted unofficial Scottish-Swedish alliance. However, even Sweden's apparent diplomatic preference for England over Scotland did not put an end to large-scale Scottish military participation in Sweden.¹⁹ The knock-on effect of this almost century-long unofficial alliance became most noticeable in the eighteenth century. When the Scottish Jacobites sought foreign aid for their cause it was once again to Sweden that they turned. Although no Scottish-Swedish 'alliance' as such was revived at this time, Scottish migrants continued to prove integral to Sweden's economic development.²⁰

¹⁹ See Grosjean 'Royalist soldiers and Cromwellian allies?', in Murdoch and Mackillop, eds., *Fighting for Identity*, 61–82, for information on a significant Scottish military levy for Sweden after 1654.

²⁰ This is perhaps best exemplified by Colin Campbell, one of the founding members of the Swedish East India Company.

PART ONE

SCOTLAND AND SWEDEN

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CHAPTER ONE

SCOTLAND AND THE RISE OF SWEDEN, 1521–1613

to mantein paice and freindschip betwux thir twa countries¹

Historical ties linking Scotland to Scandinavia predate the particular period under focus here. Evidence of formal state relations can be traced back to the era of the Kalmar Union (1397), when the three Scandinavian kingdoms were bound together under a common crown.² Over time Denmark began to dominate this confederation leading to dissension among the Swedes. As a result, Sweden fought for and gained her independence from the Copenhagen-based monarchy in 1521. After that date official state representation and legitimate alliances between Scotland and Scandinavia were directed towards the rump component of the Union, Denmark-Norway, albeit with limited royal correspondence occurring between Scotland and Sweden.³ Indeed in 1545 King Gustav I Vasa showed an interest in and an understanding of the difference between Scotland and England when he specifically requested news of relations between those two states.⁴ Thomas Riis has shown the demographic impact that this ongoing alliance had on Denmark while Steve Murdoch has demonstrated the full political impact for Scotland and ‘Great Britain’ after 1603.⁵ Theoretically, the Scottish-Danish coalition should have seen an end to any significant contacts between Scotland and Sweden, particularly after the regal treaty of 1589 and the marriage of James VI of Scotland to Princess Anna of Denmark. Yet this perspective does not fully explain the Scottish-Scandinavian dynamic. In fact, despite an

¹ Andrew Keith, 16 February 1578, *RPCS*, XIV, Addenda, 343–344.

² A Scot, James Tait, was in the service of the Swedish regent Birger Jarl in the 13th century, see J. Dow, ‘Scottish Trade with Sweden 1512–80’, *SHR*, XLVIII, (1969), 64.

³ Amongst the earliest recorded royal contacts is King Gustav I’s authorisation for a Scot to acquire horses in Sweden for the Scottish king in 1540. 12 March 1540, *KGR*, XIII, 17–8.

⁴ *KGR*, XVII, 123.

⁵ T. Riis, *Should Auld Acquaintance be Forgot* (2 vols., Odense: 1988); Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*.

apparently more than sixty year lack of formal recognition of the newly independent Swedish state by the Scottish and later British monarchies, Scotsmen arrived in Sweden in increasing numbers from the reign of the first Vasa king, Gustav I (1521–1560) onwards, and indeed the Swedish monarchs had frequent contact with Scots.

There is nothing surprising in this. After the Scottish Reformation of 1560 in particular, old Catholic allies like France did not hold the same allure either for Scotland's new Presbyterian regime or her soldiering class.⁶ Emerging Protestant states like Sweden and the Dutch Republic were probably viewed as allies and offered safe and even welcome destinations for migrants. As a result Scots began to take an active part in Sweden's developing military apparatus during the second half of the sixteenth century whilst also establishing a permanent brigade of soldiers in the Dutch Republic in 1572.⁷ Indeed it was not uncommon for Scottish soldiers from the Republic-based Brigade to enter Swedish service.⁸ This has led to confusion over these soldiers' identity, often misrepresented as Dutch due to their place of provenance as opposed to place of birth. Although there was not such a formal structure as a "Scottish Brigade" to receive new recruits in Sweden, during Sweden's later role as *stormakt* (great power) the Scots served in larger numbers and in a more decisive role than they did in the Dutch Republic. The reason for this was that these soldiers served anywhere in the Swedish army, not just in one specific regiment. They joined Scottish, mixed-British, Swedish and other

⁶ The Scots had long maintained a military unit in France, the *Garde Écossais*, which remained in service until the seventeenth century. By this time most of its members were descendants of Scots rather than natives, and the strength had dropped to around 100 men. See W. Forbes Leith, *The Scots Men-at-Arms and Life Guards in France, 1458–1830* (Edinburgh: 1882). See also M. Glozier, 'Scots in the French and Dutch armies during the Thirty Years' War', in Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 118.

⁷ J. Ferguson, ed., *Papers illustrating the History of the Scots Brigade in the Service of the United Netherlands 1572–1782* (3 vols., Edinburgh: 1899–1901). See again Glozier, 'Scots in the French and Dutch armies', in Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 117.

⁸ L. Ericson, "Arméén är under alperna . . . och garnisonerna kring hela Tyskland", den svenska krigsmakten i Östersjöområdet från 1590-talet till 1670-talet', in L. Ericson, ed., *Vägen till Westfaliska freden* (Falun: 1998), 52. For example, on June 20, 1573, Archibald Ruthven brought soldiers from Dutch in to Swedish service: "The Regent has 'cassed' all his soldiers: they all go to the Prince of Orange, and those which served the Castilians go to Sweden under the Master of Ruthven's conduct", *CSPS*, IV, 590. Similarly in July 1615 James Spens recommended Thomas Hamilton of Dutch service to Gustav II Adolf, *SRA*, Anglica III, f.15.

foreign units depending on the circumstance of the moment and longevity of service. The extent of Scottish military involvement in Sweden was, however, a natural consequence of Sweden's ongoing conflicts with her neighbouring countries, especially with Catholic Poland-Lithuania, but also Denmark-Norway — Scotland's closest official ally.⁹

*'Legotrupper': Scottish military incursions from the reigns of
Gustav I to Johan III*

During the time of the Kalmar Union, political power was all but extinguished within Sweden and Norway whilst Denmark took the reigns. The subjugation of Sweden within the Union reached its peak when the Kalmar king, Christian II, attempted to eliminate the higher Swedish nobility in 1520, in what has become known as the 'Stockholm blood-bath'. This action precipitated Sweden's break from the Kalmar Union the following year, under the leadership of the man later crowned as Gustav I in 1523.¹⁰ He knew the importance and the value of international alliances, having relied on Lübeck ships to transport him and his supporters to Sweden in order to overthrow Danish rule. This rebellion initially left Sweden in an unfavourable position as to her legitimacy among the established European monarchies, and Denmark-Norway enjoyed the advantage in foreign relations as the 'wronged' sovereign state. This, in combination with the Danish-Norwegian kings' continued attempts to regain Sweden, meant that Gustav I's (and his successors') main priority became the defence of his realm. It is well known that he initiated processes of military and economic development, in both domestic and international terms, in a bid to ensure Sweden's continued independence.¹¹

In fact Sweden's successful and steady expansion during the seventeenth century can be traced to the almost symbiotic nature of the

⁹ For the most complete survey of the wars which followed see R.I. Frost, *The Northern Wars, 1558–1721* (Harlow: 2000). For Scotland's alliance with Denmark-Norway and the nature of their relations, see Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway, and the House of Stuart*, *passim*.

¹⁰ Christian II was in Stockholm to assert his authority as king of Sweden, and at the end of a three-day banquet had 82 members of the Swedish nobility publicly executed. The king is known as Christian the Great in Denmark, but Christian the Tyrant in Sweden.

¹¹ He also sent embassies abroad, such as Duke Johan and Sten Leijonhufvud's mission of 1559 to England, see SRA, *Anglica*, 531.

relationship between its kings (and one queen) and military forces. This in turn had a direct influence on foreign migration to Sweden. The growth of the Swedish military state caused a drain on native manpower and created the need for a continuous input of foreign troops and entrepreneurs, who then often remained in Sweden either after they were finished with their particular form of service or even became a part of the local social and economic fabric. Sweden comprised a geographically large area with a relatively small population of approximately one million,¹² and the foreign interest welcomed by the Vasas brought entrepreneurs of many nationalities, in particular the Dutch, the Germans, and the Scots. Although other nationalities were also represented, it was these three who would leave a lasting mark on Swedish society.

Scottish military enterprisers certainly made contact in the 1550s during the Swedish-Muscovite War of 1555 to 1557.¹³ At this time the Swedish army consisted of 13,483 infantry and 1,675 cavalry (of which 549 infantry and 296 cavalry were German), and her navy comprised 600–700 men.¹⁴ Early in August 1556 five unnamed Scotsmen had sought service in the Swedish army on their own initiative.¹⁵ At this time Gustav I was already secretly recruiting soldiers in Germany, and he received a proposal from John Dodds and Michael Lermont, gentry from the Scottish court, to bring 2,000 Scottish troops into Swedish service specifically to fight the Russians.¹⁶ This appears to be the first recorded instance of a large-scale Scottish military engagement for Sweden. By the lengthy reply Dodds and Lermont received, including a 33 paragraph codicil concerning the funding and military discipline of those in royal Swedish service, it was taken very seriously. There was no mention of approaching the Scottish court and formalising the negotiations and indeed Gustav I emphasised the clandestine

¹² L. Ericson and F. Sandstedt, *Fanomas Folk* (Stockholm: 1982), 5, and T. Munck, *Seventeenth Century Europe, 1598–1700* (London: 1990), 56. S.E. Åström mentions circa 1.5 million in 1632, see ‘The Swedish economy and Sweden’s role as a great power’, in M. Roberts, ed., *Sweden’s Age of Greatness 1632–1718* (London: 1973), 60–1.

¹³ It is commonly believed that the earliest Scottish military service for Sweden dates from 1563, see Ailes, *Military Migration and State Formation*, 8.

¹⁴ L. Ericson, ‘När armén var under alperna’, in K. Abukhanfusa, ed., *Mare Nostrum* (Västervik: 1999), 18.

¹⁵ See letter from Gustav I to his son Johan, 10 August 1556, *KGR*, XXVI, 438; also correspondence with John Edmonston, see J. Berg and B. Lagercrantz, *Scots in Sweden* (Stockholm: 1962), 12.

¹⁶ 10 and 16 August 1556, *KGR*, XXVI, 430–3 and 442–454. For Dodds and Lermont’s letter to Gustav I, dated Edinburgh, 10 July 1556, see *ibid.*, 856–857.

nature of the undertaking.¹⁷ Thus the practice of private Scottish interest in Swedish military service and the Swedish readiness to accept it appears to have begun in the mid sixteenth century.

Indeed, during the Nordic Seven Years War (1563–70), entire Scottish regiments were recruited, thus testing the bounds of the Scottish-Danish alliance.¹⁸ In the time following the Scottish Reformation (1560) and the subsequent period of the Scottish Regencies (1567–1580), the Scots became embroiled in a game of brinkmanship playing both Denmark-Norway and Sweden off against each other. This can be shown in the patterns of military recruitment observed in Scandinavia. As the Danes had already established protectorates in the Baltic region in reaction to Polish and Russian activity there, the Swedish Vasas developed a persistent policy of Baltic expansion from 1560 onwards.¹⁹ At the same time Erik XIV of Sweden sought allies and attempted to forge closer links with both Scotland and England. This led Erik XIV not only to correspond with Elizabeth I of England in 1563,²⁰ but also to seek 2,000 Scottish troops to strengthen his forces the same year. His request was accepted in Scotland in May 1564.²¹ However, a Danish embassy arrived in Scotland to block this, and Frederick II requested Scottish soldiers for his own army through his alliance with Queen Mary, thereby temporarily thwarting Swedish hopes for large-scale Scottish aid.²² Frederick implied that he would restrict access to the Baltic, which would hinder Scottish trade in the region.²³ Queen Mary then sent an ambassador, William Douglas of Whitting-

¹⁷ 16 August 1556, *KGR*, XXVI, 455: “I vele och holle thette alth hemmeligen inne medh eder . . .”.

¹⁸ Ericson, “Arméen är under alperna . . . och garnisonerna kring hela Tyskland”, in Ericson, ed., *Vägen till Westfaliska freden*, 50. Ericson notes that around this time other foreigners, such as French, Italians, Spanish, Swiss, Flemish, Dutch and English were also recruited into the Swedish army.

¹⁹ For instance they took the regions of Ösel, Dagö and part of Estonia. See A. Kan, *Sverige och Ryssland — ett 1200 årigt förhållande* (Stockholm: 1996), 48–9.

²⁰ In addition to several Swedish embassies to England — Chancellor Gyllenstierna and Secretary Helsing’s in 1561–2 and Bengt Teits’s in 1563, *SRA*, *Anglica*, 531 — Erik also helped achieve a peace treaty between England and France in April 1564, O.S. Rydberg, *Sveriges Traktater med främmande magter* (Stockholm: 1888), IV, 584.

²¹ 15 October 1563, Erik XIV to Elisabeth I, Uppsala Carolinska Biblioteket, Register over Palmkiöldska Samlingen, Tom XXXVIII, appendix 4 [new number 60a], 452.

²² 1 September 1564, Frederick II to Queen Mary, *RPCS*, XIV, 207 and 1 November 1564, Queen Mary’s reply, *ibid.*, 208 and 210. See also W. Reid, *17th century war, weaponry and politics*, International Association of Museums of Arms and Military History, Xth congress proceedings, 1984, 53.

²³ 23 December 1564, Frederick II to Queen Mary, *RPCS*, XIV, Addenda, 209.

hame, to Denmark to mediate in the hostilities, although she only promised to support Denmark if the kingdom restored favourable trade conditions with Scotland.²⁴ Robert Fyfe was equally sent as a Scottish ambassador to Sweden.²⁵ The Scottish monarchy quickly realised that they could regularly use permission to levy Scottish troops to alternately placate the Swedes or the Danes in their interminable hostilities, and representatives of both countries were often allowed to recruit soldiers for their mutual wars at the same time. Despite the existence of a formal alliance between Scotland and Denmark-Norway, and the lack of such an agreement between Scotland and Sweden, there was a certain parity of treatment doled out by the Scottish court.

Thus royal intervention did not necessarily prove to be an impediment to Scottish enlistment for Swedish service. The Swedish-Danish Seven Years' war saw the start of a continuous Scottish presence in the Swedish army, where the Scots served in specifically Scottish units along side other foreign troops.²⁶ William Cahun, for instance, commanded a Scottish cavalry unit of 119 men at the Battle of Axtorna in 1565 and they remained in Swedish service long after that date, and indeed Scottish cavalry units are noted as such on military payrolls in 1568, 1570, 1582, 1591, 1593 and 1597.²⁷ Several other Scottish officers petitioned Erik XIV for their pay the following year. These Scots did not go unnoticed or unmolested by Frederick II, who eventually imprisoned some of them.²⁸ Scottish interest in foreign service was not limited to anonymous military men and in 1567 the queen's cousin, the Earl of Atholl, sought Swedish employment.²⁹

²⁴ 22 May 1564, Randolph to Cecil, reveals Mary's indifference, *CSPS*, II, 64. In 1564 a certain master James Barry was authorised to "mak weir, invaid and persew the King of Swadenis subjectis, and all his adherentis and partakaris in the present weris standing betuix the saidis Kingis", *RPCS*, XIV, Addenda, 209–10.

²⁵ September 1565, *RPCS*, XIV, Addenda, 234. See also a letter to Frederick II informing him of this embassy, *ibid.*, 235.

²⁶ KRA, Militieräkenskaper 1537–1619, 1568/5. Register på Tyska och Skottska Ryttare i diverse borgläger, 1568.

²⁷ Åberg 'Scottish Soldiers in the Swedish Armies', in Simpson, ed., *Scotland and Scandinavia 800–1800*, 90; KRA, Militieräkenskaper 1537–1619, 1569/10. Lönelängd över William Kohuns fana 1569. See also payrolls for the years listed above.

²⁸ 1 August 1572, Regent Mar (in the name of King James VI) to Frederick II, *RPCS*, XIV, Addenda, 290, and Fischer, *Scots in Sweden*, 48 and 50. These Scots were Thomas Henryson, John Strang, James Logan, and Walter Morrison who had all been captured serving Sweden.

²⁹ *RPCS*, XIV, 271. See also SRA, Ämnessamlingar, strödda historiska handlingar, VI and KRA, Militieräkenskaper 1537–1619.

By 1570 the level of Scottish participation in the Swedish army had increased to include at least three specifically Scottish troops of soldiers, and royal paylists reveal several Scots receiving salaries for military service.³⁰ This period included a time of trauma within the Swedish monarchy as Dukes Johan and Karl had begun a revolt against their brother King Erik in July 1568. At this time there were allegedly already 6,000 Scots in Swedish service, under the command of another foreigner, the Frenchman Pontus de la Gardie.³¹

Even after the cessation of hostilities with Denmark-Norway in 1570, Scots continued to seek employment in Sweden — there were after all, other wars to fight. Archibald Ruthven, brother of William the Lord Treasurer, was royally recommended for military service in Sweden in October in 1571.³² His license to levy 1,600 Scots for the Swedish army in 1573 contained specific conditions to prevent the levies' possible use against the regency.³³ Only 200 men were to be raised at a time, and a special license would be needed for levying men already in royal service. In addition, only 500 weapons were to be removed from Scotland, and they were all to be returned. The levies were not to support themselves by the plunder of Scotland or her allies, nor were they to serve in any 'Papist' force against Protestant troops. Finally, these levies were not to be massed near Edinburgh or within 16 miles of Stirling castle, in an obvious attempt to safeguard the Scottish crown from any surprise attack should the men be of an anti-government persuasion. Given the recent Scottish civil war, this was a justifiable precaution.

Although these measures were designed to ensure that the Swedish levy was above board in Scotland, these conditions did not prevent

³⁰ SRA, *Ämnessamlingar, strödda historiska handlingar*, VI, for example Andrew Keith, George Cahun, Henry Camar, William Krygenn, and Peter Scott. See also Berg and Lagercranz, *Scots in Sweden*, 13.

³¹ De la Gardie's military experience had included service in Scotland on behalf of his king, Henry II, followed by Danish service which brought him to Sweden. He was captured there in August 1565 along with 100 Scottish and French troops, and took service under Erik XIV. It was not long before he helped the king's brother Johan to overthrow Erik with Scottish troops, A. Tidner, *Ur Erik XIV:s saga* (Stockholm: 1910), 176.

³² 18 October 1572, letter written in James' name to King Johan III, *RPCS*, XIV, Addenda, 289. See also Dow, 'Ruthven's army in Sweden and Esthonia', 3–4 and *passim*.

³³ Dow, 'Ruthven's army', 7–9 and 57. See also a further letter regarding the levy of 300 men for Swedish service under Captain Alexander Campbell, *RPCS*, II, 237–8.

their use in Swedish intrigues. A celebrated plot to reinstate Erik XIV on the throne and murder Johan III, where Archibald Ruthven and James Balfour were central characters, was uncovered in September 1574.³⁴ This episode, well described by James Dow among others, ended ignominiously for those two Scots.³⁵ Balfour was executed in 1576 and Ruthven died in prison two years later. There was further disheartening news that year regarding the reputation of Scots in Swedish service: 3,000 Scots were lost from Swedish armies, some fell in action but many were apparently lost after they mutinied.³⁶ A lot of these subsequently entered Russian service, as did many of those taken prisoner in battle. Sir Jerome Horsey encountered a group of at least 85 of Ruthven's Scots in Muscovy who had been captured. Horsey encouraged Tsar Ivan to employ them, which he apparently did to great effect against the Crimean Tartars.³⁷

This early period of Scottish military engagement in the Swedish army involved then a mixed bag of private and official recruitment and produced a combination of loyal and mutinous units. Despite the loss of some of the soldiers, other officers began to display a loyalty to their paymaster suggesting that financial reward alone was no longer the sole motivating factor in taking up service. As such, individuals such as Andrew Keith continued to find favour and promotion in Stockholm. Keith, nephew of the 4th Earl Marischal entered Swedish service in 1568, became a captain of horse, was created baron in 1574, and became a Court Commissioner in 1576.³⁸ John Stuart was

³⁴ SRA, Strödda Historiska Handlingar, XIIIIB, Letters 1573; G. Arteus, *Till Militärstatens Förhistoria: Krig, professionalisering och social förändring under Vasasönernas regering* (Stockholm: 1986), 161. Balfour was recruited as a captain from 1573, see SRA, Titularregister till RR, I, 14 October 1573.

³⁵ Berg and Lagercrantz, *Scots in Sweden*, 17 and 19 and Dow, 'Ruthven's Army', 79 and 84. Steckzén mentions 4,000 Scots who came to Sweden in 1573, some of whom were involved in a plot to murder king Johan III, in *Svenskt och Brittiskt*, 83. A Latin petition to spare Balfour's life was delivered to the king, signed by no less than twenty-three Scottish officers, Fischer, *Scots in Sweden*, 61–2. Cf. letter from Sir Andrew Keith which contains verbatim what the king said to him concerning the treasonous Scots dated Stockholm, 25 February 1577–8, *RPCS*, XIV, Addenda, 344–8. As further evidence of close relations, one of King Johan III's supporters noted that he could "speik and onderstand guid Inglis".

³⁶ June 17 1574, Henry Killigrew to Walsingham, *CSPS*, IV, 674.

³⁷ A.F. Steuart, *Scottish Influences on Russian History* (Glasgow: 1913), 7; J.W. Barnhill and P. Dukes, 'North-East Scots in Muscovy in the Seventeenth Century', *Northern Scotland*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1972, 50–51.

³⁸ Keith told Regent Morton of the good treatment he enjoyed at the Swedish court, after just a few years of service there: "I thank God quha hes placit me heir in sic favour and estaitt as rar hes ony stranger in this cuntre bein in the lyk", 16

ennobled in Sweden after 1585, an early example of many Scots who came to enjoy that privilege.³⁹ That year also saw James Neave and Henry Leyell, who had originally been brought in by Andrew Keith, serving as captains of horse in the Swedish cavalry.⁴⁰ These soldiers achieved much for themselves, obtaining land rights in Sweden in lieu of payment for their service. Thus their income would derive from the rents paid on a given piece of land. Amongst the earliest of donations was Leyell's receipt of land in Östgötaland and Småland in 1578, two areas of Sweden which were frequently targeted for donations by the Vasa kings.⁴¹ This was often just the first step in a process which ended with property titles and inheritance rights. Thus John Stuart was granted land in Södermanland in 1579 which he later exchanged for other land and privileges, including inheritance rights for his male descendants.⁴² A close relative, Andrew, also received land from Karl IX in 1599.⁴³ It was the service of such men, and their rewards in the form of land and/or titles that facilitated the continued military migration of Scots to Sweden and their integration there, despite the antics of some of the migrants. Indeed the stated aim of some of these men, according to Andrew Keith, was to improve international relations and, as he declared "my daylie studie sall be to mantein paice and freindschip betwixt thir twa countries".⁴⁴ Keith went on to represent Sweden in a diplomatic capacity, becoming just the first of many Scottish soldiers to play such a role for the Swedish state.⁴⁵ His success could be seen at the muster of Swedish troops in 1581 with the presence of yet more new Scottish recruits, such as those commanded by William Wallace.⁴⁶

February 1577/8, Sir Andrew Keith to Regent Morton, *RPCS*, XIV, Addenda, 343. Keith served as the Swedish legate to England in 1583, see *SRA*, *Anglica*, 531.

³⁹ Colonel John Stuart was ennobled "After having procured two birth briefes, one proving his nobility on the father's, the other on the mother's side (both issued from Edinburgh in the years 1579 and 1585)", Fischer, *Scots in Sweden*, 51.

⁴⁰ For Leyell see *KRA*, *Militieräkenskaper 1537–1619*, 1582/3–1594. Henrich Leiels räkenskaper rörande avlöning for en fana Skottska ryttare. For Neave see his recommendation to Johan III signed by James VI, 20 November 1579, *RPCS*, XIV, Addenda, 348.

⁴¹ *SBL*, XXII and Fischer, *The Scots in Sweden*, 50.

⁴² *SAA*, VIII, 782–3.

⁴³ Some sources note Andrew as John's brother, others as his son. See A. Zettersten, *Svenska Flottans Historia åren 1522–1634* (Stockholm: 1890), 61–62.

⁴⁴ 16 February 1578, *RPCS*, XIV, Addenda, 343–344.

⁴⁵ 1583, 'Instruction för Erik Brahe och Anders Keith', *SRA*, *Anglica* VII, 531: Förhandlingar 1559–1632.

⁴⁶ *KRA*, *Militieräkenskaper 1537–1619*, 1581/55. William Wallas räkenskaper

Although the Scottish regency condemned any further levy of Scottish troops for Swedish service after the Balfour and Ruthven debacle (and James VI's marriage to Princess Anna of Denmark-Norway in 1589 should have precluded it anyway), Scottish enlistment for Sweden continued.⁴⁷ Intriguingly, the following year James VI crossed through Sweden in January on his travels from Norway to Denmark. After a certain Captain William Murray (it has yet to be determined whether he was in James' retinue or in Swedish service) supplied him with a safe conduct from Johan III, James was escorted by a troop of 400 Swedish cavalry.⁴⁸ The outbreak of yet another Swedish-Muscovite War (1590–95) once more saw the recruiters ply their trade. By 1591 two fresh troops of Scottish cavalry arrived in Swedish service and another by 1593.⁴⁹ They were to be commanded by William Ruthven and the veteran of Swedish service, Henry Leyell.⁵⁰ Abraham Young took charge of the third troop to arrive.⁵¹ While these men led Scottish units, other officers like John Strang and Ambrosius Henderson had been promoted over indigenous Swedes and Finns in an early example of what was later to become the norm during

rörande avlöning m.m. för en fana, 1581; Same collection, 1582–1585, Västergötland. Register på Västergötaryttares under William Wallas och Sven Anderssons fanor. These Scottish soldiers in Sweden even worked in Scotland's favour, as during the shortage of munitions in August 1584, Sir Andrew Keith organised exports of "lasts of cannon and other shot" from Sweden to Scotland. 16 August 1584, Mr. William Davison to Walsingham, *CSPS*, VII, 279.

⁴⁷ 23 June 1574, Henry Killigrew to Walsingham, *CSPS*, IV, 682.

⁴⁸ J. Spottiswoode, *The History of the Church of Scotland* (Menston: 1972, reprt.), 379–380. According to a Danish account of this event, the cavalry numbered 600 and some Swedish lords visited James VI, P. Graves, 'The Danish Account of the Marriage of James VI and Anne of Denmark', in D. Stevenson, *Scotland's Last Royal Wedding* (Edinburgh: 1997), 97.

⁴⁹ Not being a country renowned for producing cavalry horses, the Scottish troopers had to be loaned their mounts by local farmers on arrival in Sweden — 41 animals for the first 22 men to arrive. The men paid an average of 10–15 daler per horse and a total of 545.5 for the 41 horses. KRA, Militieräkenskaper 1537–1619, 1591/10. Register över borgares och bönders försträckning av häster till Skottska ryttare.

⁵⁰ KRA, Militieräkenskaper 1537–1619, 1591/12. William Ruthvens räkenskaper för en fana Skottska Ryttare, 1591–1593; KRA, Militieräkenskaper 1537–1619, 1582/3–1594. Henrich Leiels räkenskaper rörande avlöning för en fana Skottska ryttare.

⁵¹ KRA, Militieräkenskaper 1537–1619, 1592/15 and 1593. Kaptän Abraham Jungs räkenskaper för Skottska knektar och ryttare 1592–1593. Young's officers included Alexander Gordon, William Ogilvie, Andrew Moir, and Adam Walker among others.

stormaktstid.⁵² Yet the very presence of these men, whether as individuals or in Scottish units, highlights the growing divergence at the time between Scotland's official relations with the Swedish royal house and private military engagements with Sweden. This proved particularly awkward when Scotland was drawn into the fight over the succession to the Swedish crown between Sigismund III and his uncle, Duke Karl of Södermanland, leading to both the Swedish Civil War (1598) and the Polish-Swedish War (1600–1629).

Sweden was vulnerable to the threat of both military and dynastic claims to her territory from Poland-Lithuania, particularly given that not only was the Polish royal house dynastically allied with the Habsburgs but it was also related to the Vasas.⁵³ The Vasa family connection stemmed from Erik XIV's brother Johan's marriage to the Polish king's sister in 1562, whereby Sweden became a Polish ally upon Johan's coronation in 1569. Nearly two decades later Johan III was instrumental in placing the first Vasa on a foreign throne when his son became King of Poland. This led, however, not to an expansion of Swedish power but to complications over the succession to the Swedish crown: Gustav I's efforts to impose Lutheranism as the state religion would be compromised if Sigismund retained his right to the Swedish throne.⁵⁴ The religious and political implications of the election of the Catholic Swedish crown prince, Sigismund, as Poland's king in 1587 increased antagonism between that kingdom and Sweden after 1592, when Johan was succeeded by Sigismund III, and also placed Russia in an extremely precarious position. Johan had made peace with Denmark-Norway and renewed contacts with Poland-Lithuania, leading to hostility between Sweden and Russia. Those hostilities ended with the 'eternal peace' agreement of Teusina (1595) albeit the treaty was never ratified by either side.⁵⁵ Yet within

⁵² KRA, Militieräkenskaper 1537–1619, 1584/5–1594. Uppland. Hans Strangs räkenskaper rörande avlöning för en fana upplandsryttare; Same collection, 1597/7, Finland. Mantalsregister över Ambrosius Henderssons fänika Savolaxknektar.

⁵³ King Sigismund had married two of the daughters of Emperor Ferdinand I's son, the Archduke of Austria. A third daughter was married to King Philip III of Spain.

⁵⁴ King Gustav I had been pro-Lutheran since 1524, see *Handlingar Rörande Sveriges Historia*, 1st series, part one, letter of Gustav I to Bishop Brask, 8 June 1524, 231–3. The full dogma of the Augsburg Confession was only formally accepted in 1593, a year after the succession of the Catholic, Sigismund III of Poland, see *Svensk-Historiskt Hand-lexikon*, ed. Meijer, 162; Munck, *Seventeenth Century Europe, 1598–1700*, 56.

⁵⁵ Frost, *The Northern Wars*, 44–45.

the Swedish kingdom itself hostilities erupted between the contesting branches of the Vasa family. Duke Karl, who had controlled the interim Swedish government, was opposed to the Catholic king's coronation and initiated military campaigns against him. This resulted in the deposition of Sigismund Vasa the following year.

The Stuarts supported Sigismund as the legitimate king of Sweden, and the former Swedish veteran Andrew Keith, now Lord Dingwall, received a commission in December 1597 to levy Scottish troops for deployment against 'Duke' Karl.⁵⁶ However six months later a lack of money rendered his commission unsuccessful.⁵⁷ Karl on the other hand openly thanked the Scottish element of his army in 1599, emphasising their reliability. His words highlighted the discrepancy between the Scottish royal house backing the Catholic Polish monarchy, whilst many of the Scottish Protestant population had more sympathy for Protestant Sweden.⁵⁸ Official Stuart disapproval proved no obstacle for the strength of private Scottish support for Sweden.

While a common soldier could be bought on the markets of Europe at this time quite easily, the same was not true for hiring the services of skilled and reliable officers. It was in this sphere that the Scots excelled in Sweden. The numeric importance of the Scottish officer presence in Sweden is brought sharply into focus when contrasted against those in service of Scotland's main ally, Denmark-Norway, or indeed the other combatant nations vying for military expertise at the same time. For example, scrutiny of numerous texts on the subject only reveals half a dozen named Scottish officers in either Polish-Lithuanian or Russian service.⁵⁹ From 1565 until 1580 circa 23 officers have been hitherto found as enlisted in Swedish service,

⁵⁶ Keith left Swedish service in the 1580s. From 1589 he became a Stuart ambassador during the Stuart-Oldenburg marriage negotiations of 1588–89. See Berg and Lagercranz, *Scots in Sweden*, 18–20.

⁵⁷ 9 December 1597, George Nicolson to Sir Robert Cecil, *CSPS*, XIII, 132; June 12 1598, Roger Aston to Sir Robert Cecil, *ibid.*, 218.

⁵⁸ Fischer, *Scots in Sweden*, 66.

⁵⁹ Information drawn from various sources, including for Poland-Lithuania, R. Frost, 'Scottish soldiers, Poland-Lithuania and the Thirty Years' War', in Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War* and A. Bieganska, 'James Murray: a Scot in the making of the Polish navy' in *Scottish Slavonic Review*, 3, 1984; A. Bieganska, 'A Note on the Scots in Poland', in T.C. Smout ed., *Scotland and Europe, 1200–1850* (Edinburgh: 1986). For Russia see P. Dukes 'Scottish Soldiers in Muscovy', in *The Caledonian Phalanx* (National Library of Scotland: 1987); Barnhill and Dukes, 'North-east Scots in Muscovy in the seventeenth century'; and D. Fedosov, *Caledonian Connection* (Aberdeen: 1996).

Fig. 1. *Scottish officer enlistment in the Swedish army 1580–1600*

(Source: SSNE database)

normally only appearing as isolated individuals or the occasional pair.⁶⁰ However, war brought more sustained recruitment and during the Livonian campaign of 1573, at least 13 officers enlisted in one year. These ‘peaks’ of enlistment became a regular feature of Scottish military involvement in Sweden, usually coinciding with specific military operations.

Figure 1 above demonstrates the close relationship between the upsurge of Scottish military engagement in Swedish service and specific Swedish campaigns during the last two decades of the sixteenth century. The total enlistment figure of Scottish officers found for 1580–1600 is 30. This does not mean that these were the only serving Scots in Sweden, rather that during this period at least 30 new officers took service. Only the years during which Scots were noted on Swedish military muster rolls have been included here — there may have been others entering service in between these years. The peak in 1595, when eleven officers joined the Swedish army, covers the period when the Swedes re-initiated hostilities with Russia, and when troubles with Poland over the succession were ongoing. Eleven officers is perhaps not an astonishingly high number, but their presence

⁶⁰ Given that 23 Scots signed the petition on behalf of Balfour in 1574 these enlistments must be placed in the context of an already extant significant community of Scottish soldiers.

appears to confirm James VI's policy of allowing recruitment for both Scandinavian countries and indeed the other northern powers. Most unusual of all is that even after the alliance of 1589, less than half a dozen Scots enlisted in the army of Christian IV, giving weight to the conclusion that there were other factors at work in Sweden's favour at this time.

Stuart-Vasa Relations 1599–1611

Sweden was initially perceived as something of a rogue state after its final break from the Kalmar Union. However, by the reign of Johan III royal correspondence between the Scottish and Swedish monarchies was not uncommon, if somewhat sporadic.⁶¹ The 'usurpation' of the Swedish throne by Duke Karl from his nephew Sigismund did subsequently threaten the developing diplomacy between the two courts.⁶² James VI's legalistic mind initially did not allow him to be seen to support Sweden at all. Karl IX (and later Gustav II Adolf) remained sceptical in his dealings with James, who appeared fickle in his diplomacy. Not only was he allied to the Danish royal house but he had also supported a Catholic rival to Karl. The difficulty of coping with hostile official relations in the face of active individual support and interest continued after the end of the Swedish-Polish conflict. Through the contacts of respected Scots within Karl's de facto court regular recruiting agents worked on Sweden's behalf in Scotland. James Spens, Samuel Cockburn, Patrick Ruthven, and Alexander Leslie all became major players in strengthening unofficial Scottish-Swedish relations. In addition, the aforementioned John Stuart, who had been in Swedish service since 1564, enjoyed total integration at the Swedish court. He became a Gentleman of the Bedchamber to Duke Karl in 1592, and was present at the English envoy's embassy to the king in August 1609.⁶³ His relative Andrew

⁶¹ Three letters from James VI to Johan III survive in SRA, *Scotica* dated 4 September 1577, 16 April 1584 and 3 July 1591. See also Uppsala Carolinska Biblioteket, Register över Palmskiöldska Samlingen, Tom VIII, Acta ad Hist. R. Johannis III, no. 24, 621 [new number 30]. Iacobi R. Scotiae litteræ ad R. Svec. Pro D^o Erico Sparre, 1583. See also the letter written in James' name to Johan III in 1571, *RPCS*, XIV, Addenda, 289.

⁶² Munck, *Europe in the Seventeenth Century*, 56.

⁶³ *SAA*, VIII, 782–783; Berg and Lagercrantz, *Scots in Sweden*, 20–21; Fischer, *Scots in Sweden*, 51. See also SRA, *Anglica*, 531.

Fig. 2. *Scottish officer enlistment in the Swedish army 1602–1609*

(Source: SSNE database)

was employed by the Swedes in 1611 as their ambassador to Russia.⁶⁴

The continual wars and threat of conflict facing Sweden meant that the country had to rely on a stream of foreign auxiliaries for their army. In 1602 Karl approached James VI for more troops through Colonel William Ogilvie, a veteran of Swedish service who had arrived with Abraham Young in 1593.⁶⁵ Through his service Ogilvie had already stretched the boundaries of his loyalty having fought against a sovereign whom James VI had technically supported during the Swedish-Polish War. Nonetheless, James initially granted permission for the levy, but then prevented the 600 volunteers from leaving Scotland. He arrested their transport ships claiming his allegiance to Denmark-Norway forced his hand.⁶⁶ Ogilvie's attempts were followed in 1604 by those of Andrew Stuart who successfully raised a regiment of Scots for Sweden. Stuart was a veteran of the Livonian

⁶⁴ *SAA*, VIII, 782.

⁶⁵ 2 July 1602, Karl to Ogilvie, SRA, Registratur över Latinska Kansliakter; Fischer, *Scots in Sweden*, 70.

⁶⁶ 20 June and 22 September 1602, George Nicolson to Sir Robert Cecil, *CSPS*, XIII, 1007 and 1050. See also, 19 September 1602, *RPCS*, VI, 752: a notice to the mariners of the Swedish *Mercurius* in Leith not to take any of James VI's subjects out of Scotland without his permission.

Campaign of 1600 for which service he was rewarded with the governorship of Dorpat. He was joined on his recruiting drive by Captain Patrick Rutherford and mustered a troop of 300 Scots by 1605. Still more Scottish officers followed suit. The brothers, David and James Spens, also became engaged in levying troops for Swedish service in 1605. James Spens received a written request from Karl IX in October to provide 1,600 Scots, both infantry and cavalry.⁶⁷ The Swedish king initially offered 1,600 daler per 300 men levied, then 1,700 daler per 200 men. Given the defeat of Karl IX at Kirkholm, at which apparently 200 Scottish soldiers had either died or been captured by the enemy, their arrival would have been timely to the Swedish state.⁶⁸ In most of these cases the offer to raise a body of soldiers came from the officers themselves. Usually the Swedish king only accepted their offer after adding that the levies must be raised at their own expense.⁶⁹ What is of greatest interest here is that throughout this period of official alliance between Scotland and Denmark-Norway, King James allowed respectable members of his nobility and gentry to continue to serve and recruit for Sweden. For instance, in 1607 the Marquis of Huntly was approached for 200 cavalry, and Captain Gilbert Wauchop was sent to Scotland recruit a company of Scots which he mustered in Leith — a fact in itself which suggests Scottish governmental sanction.⁷⁰ One of these companies may have formed the Scottish contingent noted in a mixed foreign regiment wintering in Finland in 1607–1608.⁷¹ That same year Thomas Kerr and William Ogilvie recruited troops while the next year Colonel William Ruthven engaged a further troop for Sweden. In addition, John Stuart was appointed inspector-general of all foreign troops in Swedish service, a role subsequently given to

⁶⁷ SRA, Riksarkivets Ämbetsarkiv, Huvudarkivet FV a:31–32. The request was repeated in April 1606, see Karl IX to Spens, SRA, Anglica 4, and Fischer, *Scots in Sweden*, 71.

⁶⁸ Ericson, “Arméén är under alperna . . . och garnisonerna kring hela Tyskland”, in Ericson, ed., *Vägen till Westfaliska freden*, 51.

⁶⁹ Fischer, *Scots in Sweden*, 71.

⁷⁰ 30 June 1607, *RPCS*, VII, 401 and 420: “Capitane Gilbert being laitlie employit be the King of Swadene to levey and tak up ane company of gentilmen to pas to Swadane, qhuilkis ar alreddy gadderit togidder in the toun of Leith, and reddy to embark”. See also Fischer, *Scots in Sweden*, 71.

⁷¹ 6 July 1607, Karl IX to Erich Elfszom et al. The letter, advising preparation for the quartering in their region of 1000 foreign troops including Germans, French and Scots, is reproduced in J.E. Waaranen, *Handlingar upplysande Finlands Historia under Karl IX:s tid* (Helsingfors: 1864), II, 9.

James Spens the following year, further confirming these men's successes and integration at the Swedish court.

It has been stated that sources give no explanation for renewed military interaction between Sweden and the British Isles.⁷² However, the sources actually show the contacts had been ongoing throughout the late sixteenth and into the early seventeenth century. Given the prominence of such men as those noted above it is unsurprising that the role of these individuals, in instigating and developing Scottish-Swedish contacts, remained the chosen conduit for the continuation of formal relations. Thus when Karl IX sent James Spens to James VI and I in 1609 in an attempt to forge closer state relations, Spens took several other prominent Scottish officers as part of his diplomatic entourage.⁷³ This embassy was both diplomatic (including a secret proposal for a marriage between Princess Elizabeth Stuart and Crown-Prince Gustav Vasa) and military in nature as Spens had been issued with a travel pass in order to levy in Britain with expenses of 4,500 daler.⁷⁴ King James responded by sending Andrew Keith the younger (a relative of the Andrew Keith who had served Karl's brothers) to Sweden armed with the Stuart king's latest tract against the pope.⁷⁵ Attempts to keep relations between the kings on at least a civil basis were ongoing thereafter and gifts of falcons were sent in return from Sweden to King James.⁷⁶ After the initial approach by Spens' Scottish diplomatic mission, a Swedish delegation led by Baron Johan Skytte and Count Gustav Eriksson Stenbock followed.⁷⁷ Both Skytte and Stenbock were received well by James, who bestowed knighthoods and honours on his guests.⁷⁸ It was during the Skytte mission that King James first recognised the legitimacy of Karl IX

⁷² Ailes, *Military Migration and State Formation*, 10.

⁷³ He was accompanied by Samuel Cockburn, John Wauchop, Hugh Cochrane, George Douglas, Daniel Rogers, Robert Kinnaird, William Horne and Patrick Ruthven.

⁷⁴ SRA, Riksarkivets Ämbetsarkiv, Huvudarkivet FV a:31–32; 3 January 1609, Karl IX to Spens, SRA, Anglica 4. *RPCS*, VIII, 390, 393 and *CSPD 1603–1610*, 567 and 580.

⁷⁵ 22 September 1609, James VI to Karl IX, PRO, SP95, I, f.158; M. Jansson, P. Bushkovitch, N. Rogozhin, eds., *England and the North, the Russian embassy of 1613–1614* (Philadelphia: 1994), 51.

⁷⁶ Fischer, *Scots in Sweden*, 73.

⁷⁷ 1610, Gustav Stenbock och Johan Skyttes Beskickning, SRA, Anglica VII, 531: Förhandlingar 1559–1632. Skytte himself may not have been entirely unbiased to Scottish concerns as he was married to a Scot, Maria Neave. See further discussion of this below in Chapter Five.

⁷⁸ *SBHL*, II, 473, 520.

as the sovereign of Sweden.⁷⁹ The Stuart showed sympathetic inclinations towards Sweden in his Scandinavian diplomacy — even favouring the Swedish branch of the Vasa family over the Polish. According to the Swedish ambassadors James denied allowing Sigismund to recruit in his kingdoms at this time, and claimed that only one captain had rather unsuccessfully attempted to recruit for Poland.⁸⁰ Indeed, Spens' loyalty and whole-hearted service for the Swedish Crown was personally commended by the Stuart king as reported to Karl IX by Skytte.

During this period Karl IX also sought official recognition from neighbouring states and thereby became involved in Russia's 'time of troubles' which had begun in 1605 on the death of Boris Gudonov. Sigismund put forward a claimant to the throne of Muscovy, one of the many tsarist pretenders. Sigismund then invaded Russia in 1609 to prevent attempts by Karl IX to place either himself or Prince Gustav Adolf on the throne.⁸¹ In fact, Karl IX supported another claimant and the next few years witnessed a military race to secure the Kremlin. Karl IX offered military support to Vasilii Shuiskii, a Russian noble, in his struggle to become Tsar in exchange for Russian recognition of Karl IX, an end to their claims to Livonia and Estonia, and a promise not to ally with Sigismund.⁸² The Swedes initiated a Russian campaign in March 1609 where troops under Samuel Cockburn and Daniel Hepburn were fundamental to the successful siege of Novgorod. James VI and I supported Karl's request and 300 Scottish troops arrived in January 1610 with William Stuart who had himself been recruited the previous spring.⁸³

James' inconsistency toward levies for foreign service resulted in some covert recruitment actions such as when Captains John Borthwick and Andrew Renton, both noted as resident in Sweden, levied troops in March 1610 and sailed with them against James' expressed prohibition.⁸⁴ It was impossible for the Stuart king to control all levies

⁷⁹ 1 September 1610, Johan Skytte's and Gustav Stenbock's report to Karl IX, SRA, Anglica, 531: "så bekenner H.K. Mjt af stora Britannien E.K. Mjt för Swerigis laghkrönte konungh, aldenstund menighe Swerigis rykes ständer hafve kendt E.K. Mjt der godh före till ath wara deres konungh och opdraghet E.K. Mjt Swerigis krono och regemente".

⁸⁰ T. Berg, *Johan Skytte* (Stockholm: 1920), 240.

⁸¹ Munck, *Seventeenth Century Europe*, 56–57 and 205.

⁸² Berg and Lagercrantz, *Scots in Sweden*, 21 and 30.

⁸³ Fischer, *Scots in Sweden*, 73.

⁸⁴ *RPCS*, VIII, 619–620, "having leveyed some companeis of men for the weiris

as some of them occurred beyond Scotland anyway. In January 1609 two Scottish captains had arrived in Oslo with only 5 soldiers remaining of their troops, as the rest had deserted en route due to lack of pay.⁸⁵ These officers claimed to have been recruited in the Dutch Republic by William Stuart. It is not entirely clear if the men in this company were of Scottish or foreign origin, but it was not uncommon for Scots to recruit non-Scots.

An obvious place for Scots to look for soldiers outwith Scotland was Ireland. Several groups of soldiers were raised for Sweden by Irish recruiters like Colonel Bingley, though it is unlikely that the 6,000 mentioned in some sources ever arrived.⁸⁶ The Register of the Privy Council of Scotland makes it clear that James VI also approved of this levy and that many of the Irish were in fact pressed for service by Scots.⁸⁷ Captains John Maistertoun and Thomas Leichfield raised some companies of Irishmen, but contrary winds prevented them from arriving in Scandinavia. Although James VI and I ordered that they should be supplied with funds for food most of them apparently disappeared upon landfall.⁸⁸ This trend for desertion by the Irish continued once Karl IX's Russian campaign began in earnest. One group who deserted in Russia was captured and subsequently killed.⁸⁹ The consistent defection of the Irish at the earliest opportunity did not go unnoticed by the Swedish king. He wrote a letter to William Stuart urging him not to enlist Irishmen as they were infected with 'Pontifica Religione'.⁹⁰ If they were not deserting they

of Swaden [...] they haveing most unlauchfullie sailyeit [...] thir twa Capitanes being now resident in Swaden and actuallie in the service and wearis of the King thair of".

⁸⁵ NRA, letter dated 17 January 1609, from Enevald Kruse to the Chancellor, *Norske Kanselliinnlegg fra tiden for 1660*, 330.

⁸⁶ Indeed numbers vary greatly depending on the sources used. The letter quoted gives the figure of 700 but makes it clear these were not the first to arrive. See 8 November 1610, James Spens to the Earl of Salisbury, PRO, SP95, I, f.177. For the 6,000 figure see Lord Chichester, May 1614, *CSPI*, 1611–1614, 479–480. Robert Frost quotes a figure of only 200 Irishmen in Sweden with Bingley. See Frost, 'Scottish Soldiers, Poland-Lithuania', in Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 200. See also Jansson, et al., eds., *England and the North*, 50 and 63. Many of the Irish deserted on their way through England, overpowering the crews of their ships and thus never arriving in Sweden, see B. Bonner, *That Audacious Traitor* (Dublin: 1975), 208–211.

⁸⁷ *RPCS*, VIII, 390.

⁸⁸ *RPCS*, VIII, 390 and 393.

⁸⁹ 8 November 1610, James Spens to Earl of Salisbury, PRO, SP95, I, f.187.

⁹⁰ Fischer, *The Scots in Sweden*, 73.

often protested at being in locations like Russia and a group in Samuel Cockburn's regiment came to an agreement with General De la Gardie for leaving the theatre of war.⁹¹ The unreliability of the Irish in Swedish service later manifested itself in the desertion of a group of Irish volunteers who jumped ship in Scotland en route to Sweden under Colonel Robert Stuart in the 1630s.⁹²

Despite the setback of Irish desertion, the Swedish king mustered over 2,000 Scots and Englishmen by May 1610 in addition to numerous French and Dutch auxiliaries.⁹³ The British forces were under the nominal command of James Spens although he was in Britain at the time. Actual command rested with a Captain Calvine, acting as lieutenant-colonel, with Samuel Cockburn also mentioned among the leadership. They commanded 1,200 Scots for Jacob de la Gardie's 1610 Russian campaigns. The Russians and their Swedish allies were defeated at the battle of Klushino after which some 1,500 English, Scots and French went over to Polish service.⁹⁴ Karl strongly complained about such actions calling the men 'unworthy and deserters'.⁹⁵ Amongst the several hundred officers and men who returned to Sweden in spite of the offer to take up Polish service were Scots who would become recognised as stalwarts of the Swedish army such as Samuel Cockburn.⁹⁶ While Karl complained about the desertion of some of the British forces (most apparently returned to Sweden via Germany), the loyalty of Cockburn in particular had been noticed. With his forces depleted, Karl sought to rebuild his army. A venture set to include a new contingent of 2,200 Stuart subjects was

⁹¹ 22 April 1612? Jacob de la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, V, 12. Whilst their grievance may have been a legitimate complaint over lack of payment, as the same letter notes that others from Cockburn's regiment were being sent back to Finland for that reason, the Irish were specifically unhappy at being in Russia.

⁹² *RPCS*, second series, VI, 484–5, 527–8, 533.

⁹³ 30 September 1610, James Spens to Earl of Salisbury, PRO, SP95, I, f.170. Henry Brereton, *News of the present Miseries of Russia: Occasioned by the late Warre in that Countrey* (London: 1614), 43.

⁹⁴ Brereton, *News of the present Miseries of Russia*, 53–54; Frost, 'Scottish Soldiers, Poland-Lithuania', in Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 199–200.

⁹⁵ 24 January 1611, Karl IX to Spens, SRA, Anglica 4. Although he called the men 'British', the Scots and English returned to Sweden and no mention is made of them in the other sources found. This implies that the Irish were meant, especially given Chichester's description of their conduct in Sweden in 1614 noted above.

⁹⁶ Brereton, *News of the present Miseries of Russia*, 52; 30 September 1610, James Spens to Earl of Salisbury, PRO, SP95, I, f.170.

being organised in late 1610.⁹⁷ This number was added to by another body of Irishmen provided by Bingley who arrived in November.⁹⁸ It is known that Cockburn still commanded several hundred British and Irish in the subsequent 1612 campaign to Russia, but by the winter of that year, a lack of pay had forced at least three hundred of them, including the surviving Irish, back into Finland.⁹⁹ The new king Gustav II Adolf wanted more Scottish recruits and once more James Spens was ordered to request a further levy of 3,000 soldiers from Scotland where he had some important success.¹⁰⁰

Analysis of the officer intake in Sweden during the reign of Karl IX shows that he had been very successful in attracting Scots. Between 1600 and 1611 he had in fact taken on over 91 new Scottish officers, approximately a threefold increase from the 1590s. When added to the numbers of Scots still serving in Sweden from the earlier periods it is clear that neither Stuart support for Sigismund nor the continuation of the alliance with Denmark-Norway affected Sweden's status as the destination of choice. After the comparatively low numbers of enlistment in the first few years of the seventeenth century the post-1604 period saw things change both as a consequence of developing Stuart-British diplomacy and the impact individual Scots, such as James Spens, were having on the Stuart perception of the Northern world.

James Spens, The Kalmar War and the Papist-Polish Front 1611–1613

When war broke out between Sweden and Denmark-Norway in 1611, new military, diplomatic and geographical obstacles arose for Scottish recruitment stemming yet again from the Stuart alliance with the

⁹⁷ 30 September 1610, James Spens to Earl of Salisbury, PRO, SP95, I, f.170. Majja Jansson believes all 2,200 were Irishmen but the letter notes King James's subjects and it appears Jansson is unaware of the Scots and English recruited at the same time. See Jansson, et al., eds., *England and the North*, 50.

⁹⁸ 8 November 1610, James Spens to Earl of Salisbury, PRO, SP95, I, f.187. These are probably the Irish who went to Cockburn's regiment noted above.

⁹⁹ 22 April 1612, Jacob de la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, V, 9; 23 September 1612, Johan de la Gardie to Gustav II Adolf and 24 December 1612, Gustav II Adolf to ?. Both letters reproduced in J.E. Waaranen, *Handlingar upplysande Finlands Historia under Gustav II Adolfs tid* (Helsingfors: 1874), I, 79. Cockburn himself returned to Stockholm in June and provided much needed news from Russia to the government, 22 June 1612, *RAOSB*, first series, II, 62.

¹⁰⁰ 24 January 1611, Karl IX to Spens, SRA, Anglica IV.

Danish House of Oldenburg. Sweden was still at war with Poland-Lithuania and those Scots who wished to join in defence of a Protestant state needed to cross Danish-Norwegian territory, either through Norway by land or passing Denmark by sea. Even when the two Scandinavian countries were at peace, the Copenhagen regime balked at troops from an allied country entering the service of a country they perceived as a renegade province.¹⁰¹ When it became clear that there would be an inter-Scandinavian conflict, the problems for the Scots increased. At the end of March 1611, Karl IX complained to Christian IV about an assault on James Spens half a mile inside the Swedish border. This outrage had left Spens robbed of the official letters he was carrying as well as funds, and one of his retinue had been killed outright while the remaining four had been maltreated.¹⁰² In mid-April Karl again complained about the incident noting that Spens had been detained for 3 days by Christian's men at Helsingborg, then escorted back to the Swedish border and thereafter set upon. Spens turned to both James VI and the Scottish Privy Council complaining about the actions of Christian IV and ensuring free and unhindered passage of his goods through the Sound in the future.¹⁰³

After the outbreak of the Kalmar War this kind of harassment extended to Scottish recruits passing through Danish-Norwegian territory, irrespective of whether they were destined for the Danish or Russian-Polish fronts. This hostility culminated in the infamous massacre of some 350 Scots at Kringen in Norway in August 1612.¹⁰⁴ The official contemporary version of events states that the soldiers had embarked illegally from Scotland. Thereafter they were massa-

¹⁰¹ The Scots had to be careful not to offend James VI and I's brother-in-law. Thus when Henry Leyell and Alexander Ruthven travelled to Scotland to levy troops for Sweden in 1600, they courteously stopped at Copenhagen en route which caused some dismay at the Swedish Court, see SRA, Riksarkivets Ämbetsarkiv, Huvudarkivet FV a:31–32.

¹⁰² SRA, Riksarkivets Ämbetsarkiv, Huvudarkivet FV a:31–32.

¹⁰³ 31 March 1611, James Spens to James VI, PRO, SP95, I, f.183; *RPCS*, IX, 1610–1613, 626–627. See also a letter from Karl IX urging Spens to play up the incident in Britain. 27 August 1611, Karl IX to James Spens, *Anglica I/IV*, f.7.

¹⁰⁴ The Norwegian cultural tradition based on this incident, tells of the alleged savage behaviour of the Scottish troops as they crossed the country. Contemporary Norwegian sources reveal, however, the troops were not armed, as they were to collect their weapons on arrival in Sweden, and had not pillaged or murdered on their journey. They had stolen silver belonging to a Danish man, which was not recovered, implying that one of the Norwegians had subsequently stolen it. See letter dated 3 October 1612 to the Chancellor in Copenhagen in NRA, *Norske Kancelliinnlegg*, 335.

cred with about half of the men killed in the skirmish, the other half killed in cold blood the following day, only about 18 officers being spared.¹⁰⁵ Despite such incidents, there were certainly many Scottish soldiers in Sweden at the outbreak of the war including Colonel Patrick Rutherford's regiment.¹⁰⁶ Indeed an almost 3,000 strong reserve unit assembled at Örebro contained about 500 British recruits.¹⁰⁷ In addition there were many other Scots in smaller Scottish units, and officers in command of Swedish troops. Patrick Ruthven, for example, was put in charge of a troop of Scottish cavalry in 1610, and the cavalry troop was still in service in 1615.¹⁰⁸ John Herbert Gladstone was authorised by the Swedes to lead a foreign troop of Scottish, English, French and other nationality soldiers in July 1610, for which he would receive 1,700 daler monthly and which was still in service during the Kalmar War.¹⁰⁹ Similarly, Alexander Leslie and Robert Wallace both commanded largely Scottish units while Samuel Cockburn also remained in the field with a regiment composed mostly of Scots and Englishmen.¹¹⁰

Despite repeated assertions by Norwegian historians that the Kringen incident put an end to Scots crossing Norway in support of Sweden, that is not actually the case. Indeed, the historiography of the incident has clouded the issue of the legitimacy of Scottish service in Sweden during the Kalmar War period and even the facts surrounding the levy itself. When Spens received orders from Sweden to raise 3,000 men in Britain, Sweden and Denmark-Norway were at peace. The troops were to be used on the Polish-Lithuanian campaigns. True, King James expressly forbade the recruitment of the company of troops levied in Caithness, but not troops for Swedish service in general.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁵ 26 September 1612, Robert Anstruther to James Spens, SRA, Anglica III.

¹⁰⁶ Berg and Lagercranz, *Scots in Sweden*, 26.

¹⁰⁷ Ericson, "Arméen är under alperna . . . och garnisonerna kring hela Tyskland", in Ericson, ed., *Vägen till Westfaliska freden*, 53.

¹⁰⁸ KRA, Militäreräkenskaper 1537–1619, 1615/14. Mönsterulla över Peter Redwens Kompani (gammalt nummer 1615/55).

¹⁰⁹ For all these officers see SRA, Riksarkivets Ämbetsarkiv, Huvudarkivet FV a:31–32.

¹¹⁰ KRA, Militäreräkenskaper 1537–1619, 1612/6, 1612/7 and 1613. Rullor över Robert Wallas Kompani and Alexander Leslies Kompani 1612–1613. Same collection, Räkenskaper för Samuel Cobrons regemente värvat utländskt krigsfolk 1611/4, 1611/14, 1613/11–12 and 1614–1616. Other information can be gleaned from 1614/17, Rulla över sjuka soldater, tillhörande Samuel Cobrons regimente 1614 (gammalt nummer 1614/69).

¹¹¹ 4 August, 1612, *RPCS*, IX, 430–433, 434–6 and 438; See also 14 July 1611, *CSPI*, XII, 180.

Nor did he recall his subjects, which was quite within his powers at that time.¹¹² Although it has recently been stated that the Caithness group was the last Scottish levy for Sweden during the Kalmar War,¹¹³ recruitment continued throughout the war and, as Murdoch has suggested, James VI knew all about it.¹¹⁴

Karl IX declared that Spens' recruits were required in response to Christian IV's aggression, but he did not state that British subjects had to be used against Denmark-Norway.¹¹⁵ The war with Poland-Lithuania, and the new threat of a Jesuit-inspired Polish invasion of Sweden were also distracting Karl, who naturally did not want simultaneous wars on two or more fronts.¹¹⁶ All things considered, James VI thought it expedient to support Sweden against such a plot, but with explicit provisos. The joint British and Danish ambassador, Robert Anstruther (a half-brother of Sir James Spens) wrote to Spens from Copenhagen to make it clear that recruiting for both Denmark and Sweden was ongoing with the sanction of James VI and I.¹¹⁷ However, he emphasized that while those in Danish service could be employed anywhere by Christian IV, those destined for Sweden could not be deployed against the Danish king's forces. In particular, colonels Rutherford and Cockburn were to be alerted to this fact suggesting that the limitation of service applied equally to long-term veterans as well as newly recruited Scottish soldiers.¹¹⁸ As if

¹¹² It was not uncommon for monarchs to do this in the early modern period. Charles I certainly tried it with his sailors in 1633. See 5 May 1634, Proclamation of Charles I recalling seamen and shipmasters from foreign service in J.F. Larkin, ed., *Stuart Royal Proclamations, II. Royal Proclamations of King Charles I, 1625–1646* (Oxford: 1983), 417–418.

¹¹³ Ailes, *Military Migration and State Formation*, 13.

¹¹⁴ Murdoch, 'James VI and the formation of a Scottish-British Military Identity', in Murdoch and Mackillop, eds., *Fighting for Identity*, 17.

¹¹⁵ 27 August 1611, Karl IX to James VI, SRA, Anglica I/IV, f.7.

¹¹⁶ 38 November 1610, James Spens to Earl Salisbury, PRO, SP95, I, f.177; 1 March 1611 and 11 October 1612, James Spens to James VI, PRO, SP95, I, ff.183 and 212; 29 June 1612, James Spens to James VI, SRA, Anglica V. See also Jansson, et al., eds., *England and the North*, 51–53.

¹¹⁷ 18 July 1612, Robert Anstruther to James Spens, SRA, Anglica V.

¹¹⁸ However, some Scots did fight Christian IV's troops. A depiction of the Danish landing at Öland shows a saltire amongst the Swedish troops, see F.C. Lund's drawing Efter Karl von Manders tapet, reproduced in N.M. Probst, *Christian 4.s Flåde* (Copenhagen: 1996), 119. Whether this was a Scottish unit is uncertain, but Scots were known to be stubborn about which flag they fought under, see Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 212–213. Certainly in September 1612 the Scots were ordered to march toward the Danish troops' expected landing place, *RAOSB*, first series, II, 79–82.

that was not evidence enough, James VI told Spens, now operating with the title of General of British forces in Sweden, that he would allow even *more* soldiers for Swedish service should Christian IV refuse British diplomatic overtures designed at settling the peace.¹¹⁹

In August 1611, Spens was urged to continue his recruiting, and reiterated an earlier proposal regarding the marriage of Princess Elizabeth Stuart and Prince Gustav Adolf Vasa.¹²⁰ The suggestion was not taken up and Spens was still trying to organise his recruits at the end of the year.¹²¹ Karl IX sent 30,000 daler via an English merchant by the name of George Garrat with further funds being orchestrated in September.¹²² Spens received several more royal letters from Sweden relating to the new regiment including orders probably designed to foil Danish observations regarding British troop movements. Since the Scots maintained a brigade of three regiments in the Dutch Republic, the sending of troops there from Scotland would not cause suspicion. Gustav II Adolf, now the Swedish regent after his father's death, urged Spens to send his troops to the Dutch Republic where they should join Johan Mönnichhofen and from there continue to Sweden.¹²³ Spens was also ordered to appoint his own commander for these troops so as not to compromise his own ambassadorial status.¹²⁴ Importantly, by July 1612, Spens could report to Gustav II Adolf that the Scottish troops were on the way to the Dutch Republic for a rendezvous with Mönnichhofen.¹²⁵ Despite previous claims that there is no proof that these men were Scots, this is clearly not the case.¹²⁶ Spens was therefore successful in getting

¹¹⁹ Duke Johan used this title for Spens, see 13 September 1611, Duke Johan to James Spens, SRA, Anglica V.

¹²⁰ December 1611, *CSPD*, LXVII; T. Mathisen, *Fra Bondeoppbud til Legdshær* (Oslo: 1952), 115. A similar overture was noted in 1620, when a suitable match for Charles Stuart was being sought, Gustav II Adolf sent Spens to the Stuart court regarding a marriage with his sister. 6 November 1620, Girolamo Lando to the Doge and Senate, *CSPV*, XVI, 464.

¹²¹ 13 October and 16 November 1611, Gustav II Adolf to Spens, SRA, Anglica IV; Mathisen, *Fra Bondeoppbud til Legdshær*, 115

¹²² 27 August 1611, Karl IX to James Spens, Anglica I/IV, f.7; 13 September 1611, Duke Johan to Spens, SRA, Anglica V.

¹²³ 16 November 1611, Gustav II Adolf to James Spens, SRA, Anglica I/IV, f.11.

¹²⁴ 1 February 1612, Gustav II Adolf to James Spens, SRA, Anglica I/IV, f.126.

¹²⁵ 21 July 1612, James Spens to Gustav II Adolf, Anglica, III, f.1. See also 2 July 1612, Riksråd to Bo Ribbing, *RAOSB*, first series, II, 70, which notes that Spens had recruited some 1000s of Scots which were headed for Norway.

¹²⁶ Michell, *Scottish Expedition to Norway*, 21. The author uses 1609 statistics to show the scarcity of Scottish troops, but this does not have any bearing on the 1612 levy.

the troops raised in Scotland with official sanction from King James. They were transported to northern Norway on ships with others sent to the Dutch Republic with the specific intention of collecting Scottish soldiers. 1,400–2,200 men, many if not mostly Scots, disembarked in Norway near Trondheim in mid-July and fought their way through to Sweden under the command of Colonel Mönnichhofen.¹²⁷ They failed in the attempt to take the town of Trondheim, with the aim of cutting Norway in two and thus providing alternative Swedish access to the North Sea, but the soldiers simply retired to Sweden without any further Danish or Norwegian opposition.

In reviewing enlistment patterns for the Scots in Sweden during the 1611–13 period, it is hard to separate those joining to fight against Denmark-Norway from those enlisting to fight Poland-Lithuania. At this time Gustav II Adolf's intentions were that the Swedish army, when fully complemented would comprise 12,500 men.¹²⁸


From figure 3 it is clear that the 1611 upsurge equates to the outbreak of the Kalmar War between Sweden and Denmark-Norway. As noted above though, this also formed the tail end of the ongoing levies begun in 1609 relating to the Swedish-Polish conflicts and the Russian campaign. Still, at the start of the Kalmar War in 1611, 16 Scottish officers appeared on muster rolls in Sweden, while others in the Caithness levy did not make it that far.

Despite Anstruther's statement of 1612 that these troops were not for use against Denmark-Norway, their very enlistment raises questions over the reliability of Stuart support for Denmark. Not only did more Scots serve Sweden than Denmark-Norway throughout the war, but the total for service throughout the reign of James VI is quite telling.¹²⁹ Even before 1611 over 120 Scottish officers served in the Swedish

¹²⁷ *Samlinger til det Norske Folks Sprog og Historie* (Christiania: 1835), III, 225 and Michell, *History of the Scottish Expedition*, 23–31. One historian has noted the difference between the Kringen and Mönnichhofen episodes: "Johan Mönnichovens ferd gjennom Trøndelag som på en måte var en like stor affære, men som falt uheldig ut for Nordmennene, har ikke skapt en lignende tradisjon. De er spesielt beretningen om kampen ved Kringen som har fått en romantisk utforming", Mathisen, *Fra Bondeoppbud til Legdshær*, 119–120; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 189–190. Subsequently, 2,000 Scots marched unmolested across Norway.

¹²⁸ L. Ericson, 'När armén var under alperna', in K. Abukhanfusa, ed., *Mare Nostrum* (Västervik: 1999), 20.

¹²⁹ The Danes did not receive the help from James VI that they hoped for. Some 4,000 Englishmen were levied for Danish service under Lord Willoughby of which 2,000 were struck down straight away by epidemic. See 21 July 1612, James Spens to Gustav II Adolf, SRA, Anglica III; 11 October 1612, James Spens to James VI, PRO, SP95, I, f.212.

Fig. 3. *Scottish officer enlistment in the Swedish army 1609–1614*

(Source: SSNE database)

army. That figure is eight times the number of Scots officers (15) who entered Danish-Norwegian service during James VI and I's entire reign.¹³⁰ Either royal patronage simply was not enough, or more attention needs to be paid to the sorts of unofficial, or at least more circumspect, alliances such as those fostered by the Scots in Sweden.

It has been argued that James VI probably allowed the levy of Scots as way of ensuring the Swedes were strong enough militarily to bring the Danes to the negotiating table.¹³¹ James Spens explicitly said this, and played to the fear of Jesuit gains in Sweden should Poland win the war.¹³² The presence of the Scottish soldiers helped to restore the balance of power in Scandinavia and gave James VI the bargaining chips required to pressure his brother-in-law into establishing peace. Early reports that James would refuse to medi-

¹³⁰ Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 188.

¹³¹ Murdoch, 'James VI and the formation of a Scottish-British Military Identity', in Murdoch and Mackillop, eds., *Fighting for Identity*, 18.

¹³² 29 June 1612, James Spens to James VI and I, SRA, Anglica V; King James still practised this in 1618. When Christian IV threatened to attack Sweden, James equally threatened that he would support Gustav II Adolf, see Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 61.

ate between Sweden and Denmark-Norway were short lived.¹³³ King James, under advice from Spens, established that Gustav II Adolf would accept his overtures if he decided to put his full diplomatic weight behind ending the war. Ironically his eventual decision to arbitrate in the Baltic hostilities proved instrumental in fostering the development of official Stuart-Swedish relations. By doing so James recognised Gustav II Adolf as the legitimate king of Sweden, which he had also done for Karl IX, albeit on a personal rather than an official level. This policy shift was manifested in the use of Scottish diplomats by the House of Stuart in a number of dialogues between the Swedish, Polish, and Muscovite courts.¹³⁴ Most importantly Stuart ambassadors — Spens for Sweden and Robert Anstruther for Denmark — were integral in ending the Kalmar War.¹³⁵ They successfully negotiated the peace of Knäred in 1613 and brought the hostilities to a close.¹³⁶ After a period of isolation lasting from 1598–1611, Sweden was now firmly in the Stuart diplomatic orbit. Peace with Denmark-Norway allowed Gustav II Adolf to refocus his attention on the other serious threat to Sweden, Sigismund's commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania.¹³⁷

Conclusion

The movement of Scots to Sweden occurred against the background of unsettled relations between the various Scandinavian kingdoms

¹³³ 24 October 1611, letter to the Earl of Salisbury, in *KCFB*, I, 67. See also 8 December 1611, letter to Sir Robert Stewart, *CSPD*, 1611–1618, 98: James declined to meddle between Denmark and Sweden until he understood the “disposition of the King of Sweden in that matter”.

¹³⁴ S. Murdoch, ‘Diplomacy in Transition: Stuart-British Diplomacy in Northern Europe, 1603–1618’, in A.I. Macinnes, T. Riis and F. Pedersen, eds., *Ships, Guns and Bibles in the North Sea and the Baltic States c. 1350–c. 1700* (East Linton: 2000), 93–114, particularly 104–105.

¹³⁵ 29 April 1612, Instructions for James Spens, *Anglica III*; 6 June 1612, Christian IV's safe conduct pass for Spens, *Anglica V*. Importantly at this juncture, Spens signed a document in Stockholm binding himself to the service of Gustav II Adolf on condition that such service did not run contrary to his service of King James. See 28 October 1612, James Spens' Pledge, *SRA, Anglica V*.

¹³⁶ *Sveriges Traktater med Främmande magter jemte andra dit hörande handlingar*, (15 vols., Stockholm: 1877–1934), first series, V, 223; letter from Swedish agents to King James VI and I, 21 January 1613, *RAOSB*, first series, II, 130–2; Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna mentions James Spens as a representative of “Konungen i Store Brijtannien”, 22 June 1612, *RAOSB*, first series, II, 62; *CSPV*, XII, nos. 548, 583, 585, 789; M. Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus* (2 vols., London: 1953, 1958), I, 70; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 39–40.

¹³⁷ See Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, I, 97–99.

and their neighbours, and cannot be viewed in isolation from it. Yet from rather inauspicious beginnings, several key factors emerged from the early Scottish incursions into Scandinavia. That the trend of emigration followed by absorption into Swedish society had become a well-established route is clear enough. Over the course of the century, the traffic in military personnel had developed from a trickle of *legotrupper*, or mercenaries, simply looking for work into a quite different situation. Enough Scots had become involved with Sweden either financially or intellectually in her struggles that many of the Scots viewed themselves now as *hjälptrupper* or helptroops assisting an allied state.¹³⁸ Individual Scots adopted ever more important roles within the Swedish state. Some five Scots were appointed governors of various Swedish controlled castles, garrisons and regions between 1574–1606.¹³⁹ It was during the first two decades of the seventeenth century in particular that many of those Scots who subsequently became senior officers in the Swedish army first entered that crown's service: Patrick Ruthven, James Spens, and Alexander Leslie to name but a few. Not only did these men rise in rank to achieve the highest positions but they all served as diplomatic envoys during their careers as well. Most important of these until the death of Gustav II Adolf was the work and influence of Sir James Spens of Wormiston. Only by understanding the role of Spens can we account for the actions of James Stuart in his dealings with Gustav II Adolf. After all, the scarcity of any official Stuart-Vasa alliance would suggest hostility from the Stuart Court. However, by dealing through his trusted soldier-diplomats, he could actually extend his influence without one, or breaking his oath-bound but ever straining commitments to Denmark-Norway.¹⁴⁰ Rather than simply back away from Sweden, James would apparently risk seriously offending Christian IV to support Gustav Adolf. Indeed James was so indignant when Christian IV threatened to renege on the Stuart brokered treaty of Knäred that Spens could report to Gustav II Adolf

¹³⁸ For more on the shift in the pattern of military motivations from simple mercenary to military ideologue see Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, intro, 15.

¹³⁹ For more on this role of Scottish governorship see Grosjean, 'A century of Scottish governorship', in Murdoch and Mackillop, eds., *Military Governors and Imperial Frontiers*, 54–55.

¹⁴⁰ The pressures on the Stuart-Oldenburg alliance have been highlighted in Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 32–36 and 42–43. Murdoch suggests problems actually arose after the regal union of 1603 which added dimensions which could not have been foreseen in 1589 such as disputes over 'English' fishing rights and trade.

that King James would back the Swedish king over the Dane.¹⁴¹ Spens procured for Sweden what must have seemed the impossible: not only continued recruitment of Scots even as Sweden went to war with Denmark, but also stronger links between the Stuart-Vasa courts. Crucially, the flurry of activity by Scottish soldier diplomats and the apparent deepening of Stuart-Swedish contacts, showed that although the relationship between the two courts remained fragile, at least the formality of legitimacy had been resolved and an alliance of sorts, an ‘Alternative Band’ had been formed.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ 9 February 1618, James Spens to Gustav II Adolf, SRA, Anglica III; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 43.

¹⁴² See A. Grosjean, ‘The “Alternative Band”: Scotlan’s ties wi Sweiden, 1550–1599’, *Cairn*, no. 1 (1997).

CHAPTER TWO

GUSTAV II ADOLF AND THE SCOTS, 1613–1629

den nationen [Scotland] bestt medh vårt inlendsche folck
kunne komme öfvereens¹

The end of the Kalmar War did not assure Sweden that there would not be a re-ignition of hostilities with Denmark-Norway, and this worry persisted until the 1640s. Indeed the Riksråd records reveal the Swedes' overwhelming preoccupation with their Nordic neighbours and especially Christian IV's activities during the first half of the seventeenth century. This was hardly surprising given the Danish king's often stated ambition to re-annexe Sweden.² His aggressive behaviour did not just take the form of military operations, but also impacted economically. In particular his constant charging of tolls on ships coming from Swedish dominion territory, both in the Baltic and overseas, was a frequent source of justifiable irritation for the Swedes. After all this practice occurred in contradiction to Sweden's 'toll-free' status, which had been confirmed under the 1613 Knäred treaty. The Swedes were so angered by this particular financial interference that Christian's actions almost led to renewed war between the two kingdoms in 1624.³

Apart from an ongoing antagonism with her Scandinavian neighbours, Sweden had unresolved issues with the state of Muscovy and a continuing war with the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth to the south. Both these states presented territorial threats to Sweden and

¹ *RAOSB*, second series, V, 60–61.

² *KCFB*, I, 11. Christian IV's hopes to regain Sweden were frequently aired: in December 1603 the king protested against his Riksråd's decision not to make war on Sweden, and the following year he was still urging the Riksråd to enter into war with Sweden, *ibid.*, 13 and 35–44. See also Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, I, 61, and M. Bellamy, 'Danish naval administration and shipbuilding in the reign of Christian IV, 1596–1648', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Glasgow, 1997, part A, 19.

³ 10 December 1624, *SRP*, I, 5 and footnote; B. Meijer, ed., *Svensk-Historisk handlexikon* (Stockholm: 1882), 391. When these matters erupted again in the 1640s they sparked off the 1643–1645 war between Sweden and Denmark-Norway. See also J.A. Fridericia, *Danmarks ydre politiske historie i tiden fra freden i Prag til freden i Brömsebro (1635–1645)* (Copenhagen: 1972 repr.), 196–201.

influenced her politics throughout the century.⁴ A saving grace for Sweden was that these two entities were engaged in their own conflicts. Indeed, Polish aggression toward Russia has even been highlighted as beneficial for Sweden's very growth as a Baltic power.⁵ As these two great powers fought for domination, Sweden took the opportunity to extend her own spheres of influence.⁶

An Official Alliance Lost: Stuart-Vasa Relations 1614–1629

Having benefited greatly from Stuart support in guaranteeing the Knäred treaty, Sweden sought further British aid in obtaining diplomatic solutions to her quarrels with her neighbours. Gustav II Adolf invited James VI and I to mediate in his dispute with Poland and the Scot, Sir Patrick Gordon, was dispatched for this purpose. Along with the efforts of French and Dutch diplomats, negotiations successfully achieved the Swedish-Polish truce of 1614.⁷ Grateful for this intervention, Gustav II Adolf again sought Stuart mediation in 1616, this time to help resolve Swedish-Russian troubles.⁸ Apart from anything else, James did not wish to see what he perceived as the senseless shedding of Christian blood.⁹ The Englishman, Sir John Merrick, was dispatched to Russia to resolve Swedish-Russian differences while Patrick

⁴ See for instance A. Norberg, *Polen i svensk politik 1617–26* (Norrtälje: 1974); B.F. Porshnev, *Muscovy and Sweden in the Thirty Years' War 1630–1635* (Cambridge: 1995); Frost, *The Northern Wars*, *passim*.

⁵ "Polish-Russian hostility was one of the preconditions for Sweden's existence as a great power" from M. Roberts, 'Sweden and the Baltic, 1611–54', in J.P. Cooper, ed., *The New Cambridge Modern History* (Cambridge: 1970), IV, 217.

⁶ As Josef Polisensky stated "the realistic policy of Gustavus Adolphus is characterised by a long-standing interest in control over the Baltic coastal strip, and also over Silesia as a means of holding the Polish Vasas in check". See J.V. Polisensky, 'The Thirty Years' War and the crises and the revolutions in seventeenth century Europe', in *Past and Present*, vol. 38, (1968), 40.

⁷ *Sveriges Traktater*, first series, V, 225; Murdoch, 'Diplomacy in Transition', in Macinnes, et al. eds., *Ships, Guns and Bibles*, 104.

⁸ 22 January 1616, Gustav II Adolf's speech to the estates in Finland, *KGAS*, 136; Murdoch, 'Diplomacy in Transition', in Macinnes, et al., eds., *Ships, Guns and Bibles*, 104. In an interesting aside, Jacob de la Gardie noted that a member of an earlier diplomatic mission to Russia from Britain, a Mr Boitzer, was poorly treated by the English ambassador as he was suspected of being too pro-Swedish. De la Gardie admitted that this was true, and that he would be able to better inform James VI of the diplomatic situation than the Russian envoy's 'undoubted lies'. 23 September 1615, Jacob de la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, V, 82.

⁹ S. Konovalov, 'Anglo-Russian Relations, 1617–1618', in *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, I, (1950), 65. This is mentioned in a letter from Tsar Mikhail to King James, 1617.

Gordon returned to Poland-Lithuania to work on ending the Polish-Russian conflict and thus bring stability to the region.¹⁰ Merrick's negotiations brought a favourable end to Sweden's war with Russia — a fact that the Swedish king wished to thank James VI for as early as April 1616. Through the Peace of Stolbova, Sweden gained Kexholm and Ingermanland, which also established certain beneficial trade privileges and a cash sum of 20,000 roubles.¹¹

Sweden's foreign policy concerns again focused on Poland-Lithuania which had been left unsettled in the two-year truce of 1614. The outstanding Swedish grievances included Sigismund III's continuing claims to Gustav II Adolf's crown and the threat that any Polish army advance into Livonia would pose not only to Swedish borders but also to trade in the Finnish bay region. Pskov, a Russian town which bordered on Livonia, was viewed by the Swedes as the key to safeguarding both her territory and her economy. If gained by Poland, Sigismund would then control the Pskov-Narva trade route and so the Swedes resolved to capture it. The campaign was unsuccessful and Gustav II Adolf then sent James Spens to London in 1615 to explore the diplomatic options.¹² This was the Swede's fourth approach to James VI, in itself indicative of a considered and positive relationship between the monarchs. The Polish king's continued claims to the Swedish Crown made renewed Swedish-Polish hostilities more likely. King James then took a bold step in actually insisting to Spens that it would be expedient for Gustav II Adolf to be crowned and thus put the issue beyond dispute.¹³ In doing so he firmly established that he favoured the 'Swedish' Vasas over the

¹⁰ Kononov, 'Anglo-Russian Relations', 65; September 1617, Tsar Mikhail to King James synopsis and full letter in Russian in S. Kononov, 'Seven Russian Royal Letters, 1613–1623' in *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, 7, (1957), 19; 12 September 1615, Antonio Foscarini to the Doge and Senate, *CSPV*, XIV, 12; I. Lubimenko, 'The Correspondence of the First Stuarts with the First Romanovs' in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Fourth Series, Vol. 1, (1918), 80–81; Jansson, et al., eds., *England and the North*, 70–71; Murdoch, 'Diplomacy in Transition', in Macinnes, et al., eds., *Ships, Guns and Bibles*, 104.

¹¹ 25 April 1616, James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, Anglica V; 2 February 1617, James Spens to Gustav II Adolf, SRA, Anglica III, f.27. For the thanks of the Tsar to King James for his intervention see 1 April and 28 May 1618, Presentation of the Russian Ambassadors Stephan Evanowich Volinskii and Marke Evanuoson Posdeou to the English Privy Council, *APC*, August 1616–1617, 102 and 153; Lubimenko, 'The Correspondence of the First Stuarts with the First Romanovs', 81; Munck, *Seventeenth Century Europe*, 205.

¹² 9 November 1615, Gustav II Adolf to James Spens, SRA, Anglica I/IV, f.18; 29 December 1617, Piero Contarini to the Doge and Senate, *CSPV*, XXV, 88.

¹³ 25 April 1616, James Spens to Gustav II Adolf, SRA, Anglica, III, f.25.

'Polish' branch of the dynasty. Stuart support, albeit officially verbal and symbolic, was a crucial factor when it became obvious that Poland was intending to attack Sweden in 1617.¹⁴ Spens informed Gustav II Adolf that, through his intervention, James VI would refuse his subjects permission to serve Sigismund in any such endeavour, but expressly allowed those who wished to go into Swedish service to do so.¹⁵ Spens once more displayed his trademark flair for successfully serving two monarchs simultaneously and without any contradiction. The way seemed clear for a fuller and more formal relationship to mature between the two royal houses but developments elsewhere were to interrupt the process.

The events of 1618 led Europe into what became the Thirty Years' War. From 1618–1629, Vasa-Stuart diplomacy centred on various ways of getting the two royal houses into an alliance to fight for the 'Common Cause', that is the cause of the Protestant powers in Europe fighting the hegemony of the House of Habsburg, particularly in the Holy Roman Empire. For the Stuarts, there were very immediate reasons to become involved in the conflict. The wife of Frederick V of the Palatinate, newly crowned King of Bohemia, was Elizabeth Stuart, daughter of James VI and I. Although she was Queen of Bohemia, Elizabeth had support from British and Irish subjects, especially following her exile from Bohemia after the defeat of her husband's army at the battle of White Mountain in 1620.¹⁶ King James thoroughly disapproved of his son-in-law's provocative behaviour of 'usurping' the legitimate king, Ferdinand II (by now the Habsburg emperor), but he still took action on Frederick's behalf by covertly sending him money through Denmark.¹⁷ He also took a more pro-

¹⁴ 2 February 1617, James Spens to Gustav II Adolf, SRA, Anglica III, f.27. The Swedes also obtained information from Patrick Gordon's dispatches to Archibald Rankin, who was officially the factor to the Prince of Wales, but also served Gustav II Adolf. See Gordon's letter to Rankin, 18 August 1617, SRA, Åmnessamlingar, strödda historiska handlingar, XXIV.

¹⁵ 10 April 1617, James Spens to Gustav II Adolf, SRA, Anglica III, f.29; 24 September 1618, James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, Anglica V. Spens was supported in London by Johan Skytte who arrived on embassy in 1617. See 1617, Johan Skyttes Beskickning, SRA, Anglica VII, 531: Förhandlingar 1559–1632.

¹⁶ For a recent discussion of this theme see Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, intro, 3–4 and the various contributors, passim. From 1620 onwards young Scottish and English nobles were raising regiments to provide support for the Bohemians. The noblemen's zeal was so strong that experienced officers often lost their military positions to young noblemen desiring officer status. See 1 July 1620, Rowland Woodward to Fras. Windebank, *CSPD*, CXX, 159.

¹⁷ 20 April 1620, James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna SRA, Anglica 5; 4 May 1620, Christian IV to Christian Friis, *KCFB*, I, 171–3; 18 May 1620, Zuane Pesaro to

active stance by allowing the levy of 8,000 ‘British’ troops for use on the Continent.¹⁸ These were best represented by the Scottish regiment of Sir James Seaton and the mixed Scottish-English regiment of Colonel Andrew Gray, a Scottish Catholic and already a veteran of Swedish service.¹⁹

British Isles participation in this largely European conflict is understandable in view of the direct royal familial connection with the injured party. Sweden’s involvement stemmed from a different source, but importantly it also pre-dated the siege of Stralsund and Denmark-Norway’s withdrawal from the war, which are usually presented as catalysts for Gustav II Adolf’s arrival in Germany. The main Swedish agenda was, of course, self-defence and the preservation of Swedish interests in the Baltic. This included a strong desire to prevent Catholic encroachment in the north either directly through the actions of the Catholic Habsburg Empire or her allies, particularly Poland-Lithuania. Since 1595 Sweden had vigorously defended her Protestant status, confirmed in Karl IX’s decree of 1604 banishing Catholics from the nation, and again in the Riksdag act of 1617 condemning all contact with King Sigismund or his supporters.²⁰ The Vasa family had a personal interest in the fate of the Bohemian royals as Gustav II Adolf and his queen became godparents to the Palatinates’ newest child in 1623, along with the King of France and the Electress of Brandenburg.²¹ Throughout the 1620s it appeared to be only a matter of time before Sweden would fully engage in the conflict to help restore Frederick V to his forfeited estate of the Palatinate. This was widely understood and presented an obvious and, as became

the Doge and Senate, *CSPV*, XVI, 259; DRA, TKUA England A1/2, 3 June 1620, James VI and I to Christian IV.

¹⁸ 9 July 1620, Girolamo Lando to the Doge and Senate *CSPV*, XVI, 326–7; Polisensky, *Thirty Years’ War*, 159; and 202; S. Murdoch, ‘The House of Stuart and the Scottish Professional Soldier 1618–1640: a conflict of nationality and identities’, in B. Taithe and T. Thornton, eds., *War. Identities in Conflict 1300–2000* (Gloucestershire: 1998), 44.

¹⁹ He had served with both Patrick Ruthven and James Spens. 1620, James Spens to Gustav Adolf, SRA, Anglica, V. See also J.V. Polisensky, ‘A Note on Scottish Soldiers in the Bohemian War, 1619–1622’, in Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years’ War*, 109–115.

²⁰ Practising Catholics had already been banned from Sweden since 1595, and priests were given six weeks to leave, see Meijer, *Svensk-Historiskt Hand-lexicon*, 162, and G. Göransson, *Gustav II Adolf och hans folk* (Stockholm: 1994), 88.

²¹ The Swedish king’s continued affection for the Palatinates was shown a year later when he presented yet another son with gifts. See Marc Antonio Morosini to the Doge and Senate, 4 December 1623, *CSPV*, XVIII, 163 and Zuane Pesaro, 4 November 1624, *ibid.*, 478.

apparent, consistent motivation for Scottish enlistment in the Swedish army — or that of any army with the restoration of the Palatinate as an objective.²² A similar combination of national interest and familial relations drew Denmark-Norway into the war, as not only was the Danish king also the Duke of Holstein (in which capacity he entered the war), but he was additionally uncle to Elizabeth Stuart, Queen of Bohemia.²³ Thus the concerns of family loyalty became entwined with both support for religious freedom and struggles of national integrity in both the Scandinavian kingdoms. Christian IV did not, however, express the same military zeal as his Swedish counterpart and his preparations for war occurred on a smaller scale than Gustav II Adolf proposed.

Surprisingly, given the close familial link of Christian IV to Elizabeth Stuart, it was the Swedish king and not the Dane who made the initial approach regarding Scandinavian involvement in the war. As early as 1619 Gustav II Adolf contacted Christian IV with a suggestion for a unified Scandinavian military endeavour in favour of Frederick V.²⁴ Internal divisions in Denmark-Norway were such that factions had arisen not only in support of the Emperor but also favouring Gustav II Adolf over Christian IV. At this time three options were to be considered at the next Danish parliament: firstly, that Gustav II Adolf should command and manage the ‘German War’ with Christian’s army and Danish funding; secondly, that the two Scandinavian armies could be ruled by a common council; and thirdly, that the Swedish king be made responsible for the protection of the Danish-Norwegian coast north of the Baltic, including Halland, Blekinge and Skåne. These lands would be returned to Christian after the war as reimbursement. Gustav II Adolf was no doubt trying to protect Sweden from the possible attack of a newly

²² Alexander Leslie in particular demonstrated this in 1632 and again in 1639. After the death of Gustav Adolf in 1632 Leslie did not leave the Swedish army and return to Scotland, but saw a new opportunity for King Frederick to become the leader of the Protestant cause, and thereby concentrate efforts to regain the Palatinate, see 26 November 1632, NAS, GD406/1/10530. In 1639 Leslie was actually in charge of the Covenanting forces when he offered King Charles I the service of taking his men across to the Continent in support of the Palatinate. See 1 July 1639, *CSPV*, XXIV, 532. This remained the theme underlying his military activities.

²³ For Danish involvement in the war see P.D. Lockhart, *Denmark in the Thirty Years’ War 1618–1648: King Christian IV and the Decline of the Oldenburg State* (Selinsgrove: 1996). For the impact of Danish participation in the war for Great Britain, see Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, especially Chapters Two and Three.

²⁴ 1619, English-language account of Gustav II Adolf’s proposal to Christian IV, PRO, SP 95, II, f.51.

mobilised Denmark-Norway while facilitating his own claims to Danish territory. James Spens was issued with instructions to encourage the formation of this league by Sir George Calvert in July 1619 and offering Stuart mediation on any sticking points.²⁵ Unsurprisingly the Swedish king's offers were rejected by Copenhagen. Despite this initial setback, the two Scandinavian kings both realised the danger posed to their kingdoms by war in the Habsburg Empire and both declared support for Frederick of Bohemia in April 1620.²⁶ Although the Scandinavian monarchs simply could not come to an agreement about a joint alliance, Gustav II Adolf sent Frederick aid in the form of eight to ten cannon and 500 cannon balls as well as money.²⁷

Proceedings in Britain further antagonised the Swedes and seriously jeopardised any Swedish involvement in the European conflict. This was due to what appeared to be James VI and I's inconsistent behaviour during Sweden's war with Poland. Gustav II Adolf decided in 1621 that the best way to make use of Poland's hostilities with the Turks was to reinitiate his own war with Poland. Typically enough, James' response (in the name of Christian unity) was to encourage the maintenance of the existing Swedish-Polish truce, which the Swedes initially appeared to agree to and which was part-brokered by his diplomats.²⁸ To the horror of the Swedish king, however, it appeared that James was actually supporting his enemy militarily by allowing a levy of soldiers for use in Poland. James appeared to treat the Swedes the same way he had acted with the Danes in 1612: he hoped to avert war by arming the weaker nation. While the levy appeared inconsistent from the Stockholm perspective, James was actually applying the same strategy of military balance which had already worked to the advantage of the Swedes on a previous occasion. As far as James was concerned, the integrity of Christendom came before that of any inter-Christian feuding, just as it had done in his earlier dealings between Sweden and Russia. The British king's

²⁵ 30 July 1619, Instructions to James Spens from Sir George Calvert, SRA, Anglica V.

²⁶ 3 April 1620, Girolamo Lando to the Doge and Senate, *CSPV*, XVI, 223.

²⁷ The number of cannon varies depending on the source. 4 July 1620, Valerio Antelmi to the Doge and Senate, *CSPV*, XVI, 301. In 1620, Gustav II Adolf sent Peter Falck to London with instructions to negotiate with King James. See 1620, Peter Falcks Beskickning, SRA, Anglica VII, 531: Förhandlingar 1559–1632.

²⁸ 26 May 1621, James Spens to James VI, PRO SP95, II, f.58; J.K. Fedorowicz, *England's Baltic Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century: A Study in Anglo-Polish Commercial Diplomacy* (Cambridge: 1980), 11.

actions resulted in James Spens' October report that Gustav II Adolf had departed for Livonia with his army.²⁹

Since 1623 the Swedes had known that Sigismund had commissioned Colonel Robert Stewart, a Scot, to levy between 7,000 and 10,000 men for use in a Polish campaign in Sweden. Consequently Gustav II Adolf sent James Spens to London that year to obtain the Stuart king's promise not to allow Stewart's levy — the continuation of a project ongoing since 1621.³⁰ The Swedish agent in the Sound, Anders Svensson, noted that James was allowing Stewart to levy, albeit with the proviso that his troops were only to be used against the Turks, and not against another Protestant power, and by that he clearly meant Sweden.³¹ Gustav II Adolf informed the Scottish Privy Council directly that Robert Stewart was working for the Polish king and had recruited 8,000 Scots for his use against Sweden and not for the Polish-Turkish war as they had been led to believe.³² Well informed of the majority Scottish Calvinist opinion in Scotland, the Swedish king appealed directly to the Protestant sentiment of the Privy Council. He calculated that the Scots would object to the levy, especially one conducted by one of their own nation on behalf of a 'papist' state. Despite the fact that rumours of the levy persisted until the following year, James Spens reported to Sweden that he had managed to get the license revoked as early as March 1624.³³ Robert

²⁹ 26 October, James Spens to James VI and I, PRO, SP95, II, f.69.

³⁰ 24 June 1623, Jacob de la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, V, 219; 11 September 1623, Axel Oxenstierna to envoy to Poland, *RAOSB*, first series, II, 590; 23 September 1623 and 30 October 1623, Gustav II Adolf to James Spens, SRA, Anglica, IV; PRO, SP95, II, f.84; R. Frost, 'Scottish Soldiers, Poland-Lithuania', in Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 202–208.

³¹ Such clauses specifying troop use had not proved relevant when Irish soldiers were sent to Poland in an earlier levy in 1621; Frost, 'Scottish Soldiers, Poland-Lithuania', in Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 208.

³² *RPCS*, XIII, 364–5; *RPCS*, second series, I, 524 footnote. Chancellor Oxenstierna was also worried about a Danish-Polish alliance with Christian IV providing a safe conduct through the Sound for Stewart's recruits, *RAOSB*, first series, II, 767–70.

³³ 8 March 1624, Alvise Valaresso to the Doge and Senate, *CSPV*, XVIII, 233: "and so the king continues in his usual vacillation". Gustav II Adolf noted the vacillation of the 'English' (though actually British) with reference to Stuart support for Poland in Swedish-Polish hostilities, autumn 1624, a draft of Gustav II Adolf's speech to parliament, *KGAS*, 210–11. In November Oxenstierna feared the development of an alliance between Poland and Denmark-Norway, particularly as the rumours of Stewart's recruitment remained current, 16 November 1624, Axel Oxenstierna to Ludvig Camerarius, *RAOSB*, first series, II, 769.

Frost has demonstrated that, despite the best efforts of Robert Stewart, the attempted Polish levy came to nothing.³⁴

Having seen off the Polish threat, Spens reverted to the business of employing Britons into Swedish service. Gustav II Adolf knew that Sir Robert Anstruther was in Germany on embassy discussing a proposed coalition of anti-Habsburg powers and determined to find out what his instructions were in this regard.³⁵ Once more in The Hague, Spens was able to reassure the Swedes that they were to be part of the proposed coalition which was to include the Stuart Kingdoms, the Dutch Republic, Denmark-Norway and France.³⁶ As Gustav II Adolf's plan for the anti-Imperial alliance was set in motion, Spens and Christian von Bellin (privy councillor of Brandenburg) were dispatched back to London via The Hague. In addition, the chancellor's brother, Gabriel Gustafsson Oxenstierna, departed for Denmark to meet with Sir Robert Anstruther and the north German princes.³⁷ The French were also being encouraged to join by the Swedes and their representative negotiated with Gabriel Oxenstierna in Copenhagen to that effect.³⁸ So promising were Swedish efforts that it appeared Gustav II Adolf would eclipse Christian IV as champion of the Protestant Cause when direct and imminent intervention in the wars in Germany was suggested. Gustav II Adolf proposed that the Stuart king and the Protestant Princes in Germany should pay for two-thirds of the required supplies, including four regiments

³⁴ Frost, 'Scottish Soldiers, Poland-Lithuania', in Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 208.

³⁵ 12 October 1624, Gustav II Adolf to Duke Adolf Frederick of Mecklenburg, *KGAS*, 445–467.

³⁶ 17 December 1624, James Spens to Gustav II Adolf, SRA, *Anglica V*; 23 January 1625, Axel Oxenstierna to Ludvig Camerarius, *RAOSB*, first series, III, 12; G.M. Bell, *A Handlist of Diplomatic Representatives 1589–1688* (London: 1990), 197 and 273. This had already been mooted by Gustav II Adolf to Spens on 24 August 1624, SRA, *Anglica* 531: "S.R. Mtas et Rex Dania ac Ordines Belgii mutus foedere cum Seremissimo Mag. Britannia Rege se conjungant".

³⁷ 23 and 28 January, 10 February 1625, Axel Oxenstierna to Ludvig Camerarius and 28 January 1625, Axel Oxenstierna to Johan Casimir, *RAOSB*, first series, III, 12–14, 25. A good Danish perspective of the various negotiations is given in Lockhart, *Denmark in the Thirty Years' War*, 116–118 and 123–125. For an evaluation of Anstruther in Denmark see also Norberg who describes him as "en av den tidens skickligaste engelsk (sic) diplomater" in Norberg, *Polen i svensk politik 1617–26*, 214. Certainly Oxenstierna feared his influence at the Stuart court. See 6 April 1625, Axel Oxenstierna to Simundt von Götzen, *RAOSB*, first series, III, 52.

³⁸ 2 February 1625, Axel Oxenstierna to Johan Casimir, *RAOSB*, first series, III, 19.

to be raised in England and Scotland, and four in France. The Swedish king was thus prepared to initiate a massive German campaign involving 50,000 troops, but only on specific conditions: in addition to covering two-thirds of the cost, his allies also had to pay subsidies four months in advance.³⁹

The Swedish proposal was a costly one, both financially and in terms of the degree of trust involved on all sides. It was this factor which probably proved to be the greatest sticking point.⁴⁰ The Swedish proposal allowed Gustav II Adolf widespread territorial control in the hotly contested area of the Baltic. When Christian IV submitted a much smaller, safer and cheaper suggestion of military intervention in Germany, it seemed to offer a better deal to both the London-based financiers and the Danish king.⁴¹ In the mind of Prince Charles Stuart, now effectively in charge of preparations, the two proposals simply did not compare. Gustav II Adolf's plan would have cost him around £400,000 sterling a year, whereas Christian's

³⁹ PRO, SP75, VI, f.32. The military proposals of the Kings of Sweden and Denmark, anno 1624; 1624–1625, James Spens Beskickning, SRA, Anglica VII, 531: Förhandlingar 1559–1632. n.d. October 1624, Gustav II Adolf to James Spens, *The Camden Miscellany* (London: 1875), VII, 85. The Swedish proposal was accompanied by very specific terms including that the League was to be maintained in Gustav II Adolf's name. In return he offered to provide 12 regiments of foot, each of 1,184 men, totalling 14,208 soldiers plus 2,000 horse. In return, his allies were to provide 24 regiments of foot to the same numbers totalling 28,416 soldiers and 6,000 horse. In addition, the Swedish offer demanded four months' pay in advance for the allied troops, amounting to £311,664 sterling, and that Danzig had to remain neutral and two harbours, preferably Wismar and Bremen, were to be secured for Swedish landing on German shores. The Swedes would also provide 66 artillery pieces, 82,800 lbs of cannon powder, 120,240 lbs of musket powder and 180,360 lbs of match. See also Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, I, 238; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 58.

⁴⁰ Since August 1624 Sir Robert Anstruther had noted his despair at the deep suspicion between the Swedes and Danes. Indeed, Axel Oxenstierna later had to tell the Swedish resident in the Dutch Republic not to allow the Prince of Orange to be put off an alliance with Sweden by Christian IV. See 1 August 1624, Robert Anstruther to James Spens, SRA, Anglica V; 10 February 1625, Axel Oxenstierna to Jan Rutgers and 13 March 1625, Axel Oxenstierna to Ludvig Camerarius, *RAOSB*, first series, III, 28 and 47. In this last letter, Oxenstierna stated that he believed the behaviour of the Danes would spoil everything regarding the league, despite various assurances that they supported it.

⁴¹ Christian offered 4,000 foot, 1,000 horse, "armed and furnished with munition" with 'some' artillery, and sought only 6,000 foot and 1,000 horse from Charles I to be built up to 30,000 men with their German allies. See PRO, SP75, V, f.349. An abstract of Anstruther's negotiations in Denmark, Holstein and Germany, anno 1624; PRO, SP75, VI, f.32. The military proposals of the Kings of Sweden and Denmark, anno 1624.

plan required a ‘more reasonable’ £180,000 sterling.⁴² The Swedish idea was eventually formally rejected within days of the death of King James.⁴³ Charles I appeared not to recognise Gustav II Adolf’s proven military record — Sweden had after all been at war for the duration of his reign since 1611, mostly successfully. More importantly, the military skill of Charles’ uncle, Christian IV, was now being overestimated while the internal divisions between the Danish king, his army and his nobility were being completely ignored.⁴⁴

Gustav II Adolf was not impressed by Christian IV’s military preparations and indicated he would step in to lead the Common Cause if the Danish king failed.⁴⁵ Whilst Christian IV was engaged in Germany, Gustav II Adolf yet again turned to the Polish campaigns. Some 12,000 soldiers were sent to Livonia in 1625 in preparation for the mounting of a new Swedish action against Poland-Lithuania in Prussia. James Spens had advised Gustav II Adolf to undertake this move and break the truce with Poland, thereby ensuring the Poles did not release their Cossack army of 25,000 men for service in the Habsburg armies against the Protestant powers.⁴⁶ Gustav II Adolf was assured that Charles I concurred with his actions as it, in effect, brought the 1625 Livonian campaign into the Common Cause by using it as a decoy action. Spens was not the only Swedish representative in London at the time. Count Gabriel Oxenstierna had left The Hague to visit the Stuart Court in 1625 where he was joined by Karl Banér.⁴⁷ Andrew Keith received instructions to escort Banér

⁴² Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, I, 242; C. Russell, *The Crisis of Parliaments, English History 1504–1660* (Oxford: 1982), 300.

⁴³ Christian IV wrote to Gustav II Adolf with his intentions to go to war against the Habsburg Empire in April 1625. The latter was included in one dated 9 April 1625, Axel Oxenstierna to Ludovig Camerarius, *RAOSB*, first series, III, 55.

⁴⁴ Lockhart, *Denmark in the Thirty Years’ War*, 122–123; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 61.

⁴⁵ 6 and 9 April 1625, Axel Oxenstierna to Sigmundt von Götzen and Axel Oxenstierna to Ludvig Camerarius, *RAOSB*, first series, III, 52 and 54–56.

⁴⁶ 14 June 1625, James Spens to Sir Dudley Carleton, PRO, SP95, II, f.126.

⁴⁷ 1625, Gabriel Oxenstiernas Beskickning, SRA, Anglica VII, 531: Förhandlingar 1559–1632. In most Swedish sources it is reported, vaguely, that it was Per Banér who went to London (e.g. *SBHL*, I, 60–61, *RAOSB*, first series III, 773, index). However, the English Privy Council is very specific in naming ‘Charles’ Banér, Chamberlain to the Swedish king, as the ambassador extraordinary in London in August–September 1625. Neither the name nor the position fit Per Banér, the Governor of Estonia. Karl was at that time Öfverkammarherre (*SBHL*, I, 62). For his mention by the Privy Council of England see 1 and 7 September 1625, Privy Council Instructions, *APC*, 1625–1626, 156 and 181.

to Southampton from where he was to take passage to France to serve as a commissioner in Britain's (deteriorating) dealings with France.⁴⁸

The Swedes also kept Spens busy. He returned on another embassy to The Hague August 1625 where he personally delivered a documentation to the States General from Gustav II Adolf.⁴⁹ Ever hopeful, new moves were afoot to unite the Scandinavian armies against the Habsburgs, although these were frequently thwarted by inter-Scandinavian rivalries.⁵⁰ Thus when Christian IV suggested merging Danish and Swedish troops against the Imperial forces in 1626, Gustav II Adolf responded by proposing his defensive and offensive confederation against the Polish League, Crown and King of Poland, revealing to Christian IV exactly where he believed Swedish priorities lay.⁵¹

The death of James in 1625 led the Stuart Kingdoms to a shift in diplomatic emphasis. Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna noted that the new king had to settle differences between the Earl of Bristol and Buckingham, as well as with the English Parliament in 1626.⁵² In combination with the renewed Stuart-Oldenburg alliance and the focus of Charles I on war against France and Spain, Sweden took a diminished role in Stuart diplomacy. However the prospect of Swedish involvement in the German campaigns in the Common Cause remained enticing.⁵³ Despite the jealousies between the Scandinavian kings, Spens returned to the Stuart Court in 1626 to firm up the alliance between the Stuarts and Vasas.⁵⁴ Spens sent instructions to Lord Conway establishing the conditions by which Sweden and Great Britain could enter into a formal alliance in the name of the Common

⁴⁸ See 27 August 1625, Gabriel Oxenstierna to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, III, 84–86.

⁴⁹ 13 January 1626, Johan Skytte to James Spens, SRA, *Anglica V*; H.W. van der Burgh, *Gezantschappen door Zweden en Nederland 1592–1795* (Hague: 1886), 34.

⁵⁰ On 10 April 1625 Christian IV wrote a memorial in which he stated he wanted to meet the Prince of Brandenburg to discuss how Gustav II Adolf could take over the army which the Danish king had raised, see *KCFB*, I, 420–424.

⁵¹ Christian IV would not agree to this as Poland was a vital element in the balance of power between Denmark and Sweden at the time. In addition, the Danish king was already in league with France and Brandenburg who would resent this strong Nordic confederation. See Christian IV's comments of 30 September 1626, *KCFB*, II, 33–39.

⁵² 5 July 1626, Axel Oxenstierna to Johan Casimir, *RAOSB*, first series, III, 340–1.

⁵³ The term Common Cause was used frequently in Swedish diplomatic circles to describe the ongoing wars of which they were not technically part, but certainly interested. See for example 9 April 1625, Axel Oxenstierna to Ludvig Camerarius, *RAOSB*, first series, III, 55. James Spens frequently used the term as in 1626, James Spens to Lord Conway, SRA, *Anglica V* (French and English copies). A copy also exists in PRO, SP95, II, f.158.

⁵⁴ 11 January 1626, James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, *Anglica V*.

Cause.⁵⁵ The proposal was set out with the recovery of the lost lands of Frederik V as the first point. However, these were added to with a somewhat untenable obligation for Britain to aid Sweden by land and sea should Poland launch a surprise attack. Given the existing Stuart military commitment, this seemed an impossible clause. And that is how it was received at the Stuart Court. By October, Spens told Gustav II Adolf not to expect any help from England for his Polish and German campaigns due to the refusal of English subjects to vote money for anything without parliamentary consent.⁵⁶ Instead Spens advised the king to attack Danzig in a joint action with his wife's brother-in-law, Prince Bethlen Gabor of Transylvania.

In this same letter, Spens had intriguingly added that the Swedes should still consider formally joining the Common Cause while Count Mansfeld, the Dutch and the Danes were all still involved. To follow up on this suggestion a new British embassy set out in June for the Swedish Court, now based in Elbing with the army. Sir James Spens led as ambassador and was joined by Sir Peter Young, Sir Andrew Keith, Sir Robert Primrose and Sir Henry St George, Garter King-at-Arms of England.⁵⁷ They were greeted with some pomp, with several troops of horses riding out to meet them. As part of the mission, Charles I had instructed Spens to invest Gustav II Adolf with the Order of the Garter. He did this some days after Sir Henry St George had conferred on Gustav II Adolf the Order of St George.⁵⁸ Again there were huge celebrations during which the

⁵⁵ 1626, James Spens to Lord Conway, SRA, Anglica V (French and English copies). A copy also exists in PRO, SP95, II, f.158.

⁵⁶ Gustav II Adolf found a way around English reluctance to finance his military campaigns by exacting a 'loan' from the English Eastland Company in Elbing for 24,000 Swedish Daler (equivalent to 15,000 Rixdaler). He ordered this money to be made available to him in England which the English Privy Council agreed the company had to pay despite their petitions against it. Given that the Swedes now occupied Elbing, they really had little choice. See 9 October and 26 November 1626, Memorials of the English Privy Council, *APC*, June–December 1626, 312 and 382.

⁵⁷ n.d. (May 1627?) Charles I to Sir James Spens, PRO, SP95, II, f.164; 27 and 29 June 1627, Memorials of the English Privy Council, *APC*, January–August 1627; 8 November 1627, Sir Robert Primrose to Sir James Primrose, *RPCS*, second series, II, 1627–1628, 559.

⁵⁸ 26 November 1626, James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, Anglica V; June 1627, Charles I to James Spens PRO, SP95, II, ff.165–168. Charles knew that the Dutch were trading freely in Prussia with Swedish and Polish permission, as these two countries controlled various Baltic ports, and he wanted to learn how Stuart merchants could also benefit. In addition to this Charles wanted to hear how Gustav II Adolf successfully ruled his kingdom during all his lengthy absences on war campaigns, revealing the depth of Charles' admiration for Gustav II Adolf's internal policies.

Swedish king knighted Sir Henry St George and Sir Peter Young along with some Scottish colonels. Afterwards some 3–4,000 muskets were discharged. But behind all the ceremony there was a specific agenda.⁵⁹ Thereafter Gustav II Adolf set forth on another expedition with mixed results, and as the military campaign faltered, the Swedes and Poles both looked for ways out.⁶⁰ Charles I was particularly looking for a rapprochement between Sweden, Poland-Lithuania and Brandenburg which would facilitate full Swedish participation in the war against the Habsburg Empire in Germany.⁶¹ Gustav II Adolf still offered to commit his army to the Common Cause with 12 regiments of foot and 2,000 horse if Britain, the Dutch Republic and others assisted with men and money.⁶² This could have been achieved if only an agreement could be reached between Gustav II Adolf and Christian IV, but that did not seem possible. Spens nonetheless informed Coke about Swedish plans to leave Poland and Livonia and fully engage in Germany, and that Swedish and Polish commissioners had already planned a meeting in the near future.⁶³

Spens returned to Britain in response to Charles I's offer of mediation with Poland-Lithuania, and to continue discussion of the Common Cause. Simultaneously, Sir Thomas Roe was dispatched to Prussia to begin the process of mediation, accompanied by Archibald Rankin, a long-term Scottish agent of Gustav II Adolf based in London.⁶⁴ Despite Axel Oxenstierna's warning to the Stuart agent in Poland, Francis Gordon, that Roe should avoid the mistake of presenting himself to Sigismund III before meeting Gustav II Adolf, the English envoy did just that.⁶⁵ This resulted in a serious diplomatic incident, as Roe had displayed an insensitivity to the very reason

⁵⁹ 8 November 1627, Sir Robert Primrose to Sir James Primrose, *RPCS*, second series, II, 1627–1628, 559.

⁶⁰ For a fuller history of these campaigns see Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II, 388–399.

⁶¹ n.d. (May 1627?) Charles I to Sir James Spens, PRO, SP95, II, f.164.

⁶² 12 November and 20 December 1627, James Spens to Sir John Coke, PRO, SP95, II, f.99 and ff.209–210.

⁶³ 10 January 1628, James Spens to Sir John Coke, PRO, SP95, III, f.1.

⁶⁴ 19 March, 1629–1630, SRA, Anglica 522, Thomas Roe to Gustav II Adolf; For more on Roe in Sweden see Oxenstierna's various letters to him in *RAOSB*, first series, IV, 594–596, 628, 636, 651–653 and mentions of his embassy, passim; S. Tunberg, et al. *Den Svenska Utrikes Förvaltningens Historia* (Uppsala: 1935), 74–75; S.R. Gardiner, ed. 'Letters relating to the mission of Sir Thomas Roe to Gustavus Adolphus 1629–1630', in *The Camden Miscellany*, VII.

⁶⁵ 19 August 1629, Axel Oxenstierna to Francis Gordon, *RAOSB*, first series, IV, 589–590, and 26 August 1629, Axel Oxenstierna to Thomas Roe, *ibid.*, 594–596.

for this war with Poland (this issue of right to the Swedish crown), which was only corrected through Sir James Ramsay's intervention, allowing Roe's mission to continue.⁶⁶ Nonetheless, Roe was an important factor in brokering a five-year truce between Sweden and the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth.⁶⁷ That, coupled with the retirement of Denmark-Norway from the war in 1629 after the Treaty of Lübeck left Sweden as the only serious hope for the Protestant powers in the ongoing German conflict. With the Polish-Lithuanian front closed and no rivalry with Denmark-Norway over the leadership of the remaining allies in the field, Sweden could at last enter the Common Cause, and with Gustav II Adolf finally at the head of the alliance.

An Alliance Proven: Scotland in the Swedish Wars 1621–1629

Although there had been no formal Vasa-Stuart alliance since the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, the Scottish-Swedish 'Alternative Band' remained in place and functioned as well as before. The limited Swedish population required the continual search for auxiliary forces in order to build an army capable of sustaining the campaigns against Poland-Lithuania. In 1614, soon after the close of the Kalmar hostilities, the Swedish army numbered 10,300 soldiers on eastern fronts, and another 4,500 in garrisons elsewhere.⁶⁸ An unexpected 'British' source of military support came from Christian IV, who tried to encourage the 'English' soldiers in his army to go into Swedish service from Norway in early 1613 so that he could avoid paying for them, a move that revealed just how non-integral these troops were to the Danish army.⁶⁹ This was before Christian IV formalised the Treaty of Lübeck, but it had already become obvious

⁶⁶ For Ramsay's successful intervention see 28 January 1633, John Durie to Sir Thomas Roe reminding Roe of his cousin Ramsay's interjection on his behalf. The letter is reprinted in G. Westin, *Negotiations about church unity 1628–1634: John Durie, Gustavus Adolphus, Axel Oxenstierna* (Uppsala: 1934), 230–233; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 87.

⁶⁷ Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II, 397–399; M.J. Brown, *Itinerant Ambassador: The Life of Sir Thomas Roe* (Lexington: 1970), 180; S. Murdoch, 'Scottish Ambassadors and British Diplomacy 1618–1635', in Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 36.

⁶⁸ Ericson, 'När armén var under alperna' in Abukhanfusa, ed., *Mare Nostrum*, 19.

⁶⁹ 28 January 1613, Christian IV to Jørgen Lunge, *Norske Rigsregistranter*, IV, 483. These soldiers would probably have included the two companies of Irish as Robert Trenes and Simon Bue were sent home to recruit the previous autumn. See 22 September 1612, Christian IV to Envold Kruse, *Norske Rigsregistranter*, IV, 472.

that the fighting on the Danish-Norwegian front was over. The Danish treaty and the Swedish-Polish truce which followed allowed for a breathing space and a time to rebuild the Swedish army.

However, campaigns continued against the Russians. As early as August 1613 Samuel Cockburn's regiment had left its quarters in Finland and landed at Narva and went on to play a decisive role at Pskov in 1616.⁷⁰ Cockburn's troops were not enough, and still more were wanted in Britain. In particular, the Swedes wanted Scots as they believed that they above all other nationalities got on best with indigenous Swedish troops.⁷¹ Lieutenant General Jacob de la Gardie therefore asked Chancellor Oxenstierna to allow the Scot, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Poyler, to return to Scotland and try to get more men for the ongoing campaigns.⁷² At least five officers arrived in Britain with open warrants inviting all those willing to enlist with the King of Sweden.⁷³

The cessation of hostilities with Russia after the Treaty of Stolbova diminished the immediate need for soldiers, yet despite the success of Stuart brokered diplomacy, conflict with the Polish Vasas was never far away. In 1621 Gustav II Adolf built an invasion force of 13,600 for his Livonian campaign and by the following year 30 new field regiments were established.⁷⁴ Once again the Scots formed a major component of these formations. Because of James' desire for peace between the Vasa kings, Gustav II Adolf was denied any new major levy of Scots. However, there was no recall of Scottish soldiers from Swedish service by the Stuart king and no obstacle was placed in Gustav II Adolf's way in the deployment of those Scottish soldiers he still had in service. From 1620 onwards, recruitment in Scotland for the various episodes of the Thirty Years' War certainly had a profound impact on the numbers of Scots in Swedish service. The

⁷⁰ 1 August 1613, Jacob de la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, V, 45; L.W. Munthe, *Kungliga Fortifikationens Historia* (Stockholm: 1902), I, 327.

⁷¹ This was expressed by Lieutenant-General Jacob de la Gardie to the Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna where he stated that "den nationen [Scots] bestt medh vårt inlendsche folck kunne komme öfvereens". 17 November 1613, Jacob de la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, V, 60–61.

⁷² 17 November 1613, Jacob de la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, V, 60–61.

⁷³ It is not certain how many men took up this offer or how many came from Scotland or England. The warrants are from an English source. See 10 June 1615, Five open warrants signed by captains Richard Bond, Robert Wallace, Peeter Houe, Alex Ramsay and James Fernie, *APC*, 1615–July 1616, 197.

⁷⁴ S. Rosborn and F. Schimanski, eds., *När Händer Vad i Nordens Historia* (Lund: 1995), 113.

participation level of the constituent nations of the British Isles in the Thirty Years' War varied immensely at given times. Many Irish soldiers served in the Imperial army and in the Spanish Netherlands, preferred destinations for service with their co-religionists.⁷⁵ A recent estimate has also raised the number of English soldiers involved in Continental armies to around the 40,000 mark.⁷⁶ The Scots mostly served in the Protestant armies throughout the course of the war, at least some 50,000 of them — albeit with a few notable and high profile individuals serving in the ranks of the Habsburg armies.⁷⁷ Nonetheless, many continued to find their way into Swedish service before Sweden formally entered the war in 1630. Indeed they formed one of the largest groups of foreigners in the Swedish army.

The process of foreign enlistment can be contextualised when it is considered that indigenous Swedish and Finnish troops made up 85% of the Swedish army in 1621, yet just over 50% in 1630.⁷⁸ Among the massive foreign element it has been estimated that there were some 14,000 Scots in the 1620s period.⁷⁹ These men were deployed in both the existing and newly created Scottish regiments of the Swedish army. There were at least three Scottish, or Scottish-led, regiments in Gustav II Adolf's army by 1622: Samuel Cockburn and James Seaton were each colonels of recruited infantry regiments in 1621, whilst Patrick Ruthven was colonel of the Småland regiment in 1622.⁸⁰ By 1621, Cockburn's regiment had within it many

⁷⁵ See R.A. Stradling, *The Spanish Monarchy and Irish Mercenaries: The Wild Geese in Spain 1618–68* (Dublin: 1994), 17 and 25. See also J.H. Ohlmeyer, *Civil War and Restoration in the Three Stuart Kingdoms. The Career of Ranald Macdonell, Marquis of Antrim, 1609–1683* (Cambridge: 1993), 154–187. Seven Irish regiments found their way into French service between 1635 and 1640, placing them against their countrymen in Spanish service. See P. Gouhier, 'Mercenaires Irlandais au service de la France (1635–1664)', in *Irish Sword*, 7, 1965–1966, 58–60. Certainly there was an Irish regiment in Bavarian service which appears to have gone unnoticed by Irish scholars. The colours of the Bavarian Irish brigade, which existed from 1626–1633 when the regiment was defeated at the battle of Oldendorff, hang in the Stockholm Armémuseum. See a reproduction in Abukhanfusa, ed. *Mare Nostrum*, 208.

⁷⁶ This is deduced from Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, intro, 5–6, 19–20.

⁷⁷ Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, intro, 14 and 20. For Scots in the Habsburg service see D. Worthington, 'Alternative Diplomacy? Scottish Exiles at the Courts of the Habsburgs and their Allies, 1618–1648', in Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 51–75.

⁷⁸ Ericson and Sandstedt, *Fanornas Folk*, 9–10.

⁷⁹ *RPCS*, second series, II, x–xi.

⁸⁰ *Meddelanden från Krigsarkivet*, XI, part 2, 612, 625; and F. Rudelius, 'Kalmar Regementes Chefer, 1623–1907', *Personhistorisk Tidskrift*, vol. 9, 1907, appendix, 1–4;

Scots and Scottish officers, most notably Lieutenant-Colonel James MacDougall and the Swedish-born Mattias Forbes of Lund. Cockburn himself was recommended as a prominent leader to Gustav II Adolf by no less a commander than Jacob de la Gardie in March 1621.⁸¹ Throughout the early stages of the campaign, Cockburn's fort battery at Cobron's Sconce delivered vital volleys of cannon fire into Riga while his troops engaged Polish cavalry on the shores of the Düna river.⁸² More Scots however, served in the regiments commanded by colonels Seaton and Ruthven. Seaton's (later Seaton's 'Hofregiment', or Court Regiment), was the first of the two to muster and contained no less than 20 Scottish and one English officer. As the campaign progressed, the Kalmar Regiment came under Ruthven's command in 1623 and he brought with him a dozen other Scots, mostly veterans, providing the command structure. If ever there was a nursery for Scottish soldiers of note, it was this regiment. These dozen men would produce several colonels-in-chief of Swedish regiments and four Swedish generals, Patrick Ruthven, David Drummond, James King and the aforementioned Alexander Leslie, who eventually held the continental rank of field marshal.⁸³

The combination of loyal service and high esteem in which the Scots officers in particular were held led to a continuous round of requests for more soldiers to be raised in Scotland. Gustav II Adolf sent instructions to James Spens in September 1623 ordering that his son, James Spens the younger, should raise a Scottish regiment to be shipped to Gothenburg with the Stuart king's permission. The Scottish Privy Council authorised this levy the following year.⁸⁴ Spens did not limit his recruitment to Scotland and his other son William Spens and

F. Rudelius, *Kalmar Regementes Personhistoria 1623–1927* (2 vols., Norrköping: 1952), I, 5–22.

⁸¹ 27 March 1627, Jacob de la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, V, 153. De la Gardie proposed that Cockburn be among those considered for taking the 'remaining troops' at Gustav II Adolf's disposal to whichever front required them. It is not clear from his letter, but this probably means the remaining troops in Finland where Cockburn was usually based.

⁸² Göransson, *Gustav II Adolf och hans folk*, 119.

⁸³ See Rudelius, *Kalmar regementes personhistoria*, I, 7.

⁸⁴ 23 September 1623, Gustav II Adolf to James Spens, SRA, Anglica I/IV, f.22; *RPCS*, XIII, lvii–lvix, 478. A sum given of 9 daler per man raised was to be paid to the recruiters. This was provided by three Scottish officers from Sweden, Cunningham, Ogilvy and James Lumsden, although Spens claims to have overspent his budget by 4,000 daler. The costing comes from 18 October 1626, James Spens to Gustav II Adolf, SRA, Anglica III, f.70.

son-in-law Captain James Ramsay received an open warrant in April 1624 to take as many volunteers as would go with them from England to Sweden.⁸⁵ The regiment was successfully raised and deployed by early 1625 joining a Swedish army now numbering 38,600.⁸⁶

Official recruitment for Sweden was hampered when Charles I became caught up in the continental wars. His alliance with Denmark-Norway saw him commit some 13,700 Scots to Danish service between 1625–1629, nominally under the leadership of the Scottish Catholic Robert Maxwell, Earl of Nithsdale.⁸⁷ Hostilities with both Spain and France within the first two years of Charles' reign also pulled more soldiers away from the German theatre of war, albeit Charles viewed all his conflicts as part of the same 'Wars of Religion'.⁸⁸ Yet despite these supposed 'pressing engagements' binding the Scots officially elsewhere, Swedish recruitment continued in Scotland. After his meeting with Charles I in October 1626, Spens obtained permission to recruit the soldiers Gustav II Adolf had asked for.⁸⁹ However he advised that this be done quickly as the Dutch and the Danes would also be looking to recruit in the spring. He therefore requested that Gustav II Adolf pay half the transport, and that upon arrival one regiment be placed under the command of Spens and the other under the command of his son-in-law, James Ramsay. Spens was

⁸⁵ 14 April 1624, Open Warrant for captains Spens and Ramsay, *APC*, 1623–1625, 204. Given this warrant was issued at the same time as the preparations for the much larger levy of Count Mansfeld of some 8,000 English and 4,000 Scots, it is unlikely they would have found more than a few hundred men. For more on this see Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, intro, 9–14.

⁸⁶ Ericson, 'När armén var under alperna' in Abukhanfusa, ed., *Mare Nostrum*, 24.

⁸⁷ 8 February 1627, Charles I to Christian IV, *DRA*, TKUA AI, III; 9 March 1627, Robert Anstruther to Buckingham and Anstruther to Charles I, *PRO*, SP75, VIII, ff.42 and 45; *RPCS*, second series, II, 241, 244 and 295; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 206–207.

⁸⁸ *RPCS*, second series, I, lxxv; Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, intro, 10. Half of the troops used against France were Scottish, and Scotland also supplied half the funds for the expedition, see *RPCS*, second series, I, xi–lxxxii, 362–3, 550–3, 578–587, and 599–600 and II, ix–xiii; 22 August 1627, Charles I to the Scottish Privy Council, *The Earl of Stirling's Register of Royal Letters, relative to the affairs of Scotland and Nova Scotia from 1615 to 1635*, ed. G. Rogers (2 vols., Edinburgh: 1885), I, 200–1. For details of the conflict with France and the relevance to Sweden see *PRO*, SP 75/8 f.213 Instructions to Edward Clark, 27 July 1627; *RPCS*, second series, I, lxi–lxii; Howatt, *Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy*, 35; Sharpe, *Charles I*, 66. For the Spanish war see Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, 249 and J.H. Elliot, 'Spain and the War', in G. Parker, et al., eds., *The Thirty Years' War* (2nd ed., London: 1997), 92; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 65–72.

⁸⁹ 18 October 1626, James Spens to Gustav II Adolf, *SRA*, Anglica III, f.70.

also to be reconfirmed as General over British forces in Sweden.⁹⁰ In January 1627 Gustav II Adolf instructed Spens to continue with the levy and granted all the commissions requested.⁹¹ Money to pay for any outstanding shipping cost was to be paid by the governor of Gothenburg on their arrival.⁹² Spens received his licence from the Privy Council to levy 1,200 men anywhere in Scotland in February.⁹³ However, he reported to Sweden that the ongoing Danish levy hindered his own, but that he believed that his troops would leave before those under Nithsdale, indeed he predicted that they would be in Gothenburg by 1 May.⁹⁴

The first group set off by 24 April, slightly under-strength, but Spens hoped that they would arrive safely past the Dunkirk privateers.⁹⁵ Recruiters such as Captain Henderson continued their business in Scotland, in his case taking felons like Robert Gordon into Swedish service.⁹⁶ Again Scottish officers looked to lift men in England and were granted small warrants such as that for 150 'veterans' requested by Captain William Falkner or the 200 men sought by Captain Robert Douglas.⁹⁷ The arrival of these new recruits was well timed. On returning to his regiment, Spens reported that after the winter campaign of 1626–1627 around Riga, his numbers were down from 1,200 to 800 men. In addition, his regiment had not been paid and both officers and men required money to stave off catastrophe.⁹⁸ Due to such lack of money the Scots in Riga had become unruly

⁹⁰ Spens also observed that the usual price of 9 daler per man would not be enough and that transportation and supply costs had doubled due to the war.

⁹¹ 8 January 1627, Gustav II Adolf to James Spens, SRA, Anglica I/IV, f.42.

⁹² February 1627, James Spens to Gustav II Adolf, SRA, Anglica III, f.83.

⁹³ Charles I's warrant dated 22 October 1626 is for 3,000 men, whereas the Privy Council warrant is for 1,200. See *RPCS*, second series, I, lxxv and 523–4. For the Scottish involvement in Denmark see Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 201–225.

⁹⁴ 2 and 17 February and 6 April 1627, James Spens to Gustav II Adolf, SRA, Anglica V, ff.79, 83 and 85.

⁹⁵ 24 April 1627, James Spens to Gustav II Adolf, SRA, Anglica III, f.87.

⁹⁶ 28 April 1627, *RPCS*, second series, II, 1627–1628, 587. See also 13 March 1628, convicts to be handed over to Captain Borthwick, same volume, 267.

⁹⁷ 30 March and 27 April 1627, Warrants for captains William Falkner and Robert Douglas, *APC*, January–August 1627, 182 and 251. Just as with the Scottish Privy Council, these men were not allowed to impede the ongoing Danish levy

⁹⁸ 5 June 1627, Jacob de la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, V, 421; 6 June 1627, James Spens to Gustav II Adolf in A. Duncan, 'Diplomatic correspondence of Sir James Spens of Wormiston', Uppsala University Manuscript, E379d.

and resorted to thieving from the local population.⁹⁹ When the fresh recruits arrived they went straight into Spens' regiment and the newly created one commanded by James Ramsay. Scottish officers continued to return to Britain to find sought-after recruits. Lieutenant-Colonel George Douglas from Ramsay's regiment was successful in England.¹⁰⁰ He was granted permission to take 300 men from London and Westminster for Ramsay's regiment in Prussia.¹⁰¹ The following month Lieutenants James Kincaid and John Somerville received a pass from Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna to travel to Scotland and recruit troops for service with Captain James Bannatyne.¹⁰² In May 1628, Captain William Douglas obtained a pass to journey to the British Isles to obtain recruits, and in July Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham held a Swedish commission to levy 300 men which was granted in England, many of whom were probably those subsequently noted as mown down fighting against the Poles.¹⁰³ It is clear from the Swedish muster-rolls that more Scots arrived than there were warrants issued, and this can be attributed to three aspects: the incomplete nature of Scottish records, the recruitment of Scots out-with Scotland (Ulster and the Dutch Republic), and the illegal recruitment of Scots.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ 14 June 1626, Jacob de la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, V, 406. De la Gardie had cause to mention a few negative actions of Scots in 1626. Lt. Colonel Drummond had been ordered to transport some ammunition to Steenbrum Sconce. He had however left it in Creutzborg which then fell to the enemy and thus deprived the Swedes of valuable ammunition. See 9 October 1626, Jacob de la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, V, 412.

¹⁰⁰ 29 October 1627, James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, *SRA*, Anglica V; 30 October 1629, James Spens to Sir John Coke, *PRO*, SP95, II, f.197. Spens requested from Oxenstierna that Douglas be given half his outstanding salary to cover this trip.

¹⁰¹ 3 April 1628, Warrant for Lt. Colonel Ramsay, *APC*, September 1627–June 1628, 371–372.

¹⁰² 2 November 1627, *RAOSB*, first series, III, 678; Mention made of the Scottish officers recruiting on 24 April 1628, *RPCS*, second series, II, 319 and 18 December 1627, same volume, 163.

¹⁰³ For the levy see 15 May 1628, *RAOSB*, first series, IV, 155; 24 July 1628, Warrant for Lt. Colonel Cunningham, carrying a warrant from James Spens, to levy 300 men for Sweden. See John Barrington's letter to his mother, dated 12 November 1629: "Moste parte of the English which went over last sommer into Swethland being placed in front of the king's army weare cut of by the Polanders" in A. Searle, ed. *Barrington Family Letters 1628–1632* (London: 1983), 101.

¹⁰⁴ 24 April 1628, *RPCS*, second series, II, 319. This entry notes the complaint of Lieutenant Kincaid of Captain James Bannatyne's company regarding a soldier called Patrick Bryson who had taken 4 rixdaler pay to serve in Sweden. He then failed to turn up as he had been enlisted by a recruiter for Denmark. The important

While the legal levying of Scots is well documented, little is made of the private actions which appear to have been a most common form of recruiting. Warrants only show the maximum number of soldiers requested, not the actual number that arrived in Sweden and thus the unofficial levy could be as important as the official one.¹⁰⁵ In Scotland recruiters such as Mr William Shairpe and Doctor Douglas were illegally levying by ‘causing touke drummis for service of the King of Sueden’.¹⁰⁶ Such illegal action was encouraged by Scots at the highest level, including the British ambassador to Sweden. In August 1627, Colonel Patrick Ruthven approached Spens to tell him that he was to abandon his role as British ambassador so that he could secretly engage others for Swedish service.¹⁰⁷ Spens reported to Axel Oxenstierna that he was more than happy to do this. So it was that the Scots continued to levy in Scotland with the connivance of the official British ambassador. Spens readied some of the officers from his own regiment to return to Britain aboard English ships, but without revealing the nature of their mission to anyone.¹⁰⁸ When the numbers of illegally recruited men are added to those taken legally, but for whom no warrant has survived, then the commitment of the Scots to Sweden at this juncture is truly remarkable. Given James VI and I’s and Charles I’s official obligations to a number of campaigns, including the Danish one of 1625–1629, it can still be deduced that there were more Scots enlisting in Sweden than the total for Denmark-Norway: over 14,000 as opposed to 13,700. It has previously been stated that the number of Scottish troops in Swedish service reached about 12,000 men, or 17% of the total army in 1630 alone, but this was probably an underestimate.¹⁰⁹

point is that no-where else does it mention that Kincaid had been allowed to recruit in Scotland, but clearly the Privy Council had no objection to him doing so. A similar case is that of a company raised by Captain Hannay. We again know he did so in Scotland through a complaint he had been defrauded by an individual entrusted with cash, but no warrant has yet been found for his company. See 18 December 1627, same volume, 163.

¹⁰⁵ For a discussion of unofficial recruitment see Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years’ War*, intro, 11–14.

¹⁰⁶ 25 April 1627, *RPCS*, second series, II, 587. The text refers to “taking drums”, i.e. beating the drum to assemble recruits.

¹⁰⁷ 14 August 1627, James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, Anglica V.

¹⁰⁸ 3 September 1627, James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, Anglica V.

¹⁰⁹ Brockington, ‘Scottish mercenaries in the Thirty Years’ War’, 41.

Scottish Officers in the Swedish Army 1621–1628

The contrast in Swedish and Stuart efforts to supply soldiers for the Swedish armies is only one side of the actual developments. The enlistment figures for officers, however, provide a more accurate impression of Scottish military participation in Sweden as these are taken from the extant muster rolls. The Swedish intake lasted over a longer period of time than any Danish levies but the significance to the Alternative Band extends beyond that. These men were attracted to Sweden for a number of reasons that simply could not apply to Denmark-Norway. There was the well-developed tradition of enlistment for Sweden, dating from at least the 1550s, coupled with the knowledge that new recruits had an established community to fit into. This community extended beyond Scottish-led companies and regiments to civilian life as military service facilitated integration into Swedish society. There was the confident belief that Sweden would enter the war against the Habsburgs at some point, allowing the Scots to fight for their exiled princess. Perhaps most importantly there was a belief in Gustav II Adolf as a military leader worth fighting for.¹¹⁰


Some 31 new Scots officers had enlisted in his army between 1614 and the opening of the Livonian campaign in 1621. An initial rise in enlistment from 1614 to 1617 reflected Sweden's military campaigns in Russia, which finally ended in the peace of Stolbova in 1617.¹¹¹ The apparent lack of enlistments in 1616 coincides with the end of hostilities in Russia, and certainly that year Colonel Cockburn and his regiment were decommissioned as part of the Swedish government's economising tactics.¹¹² Despite James's reluctance to allow a levy of troops, still more officers kept arriving. These came in small numbers at first, although it has been recognised that by 1628 the recruitment of British Isles nationals had dramatically increased.¹¹³ Certainly by 1622 Gustav II Adolf himself expressed his intention

¹¹⁰ 24 April 1627, James Spens to Gustav II Adolf, SRA, Anglica III, f.87.

¹¹¹ The total absence of recruitment in 1616 is surprising and probably reflects incomplete records.

¹¹² 22 May 1616, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustav II Adolf, *RAOSB*, first series, II, 272. On 12 June Oxenstierna excused himself to Cockburn for not being able to pay him all he was owed for his service to the Crown, *ibid.*, 284.

¹¹³ Ericson, "Arméen är under alperna . . . och garnisonerna kring hela Tyskland", in Ericson, ed., *Vägen till Westfaliska freden*, 65.

Fig. 4. *Scottish officer enlistment in the Swedish army 1614–1620*

(Source: SSNE database)


to enlarge his army from the approximate 15,000 strong force established by his grandfather, to one exceeding 18,000, and included in this force amongst the foreign troops were 2 German, 1 French and 1 Scottish regiment.¹¹⁴

After attracting a half a dozen volunteer officers in 1621, by the following year the number of enlistments rose to 18. From then on, throughout the 1620s, Scots entered Swedish service at a rate of between 20 to 50 officers per year. It is impossible to be precise as to where these officers came from. Many were perhaps the remnants of Scottish units who had gone to the continent in the private expedition of Count Mansfeld in 1624–1625.¹¹⁵ Some of the officers at least were promoted from within the ranks of the Scottish regiments. Whatever their provenance, over 45 officers of varying ranks were recruited into the Swedish army in 1624 reflecting two key points. At this time the Swedish army numbered at least 38,600 officially.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ Ericson, “Armén är under alperna . . . och garnisonerna kring hela Tyskland”, in Ericson, ed., *Vägen till Westfaliska freden*, 57.

¹¹⁵ *RPCS*, second series, I, lxxxiii.

¹¹⁶ Ericson, ‘När armén var under alperna’, in Abukhanfusa, ed., *Mare Nostrum*, 24.

Fig. 5. *Scottish officer enlistment in the Swedish army 1620–1628*

(Source: SSNE database)

Firstly their employment coincided with a general trend among Scots for enlisting in anti-Habsburg armies at this time (or those of their perceived allies like Poland-Lithuania).¹¹⁷ It also took place in the same year that Gustav II Adolf made his offer to James VI and I and Christian IV regarding a military alliance against the Habsburg Empire. Certainly their recruitment followed the exhaustive preparation for the building of a Protestant League with Swedish soldiers and British forces in the Dutch army forming the core of it.¹¹⁸ As Spens was recruiting in Britain and believed this to have been the case, he undoubtedly would have encouraged Scots to join his regiment

¹¹⁷ Murdoch has detailed this military movement in the introduction to *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 9.

¹¹⁸ Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 58; Parker, et al., eds., *The Thirty Years' War*, 211.

as a way of getting into the war with a proven battlefield winner — the King of Sweden. In any case, it is evident that of the new Scottish officers in Sweden in 1624 some 30/45 (66%) enlisted directly into Spens' regiment. These men formed part of the additional 12,000 soldiers who were sent to Livonia in 1625.

Spens, in a contemporary report of the number of Scottish and English officers in Swedish service on 4 October 1627, stated that over 500 were serving above the rank of sergeant.¹¹⁹ To date over 480 British and Irish officers who enlisted in Sweden before October 1627 have been positively identified. Not all of these men survived through to 1627 leaving about 400 of those who can be named still in service. Of those there were 21 Englishmen, five Irishmen and two Welshmen. The remaining 370 Scots form the bulk of the 500 officers mentioned by Spens.¹²⁰ Allowing for any small margin of error in the national identification of these officers, the trend these numbers represent confirms that the Scots were the real backbone of British Isles interest in Sweden. However the presence of so many Scottish Catholic officers in Sweden at this time removes an often quoted reason for the lack of Irish. The enlistment of high-profile Scottish Catholics such as Sir Andrew Gray and Sir John Hepburn in Sweden or the Earl of Nithsdale in Denmark-Norway suggests a whole different motivation.¹²¹ The departure of Hepburn in 1632 is often cited as the end of high-ranking Catholic officers finding favour in Sweden, but Colonel William Gunn, another Scottish Catholic and colonel of his own regiment, was in service at least until 1637.¹²²

¹¹⁹ 4 October 1627, PRO, SP95, II, f.179.

¹²⁰ Karl Viggo Key (1875–1944) was a collector of Scottish manuscripts pertaining to Swedish military service. In his private possession were several muster-rolls of Scottish regiments and other manuscript documents. They are now in the hands of Krigsarkiv and catalogued with the number KRA 0035: 0418: Ö. These documents being in private hands suggests that many others are missing from the otherwise apparently complete muster-roll collection in Krigsarkiv. However, drawing on other sources it is often possible to add to the biographical collection of British and Irish officers serving in Sweden. Biographical details abound for numerous officers who do not appear on any extant muster-rolls in the Swedish Krigsarkiv. For more on this see the following chapter and discussion of Sir Frederick Hamilton and his men.

¹²¹ John Hepburn, entered French service after 1632, allegedly due to a disagreement with other officers over religion, Michell, *Memoirs and adventures of John Hepburn*, 182–192. Robert Maxwell, the Earl of Nithsdale, who served as the General for Scottish troops in Danish service was a Catholic, DRA, TKUA England, A1/3, 8 February 1627, Charles I to Christian IV; same letter to Robert Anstruther, *SRL*, I, 130.

¹²² KRA, Muster Roll, 1630/37,38; 1636/20–22; Anon., 'A very exact Relation of the proceeding of Gustavus Horne, in the yeare 1634, till the fatal Batell of

It has been argued that during the Thirty Years' War, these Scots' dynastic loyalty apparently took precedence over religious conviction.¹²³ However, Sir Andrew Keith, Sir Andrew Gray and other Catholics also served before the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War and were part of the ongoing Swedish-Scottish military relationship in spite of their private religious conviction.

It is also interesting to note that in the 1620s, the official Stuart ally Denmark-Norway boasted some 325 British officers, over 300 or 93% of them being Scots. That was indeed a significant number — the Scots outnumbered the Danes 3:1 in their own army providing over 22% of the entire Danish officer corps.¹²⁴ However, once again it can be shown that Sweden had attracted the majority of the Scottish (and other British officers) without any formal arrangement for doing so. The Danish data also permits the speculation that the 500 British officers in Sweden equated to about a quarter of the entire Swedish officer corps, if the ratio of officers to men per regiment did not vary significantly.

As a reward for their service, the Scots received numerous commendations and promotions both military and civic. Already in 1614 Colonel Patrick Rutherford was appointed colonel of all the soldiers in Uppland, Västmanland and Dalarna.¹²⁵ At the highest level, Sir James Spens had been reconfirmed as General of the British forces in Sweden.¹²⁶ Alexander Leslie took over command of the Södermanland, Närke and Värmland Regiment while Patrick Ruthven took over the Kalmar Regiment.¹²⁷ Colonel George Cunningham was in charge of the Västergötland-Dalarna cavalry regiment in 1626 while James Ramsay received the colonelcy of his own Scottish regiment

Norlingen, written (by an eye-witness) to his friend in England from Francfort upon the Mayne, the 10/20 September, 1634', in Anon., *The Modern History of the World. Or An Historical Relation of the most memorable passages in Germany, and else-where, since the beginning of this present Yeere 1635* (London: 1635). See also Fischer, *The Scots in Germany*, 112

¹²³ For a concise discussion of Scottish Catholic officers in Protestant armies see Murdoch, 'Scottish Professional Soldier', in Taithe and Thornton, eds., *War*, 45–6 and Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, intro, 15–18.

¹²⁴ Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 219.

¹²⁵ 12 March 1614, Axel Oxenstierna to burgesses of Sigtuna, *RAOSB*, first series, II, 154.

¹²⁶ It was not long before Gustav II Adolf styled Spens 'our loyal, royal advisor, general of our English and Scottish troops, as well as ordinary resident ambassador', 15 January 1629, noted in *SRP*, I, 258.

¹²⁷ 14 May 1623, Leslie's Muster-roll and receipt of payment, and various receipts and documents relating to Patrick Ruthven in KRA, Karl Viggo Key Arkiv, unfoliated.

in 1627. William Grey also formed and commanded an independent infantry company.¹²⁸ Several Scots led regiments into the campaign with such distinction they were rewarded with knighthoods. Indeed Robert Primrose recorded that several Scottish colonels were knighted at the same time on Spens' return to the Swedish Court in 1627.¹²⁹ Although he did not name them, it has been determined that certainly Patrick Ruthven and Alexander Leslie were two of those knighted at this point.¹³⁰ Scottish soldiers were also rewarded through their appointment as governors of conquered territories. In 1616, Patrick Ruthven, then one of Cockburn's officers already in his sixteenth year of Swedish service, was sent to govern the defences around the town of Pskov and to control passage on the river.¹³¹ Cockburn himself, who by 1621 was a veteran of at least 21 years, was appointed commandant of the fort just outside Riga in Livonia on the Düna river. Thereafter it became known as "Cobron's sconce".¹³² Cockburn had by now received two land donations in Finland from Gustav II Adolf, and the second one had already formerly been held by a fellow Scot, Thomas Abernethy.¹³³ Other governors at this time include Alexander Leslie in Pillau (subsequently succeeded by John Kinnemond when Leslie was appointed governor of Stralsund), Patrick Ruthven at Marienburg, and William Burt at Osterrode.¹³⁴ Control of these places was integral to the success of Swedish campaigns, and it was considered an honour and a mark of respect to be appointed governor, as Robert Monro said: "so great a reward from so great a Master".¹³⁵

Sweden's special relations with the trading port of Stralsund ensured that her military intervention in Germany predated her 'official'

¹²⁸ Rosborn and Schimanski, *Meddelanden från Krigsarkivet*, X, part 2, 609–632. Within these and other regiments numerous other promotions took place which space prevents discussion of.

¹²⁹ 8 November 1627, Sir Robert Primrose to Sir James Primrose, *RPCS*, second series, II, 1627–1628, 559.

¹³⁰ Balfour Paul, *The Scots Peerage*, IV, 103; V, 373–4 (1626 erroneous).

¹³¹ *Kungliga Fortifikationens Historia*, I, 327.

¹³² *Kungliga Fortifikationens Historia*, I, 346; *Svenskt Biografiskt Lexicon*, VIII, 686.

¹³³ Waaranen, *Handlingar upplysande Finlands historia*, IV, 27 and 45–46.

¹³⁴ For Leslie see *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 401–427; for Ruthven see *RAOSB*, first series III, 420–1 and IV, 318, 320, 321, 328, 330, 331, 353, 392, and IX, 356–359; and for Burt see *RAOSB*, 370, 442, 513, 529, 561. For more on the role of Scottish governors see Grosjean, 'A century of Scottish governorship', in Murdoch and Mackillop, eds., *Military Governors and Imperial Frontiers*, 57–60.

¹³⁵ Monro, *His Expedition*, part 1, 79.

involvement in the Thirty Years' War. Swedish engineers had arrived in the city in 1627 to strengthen its defences.¹³⁶ Stralsund was of great strategic importance to all the combatant nations and Gustav II Adolf agreed to support the Danish-Norwegian fleet with the Swedish one and also to add troops to the Stralsund garrison.¹³⁷ By the time of the Swedish intervention, the garrison was composed mostly of a Scottish regiment in Danish service led by Colonel Donald Mackay who had arrived there in May 1628. Towards the end of June the Swedish king allowed volunteers from his army to join them once it became clear they were facing serious problems. The first to arrive were a largely Scottish company led by Colonel Fretz, Lt. Colonel James Macdougall, Major Semple and 80 musketeers.¹³⁸ These troops engaged straight away and Semple was killed almost immediately on arrival. During the Stralsund campaign, Colonel Alexander Seaton took over as temporary Governor of Stralsund and acting commander of Mackay's regiment.¹³⁹ He managed to force a treaty until more Scottish and Danish reinforcements recruited by Lord Spynie arrived.

In addition to allowing volunteers to go to Stralsund, Gustav II Adolf supplied 4,200 kilograms of powder and eight ships for the defence of Stralsund in May 1628, and authorised a royal agent to the city the following month.¹⁴⁰ About two weeks' later a Swedish admiral arrived with troops which had originally been intended for Christian IV's use, but were then retained in the Swedish army.¹⁴¹ The joint effort of Sweden's navy and army along with formal state representation to Stralsund was organised at a time when Sweden was still officially at war with Poland-Lithuania, and Gustav II Adolf remained on campaign in Prussia while working out the details of the assistance he was willing to lend Stralsund.¹⁴² By July, Alexander

¹³⁶ Parker, et al., eds., *Thirty Years' War*, 89.

¹³⁷ Monro, *His Expedition*, I, 64–79; Mackay, *An Old Scots Brigade*, 60–80.

¹³⁸ Monro, *His Expedition*, I, 69; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 216.

¹³⁹ For Seaton see Monro, *His Expedition*, I, 75. For Holcke see *ibid.*, I, 64–65, 74–75. Monro concluded that the official governor, Holcke, who had absented himself on several occasions during the siege, was not suitable for the task. Monro also recounted how a Scottish lieutenant Lumsdell (Lumsden) noted the speed with which Holcke retreated from the enemy. See also Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 216.

¹⁴⁰ 3 July 1628, *SRP*, I, 90, fn. 3.

¹⁴¹ 16 June 1628, *SRP*, I, 83.

¹⁴² 3 July 1628, *SRP*, I, 90.

Leslie landed with a 1,000 strong regiment of Scots and took over as Governor from Seaton, after which the defence of the island became the responsibility of Gustav II Adolf.¹⁴³ Whether in the service of Denmark-Norway or Sweden, the defence of Stralsund was undoubtedly a Scottish military affair. A ‘capitulation act’, which was also a twenty-year alliance between Sweden and Stralsund, meant the ‘Swedish’ troops were to be maintained by Stralsund, with the Swedish commander in charge of his own troops and the local soldiers.¹⁴⁴ As Alexander Leslie took over command from Seaton on the 16 July this placed the Stralsund operation almost entirely in Scottish hands. Another Scot, Alexander Erskine, was appointed Swedish agent and assistant councillor in the city.¹⁴⁵ In the late autumn, Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna arrived in Stralsund as a royal envoy to the city and to Christian IV.¹⁴⁶ By December 1628 the Riksråd agreed with Gustav II Adolf that Stralsund provided the optimum base from which to lead the war against the empire.¹⁴⁷ Although this move was largely appreciated by the local population, there was the odd complaint, largely due to the cost of quartering an army in the town.¹⁴⁸ However, Leslie’s service was beyond question as by September 1629 he informed the Riksråd that only 1,000 men were left to defend the city, and that nightly watches were necessary, revealing constant vigilance and

¹⁴³ Monro, *His Expedition*, I, 74–90. On 9 July 1628, 1,100 troops from a Scottish regiment in Swedish service arrived in Stralsund, see Göransson, *Gustav II Adolf och hans folk*, 188.

¹⁴⁴ Göransson, *Gustav II Adolf och hans folk*, 186.

¹⁴⁵ B. Schlegel and C.A. Klingspor, eds., *Den med sköldebref förlänade men ej å rid-darhuset introducerade svenska adelns ättar-taflor* (Stockholm: 1875), 69; *DBBTI*, V and VI, passim. Erskine would later become a member of the Swedish military council and was ennobled in 1652 for his services.

¹⁴⁶ 31 July 1628, *SRP*, I, 101. Gustav II Adolf wrote to his government concerning the siege. Later, when two skippers from Stralsund arrived in Stockholm they were brought to the Riksråd to be questioned, 9 October 1628, *SRP*, I, 113.

¹⁴⁷ 9–15 December 1628, *SRP*, I, 123–125.

¹⁴⁸ In August 1629 the Riksråd was visited by a representative of the Stralsund council complaining about the Swedish reluctance to take the island of Rügen. The complaints also extended to Alexander Leslie’s command of the Stralsund defence, which was described as sloppy, whilst the legitimacy of his command was questioned as he was believed to be illiterate and thus unable to receive instructions from the king, 25 August 1629, *SRP*, I, 201. This appears to be a case of a personality clash between the Scottish officer and the local council as no officer would have been promoted colonel if he was incapable of receiving instructions! There is some doubt as to the extent of Leslie’s education. Fraser did not agree with the tradition of Leslie’s believed illiteracy, but called him “uneducated”, or suffering a “neglected education” in *The Melvilles, Earls of Melville and the Leslies, Earls of Leven* (3 vols., Edinburgh: 1890), I, 388.

a high rate of attrition.¹⁴⁹ The Swedes were determined to maintain their part of the defence and letters to the king from both the Riksråd and Stralsund council were forwarded and provisions promised for the defence of the city.¹⁵⁰ The defence of Stralsund was both a Swedish and a Scottish victory. It facilitated Gustav II Adolf's entry into the Thirty Years' War by giving him a continental base to work from and by proving to Charles I and the Protestant League that he could sustain the Protestant defence against the empire.¹⁵¹

The retirement of Christian IV from the war after the treaty of Lübeck left Sweden as the only major power left capable of mounting a serious challenge to the forces of the Habsburg empire and her allies. As such, Britain's relations with Denmark-Norway entered their 'Dour Years' and a strong round of diplomatic activity was undertaken between Sweden and Britain trying to get a full and official alliance signed at last between the Stuart and Vasa monarchies.¹⁵²

Conclusion

The assumption that Scottish participation only resulted from royal warrants, is refuted by archival sources which record a high percentage of personal initiative as well, extending far beyond mere mercenary service for foreign overlords. Indeed, this is a source of difficulty in obtaining true figures for Scots in Swedish service as some of these officers and troops do not appear on official registers, while some several hundred were also clearly English. However the motivation behind enlistment was significantly different for the two nations. For example, in 1629 an Englishman, John Barrington, described his requirements for joining the Swedish army to his mother:

I do hope (God willing) to goe for Swede and to have a company for that service, but as yet wee have noe absolute answeare of those conditions are sent to the king, which are carried thither by a Dutchman who is to be our collonell (if wee are agreed upon our condicions). I

¹⁴⁹ 17 and 19 September, *SRP*, I, 213–215.

¹⁵⁰ 19 September 1629, *SRP*, I, 214–215.

¹⁵¹ As one author put it: "Gustavus Adolphus crossed the Baltic, and saved Europe from an impending reign of the Jesuits", J. Viscount Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire* (London: 1928), 383.

¹⁵² For the Stuart-Vasa "dour years" see Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, chapter 3.

was demanded by a special frind if I would be one of the regiment, to which I have willingly agreed. As yet wee have no certaintie before wee heare from thence, which wee earnestlie expect. The chiefe points wee stand upon are for monie to be paid us heare to rayse our men; and for the time how long they will entertaine us, wee desire to make in our condicions that the king shalbe bound to keepe us in pay three yeares at least. They would pay us (as to some before) halfe our monie heare and the rest a month after our arrivall there, for raying our men, but wee hope to have all our monie heare to rayse and transport our men, which is 300 li to each captain. A captain's meanes is good there which is twentie five pounds a month, ten to a lieutenant, as much to an ensigne. I shall be wondrous willing to imbraced this employment if wee can agree to have all our monie heare to rayse and transport our men, else wee cannot rayse them for want of monie."¹⁵³

Not only does Barrington's personal motivation appear to centre on financial concerns, but even the method of recruitment — contact was made through an unnamed "special friend" — is radically different from the Scottish experience. The Scots' relationship with Sweden hinged on a long-standing tradition of military service bolstered by a mutual balance of need: Sweden needed soldiers and the Scots needed prospects. Further, the steady increase in numbers of officers and men enlisting in Sweden after 1621 highlights the direct connection to the House of Stuart. The Scottish migration was a personal reaction to ongoing wars within Germany and in anticipation of Swedish participation in them. This kind of interest stemmed from the well-established personal links between Scotland and Sweden.

Scots were found in both Denmark-Norway and Sweden, and it was not unusual for Scots to achieve high rank in the military services of those kingdoms as well as in their nobility.¹⁵⁴ Some of these Scots became responsible for delicate diplomatic relations, not only for their own king but also for the benefit of the four major northern European kingdoms already mentioned, as epitomised by Sir Andrew Keith, Sir James Spens, Sir Robert Anstruther and Sir Patrick Gordon. However, the lesser known diplomatic interventions by Robert Primrose, Archibald Rankin, Sir Peter Young or Colonel James Ramsay vis-à-vis Sir Thomas Roe should not go unnoticed. In direct contrast to Scottish-Danish relations, which had their roots

¹⁵³ 13 August 1629, John Barrington to his mother, in Searle, ed., *Barrington Family Papers*, 79.

¹⁵⁴ For Scots ennobled in Sweden see Elgenstierna, *SAA*.

and strength in royal family connections, Scottish-Swedish relations developed and flourished in spite of, not because of, the Stuart monarchy, as the steady enlistment in the face of limited and occasional Stuart military supplies has shown. The Scots had early gained a reputation as trustworthy and reliable soldiers which was exactly what the Swedes needed for their frequent military campaigns. Numerous though these men were, they would more than double their numbers in the following twenty years as Sweden's final entry into the Thirty Years' War facilitated a continual need for still more soldiers and officers from Scotland.

CHAPTER THREE

THE SCOTS IN SWEDISH SERVICE, FROM STRALSUND TO WESTPHALIA

medan som thet Engelske folcket dock intet mycket duger . . . så kunne officerarne heller draga uthur Skåttlandh soldater till hundradetals och mindre troupper aff them, som förr haffve tjent, medh hvilke Chronan kan vara bättre benögd¹

Obtaining manpower for the army was not Gustav II Adolf's only concern. Moves had been afoot to formalise an alliance between Sweden and Britain since Charles I succeeded his father in 1625. The following year the Swedish king sent embassies to the Netherlands and to London to investigate the possibility of joining the already established Evangelical alliance.² These forays came to nothing and in 1629 negotiations began anew, during which the Stuart ambassador to Denmark-Norway, Robert Anstruther, operated on behalf of Sweden as a very unofficial agent. The Emperor, Ferdinand II, and his Generals, Tilly and Wallenstein, were well aware that the Dukes of Mecklenburg were preparing to militarily support any Swedish landing on German territory. Ferdinand tried to pre-empt this by offering an agreement between himself and Gustav II Adolf whereby the Emperor would appease the Mecklenburgs for their losses in the Treaty of Lübeck if the Swede would employ his forces elsewhere. However Anstruther reported to London that the cities of Lübeck, Bremen and Hamburg had all resolved to stand firm against the Emperor anyway.³ Anstruther then approached the Riksråd in June with a proposal he had made to Charles I for an alliance between Britain, Sweden and the Hansa towns.⁴ As the Swedes were still occupied with their Polish war it

¹ *SRP*, V, 15.

² 16 December 1625, Gustav II Adolf to Axel Oxenstierna, *KGAS*, 509.

³ For the unease of Wallenstein and Tilly and their "eye unto the proceedings of the Suede and Hollanders", see 29 October and 12 November 1629, Robert Anstruther to Thomas Roe, *PRO*, SP88, VI:2, f.110 and 124. For Ferdinand's alleged offer of accommodation and the refusal of Hanse towns to agree to it see 11/21 March 1629/30, *PRO*, SP88, VII:2, ff.232-235; 13 March 1629/30, Robert Anstruther to Lord Dorchester, *PRO*, SP75, XI, f.24.

⁴ 28 June 1629, *SRP*, I, 164.

was not until after Thomas Roe had successfully completed his mission to negotiate peace between those warring parties that more direct contact was made. Roe himself broached the topic of a triple confederacy, involving the Netherlands, Britain and Sweden, with Axel Oxenstierna before he departed for London. This would bring Sweden funds of 10,000 pounds monthly, equivalent to more than 480,000 rixdaler annually.⁵ Charles I had apparently hesitated to suggest this earlier as he expected it to be rejected out of hand, although his ongoing negotiations with Spain also complicated the issue. Indeed, the Stuart king's reputation was already greatly diminished in Denmark due to Britain's lacklustre financial support to Christian IV during his war with the Holy Roman Empire. Whilst Charles feared a negative reception from Gustav II Adolf, Oxenstierna attempted to draw England and the English, in particular, closer to Sweden, by favouring the English merchants he came across in Prussia.⁶

However, from the Swedish perspective it was important to obtain Charles' agreement to supply troops and funding.⁷ Gustav II Adolf had already noted to his Riksråd that alliances with France and England were practically prerequisites to his entry into the Thirty Years' War.⁸ The Swedish king wanted an army of 30,000 for his German campaign largely supplied by his allies, whilst the Swedish army proper would number a further 45,000 men to maintain the rest of his military apparatus.⁹ In October 1629 Colonel Alexander

⁵ 28 February 1630, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustav II Adolf, *RAOSB*, first series, IV, 135.

⁶ However, apart from negotiations through Roe, Gordon and Thomas Eaton, on behalf of the Eastland Company on matters of customs and the staple at Elbing, there appears to be little other formal communication with the Stuart envoys. See 8 January 1631, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustav II Adolf, *RAOSB*, first series, VI, 30: "jagh och medh all flijt hafver sökt här att draga dem Engellske köpmännen till E.K. M:ttis tjänst". See also various references in *RAOSB*, first series, IV, 272–276, 395, 400–403, 434–436.

⁷ The Swedes' financial straits were impacting on their foreign recruits, as those of James Ramsay and Alexander Leslie had not received any pay by June 1629. The following month Leslie informed Oxenstierna that some of his men were defecting to the German regiment also stationed at Stralsund as they got more than just "copper money and provisions". See 13 June 1629, Patrick Ruthven to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 371 and 4 July 1629, Alexander Leslie to *idem*, *ibid.*, 419.

⁸ 27 October 1629, *SRP*, I, 218: "Bellum Germanicum drager flere puncter medh sigh, nempe foedus cum Gallo et Anglo". Note the use of the word "Anglo" — the Swedish king appears to differentiate the alliance with the Stuart king as one with England.

⁹ Ericson, "Armén är under alperna . . . och garnisonerna kring hela Tyskland", in Ericson, ed., *Vägen till Westfaliska freden*, 59.

Hamilton first came to Sweden to initiate talks on behalf of James, Marquis of Hamilton, and David Ramsay followed him in the spring of 1630, to discuss the raising of a British army to serve alongside the Swedes in Germany. It is typical of the rather Scottish nature of Stuart-Swedish connections that the very negotiations to levy a British army was undertaken by two Scottish officers. In March 1630 then two contracts were approved for the Marquis of Hamilton, for 30 captains to levy 6,000 soldiers in England and a further 6,000 in Scotland. This allowed for a British army totalling as many as 12,000 men.¹⁰ By May 1630 the Swedish king expressed his pleasure at this development to Charles I and in November Colonel Wolmar von Farensbach received the funds to levy 4,000 English soldiers.¹¹ The arrangement for the levy of 6,000 soldiers in Scotland was only confirmed in 1631, and Hamilton did not join the Swedes in the field until August 1631.¹² In the meantime Gustav II Adolf maintained the pressure on the British court reminding Charles I that the recruitment of Hamilton's army was only one step in the process of a full alliance between the two royal houses and urging Hamilton to continue with his efforts in that direction.¹³

Of course the attempted Vasa-Stuart alliance was just one of many diplomatic avenues being explored by either side. The Swedes and French had also been busy in separate negotiations and came to an agreement in March 1631.¹⁴ The French agreed to provide 500,000 rixdaler per year, to the Swedes with 700,000 in advance, though

¹⁰ 8 June 1630, *APC*, June 1630–June 1631, 264, and 367–378 and 23 and 31 March 1631, *RPCS*, IV, 193–194.

¹¹ 30 May 1630, Gustav II Adolf to Charles I, NAS, Hamilton Muniments, GD406/1/9291. The Army cost Charles £20,000 sterling with other funds coming from the allies; 19 November 1630, Maximilian Teufel to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 555, and 21 November 1630, W. Baudissin to Axel Oxenstierna, *ibid.*, 784, and 7 March 1631, *SRP*, II, 62.

¹² Steckzén, *Svenskt och Brittiskt*, 87. As yet the only primary source reference dates the levy to 23 and 31 March 1631, *RPCS*, IV, 193–194.

¹³ 25 and 26 April 1631, Gustav II Adolf to Marquis Hamilton, NAS, Hamilton Muniments, GD406/1/9256 and 9257.

¹⁴ See O.S. Rydberg and C. Hallendorff, *Sveriges traktater med främmande magter*, V:1, (Stockholm: 1903), 438–449; C. Hallendorff, *ibid.*, V:2 (Stockholm: 1909), 12–18, 130–138. According to *Le Soldat Suedois* the alliance was concluded between Field Marshal Horn and General Banér with the French ambassador Charnacé. The four articles included annual financial support to the amount of 400,000 “écus”; a common aim of restoring freedom in Germany; reciprocal trade rights between Sweden and France; and the maintenance of Catholicism where it was already established and good relations with the Duke of Bavaria and the League.

it was expected that the French would act on payment as slowly as they negotiated.¹⁵ This kind of definite assistance provided immediate relief for Gustav II Adolf's financial straits. However, Donald Mackay noted in 1631 that the Swedish king "sayes that he is more obliged to the king off Britane, that sends him men to mack ane diversione, than to the French king, that sends him monyes; for iff he have men in Germanie, he can command monyes at will".¹⁶

Although efforts at formalising an alliance with Britain dragged on, the Swedes certainly employed many Scots, officially and unofficially, for some of their sensitive diplomatic and military missions. One such development occurred in January 1630 when they needed to negotiate with the port of Danzig over the collection of Swedish tolls, a vital component of funding their campaign, and the transfer of the Swedish-held Haupt to Brandenburg. Oxenstierna told Gustav II Adolf that there was no Swede or better-suited person to the task than Colonel John Hepburn, who had been an officer in Swedish service since 1625.¹⁷ Also in 1630 the Swedes were concerned that Russia should continue its war with Poland, as this reduced the probability of a Polish attack on Sweden.¹⁸ Another Scot in Swedish service, Colonel Alexander Leslie (also known as Auchintoul), was sent to Russia, along with troops of men to assist the Russians in maintaining their campaign.¹⁹

In the meantime Charles I sent Sir Robert Anstruther to the Emperor in 1630, and he again acted as an unofficial agent to the Swedes. Steve Murdoch has already highlighted how the Catholic allies used the Vienna negotiations to prevent a full alliance between the British kingdoms and Sweden.²⁰ Although the Spanish hoped Charles I would

¹⁵ 13/23 March 1630/31, Joseph Averie to ?, PRO, SP75, XII, ff.68–69.

¹⁶ 22 January 1631, Lord Reay to Lord Dorchester, PRO, SP75/12, f.26.

¹⁷ "Jagh haffver därtill deputeret öfversten Hepburn (allanstundh jagh ingen svensk här hadhe eller någon annan bequemere)", 28 January 1630, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustav II Adolf, *RAOSB*, first series, V, 53 and 77–84 for Hepburn's instructions.

¹⁸ 6 April 1631, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustav II Adolf, *RAOSB*, first series, VI, 204.

¹⁹ Dukes, 'New Perspectives: Alexander Leslie and the Smolensk war', in Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 176–179; D. Normann, *Gustav Adolf's Politik mot Ryssland och Polen under Tyska Kriget (1630–1632)* (Uppsala: 1943), 49, 56, 64–67; *SRP*, II, 72–73; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II, 563.

²⁰ See Murdoch, 'Scottish Ambassadors and British diplomacy', in Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 27–50. The author of *Le Soldat Suedois* noted Anstruther's mission and also that the Emperor could not respond with an Ambassador of equal status, drawing from that the impoverished state of the Emperor's finances. *Le Soldat Suedois*, 129.

agree either to settle a peace with the Dutch or even join an alliance against them, Anstruther was able to report back on ‘the feebleness of the promises of the Austrians’, leading an agent of the Duke of Bavaria in London to accuse him of being a ‘violent partisan of the King of Sweden’ in December 1631.²¹ Anstruther’s negotiations put pressure on Gustav II Adolf to restore the Palatinate by force or, as Anstruther put it “make peace by his sword”.²²

Whilst Anstruther was in Vienna, James Spens returned to the Swedish Court in Wurzburg on what turned out to be his final embassy.²³ Throughout this period, Sir Henry Vane had undertaken a particularly unsuccessful mission to both the Danish and Swedish kings as revealed when Oxenstierna informed the Riksråd in Stockholm of his discussions with Vane in March 1632.²⁴ The Chancellor had little faith in Vane, describing him as a typical Englishman only seeking ‘his own advantage’, and nothing was finalised.²⁵

Indeed, Oxenstierna later learned from the French ambassador La Grange that Vane also negotiated with Wallenstein, who was keen to keep Charles I from achieving a treaty with Sweden, on promises of returning the lower and upper Palatinate to Frederick of Bohemia.²⁶ This was confirmed to him the following year when he met Anstruther,

²¹ 30 August, 27 September and 1 November 1631, Pietro Vico, Venetian Secretary in Germany, *CSPV*, XXII, 539, 546 and 549; 20 December 1631, Francesco Corner, Venetian Ambassador in Spain, *CSPV*, XXII, 581–582; 12 December 1631, Giovanni Soranzo to Venice, *CSPV*, XXII, xxxvii and 567–568; Murdoch, ‘Scottish Ambassadors and British diplomacy’, in Murdoch ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years’ War*, 73.

²² 5 March 1630, Robert Anstruther to Lord Dorchester, *PRO*, SP75, XI, f.20.

²³ 31 July 1629, pass for James Spens and retinue, *APC*, May 1629–May 1630, 117. 24 August 1631, Jacob de la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, V, 488. C. 1632, John Durie to Hartlib, Hartlib Papers, HP60/5/1a–8b; 1631–1633, n.d. Memo on Durie and ecclesiastical peace, Hartlib Papers, HP20/11/15a–28b.

²⁴ *PRO*, SP95, XII, ff.204–232; *SRA*, ‘Svenske sändebud till utlandske hof och deras sändebud till sverige’, 83; Murdoch, ‘Scottish Ambassadors and British diplomacy’, in Murdoch ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years’ War*, 41. 21/22 March 1632, *RAOSB*, first series, IV, 63–75, and more news came from Colonel David Drummond on 4 May 1632, *SRP*, IV, 166. Once again a Scottish officer played an additional role above and beyond his military position, supplying diplomatic information.

²⁵ 29 March 1632, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustav II Adolf, *RAOSB*, first series, VII, 103: “ded ordspråkedt om dem Engelske vara santt, att de altidh komma efter medh en sleng”. See also 19 April 1632, Axel Oxenstierna to the Riksråd, *RAOSB*, first series, VIII, 218. Even Marquis Hamilton was issued with instructions regarding “foederis inter reges regnaque Sueciae et M. Britanniae” in September 1632, a copy of which is in *SRA*, *Anglica*, 531.

²⁶ 25 September 1632, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustav II Adolf, *RAOSB*, first series, VIII, 554.

who had already visited The Hague, Elizabeth of Bohemia and Trier to discuss the various options to be examined at the Diet of Allied Princes at Heilbronn.²⁷ These centred on trying to get the Duke of Bavaria elected as Emperor which would have separated him from the Austrian Habsburg camp. Although the Dutch liked this plan they did not believe the Duke of Bavaria would side with the Protestant party, and so they further hesitated to commit themselves to Charles' plans for military intervention on behalf of the Palatinate unless he could produce firm details of the men and money he would provide.²⁸ Undaunted by Dutch reservations, Anstruther pressed on to confer with Philip Ludvig Duke of Simmern, brother of the late Elector Frederick, and Axel Oxenstierna.

Charles I's reliance on Vane's misinformation resulted in the king's decision not to issue Anstruther with written authority to negotiate with the Swedish delegation.²⁹ This was an unfortunate choice as Anstruther, who had by this point lost faith in Christian IV, spent much time in private audience and correspondence with Axel Oxenstierna discussing Stuart and Swedish intentions for Europe.³⁰ Oxenstierna learned how Vane had misrepresented the Swedish position to Charles I. In particular, Gustav II Adolf's death had been understood as equating to the end of Sweden's power, and therefore Sweden's position in a treaty with Britain was to be replaced by Saxony.³¹

In Anstruther's open meetings with Oxenstierna the Stuart envoy intimated that Charles I might offer up to £10,000 per month to

²⁷ For a contemporary relation see Anon., *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Third Part* (London: 1633), 112–227; 6 May 1633, Axel Oxenstierna to the Riksråd, *RAOSB*, first series, VIII, 669; 10 February 1633, Alvise Contarini, Venetian Ambassador to the Netherlands, *CSPV*, XXIII, 73; Murdoch, 'Scottish Ambassadors and British diplomacy', in Murdoch ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 41.

²⁸ 27 January, 3 and 17 February 1633, Alvise Contarini, Venetian Ambassador to the Netherlands, *CSPV*, XXIII, 66–67, 70–71, 75–76; Murdoch, 'Scottish Ambassadors and British diplomacy', in Murdoch ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 42.

²⁹ 6 May 1633, Axel Oxenstierna to the Riksråd, *RAOSB*, first series, VIII, 669.

³⁰ See Anstruther's several letters to Oxenstierna dated 6 and 25 May 1633, SRA, *Anglica Engelska beskickningars memorial 1591–1692*; 26 June 1633, Anstruther to Oxenstierna, SRA, AOSB, E556; for Anstruther's numerous private audiences with the Chancellor see 20 July 1633, Thomas Roe to the Archbishop of Canterbury, Hartlib Papers, HP 14/4/8a–8b.

³¹ 6 May 1633, Axel Oxenstierna to the Riksråd, *RAOSB*, first series, VIII, 669: "att Sverriges namn effter s. Kongl. M:ttz dödth inthed mehra häruthe skulle komma i consideration, uthan att alt skole deriveras på churfürsten af Saxon".

the new alliance and that £15,000 had already been dispatched for the alliance. Throughout the Heilbronn discussions, Anstruther had been assisted in his negotiations, covertly, by the Scottish cleric, John Durie, whom he encouraged to co-operate with like-minded people for closer relations between the Protestant allies.³² Anstruther's instructions involved obtaining John George of Saxony's alliance to secure the unrealistic aim of restoring Germany to its pre-war condition.³³ The failure of Charles' promised financial aid to materialise meant that Anstruther faced a dubious welcome from the other delegates.³⁴ Despite this, the Stuart envoy managed to gain many votes from the other participants, an unexpected result that Oxenstierna noted.³⁵ Sweden's role in the Heilbronn League was slightly diminished, as that of France increased.³⁶

Charles I apparently intended to provide a private army to protect the Palatinate, a move which Oxenstierna feared was not only of little use, but also in direct contradiction to Sweden and her allies' policies. The Swede reiterated that an alliance between Britain and Sweden, such as had been struck with France, would serve everybody's causes, particularly if Charles allowed free recruitment in his kingdoms.³⁷ As a result of Anstruther's negotiations at Heilbronn, the Chancellor's son, Johan Oxenstierna, was dispatched on embassy to London and the Dutch Republic and also to bring over more 'confederated troops' from Britain.³⁸ The proceedings had led to actual drafts of a British-Swedish treaty being circulated widely in Sweden.³⁹ Anstruther returned

³² Murdoch, 'Scottish Ambassadors and British diplomacy', in Murdoch ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 42. "Je n'ay neglig nullment de travailler en caste affaire Chretienne concerte entre nous a Heylbron, sur l'ouverture que m'enfist [premierement?] Monsieur L'Ambassadeur Anstruther", 4 July 1633, Bunickhausen to John Durie, Hartlib Papers, HP 69/8/1a-2b.

³³ 24 July 1633, Vincenzo Gussoni to Venice, *CSPV*, XXIII, 130-131.

³⁴ Murdoch, 'Scottish Ambassadors and British diplomacy', in Murdoch ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 43.

³⁵ 6 May 1633, Axel Oxenstierna to the Riksråd, *RAOSB*, first series, VIII, 669.

³⁶ Polisensky, *The Thirty Years' War*, 211; Lockhart, *Denmark in the Thirty Years' War*, 240.

³⁷ 6 May 1633, Axel Oxenstierna to the Riksråd, *RAOSB*, first series, VIII, 670.

³⁸ December 1633, Instructions to Johan Oxenstierna, and Axel Oxenstierna to Charles I, *RAOSB*, first series, X, 559 and 571; 1634, Johan Oxenstiernas Beskickning, SRA, Anglica VII, 532: Förhandlingar 1633-1660. However James VI believed that Axel Oxenstierna and the German princes had decided that the issues Johan had proposed should be discussed at Frankfurt and so he sent Anstruther there to deal with it. See also 12 April 1634, John Coke to Johan Oxenstierna, SRA, Anglica 532.

³⁹ 21 March 1632, Axel Oxenstierna to the Riksråd, *RAOSB*, first series, VII, 64-70. It was proposed that Marquis Hamilton be made general of the British army entering Swedish service.

to the Diet of Protestant Princes at Frankfurt am Main in 1634 and continued his negotiations with Oxenstierna relating to British involvement in the Evangelical League.⁴⁰ However, ambassador Johan Oxenstierna's poor treatment in England led to the Chancellor effectively withdrawing Swedish support for any Stuart initiatives regarding the Palatinate, albeit a follow up mission by Johan Skytte junior arrived in Britain soon after.⁴¹ Even Anstruther could not convince Oxenstierna that Charles' offers were serious, and the Swede did not engage in further discussions with him before leaving Frankfurt in September.⁴² When negotiations with Britain were re-initiated, after the defeat at Nördlingen, it was through Paul Strassburg and not with Oxenstierna himself.⁴³

This deterioration in relations may explain Charles I's move in appointing a veteran of the Swedish army as his next ambassador to a Swedish negotiation. Sir George Douglas was employed in the summer of 1634 for the extraordinary embassy to Poland and Sweden.⁴⁴ Although Douglas was diplomatically quite inexperienced, he had held the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the Swedish army and was not unknown to the Chancellor.⁴⁵ Douglas' departure from service was due to a disagreement with Gustav II Adolf, but he had maintained a correspondence with Oxenstierna and his fellow Scottish veterans.⁴⁶ He was also highly recommended by Queen Elizabeth of Bohemia and arrived in Danzig in January 1635, where Per Brahe, the Swedish

⁴⁰ 29 July 1634, Robert Anstruther to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, AOSB, E556; 11/21 March and 31 May 1634, Robert Anstruther to Secretary Coke, PRO, SP75, XIII, ff.172 and 196.

⁴¹ 17 May 1634, Axel Oxenstierna to Johan Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, first series, XI:2, 724–728. Johan, is sometimes erroneously noted as “Gabriel”. 12/22 February 1634, Robert Anstruther to John Coke, PRO, SP75, XIII, f.158; 14 July 1634, John Durie to Thomas Roe, *CSPD*, 1634–5, 148; Murdoch, ‘Scottish Ambassadors and British diplomacy’, in Murdoch ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years’ War*, 43–44. For Skytte see 1634–1635, Johan Skyttes Beskickning, SRA, Anglica VII, 532: Förhandlingar 1633–1660.

⁴² 4 July 1634, Axel Oxenstierna to the government and Riksråd, *RAOSB*, first series, XII, 143, and 23 September 1634, *idem* to Robert Anstruther, *ibid.*, 483–484.

⁴³ 1 October 1634, Axel Oxenstierna to Charles I, *RAOSB*, first series, XII, 525–526 and 13 October 1654, *idem* to Robert Anstruther, *ibid.*, 569–570.

⁴⁴ 10 November 1634, Anzolo Correr, *CSPV*, XXIII, 294–295; *SBL*, XI, 369–372; Bell, *Diplomatic Representatives*, 216; Fischer, *The Scots in Germany*, 97.

⁴⁵ KRA, MR, 1628/8–15; 1629/5–10, 12,14,16, 18–19; 1630/25; 1631/12, 15; 29 October/8 November 1627, James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, Anglica V. 15/25 December 1627, Axel Oxenstierna to Riksråd, *RAOSB*, first series, III, 646.

⁴⁶ See for example 20/30 March, 14/24 November 1631, 27 December 1632 and 6 January 1633, all George Douglas to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, AOSB, E588

commissioner for negotiations with Poland, received him and two letters he bore from Oxenstierna.⁴⁷

The defeat suffered at Nördlingen in September 1634 led to the collapse of the League of Heilbronn as some of Sweden's allies, including John George of Saxony, sought peace with the Emperor.⁴⁸ By the Treaty of Prague in May the following year, Saxony ended its alliance with the Swedes and pulled out of the war with Ferdinand II. Douglas' mission was vital to make a positive contribution in Swedish-Polish politics as the last thing the Swedes needed was a renewed second front against the armies of Wladislav IV Wasa. However, Douglas' inexperience resulted in diplomatic failure and, after a disagreement with the Polish king, he was recalled by Charles I.⁴⁹ Stuart diplomacy had focused on Great Britain forming a central part in a new alliance. The allies in the field had to reconsider their position rather hastily after the Treaty of Prague.⁵⁰ As such they could not rely on intangible Stuart promises and thereafter France emerged as the dominant state fighting alongside the Swedes, which had actually been the case for several years.⁵¹ The Swedes also looked to other intermediaries to settle a new treaty with the Poles.⁵²

However, in addition to various negotiations and embassies, the Scots were very heavily engaged in the field campaigns of the so-called 'Swedish period' of the Thirty Years' War.

⁴⁷ 21 January 1635, Per Brahe to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, III, 487.

⁴⁸ Polisensky, *The Thirty Years' War*, 214.

⁴⁹ Douglas died on his journey home. A diary was kept by one of his colleagues, showing Douglas in a more positive light. For his own diplomatic dispatches on his mission see PRO, SP88, VIII-IX, *passim*.

⁵⁰ For a copy of the treaty see Anon., *The Modern History of the World. Or An Historical Relation of the most memorable passages in Germany, and else-where, since the beginning of this present Yeere 1635. Divided into three sections* (London: 1635), section II, 37-72. For the effect on some of the Swedish garrisons effectively placed behind enemy lines by the treaty see part III, 1-17 and 52.

⁵¹ For earlier actions of the French (with Scots) in joint actions with Swedish troops and their German allies see Anon. *The History of the present Warres of Germany. A sixth part. Gathered out of the best intelligences, and reduced into times, places and actions. Briefly brought down from October Last part to Our Lady day 1634* (London: 1634), 58-65, and for a Scottish report of the same, 65-71. One of the most influential officers leading the French campaign both before and after the Treaty of Prague was the Scottish veteran of Swedish service Sir John Hepburn. In 1634 he had command of a French army of 6,000 men. See Anon., *The Modern History of the World*, section I, 8, 11, 15 and III, 57-58; Anon., *News From the Continent*, 29 November 1634, in Hartlib Papers, HP11/1/17a-b.

⁵² This was achieved at the Truce of Stuhmsdorf [aka Humsdorf] on 20 September 1635 which confirmed a 12 year cessation in hostilities. See Polisensky, *The Thirty Years' War*, 215-217; Parker, et al., eds., *The Thirty Years' War*, 141.

The Swedish army in the lands of the Holy Roman Empire

Before his engagement on the European battlefields Gustav II Adolf commanded 24 infantry regiments in Sweden-Finland. Although the number of complete Scottish regiments remained low, seven full and one half regiment were led by Scottish officers, placing just under a third of Sweden's military under Scottish command. As the Swedish army did not consist of one single unit, but comprised several smaller armies which operated simultaneously, this created the need for several command structures. For the new campaign in Europe there could be as many as six or as little as four armies under Swedish command between 1630–32 alone and their national composition varied. For example, in 1631 the force of over 21,000 men headed for Breitenfeld comprised 13,000 of Swedish or Finnish nationality whilst the remainder were foreign.⁵³ Additionally, the Swedish armies were supplemented by armies belonging to the allied German princes which also varied in number. When Gustav II Adolf landed in Pomerania, the Swedish forces comprised five armies: the king's royal army in Pomerania and Mecklenburg; Gustav Horn's army on the Oder, Maximilian Teuffel's army in lower Pomerania and Schlesien, Diederich von Falckenberg's army on the Elbe, and the Hamilton-Leslie army (as it became known) on the Weser.⁵⁴ A sixth army was created towards the end of the year under Åke Tott and Johan Banér to maintain control over the coast which was susceptible to Danish or Polish attacks.⁵⁵ By 1632 there were only four armies: the Royal Army, Gustav Horn's army, General Tott's army on the Weser and the Marquis of Hamilton's army 'with whom Banér was joined on the Elbe'.⁵⁶ These armies frequently merged or split, and were regularly complimented with new recruits, which makes tracking their movements and describing their national composition quite difficult.

⁵³ Ericson, "Armén är under alperna . . . och garnisonerna kring hela Tyskland", in Ericson, ed., *Vägen till Westfaliska freden*, 63.

⁵⁴ Note that Hamilton himself did not arrive for nearly a year after this so the army was de-facto commanded by Alexander Leslie from the start. See 31 October 1630, Axel Oxenstierna to Alexander Leslie, *RAOSB*, first series, V, 647 and 660. L. Ericson, 'De svenska arméerna i Tyskland', in K. Abukhanfusa, ed., *Krig och fred i källorna* (Jyväskylä: 1998), 46–47, gives the full number of Sweden's armies as 108,000 by February 1632. When the allied armies of Mecklenburg, Bremen, Saxony and Brandenburg are added this number rises to 140,000.

⁵⁵ Ericson, 'De svenska arméerna i Tyskland', in *Krig och fred i källorna*, 47.

⁵⁶ Monro, *His Expedition*, II, 107. Of course whether this was the Hamilton-Banér army or the Banér-Hamilton army will depend on the sources consulted.

The constant flux of troops and regiments, along with the frequent employment of Scottish officers in Swedish or German regiments,⁵⁷ means that the existence of a specifically 'British' component to these armies is equally problematic to determine. Sir James Spens had long been appointed General of all British troops in the Swedish army, but upon the arrival of the Marquis of Hamilton as an ally of Gustav II Adolf the title passed to him instead. Spens however retained the generalship over Scottish troops alone, but this did not stop his recruits from being a mixture of English and Scots. This bizarre division of nomenclature illustrates that the Swedes had an awareness, if not an actual understanding, of the concept of British as something other than either Scottish or English.⁵⁸

The unusual division of Scottish and English from British creates a tangled web of information regarding the actual employment of these men.

Scots in the Swedish Royal Armies

It is clear that much of the manpower in the various Swedish armies originated in Scotland. Whether specific areas within Scotland were targeted by recruiters remains an unclarified point. Fallon noted that "the areas used for recruitment for the regiments which served Sweden cannot be so precisely defined as those used for the units intended for Danish service".⁵⁹ Those troops departing directly from Scotland embarked from various ports, such as Cromarty, Aberdeen, and Leith, but of course the port location did not automatically imply that it was the home region of the soldier. As already mentioned in the introduction, no single method of recruitment has emerged, although the use of agents with court connections was important, as was the support of the Privy Council. Sometimes the agents were themselves colonels

⁵⁷ In 1635 Colonels Francis Ruthven and Robert Cunningham were both in charge of German regiments, 15 September 1635, Herman Wrangel to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 295.

⁵⁸ Murdoch has already begun an investigation into Gustav II Adolf's use of the terms British, English and Scottish, see 'James VI and the formation of a Scottish-British military identity', in Murdoch and Mackillop, eds., *Fighting for Identity*, which discusses the concept of a British military identity (including Hamilton's Army) and the subsequent impact in Britain.

⁵⁹ Fallon, 'Scottish mercenaries', 133.

and usually captains.⁶⁰ Although it was apparently normal for an agent and a prospective colonel of new troops to sign an agreement regarding the levies, intriguingly Fallon noted that only two such letters appear to have survived.⁶¹ This in itself begs the question regarding the true nature of the recruitment: if it was official why do not more of these letters of agreement exist? Of the people involved, many were officers who had already been in service before Gustav II Adolf's landing on the Pomeranian coast. Thus these were men who knew the means to recruitment personally and would have undertaken the task as a matter of course. Indeed, many of the Scots who became colonels between 1631 and 1633, such as James Scott, Thomas Thomson, Francis Ruthven, William Cunningham, and Alexander Gordon, had entered Swedish service prior to that Crown's engagement in the German campaigns.⁶² In addition to this were the Scottish colonels of Swedish and Finnish regiments, many of whom were settled in Sweden or Finland, and now part of the domestic fabric: Hugo Hamilton, John Burdon, John Gordon, Alexander Irving, John Nairn, Francis Johnstone and Thomas Kinnemond.⁶³

New recruitment also occurred from outwith Scotland, particularly from the Scottish community in Poland and the Netherlands.⁶⁴ Warrants for several thousand soldiers were issued in 1629 and the first of these men, over 2,200, sailed through the Sound before the year was out and the next year 2,527 followed, fully armed.⁶⁵ Other Scots crossed over from Danish-Norwegian service after Christian IV withdrew from the war, such as Mackay's regiment, joined by remnants of other regiments, which transferred directly to that of Sweden.⁶⁶ Gustav II Adolf's warrant to them, dated 17 June 1629, shows that

⁶⁰ An exception to this is the recommended use of an unnamed pearlfisher in November 1642 to recruit troops in Scotland, see *SRP*, IX, 449.

⁶¹ Fallon, 'Scottish mercenaries', 41.

⁶² Monro, *His Expedition*, II, 109.

⁶³ Wieselgren, *DelaGardiska Archivet*, X, 10–11.

⁶⁴ For example, in January 1629, General Wrangel wrote the Chancellor saying he could obtain 100 Scottish soldiers from the Netherlands, 22 January 1629, Herman Wrangel to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 132.

⁶⁵ N. Bang, ed., *Tabeller over skibsfart og varetansport gennem Øresund 1497–1660* (Copenhagen: 1933), II:2, 18 and 56, fn. 43 and 45. In 1629 first 2,025, then 180 soldiers passed through the Sound, and in 1631 there were first 2,057 in Scottish ships, followed by 150 on a Dutch and 320 on Bremen ships.

⁶⁶ Most Scottish troops in Christian's service were ordered to Fyn to settle their financial and contractual arrangements with the Danish Chancellor, 28 June 1629, missives to Niels Krag, *Kancelliets Brevbøger 1627–1629*; Monro, *His Expedition*, I, 85.

they were preparing to leave even before they had settled up with the Danish Chancellor.⁶⁷

Having already secured Stralsund with Scottish troops, Gustav II Adolf ordered the governor, Sir Alexander Leslie to take Rügen, which was accomplished by mid April supported by a fleet of 18 Swedish ships.⁶⁸ After being shipwrecked on the coast of Rügen, some 800 Scots under Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Monro secured the island.⁶⁹ Soon after this the Swedish king landed in Pomerania with a large army and the action of Monro's men at Schiffelben gave him his first conquest in that region.⁷⁰ In fact, Gustav II Adolf was accompanied by three Scottish regiments led by General James Spens, Lord Reay (Donald Mackay), and Colonel James MacDougall.⁷¹ These were restructured so that the Scottish regiments of James Spens, Lord Reay, James Ramsay and Ludovick Leslie all came under James Spens' generalship and as Monro observed, "These four regiments of foot followed his Majestie in all occasions".⁷² The service of these Scots, particularly Lord Reay's regiment (Mackay's), is well documented but some specific points about action, command and consequences of their service are worth highlighting.⁷³

⁶⁷ Mackay, *An Old Scots Brigade*, 83–86. Lord Reay himself decided to move his entire family over to Denmark while he prepared to join his regiment in the Swedish campaign, 12 June 1629, pass for Lord Reay to return to Denmark with his mother, wife, maid, nurse, children, servants and retinue including luggage, *APC*, May 1629–May 1630, 47.

⁶⁸ Anon., *The Swedish Intelligencer. The First Part* (London: 1632), 47 and 74. This was one of several actions which showed that being appointed as a governor did not equate to a desk job. Sir Patrick Ruthven, after being appointed Governor of Ulm still continued field operations quite successfully. See Anon. *The Continuation of the German History. The Fifth Part* (London: 1633), 37.

⁶⁹ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The First Part*, 61–63.

⁷⁰ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The First Part*, 63; Monro, *His Expedition*, II, 3–11.

⁷¹ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The First Part*, 49.

⁷² Monro, *His Expedition*, II, 107.

⁷³ At this point many Scottish officers were engaged in recruitment in England in 1629. The English Privy Council noted that 2,000 troops were to be raised in England, although the captains mentioned only had warrants for 800 men. The other 1,200 were to be taken from Ireland under Colonel Dowda, in part from royal regiments. See 19, 24 and 31 May 1629, *APC*, May 1629–May 1630, 16, 140 and 32. Additional warrants were awarded to Captains William Douglas and Harry Muschamp for 150 men each in September 1629, and 300 for Colonel Spens in April 1630. This means that circa 2,000 English and Irish were integrated into existing Scottish regiments, and it is unclear whether these have been noted in previous discussions of 'Scottish' regiments. However, already in May 1630 some of the English troops were defecting to Imperial service for 5 ducats each, see 12 May 1630, Baudissin to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 767. This chal-

Although Spens was the nominal General, he often flitted between the various armies, and as battlefield losses took their toll, the Scots came under the leadership of Sir John Hepburn. He, as the senior Scottish Colonel, took command of the 'Scottish' Green Brigade after Frankfurt an der Oder in 1631. By then the Brigade included other Scottish regiments including those of Colonels Lumsden and Muschamp.⁷⁴ At Frankfurt Lieutenant Colonel Robert Monro noted how the king "as commonly as usuall" had the artillery and ammunition placed behind the Scottish brigade for security.⁷⁵ Indeed Monro and Lumsden led the charging party which entered the port, and facilitated the taking of the city.⁷⁶ This notion of putting the Scots into the vanguard of the force (which they often requested), or into the most difficult situations, appears to have been the norm.⁷⁷ Another example of this is how at Oppenheim in December 1631, Sir John Lumsden initially received the privilege from Gustav II Adolf due to his "being the eldest Colonell, commanded there in chief, to Storme, or give an assault unto the Fort, before the morning", though the order was subsequently countermanded.⁷⁸

The Green Brigade also had the honour of storming Mergentheim and held it against General Tilly in the face of superior numbers and played a leading role in the capture of Oppenheim and Mentz, winning in the process the first ever Spanish colours taken by the 'Swedes' in the war.⁷⁹ The roll of honour for regiments does not end there, as shown by Lieutenant-Colonel George Douglas at Kreutzenach, for which action he was awarded governorship of the town (although this was given over to Colonel Alexander Ramsay.⁸⁰ He also had a

lenges the notion that "the three Stuart kingdoms of England, Scotland and Ireland isolated themselves effectively from [the Thirty Years' War]", see Ohlmeyer, 'Ireland Independent', in Ohlmeyer, ed., *Ireland from Independence to occupation*, 90.

⁷⁴ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Second Part*, 27; Monro, *His Expedition*, II, 13. Muschamp, although English, was often confused as being Scottish probably due to his regiment's nationality and the fact that he married into a Scottish family.

⁷⁵ Monro, *His Expedition*, II, 31. Gustav II Adolf personally communicated his orders. Monro was commanded to keep watch during the defence of Werben garrison, he got his orders from "his Majestie himselfe, how I should keepe good watch, and how to behave my selfe, in case of the enemies pursute", II, 54.

⁷⁶ A Swedish source has, however, described this last success as 'thanks to the bravery and superior equipment of the Swedes and the generalship of Gustavus'. See C. Hallendorff and A. Schück, *The History of Sweden* (London etc.: 1929), 246.

⁷⁷ See for instance, *The Swedish Intelligencer. The First Part*, 53; Monro, *His Expedition*, II, *passim*.

⁷⁸ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Second Part*, 43.

⁷⁹ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Second Part*, 27, 46-48.

⁸⁰ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The First Part*, 77-79. See also Grosjean, 'A century of

leading role in taking Harburg, for which Hepburn was publicly congratulated by the king before Frederick V and the assembled nobility of the army while Patrick Ruthven was made governor.⁸¹

Hepburn was given the vanguard of the army in pursuit of the Bavarian army in April 1632, and after taking Landshut at the end of the month he was made governor of the city, and the following month of Munich.⁸² Patrick Ruthven was sent as an envoy, accompanied by a garrison of 1,200, to negotiate with the city of Ulm, and became governor there.⁸³ Ruthven was also to recruit two new regiments, infantry and cavalry, for which the town of Ulm was expected to provide the finances.⁸⁴ He was also promoted to the rank of Sergeant-Major General and left in command of one of the armies in Swabia along with the forces of Duke William of Saxe-Weimar.⁸⁵ These actions and the names of those who undertook them were described and discussed at the time, as the contemporary news-sheets reveal, and would have inspired many a budding officer to enlist in the Swedish army.

The 'British' Period of the Thirty Years' War 1630–1632

It is after 1629 that the Swedish army can be said to contain a sizeable number of British, as opposed to solely Scottish, troops for the first time. The British army of the Marquis of Hamilton must be one of the least understood, and often misrepresented levy of soldiers who served beside the Swedes during the Thirty Years' War.⁸⁶

Scottish governorship', in Murdoch and Mackillop, eds., *Military Governors and Imperial Frontiers*, 60.

⁸¹ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Second Part*, 137–139.

⁸² *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Second Part*, 145–146, 171 and 176.

⁸³ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Second Part*, 176.

⁸⁴ 18 February 1632, Axel Oxenstierna to the mayor and council of Ulm, *RAOSB*, first series, VII, 27. See also February 1632, *idem* to Gustav Horn, *RAOSB*, first series, VII, 767.

⁸⁵ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Second Part*, 178–180.

⁸⁶ I have previously underestimated their actual participation in the campaigns, based on the Swedish secondary sources, see Grosjean, 'Scotland: Sweden's Closest Ally', in Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 152–153. When Dr. Steve Murdoch and I searched for some of the officers of the British levy in the muster-rolls in the Swedish Krigsarkiv we discovered that there is virtually no record of many of these prominent men. Chasing them up in Scottish primary sources revealed how their participation had been misrepresented, or at least misunderstood.

Hamilton's was the largest single levy to come out of Britain in this period and comprised up to 12,000 Scottish, English and Irish soldiers, many of whom eventually landed in Germany by July 1631.⁸⁷ These collectively were called "the Brittaines forces", and Hamilton styled "General of the British Army".⁸⁸ The Swedes sent Colonel Alexander Leslie (the future Earl of Leven) to negotiate with the Bishop and town of Bremen to secure safe quarters for Hamilton's army, and the Marquis became responsible for communicating Gustav II Adolf's hope that Charles I would appease Christian IV of Denmark-Norway over Sweden's advances.⁸⁹ The Swedish king was au fait with Hamilton's lack of military experience and had promoted Leslie to Sergeant-Major General to assist the Marquis.⁹⁰

Illness soon took its toll on the recruits and just three weeks into their service only 4,000 were fit for service.⁹¹ Of these Spens noted that the English proved particularly susceptible to the hardships of war but both Scots and the English became ill and many were placed into garrison.⁹² They continued to drop off in number through illness so that by 1632 Hamilton's forces barely numbered 700 men.⁹³ Despite a pervasive belief that Gustav II Adolf never tested these troops and they were reserved only for garrison duty, these troops saw a considerable amount of action.

⁸⁷ *Le Soldat Suedois*, 59. The author notes the arrival of 8,000 in this army, but there is confusion as to how many arrived. English and Scottish warrants were for 6,000 each, as noted in *APC*, 1630–1631, 264 and 367–368 and *RPCS*, IV, 193–194.

⁸⁸ Monro, *His Expedition*, II, 01 verso and 85; Interestingly Oxenstierna pointed out that it was through the engagement of Hamilton and his levies that Gustav II Adolf brought the "Brittanic nation" into the Thirty Years' War. This highlights the Swedes' understanding of the different components of the British state, as obviously all the Scottish recruits taken into Swedish service before this time were not viewed as "British". 17 January 1631, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustav II Adolf, *RAOSB*, first series, IV, 53–54: "E.K. M:tt ochså därvedh inveklar den Britanniske nationen i sitt kriggh".

⁸⁹ Fraser, *The Melvilles*, II, 14–17; 16 April 1631, Johan Salvius to Marquis of Hamilton, NAS, Hamilton Muniments, GD406/1/9253.

⁹⁰ 31 October 1630, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustav II Adolf, *RAOSB*, V, 647: "den Engelsche arméen under Hamiltonnerne adsideredt aff Lesle vidh Weserströmmen"; 29 June 1631, Alexander Leslie to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 427–428; 7 July 1631, L. Camerarius to Marquis Hamilton, NAS, Hamilton Muniments, GD406/1/9247. See also the king's letters to both Marquis Hamilton and Alexander Leslie in Fraser, *The Melvilles*, II, 13–17.

⁹¹ Fraser, *The Melvilles*, II, 80–81 and 19.

⁹² 13 September 1631, James Spens to Gustav II Adolf, SRA, Anglica, III, f.107; 24 September 1631, Gustav II Adolf to Marquis of Hamilton, NAS, Hamilton Muniments, GD406/1/9348; *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Fourth Part*, 110.

⁹³ Steckzén, *Svenskt och Brittiskt*, 98–99.

Almost immediately upon his arrival, the Marquis of Hamilton's troops helped to lift the siege of Crossen and caused a commotion among the confederates of the Catholic armies even before they arrived.⁹⁴ Hamilton was sent with his 6–8,000 men to join up with Field Marshal Banér where they successfully took part in combined operations in Brandenburg and around Magdeburg throughout August–December 1631.⁹⁵ Despite his inexperience he acquitted himself well during these operations, and had he been properly supplied, may have been even more effective. Not only were his forces mostly unseasoned, but they were also virtually unarmed and somewhat abandoned by both the Swedes and Charles I in this regard.⁹⁶ Hamilton complained bitterly to Charles I about the lack of supplies, though Colonel James Ramsay eventually brought some a few weeks after their arrival.⁹⁷ The Scots and English were quartered around Halberstadt until April and in July 1632 the surviving regiments were

⁹⁴ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The First Part*, 108–109; 30 October 1631, Congratulatory letter to the Marquis of Hamilton, NAS, Hamilton Muniments, GD406/1/233.

⁹⁵ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Fourth Part*, 107 notes “His Lordships Army arriving in *Pomerland* in the beginning of August; presently did this service unto the King of *Sweden*: that it was confessed to be one of the occasions of the victorie of *Leipsick*”. See also 16 December 1631 and n.d. 1631, both Johan Banér to Marquis of Hamilton anent Magdeburg, NAS, Hamilton Muniments, GD406/1/9245–6; and January 1632, Marquis of Hamilton to Johan Banér and another to Charles I anent the siege.

⁹⁶ The fact that the English and Scots of Hamilton's army were unarmed was highlighted in *The Swedish Intelligencer*: “neither *English* nor *Scottish* Regiments, had any fixt Armes, as yet: which in plaine *English* phrase is; They were not yet fully armed [. . . they . . .] lay some 10 dayes at first, an *English* mile off from Boxtehude: with unfixt Armes, for a great part, and without powder or bullets . . . [the Buxtehude garrison] having advertisement by the Boores, that the *English* and the *Scottish* Regiments, were not halfe armed, and but raw soldiers; 200 of the towne Horsemen; one night sallied out upon their Quarters. They fell out with a very great clamour and noise making: and were comme within 20 paces of their very Guards. Those of our nation that had Armes, stood their ground and 2 troops of horse were quickly at hand to second them. Tis said that some of the *Irish* ventured upon the salliers horsemen, with their skeynes [knives] or swords only: and did some peece of execution upon them”, *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Fourth Part*, 127–129. See also *idem*, 107–116 and 128–133 for more on Hamilton's army. Monro gave an alternative version, concluding that the Army was well-furnished and “in complete Armes, being well araid, and furnished of artillery”, Monro, *His Expedition*, II, 52. His account was second hand (he may have met the marquis, but did not see his army) and was written several years after the event, while the author of the first account was an eye-witness and published at the time. *Le Soldat Suedois* does not specify whether the English and Scottish men of Hamilton's regiment were armed, although it does highlight the English “sumptuousness” of the accompanying court.

⁹⁷ n.d., 1632, Marquis of Hamilton to Charles I, NAS, Hamilton Muniments, GD406/1/9631; 2 September 1631, Captain J. Pennington to the lords of the admiralty, *CSPD*, 1631, 139.

reduced into two, one Scottish and one English.⁹⁸ The command of the English was given to Sir William Bellenden (a Scot) while Sir Alexander Hamilton led the Scots. They were sent to join the army of Duke William of Saxe-Wismar with whom they campaigned in Bavaria.⁹⁹ These soldiers were reduced by Gustav II Adolf on 22 October 1632 after which the marquis returned to Britain carrying diplomatic instructions from the King of Sweden.¹⁰⁰

A Second British Army in the Field

It is clear from Axel Oxenstierna's correspondence that the Army of the Weser under Alexander Leslie's command was to form part of Hamilton's British army. However, we also know that Hamilton and his contingent did not arrive before July 1631. Yet other regiments had arrived and formed up before that date.¹⁰¹ Some of these were more complete than others, but their presence is not usually considered in histories of the campaign. As there was no General of specifically English troops in Sweden, English soldiers should have fallen under the command of the Marquis as 'General of the British Army'. With Sir Alexander Leslie already in command of these forces as early as July, there was in fact a second British army in the field. In July 1630 Colonel Thomas Conway had taken part in the siege of Griefenhagen with Leslie and then returned to England to recruit more men after being wounded.¹⁰² Only five of his eight new English companies arrived in Germany. The colonel, his second in command and 300 men drowned on the coast of Norway en route. Thereafter the remnant were led, unescorted, by their sergeant-major,

⁹⁸ In March the Chancellor made specific requests of Ludwig of Anhalt to quarter Hamilton's troops, 3 and 28 March 1632, Axel Oxenstierna to Ludwig of Anhalt, *RAOSB*, first series, VII, 33 and 96–97.

⁹⁹ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Third Part*, 30–37. Major Urchard MacDougal, and Captains James Hamilton, John Hamilton, and Alexander Stuart were all sent to Scotland to recruit for this regiment, each with a leave of six months, see 19 May 1632, *RAOSB*, first series, VII, 805, fn. 1. Captain Thomas Hume was sent to recruit 200 Scots from Poland for the regiment, 16 June 1632, Axel Oxenstierna to Thomas Hume, Sten Bielke and Bengt Bagge, *RAOSB*, first series, VII, 418–419.

¹⁰⁰ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Third Part*, 71; 1632, Svensk instruction för Markisen av Hamilton, SRA, Anglica VII, 531: Förhandlingar 1559–1632.

¹⁰¹ For instance Colonel James Ramsay received a warrant to raise 300 men in England, volunteers only, and to send them onto his regiment.

¹⁰² *The Swedish Intelligencer. The First Part*, 71.

Captain Thomas Grove, through Mecklenburg until they fell in with three regiments of Scots.¹⁰³ This formation then linked up with Alexander Lord Forbes' Scottish regiment and the mixed Scottish-Irish regiment of Sir Frederick Hamilton. Another English regiment under Colonel Aston completed this newly recruited section of the British army while the veteran Colonel Robert Leslie's "old regiment of Scots" were seconded to them to give them some experience.¹⁰⁴ These men were deployed straight into the 14,000 strong army of Field Marshal Åke Tott and not with the rest of the 'British' army under Hamilton.¹⁰⁵ In other words, about half of Tott's Swedish army were British and further bolstered by a sixth Scottish regiment, that of Major General Leslie at the end of 1631.

There has been general confusion about the exact number of 'British' levies made for Swedish service at this point, caused largely by two identical warrants being issued simultaneously.¹⁰⁶ However, the presence of this, effectively, second British army in the field for

¹⁰³ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Fourth Part*, 127, see also 6 April 1632, Axel Oxenstierna to Johan Salvius, *RAOSB*, first series, VII, 162. It is not clear if these Scottish regiments were part of Hamilton's British army, or previously recruited Scots.

¹⁰⁴ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Fourth Part*, 127. Four more of Sir Frederick's companies went astray and did not arrive until mid-summer. These must have included Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Forbes and Captain John Baillie's companies which were to be recruited in Ireland in July 1631 and for which they received 1,500 rixdaler, see 29 July 1631, NAS, Lord Forbes' Papers, GD52/93. For the warrants to raise these and other forces see *RPCS*, second series, III and IV, *passim*. See also 4 February 1631, Charles I to Gustav II Adolf, SRA, Anglica III/517. These may have been Colonel James Ashley's levies, see *APC 1630-1631*, 178. Intriguingly Monro does not list Ashley, although an 'Austin' (probably Aston) is noted, *His Expedition*, II, 02 verso. It was not unusual for names to be misspelt: Valentine for Bellenden, for example.

¹⁰⁵ *The Swedish Intelligencer, The Fourth Part*, 126; Monro, *His Expedition*, II, 02 verso and 102. The commanders of these units were Colonels Sir James Lumsden, Alexander Lord Forbes, Sir Frederick Hamilton, Robert Monro of Fowlis and Robert Lesley. Under the Marquis of Hamilton's advice, those regiments of Sir Frederick Hamilton and Alexander Lord Forbes were merged. See 29 June 1631, Alexander Leslie to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 431 and 3 November 1631, *RPCS*, second series, IV, 349. According to Monro, the English were commanded by Colonel Aston with Lieutenant-Colonel Mon-George in command of Conway's remnants (although the *Swedish Intelligencer. The Fourth Part*, 127 and 138 has Captain Grove initially in charge, then replaced by Sir John Casswell). Despite a search conducted by Steve Murdoch, several archivists and myself in Krigsarkiv, no trace of Frederick Hamilton's regiment was found in the muster-rolls for Åke Tott's army.

¹⁰⁶ I have previously published a figure of 6,000 in 'Scotland: Sweden's closest ally?', *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War 1618-1648*, 152-153. A contemporary source, in a letter to the Estates General of the Netherlands regarding helping Hamilton with his army of 12,000 men, dated April 1631, NAS, Hamilton Muniments, GD406/1/9296 states 12,000. However, only those levied by Spens appear in the Swedish muster-rolls.

Sweden has thus been lost and must be assessed. If so this proves that Hamilton's army could have comprised more than 8,000 as these other troops were distributed elsewhere. Monro's *Expedition* highlights these problems. Captain James Ramsay for example was to raise a regiment for Hamilton, however the troops never served with the Marquis, but followed the Swedish king's army.¹⁰⁷ If this is the same Ramsay who was quartermaster to Hamilton, then he became governor of Breisach in Baden.¹⁰⁸

In any case, Sergeant-Major Grove and Sir Frederick Hamilton's regiments took on most of the work at the siege of Buxtehude before they were even fully armed.¹⁰⁹ Thereafter Sir Frederick's troops were sent alone to take Bremersford. Poorly supported by the Swedes they were nearly cut off by Pappenheim's army in the city, but escaped due to their noteworthy agility.¹¹⁰ At Lüneberg in Lower Saxony in 1632 Colonel Robert Leslie commanded 3 regiments of Scots making up the right wing of the army while the British brigade of Frederick Hamilton made up the left wing of the rear.¹¹¹ In one of the final actions of the second British army, Frederick Hamilton's Brigade took Draconfeldt, after which the brigade was paid off. Those that wished to remain in the field did so in Scottish or Swedish regiments.¹¹² Although these initial attempts at providing a 'British' army overseas appeared to fail, a new attempt was made in late 1633, despite Oxenstierna's own objections to it. He stated categorically in May 1633 that no more British forces should be allowed into the German theatre, but that only more troops should be brought from the island.¹¹³ Nonetheless he commissioned Patrick Ruthven as the new 'General of British troops', after which attempts were made to furnish a new 'Britannicæ regimenta' to supplement the surviving elements of British forces under his command.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁷ Monro, *His Expedition*, II, 107.

¹⁰⁸ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The First Part*, 77–79.

¹⁰⁹ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Fourth Part*, 128. The English Sergeant-Major Grove was rewarded with the governorship, but lost it within weeks as General Tott wanted a Swede to be governor.

¹¹⁰ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Fourth Part*, 131. The author notes "The Regiment being most *Irish* and *Scots*, used to wading and night marching: came flouncing thorough [*sic*] the Bogs and By-places, and recovered safely into *Buxtehude*."

¹¹¹ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Fourth Part*, 142.

¹¹² *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Fourth Part*, 150.

¹¹³ 6 May 1633, Axel Oxenstierna to the Riksråd, *RAOSB*, first series, VIII, 669; Murdoch, 'James VI and the Formation of a Scottish-British military identity', in Murdoch and Mackillop, eds., *Fighting for Identity*, 23.

¹¹⁴ 22 November 1633, Axel Oxenstierna to Charles I, as well as to George Hay,

Examples of Actions

Scottish troops did not have to be numerically significant to make an important contribution to the war. This can be seen in the Scottish force deployed by Gustav II Adolf at the battle of Leipzig on 7 September 1631. The Swedish army there was joined by that of John George of Saxony and the combined strength totalled about 36,000 men, of which 10% were Scots. The Scottish musketeers led the vanguard under colonels James Ramsay, James Lumsden, John Hamilton and Robert Monro of Fowles. Sir John Hepburn, for his part, was in overall command of the three Brigades of the reserve.¹¹⁵ In fact one Scottish source rather subjectively notes that “The Scottish brigades covered both the advance and rear of the *so-called* Swedish army” (italics mine).¹¹⁶ The king’s cavalry was positioned between two Scottish companies, those of Ramsay and Monro.¹¹⁷ After the Saxon allies beat a hasty retreat a gap opened in the left flank of the Swedish army, Gustav II Adolf is said to have ordered 2,000 Scottish musketeers to charge aided by 2,000 cavalry.¹¹⁸ The Scots under Hepburn, Lumsden and Mackay then formed smaller groups only three men deep, with the front row kneeling, the second row bent forward and the back standing. They fired in unison at the enemy, breaking their ranks and paving the way for their own infantry charge followed by one from the Swedish cavalry.¹¹⁹ Thereafter, Lt

Richard Weston, Robert Ker, Henry Rich, James Hay, James Stuart, Marquis Hamilton and Thomas Roe, *RAOSB*, first series, X, 312–319; a copy of the letter to Hamilton can also be found in NAS, Hamilton Muniments, GD406/1/9318; Axel Oxenstierna to Charles I, December 1633, *RAOSB*, first series, X, 572–574; A total of 3,000 levies is noted in J.H. McMaster and M. Wood, ed., *Supplementary report on the manuscripts of his grace the Duke of Hamilton* (London: 1932), 34.

¹¹⁵ Captain John Forbes, *A letter from Sariant Maior Forbes from the King of Swethens army to his reverend father Mr. Iohn Forbes, minister to the Worshipful Company of Marchant Adventures residing in Delft touching the great battle fought by Lypsick betweene the King of Swethen, the Duke of Saxons army, the Emperours army, and that commanded by Generall Tilly, of the Catholique League the 7. September, 1631* (Amsterdam: 1631). See also Monro, *His Expedition*, II, 63–64, and *Le Soldat Suedois*, 71.

¹¹⁶ Grant, *Memoirs and adventures of John Hepburn*, 99.

¹¹⁷ Monro, *His Expedition*, II, 63–64.

¹¹⁸ Monro, *His Expedition*, II, 66; *The Swedish Intelligencer. The First Part*, 123–124.

¹¹⁹ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The First Part*, 124 notes that “the Scots ordering themselves in severall small battagliaes, about 6 or 700 in a body, presently now double their rankes, making their files then but 3 deepe, the discipline of the King of Sweden beeng never to march above 6 deepe”. This appears to suggest that the order came from the field commanders and, in any case broke the Swedish rules of engagement. See also Anon., *The Swedish Discipline* (London: 1632), 24–26.

Colonel Robert Monro, leading Mackay's and Lumsden's musketeers, seized the enemy artillery securing their defeat.¹²⁰ Monro said that "the victory and the credit of the day, as being last engaged, was ascribed to our Briggad, being the reserve, were thanked by his Majesty for their service, in publique audience, and in the view of the whole Army, we were promised to be rewarded".¹²¹ Gustav II Adolf tends to be credited for the victory — although how he could have foreseen the desertion of the Saxon troops and thus planned the last-minute Scottish input remains a mystery. It would have required either prior or immediate consultation with his officers regarding the defection of half his forces. It is more credible that the commanders on the ground dealt with the situation as it arose. Either way the king was dependent on the Scottish troops and their steadfast service.

After Leipzig Sir James Ramsay captured Marienburg on the Main at great cost, injuring an arm in the process, and was rewarded with land in Mecklenburg.¹²² One of his lieutenants, Robert Ramsay, successfully conned his way into the castle through his excellent command of the German language.¹²³ Elements of James Ramsay's regiment were also engaged in taking Aschaffenberg, Oppenheim, Kreuznach, Bingen and Bacharach.¹²⁴ Ramsay's greatest service was as the Defender of Hanau, for which city he served as governor between 1634–38.¹²⁵

Gustav II Adolf continued his march through German territory, taking Thuringen, along the Main valley toward the Rhine and established a base at Frankfurt am Main. Alexander Leslie was appointed Major-General of the Silesian army and the chief commandant of Upper and Lower Saxony.¹²⁶ However, Swedish advances were brought to a halt with the defeat at Nuremberg, and the king's death at Lützen.¹²⁷ Although the Scottish colonel of the Green Brigade,

¹²⁰ Anon, *The Swedish Discipline*, 24. This source notes the significant losses to the Scots and that that the Imperialists "shot all the Scottish Ancients dead upon the place", but does not detail who they were.

¹²¹ Monro, *His Expedition*, II, 66.

¹²² *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Second Part*, 12–13.

¹²³ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Second Part*, 12–13. Although Ramsay was subsequently caught and imprisoned, he was released when the castle fell to the Swedes.

¹²⁴ Grant, *Soldiers of Fortune*, 201–207.

¹²⁵ For more on Ramsay in Ulm see H. Ruffer and K. Zickermann, 'German Reactions to the Scots in the Holy Roman Empire during the Thirty Years' War', in Murdoch ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 283–287.

¹²⁶ *RAOSB*, X, 112–113, 244–248, 365–368.

¹²⁷ For one of many accounts of the battle see *Le Soldat Suedois*, 484–494.

Hepburn, had left the Swedish army to take up service in France before Lützen, the Brigade itself was there. Other Scottish troops present included Captain Alexander Irving with 200 Scots serving with Duke Bernard of Weimar's troops, Colonel Henderson in the reserve, and Colonel Ludovick Leslie's regiment.¹²⁸ These troops did not prevent Gustav II Adolf's death, but they were instrumental in achieving a victory in the battle itself.

Scottish defeats

The Scottish role in the Swedish army was not consistently positive or glorious, mistakes were made, battles and garrisons were lost and orders disobeyed. In April 1632 for example, Colonel John Ruthven allowed two of his companies to surrender Oppenheim as they were losing out to the enemy — this was against Swedish orders, and Oxenstierna subsequently had to ask Duke Bernhard to achieve the retaking of the town. In any one action, a regiment could be decimated. Major-General Leslie's own regiment, including four of Monro's companies, was caught in the open by Pappenheim's army and at a stroke lost 19 colours, numerous officers and hundreds of men.¹²⁹

Perhaps the most well-known defeat of the Thirty Years' War was the battle of Nördlingen in 1634, although the Scots maintained their well-earned reputation here. The two main commanders on the Swedish side were Duke Bernhard of Weimar and General Gustav Horn. In the Duke's army, Scots served under Colonel Macdougall and Colonel Leslie (brother of Alexander Leslie). In Horn's army Colonel Gunn and Colonel Arvid 'Finn' Forbes led the Scots. Monro's regiment was also present, temporarily led by Lieutenant Colonel William Stewart.¹³⁰ It was the troops under Gunn who were ordered into battle first along with some mixed British units under the Englishman Colonel Mustein. They dislodged some 3,000 Spaniards off the high ground in a battle which lasted through the night. Full of success, and against the advice of some of the field officers, the Swedes decided to press on for a second day without the support

¹²⁸ Monro, *His Expedition*, II, 162–170; *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Third Part*, 117–170.

¹²⁹ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Fourth Part*, 132.

¹³⁰ Monro, *His Expedition*, II, 178.

of the Count Palatine army and despite the fact that the city had received fresh supplies of men and equipment through the night. One of the Scots later wrote an account of the battle in which he stated that on the second day, the Scots Brigade went further than any other unit and held the sponce they captured all day, but with insufficient cavalry support. Combined with the high attrition rate, their situation became hopeless.¹³¹ Thereafter, Gunn withdrew the remnants of the British from the field in better order than the rest of the Swedish army until the brigade finally linked up with the Count Palatine army.¹³²

Scottish roles in the Swedish army post 1634

By 1634 Patrick Ruthven and Alexander Leslie had both been promoted general.¹³³ In 1634 Leslie also took part in the siege of Landsberg. It was for taking this city that he was then given command over Kniphausen's army, though Leslie wished an audience with Oxenstierna before he accepted it. He thereafter went on to command these forces at Frankfurt an der Oder.¹³⁴ Sweden's next move in the Thirty Years' War involved the building up of defences in anticipation of attacks. Patrick Ruthven in fact became the right-hand man

¹³¹ Anon., 'A very exact relation of the proceeding of Gustavus Horne, in the years 1634, till the fatal Batell of Norlingen, written by an eye witness to his friend in England, from Francort upon the mayne, the 10/20 September 1634' reproduced in *The Modern History of the World*, I, A3-A4. The author recorded the Scots dead as Lieutenant Colonel Forbes of Tulloch, Sergeant-Major King, Captain Adam Gordon, Captain Hay, Captain Weymes, Captain Bothwell, Captain Drummond, Captain Graham and numerous "of our best infantrie were slain: and diverse of our best Commanders killed hurt, or taken prisoner". He also noted the English officers Colonel Mustein, Captain Mustein and Captain Morgan killed and the Scots, Colonel Hume, Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart of Clery, Lieutenant-Colonel Sandilands, Lieutenant-Colonel Forbes, Sergenat-Major Leslie and numerous other Scottish officers taken prisoner.

¹³² Anon., 'A very exact relation of the proceeding of Gustavus Horne', A4. The author states "I may justly say without ostentation or partiality that our nation did purchase to themselves great honour, credit and reputation in this battaile, and in the retreat also, under the command of Colonel Gwin [Gunn], who played the part of a good Leader, and of a valiant soldier; as the Germans themselves do witness and contest". For an account of the disorder of the Swedish army in the aftermath of battle see 15 November 1634, *News from the Continent*, Hartlib Papers, HP/11/1/17a-b.

¹³³ 3 March 1634, *SRP*, IV, 53.

¹³⁴ The taking of the city was announced to the Marquis of Hamilton by Sir David Drummond. See 11 September 1634, Drummond to Hamilton, NAS, Hamilton Muniments, GD406/1/9336; Anon., *The History of the present Warres of Germany. A Sixth Part* (London: 1634), 161, 168 and 171.

to Swedish Field Marshal, Johan Banér.¹³⁵ Also serving under Banér, James King commanded no fewer than three regiments at the siege of Hildesheim in March 1634.¹³⁶ Colonel James Macdougall in Duke Bernhard's army (in command of Swedish troops) took numerous Bavarian and Imperial cities throughout 1633–1634.¹³⁷ In the process of all these actions, the Scottish forces had suffered massive rates of attrition. This resulted in the amalgamation of many of the units and Scots being sent into regiments under foreign command. Despite this there were at least three Scottish and English regiments in service in 1635, and six companies of Colonel Alexander Gordon's newly recruited dragoon regiment were sent to join the royal army.¹³⁸ It also led to a fresh round of recruiting in Scotland, both legally and illegally between 1634–1638, as several officers, including Patrick Ruthven, accompanied Johan Oxenstierna on his embassy to Charles I in 1634, resulting in at least 1,660 Scots legally levied for Sweden.¹³⁹ Major-General Alexander Leslie returned to Scotland in 1635, ostensibly on personal business, but also for recruitment purposes. Intriguingly, the Stuart envoy to Denmark-Norway and Sweden, Joseph Averie, noted in 1636 that the delay in obtaining English recruits at this time was endangering the Swedish position in the Empire and that Oxenstierna was preparing to make peace with the Emperor.¹⁴⁰

Colonel Alexander Cunningham also went to Scotland for reinforcements and arrived in Stralsund in November 1637 with 5 com-

¹³⁵ L. Tingsten, *Fältnarskalkarna Johan Banér och Lennart Torstensson såsom härförare* (Stockholm: 1932), 25.

¹³⁶ Anon., *The History of the present Warres of Germany. A Sixth Part* (London: 1634), 168.

¹³⁷ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Fourth Part*, 158; Anon., *The Continuation of the German History. The Fifth Part* (London: 1633), 127; *The History of the present Warres of Germany. A Sixth Part*, 9–10.

¹³⁸ 8 October 1635, Herman Wrangel to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 297–298.

¹³⁹ The officers sent to recruit in Scotland during this period were Major Thomas Moffat, colonels Robert Stuart, Robert Monro, Johan Skytte, Alexander and Robert Cunningham, and lieutenant colonels Ludovick Leslie, Stuart and Monro 7 October 1634, *SRP*, IV, 229; 8/18 April 1636, Joseph Averie to John Coke, *PRO*, SP75, XIII, f.315; 16/28 March 1636, NAS, Hamilton Muniments, GD406/1/9635; 23 March/2 April and 24 April 1636, NAS, GD406/1/9626 and 9627; 16 April 1636, NAS, Hamilton Muniments, GD406/1/9331; 2 April 1636, Axel Oxenstierna to Hamilton, *RAOSB*, XV, 365; 25 April 1636, Memorial for Lars Grubbe, *RAOSB*, XV, 402–403; *RPCS*, second series, VI, 65–66, 458–459, and 484–485.

¹⁴⁰ 15/25 June 1636, Joseph Averie to John Coke, *PRO*, SP95, IV, f.128.

panies of fresh Scottish recruits.¹⁴¹ At that time recruiters were sent to Ireland as well to levy soldiers, although some of these men deserted in Scotland and the Scottish Privy Council put out a warrant for their arrest.¹⁴² The Swedes hoped for more and believed that Charles was stalling them, that recruiting in England was difficult and the English recruits they got were inferior and less motivated than the Scots.¹⁴³ As a result Lieutenant-General James King also offered to recruit one or two regiments in Scotland in late 1638, and with some success.¹⁴⁴

The troops who arrived between 1635 and 1636 were to engage in one of the most spectacular victories by any Swedish army during their 18 years of warfare in the empire. When John George of Saxony signed the Peace of Prague with the Emperor in 1635, the treaty was described by Major General Drummond as ‘ruinous’ to the Swedish army while the Duke himself was implicated in some deceitful plot to capture some of the Swedish army.¹⁴⁵ In Scotland news of the treaty was related with contempt. Monro called it a ‘profideous peace’ and wished God to punish him for his treachery. He further vowed to be willing to sacrifice his own blood to get his revenge upon him.¹⁴⁶

It was not just Saxony who made peace with the Emperor: the Duke of Lüneburg also left the Swedish camp, leaving them seriously undermanned. The head army consisted of about 26,000 men, of which only 2–3,000 were Swedish or Finnish.¹⁴⁷ The rest were Germans, Scots and English and the restructuring that took place after the treaty left the Swedes with a headache regarding funding and, although Oxenstierna promised much, several of the Scottish

¹⁴¹ *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 479–480; 20 June 1637, *RPCS*, second series, VI, 458–459.

¹⁴² July? 1637, *CSPI 1633–1647*, 165: “Some German captains, Captain White, a son of Sir Nicholas, Colonel Stewart, and others are here, with licence to take up men for the Swedes”; 25 September 1637, *RPCS*, second series, VI, 533.

¹⁴³ 28 February 1638, *SRP*, V, 15: “medan som thet Engelske folcket dock inet mycket duger . . . så kunne officerarne heller drag uthur Skåttlandh soldater till hundradetals och mindre troupper aff them, som förr haffve tjent, medh hvilke Chronan kan vara bättre benögd”.

¹⁴⁴ *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 936.

¹⁴⁵ 20 April 1635, Extract of Major Drummond’s Relation to Joseph Averie, and 25 April 1635 Averie to Coke, *PRO*, SP75, XIII, ff.239–240.

¹⁴⁶ D. Horsburgh, ‘Wish You Were Here? Scottish reactions to “Postcards” home from the “Germane Warres”’, in Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years’ War*, 254.

¹⁴⁷ Tingsten, *Fältmarskalkarna Johan Banér och Lennart Torstensson*, 24.

colonels were left with no means to pay their troops. As a result colonels Robert Monro and Robert Leslie were reported to have cashiered themselves from the army along with other Britons in protest, although only temporarily.¹⁴⁸ When the Saxon army engaged the Swedes in October 1635, Banér met Ruthven and together they implemented a defeat of the Saxon cavalry and its commander, von Baudissin. Ruthven was accredited with routing 5–7,000 Saxon cavalry with only one mounted regiment of his own and 700 infantry.¹⁴⁹ Lieutenant-General Ruthven was then placed in charge of taking the enemy's bridges, and thus disrupting the lines of communication.

The Chancellor's main intentions were to strengthen the Swedish defences along the Baltic coast. To this end he devised the establishment of two new armies along the Weser and Oder rivers, and in support of Banér's army.¹⁵⁰ When choosing the new Field Marshal of the Army of the Weser, the Chancellor considered Patrick Ruthven, Lennart Torstensson, and James King amongst others before deciding that Alexander Leslie was the best man for the job.¹⁵¹ That three out of the four candidates for the post of Swedish Field Marshal were Scots is revealing in its own right. Although Oxenstierna liked and respected Ruthven, he did not want to pull him away from Banér, and the same reasoning was mentioned for King, whereas Leslie's qualities adequately satisfied the post.¹⁵² The Chancellor also appointed Lieutenant-General James King as an assistant to Field Marshal Leslie and ordered King to rendezvous with Leslie in Hamburg.¹⁵³ Even for the other army, along the Oder, Oxenstierna suggested that Colonel David Drummond be seconded as Major General of the infantry under Field Marshal Herman Wrangel.¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁸ 30 June 1635, Joseph Averie to Coke, PRO, SP75, XIII, f.245. Averie later noted after a particular success of General Ruthven "how poor a recompence those of our nation are like to receive for their true and faithful service to the Crowne of Sweden. 12/22/November 1635, Averie to Coke, PRO, SP75, XIII, f.270.

¹⁴⁹ 12/22/ November 1635, Averie to Coke, PRO, SP75, XIII, f.270; Tingsten, *Fältmarskalkarna Johan Banér och Lennart Torstensson*, 44–45.

¹⁵⁰ The armies totalled 53,000 men, a significant difference from the 108,000 of 1632 noted previously, see Ericson, 'De svenska arméerna i Tyskland', in *Krig och fred i källorna*, 47.

¹⁵¹ 26 January 1636, Axel Oxenstierna to Johan Banér, *RAOSB*, XV, 77–79. See also 10 March 1636, *News from the Continent*, Hartlib Papers, HP/11/1/107a–b.

¹⁵² 29 March 1636, Axel Oxenstierna to Queen Kristina, *RAOSB*, XV, 287–302. See also 9 February 1636, instructions for Field Marshal Alexander Leslie, *ibid.*, 126–133.

¹⁵³ 27 February 1636, Axel Oxenstierna to James King, *RAOSB*, XV, 206–209.

¹⁵⁴ February 1636, memorial to Lars Grubbe, *RAOSB*, XV, 164–167.

Thus when it came to appointing officers to the highest positions of authority in the Swedish army Chancellor Oxenstierna's personal choices always included Scots, and when Leslie was involved he invariably won favour over the Swedes.¹⁵⁵ Alexander Leslie mentioned Ruthven's successful collaboration with Banér in his correspondence to the Marquis of Hamilton about his own successes on the battlefield in 1636.¹⁵⁶ Leslie noted his successes at Petershagen where he captured Colonel and Baron Kotler along with several other officers and many soldiers. That was followed by his victories at Osnabrück and Minden, the last of which towns he garrisoned with his own troops. Leslie urged Hamilton to convince Charles I that his 5,000 strong army of Westphalia offered the best hope of regaining the Palatinate, thus linking Swedish military action in Germany to the Stuart agenda in Europe. Sir Thomas Roe related to John Durie that given the tensions growing between France and Spain, and the subsequent redeployment this caused, that Leslie's army "could settle the affaires of Germanie" with their Swedish allies.¹⁵⁷ Leslie specifically told the British resident in Hamburg, Joseph Averie, that should Sweden make a peace with the Emperor he, as Field Marshal and the officers, also being subjects of Charles I, would keep the army of Westphalia in the field to assist the Elector Palatine.¹⁵⁸ Quite how the Swedes would have reacted to that is unclear, but tension was growing between Banér and Leslie.¹⁵⁹ Banér's jealousy of Leslie and other Scottish commanders only increased after the next battle against the Empire which proved decisive in terms of the whole Protestant campaign.

Wittstock has been described as the most outstanding example of the art of military command, often attributed to Banér, and always called 'Swedish'.¹⁶⁰ In 1636 only 1/3 of the Swedish army of circa 15,000 men comprised Swedes and Finns, whilst the rest of it contained German, Scottish and some English troops.¹⁶¹ Field Marshal

¹⁵⁵ 8/18 April 1636, Joseph Averie to John Coke, PRO, SP75, XIII, f.315.

¹⁵⁶ 9 May 1636, Fraser, *The Melvilles*, II, 85–87.

¹⁵⁷ 18² July 1636, Thomas Roe to John Durie, Hartlib Papers, HP/14/4/45a–46b. Roe calls the Army of Westphalia simply "Leslie's Army".

¹⁵⁸ 22/12 March 1636, Joseph Averie to Secretary Coke, PRO, SP75, XIII, f.303. The strength of the army was given in 10 March 1636, *News from the Continent*, Hartlib Papers, HP11/1/107a–b.

¹⁵⁹ 8/18 April 1636, Joseph Averie to John Coke, PRO, SP75, XIII, f.315.

¹⁶⁰ See for example 28 October and 3 November 1636, J.J. Hausman to Samuel Hartlib, Hartlib Papers, HP9/5/3a–6b; B. Steckzén, 'Wittstock 1636', in *Det Svenska Svärdet*, 126.

¹⁶¹ Tingsten, *Fältmarskalkarna Johan Banér och Lennart Torstensson*, 67.

Johan Banér, with Colonel John Nairn and his troops, led the cavalry in the right flank of the army, which was to attack the enemy's left and centre flanks. These would be forced to turn straight into the Swedish left flank commanded by Lieutenant General James King, which was to undertake a surprise attack on the enemy from the west. Colonel Robert Douglas and his troops were in this flank.¹⁶² In the meantime Field Marshal Alexander Leslie commanded the centre of the Swedish army which entered the battle just as Banér's right flank was beginning to waver.¹⁶³ The Swedish and Scottish brigades of the centre section took the brunt of the elite Imperial cavalry charge. Leslie's centre flank, made up of "Swedish farmboys, Scottish veterans and German peasants", suffered badly.¹⁶⁴ The arrival of James King and his second in command, Major General Torsten Stålhandske, proved decisive in saving the day.¹⁶⁵ Enemy losses were around 5,000, and Swedish losses were about 3,000.¹⁶⁶ Of the 892 Swedish brigade, only 308 survived, and of the 800 Scottish brigade, 350 died.¹⁶⁷ Thus another Swedish victory can be largely attributed to the fact that two out of three senior officers were Scottish, and particularly Leslie's troops' steadfastness compared to the disarray of Banér's men. News of the victory went down well among the Scottish Calvinist clergy, with the Reverend William Spang in the Dutch Republic relating "glad I am to see the wickedness of that foolish prince of Saxone punished".¹⁶⁸

After the success at Wittstock in 1636, Banér had sent an expeditionary force under James King and Major General John Ruthven, along with their newly arrived Scottish and English recruits, southward along the Weser. As Nienburg and Minden fell to the Swedes, Alexander Leslie had the task of appeasing Duke George of Lüneburg over these losses.¹⁶⁹ Leslie could only get a guarantee of the Duke's co-operation if he raised the siege of Hanau, where Colonel James

¹⁶² Douglas, *Robert Douglas*, 58.

¹⁶³ Tingsten, *Fältmarskalkarna Johan Banér och Lennart Torstensson*, 69.

¹⁶⁴ Steckzén, 'Wittstock 1636', 120.

¹⁶⁵ After victory became certain, King and his men were ordered to pursue the retreating Imperialists. 33 canon, 151 standards, much loot and 2,000 prisoners were taken by the end of the day. Tingsten, *Fältmarskalkarna Johan Banér och Lennart Torstensson*, 70. Steckzén, 'Wittstock 1636', 125.

¹⁶⁶ Tingsten, *Fältmarskalkarna Johan Banér och Lennart Torstensson*, 71.

¹⁶⁷ Steckzén, 'Wittstock 1636', 119.

¹⁶⁸ Horsburgh, 'Wish You Were Here', in Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 254.

¹⁶⁹ Tingsten, *Fältmarskalkarna Johan Banér och Lennart Torstensson*, 82 and 91.

Ramsay was governor, and this he did successfully. However, recruitment continued and in November 1637 Leslie could report that Colonel George Cunningham was bringing a new Scottish regiment to Germany of which the first five companies had endured severe weather at sea, but another three companies were still expected.¹⁷⁰

By this point Patrick Ruthven, one of the stalwarts of the Swedish army, had left Swedish service to become Charles I's lieutenant-general in Britain.¹⁷¹ During this period many other Scots prepared to return to Scotland, some due to their commitment to the National Covenant of Scotland, and others due to disagreements with Swedish field commanders. It was not only Covenanters who left the Swedish army at this time. In October 1638 Lieutenant-General James King, as temporary commander of the Army of Westphalia was engaged in the siege of Lemgo and the following month expected to be appointed Field Marshal.¹⁷² King and Banér argued over King's actions in the defeat at Vlotho near Minden, and this combined with the lack of confirmation of promotion led to his request for release from Swedish service.¹⁷³ Not all the Scots wanted to leave however. When Banér mustered his army at Stettin in July 1638, Robert Douglas's regiment was present and captured some notable Imperial officers just beyond the Bohemian border soon after.¹⁷⁴

On the death of Johan Banér, Lennart Torstensson gained command of the main Swedish army and took the war right into Austria. His campaigns would eventually lead to the second battle of Breitenfeld in 1642, at which Colonels John Nairn and Robert Douglas were both present. Douglas' regiment fought in the right flank until Johan Lilliehöök, the second-in-command to Torstensson, called Douglas and his cavalry into the centre where he defeated the Imperial

¹⁷⁰ 22 November 1637, Alexander Leslie to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 479.

¹⁷¹ 17 June 1636, Alexander Cunningham to Axel Oxenstierna, *SRA*, *AOSB*, E583.

¹⁷² 2 May 1638, Queen Kristina to James King, Special Collections, Aberdeen University MS, 2957/5/2a; 9 October 1638, James King to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 933–939.

¹⁷³ Tingsten, *Fältmarskalkarna Johan Banér och Lennart Torstensson*, 95–96.

¹⁷⁴ Douglas, *Robert Douglas*, 64–65. The captured officers were "fälttygmestare" Salis, Colonel Spiegel, Colonel Borge, Lieutenant-Colonel Salis' cavalry regiment, Quartermaster-General von Mandelsloh, an infantry regiment and others. The Swedes feared that Scottish officers might desert, not to the Emperor or to Spanish forces, but to Russia, Poland or Denmark-Norway. See 29 July 1639, *SRP*, VII, 532–533.

infantry.¹⁷⁵ After this Douglas became the commander of the cavalry's right flank and the major general over the officers. It was also at this point that Douglas began to serve with Karl Gustav, who would later become king of Sweden.¹⁷⁶

While Torstensson's campaigns proved effective in Germany, he feared a second front being opened against him by Denmark. He thus organised a pre-emptive strike against Christian IV that effectively removed Denmark as a serious threat to the main war effort in Germany. After Torstensson's Danish campaign, he then returned his focus to the Germany where he defeated the Imperialists at Berneburg, Magdeburg and Jüterburg. Again Robert Douglas played a significant role, guarding the rear and capturing the Imperial Master-General of the Ordnance, Enkeford, along with other officers.¹⁷⁷ Thereafter, Douglas became the most prominent of the surviving Scots in Swedish service. Attempts were made to bring in more Scots, and in August 1646, Alexander Leslie was offering to raise two regiments for Swedish service.¹⁷⁸ Leslie repeated this offer in January 1647, specifying that the standing Scottish army had at least 2,000 men, with many more in reserves though circumstances in Britain prevented their deployment.¹⁷⁹

Douglas's career continued successfully, and he served in the left flank of the Swedish army at Jankau in Bohemia where he captured no fewer than five Imperial generals.¹⁸⁰ He carried on fighting on the Hungarian border, and proved, along with fellow Scot Alexander Erskine, vital in convincing Prince György Rákóczy of Transylvania to remain an ally of Sweden.¹⁸¹ When Field Marshal Karl Gustav Wrangel took over Torstensson's position as chief commander of the Swedish army, Douglas and his troops played a significant role in

¹⁷⁵ Douglas, *Robert Douglas*, 74.

¹⁷⁶ Douglas, *Robert Douglas*, 75.

¹⁷⁷ Douglas, *Robert Douglas*, 82.

¹⁷⁸ 11 August 1646, Alexander Leslie to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 505.

¹⁷⁹ 29 January 1647, Alexander Leslie to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 510. 19 October 1647, Alexander Leslie to James King, SRA, *Ämnessamlingen, strödda historiska samlingar*, XXVI. Here Leslie replies to King's previous requesting troops for Sweden and notes that Parliament will not meet until March 1648. By then, Leslie's troops had been diverted for Charles I's cause.

¹⁸⁰ Douglas, *Robert Douglas*, 85.

¹⁸¹ 3 June 1645, Lennart Torstensson to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, VIII, 460 and 543. Polinsky, *The Thirty Years' War*, 110.

his campaigns. Throughout 1646, Douglas twice provided crucial information on the enemy, and in December he was sent to Ulm to negotiate a truce with the Imperial forces.¹⁸² In January 1647, General Robert Douglas and commissioner Brandt were again sent to Ulm where a truce with the Duke of Bavaria was agreed.¹⁸³ Douglas was then chosen by Wrangel to return to Sweden to obtain the queen's ratification of the proposed treaty.

After Douglas' success in Bavaria, Alexander Erskine was appointed by Queen Kristina personally as the army's representative to the peace negotiations at Osnabrück, to advise the commissioners there on the amount of compensation to be obtained.¹⁸⁴ As trophies of war Sweden obtained upper Pomerania, Stettin and surrounds in lower Pomerania, Weimar, and the bishoprics of Bremen and Verden, along with a compensation payment of five million riksdaler from the defeated German states.

Conclusion

The Swedish government itself noted that the recruitment of Scots and Germans was preferential to the conscription of Swedish peasants as early as June 1629.¹⁸⁵ This may have been simply to avoid Swedish casualties, yet the preference for Scottish soldiers over other nationalities was frequently voiced.¹⁸⁶ Some 1,000 Scottish officers

¹⁸² B. Steckzén, *Karl Gustaf Wrangels Fälttåg* (Uppsala and Stockholm: 1920), 24, 103, 142.

¹⁸³ Douglas, *Robert Douglas*, 104–106.

¹⁸⁴ 9 March, 12 April and 17 June 1647, *SRP*, XI, 61, 109 and 350. See also 29 June 1647, General Wrangel to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, VIII, 730–731. Albeit that Erskine was born in Germany of Scottish parents, and moved with them to Sweden, he regarded himself as a Scot. For more on him see Berg and Lagercrantz, *Scots in Sweden*, 45; Fischer, *Scots in Germany*, 201; Burton, *The Scot Abroad*, II, 225–226; H. Marryat, *One Year in Sweden; including a visit to the isle of Gotland* (London: 1862), 484; K. Conermann, *Die Mitlieder Der Fruchtbringenden Gesellschaft 1617–1650* (Wienheim: 1985), III, no. 421. See his son's letter to the Earl of Mar, 19 September 1681, Erskine to Mar, *NAS*, GD124/15/171.

¹⁸⁵ 22 June 1629, *SRP*, I, 156; Ericson, 'De svenska arméerna i Tyskland', in *Krig och fred i källorna*, 43. Circa 25,000 Finns (out of a population of around 400,000) served in the German campaigns, see J.T. Lappalainen, "'Ex agmine haccapellorum libera nos Domine": les 25,000 Finnois dans la Guerre de Trente Ans' in *Commission Internationale d'Histoire Militaire* (Prague: 1998), 1.

¹⁸⁶ 8 January 1631, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustav II Adolf, *RAOSB*, VI, 25–41.

served in the first period of Swedish intervention before the death of Gustav II Adolf alone. There were, by comparison only 3 English colonels and the same number of lieutenant colonels.¹⁸⁷ However, the analysis of British engagements and the lack of reference to them in muster-rolls suggests that there were probably several thousand more English soldiers in service than usually understood. The 6,000 figure normally quoted only represents those soldiers of Hamilton's to be recruited in Scotland while some of the traditionally viewed Scottish regiments (like Bellenden's in 1632) can be shown to have been English remnants from Hamilton's army. Irish and Welsh officers and soldiers also served in these regiments, and thus the usual statistic of 35,000 Scots in the Swedish army has been rounded down to around 30,000.¹⁸⁸ Given these numbers it is hardly surprising that Scots were involved in most of the two dozen truly significant battles from 1630 until 1648.

By 1648 at least 2,000 Scottish officers are known to have served in the Swedish army, making up between a fifth and a quarter of the Swedish officer corps.¹⁸⁹ Facing the Imperial General Tilly in January 1631, some 23% of the 13,000 strong Swedish forces were Scots. This statistic remained quite constant so that at Frankfurt an der Oder in April they made up 23% of 8,200 Swedish force.¹⁹⁰ In some cases it is possible to work out the ratio of officers to men such as at the siege of Magdeburg in May 1631, where 23% of the officers and 21% of the men were Scots.¹⁹¹ Similarly, at Leipzig in September 1631, 25% of the officers and 23% of the soldiers in the Swedish army of

Oxenstierna advised the king to deal positively with British merchants as many such people, particularly Scots, were in his service: "månge af dhem och serdeles Skottska nationen ähre i E.K. M:ttis tjänst".

¹⁸⁷ Monro, *His Expedition*. See the section entitled 'The list of the Scottish Officers in Chiefe (called the officers of the Field) that served his Majesty of Sweden, Anno 1632'. Monro even lists the English Colonel Sir Thomas Conway who never saw Swedish service, having drowned off the coast of Norway, see *The Swedish Intelligencer. The Fourth Part*, 126.

¹⁸⁸ The 35,000 figure comes from Åberg, 'Scottish soldiers in the Swedish Armies' in Simpson, ed., *Scotland and Scandinavia, 800–1800*, 91; Grosjean, 'Scotland: Sweden's Closest Ally?', in Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 151.

¹⁸⁹ This figure includes those Scots who first entered Swedish service but then served Russia between 1630 and 1635, see P. Dukes, 'New perspectives: Alexander Leslie and the Smolensk War', in Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 173–189.

¹⁹⁰ Wieselgren, *DelaGardiska Archivet*, X, 11–13.

¹⁹¹ At Magdeburg it equates to 432 out of 1,890 officers and 2,042 out of 9,633 men. Wieselgren, *DelaGardiska Archivet*, X, 13–14.

nearly 16,000 were Scots.¹⁹² These latter two statistics indicate that the Scottish command over other 'Swedish' troops was significant.

Similarly in major garrisons, such as Stralsund, Stettin, Frankfurt and Spandau nearly half of the troops in place were officered by Scots.¹⁹³ Not only did Gustav II Adolf employ a systematic garrison tactic throughout the Empire but the Swedish army also took German towns and castles at such a rate that often the military commanders or governors employed were Scottish officers. In fact, the Swedes took eighty cities, castles, and sconces in an eight month period, and from 1629 to 1650 over 40 locations were governed by Scots.¹⁹⁴ The king even donated the land taken to the victorious officers, such as the castle of Legnicz to Alexander Leslie. Monro makes the important point about Scots both commanding foreigners and receiving governorships stating:

At this time also there were a great many Cavaliers of our nation under his majestie, who, for their long experience and valour, had attained to the honour not onely to be trusted before others with Governments, but also were honoured in commanding of strangers, both Dutch and Sweden, some in Liffeland, and some in Spruce; all alike serving their master to his minde, where he liked best to make use of them for the weale and advancement of his service.¹⁹⁵

In addition to the at least 70 Scottish colonels, 49 lieutenant colonels, and 57 majors identified to date in Swedish service from 1629–1660, there were eight generals and field marshals: General James Hamilton, General James Spens, General Patrick Ruthven, Field Marshal Alexander Leslie, Major General James King, Major General David Drummond, Major General James Ramsay, Major General James Dougal, Major General Arvid Forbes, Major General Thomas Kerr/Karr, Major General John Ruthven and General Robert Douglas.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹² At Leipzig this represents a statistic of 832 out of 3,280 officers and 3,578 out of 15,296. At Magdeburg it equates to 432 out of 1,890 officers and 2,042 out of 9,633 men. Wieselgren, *Dela Gardiska Archivet*, X, 13–14.

¹⁹³ Wieselgren, *Dela Gardiska Archivet*, X, 10–11, 15. See also Grosjean, 'A century of Scottish governorship', in Murdoch and Mackillop, eds., *Military Governors and Imperial Frontiers*, 60–70.

¹⁹⁴ *The Swedish Intelligencer. The First Part*, 85; and again Grosjean, 'A century of Scottish governorship', in Murdoch and Mackillop, eds., *Military Governors and Imperial Frontiers*, 60–61.

¹⁹⁵ Monro, *His Expedition*, II, 107–109. He lists here all the Scottish commanders and who they commanded, even noting when the veterans were brought into Germany after the Polish truce.

¹⁹⁶ See Monro's list of Scottish officers, *His Expedition*, 02. The English also noted

Every one of these men was also engaged in diplomacy on behalf of the Swedish Crown. The efforts of those soldiers, both militarily and diplomatically, highlight the extent of the unofficial Scoto-Swedish alliance of the first half of the seventeenth century, and that Scotland proved to be Sweden's most consistent ally through out the period.

this fact, see Joseph Averie's letters to John Coke, PRO, SP75, XVI, f.270 and f.303. This is in stark contrast to Fallon's statement that the over-all impact of Scots in Sweden was negligible, 'Scottish Mercenaries', 306.

List 1. *Scottish colonels in the Swedish army 1629–1648*¹⁹⁷

James Affleck's recruited dragoon company	1635
William Baillie's recruited infantry regiment (German)	1630–33
David Barclay's recruited infantry company	1635
William Bellenden's recruited infantry regiment (English and Scots)	1632
John Beaton's recruited infantry squadron	1635
John Burdon, colonel of Närke and Värmland regiment	1645
Archibald Colville's recruited infantry regiment	1635
Alexander Cunningham's recruited infantry regiment	1629
Alexander Cunningham's recruited infantry regiment (German?)	1638–40
George Cunningham's recruited infantry regiment	1630–37
William Cunningham, colonel of Scots in Prussia	1632
John Douglas, colonel of German Reiters (cavalry)	after 1632
David Drummond's recruited infantry regiment	1635–38
James Drummond's recruited company	1637
Andrew Dunn's recruited squadron	1633
James Dunbar's company	1635
Henry James Duwall, regiment	1633 (poss same as below)
Joachim Duwall, regiment	1633 (poss son/ relative of former?) ¹⁹⁸
James Duwall's recruited infantry regiment	1630–33
<i>ibid.</i> recruited cavalry company	1630–31
<i>ibid.</i> recruited dragoon regiment	1632
Mauritz Duwall's recruited squadron	1633
Alexander/Arvid Forbes, colonel of a Finnish regiment	1632
John Forbes, colonel of a German regiment	1632
Arvid Forbes' recruited infantry regiment	1632–37
Herbert Gladstone, colonel of Österbotten regiment	1647
Alexander Gordon's recruited dragoon regiment	1634–38
John Gordon, colonel of a German regiment	1632
William Grey's recruited infantry company	1627
John Gunn, colonel at Ohlau	1638

¹⁹⁷ Extracted from B. Gäfvert, ed., *Meddelanden från Krigsarkivet*, X:2, 609–635; Monro, *His Expedition*; and Grant, *Memoirs and Adventures of Sir John Hepburn*, 253–257. Although an impressive list in itself, it does not reveal the extent of Scottish participation at the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and many of these officers were often called upon to act as colonel for a time if and when the need arose.

¹⁹⁸ 28 February 1633, *DBBTI*, V, 134. This source calls them the elder and the younger without specifying which is which.

William Gwinn, colonel of infantry	1632
Alexander Hamilton's recruited infantry regiment	1629–32
Hugo Hamilton's recruited infantry regiment (German)	1642–43
John Hamilton's recruited infantry regiment	1630–32
James Hamilton, colonel of a Scottish regiment	1632
Frederick Hamilton, colonel of Scots and Irish	1632
Alexander Hay's dragoon squadron	1636–37
Henry Henderson, colonel of reserve Scottish infantry	1632
John Hepburn's Green Brigade (German)	1630–32
Alexander Irving, colonel of Småland infantry	1645
Edward Johnstone, colonel of Finnish regiment	1648
Francis Johnstone, colonel of Viborg infantry	1646
Thomas Karr's recruited infantry regiment	1632–33
John Kinnemond's recruited squadron	1636
Patrick Kinnemond's recruited squadron	1635
<i>ibid.</i> recruited regiment	1636
Thomas Kinnemond, colonel of Viborg regiment	1648
William Kinnemond, colonel of recruited infantry	1638
George Lawder's recruited dragoon company	1630–31
James Lawder's recruited infantry	1635–37
William Lawson's recruited infantry squadron	1628
Walter Leckie, colonel of Swedish infantry	1632
Alexander Leslie's recruited infantry regiment	1629–31
David Leslie's cavalry	after 1632
John Leslie of Wardis, "colonel of Scots"	after 1632
Ludovick Leslie, colonel of a Scottish regiments	1632
Robert Leslie, colonel of a Scottish regiment"	1632
Robert Leslie's recruited infantry regiment	1629–31
Alexander Lindsay, "colonel of Scots"	???
George Lindsay, earl of Crawford's recruited infantry regiment	1630–33
James Lumsden's Green Brigade	1632
James Lumsden's recruited infantry regiment	1631
Donald Mackay's recruited infantry regiment	1629–32
John Meldrum's recruited infantry regiment	1629–30
John Monro of Obisdell, colonel of a Scottish regiment	1632
Hector Monro, colonel of a German regiment	after 1632–35
Roberto Monro's Green Brigade	after 1632
Robert Monro of Fowlis, colonel of German cavalry and infantry	1632–38
Robert Monro's recruited infantry squadron	1631
Robert Monro's recruited infantry regiment	1632–39
Patrick More, colonel of a cavalry regiment	1648
John Nairn's recruited infantry regiment	1648
William Philp, colonel of Västmanland regiment	1648
James Ramsay the Fair, colonel of an English regiment	1632

James Ramsay the Black, colonel of a Scottish regiment	1632
James Ramsay's recruited infantry regiment	1627–32
Francis Ruthven's recruited infantry regiment	1633–38
John Ruthven's recruited company	1629
John Ruthven's recruited infantry regiment (German)	1631–32
Francis Ruthven, colonel of a German regiment	1632
Patrick Ruthven's recruited infantry regiment	1629–38
James Seton's recruited regiment	1630–32
James Seaton of Gargunnoch, "colonel of a Swedish regiment"	????
Francis Sinclair's recruited dragoons	1637–38
James Scott, colonel of a Finnish regiment	1632
Johan Skytte's recruited infantry regiment	1635–37
James Spens's recruited infantry regiment	1624–32
Robert Stuart's recruited infantry regiment	1638–39
William Stewart's recruited infantry squadron	1635
Thomas Thomson, colonel of a Swedish regiment	1632

List 2. *English and Irish colonels in the Swedish army 1629–1648*

Arthur Austin/Aston	colonel of English infantry	1632
John Cassels	colonel of English infantry	1632
Thomas Conway (never saw service)	colonel of an English regiment	1632
Dowda [noted as Irish]	colonel of recruited Irish regiment	1629
George Fleetwood	colonel of recruited regiment	1631–39
Thomas Muschamp (died in September that year)	colonel of Swedish infantry	1629
Christopher Potley	colonel of infantry	1637

CHAPTER FOUR

SCOTS IN THE SWEDISH NAVY, 1534–1654

Kapten Foratt sprängde sigh i luften

Scottish participation in the Swedish navy was unsurprising. Both kingdoms had significant sea-faring populations, depended heavily on naval strength for defence and shipping for trade, and the success of their merchant shipping relied on the protection of a strong navy. Scots and Swedes were both perpetrators and victims of acts of piracy against each other in the early sixteenth century.¹ However, amongst the earliest recorded Scots of note in the newly independent kingdom of Sweden was a naval captain who in 1534 offered his services to the Swedish crown presently at war with Lübeck.² He was only a very small part of the process of constructing a national navy undertaken by Gustav I Vasa, who at that time had 20 ships of varying sizes at his disposal.³ The king took responsibility for this development at all levels. He strove to control every aspect of the fleet from the supervision of shipbuilding, the employment of ship personnel, and the acquisition of provisions. The employment of the anonymous Scottish skipper proved to be the first step in creating the route which others would follow into service. Not only was Gustav open to the prospect of boosting the Swedish navy with foreign manpower, but he also enthusiastically sought overseas technical knowledge. He sanctioned the acquisition of a Scottish-made ship in 1544, and commanded his own shipbuilders to study and incorporate Scottish ship designs when building vessels for the Swedish navy.⁴ By this time the navy encompassed 28 ships, although it is unclear how many of these were war-

¹ Fischer, *The Scots in Sweden*, 39. See for example *KGR*, XVI, 641–643 and *KGR*, XVIII, 366–368.

² 18 June 1534, Gustav I to Severin Kijl, *KGR*, IX, 148–9. His identity has yet to be ascertained. See R.C. Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Baltic 1522–1850* (London: 1969), 1–3 for a brief summary of the 1520–1563 period.

³ Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig 1611–1632* (6 vols., Stockholm: 1936–1939), bilagsband I, 3.

⁴ 1 May 1544, Gustav I to ?, *KGR*, XVI, 345; 11 May 1550, Gustav I to Sten Eriksson, *KGR*, XXI, 242.

ships, or even what size they were. Apparently the largest of Gustav I's ships recorded was 174 feet long, 40 feet wide, and rose 54 feet above the water, and, like most of his vessels, had three masts.⁵

Gustav I succeeded in his efforts to create a sizeable fleet, as on his death in 1560 he left some 56 ships behind him, of which 19 were warships.⁶ His legacy continued to pay dividends as Sweden could finally present a real threat to the power of Denmark-Norway at sea. Erik XIV, not content with the fleet, continued to expand his maritime forces both at home and through foreign acquisitions, and by 1563 he had 87 ships. The largest of his fleet was *Mars*, which carried 173 firing pieces of varying calibres.⁷ The following seven years saw a protracted war against Denmark-Norway and thus it was unsurprising that Frederick II of Denmark-Norway objected to the manning and arming of a ship in Leith for Swedish service in April 1566.⁸ Despite this, other ships got through and more were built within Sweden itself. The success of Erik's naval efforts were revealed in a newsletter giving accounts of Holland, Denmark and Sweden in 1568, which noted that "the Swedish navy consists of 70 great ships, is very strong and always ready".⁹ The accuracy of this report, or how many of these boats were of Scottish provenance, remains uncertain, but the results of continuous developments in the Swedish navy were nonetheless demonstrated. The total size of the navy comprised 120 sea-craft until the reign of Johan III (1569–1592) when it initially dipped to 90 and finally to 45 vessels.¹⁰

Although that decline was soon reversed during Karl IX's reign and the navy expanded to 139 ships, this figure was soon counter-balanced by the continual effect of war and wreckage.¹¹ It is also

⁵ Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig*, bilagsband I, 5.

⁶ Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig*, bilagsband I, 3, and Frost, *Northern Wars*, 7.

⁷ Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig*, bilagsband I, 6. Of these vessels perhaps 40 were of a military purpose.

⁸ 25 April 1566, Frederick II to Queen Mary, *RPCS*, XIV, Addenda, 251, and 3 May 1566, Mary's reply, *ibid.*, 255. Indeed there was a ship called *Skotska Pinckan* in the Swedish fleet in 1566, taken from the Danes in 1564 and subsequently recaptured by them in 1570. See Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Baltic*, 12 and 16.

⁹ Hamburg, February 1568–9, anonymous, Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Report on the Pepys Manuscripts* (London: 1911), 149.

¹⁰ Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig*, bilagsband I, 4.

¹¹ Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig*, bilagsband I, 3–4. For example, in 1610 Christian IV arrested two Swedish warships and it has yet to be determined whether they got them back before the outbreak of the Kalmar war, 13 December 1610, instructions for the Swedish envoy to Denmark, *RAOSB*, first series, II, 109.

unclear if this statistic related to every war vessel that put to sea, or if it referred to warships only. The former is the more probable. However, the persistent threat from Denmark-Norway necessitated the maintenance of a strong Swedish fleet, including a Scottish-bought ship called *Skotska Lejonen*.¹² Christian IV's effective control of the Sound left Sweden virtually encircled by his kingdom. This became all the more tangible through Denmark-Norway's imposition of tolls on every ship sailing through the Sound, including Swedish ones, in breach of one of the clauses in the 1613 Kalmar treaty. Figures for the size of the Danish-Norwegian navy at this point show that it had a maximum strength of 50 to 60 ships, well below the numbers usually quoted for Sweden. This numerical discrepancy was compensated by the fact that the strongest of the Swedish ships only carried the same amount of cannon as the weakest of the Danish. That is, Swedish ships usually bore between 22 and 34 cannon whereas the Danish held between 34 and 64 cannon on board.¹³

A report, presumably compiled by Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna in 1616, listed eight *royalskepp* each crewed by 200 men, 20 medium warships with crews of 60 men, and 12 *pinasser* (other three-masted ships) carrying 30 men each.¹⁴ This did not change over the next four years, apart from slight variations in crew numbers. By 1622 the navy counted 2,000 men, with five notable warships, being *Äpplet*, *Kronan*, *Apollo*, *Vasan*, and *Svärdet*, of which the largest was *Äpplet* at 450 tons and carrying 150 men.¹⁵ However in September 1625 the fleet suffered a catastrophe when ten ships were lost at once.¹⁶ This kind of loss could only exacerbate Gustav II Adolf's constant worry over who ruled the Baltic waterways, particularly when General Wallenstein was appointed Imperial admiral in the Baltic and the North. Lübeck was singled out as the proposed main harbour of the

¹² Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Baltic*, 32. See the detailed list of Danish fleet sizes, especially 1611–12 in SRA, Handlingar angående örlogsflottan och arméens flotta, M-1848.

¹³ L. Jespersen, 'The machtstaat in seventeenth century Denmark', *SJH*, X, no. 4, 1985, 274; Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig*, bilagsband I, 53.

¹⁴ Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig*, bilagsband I, 24.

¹⁵ Ericson, 'När armén var under alperna', in Abukhanfusa, ed., *Mare Nostrum*, 24. In the autumn of 1624 Gustav II Adolf listed the mighty Swedish navy as one of the blessings of Sweden, along with religious unity and good weather, *KGAS*, 209. See also E. Matz, *Vasa* (Stockholm: n.d.), Vasa museum catalogue, 9.

¹⁶ Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig*, bilagsband I, 33. Indeed, on hearing this, Oxenstierna and two of his compatriots in Riga suggested that the rest of the Riksråd in Sweden should fund and donate a new warship to the Crown, see *SRP*, I, 18, fn. 2.

Habsburg Empire in 1627, intensifying the threat of Sweden's subjugation by this foreign power.¹⁷ At that time the Swedish king had 28 vessels at his disposal and commanded the towns to provide a further 20. By the following year the five largest ships in Sweden were *Äpplet*, *Vasan*, *Kronan*, *Gamble Svärdet*, *Stora Nyckelen*, although once again wreckage took its toll and both *Vasa* and *Stora Nyckelen* were lost.¹⁸

Swedish engagement in two separate military campaigns in 1628 forced the Swedish king to divide his navy into two fleets: one for use against Poland-Lithuania, Danzig and Lübeck, while the other was formed to support the Danish-Norwegian fleet, as Sweden was allied with Denmark at this stage of the Thirty Years' War.¹⁹ Gustav II Adolf believed the Imperial navy in the Baltic to consist of 20 ships in early 1629. This belief, along with the many ports in Imperial possession, reinforced his intention to continue the expansion of his naval forces.²⁰ It was imperative that the Imperialists be prevented from gaining a foothold in the Baltic, which would bring the war to Sweden's very doorstep — a disastrous possibility given the impracticability of defending Sweden-Finland's many harbours. A Swedo-Danish treaty signed in Stockholm between the two kings obliged Christian IV to harbour eight Swedish ships, for use at Stralsund in a joint action of defence.²¹ The Swedish relief of the siege of Stralsund could only be implemented with naval support, both for the transport of troops and provisions, and for the defence of Sweden from a potential sea-based attack by the Imperialists or their allies. The Riksråd was still pressing Gustav II Adolf's demand that the major Swedish towns supply 16 ships for the navy in January 1629, and persisted with it after Christian IV's peace treaty with the Emperor in June heightened the tension in the Baltic.²² The next month the Riksråd warned the king of the shortage of ships in Stockholm, with the result that Gustav II Adolf increased his requirement to 20 new ships from the towns.²³ By June naval movements were detailed: *Apollo*, *Andromeda*, *Mehrman*, *Lille Nyckelen* and *Svarte Hunden*, all stationed

¹⁷ 4 October 1627, James Spens to Sir John Coke, PRO, SP95, II, ff.175–176.

¹⁸ 28 April 1628, GIJA's instructions to the Riksråd, SRP, I, xxxi.

¹⁹ Incidentally, the 'Danzig' fleet was also used to transport Scottish regiments to the conflict. See below p. 135.

²⁰ 5 March 1629, Gustav II Adolf to Axel Oxenstierna, KGAS, 534.

²¹ 10 November 1629, SRP, I, 237.

²² 25 and 27 June 1629, SRP, I, 158 and 162.

²³ 3 July 1629, SRP, I, 166.

in Pillau, were to be seconded for Erik Rynning's Pomeranian campaign, along with *Regnbogen* located at Danzig. Only *Pelikanen* and *Månen* were to be left in Danzig, whilst the vice-admiral, Hans Horn, was to retain *Mercurius*, *Vestervik*, *Storken*, *Pappegojan*, *Jupiter* and *Jungfrun* in Sweden.²⁴ This would bolster the extant 28 royal ships already in service to a total of 48, and certainly by 1630 there were 31 vessels available.²⁵ In addition, James Spens had brought an English ship to Pillau for the Swedes in August 1629, although Gustav II Adolf ordered that the vessel be thoroughly inspected before it was accepted and paid for.²⁶

Between 1628 and 1632 the Swedish king regularly expressed his concerns about provisions and payment for his naval staff.²⁷ Two Scottish captains in his navy, Simon Stewart and Andrew Stuart, supported the main Swedish attack by patrolling the southern Sound against any Imperial ships in 1629 and conducting scouting missions before the king's departure for Stralsund.²⁸ Simon Stewart continued to cruise the Baltic on board the *Stockholm* in fleets alternating from two to six vessels between 1629 and 1631, always on the lookout for Imperial ships. The service these Scots provided was but another aspect of the military and naval integration of Scots into the Swedish military state.

The practice of hiring foreign ships and their crews was a well-established one in this part of the world, and various studies in the field of international maritime recruitment have discussed this.²⁹ The Netherlands was particularly keen on seeking foreign labour for its naval forces, and the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries witnessed an increase in this type of migration and labour market. The maritime world facilitated the movement of people and mixed nation-

²⁴ 13 June 1629, Axel Oxenstierna to Hans Horn, *RAOSB*, first series, IV, 526–528.

²⁵ 27 October 1629, *SRP*, I, 219–220, and Ericson 'När armén var under alperna', in Abukhanfusa, ed., *Mare Nostrum*, 31.

²⁶ 11 August 1629, Axel Oxenstierna to Hans Horn, *RAOSB*, first series, IV, 584–585.

²⁷ 16 June 1628, *SRP*, I, 84; 15 June 1630, 10 and 27 May 1631 and 11 April 1632, *SRP*, II, 9, 87, 96 and 153.

²⁸ Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig*, II, 513 and III, 261–262, 410–411, 468.

²⁹ See for example: P.C. van Royen, J.R. Bruijn and J. Lucassen, eds., *“Those Emblems of hell”? European Sailors and the Maritime Labour Market, 1570–1870* (St. Johns, Newfoundland: 1997); J. Lucassen and L. Lucassen, eds., *Migrations, Migration History, History: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives* (Barn: 1997); K. Davids and J. Lucassen, eds., *A Miracle Mirrored: the Dutch Republic in European Perspective* (Cambridge: 1996); J. Roding and H. van Voss, eds., *The North Sea and Culture* (Hilversum: 1996); S. Sogner, *Ung i Europa: norsk ungdom over Nordsjøen til Nederland i tidlig nytid* (Oslo: 1994).

ality crews were often found on ships, even serving against their own countries during military actions.³⁰ In the British case this saw as many as 3,000 Scots and Englishmen serving in the Dutch marine during the third Anglo-Dutch War in 1672.³¹ In Sweden it was far from unusual to seek foreign naval expertise: Gustav I had understood the value of this practice already in 1522 when he hired ten Lübeck ships for use in his bid to gain the Swedish crown.³² This process was reflected over a century later when Charles II requested four ships from Queen Kristina in 1649, to aid him in his campaign to be reinstated in the British Isles.³³ Not just crewmen but also officers flitted between service, as when British officers went from the Royal Navy into Swedish or other foreign service or vice versa. Such appointments for sailors and officers could be as short as several weeks as in the cases of Samuel Relfenck and Walter Smith. Despite being commissioned officers in the Swedish navy, they briefly joined the Royal Navy as volunteers in 1693 and served for less than three months each.³⁴ Such employment occurred in times of crisis, when an ally was in peril, or simply because there was a surplus of manpower in a particular navy at one time. The out-migration of Britons could also result from simple dissatisfaction with conditions offered by their own monarch.³⁵ Service in any foreign

³⁰ J. Lucassen, 'The International Maritime Labour Market (sixteenth–nineteenth centuries)', in van Royen, Bruijn and Lucassen, eds., *“Those Emblems of Hell”*, 11–23.

³¹ J.D. Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins: the officers and men of the Restoration navy* (Oxford: 1991), 84.

³² Rydberg, *Sveriges Traktater med främmande magter*, IV, 579; and Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig*, bilagsband I, 3.

³³ 17 March 1649, Patrick Ruthven to Charles II, Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Report on the Pepys Manuscripts*, 292.

³⁴ 30 June 1693, Ken Hoskins to Christoffer Leijoncrona, SRA, Anglica 190, Brev från utlänningar, 1689–1709 till Christoffer Leijoncrona, section H. Captain Hoskins on HMS *The Restoration* recommended “Samuel Relfenck and [Wal]ter Smith, being officers under the king of Sweden, as by their papers may appear, came aboard. Their Majesties Ship *The Restoration* under my command as volunteers on the 13th day of June 1693 during which time they behaved themselves soberly and diligently with obedience to command and doe conceive them to fittly qualified to serve at sea, and doe therefor reccomend them to your lordship’s favour”.

³⁵ Conditions in the Royal Navy were far from ideal, making foreign service a tempting option for British sailors and naval officers. After the horrendous experiences of Cadiz expedition in 1625, it was reported that sailors’ “ordinary talk being that his Majesty presseth them, and giveth them so little means that they are not able to live on it, and that it were better to be hanged or serve the King of Spain, or the Turk, then his Majesty”, 27 February 1626, Sir E. Cecil to Sir J. Coke, quoted in J. Glanville, *The Voyage to Cadiz in 1625, being a journal written by John Glanville*, ed A.B. Grosart (London: 1883), xlii. See also HMC, no. 23 *Manuscripts of Earl Cowper*,

navy in the 1630s, for instance, ran contrary to the royal decree of Charles I, who recalled all sailors and shipmasters from foreign service on 5 May 1634. This order was ignored by Scots in Sweden, as well as by those in other areas.³⁶ In fact by 1636 Charles needed to reiterate his decree, stating that “no terror of punishment will restrain mariners from abandoning his Majesty’s service”.³⁷

Although the number of Scots in the Swedish navy did not equal the figures for Scottish participation in the Swedish army, the trend is clearly strong and certainly confirms the largely Scottish bias of British Isles involvement. These Scots were active in various ways including privateering, shipbuilding and the officer corps.

Scottish Privateers

Privateering was a natural side-effect of any sea-based economy, and it provided an obvious route of entry into foreign naval service through the recruitment of privateers during times of war. These individuals and their vessels, warships or armed merchantmen, usually were no expense to the Crown that hired them (particularly when armed with letters of marque allowing pillage) whilst bolstering fleets in naval campaigns. Their service could be crucial depending on circumstances and certainly Scottish privateers operated both against and for the Swedish state. The Swedish agent in Helsingör, Anders Svensson, noted that two Danzig based Scots — Alexander Muir and Michael Kloch — had taken some Swedish ships in 1622.³⁸ The following year more Scottish privateers were found working for the Poles (having previously served Christian of Brunswick) just after

(12th report) Appendix I–III, (1888–9), I, 258; N.A.M. Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea* (London: 1997), 401–403. Lack of provisions was noted as a particular cause of distress for mariners, and in 1629 Admiral Mervyn commanding in the Narrow Seas said that “these neglects be the cause why mariners fly to the service of foreign nations to avoid his Majesty’s”, quoted in M. Oppenheim, *A history of the Administration of the Royal Navy and of Merchant Shipping in relation to the Navy, 1509 to 1660* (London: 1896), 235. See also D.E. Kennedy ‘The Crown and the Common Seamen in Early Stuart England’, *Historical Studies Australia and New Zealand*, XI, 1963–5, 173.

³⁶ Larkin, *Stuart Royal Proclamations*, II, 417–418. For an analysis of the result of this order on Scots in Danish-Norwegian service, see Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 103.

³⁷ Sharpe, *Charles I*, 100; Rodger, *The Safeguard of the Sea*, 409.

³⁸ 24 May 1622 and 13 June 1622, Anders Svensson to Axel Oxenstierna/Gustav II Adolf, Tandrup, ed., *Svensk agent ved Sundet*, 183, 193, 200.

Gustav II Adolf had reinitiated his war against Sigismund III. Their names remain unknown, but service such as theirs led the Swedish king to request of Charles I that no more recruiting of single ships or fleets should be allowed for Danzig or Poland.³⁹ Further, the disappearance of some Swedish ships in 1628 was put down to Scottish ‘piratical’ activity.⁴⁰

During the Kalmar War, Gustav II Adolf appears to have received help from Scottish armed merchantmen. In 1614 the Scottish Privy Council wrote to their Swedish counterparts on behalf of eight Scottish merchants from Edinburgh and Montrose who had sent merchant ships to Sweden the previous year for Gustav II Adolf to buy for 36,000 Swedish daler.⁴¹ The Stuart ambassador to Denmark-Norway, Sir Robert Anstruther, reported that on the 1st, 3rd and 5th of June 1612, at least three Orcadian ships had attacked sundry Norwegian harbours with a particularly aggressive raid being made on Bergen.⁴² Two of the ships were commanded by skippers called Stewart, one of whom can be positively identified as Captain Simon Stewart, who was subsequently captured by the Danes.⁴³ It was rumoured that these vessels were working either for James Spens or for Robert Stewart, the son of Patrick Earl of Orkney. The latter is more likely as Robert corresponded with the Swedish government about payment. By June 1612 he had not only requested an initial payment of 5,000 daler, but also followed this with a further demand for 30,000 daler for

³⁹ 6 November 1623, Anders Svensson to Axel Oxenstierna/Gustav II Adolf, Tandrup, *Svensk agent ved Sundet*, 361–362. 21/31 March 1627, Gustav II Adolf to James Spens, SRA, Anglica I/IV, f.44.

⁴⁰ *SRP*, I, 121. One mention of English piracy occurred in the Scottish Privy Council records regarded prisoners who, out of royal clemency, were to be sent for use in the Swedish campaigns, to be transported under the charge of the Earl of Crawford. See 24 November 1629, *RPCS*, second series, III, 357.

⁴¹ 15 September 1614, Scottish Privy Council to the Riksråd, SRA, Scotica, I.

⁴² 8 June 1612, Robert Anstruther to James VI, PRO, SP75, IV, f.314. See also Michell, *History of the Scottish Expedition*, 133–135.

⁴³ See also 4 July 1615, NLS, Adv. MS, 33.1.2, XIV, f.48; *RPCS*, XVI, 348, 350–2, 383, 389. These sources provide information on Captain John Mason of Lyme and Captain Wilman. They appear to have been operating as ‘pirates’ off the coast of Norway at exactly this time. In the report of 4 July 1615, it is stated that sometime after April 1612, Mason left for the coast of Norway, via Orkney and Shetland. He put his vessel to work attacking Danish and Rostock shipping. There is no evidence that they were part of the Earl of Orkney’s fleet and they may simply have been pirates. However the timing of their attack and their location is noteworthy and perhaps Mason thought he would stand more chance of escaping the gallows as a first time pirate rather than a traitor, in which category the Bergen raids would most certainly have put him. Thanks to Aonghas Maccoinnich for these references.

his expenses.⁴⁴ This indicates that the raids themselves were orchestrated to test the defences of the Norwegian coast in preparation for imminent landings of the Scots destined for Kringen and Trondheim.

Certainly the Swedes actively sought Scottish maritime support during later periods of conflict. During the 1643–1645 war with Denmark-Norway, they wanted to hire as many as 24 Scottish men-of-war. Charles I tried to warn Christian IV that the Committee of Both Kingdoms was contemplating sending a fleet against Denmark to ‘take away his [Christian IV’s] customs of the Sound’. It was to include 2,000 Scottish soldiers and 1,000 Scottish sailors recruited to join the Swedes in an attempted occupation of the Sound.⁴⁵ How many of these actually joined Sweden is uncertain, but that the Swedes entertained hopes of obtaining these men at all shows that Scotland maintained a reputation as both a source of warships and experienced sailors.

Scottish Shipwrights

The Swedish monarchs ensured that naval construction work occurred in several locations throughout their kingdom (including Kexholm, Riga and Elbing — in conquered territory), unlike the Danes who had only one major shipyard at Copenhagen (although ships were also privately built in Norway and Holstein). The most important shipyards in Sweden were Stockholm, Kalmar, Nyköping, Älvsborg, Åbo and Viborg.⁴⁶ This increased the opportunities for employment as the Swedes needed more master shipwrights than Denmark, at least one per shipyard, and probably explains the higher number of Scots found in Swedish service. Michael Roberts has noted the Danish practice of financing its navy through the profits of the Sound Tolls,

⁴⁴ 14 June 1612, Riksråd to Gustav II Adolf, *RAOSB*, first series, II, 51. Michell notes earlier correspondence from Robert Stewart highlighting that men could be supplied for Sweden from the Netherlands as long as there was money to pay for them, 4 April 1611, Stewart to Stenbock, *History of the Scottish Expedition*, 133, fn.

⁴⁵ T. Park, ed., *The Harleian Miscellany: A collection of scarce, curious, and entertaining Pamphlets and Tracts, as well in manuscript as in print. Selected from the library of Edward Harley, second Earl of Oxford. Interspersed with historical, political and critical annotations by the late William Oldy’s esq. and some additional notes by Thomas Park, F.S.A.* (London: 1811), VII, 567–570. ‘Instructions to Colonel Cockran, to be pursued in his Negotiation to the king of Denmark’. c. 1644–45; DRA, TKUA England A II 15. Proposal of John Cochrane (?) to Christian IV, c. June 1644; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 126.

⁴⁶ Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig*, bilagsband I, 6.

which raised the funds for shipwrights from Scotland, England and Holland to build ships for Denmark.⁴⁷ That avenue, the hiring of foreign professionals, was equally utilised by the Swedes, albeit financed quite differently and thus far with only an assumption as to where the largest influences came from.⁴⁸

For the 401 ships listed in Zettersten's history of the Swedish navy only some 22 shipwrights are named. Of these only three have been attributed to men from the British Isles: Robert Turner, Francis Sheldon and Thomas Day. All of these men worked in the 1660–1680 period and thus fall outwith the scope of this present survey.⁴⁹ Of those shipwrights for whom a nationality can be ascribed in Gustav II Adolf's reign, there were certainly influential Dutchmen. Cederlund's article on Dutch shipwrights and their contribution in Sweden relates to the importance of two such Dutch master craftsmen in the early 17th century. In passing he also mentions the presence of one Scot and one German.⁵⁰ However, there were more Scots engaged in shipbuilding than Cederlund believed.

⁴⁷ Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II, 273.

⁴⁸ Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II, 292. Roberts notes that Swedish naval architecture was probably influenced by the architects brought into Sweden from the Netherlands, England and Scotland. As many of the ships in Swedish service were captured from Denmark-Norway, the Imperial navy or Holland, or were commissioned outside of Sweden, the identity of the shipwrights remains unknown. The Walloon entrepreneur Louis De Geer was already providing ships and ammunition for the Swedish state in 1628, and in 1634 alone 5 ships were commissioned in Holland through De Geer, 9 May 1634, *SRP*, IV, 112. Other methods of obtaining ships included the simple confiscation of arrested ships, such as those at Stralsund in 1629, 29 May 1629, *SRP*, I, 135. Of the ships captured between 1635 and 1680, 26 of the ships identified were taken from the Danes, 7 from the Imperial navy and 1 from the Dutch in naval actions. The Swedes themselves lost 21 ships to the Danes, and 6 to the Dutch, as deduced from A. Zettersten, *Svenska Flottans Historia* (2 vols., Stockholm: 1903), I, 563–587.

⁴⁹ Zettersten, *Svenska Flottans Historia*, I, 563–588. For useful information on some of the ships built by Sheldon see SRA, *Anglica, Bihang: Scotica*, II, II, 1670 talet, *Handlingar ang. Kaperier*, unfoliated. A packet of letters exist describing an ongoing dispute between Peter Hackett and Francis Sheldon. The men entered into an agreement in 1669 to build the ship *Dolphin* with equal shares and costs. Sheldon was accused of not putting up his share of the money and Hackett claimed he was owed slightly over 21,833 daler which had been laid out against the ship. The letters also mention that the ship was jointly owned by the men when it was taken by English privateers during the the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672–1674) as the skipper, John Johnson Oldborg (aka Oude Boer) was a Dutchman and the ship therefore liable for confiscation under British letters of Marque.

⁵⁰ C.O. Cederlund, 'The Wasa as a product of Dutch Shipbuilding', in A.B. Anderson, B. Greenhill and E.H. Grude, eds., *The North Sea; A Highway of Economic and Cultural Exchange, Character — History* (Oslo: 1985), 172.

Four shipwrights from the British Isles have been identified in Swedish service in the first half of the seventeenth century, although others who had undertaken the same work elsewhere also joined the navy, but as operational commanders. One such case was that of Andrew Forrat of St Andrews who built at least one ship in Norway with the permission of Anna of Denmark in the early 1590s.⁵¹ However, after sailing it back to Scotland, Andrew went on to enlist in the Swedish navy as a captain in 1597.⁵² Most of the Britons who did work as shipwrights were Scots and hired by Karl IX and served into the reign of his successor. Two exceptions were Robert Engelsman (presumably an Englishman), who served as a shipwright at Kungsör shipyard in 1601, and Nils Engelsman, who was the yard captain at Stockholm shipyard until July 1611, after which he engaged the Danes at sea during the Kalmar War.⁵³ In 1608 the Scot, William Williamson, worked as a senior shipbuilder in the Stockholm shipyard. The following year William Robertson Ruthven appeared as another master shipbuilder in Sweden where he served between 1609–1613.⁵⁴ Not only was he the master shipbuilder at Nyköping and Ulvesund's shipyards in 1609, but he was also given the naval rank of *varfsadmiral* (wharf admiral) at Ulvesund from 1610 to 1611, and at Ridövarf from 1610 to 1613.⁵⁵ Unfortunately there appears to be no trace left of the ships built by Williamson and Ruthven.

During Gustav II Adolf's reign it appears that the well-known Scottish shipwright, Daniel Sinclair, was recommended for Swedish service by James Spens in 1614, though he subsequently joined Danish-Norwegian service that year where he led a successful career.⁵⁶ Ten years later another Scottish master shipbuilder, whose identity remains unknown, actually arrived in Sweden also carrying accred-

⁵¹ 27 September 1590, Christian IV to Axel Gyldenstjerne, *Norske Rigs Registranter*, III, 140 and 6 August 1591, Christian IV to Peder Thott, *ibid.*, 210.

⁵² KRA, Biografiska Anteckningar om Officerare vid Örlogsflottan 1600–1699, 154.

⁵³ For Robert see O. Lybeck, et al., *Svenska Flottans Historia: Örlogsflottan i ord och bild från dess grundläggning under Gustav Vasa fram till våra dagar* (3 vols., Malmö: 1942), I, 80. For Nils see Generalstabens, *Sveriges Krig*, bilagsband I, 44 and Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Baltic*, 31–32.

⁵⁴ Zettersten, *Svenska Flottans Historia*, I, 255–266. Ruthven had been in Sigismund's service as an officer at Åbo castle in 1599, but entered Karl IX's service when the castle fell to his forces.

⁵⁵ KRA, Biografiska Anteckningar om Officerare vid Örlogsflottan 1600–1699, 338; Zettersten, *Svenska Flottans Historia*, I, 255–256; Berg and Lagercrantz, *The Scots in Sweden*, 52.

⁵⁶ 10 May 1614, James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, Anglica V.

itation from Spens.⁵⁷ However, the most influential Scottish shipwright to take Swedish service was one Richard Jacob Clerck.⁵⁸ Similar to Andrew Forrat, Richard Clerck's shipbuilding career can be traced back to Norway where he had engaged in constructing ships in a time honoured Scottish fashion. When he and his associates, William Duncan and Richard Waddell, built ships in Norway in 1605, they were acting against a royal prohibition of such activities. As punishment Christian IV suggested that the vessels either be confiscated or bought from the Scots as cheaply as possible.⁵⁹ Having thereby compromised a career in Denmark-Norway, Clerck turned to Sweden as a zone of shipbuilding opportunity. He entered the Swedish navy in 1606 as master-shipwright for Stegeborgsvarf in Stockholm.⁶⁰ Although it is known that he built the ship *Mars* which was completed by 1608, no data has yet been found detailing which or how many ships he built after that. He acted as an operational admiral at sea between 1610 and 1612, twice commanding fleets of 11 ships convoying between Sweden and Danzig.⁶¹ This was only a temporary posting and he soon returned to the shipyard, and between 1615 and 1625 he was awarded the monopoly over all cordage and blocks, tackles, and material supplies for the navy on contract from the Swedish Crown. He was promoted to *holm* admiral in 1619, placing him in command of the Stockholm shipyard, in charge of all administrative and military functions at Sweden's most important naval base.

It is difficult to determine how many of Sweden's ships were actually built by Scottish shipwrights, largely due to the sparse nature of shipbuilding records from this time. They most certainly were employed and appear to have caused the Swedes less distress than some of their Dutch counterparts, as when Henryk Hybertsson's *Vasa*, meant to be the most glorious Swedish ship in the Swedish navy, promptly

⁵⁷ 26 April 1624, Spens to Gustav II Adolf, SRA, Anglica, III. Spens' recommendation was for a naval architect who was also a knowledgeable navigator and a skilled mathematician.

⁵⁸ See Zettersten, *Svenska Flottans Historia*, I, 98–101, and 255–8. This man went by both the name Richard and Jacob which can cause confusion in tracing him.

⁵⁹ 4 April 1606, James VI to Christian IV, DRA, TKUA England A 1, 2; *Norske Rigs Registranter*, IV, 79 and 123.

⁶⁰ Zettersten, *Svenska Flottans Historia*, I, 257–258 and Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig*, bilagsband I, 34.

⁶¹ 9 June 1612, Riksråd to Gustav II Adolf, *RAOSB*, first series, II, 49; Anderson, *Naval wars in the Baltic 1522–1850*, 33 and 35.

sank on her maiden voyage in 1628.⁶² When the cost of white elephants like the *Vasa* was added to the expense of maintaining a permanent fleet, shipbuilding appeared to create an unacceptable drain on the Swedish state. Indeed, from 1620–1630 alone, sixteen new warships were constructed and the expenditure on the navy increased at least five-fold.⁶³ Many debates were held in the Riksråd as to whether the programme should continue or be reduced. An interim solution to the lack of ships was the feasibility of acquiring vessels inexpensively elsewhere. In 1629 one Swedish merchant was ordered to obtain a replacement for a ship he had lost for the price of 1,000 *riksdaler* or less from Scotland, suggesting a continued recognition of Scottish naval design. But buying abroad was never as viable as building at home.⁶⁴ Another method suggested by the Council for building up the fleet was to sell their naval officers one or two ships, particularly those who were owed back wages. Here the Scots were singled out as examples of officers who would hold on to their craft instead of selling them on for profit, adding integrity to their earlier accolade of design skills.⁶⁵

Despite these short-term solutions, the royal shipbuilding programme featured regularly in the Riksråd debates. In one 1634 session, indigenous shipbuilding was rated as second only to God in importance to Swedish defence and by 1636 the building and commissioning of new ships once more became central to the Swedish government.⁶⁶ By this period however, of the Scottish shipbuilders only William Ruthven remained in Swedish service. The expansion of the Swedish

⁶² Cederlund, ‘The *Vasa* as a product of Dutch Shipbuilding’, 171–179. There is no doubt but that Gustav II Adolf only had himself to blame for insisting on the changes to the design. Hybertsson completed the vessel despite knowing it would probably sink and a stronger resistance would have saved a spectacular loss in international prestige.

⁶³ D. Kirby, *Northern Europe in the early modern period: the Baltic world 1492–1772* (London: 1990), 142. In late January 1626 the Riksråd debated the construction of a warship to replace the recent losses due to storms and accidents. See 23 January 1626, *SRP*, I, 18. That year Hybertsson was commissioned for the following four years to manage the navy and to build four new ships to be delivered in 1626, 1628 and two in 1629. See 22 August 1626, *SRP*, I, 28. The shortage of ships led to private ones being requisitioned by the Crown, and in one case the Livonian owner sued the Riksråd for damages. See 8 July 1628, *SRP*, I, 94–5.

⁶⁴ 25 April 1629, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustav II Adolf, *RAOSB*, IV, 487.

⁶⁵ 1 September 1635, *SRP*, V, 158: “Skottarne skulle dem väll behålla och gjöra sigh der medh betalte.”

⁶⁶ 13 June 1634, *SRP*, IV, 127: “skepzbyggningen, på hvilken rijkzens säkerheet, näst Gudh, mycket hänger”; 13 December 1632, *SRP*, II, 256; 21 May 1633, *SRP*, III, 108; 30 March 1636, *SRP*, VI, 145.

navy continued through Chancellor Oxenstierna's regency so that in 1635 there were 53 vessels and by the 1640s Sweden's navy included ships of between 50 to 80 brass guns.⁶⁷ By 1645 the Swedish navy consisted of 58 vessels, as opposed to Denmark-Norway's 35, although losses the following year proved heavy: twenty vessels while only seven new ships were built.⁶⁸ This discrepancy was soon balanced out by Danish developments and in 1650 the Swedes had one less vessel in its navy than their Nordic neighbours, 42 against 43.⁶⁹

Scottish Officers in the Regular Navy

One of the few statistics printed for the numbers of British officers in the Swedish navy in the seventeenth century notes that only 'a handful' of British officers served including "four captains, one vice admiral and three admirals".⁷⁰ However, that is a remarkable underestimate, as scrutiny of Scandinavian naval records presents close to 150 Scottish, English and Irish officers in naval service during the seventeenth century, of which some 80 came to Sweden.⁷¹ None of those in Sweden had come from Ireland, although 25 were Englishmen. A complication arises here in that the English sent an auxiliary fleet to the Sound to support the Swedish campaign against Denmark-Norway between 1658–1660. However, only some of these officers were commissioned into the Swedish navy, whilst the rest remained part of the parliamentary navy seconded to Sweden. As such we can assume that the number of English officers working within the Swedish fleet would have doubled in this two year period. There is no such complication for the Scots. Those that served in Sweden in the seventeenth century did so as integrated members of the Swedish marine.

The concept of royal navy staff was introduced during the reign of Erik XIV, although it was first implemented during the time of his successor. Johan III created the position of 'admiral-colonel' who

⁶⁷ Ericson, 'När armén var under alperna', in Abukhanfusa, ed., *Mare Nostrum*, 32. See also, Turner, *Memoirs*, 12.

⁶⁸ Ericson, 'När armén var under alperna', in Abukhanfusa, ed., *Mare Nostrum*, 31–32.
⁶⁹ Ericson, *ibid.*, 32.

⁷⁰ Ailes, *Military Migration and State Formation*, 49.

⁷¹ For an analysis of the Scots in the Danish-Norwegian navy see Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 193–201. The main source for this information is KRA, Biografiska Anteckningar om Officerare vid Örlogsflottan, which only lists officers in command of specific ships, not those acting in other capacities.

was second only to himself in importance as regarded naval affairs. This later became the *Riksadmiral*, which was equivalent to the lord high admiral in the British Isles.⁷² The continued growth of the navy meant that new ranks were established in order to bring a coherency to the command structure, particularly by Gustav II Adolf. Although there were usually three or four admirals at any one time, he formalised this at five, and subdivided the navy into a corresponding number of fleets. The number of admirals in Swedish service at any given period varied as whenever a naval force went to sea there would often be more than one admiral appointed to command the ships. This campaign-rank was only valid for the duration of the actual campaign. In addition, the king first purged the navy of useless captains, and then increased the number from 20 to 30, while the rank of lieutenant was established in 1620, of which 30 were appointed. These men had command of a smaller warship under the direction of a captain who might sail with his own ship and several commanded by lieutenants. The king also appointed 5 vice-admirals with an ensign for each, and in 1626 the rank of major was introduced (later replaced by “schoutbynacht”), equating loosely to that of a commodore in the Royal Navy.⁷³ A major could command anything from a squadron to a small fleet, and sat between the rank of a captain and a vice-admiral.

One of Spens’ dispatches stated that in 1627 the Swedish navy comprised a permanent corps of 14 salaried captains for its 40 warships, while other officers were retained for the command of 30 smaller vessels such as galleys, sneaks, drummlars, as well as more than 60 great flat boats.⁷⁴ It is clear from this and other references that not all warships had a captain and could have a more junior officer serving as master.⁷⁵ In addition, each shipyard had a yard admiral, who had administrative and military control of his yard. In Stockholm this became the *holmadmiral*.⁷⁶ Other ranks included captain, ship’s captain, lieutenant and ensign. As these smaller squadrons

⁷² Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig*, bilagsband I, 6.

⁷³ Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig*, bilagsband I, 12. There is some confusion about the exact date this rank was introduced. In volume III of *Sveriges Krig*, 619, Simon Stewart is called major in 1620. However Roberts stated that the rank of major was created in 1628, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II, 296.

⁷⁴ 4 October and 20 December 1627, James Spens to John Coke, PRO, SP95, II, ff.17 and 209–210.

⁷⁵ 27 April 1627, James Spens to Gustav II Adolf, SRA, Anglica III, f.89.

⁷⁶ Roberts translated it as “port-admiral”, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II, 300.

grew in number so other ranks were introduced, including subdivisions such as sub-lieutenant, over-captain, and holm-captain.

As it was not unusual for foreigners to serve in the Swedish navy, the British were to be found at all levels from common seamen to naval gunners and others with expertise in naval matters.⁷⁷ In April 1627 for instance, Gustav II Adolf requested that James Spens find him two naval captains and 10–12 gunners (*konstapel*) in Britain with naval experience.⁷⁸ Spens found them quickly, recommending the Scot John Hay as a naval expert, whom Spens had promised the command of some Swedish ships. He also sent five Scottish gunners and hoped that other naval captains and bombardiers would arrive from Scotland in due course.⁷⁹ Of particular note is that Spens added that the gunners could also command ships in their own right should that be required, highlighting the extent of their experience and the ability of the Scots to operate at the highest level in a number of disciplines.⁸⁰

As mentioned earlier, Richard Clerck was perhaps the most influential of Scottish shipwrights to serve Sweden. After his death in 1625, his monopoly passed to John (Hans) Clerck, his brother.⁸¹ The most famous rigging constructed by this man was that for the *Vasa* in 1628.⁸² That same year he also felt his monopoly was being jeopardised and he complained to the Riksråd in July that his contract with the Crown was not being honoured. Although the monopoly was returned to the admiralty, Clerck still retained a major influence over the industry.⁸³ He had long favoured the Dutch Republic as a source of naval supplies. Between March and April 1630 he went there, with the rank of vice-admiral, to purchase five ships and additional ship's gear and sails.⁸⁴ John became *holmadmiral* in 1631 and

⁷⁷ Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig*, bilagsband I, 7.

⁷⁸ 8 January 1627, Gustav II Adolf to James Spens, SRA, Anglica I/IV, f.42.

⁷⁹ 27 April 1627, James Spens to Gustav II Adolf, SRA, Anglica III, f.89.

⁸⁰ This change from naval gunner to naval captain can be exemplified in person of Alexander Clerck who entered Swedish service as a gunners-mate (*konstapelsmatt*) in 1637, progressed to lieutenant, and finally captain by 1654. Another example can be found in James Kinnaird, also *konstapelsmatt* in 1670, *konstapel* in 1674, and ships lieutenant in 1676. See KRA, Biografiska Anteckningar om Officerare vid Örlogsflottan 1600–1699, 106 and 224.

⁸¹ Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II, 288–9; Berg and Lagercrantz, *The Scots in Sweden*, 52.

⁸² The excellent preservation of the *Vasa* and her contents means that some of Clerck's rigging and sails can still be inspected in Vasamuseet in Stockholm.

⁸³ 28 July 1628, *SRP*, I, 100; Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II, 288–9.

⁸⁴ Zettersten, *Swenska Flottans Historia*, I, 258; Van der Burgh, *Gezantschappen door Zweden en Nederland*, 35. Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig*, bilagsband I, 35–36. Zettersten calls these ships 'kompaniskepp' implying they were either bought from the Dutch

is noted, along with Admiral Klas Flemming, as the driving force in the admiralty during the early period of Sweden's involvement in Thirty Years' War.⁸⁵ Another member of the Clerck family, Richard the younger, was appointed yard captain — or second in command at the Stockholm shipyard — in 1630.⁸⁶

The search for maritime employment provided a particular motivation for British mariners after 1603. James VI's assumption of the English crown had resulted in the reduction of both the Scottish and English navies, leaving many officers without employment.⁸⁷ However this in itself does not explain the profusion of Scotsmen (and later Englishmen) taking service in Sweden. The high incidence of Scotsmen in the navy can also be linked in some way to service of Scottish soldiers already in Sweden. Many of the earlier naval captains were either recruited from the ranks of the army, or had a familial relationship with a soldier serving in Sweden. For example, a second John (Hans) Clerck, who was the son of Captain William Clerck of the Swedish army, joined the navy in 1632. He, like his namesake, later became a *holmadmiral* in the Stockholm fleet in the 1660s. The presence of large numbers of Scottish soldiers in Swedish service provided their nautical compatriots with a ready-made community of fellow Scots in Sweden and facilitated their integration into Swedish society. The much smaller numbers of Englishmen in the pre-1654 period meant that such a support structure did not exist for them.

As with army recruitment, it is during specific campaigns that 'peaks' of enlistments occurred, and from 1609 until 1660 three such major clusters of naval recruitment stand out from the records available. Naval recruitment patterns also follow closely the conflicts which Sweden involved herself in throughout the course of the century. The three groupings as shown in Figure 6 clearly relate to the Swedish wars with Poland-Lithuania and Denmark between 1609–1613;

East or West India company. Some of the following ships which entered Swedish service that year may have been bought by Clerck: *Arbogaskeppet*, *Göteborgskeppet*, *Kälmarskeppet*, *Norrköpingskeppet*, *Nyköpingskeppet*, *Stockholmsskeppet*, *Söderköpingskeppet*, *Täljeskeppet* and *Vasterässkeppet*. The Swedes also sent their factor Eric Larsson to Holland in March 1630 to buy new ships and he was probably part of the same mission as Clerck.

⁸⁵ E. Wendt, *Amiralitetsskollegiets Historia*, part 1 (Stockholm: 1950), 25.

⁸⁶ Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig*, bilagsband I, 44.

⁸⁷ C.D. Penn, *The navy under the early Stuarts and its influence on English history* (London: 1970), xi. See also chapters I and II on 'naval deterioration' after James VI's accession to the English crown.

Fig. 6. *Scottish and English officers in the Swedish navy during three periods of war*



(Source: SSNE database)

the Thirty Years' War between 1628–1648 which also included the Swedish-Danish Torstensson war from 1643–1645; and two further Swedish-Danish conflicts in 1657 and between 1658–1660. This demonstrates that during the time of the unofficial Scottish-Swedish alliance, Scots dominated the British presence in the Swedish navy. This was subsequently altered when England and Sweden entered a formal alliance in the 1658–1660 period and about 30 English officers enlisted. Indeed, the technique of English ship-building became the fashion and King Karl X hired Francis Sheldon and Thomas Day in 1659 and employed them at his Gothenburg and Karlshamn shipyards respectively.⁸⁸

It has been possible to identify a number of the Scottish naval officers in Sweden, including some who served Karl IX and many more during the reigns of Gustav II Adolf and Queen Kristina. While the service of early naval officers fluctuated between military and naval, depending on requirement, they were certainly considered as part of the navy for the campaigns they served. Andrew Stuart, for example, had a varied career as both a sailor and soldier. He twice served in the navy, firstly as captain of the *Svenska*

⁸⁸ E. Wendt, *Amiralitetskollegiets Historia* (Stockholm: 1950), I, 219, and R.C. Anderson, 'Francis Sheldon and his family', *The Mariner's Mirror*, 43, no. 2 (1957).

Björn in Joachim Scheels squadron in 1598, and then as ‘under-admiral’ on the Riksadmiral’s fleet in 1621.⁸⁹ John Forrat joined the fleet in 1610 and took over command of the vessel *Mars*. In 1618 he became one of the first ship’s captains to be made responsible for maintaining discipline, training and exercising his men during his time when he was based at Åland.⁹⁰ A long time servant of the Swedish navy, his career at sea lasted until 1628.⁹¹ His relative, Alexander Forrat, joined right at the end of Karl IX’s reign, serving initially in command of galleys and *lodjar* operating in the waters between Nyköping and Kalmar.⁹² By 1625 he was the yard admiral of Älvsborg shipyard.⁹³ His own charge was initially over the small vessel *Lejoninnan* although both his command and reputation grew to international heights during the 1620s.⁹⁴ It was during the actions against Danzig in 1627 at the battle of Oliva that Forrat achieved his fame. Serving in his capacity as flag-captain, he chose to blow up himself and his ship, *Solen*, rather than let it be captured by a squadron of Polish ships. James Spens recorded the incident:

The King had left in the Danzig roads only 5 of his smallest and worst ships to prevent Danzig vessels coming out this year, for winter storms of frost and snow often lead to loss of ships in the narrow rocky waters; whereupon the Danzigers prepared 10 ships which on a night of full moon sailed out, with the subsequent fight lasting two days; during the second day the admiral’s vessel was captured, whereupon his captain, a Scotsman called Forath, decided to blow it up and die courageously rather than fall into the enemy’s hands; the other four, unable to endure, sailed for home.⁹⁵

⁸⁹ Zettersten, *Svenska Flottans Historia*, I, 61–62. For officers in the Swedish navy see KRA, Biografiska Anteckningar om Officerare vid Örlogsflottan 1600–1699, 154; KRA, Meritforteckningar (Flottan); SRA, Riksarkivets Ämbetsarkiv, Huvudarkivet FV a:31–32.

⁹⁰ Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig*, bilagsband I, 21.

⁹¹ Zettersten, *Svenska Flottans Historia*, I, 98–99.

⁹² Apart from capital ships, the Swedish navy made use of smaller craft called ‘galej’, ‘lodja’ and ‘pinass’. The *galej* were powered by either oars, sail or a combination of both. *Lodja* were flat-bottomed smaller rudder vessels, often used as warships, while a *pinass* was a smaller quick sailing vessel, often of three masts. Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig*, bilagsband I, 29 and Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II, 287.

⁹³ Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig*, bilagsband I, 21.

⁹⁴ Zettersten, *Svenska Flottans Historia*, I, 100–101.

⁹⁵ 24 November 1627, James Spens to Sir John Coke, PRO, SP95, II, f.201; KRA, Biografiska Anteckningar om Officerare vid Örlogsflottan 1600–1699, 154; KRA, Meritforteckningar (Flottan); Zettersten, *Svenska Flottans Historia*, I, 100–101; Berg and Lagercrantz, *The Scots in Sweden*, 52.

Another notorious incident provides an idea of the community the Scottish naval officers operated in. An episode involving Captains Alexander Forrat and James Muir found them accused of the murder of Ensign James Logan at the house of Admiral Richard Clerck, where the guests included at least five other Scottish officers. In April 1622 Ensign Logan, a relative of Muir's, recently taken into Swedish service, attended a social evening at the house of Admiral Richard Clerck, along with Muir, Forrat and Captain Simon Stewart. The group carried on to another officer's home where Forrat and Logan began a dispute over money. A fight ensued, resulting in the wounding of Admiral Clerck and the death of Ensign Logan. Captain Forrat was found guilty of starting the fight, fined and ordered to take any additional punishment imposed by the king at the subsequent trial. Muir was sentenced to death for killing a relative, though the text does not say whether the sentence was carried out.⁹⁶ This event reveals several details about the Scottish community, not least that a newly recruited Scottish ensign could be found socialising with the highest ranking officers in the navy, albeit through family connections. Forrat, Stewart, and Clerck frequently served on the same ship — *Jupiter* from 1618–1620, *Mercury* from 1619–1620, and *Svärdet* in 1620.⁹⁷ Coupled with other information, it is known that family structure was important while nationality bound them together. When Spens informed Gustav II Adolf of his recruitment of five Scottish gunners in 1627, he highlighted that they wanted to bring their wives and families along with them to Sweden.⁹⁸ Indeed the possibility of bringing dependents along probably encouraged these men to take Swedish service.

When Gustav II Adolf restructured the navy in 1614, he retained 16 commissioned naval captains who between them had command of a fleet of 40 ships.⁹⁹ At this juncture we can be sure that 25% of those captains kept on were Scots; Andrew Forrat, John (Hans) Forrat, Alexander Forrat and Richard (Jacob) Clerck.¹⁰⁰ Two of these men commanded significant fleets that year. Alexander Forrat sailed with 6 pinnaces and 36 *lodjar* between Stockholm and Narva, while

⁹⁶ *Svenska Sjöofficerare*, II, 256.

⁹⁷ Zettersten, *Svenska Flottans Historia*, I, 65–66, 98–99, 258.

⁹⁸ 27 April 1627, James Spens to Gustav II Adolf, SRA, Anglica, III, f.89.

⁹⁹ Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig*, bilagsband I, 12, and Roberts, *Gustavas Adolphus*, II, 296.

¹⁰⁰ It is possible that Captain James Forbes was also kept on as he certainly reappears in the navy in 1628.

Richard Clerck sailed with a fleet for Reval and took responsibility for the king's transportation. Clerck was by now an admiral, one of two Scots with the rank in Sweden in 1614 as William Robertson Ruthven still remained in Sweden with the rank of *varfsadmiral*.

The high percentage of Scottish participation continued as the regular Swedish navy established itself. Still in late 1627 and early 1628 some 9 Scottish-born captains are known to have been in service at sea, or 64% of the total of 14 captains which Spens noted in regular service that year.¹⁰¹ The number rose to 30 captains by the end of Gustav II Adolf's reign, bringing several more Scots into service. The influx of officers after 1628 also brought the like of Lieutenants John Dick and Jacob Crome to Sweden. When the new rank of vice-admiral was formalised in 1630, two of the appointments were Scots: Simon Stewart and John Clerck, who both received further promotion, Stewart to lieutenant admiral in 1644 and Clerck to *holmadmiral* in 1631.¹⁰²

A concentration on the officers of only the rank of captain and above would ignore the contribution of the many other Scots who commanded Swedish ships at lesser rank. The data collected indicates that these Scots would be serving in a navy dominated by other Scots in terms of British involvement. The Scottish admirals commanded many of their countrymen in the lower ranks, including some particularly effective lieutenants and captains. During the Torstensson War (1643–45) no fewer than one Scottish lieutenant admiral, one major, three other captains and four lieutenants put to sea, while Holmadmiral Hans Clerck remained in command of shore facilities.¹⁰³ Lieutenant-Admiral Simon Stewart commanded a fleet of 6 warships patrolling between Bornholm and Stralsund. Major Richard Clerck put to sea in Admiral Flemming's squadron in 1644 and the

¹⁰¹ These 9 were: Vice-admiral and Captain Andrew Stuart; Major Simon Stewart; Senior Captain John Forrat; Senior Captain John Clerck; Captain John Hay; Captain Richard Clerck the younger; Captain Alexander Forrat; Captain Andrew Forrat and Captain James Forbes.

¹⁰² Generalstaben, *Sveriges Krig*, bilagsband I, 49 states that the names of the five vice-admirals appointed in 1630 were Erik Eriksson Ryning, Simon Stewart, Erik Hansson Ulfsparré and Hans Hansson. It does not mention Hans Clerck here, but notes him as *viceadmiral* in 1631 on page 10. Both Zettersten, *Svenska Flottans Historia*, I, 258, and Van der Burgh, *Gezantschappen*, 35, call him vice-admiral by March 1630.

¹⁰³ The Scottish officers in service in 1644 were: Holmadmiral Hans Clerck, Lieutenant-Admiral Simon Stewart, Major Richard Clerck, Captains Alexander Clerck, Hans Kinnaird, Richard Stewart and Lieutenants Thomas Gray, William Allen, George Liddel and John Forrat. Also in service was barber-surgeon George Forrester.

following year commanded the third squadron in Admiral Rynning's fleet, consisting of 10 warships plus auxiliary vessels. One of the Scottish lieutenants, George Liddel, proved to be particularly effective in the 1644 campaign. At the battle of Femern on 13 October he played a significant role in the destruction of *Lindormen*, the ship of the Danish Admiral Joachim Grabow, but he also obliged Vice-Admiral Stenzel von Jasmund to surrender his command, *Oldenborg*, for which exploits he received reward money in February 1650.¹⁰⁴

Even beyond those in command of vessels, Scots could play a prominent role in the navy. Non-combatant contributions came from Captain William Netherwood who served as court-master to Riks-admiral Carl Gyllenhjelm between 1629–1633 and James Kinnaird, a senior book-keeper for the admiralty 1660–68.¹⁰⁵ Simon Stewart took on administrative responsibilities at the board of Admiralty in Stockholm when Rynning was absent on campaign.¹⁰⁶ In a different administrative post was Daniel Young Leijonancker who worked as the assessor of the Admiralty Court between 1665–68.¹⁰⁷

These promotions opened the floodgates to what would become effectively naval dynasties in Sweden based around the Clerck, Stewart and Forrat families. Of the Stewarts, Simon — as already discussed — served from 1612–1646 and rose to the rank of lieutenant admiral, while his son Richard also joined the fleet as an officer. Their countryman but no known relation, Andrew Stuart the elder, also earned the rank of vice-admiral and served between 1621–1640.¹⁰⁸ The Stewarts were, however, not the most impressive examples of the rise and integration of seafaring Scots in Sweden. That distinction fell to the Clercks, many of whom became *holm admirals* of

¹⁰⁴ KRA, Biografiska Anteckningar om Officerare vid Örlogsflottan, 1600–1699, 250. For more on the battle see Probst, *Christian 4.s Flåde*, 244–251. *Lindormen* carried 38 guns and had a crew of over 200, of which 50 were killed when she blew up. In total three Swedish ships took part on the attack on *Oldenborg* which carried 32 guns and a crew of 250. She was later upgraded and used in the Swedish navy with 38 guns, Probst, *ibid.*, 245 and 254. Anderson noted that the *Oldenborg* was taken by Västervik's *Fortuna*, Kinnaird's ship, with support from *Svanen* with 22 guns, *Tre Kronor* of 32 guns and *Leopard* carrying 36 guns, see *Naval wars in the Baltic*, 63.

¹⁰⁵ For Netherwood see *SAÄ*, V, 417; Marryat, *One year in Sweden*, 494. For Kinnaird see KRA, Meritförteckningar (Flottan); Zettersten, *Svenska Flottans Historia*, II, 612. Zettersten notes that Kinnaird came from Holland, confirming the Dutch Republic as a recruiting ground for Scottish mariners.

¹⁰⁶ Wendt, *Amiralitetskollegiets Historia*, I, 103.

¹⁰⁷ *SAÄ*, IV, 523.

¹⁰⁸ Berg and Lagercrantz, *The Scots in Sweden*, 52.

the fleet. Richard the elder held this title from 1619 to 1625, his brother Johan held it from 1631–1644, and Richard the younger (probably their nephew) held it from 1655 to 1668.¹⁰⁹ His brother Hans Williamson Clerck, became holm-admiral from 1668 to 1674. Hans Richard Clerck received the appointment on 31 January 1677 while Hans Hanson Clerck became a full admiral the same year.¹¹⁰ Numerous others in the family served as ship's captains in the Swedish navy creating a particularly Scottish hold on promotion.

However, there were two English admirals who served in Sweden, Sir George Ayscue and Owen Coxe.¹¹¹ They served in command of a large squadron of English ships in Swedish service from 1657–1658, and were both ennobled for their actions in 1660 before returning to England. While highly praised, their limited service in Sweden reflects a period of actual and formal military alliance between Sweden and England. It simply does not compare with the Scots, who joined independently and tended to serve for the duration of their careers.¹¹²

Scots were involved in the Swedish navy at almost every level. In administrative and shore-based positions there were four holm-admirals and three others who held positions as staff officers in the admiralty. Operationally there were four majors, two admirals (equivalent to commodores in Britain), four vice admirals — perhaps five depending on Alexander Forrat's exact rank — two underadmirals serving the

¹⁰⁹ The exact relationship between Johan and Richard the younger is unclear: Zettersten indicates that Captain William Clerck is Richard's father in *Svenska Flottans Historia*, 258, whereas other sources note William's children as Hans and Tomas. In any case Richard the younger also held operational commands and in 1657 he was vice-admiral to Riksdmiral Bjelkenstierna on *Draken*, and subsequently commanded the whole fleet on the Riksdmiral's departure, Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Baltic*, 78.

¹¹⁰ KRA, Biografiska Anteckningar om Officerare vid Örlogsflottan 1600–1699, 106–108.

¹¹¹ Ayscue wrote to Karl X Gustav requesting employment after which he served as Admiral, Owen Coxe as Rear Admiral, and with another 13 or 14 English captains and a similar number of lieutenants. For more on Ayscue see F.A. Patterson et al., eds., *The Works of John Milton State Papers* (Columbia University Press: 1937), XIII, 411–413; B. Capp, *Cromwell's Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution 1648–1660* (Oxford: 1989); Davies, *Gentlemen and Taraulins: The Officers and Men of the Restoration Navy*; P. Le Fevre, 'Sir George Ayscue, Commonwealth and Restoration Admiral', *Mariner's Mirror*, 1982, 189–202; DNB. For Coxe see KRA, Biografiska Anteckningar om Officerare vid Örlogsflottan 1600–1699, 354–355; Zettersten, *Svenska Flottans Historia*, II, 626.

¹¹² Other Englishmen also took Swedish service, such as Captain Marcus White also served briefly. He defected to Sweden from the Danish-Norwegian navy in 1644 with two ships. He was however captured within months and subsequently hanged as a traitor, see Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 199.

Riksadmiral (these were senior, but only temporary, ranks similar to lieutenant admirals), and four lieutenant admirals.¹¹³ The only major rank not held by a Scot was that of Riksadmiral. In addition, the troops who were seconded to man the ships so often captained by Scots were themselves Scottish. When Gustav II Adolf divided his navy into two fleets, one for Danzig and the other for Denmark, in 1628 he also detailed which regiments were to accompany each fleet.¹¹⁴ James MacDougall's regiment was sent on the Danzig fleet, to be replaced by David Drummond's regiment in August, which in turn would be relieved by either MacDougall's again, or Thomas Muschamp's regiment. Although the first troops sent on the Danish fleet were Swedish under Lindorm Torstensson, they were to be replaced by James Seaton's Uppland regiment in August and finally William Grey's regiment. The Swedish military manoeuvres of 1628–1629 can truly be demonstrated to be reliant on their Scottish officers and soldiers. As with the army, the heaviest period of direct enlistment from Scotland for the Swedish navy occurred during the first half of the seventeenth century. The continued appearance of Scottish names in Swedish naval records after the end of this period reflected the total integration of those particular families, and represented men with more claim to being Swedes than Scots.

¹¹³ These positions were shared among a group of 13 individuals, of whom many held several different ranks during their careers.

¹¹⁴ 28 April 1628, Gustav II Adolf's instructions, *SRP*, I, xxvii.

Tab. 1. *Senior Scottish naval officers in Sweden 1597–1654*

<i>Name</i>	<i>Rank Attained</i>	<i>Known Service Dates</i>
Andrew Forrat	Captain (1597)	1597–1631
Andrew Stewart	Captain (1598), Vice-Admiral and Under-Admiral in the Riksadmiral's fleet (1621)	1598 & 1621–1641
William Farlay	Captain (1602)	1602
Hans Forrat	Captain (1610), Flag Captain (1620), Senior Captain (1626)	1604–1640
Richard J. Clerck D.A.	Master-Shipbuilder (1606), Captain (1610), Admiral (1610), Under-Admiral in Riksadmiral's fleet (1611), Holm-Admiral (1619)	1606–1625
William R. Ruthven	Admiral (1609), Admiral of the Wharf (1610)	1609–1614
Captain James Forbus	Captain (1609)	1609–1630
Alexander Forrat	Captain (1610), Flag Captain [Vice-Admiral in some sources only] (1628)	1610–1628
Simon Stewart	Captain (1616), Ensign to Riksadmiral (1620), Major (1620) Vice-Admiral (1630), Under-Admiral to Riksadmiral (1630), Lieutenant-Admiral (1644)	1616–1646
John (Hans, Johan) Clerck D.Å.	Captain (1617), Staff Officer to Riksadmiral (1620), Senior Captain (1626), Vice-Admiral (1630), Holm-Admiral (1631)	1617–1644
Göran Stewart	Officer (1627)	1627–1633
John Hay	Captain (1627)	1627
Richard Clerck D.Y.	Captain (1628), Holm-Captain & 'Gårds'-Captain for Skeppholmen (1630), Holm-Major (1640), Lieutenant-Admiral (1654), Holm-Admiral (1655)	1628–1668
William Netherwood	Captain (1629), Court Master to Riksadmiral (1629)	1629–1633
Jakob Crome	Lieutenant (1630)	1629–1630
Johan Dick	Lieutenant (1630)	1630
Hans Williamson Clerck D.Y.	Senior Gunner (1632), Ensign (1633), Artillery Lieutenant (1636), Major and Flag	1632–1679

Tab. 1. (*cont.*)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Rank Attained</i>	<i>Known Service Dates</i>
	Captain (1658), Lieutenant-Admiral (1664), Holm-Admiral (1668)	
Heide Duwall (Macdougall)	Captain (1634)	1634-1635
Robert Fogart	Captain (1634)	1634
Alexander Clerck	Gunner's Mate/ Konstapelsmatt (1637), Lieutenant (1652), Captain (1654)	1637-1658
Hans Kinnaird	Captain (1639), Major (1658)	1639-1658
Richard Stewart	Captain (1639)	1639-1645
Thomas Gray	Lieutenant (1641)	1641-1647
William Allen	Lieutenant (1642)	1642
George Liddel	Lieutenant (1643)	1643-1650
Derrick Forbes	Captain (1645)	1645
Johan Forrat	Lieutenant (1645)	1645
William Sinclair	Captain (1653)	1653-1655

(Source: SSNE database)

CHAPTER FIVE

THE INFLUX AND INFLUENCE OF SCOTSMEN IN THE SWEDISH NOBILITY AND CIVIC SOCIETY

Carl Bock een skätz köpman [. . .] anklagedes att han drifwer stoort landzkööp, både med prångleri och mongelerij, med allehande wahrur, och elliest förere i alle marckneder öpen krambodh¹

Scottish-Swedish relations during the late-sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth centuries are often assumed to be purely martial in nature, and even the few diplomatic connections known about are perceived to be instigated by military needs. However, not only military but also economic migrants from Scotland were making an impact in Sweden during this period, sometimes attracted to Sweden through the military participation of another family member but more often through simple mercantile contacts. These merchants are frequently simply noted with the name “Skotte” in the early records, or they sometimes appear as Germans or Swedes by the corruption of their names.² It is rare that these men can be absolutely defined as Scots as the name could remain for several generations. In other cases, common names like ‘Smith’ took on continental forms. William Smidt, for example, was a merchant who described himself as a Scot in his correspondence with Johan III, and it is only his letter that identifies him as such.³ These Scots settled easily in their adopted home, often becoming burgesses of the towns they lived in, serving on local councils, and sometimes marrying into local gentry or even noble families. They thereby eventually became part of the higher echelons of Swedish society. This latter integration again makes them hard to identify and to segregate from their host community as they could take very un-Scottish names such as Rosenschmidt, Huppenfeldt or Leijonancker.

¹ 21 November 1612, N. Staf, ed., *Stockholms stads tänkeböcker, 1608–1613* (Stockholm: 1964), 218–219.

² For instance see *Stockholms stads tänkeböcker, 1544–1548* (Stockholm: 1936), 197, 254–256, 270. On these pages are found details of Wellam, Hans, Lasse and Oluf Skotte (variously spelt Skotte, Schotte, Skutte). Without some other corroborating evidence it is impossible to say if these men were, or were not from Scotland.

³ Undated, William Smidt and Hans Blickart to Johan III, SRA, Scotica, I.

The mercantile Scots in Sweden during Gustav I's reign appear distinctive and relatively few in number (compared to the soldiers), but it was not unusual for much of the early Scottish-Swedish royal contact to concern trade and the plight of merchants as often as it did military affairs. Despite the difficulties inherent in definitively labelling these people, Swedish sources abound with references to both men and women from Scotland, although a certain amount of detective skill is often necessary in tracing them. Intriguingly, in June 1550 Gustav I noted that some Scots had recently arrived in Stockholm bearing an amount of gold — the king was very keen to relieve the Scots of their goods and commanded some of his burgesses to detain the men.⁴ It was of course not unusual for a monarch to enlist the services of skilled craftsmen in his service. The royal payrolls for 1565 include people such as Sander Scott and John Scott, who were both listed for the year 1565.⁵ Perhaps of greater significance is the existence of legal documents which reveal the strength of the Scottish community in Stockholm. For example, in 1570 Jacob Paterson, Jacob Galloway and Robert Greg, drew up a band of surety for three others, Hans Beathon, Jons Black and Jacob Black, which was then to be presented to Johan III.⁶ Thus already at this point three Scottish residents of the town were trusted and trustworthy enough to act as guarantors for other foreign individuals. The Stockholm town legal accounts from the late sixteenth century also contain a wealth of references to various Scots and the trouble they fell into, often with other Scots, or with Germans and Swedes resident in Stockholm. Even legal transactions which occurred in Scotland were noted in Sweden.⁷ The abundance of records dealing with the 'civic Scot' stands as testimony to the numeric strength of the community even at this relatively early date.

⁴ E.F. Heckscher, *Sveriges Ekonomiska Historia från Gustav Vasa* (Stockholm: 1935), I, 76.

⁵ SRA, RKB, 42:6:2v cited in K. Hedell, 'Musiklivet vid de svenska vasahoven med fokus på Erik XIV:s hov (1560–68)', *Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Musicologica Upsaliensia*, nova series, 20 (Uppsala: 2001), 96 and B. Lager-Kromnow, *Att vara Stockholmare på 1560-talet* (Uppsala: 1992), 229. A 'Thomas Englishman' also is noted.

⁶ 12 March 1570, 'band of surety' to Johan III (draft), signed by Jacob Paterson, Jacob Galloway and Robert Greg, SRA, Åmnessamlingar, Strödda Historiska Handlingar, miscellaneous volume, unfoliated.

⁷ So integrated had they become that even Scottish land transactions were noted in Swedish legal records, such as when John Macpherson sold Walter Richardson his house and inherited goods in Scotland and requested a seal from the Stockholm council to confirm it in May 1569. See J.A. Almquist, *Stockholms stads tänkeböcker, 1568–1575* (Stockholm: 1941), 7.

By the 1570s the Scots had become a significant national group noted as distinct from the Germans in Stockholm's *vågböcker*, or weight-books. Two Scottish individuals (unfortunately unnamed) accounted for 6% and 4% respectively of all the exported goods from the town, at a time when it was normal for an individual to undertake only 1/4% of this trade in total.⁸ One of these was most probably William Anderson, noted as a significant merchant in Stockholm by 1570, and a man who had established trading links with fellow Scotsmen in German cities like Augsburg.⁹ In 1573 Hans Blandt complained to the Stockholm court that he was due money from William Cahun, Sander Heborn, Michell Ruth, Johan Gilcrest, Hans Forbos, Tomas Colborn and Niclas Palmer.¹⁰ There were soon many Scots traders working out of Swedish towns: between 1583 and 1591 for example, Blasius Dundee, Thomas Mischee, James Crawford and Thomas Ogilvie all took oaths to become burgesses in Stockholm and Nyköping.¹¹ The Scottish presence in Stockholm is explained by that town's role as the most important commercial port in Sweden, handling 2/3 of Swedish trade.¹² Several of the Scottish (and some English) merchants based in Stockholm plied their trade through contacts in Stralsund, Danzig and Elbing. Indeed the Scots have been accredited with facilitating increased trade between Sweden and the south Baltic ports during this period, providing an insight into the kind of mercantile networks they had already established in northern Europe.¹³ These contacts proved useful in chasing financial defaulters. When Thomas Ogilvie appeared in the Stockholm court regarding unpaid debts he

⁸ Hecksher, *Sveriges Ekonomiska Historia från Gustav Vasa*, I, 49.

⁹ C. Dalhede, *Handelsfamiljer på Stormaktstidens Europamarknad* (3 vols., Partille: 2001), I, 109 and II, 462. Noted as Guilelm Anderson, his trading partner in Augsburg was William Dunkenson.

¹⁰ Almquist, *Stockholms stads tänkeböcker 1568–1575*, 238.

¹¹ J.A. Almquist, *Stockholms stads tänkeböcker 1578–1583* (Stockholm: 1945), 383; J.A. Almquist, *Stockholms stads tänkeböcker 1589–1591* (Stockholm: 1948), 44–5, 61, 286. However, not all Scottish or other foreign burgesses remained in a town after taking the oath, as noted when both Raumo and Helsingfors received township privileges in 1607, see S.E. Waaranen, *Handlingar Uppplysande Finlands Historia under Karl IX:s tid* (Helsingfors: 1864), II, 286 and 307.

¹² Dow, 'Scottish trade with Sweden 1580–1622', 124.

¹³ A. Tonneson 'Skotterne og englænderne', in *Helsingøres udenlandske borgere og indbyggere ca. 1550–1600* (Ringe: 1985), 22. Some members of the English community were Hans Porter, Randolph Titkens, Robert Whitefield, and Robert Burgess, all noted as English merchants in Stockholm in 1573. See Almquist, *Stockholms stads tänkeböcker 1578–1583*, 236.

was owed by a fellow Scot based in Poland he was supported by Blasius Dundee, William Davidson, Henry Eller, Robert Clementson and Andrew Lambton (all noted as Scots).¹⁴ Blasius Dundee appears to have been settled in Stockholm since at least 1575, at which time he was already an established merchant, although his name does not appear on the burgess list until 1583. He was engaged in purveying goods to the Swedish court and King Johan III allowed him the use of royal supplies of butter in payment for his services.¹⁵

Some of these civilians reached extraordinary heights. For instance, Gothenburg's first town council was more than half-foreign in composition, of which two members were always to be Scots by right.¹⁶ The encouragement of foreign mercantile interest in Sweden was noted as one of Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna's policies and certainly helped to develop the nation's economy.¹⁷ One of these, John Maclean, moved to Gothenburg in 1628, became a town councillor in 1632, and was ennobled in 1649. He was amongst the richest men in Sweden and sometime personal banker to Queen Kristina, and played a key role in supplying Swedish support to Scotland during the 1639 to 1650 period. His compatriot, John Spalding, served as a Gothenburg councillor in 1640 and president of commerce in 1658. His brother James Spalding was a councillor in Norrköping in 1649. Benedictus Fistulator, a Scot who had emigrated from Scotland, either via Danzig or straight to Sweden, acted as a town councillor there in 1648. These men were not unique, but rather symptomatic of a growing presence in Sweden's commercial markets.

The Scottish civilian community maintained strong links with their countrymen in the military. The rapid growth of the Swedish military machine needed a successful economy for its maintenance as much as it relied on the constant input of fresh manpower. The integration of Scottish officers into Swedish society is therefore inextricably entwined with the parallel success of Scottish merchants there, not only because they often undertook financial transactions with them, but

¹⁴ Almqvist, *Stockholms stads tänkeböcker 1589–1591*, 44–5.

¹⁵ A few years later Dundee gained exemption from customs, but nothing more is heard of him after 1616. See Fischer, *The Scots in Sweden*, 21–22 and 25.

¹⁶ For details of Scottish influences in seventeenth century Gothenburg see H. Almqvist, *Göteborgs historia grundläggningen och de första hundra åren* (2 vols., Göteborg: 1929 and 1935), passim and H. Fröding, *Berättelser ur Göteborgs Äldsta Historia* (Göteborg: 1908), passim.

¹⁷ Autumn 1645, John Durie to Sir Cheney Culpeper, *Seventeenth century Political and Financial Papers*, Camden Miscellany 33 (London: 1996), Camden 5th series, VII, 237.

also through the intermarriage that frequently occurred between the two groups.¹⁸ Given the dangerous nature of an officer's career it was very common for a woman to be married at least twice and often three times during her lifetime. The aforementioned John Maclean was responsible for much of these relations. His third wife was Anna Thomson, the daughter of Colonel Thomas Thomson, and the widow of Colonel John Gordon. One of his daughters, Catharina, married first Colonel David Sinclair and then Major-General Malcolm Hamilton.¹⁹ In addition, Lunetta, the daughter of the Stockholm-based Scottish merchant James Maclean, married the naval officer Richard Clerck.²⁰ It was not just merchants' daughters who became soldiers' wives, but sometimes soldiers' children married into mercantile families. Johanna Kinnaird was a daughter of the soldier turned merchant James Kinnaird and she in turn married John Spalding the merchant-burgess in Gothenburg.²¹

Those merchants whose children did not marry into another Scottish family abroad were often related to the military Scots anyway. Consider the case of Charles Ramsay of Dundee who migrated to Elbing along with his family in the 1630s and became a merchant there. That one of the senior Swedish commanders, Sir James Ramsay, had lived in the town at the same time as this man and shared the same surname may indicate a familial preference, but certainly alerts us to the clannish nature of Scottish military and commercial society in Swedish-held territory.²² This civic-military relationship was strength-

¹⁸ Intermarriage was not confined to the Scottish community and both merchant and military offspring married into the Swedish and wider foreign communities. Several studies of marriage patterns in the Scottish community abroad have been undertaken. Their varying results, based on small samples, reflect interesting data on the groups selected. For more on this topic see M. Glozier, 'Scots in the French and Dutch armies during the Thirty Years' War', in Murdoch ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 131–137; Ailes, *State Formation and Military Migration*, 58–72, and Grosjean, 'Scots and the Swedish State', 140–144.

¹⁹ J.N.M. Maclean, *The Macleans of Sweden* (Edinburgh: 1971), 26; *SAĀ*, III, 454 and V, 143.

²⁰ *SAĀ*, II, 23. Similarly, Clerck's sister Elizabeth married twice to Scottish officers.

²¹ *SAĀ*, III, 410, IV, 98 and VII, 370–372.

²² For Charles Ramsay see A. Bieganska, 'The Learned Scots in Poland (from the mid-sixteenth to the close of the eighteenth century)', *Canadian Slavonic Review*, XLIII, no. 1, 16. Colonel James Ramsay had resided at Elbing for two years with his wife Lady Ramsay. The town garrison included some of his troops even after he himself moved with the Court to Wurtzburg. For the reference to Lady Ramsay's stay in Elbing see undated (c. 1632), John Durie to Samuel Hartlib, 'Narrative of his German Travels', Hartlib Papers, HP60/05/1A–8B.

ened in a number of ways. Some Scottish merchants, even merchant-burgesses of Swedish cities, joined the Swedish armed forces where they bolstered their already existing communal links.²³ James Forbes of Lund made this transition at the age of 46, joining the army as a private soldier. He applied his business acumen to exploit commercial opportunities within the military and soon found himself dealing with the Riksråd on their behalf in his capacity as a burges of Stockholm.²⁴ Other Scottish soldiers became citizens in the towns where they had been stationed, such as James and William Fraser who both settled in Thorn after having served there with William Cranstoun's regiment.²⁵ Citizenship of a town was only one of the avenues by which soldiers became civilian. It was also not uncommon for retiring soldiers to be given a small homestead to retire to, making them part of the civilian population. Others received larger grants of land in return for services rendered sometimes on retirement and sometimes while still serving. Even those who received land, but remained within the armed forces, took on a certain 'civilian' facet through the obligations they had towards the land they held and the population that lived upon it.

Scottish Landholding in the Swedish Empire

It was a well-established custom to make land donations to prominent foreigners in Swedish service whether civilian or military.²⁶ Land could be acquired in a number of ways such as royal donation or governmental loan — whereby the temporary landholder gained the interest earned on the income from the land. Property could also be bought, gifted and inherited, all of which methods saw Scots established as

²³ See Frost, 'Scottish Soldiers, Poland-Lithuania', in Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 196.

²⁴ *SÄÄ*, II, 780–790. See *SRP*, I, 177 and *ibid.*, II, 48; also *RAOSB*, XV, 23 for references to Forbes as a burges of Stockholm. Forbes was quickly promoted and ennobled.

²⁵ It is of some interest that they actually became citizens in the city after it fell out of Swedish control! See *KRA*, MR 1656/10, Cranstoun's Regiment; A.F. Steuart, ed., *Papers Relating to the Scots in Poland 1576–1793* (Edinburgh: 1915), xxii; J. Fraser, *Chronicles of the Frasers*, W. Mackay, ed. (Edinburgh: 1905), 424. For more on this regiment and the peculiar situation they found themselves in Thorn see Grosjean, 'Royalist Soldiers and Cromwellian allies', in Murdoch and Mackillop, eds., *Fighting for Identity*.

²⁶ Brännman, *Frälseköpen under Gustav II Adolfs regering*, 144.

Swedish landlords throughout the early modern period. The properties in question encompassed much of the Swedish empire as Scots became landholders not only in Sweden proper, but also in Finland, and in the Baltic and newly acquired German territories. In the ‘early period’ of Scottish migration to Sweden, that is from the 1560s until 1600, there were at least eight Scots who obtained land in return for service.²⁷ This practice increased during the following twenty years, in tandem with Sweden’s military engagements, and at least another thirteen Scots were granted Swedish property.²⁸ None of these men was ennobled at the time of obtaining their land, which contradicts the often stated belief that only people of noble status could gain land. Land grants also varied in size, from one *mantal* (a Swedish term for a specific amount of land for an individual’s use) to 301 *hemman*, which Samuel Cockburn was granted in pawn for a loan of 8,000 riksdaler he had made to the Crown. In addition, he obtained properties from the late Thomas Arbuthnot/Abernethy, comprising three separate villages in Finland.²⁹

During the heyday of Scottish migration, which coincided with the Swedish period of the Thirty Years’ War 1630–1648, land donations formed a very convenient and frequent method of satisfying officers’ demands for payment when funds were low.³⁰ The practice

²⁷ Andrew Keith [1568–1590; Forsholm], Henry/Hugh Cahun [1569–1571], Henry Leyell [1578, 1587; Småland and Östergötland], James Neave [1580s], William Wallace [1582], William Ogilvie [1599], Thomas Arbuthnot/Abernethy [?; Finland] and Andrew Stuart [1599; Västergötland]. Fischer, *Scots in Sweden*, 50; Dow, ‘Ruthven’s Army’, 25–27.

²⁸ Patrick Rutherford[?], David Reid [1604, 1613; Finland], William Ruthven [?; Finland and Uppland]; Samuel Cockburn [1612, 1615, 1618; Finland], John Ramsay [1614; Finland], Alexander Forath [1615, 1619; Uppland], Patrick Ruthven [1618; Småland], David Drummond [1619], James Seton[?], Simon Stewart [1619, 1627; Uppland], William Grey [1621, 1628; Uppland], Alexander Leslie[?] Edward Jordan [1623]. See also Ailes, *State Formation and Military Migration*, 77–90.

²⁹ Brännman, *Frälseköpen under Gustav II Adolf’s regering*, 45–50, 85, 117, 144–145. *Hemman* is an archaic term for a particular type of landholding and translates roughly as ‘homestead’.

³⁰ These men included: George Cunningham [1630], James Duwall [1630], James Spens [1630], George Scott Pistol Kors [1630], Simon Stewart [1630, 1632, 1637], James Forbes of Lund [1631], James Ramsay [1631], Peter Udnie [1633], Patrick Ruthven [1633], William Spens [1639], James Campbell [1639], George Crawford [1641], William Barclay [1643], James King [1644], David Sinclair[?], Hugh Hamilton[?], Alexander Irving[?], Tobias MacDougall[?], Mauritz MacDougall[?], Herbert Gladstone[?]. See also Ailes, *State Formation and Military Migration*, 102. The Scottish origins of George Scott till Pistol Kors is disputed and he may have claimed to be a Scot in order to advance socially. For his conflicting origins see *SAÄ*, V, 725–726; Marryat, *One Year in Sweden*, 495.

of reward for service continued after Westphalia, especially during the various wars of Karl X.³¹ On departure from Swedish service, Scots could still use the income from their Swedish property or, as frequently happened, they could sell the properties to obtain funds for their activities at home. This in turn could also benefit those Scots who remained in Swedish service. Robert Douglas became one of the largest landholders in Småland by adding General James King's donations in that region to his own property in 1651. Further to all these individuals are the wives and daughters of Scots who often either inherited or even bought property on the death of their fathers or husbands and who rarely appear in accounts of foreign landholders. Maria Neave was both a beneficiary of her husband's estate and a significant property owner in her own right. Elisabeth Clerck also inherited land from her husband in 1645 (after writing to Queen Kristina pleading poverty) while Margaretha and Isabella, the daughters of Thomas Muschamp, inherited their father's land upon his death.³² These are just a few examples of a largely unrepresented social group.

Scots in the Swedish Nobility

The most important and permanent form of landholding enjoyed by the Scots came as a result of ennoblement. During the reign of Erik XIV it had been decreed that all new members of the nobility had to be Swedish-born. However Johan III began to allow the ennoblement of foreigners, albeit with a proviso that naturalisation was required if these nobles sought introduction into the Riddarhus (the house of nobles). This also applied to the Swedish-born sons of foreigners, providing evidence that an individual's place of birth did not determine his or her nationality, a view which persisted into the seventeenth century. At the time of Gustav II Adolf's accession the nobility numbered about 400 families (with some 100 families exiled in Poland) of which 12 were titled.³³ None of these were Scots. The

³¹ See for example the land donations in respect of John Maclean [1652, 1658], John Kinnemond [1654] and John Bordon [1659].

³² 1645, Elizabeth Clerck to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, AOSB, E589. For the Muschamp girls see SAA, I, 625 and V, 34. Although Muschamp himself was English, he married a Scottish woman and so his daughters were half-Scots.

³³ A.F. Upton, 'The Swedish Nobility, 1600–1772', in H.M. Scott, ed., *The European Nobilities in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (London: 1995), 17.

magnates, such as the Bielkes, Bondes, Brahes, Oxenstiernas, were members of great families linked by ties of blood to the Crown and drawn from the Swedish heartland.³⁴ The Swedish older nobility comprised few families and individuals so that in proportion, every such family had on average many times as much land as had lesser nobles. Wealth was measured in farm ownership, and by 1654 the nobility owned 2/3 of all the farms in Sweden and Finland.³⁵ In fact, during both Gustav II Adolf's and Kristina's reigns, royal land was sold to the nobility to pay for military activity, and resulted in an imbalance of the social weight of the nobility against the Crown. Both Kristina and Karl X initiated efforts to redress this balance, but it was not fully achieved until the *reduktion* of Karl XI's reign.³⁶

In 1626 Gustav II Adolf divided the nobility into three classes by the Riddarhusordning (Order of the House of Nobility), which made titles heritable and gave the higher nobles a direct influence on the government through a voting system, which favoured the top class of counts and barons.³⁷ The first two classes were *herreklassen* (counts and barons), who also had the privilege of being introduced more or less automatically into the Riddarhus, and *riddareklassen* (descendants of the Riksråd). Both classes held extensive land grants. The third class was *svenneklassen* (the common nobility), which derived its income from minor positions of employment for the Crown, and as such comprised the 'lesser' nobility.³⁸ This class initially contained the largest number of Scots. There was an imbalance of power within the three classes however, as the first class was allowed individual votes in taking decisions in the Riksdag, and thus any Scots in that class could wield a lot of influence in Sweden.³⁹ The Riddarhusordning also formalised the requirement of a royal patent as the only qualification for entering the higher nobility, and this was not difficult to obtain.⁴⁰ Although ennoblement for foreigners was relatively eas-

³⁴ Åström, 'The Swedish economy', in Roberts, ed., *Sweden's Age of Greatness*, 59.

³⁵ S. Dahlgren, 'Estates and classes', in Roberts, ed., *Sweden's Age of Greatness*, 120–122.

³⁶ The *reduktion* was the Crown's reclamation of land and revenue which had been given to the nobility.

³⁷ *Svenskt-Historiskt Hand-Lexikon*, ed. Meijer, 2–3.

³⁸ Dahlgren, 'Estates and classes', in Roberts, ed., *Sweden's Age of Greatness*, 121.

³⁹ For example, William Spens, Andrew Stuart, and James Forbes, appeared among the signatories when renewing the monetary grant for building the Riddarhus in 1638. See number 27 in *Förteckning över Riddarhusets arkiv*, Riddarhusarkivet, Stockholm, 5.

⁴⁰ Munck, *Seventeenth Century Europe*, 147.

ily achieved in Sweden, induction into the Riddarhus was a matter for serious consideration as only those of Swedish birth could enter. It required a personal application accompanied by proof of noble origins from the applicant's country of birth, as verbal claims to descent from ancient nobility in Scotland was not enough. When written evidence was accepted and introduction processed, the applicant was considered 'naturalised' for membership in the Riddarhus without written proof.⁴¹ Admittance to that body led, in several cases, to membership of the Riksråd. Although Riksråd seats were only available to Swedes, the obstacle for Scots had already been removed once they had become naturalised, already noted as a precondition for their entry into the Riddarhus.⁴² Of the Scottish families in the titled nobility — the Douglasses, Forbeses, Hamiltons, and the Spenses — only the Forbes were Finnish-born, whilst the rest were Scottish-born. It would appear that only one Englishman achieved the same honour during this time, George Fleetwood.


The 1611–1660 period in Sweden saw the rule of three distinctive monarchs, and one aristocratic regent. All of these individuals personally influenced the rate of ennoblement, which varied during these four separate periods of government of the seventeenth century. Figure 7 shows the rate of ennoblement throughout the seventeenth century, and thus the information for King Karl XI has been included to give a complete picture.⁴³ Although it has not been possible to determine the total number of all ennoblements, that is of Swedes and foreigners, the general trend until 1654 denotes a gradual increase in numbers. The sudden decline which occurred during Karl X's reign is distinct. Not only did Karl rule for barely 4 years, but during that time he was constantly at war. He also initiated the process of reasserting monarchic authority over the ruling nobility, and in order to reduce their power and influence was hardly likely to increase their numbers.

Analysis of the Scottish ennoblements provides an insight into the extent of integration that some Scots experienced in Sweden. The

⁴¹ For example when the Scot Thomas Michellson, was among a list of people seeking entry into the Riddarhus, it was decided that if he produced a valid genealogy he would have the benefit of the seat in the Riddarhus, as was his right. See 14 July 1634, *SRP*, IV, 166.

⁴² Åström, 'The Swedish Economy', in Roberts, ed., *Sweden's Age of Greatness*, 9.

⁴³ Ailes shows a similar trend in her graph of ennoblement by decade, *Military Migration and State Formation*, 94. However, the graph does not specify either the nationality of people represented on it nor the year of ennoblement.

Fig. 7. *Number of Scots ennobled in Sweden between 1611–1697*

(Source: *SSNE* database and *SAÄ*)

seventeenth century ennoblements all occurred after 1625, which coincided with the beginning of the heaviest phase of Scottish enlistment in the Swedish army, and at least 47 Scots were ennobled and introduced into the Riddarhus in the period up to 1660.⁴⁴ Four of the six men ennobled during Gustav II Adolf's reign were Scottish-born whilst the remaining two were Swedish-born sons of Scottish parents. Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna instigated an increase in ennoblements from 1633 to 1643, although they would have been granted in the name of Kristina, still a minor. Of those fourteen 'Scottish' ennoblements, ten were Scots-born and the remaining four were born in Sweden to Scottish parents. The greatest upsurge occurred after Queen Kristina attained her majority, as she raised a total of 28 Scots to the Riddarhus during her reign. It was the norm by 1649 that soldiers who had served well were rewarded with a noble title and a coat of arms.⁴⁵ Of these 28 again the majority, 16, were

⁴⁴ This figure was extrapolated from the *SAÄ* volumes and the *SSNE*.

⁴⁵ As mentioned during a Riksråd debate over entitlement to nobility in 1649, see 1 October 1649, *SRP*, XIII, 385.

Scots-born and the remainder were Swedish-born. As these men, whether born in Sweden or not, had to become naturalised Swedes before they could be introduced into the Riddarhus, this reveals that even the Swedish-born individuals would have been considered Scots until the point of their naturalisation.

That the number of Scotsmen ennobled in Sweden decreased during the reign of Karl X is probably a reflection of the fact that many of those who were then in service had already been ennobled by Kristina. This period also appears to have witnessed an easing off in the level of Scottish migration to Sweden. Interestingly one of Karl X's four ennoblements was an Englishman, Owen Coxe, whom he had specifically invited into his service in 1655. This move reflected Karl X's pro-English policies as a whole. However, Karl's efforts to reward Coxe had little impact and subsequently the Englishman departed almost immediately from Swedish service. This temporary downward trend was reversed in the following years. Of the 40 ennoblements of British Isles subjects which occurred during Karl XI's reign in the latter half of the seventeenth century only one was English and three were descendants of Englishmen. In contrast, twelve were Scots born, and 24 were of Scottish parentage. These later ennoblements related directly to the high proportion of Scots who had 'gone native' and settled in Sweden, as it was largely their sons who became ennobled. Not only were these Scots now living permanently in Sweden, but in many cases they had married Swedish women and were accepted as Swedes themselves. At this point these individuals were presumably no longer viewed as foreigners, which probably explains the high number of Scottish as opposed to English ennoblements.⁴⁶

As with military recruitment, ennoblement in Sweden involved a large number of Scottish migrants. There is a total lack of Irish presence, and only a small number of English individuals appear amongst the nobility. Not a single Irishman was found ennobled in Sweden during the seventeenth century, although the Hamilton family, of which two distinct branches lived in Sweden, is usually denoted as Irish in the Swedish peerage list. This is despite the knowledge that both branches in fact stemmed from Scotsmen. Archbishop Archibald Hamilton was born in Scotland and only settled in Ireland in 1610 as the archbishop of Cashel. Hamilton was certainly not considered

⁴⁶ See below for a discussion of the wives of ennobled Scots.

an Irishman by the Irish, who forced him out of Ireland during the rebellion in 1641.⁴⁷ Once he settled in Sweden after 1649 he continued to sign himself ‘Archibaldus Hamilton Caseliens’, clouding the issue of identity for later historians.⁴⁸ In 1654 Archibald’s predecessor Malcolm Hamilton’s sons Hugh and Louis were raised to barons and have also traditionally been described as Irishmen. This was probably due to their use of the titular form of ‘Hamilton of Balygally’, although how they would have described themselves remains a point of debate.⁴⁹

The standard view has been that it was rare for anyone whose forebears were not ennobled or had not entered into the peerage in the previous generation to move into the high nobility before 1680. In addition, of the foreigners ennobled, only the Germans of high status and those from Livonia and Estonia have formerly been viewed as of significance.⁵⁰ Some of these ‘Germans’ or other foreign nationals were sons of Scottish émigrés, and in the present study these sons have been taken as Scotsmen. Even without this re-classification the Scots were already being equally absorbed with Germans into the ranks

⁴⁷ S. Murdoch, ‘Northern Exposure: Irishmen and Scandinavia in the Seventeenth Century’, *History Ireland*, (1998), 5. He was the son of Sir Claud Hamilton of Cochno in Dumbartonshire, and settled in County Tyrone in 1610 where he held the position of archbishop of Cashel and Emly in Ireland. Archibald and his family fled Ireland in 1641, migrating to Sweden via the Dutch Republic, and he died there in either 1658 or 1659. J. Lodge, *The Peerage of Ireland; Or a genealogical history of the present nobility of that kingdom*, ed. M. Archdall (7 vols., Dublin: 1789 edition), and Lt. Col. G. Hamilton, *A History of the House of Hamilton* (Edinburgh: 1933), 251.

⁴⁸ Undated, Archibald Hamilton to Gabriel de la Gardie, SRA, Ericbergarkivet, Autographsamlingen, Stor-Britannien, vol. 269. The confusion between the two archbishops, in both Swedish and Irish sources was extended to their sons. Lodge’s *Peerage of Ireland* suggests that Malcolm’s sons Hugh and Louis were the sons of Archibald. In fact Malcolm had at least four sons, Hugh, Louis, Archibald and John. Two of these, Hugh and Louis, served in the Swedish army and were ennobled in Sweden under the Swedish name ‘Desserf’, a corruption of Dalsersf. See Lodge, *Peerage of Ireland*, II; Hamilton, *House of Hamilton*, 1013–4. For Hugh’s identification as a Scot by his Scottish contemporaries see Monro, *His Expedition*, II, 02 verso, ‘The List of Scottish Officers in Chief anno 1632’; Sir Thomas Cromarty of Urquhart, *The Jewell*, ed., R.D.S. Jack and R.J. Lyall (Edinburgh: 1983), 93.

⁴⁹ It is unclear if they considered themselves Scottish, Irish, British or Swedish at the time of ennoblement. Their nephews Malcolm and Hugh joined them in Sweden and also became barons in 1689, bringing the total number of barons in that family to four. The issue of nationality as defined by place of birth was raised by Sir James Turner in his memoirs as he described another man as “a Scot, bot borne in Ireland”. See Turner, *Memoirs*, 111. For more on nationality and identity see Murdoch, ‘Database in early modern Scottish history’, 85–6 and 93.

⁵⁰ It has been stated that “of those who became counts before 1680, only one was not a member of the old nobility”, Dahlgren, ‘Estates and classes’, in Roberts, ed., *Sweden’s Age of Greatness*, 21. For the assertion about Germans see Åström, ‘The Swedish Economy’, in *ibid.*, 76–7.

of the Swedish nobility by 1626. Of twelve families introduced with a title that year only two were foreign, but one was Scottish — the Spens family — and the other German.⁵¹ Earlier studies only listed two Scots counts and three Scots barons as introduced into the Riddarhus in the years from 1560 to 1697.⁵² Åström claimed that Gustav II Adolf and Kristina each ennobled one Scotsman as a Swedish baron. Kristina actually doubled the number of noble families in Sweden and increased the number of counts and barons by seven, four of which were native Scots and one the descendant of Scots.⁵³ James Spens, two of his sons, the two Hamilton brothers, James King and Robert Douglas were all Scots and all ennobled as barons in the years 1626 to 1654. Three further significant barons of Scottish extraction were Alexander Erskine, Arvid Forbes and James MacDougall. Their cases are not straightforward, but certainly merit consideration. Erskine was Pomeranian-born of Scottish parents, and he himself identified himself as a Scot in 1653.⁵⁴ Forbes was Finnish-born, although it was his Scottish origins which enabled both his and his brother Mauritz's admissions to the Riddarhus and, like the Hamiltons, their nationality appears to have been acknowledged by their contemporaries.⁵⁵ James MacDougall like Erskine was German-born, of Scottish parents. He was registered as a baron posthumously on the merit of what he had achieved between the years of 1607 and 1634, during which time he was also identified by his comrades as a Scot.⁵⁶

⁵¹ K. Ågren, 'Rise and decline of an aristocracy: the Swedish social and political elite in the 17th century', *SJH*, vol. 1 (1976), 73.

⁵² This number is derived from Åström's data, 'The Swedish economy', in Roberts, ed., *Sweden's Age of Greatness*, 77. See also Marryat, *One Year in Sweden*, 461–484 which lists only one Scottish count and three Scottish barons before 1660.

⁵³ Roberts, 'Queen Christina and the General Crisis', in Roberts, *Essays in Swedish History*, 128. These were James King, Robert Douglas, the Hamilton brothers and Arvid Forbes. See also H. Kamen, *The Iron Century, Social Change in Europe 1550–1660* (London: 1971), 164.

⁵⁴ Erskine was approached by King Charles II that year, *Calendar of Clarendon State Papers preserved in the Bodleian library* (4 vols., Oxford: 1872–1932), II 195. For a reference to Erskine's children re-affirming their Scottish origins and familial links see 19 September 1681, NAS, Mar and Kellie Papers, GD124/15/171. Here Alexander Erskine junior wrote to the Earl of Mar relating his father's position in Sweden and acknowledging Mar as the head of the Swedish Erskine kin-group.

⁵⁵ Monroe, *His Expedition*, II, 02 verso, 'The List of Scottish Officers in Chief anno 1632'; *The Modern History of the World*, The Eighth Part, A3. From these sources it is clear that, by the Scots and English at least, Arvid Forbes was called Colonel Alexander 'Finnesse' Forbes and sometimes simply Colonel Finn-Forbes.

⁵⁶ 21 November 1633, NAS, Messers Hope, Todd and Kirk, WS Papers, GD246/box 26/bundle 5, item 21; Monroe, *His Expedition*, II, 04 verso, 'The List of Scottish Officers in Chief anno 1632'; *The Swedish Intelligencer*, the first part, 49 and The

Debates over introduction to the Riddarhus

In 1634 the Riksråd debated the right to introduction of foreign noblemen's Swedish-born sons. It was decided to allow these individuals into the Riddarhus as the *Riddarhusordning* (the order of the House of Nobles) did not expressly forbid it. Thereby, when a foreign person was born into an ennobled family in Sweden he was (theoretically) naturalised automatically.⁵⁷

Throughout 1635 there was discussion and debate as to the validity and propriety of foreign ennoblement and its reciprocity between foreign states and Sweden. It started when a Swede, Per Ericsson, claimed to be ennobled in England by Charles I, without any external involvement and on the king's initiative alone.⁵⁸ One of the Oxenstiernas on the council remarked that Ericsson had behaved like a fool — having bought or begged English noble status, he could not expect it to be recognised in Sweden. Oxenstierna feared that it would set a precedent and create a deluge of Swedes claiming foreign ennoblement and thereby expecting acceptance in the Swedish nobility. Interestingly, when James Spens' children were being considered for membership of the Riddarhus, they were compared favourably to Per Ericsson who was deemed unsuitable for acceptance into the House. Spens, although ennobled as Baron Öreholm, had often been absent from Sweden, serving as resident ambassador to the Stuart Court or as colonel and general of Swedish forces abroad. The Riksråd specified that introduction due only to foreign ennoblement, rather than particular service beneficial to the Swedish Crown, was wrong.⁵⁹ This speaks volumes for the Scots who were ennobled in Sweden, as this was a clear statement of the qualifications for higher Swedish ennoblement. Even a native Swede who had been in some diplomatic capacity abroad was not automatically consid-

Fourth Part, 157. Although called Colonel Macdougall here and in charge of a Scottish regiment, once he took over command of non-Scots he was later referred to as Dovaldt or Douwaldt and other derivations thereof. See *The Swedish Intelligencer*, *The Fifth Part*, 127 and *The Sixth Part*, 9.

⁵⁷ 5 July 1634, *SRP*, IV, 139: "Riddarhusordningen förbjuder thed inthed, derföre så kan thed och väl tillåtas; och eo ipso actu som een sådan blifver född, så naturalizeras och den samma". About a year later the foreign-born sons of an ennobled foreigner were also allowed into the Riddarhus, see 12 August 1635, *SRP*, V, 130.

⁵⁸ 1 July 1635, *SRP*, V, 97.

⁵⁹ 26 October 1635, *SRP*, V, 229: "att han tillföremme gör sikh något meriterat hoos Sveriges Chrono; men simpelt sleppa honom in på Ridderhuset, för dedt han drogh till Engelandh, synes icke vara reputerligt."

ered worthy. James Spens' sons were allowed entry into the House, specifically because they had royal privileges. At this time the Vasa royal physician Doctor James Robertson of Struan's children were also considered and accepted into the Riddarhus without question.⁶⁰ This shows that such promotion was only afforded to those who had proved themselves deserving of it.⁶¹

The Ericsson case continued into the following year when he was serving as 'president' (a legal position) of Gothenburg and his title again became the source of Riksråd debate. One of the councillors wondered if Charles would not be infuriated by the rejection of the noble title he had given to Ericsson.⁶² Some of the Riksråd felt that Ericsson should be able to benefit from the same ease of access to the nobility in Sweden that other foreigners had. It was argued that without the proper title Ericsson could not correctly undertake his duty, and that he would not need immediate matriculation into the Riddarhus anyway. An additional reason given in Ericsson's favour was that his nine sons could all in future serve the Swedish crown. After a difficult debate Ericsson was finally accorded the full title.⁶³

The claim of Scottish noble descent usually opened a pathway toward introduction into the Riddarhus, although how reliable these claims were seems open to discussion given the variety of origins for them. Where possible the Scots obtained letters signed by Charles I, although to date only six of the Scotsmen ennobled and introduced in Sweden appear to have supplied royal letters verifying their noble origins.⁶⁴ For example, Maurice MacDougall/Duwall relied on the words of Johan Oxenstierna and another Scot, James Forbes, as

⁶⁰ 20 October 1635, *SRP*, V, 214–215. See also 31 October 1635, *ibid.*, 257. The problem of religious persuasion arose in relation to the Spens children. This instigated debate over whether Calvinists or Catholics should be matriculated into the Riddarhus. The eventual acceptance of the family indicates that religion was not necessarily a disqualifying feature, although no specific outcome was recorded.

⁶¹ Robertson ran his own apothecary in Stockholm and was ennobled in 1630, see *SAÄ*, VI; Berg and Lagercranz, *Scots in Sweden*, 45.

⁶² "Så ähr och thet betänkeligitt, om icke Konungen i Engelandh bliffver stött för huffvudet, om honom adeligh titel, som aff honom är donerat, denegeres." 7 April 1636, *SRP*, VI, 170.

⁶³ Interestingly enough, he became an influential man in Gothenburg and was associated with John Maclean, particularly during Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna's visit to the town in 1640. See Chapter Four below for further discussion.

⁶⁴ See *Katalog öfver Sköldebref*, Riddarhusarkiv, Stockholm. These are noted in the catalogue for two members of the Forbes family, Simon Stewart, James Robertson, Herbert Gladstone and William Philp. Most of the other entries simply state "proof" of noble origins supplied without specifying what this was.

support for his Scottish claims in 1638. Hans Bogge supplied his birth briefe proving Scottish noble origins in 1652. Henry, known as Hans in Sweden, Belfrage from Culross did likewise in 1665 and was ennobled the following year, and then introduced in 1668. Even as late as 1705 such a document from Scotland obtained in 1628 was corroboration of Scottish noble origins.⁶⁵ More surprising was the case of Mattias Forbes, born in Finland, whose Scottish birth briefe dated 1534 was considered valid evidence of his origins. In contrast, Patrick Ogilvie of Inchmartin had to show two separate documents signed by fellow Scottish officers, in 1640 and 1642, to ascertain his Scottish noble origins before he was accepted into the Swedish nobility.⁶⁶

Ease of access was not always the case for Scotsmen, particularly during the period of civil rebellion against the Stuarts. In 1643 Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Irving sought membership to the Riddarhus for his children. He was willing to provide proof of his nobility from the 'Vice-committee', presumably the shire committee of war, in Aberdeen.⁶⁷ When this evidence was produced the following day, the Riksråd decided that it could not be accepted despite Irving's many years of service to the Crown. If he could obtain royal proof from the Stuart Crown, or from the Scottish Privy Council or Parliament, obviously viewed as alternative authorities to the King, Irving was told, then the matter would be reconsidered. Thereafter a resolution was passed that only documents from sovereign kings, dukes, republics, parliaments and senates would be accepted as sufficient evidence of noble status.⁶⁸ Thus in 1648 Herbert Gladstone was lucky to obtain proof of nobility from King Charles I just over two months before the king was executed.⁶⁹ Most of the Scots appear to have obtained some other form of patent from Scotland, probably from the parliament.⁷⁰ Patrick Ogilvie's patent under the Great Seal in February 1642, was an example of this.⁷¹ Although the Swedish nobility has been

⁶⁵ *SAA*, I, 265 for Hans Belfrage, and 469 for Hans Bogge; *SAA*, II, 355 for Maurice MacDougal, and 676 for Peter Feif.

⁶⁶ *SAA*, II, 788 for Mattias Forbes; *SAA*, V, 537–8 for Patrick Ogilvie.

⁶⁷ 19 October 1643, *SRP*, X, 309.

⁶⁸ 20 October 1643, *SRP*, X, 310.

⁶⁹ *Katalog öfver Sköldebref*, Riddarhusarkivet, Stockholm. Gladstone appears to have been ennobled in 1647 already, perhaps on the promise of producing the royal patent.

⁷⁰ *SRL*, contains several letters from Charles I to the Chancellor of Scotland dated from 1626 to 1627 concerning Andrew Arbuthnot and Captains Robert Scot and John Kinnemond seeking proof of lawful birth and progeny, 66, 176 and 207 respectively.

⁷¹ See references to Patrick Ogilvie in *The Register of the Great Seal of Scotland, A.D.*

described as “an open élite” this was not the case.⁷² In 1645 Lieutenant Colonel Carl Henderson, brother of the late John who had been ennobled and acted as governor and commandant of Gothenburg (during the recent war with Denmark-Norway), sought to gain his brother’s seat in the Riddarhus.⁷³ The Riksråd believed that allowing this would set a precedent which would devalue ennoblement for people who deserved it on their own merit. It was decided that transferred inherited entry into the Riddarhus would not be allowed.

This decision reflects the power of the Riksråd in restricting access to its particular circle of nobility although Queen Kristina changed this. When William Barclay approached the same authority almost ten years later seeking admittance to the Riddarhus for himself, his request was personally accepted by Kristina. This was not due to any personal quality on Barclay’s part as he was a controversial character who had lost his position as colonel for excesses of plunder committed in 1648. Although he had just been ennobled that year, he did not get thrown out of the nobility as a result of his conviction. He became the city colonel in Stockholm and a town commissioner, but he continued to experience problems with the law.⁷⁴ He was indeed accepted into the Riddarhus in 1654, although his secondary request to Kristina, for a land grant, was denied.⁷⁵

Indigenous entrepreneurs, financiers, merchant magnates and military personnel, could all become ennobled, but did not necessarily access the limited circle of ‘introduced’ nobility. Gustav II Adolf initiated the expansion of the Swedish nobility, admitting “new members through wealth, talent and royal favour, including a number of foreign financiers, entrepreneurs and soldiers”.⁷⁶ All those who served

1635–1651 (Edinburgh: 1897), 369 and *RPCS*, Second Series, VII, 205. There is also an undated supplication (circa 1649) from William and Robert Monteith, who intended to go abroad for business purposes and possibly for settlement, seeking a warrant to the Chancery for “ane testificat of our genealogie contening therein the families quherof we ar descended in the maist ample and large forme”, *RPCS*, second series, VIII, 205–6.


⁷² Upton, ‘The Swedish Nobility’, in Scott, ed., *The European Nobilities*, 19.

⁷³ 10 January 1645, *SRP*, XI, 1.

⁷⁴ Barclay was called into the Riksråd along with the city captains regarding the complaints of the civic guardsman who had been attacked by some cavaliers under Barclay’s authority. See 11 August 1657, *SRP*, XVII, 240–2. See also 4 April and 14 May 1657, *ibid.*, 85 and 114.

⁷⁵ 1 March 1652, *SRP*, XV, 278.

⁷⁶ Munck, *Seventeenth century Europe*, 162.

Fig. 8. *Occupations of ennobled Scots in Sweden, 1611–1660*(Source: *SSNE* database)

Sweden, irrespective of origin, could be ennobled, and because the Scots were present in such numbers their impact was pervasive. From 1611 to 1680 new ennoblements numbered 670 people, of which more than half—360—were foreigners.⁷⁷ Just over one fifth of these were Scots and the majority of those were soldiers.⁷⁸

Conclusion

In the variety of work produced about the Scots in Sweden (and indeed other places), there has been a tendency to produce linear lists of Scots in particular roles in society, whether that be as burgesses, noblemen or land-owners.⁷⁹ These provide helpful starting points for

⁷⁷ Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, II, 160.

⁷⁸ SAA, I–IX, and *Register till Sveriges Ridderskaps och Adels Riksdags Protokoll, 1627–1714, I, Personregister*, which provided about seven further Scottish names. Fallon listed 38 names in his appendix, ‘Scottish Mercenaries’, 386. ‘Ailes’ total of ennobled first generation officers was 35, ‘British Mercenaries’, 73 and 163.

⁷⁹ See for example Fischer, *Scots in Sweden*, 215–216, ‘List of Scottish Citizens of Stockholm from 1573–1673’; Steuart, *Scots in Poland*, 36–58, ‘Scots admitted to the

investigation, but for this present survey, a more useful guide toward a picture of Scottish society is the sort of collective list Monro provided of the senior Scottish officer corps in Swedish service in 1632.⁸⁰ When such ‘snapshots’ of the influential Scottish community are collated during significant episodes of the Scottish-Swedish alliance, the full degree of Scottish influence within Swedish society at specific junctures becomes apparent.

At the turn of the seventeenth century, there were only a handful of Scottish citizens and influential courtiers in Sweden most of whom do not appear to have retained a high-profile “foreign” identity. [See Snapshot 1600 below] It was during the 1638–41 period, when Scottish society was in turmoil, that the number of Scots then settled in Sweden began to exert a level of influence on their host government. They co-ordinated with the officers in the army to provide substantial support gathered from within the Scottish community abroad in answer to a specific call from Scotland. In addition to the many military and naval officers previously mentioned, the civic community itself had developed a far more influential shape. [See Snapshot 1640 below] Both Stockholm and Gothenburg had numerous burgesses while other Scots had gained citizenship in smaller towns. The community was also well represented by civic councilors and government officials as well as throughout the nobility. For example, William Spens was not only a noble, but he was also present at the 1638 and 1640 Swedish Riksdag parliamentary sessions. At the same time, Arvid Forbes served in the Krigsråd, the war council, before becoming a member of the Riksråd in 1653.⁸¹

The Scottish community also had access to court and governing circles through professional and personal court servants who were members of their community. For example, court doctor James Robertson, who had been ennobled in 1635 for his services, including translating diplomatic dispatches during Gustav II Adolf’s reign, would

Citizenship of Cracow’. This list covers a time period spanning 1573–1702. See also Ailes, *Military Migration and State Formation*, 80–81, two tables of land donations, without dates, but the names suggest a time span of at least 70 years.

⁸⁰ Monro, *His Expedition*, II, 02 verso, ‘The List of Scottish Officers in Chief anno 1632’.

⁸¹ Although his connection to Scotland was distant, his ennoblement in Sweden only occurred on production of evidence of his Scottish noble origins. This document was obtained from Aberdeen and signed by 25 members of the Forbes family. The Scottish connection was thus still valid.

have had direct contact with not only the queen but also Chancellor Oxenstierna.⁸² Queen Kristina's chief lady-in-waiting, Agneta Patkull, was married to a Scot, Alexander Irvine. It is highly likely that he would have tried to use his marital connections to influence Kristina indirectly, particularly when his native land was invaded by the English. This kind of personal influence also included the hearthfire, as both Scottish men and women had also married into some notable Swedish families producing some very influential offspring. The children of Riksråd Johan Skytte and Baroness Maria Neave were all 'Scots' by matrilineal heritage, and that they viewed themselves as such was confirmed by the actions of Johan Skytte junior who had himself naturalised as a Scot under the Great Seal of Scotland in 1635.⁸³ Johan died only a few years after this, but his brother Bengt went on to greater heights. Knighted in Britain, from 1638 he served on the Swedish Exchequer, and he was a member of the Riksråd from 1648 until 1662.⁸⁴ Their brother Jakob was also knighted by King James, and served as a judge by 1638 and vice-president of the Svea Hovrätt by the early 1640s. The very probable impact of Scottish spouses on their Swedish partners should not be ignored, particularly in the cases of Krigsråd Adolf Frederik Schletzer or Commissioner Per Larsson Grippenwaldt. They may well have found themselves being urged into support for the Scottish community in 1650 by their Scottish wives, Elisabeth Robertson and Margaret Spalding. Similarly the Swedish noble wives of Scotsmen may equally have been pressured to raise 'Scottish' issues with their families (either during the Bishops' Wars of 1639–40 or the Montrosian campaign of 1650). Such Swedes must have included Nils Asserson Mannersköld as three females in his family were married to Scottish officers.⁸⁵

⁸² 13 December 1623, James Spens to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, Anglica 5. Spence recommended Robertson to the Chancellor with regard to translating a letter Spens had written to him in Scots.

⁸³ 9 May 1635, Naturalisation patent for Sir John Skyte (sic) under the Great Seal of Scotland, SRA, Depositio Skytteana, A:5, E5412.

⁸⁴ *SBH*, II, 473–4.

⁸⁵ These were (with husband's name in brackets); Anna Mannersköld (Alexander Forrat); Catherina Mannersköld (Patrick Ogilvie); Marta Mannersköld (William Philp); for the importance of Nils Assersson Mannersköld see *SBL*, XXV, 94–96. He had an elder half-brother, Christopher Asserson "Mandskioldh". Some of the other 'Swedish' women married to Scots in 1650 alone included Margaretha Becker (Patrick Kinnemond, William Barclay); Barbera Maria Dress (James Leijel); Elizabeth Edger/Edgen (Henry Primrose); Maria Grooth (Andrew Boij); Maria Lilleram (James Forbes); Elizabeth Segolsdotter (John Belfrage); Anna Stråle (Carl Netherwood); Anna Svinhufvud (Simon Stewart).

It was probably the very interspersed nature of Scottish integration into Swedish society that allowed for their success. The Scots did not form one large, consistent and distinctly visible — and thus possibly suspect — pressure group. Their impact came from networking, from making a success of themselves by supporting and indeed helping to develop their host society. This expansion of ‘Scottish’ influence reached the highest peak during the last decade of the Scottish-Swedish alliance. [See Snapshot 1650 below] The following chapters will reveal just how the Scots could and did use their positions of influence to channel Swedish opinion into supporting diplomatic and military action in the British Isles not once, but twice in a dozen years.

*Snapshot of Scots in Sweden 1600**Citizens*

Ernald Forbes, Borgå
 William Hamilton, Karlstad
 William Moncrief, Marstrand
 Thomas Ogilvie, Nyköping
 James Reid, Nya Lödöse
 Hans Waterston, Stockholm
 Andrew Stuart, Stockholm

Civic/Government Officials

Henry Camhus, governor at Nyköping Castle
 Ernald Forbes, tollman in Borgå
 Patrick Gordon, tutor to Gustav Stenbock
 Andrew Stuart, governor at Fellin and Dorpat

*Snapshot of Scots in Sweden 1640**Citizens/Residents*

John Belfrage, Bratte
 Andrew Boij, Stockholm
 Alexander Clerk, Stockholm
 David Feif, Stockholm
 Donald Feif, Stockholm
 George Garden, Stockholm
 James Gardner, Stockholm

 William Guthrie, Stockholm
 William Halliday, Stockholm
 William Hay, Stockholm
 James Henderson, Stockholm

 John Kinnemond, Stockholm
 James Maclean, Stockholm
 James Porteous, Stockholm
 John Carnegie, Gothenburg
 John Maclean, Gothenburg
 James Merser, Gothenburg
 Henry Sinclair, Gothenburg
 John Spalding, Gothenburg
 William Gardner, Åbo
 James Guthrie, Vesterås
 James Campbell
 Margaret Forat
 Christina Gray
 Catherine Guthrie
 Elin Lindsay
 Catherine Murray
 Elin Ramsay
 Isabella Spens
 Christina Scott
 Anna Stuart
 Marta Stuart
 Christina Stuart
 Sophia von Enstroph, wife of
 Alexander Andersson

Civic/Government Officials

Andrew Boij, councillor, Stockholm
 Alexander Erskine, *krigsråd*, Stockholm
 Jacob Scott, court gentleman, Stockholm
 Bengt Skytte, *kammarråd*, Stockholm
 Jacob Skytte, judicial president, Stockholm
 William Spens, Riksdag member, Stockholm
 John Maclean, councillor, Gothenburg

 Henry Sinclair, customs officer, Gothenburg
 John Spalding, councillor, Gothenburg
 John Young, councillor, Gothenburg
 Peter Bursie, councillor and postmaster,
 Gothenburg
 Jons Smith/Rosenschmit, *landsekreterare* Åbo
 John Gunn, governor, Ohlau

Nobility

John Forbes of Lund
 Maurice Macdougall
 Maria Neave
 William Philp
 John Ramsay
 James Robertson
 Jons Smith/
 Rosenschmit
 Bengt Skytte
 Jacob Skytte
 Andrew Stewart
 Simon Stewart

Torsten Stålhandske

*Snapshot of Scots in Sweden 1650**Citizens/Residents*

Andrew Boij, Stockholm
 Alexander Buchan, Stockholm
 Peter Chambers, Stockholm
 Alexander Clerck, Stockholm
 Donat Feif, Stockholm
 James Forbes, Stockholm
 George Garden, Stockholm
 James Gardner, Stockholm
 Albert Guthrie, Stockholm
 Walter Guthrie, Stockholm
 William Guthrie, Stockholm
 William Halliday, Stockholm
 James Henderson, Stockholm
 John Kinnemond, Stockholm
 Robert Kinnemond, Stockholm
 David Leyell, Stockholm
 William Lindsay, Stockholm
 James Maclean, Stockholm
 Jacob Porteous, Stockholm
 John Primrose, Stockholm
 James Semple, Stockholm
 William Strang, Stockholm
 Daniel Young, Stockholm
 John Carnegie, Gothenburg
 Thomas Hunter, Gothenburg
 James Kinnaird, Gothenburg
 John Maclean, Gothenburg
 Henry Sinclair, Gothenburg
 John Spalding, Gothenburg
 John Hython, Norrköping
 Jacob Spalding, Norrköping
 Hans Gahn, Falun
 John Belfrage, Vänersborg
 William Bellenden, Stockholm
 Archibald Hamilton, Stockholm
 Margaret Buchan
 Elizabeth Clerck
 George Crawford
 Elizabeth Forbes
 Margaret Forat
 Christina Gray
 Catherine Guthrie
 Elizabeth Kinnaird
 Elin Lindsay
 Isabella Muschamp
 Margaret Muschamp
 Catherine Murray
 Patrick Ogilvie
 Elin Ramsay
 Ebba Ramsay
 Elizabeth Robertson

Civic/Government Officials

William Bellenden, Stockholm
 Andrew Boij, Stockholm
 James Mackler, Stockholm
 James Robertson, Stockholm
 Jane Ruthven, lady-in-wating, Stockholm
 Bengt Skytte, *Riksråd*, Stockholm
 Andrew Stuart, Stockholm
 John Maclean, Gothenburg
 Henry Sinclair, Gothenburg
 John Spalding, Gothenburg
 Benedictus Fistulator, Norrköping
 John Hython, Norrköping
 James Spalding, Norrköping
 Peter Bursie, Jönköping
 Jacob Skytte, governor, Östergötland
 Arvid Forbes, Pomerania
 Patrick More, Buxtehude
 Robert Douglas, Schwabia
 Thomas Kinnemond, Nyenmünde
 Alexander Forbes, Pomerania

Nobility

William Barclay
 John Bordon
 Hans W. Clerck
 Richard Clerck
 Robert Douglas
 Johan Drummond
 Alexander Forath
 James Forbes
 Peter Forbes of Lund
 Robert Gardner
 Albert Gladstone
 Alexander Irving
 James King
 Thomas Kinnemond
 Jacob Lenck
 John Lowrie
 Maurice Macdougall
 John Maclean
 Maria Neave
 Carl Netherwood
 John Netherwood
 William Philp
 John Pott
 John Ramsay
 James Robertson
 Patrick Ruthven
 George Scott
 James Scott
 Francis Sinclair
 Bengt Skytte
 Jacob Skytte
 John Urquhart
 Paul Wood

*Snapshot of Scots in Sweden 1650 (cont.)**Citizens/Residents*

Christina Robertson
Maria Robertson
Christina Scott
Regina Sinclair
Elizabeth Spalding
Christina Spalding
Margaret Spalding
Johanna Spalding
Margaret Stewart
Anna Stuart
Martha Stuart
Catherine Stuart
Johann Sutherland
Anna Seitserf
Sophia von Estorph

*Civic/Government Officials**Nobility*

PART TWO

SWEDEN AND SCOTLAND

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CHAPTER SIX

THE UNOFFICIAL ALLIANCE RECIPROCATED: SWEDEN AND THE BISHOPS' WARS, 1638–1640

Och såsom den Skottske nationen haffver nu ifrån een rund tijd, vid pas 60 åhr, hafft stoore kundskaper och umgenge med oss, och en god deel af bemälte Skottske nation bevijst vår framfarne Konungar och Chronan berömelige tienster, att och för denne skull dess lycha och välstånd haffver icke mindre varit oss önskelig än den Skottske nationen sielfver¹

The previous chapters have described the developing Scottish-Swedish relationship as largely one sided. True, for over a century Sweden had been able to draw on Scottish manpower for her numerous and largely successful wars, whilst Scotland's main benefit from the relationship occurred on a smaller, more individual scale. The return migration of some of these people with their wealth meant that for particular soldiers and families the reward earned through promotions, the granting of land, or ennoblement in return for service was further spread to Scotland. However, in terms of the Scottish role in providing manpower to help build the early modern Swedish state and empire, it appears that it was not until the Presbyterian Covenanted revolution of 1638–1641 — and the subsequent Bishops' Wars — that the Swedes returned the favour. The extent of Sweden's involvement in domestic Scottish politics during this time is unprecedented in the history of Scottish-Swedish relations. It also, arguably, outstrips any other similar foreign intervention in Scotland in terms of importance.

When Charles I tried to introduce changes to religious practices in his kingdoms they were viewed by some Scottish clerics as threatening to the integrity of the religious and civic institutions of the Scotland. Not only did this rebellion become organised into the 'Tables', which embodied a form of governing authority in Scotland, but ultimately the rejection of Charles' policies led to preparations for war in 1638.²

¹ 8 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 98.

² D. Stevenson, 'The financing of the cause of the Covenants, 1638–1651', in *Scottish Historical Review*, vol. li, 2, no. 152, (1972); D. Stevenson, *Scottish Covenanters and Irish Confederates* (Belfast: 1981); M. Lee jnr., *The Road to Revolution: Scotland under*

Scottish soldiers abroad were recalled because there was no body of trained men in Scotland with which the Covenanters could build an army in Scotland due to 60 years of relative peace in the country.³ The majority of the population and ruling elite were strongly attached to their Presbyterian confession of faith and, as already mentioned, many had fought in the name of the reformed religion across Europe. These people were mobilised by hard-line activists not prepared to tolerate what they perceived as a reversion to Catholicism as offered by Charles' Anglican reforms. Several of the opponents to these changes had served in Sweden and let it be known there that they would not sit idly by as the reformed religion in their native country came under threat. As part of this opposition Scotland sent out commissioners seeking foreign support, including the radical missions of the Scottish envoys Field Marshal Alexander Leslie and Colonel John Cochrane. The ensuing debates in the Swedish Riksråd concerning both Leslie's and Cochrane's missions were extraordinary: they for the first time made public a definition of Scottish national identity. These discussions of intellectual and military opposition to King Charles' reforms presented the Scots' view of themselves as separate from the inclusive British version pressed by the House of Stuart to a foreign audience. This would not have come as a total surprise to the Swedes who had long been aware of the multi-national complexity of the British kingdoms.

The Swedes listened attentively to these personal supplications but had to consider them in the light of their formal relations with the House of Stuart. By 1638 official Stuart-Swedish relations, which had long been unsatisfactory to the Swedes, were further weakened by revelations of Charles I's resumed negotiations with Spain.⁴ Charles had

Charles I 1625–37 (Illinois: 1985); D. Stevenson, *The Covenanters, the National Covenant and Scotland* (Edinburgh: 1988); J. Morrill (ed.), *The Scottish National Covenant in its British context 1638–51* (Edinburgh: 1990); A.I. Macinnes, 'Covenanting, revolution and municipal enterprise', in J. Wormald, (ed.) *Scotland Revisited* (London: 1991); A.I. Macinnes, *Charles I and the making of the Covenanting movement 1625–1641* (Edinburgh: 1991).

³ E. Furgol, *A Regimental History of the Covenanting Armies 1639–1651* (Edinburgh: 1990), 1.

⁴ 13 September 1638, *SRP*, VII, 308: "Aff Engelandh haffve vij hvarken reat subsidium eller penningar hafft". For Spanish negotiations see Worthington, 'Alternative Diplomacy? Scottish exiles at the courts of the Habsburgs and their allies, 1618–1648', in Murdoch ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 51–76. See also E.A. Beller, 'The Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to the conference at Hamburg, 1638–40', *English Historical Review*, vol. xli, (1926), 62. See also K. Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I* (New Haven and London: 1992), 70–82.

also recently renewed his confederation with the Oldenburg kingdoms, thus placing the Stuart in favourable relations with Sweden's two major enemies.⁵ By 1640 the Swedes felt they were suffering daily affronts at the hands of the Danes and expected all-out war at any time.⁶ The Covenanting missions to Sweden thus coincided with the perception of a combined onslaught of threats from Charles I, Denmark-Norway and Spain. Sweden saw the advantage of having a destabilising influence in the British Isles by supporting the Scots against Charles, particularly due to his renewed alliance with Denmark-Norway.⁷

The influence of the personal relations between Scottish officers in Swedish service and the Riksråd thus proved extensive. Charles had perhaps counted on these men to take his side in the Scottish developments, but he soon found to his dismay that concerns other than royal authority held sway with the majority of them.⁸ A few famous veterans of Swedish service rallied to him such as the Marquis of Hamilton and Sir Patrick Ruthven, both of whom had left Swedish service prior to 1638, and James King. Even the latter did not return to Britain and took no active role in the wars, and as such his support for Charles cannot be deemed significant. In contrast, Field Marshal Alexander Leslie was well supported in his appeal for men to return to Scotland and join him in defence of their country.

⁵ *Danmark-Norges Traktater*, eds. L. Laursen and C.S. Christiansen, (11 vols., Copenhagen: 1907–1949), IV, 191–199; PRO SP81, XLV, f.244, 12 April 1630 Thomas Roe to John Coke. The original alliance had been created in 1589 when King James VI married Princess Anna of Denmark-Norway.

⁶ 27 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 158: “Danmark, af hvilken vij nu dageligen lijda affronter och förvänta inthet annat än itt uppenbare krig af honom”. Oxenstierna, like much of the Swedish nobility, believed that every move Christian IV made was directed against Sweden, see 21 January 1638, *SRP*, VII, 436: “Kongen all den allianse han giöra, giöra han intet mott Kejsaran uthan mott oss.” Sweden's distrust of Denmark was known internationally: Maurice of Orange at one time believed that the Swedes would rather submit to Sigismund of Poland than to Christian IV, see Jansson, et al., eds., *England and the North*, 52.

⁷ By 1639 England and Denmark-Norway were believed to be in league against France, the United Provinces and Sweden, and the Riksråd undertook secret negotiations with Holland to counter this feared alliance, see 14 August 1639, *SRP*, VII, 571.

⁸ For example, Sir John Seaton, a Scottish colonel in the Swedish army openly informed Charles that he could not bring himself to serve the king against his native kingdom, *The Letters and Journals of Robert Baillie, A.M. Principal of the University of Glasgow MDCXXXVII–MDCLXII*, ed. D. Laing, (3 vols., London: 1844), 72.

The Leslie Connection

By 1638 Leslie had been in Swedish service for thirty years, during which time he had become a loyal and trusted servant of the Swedish Crown. For personal reasons regarding issues of inheritance, he became keen to return to Scotland from October 1637 onwards and he certainly left Stralsund for Scotland by 1st January 1638.⁹ It is more than likely therefore that he was in Scotland before or at the time of signing the Covenant on February 28. Once home, Leslie remained in contact with the Swedish Chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna, and the first surviving letter of his from that period, dated June 1638, refers to a previous letter explaining his two month delay in Edinburgh. Leslie detailed the relations between the Scots and Charles I, including the threatened excommunication of the Episcopalian clergy, and he clearly stated that the two causes of conflict in Scotland were religion and national liberty. A copy of the National Covenant was also included for Oxenstierna's scrutiny.¹⁰ This letter was read out in the Riksråd meeting on the 28 June and the issues of national and religious freedoms in Scotland came to be repeatedly debated in the Riksråd.¹¹

Leslie left Scotland for Sweden at the end of July, before the Glasgow Assembly had been held where the Covenanting movement was confirmed as the leading political power in Scotland.¹² At this time the Swedish State Marshal, Jacob de la Gardie, told the Riksråd of Leslie's desire for a swift decommissioning from Swedish service. In order to undertake military service in Scotland he had to return before Charles I's proposed naval blockade of the Scottish coast was implemented.¹³ As early as June 1638, the Marquis of Hamilton

⁹ 1 June 1638, *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 480–1. The letters of Johan Baner to Axel Oxenstierna from 29 October, 4 November 1637 and 1 January 1638 in *RAOSB*, VII, 460, 467 and, 487–8. See also 19 February and 16 April 1638, *CSPV*, XXIV, 373 and, 398. Macinnes noted that Leslie was attending the Marquis of Hamilton at Dalkeith in July 1638 in *Charles I*, 191. For a copy of the Scottish National Covenant see *The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625–1660*, ed. S.R. Gardiner, (Oxford: 1899), 124–134.

¹⁰ 1 June 1638, “Exemplar illius confessionis et foederis, cui subscripserunt omnes regni incolae praeterquam papistae et Regis officarii”, *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 480–1. It appears that Leslie also brought another copy with him to Sweden, see 28 July 1638, Swedish government to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, Oxenstiernska samlingen, E722. As yet neither document has been found.

¹¹ 28 June 1638, *SRP*, VII, 252: “de motibus Scotiis . . . religionem et libertatem patriae”.

¹² Macinnes, *Charles I*, 189.

¹³ 28 July 1638, *SRP*, VII, 272. See also 28 July 1638, Swedish government to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, Oxenstiernska samlingen, E772.

noted that: “[the Covenanters] ar still sending for more armes and amunitioun not onlie from Hollen but lykuys from Hamburg, Breme, Lubick, Dansick, and Sued, that if one part should fail they may be suppleud from ane other”.¹⁴ The marquis correctly understood the degree of support the Scots were likely to receive from Sweden. Within a week of Leslie’s initial enquiries, Oxenstierna not only agreed to Leslie’s request for release but more importantly to his request for artillery.¹⁵ The Swede advised that the artillery should follow Leslie as though it were an advance on his salary, as it would not do for Sweden to be seen to be subverting Charles I’s authority. Although the Chancellor was displaying a superficial concern for Sweden’s relations with Charles, his immediate reaction had been to respect Leslie’s requests for support. However losing a field marshal like Leslie was not a welcome option for the Swedes who were still fighting campaigns in the Holy Roman Empire, and so the Riksråd resolved to debate the issue of Leslie’s release with Oxenstierna.

Several discussions followed over the next two weeks, with the most intensive debates taking place on 9 and 10 August. First they pondered Leslie’s written submissions. They felt that his request for decommissioning could not be refused due to his lengthy and faithful service and also because he was well-liked among the councillors. From the beginning the personal friendship between the Swedes and Leslie was highlighted. The Riksråd understood that it was *solus amor patriae*, the love of his country alone without hope of reward for his actions, which forced his decision. They conceded that Leslie also had personal concerns in Scotland, having placed all his earnings from Swedish service into land there, and that his son had also married into the nobility there.¹⁶ It was also remarked that if Leslie and his fellow officers were refused permission to leave, they would only become unwilling servants of the Swedish Crown thereafter. Leslie admitted that he was prepared to take temporary leave if the Swedes could not let him go permanently, but he vigorously argued that it was imperative that he return to Scotland in order to defend it.¹⁷

¹⁴ 24 June 1638, NAS, GD406/1/10491; S.R. Gardiner, ed., *The Hamilton Papers, being selections from original letters in the possession of his grace the Duke of Hamilton and Brandon* (London: 1880), 17.

¹⁵ 2 August 1638, *SRP*, VII, 274.

¹⁶ Alexander Leslie junior was married to Margaret Leslie, daughter of John, Fifth Earl of Rothes, see *The Scots Peerage*, Balfour Paul, V, 378.

¹⁷ 9 August 1638, *SRP*, VII, 276. As for Leslie’s military responsibilities, it was agreed that these could be taken over by the competent General Johan Banér, for as long as Leslie was absent.

The Riksråd was very aware that by supporting Leslie it not only ran the risk of offending Charles I, but also of being seen as the funder of the civil unrest in Scotland. Releasing Leslie from Swedish service before his return to Scotland was integral to minimising the impression that Sweden condoned the use of arms against Charles I. However the risk was deemed to be worth the potential benefits, particularly given the suspected pro-Danish attitude in the Stuart court. If Charles gained the upper hand in Scotland, some of the Riksråd felt that he would become an enemy of Sweden. Thus the Scots were considered to be important allies for Sweden should they enter war with England. As for the weapons Leslie requested, the Riksråd agreed that these could be provided under the pretext of reward for lengthy service.¹⁸

The next day the Riksråd summoned Leslie so that he could address them personally. He reassured the Swedes that as soon as Scotland was at peace he would return to serve the Swedish Crown. This had the desired effect and the councillors granted his requests in honour, they said, of the respect Leslie showed for his native land. The artillery supplies Leslie requested were to be provided privately by a merchant who would obtain them from the Crown. Not only would he receive 2,000 muskets, but also copper could be supplied for crafting weapons in Scotland, which the Swedes hoped to get in return. The Swedish military council authorised the delivery of 200 muskets with accompanying pieces through the Scottish merchant in Stockholm, James Maclean, for Leslie's use. The rest would be arranged through his relative, John Maclean at Gothenburg.¹⁹ When Leslie took his final leave of the Swedish government on 22 August he thanked the Riksråd for all its affection and reiterated his promises of a swift return to Swedish service.²⁰

Indeed not only were the Swedes willing to help the Scots but they would not even allow this help to be taxed, as in early October the Riksråd decided to allow them to go toll free.²¹ Reports of two Swedish

¹⁸ 9 August 1638, *SRP*, VII, 276–7.

¹⁹ 10 August 1638, *SRP*, VII, 278–9. These Macleans were known in Sweden as 'Macklier' or 'Mackler'. Relying on the Macleans was no new method for dealing with Scots and supplies. Already in 1635, the clergyman Eleazer Borthwick obtained his wages through James Maclean for negotiating on behalf of the Marquis of Hamilton and Charles I with the Riksråd. See 8 August 1635, *SRP*, V, 127.

²⁰ 22 August 1638, *SRP*, VII, 289. There is a copy of queen Kristina's letter of decommission for Field Marshal Leslie dated 14 August 1638, NAS GD26/section 13/G/322.

²¹ 12 October 1638, *SRP*, VII, 326–7.

ships arriving in Leith harbour laden with military supplies surfaced in November.²² To prevent any further shipments, the Marquis of Hamilton suggested that all Stuart agents and ambassadors should be employed to stop this, particularly through the help of Christian IV, who could ensure ships could not leave the Sound. Alternatively it was argued that Charles could place one of his own ships at Helsingör to intercept ships from Lübeck, Sweden or Danzig.²³ In both these plans it seems that Christian IV did little to support his nephew.²⁴ In contrast Sweden was viewed by the Scots as “fullie ours to have granted us all the help they could spare from Germanie”.²⁵

Despite military operations in Scotland beginning in March 1639, some of the Swedish supplies did not get through initially. One of James Maclean’s ships was halted by the Danish navy in April with a weapons cargo bound for use in Scotland. The goods were eventually allowed to carry on to the Dutch Republic after the Swedish resident in Denmark promised they would not be used by any other state, and from there they were probably sent on to Scotland.²⁶ Other supplies did not get through at all. In May 1639 the Royalists captured at least one ship destined for the Covenanters — it had sailed from Bremen and contained many of Leslie’s former officers from Swedish service, and their families.²⁷ The search for supplies had been ongoing

²² PRO SP81, XLV, f.311, 7 December 1638, Thomas Roe to John Coke. The weapons carried were ten field pieces, two half cannon and 100 iron bullets for each. The Earl of Stratford noted that Leslie had obtained 15 brass cannon, 4,000 corselets and 1,800 muskets, see Beller, ‘The Mission of Sir Thomas Roe’, 73.

²³ Gardiner, *Hamilton Papers*, 17.

²⁴ Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 98–110.

²⁵ Laing, *Baillie’s Letters*, I, 191.

²⁶ 26 April 1639, Missive til Frederik Urne, *Kancelliets Brevbøger, 1637–1639*, ed. Marquard, 722–723. “Denne Thomas Gilmour, der tjener Jacob Makelius [James Maclean], har berettet, at han sidste Efterhøst kon fra Stockholm med 600 Musketter, 2,000 Bandolerer og 2,000 Stormhatte til Øresund. Da han med denne Munition agtede at sejle til Skotland, blev han anholdt i Øresund, og same Munition blev af deres Faktor oplagt i Helsingør. Han har nu begæret Tilladelse til at fore same Munition gennem Sundet til Nederland. Kongen tillader denne Thomas Gilmour at fore same Munition genem Sundet til Nederland efter hans eget Tilbud og ikke til Gottenborg, som først nu omtales og aldrig er omtalt. Den svenske Resident skal kaverer for, at same munition ikke føres til andre Steder end til Nederland”; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 104–110, particularly 105. Murdoch notes that either Christian IV was completely naïve or simply unscrupulous by this action which was bound to impact badly on his nephew Charles I.

²⁷ 20 May 1639, letter from the Marquis of Hamilton to Eleazer Borthwick, NAS, GD406/1/924 and 21 May 1639, letter from the Marquis of Hamilton to Sir Henry Vane, NAS, GD406/1/1193. A newsletter from May 1639 recounted the capture of another ship from Sweden laden with former officers of the Swedish army, see

since 1638. In October Charles I had his navy search all merchant ships in Scottish ports in a bid to discover clandestine cargoes of armaments, hoping in vain to find and apprehend Alexander Leslie.²⁸ However, the Field Marshal successfully ran the blockade and returned to Scotland to take charge of the Covenanting army and encouraged many fellow officers to follow him home.²⁹ Colonel Robert Monro was one of the first to do this, passing through the Danish Sound with his regiment aboard Swedish troop ships in February 1639.³⁰ At the end of May 1639 there was a whole group of Scottish officers seeking an audience with the Riksråd — out of the nine Scots concerned only one wanted to enter Swedish service. Five of them sought decommissioning and at least one of these, Colonel Harrie Lindsay, formed a regiment upon his return to Scotland.³¹

It is known that in the Army of the Covenant each lieutenant-colonel, major, ensign and sergeant had to be a professional soldier, and most of these would have seen service in the Swedish army.³² In all, over 300 Scottish officers departed from Swedish service between 1637–1640, forcing a reorganisation of the various British regiments in the Swedish army.³³ Not all those no longer in service left to join the Army of the Covenant — many were killed or captured

24 May 1639, *CSPD 1639*, 225–7. The account merely states that ‘divers Scotch officers who had cashiered themselves off the Swedish service’ had come from Bedame and were sent to Berwick.

²⁸ 1 October 1638, letter from the Earl of Roxburghe at ‘Seatoune’ to the Marquis of Hamilton, NAS, GD406/1/685. It was not until December 1639 that the Stuart agent Sir Thomas Roe informed the English secretary of State John Coke of “lieutenant general” Leslie’s acquisition of ships and munitions from the Swedes in July, and that it was shipped from Gothenburg, to avoid the Sound. Interestingly Roe noted that Charles was not aware of this, see Roe to Coke, 7/17 December 1638, PRO, SP81, XLV, fol. 311.

²⁹ These were the supplies that Leslie obtained personally in August, and which arrived in Leith in November. Leslie’s calls for “expert captains, commanders, and officers to attend service” are noted in J. Spalding, *The history of the troubles and memorable transactions in Scotland and England from 1624–1645*, (2 vols., Edinburgh: 1828–9) I, 88 and 99.

³⁰ 19 February 1639, Missive til Frederik Urne, *Kancelliets Brevboger, 1637–1639*, ed. Marquard, 672–3; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 104–105; For Monro’s first action in Scotland in March 1639 see Furgol, *Regimental History*, 34.

³¹ For a full analysis of the decommissioning of Scots see A. Grosjean, ‘General Alexander Leslie and the Riksråd Debates, 1638–1640’ in Macinnes, et al., eds., *Ships, Guns and Bibles*, 115–138. For the May contingent see 31 May 1639, *SRP*, VII, 524. For Lindsay see Furgol, *Regimental History*, 58.

³² Furgol, *Regimental History*, 2.

³³ 19 June 1639, Axel Oxenstierna to Johan Lilliehöök, SRA, Det odelade kansliet Riksregistratoret, 198, f.519 discusses the rebuilding of Scottish and English regiments.

by the imperialists.³⁴ That being so it is interesting to note that about 60 each of ensigns and lieutenants, over 40 captains, six majors, and 18 lieutenant colonels and colonels, and three major generals, as well as Field Marshal Alexander Leslie himself, actively departed from the Swedish army.³⁵ Not all of these were Covenanters, and Generals King and Ruthven were both active against their former colleagues. Nonetheless these figures do help to explain the professionalism of an army brought together from scratch. However, they also made the prospect of war a certainty.

In May 1639 Patrick Ruthven informed Oxenstierna that the Scottish lords were heading further toward rebellion every day without any attempt at reconciliation with the king, and were making the populace believe that Charles I was a papist.³⁶ With such accusations being spread, hostilities could not be far off. After the initial actions in Scotland against Edinburgh Castle, Leslie put out a general call to arms dated 28 May.³⁷ He had been appointed to command the army by the Covenanters' governing body, The Tables, whilst authorising national levies and local quotas and nominating colonels in Swedish style. His organisational skills led ultimately to Covenanting success over the Royalist forces led by the Marquis of Hamilton in the First Bishops War.³⁸ Although no major battles took place, the Covenanters

³⁴ There is inevitably a small margin of error: personal names were sometimes still listed in the muster rolls after the officer concerned had either died or departed from the army. When the catalogue of muster rolls was consulted for example Colonel Robert Monro's regiment and even his personal company are still listed as in service in Pomerania in April 1639. See KRA, Katalog över rullor 1638–1640, 151.

³⁵ Grosjean, 'General Alexander Leslie', in Macinnes, et al., eds., *Ships, Guns and Bibles*, 125.

³⁶ Ruthven also described the Marquis of Hamilton's arrival in Edinburgh with 30 ships, and Charles I's forces of 36,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, 8,000 volunteers across land and water. 7 May 1639, Newcastle, *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 392–3. When the Marquis of Hamilton was sent in place of Charles I to deal with calling a Scottish parliament, Ruthven informed Oxenstierna. 5 August, 1639, Edinburgh, *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 393–4.

³⁷ 28 May 1639, NAS, Mar and Kellie Papers, GD124/10/376. The situation between the king and the Scots was being widely discussed internationally, particularly between Swedish agents who would have had some role in co-ordinating Swedish support. For just a few examples see 15/25 June 1639, Hugo Grotius to L. Camerarius; 25 June 1639, Hugo Grotius to Axel Oxenstierna, and same author and date, to N. Van Reigersberch, *BHG*, X, 422–424. In the 25 June letter to Oxenstierna the editors have translated 'Scoti Regis Britanniae' as Karel I van Engeland!

³⁸ Leslie's skill as a commander was frequently noticed even by those in the field against him such as John Aston who said "The general was much good admired by his soldiers for his judgement in encamping and the good discipline of his men".

ultimately forced Charles I into a truce at Berwick and in September 1639 Queen Kristina apparently commended Charles I on making peace with his subjects.³⁹ Through his success, Leslie's reputation grew to such heights that one Scottish contemporary placed him as second only to the Swedish monarch in importance noting "Felt Marshall Leslie his Excellence . . . by his valour and good luke, attained to this title his Excellence, inferior to none but to the king of Sweden".⁴⁰

Charles I suffered military and political humiliation at the hands of the Covenanters due to their superior numbers, organisation and strategy developed in Swedish service. He was determined to reassert his authority, which led to his preparations for a second war during the early months of 1640. These preparations were evident on the Continent, as Christian IV noted the arrival in Glückstadt in early 1640 of Scottish colonels and captains who had been in Swedish service in Germany.⁴¹ In November 1639 Leslie informed Oxenstierna of the latest Scottish developments. The Scots continued to demand "la continuation de restablissement de la religion et de la liberté du royaume par des synodes libres de l'église générale et parlement de l'estat". Leslie maintained that although Charles had initially agreed to some of the Scots' demands, he had been dissuaded again by his religious advisors. Leslie stated that it was the repeated postponement of parliament and Charles' refusal to see the Scottish commissioners which had forced the issue. It was "la liberté fonda-

See 19 June 1639, J.C. Hodgson ed., *The Journal of John Aston, 1639* (Pallas Armata Reprint: 1999), 28. His leadership in this campaign was still remembered by the English four years later as when Sir Cheney Culpepper observed that if the English army "were leade on by a Generall, like Lesley in the Scots first expedition, not too wise (or greate) to be cowncelled, our affaires wowlde goe better on then they have lately done", 20 December 1643, Culpepper to Samuel Hartlib, HP13/22B-23B. See also Laing, *Baillie's Letters*, I, 192; Furgol, *Regimental History*, 3-5.

³⁹ These reports may have originated with Roe as a face-saving ploy on behalf of Charles, see 20 June 1639, John Coke to Thomas Roe, PRO SP81, XLVII, f.85 and 6 September 1639, Thomas Roe to unknown, PRO, SP81, XLVIII, f.12.

⁴⁰ Of course the fact that Sweden was then governed by a queen should have been obvious. See Spalding, *History of the Troubles*, I, 88; Gardiner, ed., *Hamilton Papers*, 95.

⁴¹ 10 February 1640, Christian IV to Korfits Ulfeldt, *KCFB*, IV, 300. Although Christian notes that "all" the colonels and captains were present, this seems highly unlikely given the number of officers who had already returned to Scotland. It is probable that the colonels and captains noted were General James King, Colonel Francis Ruthven, Lieutenant-Colonels James King, John Leslie, and H. Gladstone, and Captain William Ogilvie who had signed a certificate of weapons being transported to England from Hamburg in June 1639, see PRO, SP81, XLVII, f.102.

mentale” and “la preservation de leur liberté” which fuelled the Scots who now believed (or at least said they believed) that it was the English clergy and Catholics who caused Charles I to attack them by sea and by land, and was the cause for their reaction.⁴²

At a committee meeting of the Short English Parliament in April 1640 it was noted how the Covenanters were still able to access supplies from Sweden which even posed a threat to the very Crown of England.⁴³ This was not on the Covenanting agenda, but preparations were afoot in their camp for a new war against their monarch. Leslie was re-appointed to command the Army of the Covenant for the Second Bishops' War campaign in charge of an estimated 20,000 men.⁴⁴

Colonel Cochrane: Covenanter Envoy in the North

In April 1640, the Scottish Covenanting leadership sent out emissaries to those states they believed could help in their preparations for the inevitable renewed conflict between them and Charles I. William Colville and one Erskine were sent to France where they negotiated with Cardinal Richelieu through the unlikely conduit of the Scottish Jesuit, Abbot Thomas Chambers.⁴⁵ In return for support, France

⁴² SRA, AOSB, Alexander Leslie to Axel Oxenstierna, 18 November 1639. See also *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 483–5: “les prelates et papists d'Angleterre seront cause que le Roy nous attaque encore avec ses armées tant par terre que par mere. Cela fait que tout coeur loyal soit froisse de voir un Roy bouder contre son ancien et native royaume par les bouffeues de Rome. Cela anime l'esprit de chaque bon compatriot et enflamme les coeurs de chaque bon crestien pour mettre et sacrifier leur biens et leur vies pour la defence de leur religion et liberté selon le solennel pact qu'ils ont faict avec Dieu, lequel a esté approuvé et signé à la dernier assemblé par le deputé du Roy”.

⁴³ “The Scots are able to draw in the Goth and Vandalls and other great Armies; and when the Swedes are quiett for ought I know they may offer them the Crowne of England”, *Proceedings of the Short Parliament*, eds. E.S. Cope and W.H. Coates, Camden 4th series, vol. 19, (London: 1977), 77.

⁴⁴ For some interesting contemporary references to this army see *The Intentions of the Army of the Kingdom of Scotland, Declared to their Bretheren of England: By the Commissioners of the late Parliament and by the Generall, Noblemen, Barons and others, Officers of the Army* (Edinburgh: 1640); Spalding, *History of the troubles*, I, 195 and, 214. For the most comprehensive review of Alexander Leslie's campaign in England in 1640 see E. Furgol, ‘Beating the Odds: Alexander Leslie's 1640 Campaign in England’ in Murdoch and Mackillop, *Fighting for Identity*.

⁴⁵ Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 93. Murdoch cites 3 letters, of 4–5 May 1640, Cardinal Richelieu to M. de Chavingi in M. Avenel, ed.,

would be allowed to continue recruiting in Scotland for the campaigns against the Habsburgs.⁴⁶ Representatives were also sent to the Dutch Republic where Swedish agents reported back to Stockholm on their activity.⁴⁷ More directly, Colonel John Cochrane, a veteran of Swedish army, was chosen to represent the Covenanter committees on an official embassy to Scandinavia in April 1640, arriving sometime in July.⁴⁸

Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna informed the Riksråd on 8 July 1640 of Colonel Cochrane's arrival as a representative of the 'Directors of the Scottish League', the Swedish term for the Committee of Estates in Scotland.⁴⁹ Cochrane had several letters of accreditation, one for Queen Kristina, and two for Axel Oxenstierna. Of the two letters for Oxenstierna, one came from the Covenanters and the other from Alexander Leslie. Once again, albeit indirectly, Leslie engaged himself in a Covenanting mission to Sweden, more than just a familiar contact to lend credence to Colonel Cochrane's presence and requests, rather as a trusted guarantor.

Cochrane soon gained an audience with the Riksråd in the name of the 'directors of the Scottish people'.⁵⁰ Although he apologised on behalf of the Scots for not having informed the Riksråd of their domestic situation earlier, this was a formality as Oxenstierna was au fait with events in Scotland through his private correspondence with Leslie. Cochrane explained that the escalation of the discord had been caused by two issues. The first of these was that Stuart policy would re-introduce Catholicism in Scotland by the enforcement of new religious practises and offices. The Scots feared that something akin to a Spanish inquisition was close at hand.⁵¹ The second

Lettres, Instructions Diplomatiques, et Papiers D'Etat du Cardinal Richelieu (Paris: 1867), VI, 688–691; an attachment contains instructions to William Colville, representative of the Scottish Covenanters signed by Leslee, Mar, Louden, Forester, Rothes, Montrose and Montgomeri. See also M.V. Hay, *The Blair Papers* (London: 1929), Appendix VI, Richelieu and the Covenanters, 250–253.

⁴⁶ Glozier, 'Scots in the French and Dutch Armies during the Thirty Years' War', in Murdoch, *Scotland and the Thirty Years War*, 123–124.

⁴⁷ 14 April 1640, Hugo Grotius to L. Camerarius and 7 May 1640, N. Van Reigersberch to Hugo Grotius, in B.L. Meulenbroek, ed., *Briefwisseling van Hugo Grotius* (The Hague: 1981), 251 and 266.

⁴⁸ 8 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 97. For his credentials presented in Denmark see DRA, TKUA, Skotland A II 4, f.79a 14/24 of April 1640.

⁴⁹ 8 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 93.

⁵⁰ 8 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 93 "nomine Directorum gentis Scotiae".

⁵¹ 8 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 97 "Religionen och gudztiensten bliffver med några nya och papistiske stadgar förvänd; them påtränges emot deres kyrkiordning ovan-

concern was that the polity of Scotland was being altered: their laws and freedoms were being removed and the kingdom was being reduced to a province.⁵² Cochrane related how the Scottish Estates had united in opposition to this: the leaders were prepared to upset all that was dear to them in the name of God and Scotland. Cochrane reiterated that the Scottish Estates had not wanted to impose on the Swedish Crown, particularly in view of the great friendship and benevolence the Swedish monarchy had already shown Scotland.⁵³

Chancellor Oxenstierna accepted Cochrane's presentation on behalf of the Riksråd and crucially stated that he hoped for successful maintenance of the sixty-year relationship between Sweden and Scotland, particularly through the continued service of Scotsmen to the Crown.⁵⁴ For the first time, the Scottish-Swedish 'alternative alliance' was vocalised in the Swedish public domain and dated to having started around 1580. Oxenstierna then proceeded to state that he felt that this situation between the king in England and the Scottish nation was regrettable and Sweden should try to rectify it, although the form of support Sweden could take required much consideration, and would therefore be dealt with later. Before Cochrane left the Riksråd he emphasised that the Covenanters sought neither soldiers nor money, as both of these Scotland had in supply, but some ships with the relevant munitions. These were to be borrowed from Sweden and returned when no longer needed.⁵⁵

Although Oxenstierna urged impartiality in this development at the start of the closed Riksråd discussion, he also stated that nothing would be more dangerous than that the now united Scottish nation

lige officia, och alt dirigeres där hän, att man befructer ther inthet bättre än thet hade sig med inquisitione Hispanica". It is interesting to note that the Irish Confederates used very similar arguments, albeit in favour of Catholicism, in their search for foreign support a few years later, see Ohlmeyer, 'Ireland Independent', in Ohlmeyer ed., *Ireland from Independence to Occupation*, 97–99.

⁵² 8 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 97: "regnum blifver redigerat in formam provinciae".

⁵³ Cochrane flattered the Riksråd by saying that the Scots feared that Sweden would feel obliged to defend them, in view of the Swedish practise of defending those in need, and then Cochrane continued that the Scots were seeking help from a country to whom they were already in debt and would remain in eternal service and gratitude, 8 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 97.

⁵⁴ 8 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 98: "Och såsom den Skottske nationen haffver nu ifrån een rund tijd, vid pas 60 åhr, haftt stoore kundskaper och umgenge med oss, och en god deel af bemälte Skottske nation bevijsst vår framfarne Konungar och Chronan berömelige tienster, att och för denne skull dess lycha och välstånd haffver icke mindre varit oss önskelig än den Skottske nationen sielfver".

⁵⁵ 9 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 99.

should be oppressed into a state of confusion.⁵⁶ This was a sentiment he claimed to have shared with Alexander Leslie when he was still in the country. Oxenstierna believed that Charles I could settle the dispute by curtailing the influence of his clerics, applying moderation in his reforms and compromising a little. Charles might even gain English support against Scotland.⁵⁷ The chancellor thus decided to persuade Cochrane privately that immediate and especially hostile action was not prudent, but that selling ships and munitions was feasible.

It was not until 18 July that Oxenstierna revealed a private discussion he had held with Cochrane to the Riksråd. The Swedes had received information that the Scottish dispute was resolving itself and they therefore did not know how to proceed. Despite this, Queen Kristina's affection for and desire to support the Scottish nation had been passed on to Cochrane.⁵⁸ However, Cochrane denied that any amelioration between the Covenanters and Charles I had occurred, and emphasised that Charles I's decision to attack Scotland, once made, would unfold quickly.⁵⁹ Cochrane reminded Oxenstierna of the Scottish enthusiasm for Swedish military service and pointed out that it was Scotland's close relations with Sweden that had provided the Covenanting army with its officers.⁶⁰ Oxenstierna's reservations concerned placing Sweden in a compromising position between Charles I and the Scottish nation, and playing judge in a situation in which no other nation was involved. In addition, Sweden was at war and still on uneasy terms with her neighbours.⁶¹ In Cochrane's response he said that the Covenanters understood this, but if the English gained the upper hand over Scotland even Sweden would suffer for it, no doubt inferring a loss of manpower and crucial ally. He added (though probably overstated) that the Scots only requested munitions which were in very short supply at home, with hardly enough to

⁵⁶ 9 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 99: "inhet är farligare och meera att befructa, [än] att Skottske nationen, som nu henger tillsamman, bliffver förträn[g]t och således ligger alt omkull".

⁵⁷ 9 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 99: "Om Konungen i Engelland [...] vinna till sig the Engellska och exaggerera difficulteeterne i Skottland, skulle han snart venda theta spelet effter sin begäran".

⁵⁸ 18 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 118–9.

⁵⁹ This uncertainty as to the extent of hostilities between Charles and the Scots persisted throughout much of the debate. See 9 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 118–9. See also 27 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 158.

⁶⁰ 18 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 119.

⁶¹ 18 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 119.

see them in the field, let alone for defence at sea or in garrisons.⁶²

In response to Cochrane's statements, Oxenstierna presented the Riksråd with two items to decide: whether to undertake any action or not, and if so, what form that action would take and how to do it inconspicuously. Showing an astute commercial side, Admiral Klas Flemming suggested the use of Scottish merchants in Gothenburg again, who were not only capable and trustworthy, but would get the best price for the weapons being sold to the Covenanters.⁶³ Thereafter, Oxenstierna placed the Scottish developments into a wider European context. The Scots wanted to strengthen their longlasting alliance with France, which Charles I would take any opportunity to destroy. Oxenstierna described how war in Scotland would just be the first flame of a North Sea fire, which would engulf all neighbouring lands. This would draw strong naval powers like Spain and Denmark-Norway into the quarrel between Charles and the Scots.⁶⁴ Oxenstierna used the example of Holland to explain himself: had Spain successfully suppressed the Dutch Republic in her rebellion, all the neighbouring countries would have been forced into action to safeguard their own national integrity.⁶⁵

Cochrane was still waiting on a reply almost two weeks later when the Riksråd debated the Scottish issue again.⁶⁶ Oxenstierna publicly urged caution as it was still not certain which way the situation would develop. The Riksråd believed that should the war actually erupt, it would be an unfair one for Scotland with the smaller population.⁶⁷ When the Riksråd became split in its support for Scotland,

⁶² 18 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 120.

⁶³ 18 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 120. James Maclean had already been of service in 1635, when the cleric Eleazer Borthwick was negotiating on behalf of Hamilton and Charles I with the Riksråd. Borthwick obtained his wages through Maclean, 8 August 1635, *SRP*, V, 127. Three Scots held senior positions in the Swedish navy between 1639–1641 and were certainly in positions where they could influence Admiral Flemming. Holm-Admiral John Clerk was obviously a close associate. Vice-Admiral Simon Stewart had sailed with Flemming since at least 1627 and was highly respected. He also commanded a fleet of 19 ships to Germany carrying troops, and it is possible he commanded the fleet that took Monro through the Sound in 1639. For Simon Stewart's command of the 1639 troop fleets see Wendt, *Amiralkollegiets Historia*, I, 91.

⁶⁴ 18 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 120: "Kan nu eder Konung [Charles I] inthet med eder [the Scots] förlikas, så drages Konungen af Spagnien och Danemark uti spelet med".

⁶⁵ 18 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 120. Again, see 27 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 158 for a reiteration of these fears.

⁶⁶ 27 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 158.

⁶⁷ 27 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 159.

Oxenstierna departed from his neutral stance and put paid to any anti-Covenanting element present. He explained that either one tolerated civil unrest or one supported tyranny and general confusion, offering a clear insight into his personal view of Charles' actions. Oxenstierna, well briefed by Leslie among others, then delivered a brief history of the political changes in Scotland which had led to the Covenanting movement. Once Charles I had removed all apparatus of law from Scotland into England, leaving only the Privy Council, and even this only in name, all decisions were taken in England by the House of Lords, whose membership was by birthright only, and included clergy. Despite this and the placement of an archbishop as Chancellor, opposition to royal authority only began when the question of religion was broached, leading to the National Covenant. Oxenstierna believed that people in this situation could not be persuaded to remain quiet and obedient.⁶⁸ Finally, and most importantly, Oxenstierna made a comparison to Sweden's own history by stating that if the Swedes under Engelbrekt and Gustav I Vasa had not taken hold of their own situation they would still be under Denmark's yoke, just like Norway.⁶⁹ Oxenstierna had the Riksråd convinced, and it was resolved to aid the Covenanters with military supplies again through the Scottish merchants in Gothenburg and Stockholm.

In mid-August Cochrane informed Oxenstierna that the Covenanting army had marched into England and the ships, weapons and copper he had requested were required.⁷⁰ The Riksråd again discussed how England, and especially Charles I, had always been against the Swedes in their efforts in Germany, particularly by blocking the recruitment of Scottish soldiers either as individuals or in regiments. The Scots on the contrary had been in the Swedish Crown's service for many years, and even at the present time the finest gentlemen were to be found in the Swedish army. The councillors, like Oxenstierna, accepted that Scotland and Sweden had a special relationship and that the agenda differed considerably to that between the royal houses. The mood was not totally unselfish and they further conjectured that by

⁶⁸ 27 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 159: "nekar man, att subditi uti sådana fall inthet må tala, så bijfaller man och indrager een tyrannidem in rempublicam et rerum omnium confusionem".

⁶⁹ 27 July 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 160: "hade icke våre förfäder fattat een god resolution under Engelbrecht och gamble Konung Gustav, vij hade i thenne dag legat under Danmark med samma condition som Norrige"

⁷⁰ 18 August 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 217.

helping Scotland at that moment the Scots would be obliged to supply soldiers in the future.⁷¹ In any case, Cochrane's mission had been a complete success and he was to receive all the items requested on behalf of the Scottish nation.⁷² In addition, the Swedes agreed to provide ships to transport the goods for the Scots. Shortly thereafter five Swedish ships sailed from Gothenburg to Stockholm and returned through the Sound to the United Provinces. As yet no direct evidence has been found linking this convoy to Cochrane's mission, however the commander of the fleet sent on this mercantile trip was none other than Holm-Major Richard Clerck the younger.⁷³ In October the admiral reported that the five ships had safely come through the Sound without incident, and pointed out that this had never been achieved before.⁷⁴

Cochrane's presence in Sweden had impacted on many of the Scots still serving there. Just as in the previous two years, many petitioned

⁷¹ There is a hole in the parchment at the point where the Riksråd specified what Cochrane would receive from Sweden and the name of the merchant involved is also lost, *SRP*, VIII, 217. It was most likely either James or John Maclean, as with Leslie's mission. Indeed, Axel Oxenstierna who was in frequent contact with Leslie, had spent time with Maclean in his Gothenburg home in April 1639, leaving him well placed to discuss Scottish developments with Maclean. See Almqvist, *Göteborgs Historia, grundläggningen och de första hundra åren*, I, 348. In addition, it is interesting to note that two of Sweden's military factors at this time were the Scots John and Peter Bursie, see 14 August 1639 and 7 March 1640, KRA, Krigskollegium kansliet, Adressatregistratur till Krigskollegiets Registratur 1631–1654.

⁷² 18 August 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 217. Colonel John Cochrane received a gold chain of 200 kronor and 300 kronor in cash to cover his expenses during his stay in Stockholm. This was the norm for official envoys and proves that the Swedes had accepted the legitimacy of Cochrane's mission. See 28 August 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 243.

⁷³ Zettersten, *Svenska Flottans Historia*, II, 598–9; 8 September, *SRP*, VIII, 262. The sending of Swedish supplies to the Dutch Republic explains previous assumptions that the Covenanters received all their supplies from Holland. See for example Furgol, *Regimental History*, 3 and Furgol, 'Scotland turned Sweden: the Scottish Covenanters and the military revolution', in Morrill, ed., *National Covenant*, 137. See also Richard Clerck's letters to the admiralty from Amsterdam August 1640, KRA, Amiralitetskollegium kansliet, serie EIIA, fo. 125 and 128; the admiralty's instructions from July and August, KRA, Amiralitetskollegium kansliet, serie BIA, fos. 146, 176, 204, 216. This shipment, although it predates the conclusion of Cochrane's mission, is the only one noted at this period. If Clerck did carry supplies for Scotland this would imply either that Clerck was going to transport the materials regardless of official sanction, or that the admiralty had agreed in principal before the official agreement

⁷⁴ They were vulnerable to Danish confiscation in the Sound, as was a frequent occurrence at the time. See 29 August and 22 October 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 245 and, 299. Whether these ships were allowed through by coincidence or by collusion is unclear, see Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 100–110.

to return home to fight in the Army of the Covenant including Colonel David Leslie.⁷⁵ He left with Colonel James Lumsden and both men took commanding roles in the British Civil Wars throughout the 1640s. The Riksråd resolved to give each officer 200 muskets and 200 suits of armour as decommissioning payments and added that Lumsden should receive his annual pension in Hamburg, which would have facilitated the money's use for weapons acquisitions.⁷⁶ Lieutenant-Colonel George Monro was also authorised by the Riksråd to receive 2 months' salary as a parting gift.⁷⁷ Ironically, by the time these officers, their men and the Swedish weapons arrived in Scotland, Alexander Leslie had decisively defeated Charles Stuart's army at Newburn on 28 August 1640.⁷⁸ While militarily the mission had little impact on the campaign, through it the Scottish Covenanters had scored a massive political and diplomatic victory.⁷⁹

*Developments from the Swedish Military
Machine in the Covenanting Army*

Recent work has recognised the importance of the 'Swedish military model' in influencing the development and organisation of the Cov-

⁷⁵ Colonel Leslie's later departure was occasioned by his recuperation period after being wounded in Germany rather than indecision over which course of action to take. He received a pension relevant to a colonel and a gold chain for his long and faithful service, 10 August 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 186. The English ambassador Sir Thomas Roe informed Secretary Windebank that Colonel David Leslie, Colonel James Lumsden and 24 other 'men of note' were leaving Sweden for Scotland on the 1 November and that it should not be hard to detain them upon arrival, in *CSPD 1640-41*, 26 September 1640, 102. He was wrong.

⁷⁶ 5 August 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 184. Lumsden had already asked to be decommissioned in March 1639. Additionally, two months later Axel Oxenstierna authorised the promised supply of 100-150 ship's pounds of copper to Scotland, see 26 October 1640, Oxenstierna to Johan Oxenstierna, SRA Oxenstiernska samlingen, Johan Axelsson Oxenstierna av Södermöre, E978.

⁷⁷ 19 August 1640 and 25 August 1640, *SRP*, VIII, 220 and, 229. See also 16 August 1640, list of money to be paid to departing Scottish officers, SRA, Kammarkollegiet kansliet ca. 1618-1879, E II a brev och suppliker, 94, f.168.

⁷⁸ The Covenanter victory led to the Treaty of Ripon where Charles finally conceded to all the demands of the Covenanters. For the details see J. Bruce, ed., *Notes of the Treaty carried on at Ripon between King Charles I and the Covenanters of Scotland, A.D. 1640, taken by Sir John Borough, Garter King-of-Arms* (London: 1869).

⁷⁹ The Covenanters had also established that a rebellious 'faction' could gain international recognition and support in a manner that the Irish confederates failed to replicate, see Ohlmeyer, 'Ireland Independent', in Ohlmeyer ed., *Ireland from Independence to Occupation*, 99.

enanating army in Scotland.⁸⁰ Of course, the Swedish veterans brought their leadership abilities to the Army of the Covenant. However, not so well documented is the fact that Scottish officers developed some of the latest military hardware or tactics in the seventeenth century Swedish army.⁸¹ An important innovation of the early seventeenth century was the Swedish leather gun. Several people claimed a share in the development of this piece of ordinance, but two Scottish veterans of the Swedish army, colonels Robert Scott and Alexander Hamilton, were responsible for its impact on Scotland during the Bishops Wars.⁸² In Sweden the leather gun is seen as something of a failure and it fell out of use in the early 1630s.⁸³ While it is true

⁸⁰ See Furgol, *Regimental History*; Furgol, 'Scotland turned Sweden', in Morrill, ed., *National Covenant*; and Macinnes, *Charles I*, 191.

⁸¹ The Swedish veterans' contribution to the military advances within Scotland were not in isolation. In 1626, Captain William Douglas of the Dutch army applied for a patent for a gun with which, it was claimed "one trooper will shoot as many times as six do now". The Dutch authorities granted a patent protecting the invention for 20 years and on 22 January 1628, ordered their first consignment. Douglas also developed a cannon which could fire between three and five times to one shot from a conventional cannon. The Dutch Council of State encouraged its production and ordered its demonstration in a test action by a private naval force commanded by Douglas and his two brothers. See Ferguson, ed., *Papers Illustrating the History of the Scots Brigade*, I, 358–368.

⁸² In 1627, Colonel Robert Scott, as Quartermaster General of the Swedish army, claimed to have made significant advances in the design of the leather cannon over his rival, Melchior von Wurmbrandt. Not only did he claim a superior design, but he also offered to sell Gustav II Adolf the secret of how to fire the gun 500 times only having to reload on 10 occasions. When Gustav II Adolf refused to pay for the design, Scott entered the Danish-Norwegian army as General of Artillery, taking his designs with him. See Munthe, *Kungliga Fortifikations Historia*, I, 222; Åke Meyerson, *Läderkanonen Från Tidö i Livrustkammaren* (Stockholm: 1938), O. Blom, 'Smaa Bidrag til Artilleriets Historie under Kristian d. 4de: Robert Scott og Læderkanonerne', *Historisk Tidsskrift*, 3, (Copenhagen: 1900–1902), 332–44; Riis, *Auld Acquaintance*, II, 116. Scott was released from Danish service after the treaty of Lübeck in 1629 and became a Gentleman of the Bedchamber for Charles I. A Danish leather cannon can be found in Tøjhusmuseet in Copenhagen, whilst another type is kept in Livrustkammaren, Stockholm.

⁸³ Some argue that the unreliability of leather cannon implied the military backwardness of Scotland, citing the example of some 50 year old specimens in 1689 and the fact that they did not provide victory for the Covenanters at Dunbar and Worcester in 1650 and 1651 respectively, see G. Parker, *The Military Revolution: military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge: 1988), 33–35. This does not do justice to a weapon which the French knew as 'Canon à la Suedois' and continued to use until 1780, see Grant, *The Scottish Soldiers of Fortune*, 174. James Wemyss, Robert Scott's nephew, further developed the leather cannon through the Cromwellian occupation of Scotland and after the Restoration Charles II continued to sanction work on this weapon. Some of Wemyss' developments have been described as "far in advance of the artillery previously in use", *DNB*, XX, 1159–1161.

that such light weapons were inappropriate as siege weapons, they were very well suited for their intended role as mobile field artillery.⁸⁴ It has already been stated that “beyond question the size and efficiency of Leven’s Army was due to Hamilton’s remarkable ability”.⁸⁵ Scotland did not have any of the great siege fortresses of continental Europe, but the Scottish strongholds could hold out as long as those fortresses due to the topography of the countryside. In 1640, Edinburgh castle held out for three months in the face of the most modern siege artillery and was compelled to surrender due to a lack of victuals rather than the bombardment.⁸⁶ Perhaps more impressive was the defence of the ‘Honours of Scotland’ in Dunnottar Castle for nine months between October 1651 and 24 May 1652. Dunnottar held out against the New Model Army with the most token of garrisons (17 men) and only capitulated after the Scottish Crown Jewels had been smuggled through the English lines.⁸⁷ In Scotland a light piece such as the leather cannon was an asset over heavier calibres which often caused delays in the Scottish countryside, as the Marquis of Montrose found to his cost in 1650.⁸⁸ Montrose had successfully used Hamilton’s leather cannon on his expedition against Huntly in 1639, allowing for a rapid passage across Scotland in the First Bishops’ War.⁸⁹

Colonel Alexander Hamilton, known as ‘Dear Sandy’, was responsible for developing tactics for the leather cannon which played on its light construction and rapid mobility.⁹⁰ He is said to have taken

The leather cannon also formed an element of ridicule in 1632 when the Germans mocked the Swedes: “What you strumbling [strömning] eaters, have you eaten up all your leather-gunnnes for hunger?”, *The Swedish Intelligencer, The First Part*, 89.

⁸⁴ A positive British reference for this comes from the cleric John Durie, commenting on a new invention called Fermin’s Engine. Indeed, Durie uses the leather gun as the bench mark to test it against noting that “it shall shoot as farre as any leather ordinance whatsoever of the same bore” and the cannon of the engine shall not be heavier then leather ordinance and yet it shall be as lasting”. Note that Durie implies that the leather cannon has good range, is light and durable. See Durie’s Memo of Fermin’s Engine, no date (1640s), Hartlib Papers, HP 67/2/1a–b. Also D. Murray-Lyon, *The History of Freemasonry in Scotland* (Edinburgh: 1873), 90.

⁸⁵ P. Young, *Marston Moor 1644, the campaign and the battle* (Kineton: 1970), 79.

⁸⁶ W. Fraser, *Memorials of the Earl of Haddington* (2 vols., Edinburgh: 1889), I, 31.

⁸⁷ “Dunottar was surrendered to Colonel Morgann [. . .] after an investment of eight months’ duration”, Rev. D.G. Barron, ed., *In Defence of the Regalia 1651–2, being a selection from the family papers of the Ogilvies of Barras* (London: 1910), 33.

⁸⁸ E. Cowan, *Montrose For Covenant and King* (Edinburgh: 1995), 285. Montrose found his cannon too heavy and abandoned them before his defeat at Carbisdale.

⁸⁹ Sir Fraser, *Memorials of the Earl of Haddington*, I, 30.

⁹⁰ Fraser, *Earl of Haddington*, I, 28–33; C.B.R. Butchart, ‘Sir Alexander Hamilton, General of Artillery’, *Aberdeen University Review*, xlii, 4, (1968), 298. In 1638 Colonel

40 of them into England during the second Bishops' War in 1640 and deployed them in a number of ways that included arrangements in multiple batteries of two or four cannon for concentrated fire.⁹¹ These cannon were particularly useful against horses, particularly when loaded with musket balls, which is how the Swedes deployed them against the Poles.⁹² A most useful deployment occurred when Hamilton placed leather cannon in church towers at Newburn where they rained down devastating fire onto Royalist positions. No conventional artillery could have been deployed in this way and Hamilton's artillery has been cited as winning the battle for the Covenanters.⁹³ Not only that, but these weapons went on to make a very significant contribution to both sides during the British Civil Wars, being used in combat for the last time by the Royalists at the battle of Worcester in 1651.⁹⁴ The only problem with the leather cannon, as Sir Cheney

Alexander Hamilton wrote to Marquis Hamilton, denying charges of slander against the Marquis, and he is described as "the engineer who made the cannon for the army in the following year". See Gardiner, *Hamilton Papers*, 23 fn; Alexander Leslie, when in charge of the Covenanting forces advocated the casting of cannon in Germany by a Captain Hamilton, either a relation of Dear Sandy or a misrepresentation of his rank. See Spalding, *History of the Troubles*, I, 88.

⁹¹ 7 September 1640, Marquis Velada, Marquis Malvezzi and Don Alonso de Cardenas to Don Ferdinand, Archives du Royaume de Belgique, Bundle 377: Don Ferdinand; Correspondence avec les trois ambassadeurs ci-dessus nommes 1640–1641, f.163; Parker, *Military Revolution*, 35.

⁹² See 21 January 1645, Sir Cheney Culpepper to Samuel Hartlib, HP 13/65a–68b. The Polish army museum in Warsaw contains three cannon from 1627–1628 campaigns, including a 1.5 lb calibre falconette, a 12 oz. 'little falconette bastard' and a 10 oz. version, and their use against horses is highlighted.

⁹³ Murray-Lyon, *Freemasonry in Scotland*, 90; Fraser, *Earl of Haddington*, I, 31; Butchart, 'General Alexander Hamilton', 299; Blom, 'Smaa Bidrag til Artilleriets Historie', 333. Blom suggests that these leather cannon were taken to Scotland by Alexander Leslie in 1638. However, Blom does not mention the fact that Hamilton had been manufacturing the guns on the continent for Sweden and at Potterrow in Edinburgh for the Covenanters. See Fraser, *Earl of Haddington*, I, 27.

⁹⁴ Leather cannon were brought to the Parliamentary army by Sir James Wemyss, nephew of Sir Robert Scott, formerly of Swedish service. He was a gifted officer who took over his uncle's patent for the guns in England. See 1643 Samuel Hartlib's Ephemerides, Hartlib Papers, HP 30/4/86a–93b and 21 January 1645, Sir Cheney Culpepper to Samuel Hartlib, Hartlib Papers, HP 13/65a–68b. See also John Adair, *Roundhead General: A Military Biography of Sir William Waller* (London: 1996), 125, quoting *The True Informer*, 9 December 1643. The Royalists captured leather cannon from the Parliamentary army in 1644 at Cobedery Bridge which, according to one of the officers "proved very servicable to the King". See *Military Memoirs of the Great Civil War being the Military Memoirs of John Guyenne* (Edinburgh: 1822, Ken Trotman reprint, Cambridge: 1987), 42. For the use of the guns by Royalists at Worcester see M. Atkin, *Cromwell's Glory: The Battle of Worcester 1651* (Gloucestershire: 1998), 30–31. Atkin notes that about 16 leather cannon were used at Worcester, mounted in pairs which "put down a steady bombardment, especially

Culpepper put it, was that they were too far ahead of their time and not properly understood by the artillery man of the day who preferred only to stick to the weapons he knew.⁹⁵

Hamilton did not simply bring the leather cannon to bear on the Royalists during the Bishops' Wars, he also developed an integrated approach using light and heavy artillery when appropriate as well as a variety of other mines, petards and fireworks.⁹⁶ Hamilton was well versed in the most up to date fortification methods such as those at Leith "refortified in the latest and most approved manner in accordance with the most up to date schools of fortification".⁹⁷ In offence too, Hamilton brought the latest innovations from his experience in the Swedish army. During the Second Bishops' War, the Hardgate in Edinburgh was turned into a formidable siege fortification to attack Edinburgh Castle. Eight demi-cannon capable of discharging 36 to 40 lb shot formed the strongest of four batteries attacking the castle.⁹⁸ Hamilton also sent officers incognito to Berwick to size up the fortifications in advance of the Scottish attempt against that fortress, a move which showed the General's thoroughness, but on this occasion the officer was discovered and the Royalists alerted to the attempt on the castle.⁹⁹

Another veteran of Swedish service, Colonel Robert Monro, published the memoirs of his service in Denmark and Sweden in 1637, in time for the opening of the Bishops' Wars. This included a 41 page appendix detailing every aspect of training new soldiers and officers in drill, the organisation of companies and regiments, and even the quartering of an army in the field.¹⁰⁰ Monro released this text again

through the first phase of the battle", but added that the lack of experienced gunners was the reason the guns were not so effective as they might have been.

⁹⁵ 21 January 1645, Sir Cheney Culpepper to Samuel Hartlib, Hartlib Papers, HP 13/65a-68b. After noting that the guns were very effective against horses and for use in enclosed country, Culpepper stated "but those things (because newe), I expect not showd yet be taken up but may perhaps in another halfe age when they haue layen a while buried in mens thowghts, for we are not yet enough freed from a blind reverencing of whatsoever hathe beene soe as to cast it presently off when we find a better." Examples of British leather cannon can be seen in the National Museum of Scotland, Edinburgh and the Tower of London, England.

⁹⁶ Fraser, *Earl of Haddington*, I, 30.

⁹⁷ Fraser, *Earl of Haddington*, I, 30; Butchart, 'General Alexander Hamilton', 298.

⁹⁸ Butchart, 'General Alexander Hamilton', 299.

⁹⁹ Fraser, *Earl of Haddington*, I, 30. *Historical Manuscripts Commission, Ninth Report, appendix*, 250.

¹⁰⁰ Monro, *His Expedition*, II, 183.

in 1644 under the new title of *The Scotch Military Discipline Learnd From The Valient Swede*, emphasising the importance of Sweden to the military apparatus of the Covenanting Movement while manuscript versions of the text were also copied and distributed.¹⁰¹ Cowan noted that the Marquis of Montrose deployed Swedish tactics on several occasions during his 1644–45 campaign. Montrose had not served in Sweden himself so his knowledge of moves must have come from Monro or other Swedish veterans with whom he had served in 1639–40. There is also some debate as to whether the tactic known as ‘the Highland charge’ was a Swedish development. Cowan suggests that the single volley of the Highland charge, where soldiers advanced to within pistol shot, fire a single volley of all their weapons and then attack the enemy as they recover from the shock, developed from Gustav II Adolf’s manoeuvres.¹⁰² As noted in chapter three, this technique had already been employed at Breitenfeld in September 1630. Cowan also noted Montrose’s use of other Swedish defence moves, particularly “Gustav’s defensive tactic of interspersing horsemen and musketeers . . . one hundred of the latter being added to thirty horse”.¹⁰³ Swedish techniques were used against, as well as by the Covenanters.¹⁰⁴

Swedish influence in the Covenanting armies extended beyond the transference of discipline and the evolution of military technology. It even reached the core of the organisation of the army and civic administration. Furgol has shown that the Scottish central government, just like Sweden’s, established military districts, nominated colonels, authorised the levying of troops and established a system of quotas by shire. A body of war committees was established to co-ordinate

¹⁰¹ R. Monro, *The Scotch Military Discipline Learnd From The Valient Swede, And collected for the use of all worthy Commanders* (London: 1644). For example, *The Swedish Briggaed*, NAS, Airlie Muniments, GD16/52/14, ff.1–14 given as anonymous but actually copied word for word from Monro. Perhaps this was given out as a manual for new officers in the field. See Monro, *His Expedition*, II, 183 ‘an abridgement of exercise for the younger soldier his better instruction’.

¹⁰² Cowan, *Montrose*, 160. The Scot Alasdair Maccolla used a running Highland charge in Ireland in 1642. The tactic may have developed independently in both countries. See also P. Lenihan, “‘Celtic’ Warfare in the 1640s”, in J.R. Young, ed., *Celtic dimensions of the British civil wars* (Edinburgh: 1997), 128.

¹⁰³ Cowan, *Montrose*, 165.

¹⁰⁴ Scottish influences in the Swedish army extended beyond the Thirty Years’ War period as seen by the cavalry charge tactic developed by Sir Robert Douglas, called ‘charge en muraille’, see Grant, *Hepburn*, 252.

the shires and the central government.¹⁰⁵ The influence of the Swedish war machine permeated through to every level of Scottish military life with the returning manpower, the influx of new techniques and technology and the implementation of a national conscription and command structure.

Conclusion

During the time of the Bishops' Wars in Scotland, private Scottish-Swedish connections between Scottish veterans and the Swedish government took priority over Sweden's official contacts with the Stuart monarchy. In part Charles I's lack of effective and efficient military support to Sweden during her then 9 year campaign in Germany was to blame, and certainly his negotiations with two of Sweden's enemies did not meet with Swedish tolerance. When the crunch came, both in 1638 and 1640 the Swedish Riksråd had little difficulty or doubt about supporting the 'Scottish nation' against the Stuart king. The Riksråd debates reveal that the revolution in Scotland would have been almost impossible to achieve without the co-operation of the Swedes in three vital ways, particularly during the First Bishops' War. Sweden, through Chancellor Oxenstierna, was the first foreign state to acknowledge the Covenant and as such paved the way for later developments, such as international recognition by the Danes.¹⁰⁶ Secondly, the Swedish armies were prepared to release many of their trusted and experienced high-ranking officers to return to Scotland. The greatest Swedish aid came in the form of returning officers, highly experienced in recruiting, organisational, tactical and technological innovations of war to create as if from nothing the most formidable army in the three Stuart kingdoms.¹⁰⁷ Thirdly, Sweden twice provided the Covenanters with weapons, ships and other military supplies risking international condemnation.

¹⁰⁵ E. Furgol, 'The Civil Wars in Scotland', in J. Kenyon and J. Ohlmeyer eds., *The Civil Wars. A Military History of England, Scotland and Ireland 1638-1660* (Oxford: 1998), 42.

¹⁰⁶ Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 114-116. For the document which effectively ensures Danish neutrality see 10 November 1640, Christian IV to the Scottish Estates, DRA, TKUA Skotland, A I 4. f/79b.

¹⁰⁷ As Furgol pointed out, 32 out of every Covenanting army regiment's 70 officers needed to be experienced and trained officers, see 'Scotland turned Sweden', in Morrill, ed., *National Covenant*, 136.

Previously the Netherlands were thought to have supplied the Covenanters with most of their military support, and the factor Thomas Cunningham, based at the Scottish staple of Veere, did ship a sizeable military supply to the Covenanters in 1639.¹⁰⁸ However the Netherlands also functioned as a convenient base from which the Swedes could send their Covenanting supplies, to avoid arousing the suspicion of Christian IV, or any other interested party. Weapons transactions were similarly undertaken between Scots and Swedish merchants in the Netherlands, so undoubtedly supplies were obtained there.¹⁰⁹ Additionally, with many of the Scottish officers in active service on the Continent, the obvious route for embarkation toward Scotland would have been from Holland or the German coasts — again minimising the direct connection with Sweden, and blurring the fact that they had official permission to leave. These elements have helped to downplay the Swedish role in the Covenanting successes in Scotland. However, military supplies were twice officially, although not publicly, sanctioned by the Swedish government for the use of the Covenanters. Indeed, the Riksråd debates show that Swedish support went much further than that, both materially and intellectually.

Oxenstierna had always been a cautious politician, and his major concern at all times appears to have been defence of and the maintenance of Sweden's position of power in the eyes of the world.¹¹⁰ This caution was severely put to the test during the Covenanting times. By determining that Swedish military support for Scotland was necessary, the Riksråd validated Scotland's right to exist as a separate and independent entity from England. The Swedes accepted the Scottish polity as sacrosanct, even to the extent of supporting allegedly subversive subjects against their rightful sovereign. The issue was important enough to release many of the best officers from Swedish service at a time when Sweden had several campaigns going in Germany. Perhaps the Swedes' distrust of Charles Stuart played a role in their decision.

¹⁰⁸ See M.P. Rooseboom, *The Scottish Staple in the Netherlands* (The Hague: 1910), 175. The list of weapons include 12 great cannon, 49,982 lbs. weight of cannonball, 15,673 muskets, 18,013 bandoliers, 6,965 swords and 52 pairs of pistols.

¹⁰⁹ In 1641 for example, a merchant from Culross travelled to Amsterdam to meet with a merchant from Stockholm to buy 2,000 muskets and bandoliers for shipment to Leith: Gemeentearchief, Amsterdam, Notariele Archieven, 25 May 1641, NA 849, nr. 19. I am indebted to Professor Peter Edwards for this reference.

¹¹⁰ The flurry of letters to all the major courts thanking them for their efforts in obtaining the peace of Prague is evidence of this, see *SRP*, V, 180 and, 210.

The endeavours of Leslie and Cochrane to gain Swedish support revealed the many allies Scotland had in Swedish society. Not only did the Scots have Swedish friends in the Riksråd, and Scottish support in the military and navy, but also at Court and local government level. The presence of such a large number of Scots must have facilitated the bond between Scotland and Sweden. Certainly it explains the positive reaction of the Swedish aristocracy in supporting many of the Scottish officers to leave service and return home to fight their king. The departure of Scottish officers was neither random nor chaotic, rather they were systematically decommissioned by regiment and with the consent of the Riksråd. Victory was ensured in a campaign which otherwise may well have faltered due to a lack of military experience and provisions. More importantly, the Scottish-Swedish alliance of “60 years standing” had been proven to be a two way affair.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SWEDEN AND THE WAR FOR THE THREE KINGDOMS, 1641–1648

sakerne i Engelandh vore så förvirrade, det man då hvarken behöfde sufflaminera Parlementet emoot Kongen eller hielpa denne emoot de andre¹

Scottish-Swedish relations had never been more intense than in the period leading up to and during the Bishops' Wars. However this was all to undergo a drastic change as the political instability which had rocked Scotland spread into the two neighbouring kingdoms. Under General Alexander Leslie's military command, the Covenanters had not only ensured that Charles I came to terms in the Treaty of London, they also facilitated a radicalisation of politics in England.² Representatives of both the Scottish Estates and the English Parliament attended the treaty signing in 1641. Further, the Scottish Parliament itself underwent a radicalisation process which fundamentally enhanced its own powers at the expense of the king.³ The Covenanters and the English Parliament thereafter formed a working alternative to royal authority in their two kingdoms in the shape of parliamentary committees, formalising their leadership of Scotland and England. Despite this, the political situation in the Stuart kingdoms remained unstable and this new-found united non-royal authority was quickly put under pressure. The radical leadership in Scotland wanted to export the Covenanting revolution to England and Ireland to protect Scotland's

¹ 3 October 1646, *SRP*, XI, 467–8.

² That the Scots had allies in England could only spell disaster for Charles I. As Allan Macinnes has pointed out “only the presence of the Covenanting army in the north of England obliged Charles to summon parliament after an eleven year lapse. Only the security afforded by the Covenanting army allowed the English disaffected sufficient scope to press for the constitutional checks on a monarchy which safeguarded the English tradition of parliamentary sovereignty”, Macinnes, *Charles I*, 198.

³ J.R. Young, ‘The Scottish Parliament and European Diplomacy 1641–1647: The Palatinate, The Dutch Republic and Sweden’ in Murdoch ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 77.

religious freedom, but this assumed the existence of a common British approach to religion. This was of course not the case, and in each of the three Stuart kingdoms, a different confession of faith proved dominant.⁴

Although the Scottish Estates declared that they had no intention of challenging royal authority with their actions, the Scottish constitutional settlement of 1640–1641 had done just that. This resulted in serious divisions appearing amongst the Covenanters as early as June 1640, after the Estates passed a series of acts remodelling the relationship between the Scottish Kirk and State in a convention known as The Tables. This body, effectively the Scottish Parliament, had convened itself without royal authority.⁵ A figure who would soon play a specific role in Scottish-Swedish relations, James Graham, the fifth Earl, and later Marquis, of Montrose was distinctly unhappy at these developments and drew up the ‘Cumbernauld Band’ to which a minority of nobles attached their signature. The ‘Band’ was a Royalist group within the Covenanting Movement bound to “loyalty to their religion, king and country, and to resist the particular and indirect practicking of a few” where the Marquis of Argyll and his followers effectively became their enemy.⁶

This contributed to ‘the Incident’ in which Royalist sympathisers among the Covenanters planned to eliminate those they perceived to be the main obstacles to complete settlement with Charles I. The person ultimately found responsible for this episode was Colonel John Cochrane, newly returned from his successful mission to Sweden to gain arms for the Covenanters. After the Treaty of London he had joined the Royalists, as like many others he felt that the issue with the king had been settled, and so he became involved in an attempt to curb the power of the Duke of Hamilton and the Earl of Argyll.⁷

⁴ Russell, *Fall of the British Monarchies*, 69; J.R. Young, *The Scottish Parliament 1639–1661* (Edinburgh: 1997), 68.

⁵ Munck, *Seventeenth Century Europe*, 78; Cowan, *Montrose*, 92; Young, *Scottish Parliament*, 20–26. The second act of this Parliament removed the estate of the clergy from Parliament and the three estates now composed of the nobles, the commissioners of the shires and the commissioners of the burghs, Young, *Scottish Parliament*, 10–15 and 20–26.

⁶ Russell, *Fall of the British Monarchies*, 311–312. See G. Wishart, *The memoirs of James, Marquis of Montrose 1639–1650* (London: 1893), 20; Cowan, *Montrose*, 97; Young, *Scottish Parliament*, 26.

⁷ *HMC Fourth Report*, I, 163–170; *CSPD*, 1640–41, 137–139. Secret account by Nicholas of the pretended plot in Edinburgh against the Marquis of Hamilton and the Earl of Argyll, 14 October 1641; Balfour Paul, *Scots Peerage*, III, 343; Cowan, *Montrose*, 124–126; Russell, *Fall of the British Monarchies*, 322–328; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 118–119.

The plot was discovered and Cochrane imprisoned until, ironically, Hamilton and Argyll secured his release in early November.⁸ By then the Covenanting movement was internally factionalised and Charles I tried to use this situation by ennobling several Covenanters and taking some of them into his Scottish Privy Council.⁹

The unrest felt in Scotland between the contesting groups was worsened by the Irish uprising, which ultimately led to Scottish military intervention to prevent the spread of the conflict back into Scotland.¹⁰ News of the Irish war quickly reached northern Europe along with rumours of growing Scottish support for the English Parliament.¹¹ When hostilities subsequently broke out in England, through September and October 1642, the Covenanters under Argyll decided, as predicted, to support the English Parliament. This assistance was formalised in the Solemn League and Covenant between Scotland and England in September 1643, in a mainly military confederation not involving parliamentary union.¹² This was not universally accepted in Scotland and certain opponents, such as Montrose and his followers, waged war on the Covenanters from 1643 until

⁸ Balfour Paul, *Scots Peerage*, III, 343; Russell, *Fall of the British Monarchies*, 328; Wishart, *Memoirs of Montrose*, 37, footnote; M. Napier, *Memoirs of the Marquis of Montrose* (2 vols., Edinburgh: 1856), I, 276–277 and appendix lviii, lxii–lxiv. For an account of Cochrane's first meeting with the Royalist faction in the Hague see, Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 118–119.

⁹ Laing, *Baillie's Letters*, II, 9. Baillie noted that upon his release from prison, Cochrane had to contend with allegations of the theft and resetting of a Swedish Copper ship, all of which he denied. Some of his enemies wanted him hanged in effigy in his absence. In response, Cochrane removed himself to the King's camp at York where, Baillie noted, "He was weell received by the King, and sent over sea, for what it is not yet known; there was never a sojourn of his years of so great credite and expectation universallie in all our land, and now none universallie in such disgrace". Some historians feel that the Incident undermined Charles's political credibility, and that rewarding Covenanters with titles was a recognition of his impotence. See Young, *Scottish Parliament*, 40.

¹⁰ Stevenson, *Scottish Covenanters and Irish Confederates*, 74. Many former Swedish officers saw action in Ireland in 1642, such as David Leslie, Alexander Hamilton, Robert Munro, see Furgol, *Regimental History*, *passim*. For recent work on Ireland in the 1640s see R. Armstrong, 'Protestant Ireland and the English Parliament 1641–1647', unpublished Ph.D., Dublin, 1995; M. O'Siochrú, *Confederate Ireland 1642–1649, a constitutional and political analysis* (Dublin: 1999), and *idem*, ed., *Kingdoms in Crisis: Ireland in the 1640s* (Dublin: 2000).

¹¹ 13/23 November 1641, Joseph Averie to Thomas Roe, PRO SP75, XVI, f.111.

¹² 25 September 1643, 'A Solemn League and Covenant for Reformation and Defence of Religion, the honour and happiness of the King, and the peace and safety of the three kingdoms of England, Scotland and Ireland', Gardiner, *Constitutional Documents*, 267–271; *APS*, VI, 41, 66 and 106. The treaty between Scotland and England was ratified on 15 July 1644. See also Young, *Scottish Parliament*, 68.

the end of 1646. An attempt towards the confederal consolidation of the Solemn League was soon made in 1644 through the establishment of the Committee of Both Kingdoms to ensure closer co-operation between the two British states in a variety of matters including defence and foreign relations.¹³ Yet, as its 27 members only included six Scotsmen, the balance was firmly in England's favour and the Scots had lost their lead position in British international relations with Sweden. The following years would in fact see the English only superficially holding to their agreement to a common approach, despite having made a pact witnessed by God.

Unsurprisingly some of the most significant roles played by the Scots in the combined effort against King Charles I was of a military nature. The 20,000 strong Scottish Army of the Solemn League and Covenant, which gained numerous victories over Charles I and his supporters in England, was largely staffed by veterans of Swedish service. The army commander was Alexander Leslie, Earl of Leven, and two of the major generals were David Leslie (no relation), later Lord Newark, and James Lumsden. In addition, the General of Artillery was Alexander Hamilton, whilst lieutenant-general William Baillie and two of Lumsden's brothers, Robert and William also served in the army. Not only was Newcastle taken, but David Leslie led the crushing victory over the Royalists at Marston Moor in 1644.¹⁴ However, the presence of the Scots in England, and particularly their occupation of the Northeast of the country irked many of their English brethren. Further, the presence of Scottish armies in Ireland also rankled and the more Royalist strongholds fell, the less the Parliamentarians felt they needed (or wanted) their Scottish allies.¹⁵

The complicated nature of the new political situations within the

¹³ 16 February 1643/4, 'The Ordinance appointing the first Committee of Both Kingdoms', Gardiner, *Constitutional Documents*, 271–3.

¹⁴ Young, *Marston Moor 1644*, 78. Robert Baillie accredited Leslie with the victory, see *Baillie's Letters*, II, 209; G. Ridsdill Smith and M. Toynebee, *Leaders of the Civil Wars 1642–1648* (Kineton: 1977), 119. There is dispute about who actually won the battle, although Cromwell had already left the field with an injury before Leslie's decisive action took place. After Marston Moor Cromwell resolved to construct a new English army along Scottish lines, the New Model Army. See also *Reprints of rare tracts and imprints of ancient manuscripts chiefly illustrative of the history of the northern counties and printed at the press of A. Richardson, Newcastle* (Newcastle: 1847) containing documents pertaining to Scottish military operations around north England between 1643 and 1648; and *The Taking of Newcastle by the Scots* (Newcastle: 1842).

¹⁵ Armstrong, 'Protestant Ireland', 121, 123–152, and Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 137–138.

British kingdoms had an adverse effect on Scottish-Swedish relations. The Swedes had long been accustomed to dealing frequently with Scottish representatives either from the Stuart court or from the Covenanted authorities. Now they were faced with an allegedly united Scottish-English alliance in the Committee of Both Kingdoms. While the Scots viewed this new confederation as one between equals, the Parliamentarians saw it as an expedient allowing them to press their own specifically English concerns.¹⁶ As the English republic gained status the sentiments of the Swedish government similarly became gradually recast into pro-English Parliamentary tendencies, ultimately to Scotland's loss.

At this time there was understandably a flurry of embassies and missions as representatives of the various British factions were sent abroad in search of allies. The Covenanters of course targeted the Dutch Republic as co-religionists. However they also tested French support as in February 1643 William, Earl of Lothian, travelled to the Continent to investigate possibilities of a renewed French-Scottish alliance.¹⁷ This was officially undertaken on behalf of Charles I (the Scottish Parliament was not yet at war with the king). However, when the French ambassador arrived in Scotland the Solemn League and Covenant had already been signed. One of the French conditions for an alliance was that the Scottish army remain out of England and that the embargo on soldiers serving in France be lifted. The 'auld alliance' between the two nations appeared fragile, but Scots did still serve in France and the French did not intervene again on behalf of Charles I.¹⁸ This did not stop the Royalists from turning again to

¹⁶ For an exception to the rule see 28 November 1643, Hugo Grotius to Axel Oxenstierna, *BHG*, XIV, 728. Grotius reported that an Englishman (Walter Strickland most probably) was spreading pro-Solemn League propaganda in the Dutch Republic.

¹⁷ On 1 December 1642 Lothian's mission was approved, and he received his instructions in February, *RPCS*, VII, 354–355 and 571. 28 February 1643, Hugo Grotius to J. De Wicquefort, *BHG*, XIV, 128. Covenanter agents had already contacted Cardinal Richelieu in 1640 as noted in the previous chapter. See M. Avrel, ed., *Lettres, Instructions Diplomatiques et Papiers d'État du Cardinal Richelieu*, XVI, 688–690. See also Glozier, 'Scots in the French and Dutch armies', in Murdoch ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 123.

¹⁸ 9 November 1643, *RPCS*, VIII, 12–15. Irish Royalists had little luck as "Catholic Ireland clearly ranked as a third rate power [...] France and Spain not only balked at receiving Irish agents, but refused to send fully accredited ambassadors to Kilkenny", see Ohlmeyer, 'Ireland Independent', in Ohlmeyer ed., *Ireland from Independence to Occupation*, 93. The missions of Jean de Montreuil and the Bellièvre brothers cast Irish diplomats further in the shade as Catholic France chose to support and recognise

France, particularly in response to the Covenanters' support for the English Parliament.¹⁹ Seeking French aid was a natural tactic given not only that Charles I's queen was French but also the history between the Stuarts and the French. In 1644 Charles' Chamberlain, Sir Thomas Dischington, was sent to France to re-establish an alliance with Royalist Scotland, as a first step toward Charles regaining his British crown.

The return of monarchic control to Sweden, as Kristina came of age in 1644, could have implied that support for the Royalists was forthcoming from the Swedish Crown, (especially given the size of the Scottish community in Sweden, many of whom would have been pro-Stuart) but this was not initially the case. Kristina had not been able to forge close relations with any of the Scottish officers in her service in the way that her father, her tutor and Chancellor, and other members of the Riksråd had by serving on campaigns together in Germany. Kristina's reign was very different from either that of Gustav II Adolf, or the regency of Oxenstierna. During the ensuing transition period of increasing royal control, both the nobility and Oxenstierna gradually lost the reins of power. This understandably had a detrimental impact on official relations with Scotland, as the ruling nobility had effected most of the personal contacts with the Scots. In particular it was Oxenstierna's friendships with leading Scottish Covenanters that were largely responsible for Swedish support obtained during the Bishops' Wars. Thus, as Queen Kristina gradually gained control over her government, the Scottish-Swedish relationship fell into unfamiliar and inexperienced hands.

The end of Oxenstierna's rule

Chancellor Oxenstierna served his last year as regent in 1643, bringing to a close perhaps the most successful period of Scottish-Swedish relations. Although he was "demoted" from regent to Chancellor,

Protestant England, Scotland and the Solemn League and Covenant. See J.G. Fotheringham, *The Diplomatic Correspondence of Jean de Montereul and the brothers de Bellière French ambassadors in England and Scotland 1645-48* (2 vols., Edinburgh: 1898), II, 564. See also *Correspondence of the Scots Commissioners in London*, ed. H.W. Meikle, (Edinburgh: 1917), 153 for a reference to Montereul visiting Charles at Oxford and obtaining a pass for Scotland in January 1646.

¹⁹ This was also in keeping with maintenance of the balance of power as the Stuarts traditionally turned to France whereas England turned to Spain.

his understanding of the significance of British developments continued to be displayed in his discourses in the Riksråd debates in a way which Kristina could never match.²⁰ His extensive knowledge derived from the maintenance of his personal correspondence with former Scottish officers who supplied him with details of the domestic politics in the three Stuart kingdoms.²¹ General Alexander Leslie, the most frequent Scottish writer, was largely occupied with military campaigns in Ireland, England and Scotland. General Patrick Ruthven who supported Charles I's cause, decamped to the Royalist bases on the continent from whence he, along with Lieutenant General James King in Hamburg, provided information from a Stuart perspective.²² Of the at least two Swedish agents acting in Britain at this time, Hugo Mowatt and Michael LeBlon, Mowatt was a Scot.²³ In addition, the Swedish agent Hugo Grotius, based in the Netherlands, provided constant news of international developments, including those occurring in Britain. For example, in September 1643 he described the Scottish preparation of a "foederis pro religione et libertate" and this league's finalisation.²⁴ Foreign newspapers and newsletters also informed the Swedes of events in Scotland, England and Ireland.²⁵ There was thus

²⁰ Although Kristina was keen for her government to decide on a formal approach to British developments in 1645, it was Oxenstierna who led the discussion, 2 and 3 October 1645, *SRP*, XI, 206–213.

²¹ The letters were mostly from General Alexander Leslie, General Patrick Ruthven and Lieutenant-General James King, see *RAOSB*, second series, IX. Of course he also got information, albeit second hand from Hugo Grotius in the Dutch Republic. See *BHG*, XIV–XVI, in particular.

²² Despite the turbulence in the Stuart kingdoms, the aforementioned officers maintained desires to return to Swedish service, and both Ruthven and Lieutenant-General James King did appear later at Kristina's court as envoys for Charles II. Leslie repeatedly regretted his inability to return to Sweden and did not finally manage it until after Oxenstierna had died and Kristina had abdicated in 1654. He was prevented from returning for two reasons: firstly, military duty in Ireland in 1642, and in England 1647 and 1648; secondly, imprisonment by the English Parliament, following the Cromwellian occupation of Scotland. See 30 June 1642, 9 June 1647 and 18 April 1648, in *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 490–2, 511–12, and 512–13.

²³ Mowatt's correspondence is contained in SRA, AOSB E583. In addition, a probable copybook of his with copies of his letters to a variety of recipients, dated London September 1645 to March 1646, is in SRA, Anglica, II/VII (unspecified).

²⁴ 19 September 1643, Hugo Grotius to Axel Oxenstierna, *BHG*, XIV, 555 and 3 October 1643, same to same, *ibid.*, 591–592. The letters of Grotius to Oxenstierna are also printed in *RAOSB*, second series, IV.

²⁵ For an example of newspapers being read out in the Riksråd see 28 March 1645, *SRP*, XI, 36. Unfortunately the newspapers, or newsletters being read were not usually specified, although sometimes a place of origin such as London, or Bremen, was given. The reliability of reports was of course open to question.

no lack of information in Sweden and any “confusion” regarding intra-British relations, and Sweden’s place within that, was not a result of ignorance, but rather of the constant changes afoot in Britain.

Communication with Scotland remained a necessity for the Swedish war effort in Germany and the Scots were still the major resource for Swedish recruitment. Of the more than 1,000 prisoners recently taken by the Imperialists in August 1642, most were Scotsmen, revealing not only that Scots still formed a large portion of the Swedish army, but that such high losses made it imperative that Sweden recoup its depleting manpower.²⁶ The Swedes believed it was important to maintain friendly relations with Leslie, as through him recruitment in Scotland would be facilitated, but that they should also maintain contacts with the Stuarts, and this would be done through Patrick Ruthven.²⁷ Intriguingly, the term “English” was used to denote the Royal House.

Oxenstierna debated whether Sweden should become involved in the ‘British’ dispute on Scotland’s side in order to be able to levy Scottish troops, in keeping with the recruitment traditions of both King Gustav II Adolf and Karl IX and highlighting his understanding of the durability of the Scottish-Swedish connection.²⁸ Christian IV’s policy in the Sound was placing three times as many tolls on Scottish and English ships as on other nationalities, giving the Swedes a leverage point for negotiations.²⁹ Oxenstierna’s main concern was the effect that direct involvement in the British disputes would have on Sweden. Should Charles I gain the upper hand, perceived as he was by the Swedes to be both a ‘Catholic’ (i.e. in contact with Spain) and a ‘good Dane’ (i.e. favourable to Christian IV), this could only be of great disadvantage to Sweden.³⁰

²⁶ 6 August 1642, Count Walter Leslie to Sir Thomas Roe, PRO, SP81, LIII, f.133.

²⁷ 5 July 1642, *SRP*, IX, 312: “Lesle som en Skotte måtte vij maintnera vänskap [. . .] man skulle och lätteligen erholla reputation hoos Stenderne i Engellandh [. . .] Erhollas Skottarne igenom Lesle och Engelderne per Redven.” The tumultuous nature of events in England only surfaces twice in the Riksråd discussions, on 27 and 29 October 1642, *SRP*, IX, 433 and 437.

²⁸ 14 June 1643, *SRP*, X, 192.

²⁹ For references to toll payments see *KCFB*, IV, 306; PRO, SP81, XLVIII, f.249; PRO, SP75, XVI, f.168 and 178; and Lockhart, *Denmark in the Thirty Years’ War*, 253.

³⁰ Oxenstierna had no love for the House of Stuart, and probably passed this prejudice on to Kristina, thereby explaining her favouring the English Parliament over Charles II. Indeed Colonel Potley in a report on his mission to Kristina’s court

The continuation of the war in the Holy Roman Empire meant that the Riksråd were keen to draw the Scots back to Sweden for military service. The Swedes were also contemplating the occupation of Norway and needed to distract Christian IV's navy away from the Sound.³¹ Scotland's proximity of access across the North Sea from Norway made her an attractive ally for this plan. However, courting Scottish troops and taking on Denmark-Norway would still appear as taking sides in the domestic dispute in the British Isles. The Riksråd was aware of the unpredictable nature of civil war, and the possibility that the Scots might turn in support of Charles increased the danger of recruiting Scottish troops.³² Oxenstierna had received a letter from Leslie which encouraged him to suggest to the Riksråd that the old General could recruit a regiment in England and a further two in Scotland for Swedish use.³³ Certainly by November 1643 Oxenstierna listed seeking aid from Scotland and England as vital to Sweden's defence against impending Danish-Norwegian attack.³⁴

In the meantime it was decided to send an envoy to Scotland to ascertain whether the Scots would be favourable to helping the Swedes with their designs on Norway. The envoy could pretend to seek an alliance with Charles I. Under cover of those negotiations the Swedes could probably also recruit amongst the Scots as long as the Stuart king was kept unaware of it. This was largely a continuation of Swedish recruitment policy as developed from the time of Gustav II Adolf, but played out in a new context of war in the three Stuart kingdoms. Although the Swedes were covering both options, they resolved to offer Kristina's help to the Scottish Estates as long as the Scots would contribute to Sweden's designs, and by June 1643 they decided to place a resident in Scotland who could

in 1650 implied that Oxenstierna thought of Charles I as 'a great tyrant', PRO, SP95, V, f.36.

³¹ The Swedes would have been glad to access the Scottish type of armed merchant vessels, which successfully served as privateering ships, for their campaign. See A. Grosjean, 'Scottish-Scandinavian naval links and the SSNE database', in *Northern Studies*, no. 32, 1997, 109.

³² 14 June 1643, *SRP*, X, 192: "ähr fahrligit att taga skottsk folck efter som de som in bellis civilibus gemenligen skeer, skole kanskee slå sigh till Kongens parti, som är oss aduersum."

³³ 8 July 1643, *SRP*, X, 211.

³⁴ 14 November 1643, *SRP*, X, 334. Some English believed that the Scots had incited the Swedes into war with Denmark-Norway as a means of distracting Charles I (or perhaps ensure that Christian IV could not help the Stuart king), see *The Journal of Thomas Juxon, 1644-1647*, K. Lindley and D. Scott, eds., Camden fifth series, (Cambridge: 1999), 62.

penetrate the Covenanting council.³⁵ Although no Swedish legate had been sent by November, the Riksråd were now beginning to consider a formal alliance with the English and Scottish Parliaments.³⁶ The efforts exerted by Leslie and the Scottish Estates thus held sway over those made by Charles I and his supporters, and by the end of Oxenstierna's regency relations with Scotland's Covenanters still superseded those of any other faction from the British Isles.

Moves toward a confederation between Sweden, Scotland and England

While most political groups in the British Isles still contemplated replicating the successful Covenanter diplomacy of 1639–1640, the Scottish leadership themselves were already one step ahead.³⁷ Leslie had been a proponent of the idea of a confederation between Sweden, Scotland and England from 1641 onwards, at the time with the support of Charles I, as it was couched in terms of a pro-active campaign to regain the Palatinate.³⁸ However, the Riksråd's hesitation over the scheme is highlighted by Leslie's repeated encouragement to Oxenstierna over the years.³⁹ For example, when Oxenstierna congratulated Leslie in 1642 on achieving reconciliation with Charles I and on becoming the Earl of Leven, no mention was made of any confederation.⁴⁰ Indeed, Leslie bemoaned the Swedes' slowness to respond to this

³⁵ The selected envoy was to be sent from Gothenburg by ship to live in Edinburgh, and would help Leslie recruit The Swedes were also considering recruiting all Christian IV's dismissed German troops, as well as other troops from Germany, Russia, Scotland and England for this operation. Ships could be negotiated for in Holland. See 14 and 19 June 1643, *SRP*, X, 192–3, and 201.

³⁶ 14 November 1643, *SRP*, X, 332–334.

³⁷ Ohlmeyer notes that the Irish confederates failed as their attempts were undermined by English diplomats, see 'Independent Ireland', in Ohlmeyer, ed., *Ireland from Independence to Occupation*, 96–97.

³⁸ 4 October 1641, Alexander Leslie to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, IX, 488. James King had also approached Oxenstierna regarding a union between the British and the Swedish Crowns. King mentioned sharing Leslie's hopes for improved relations between Scotland and England and Sweden. ? July and 19 October 1641, *RAOSB*, IX, 959 and 965.

³⁹ 3 April 1645, ? May 1646, 29 January 1647, Alexander Leslie to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, IX, 495, 503, 509. See also Macinnes, 'The Court and Anglo-Scottish Union', in Connolly, ed., *Kingdoms United*, where Macinnes makes reference to the Loudon Box "Green deed box", Dumfries House, bundle 1 and Loudon Scottish Collection, box 5, LO 8056–7, box 30, LO 10336 in the Huntington Library.

⁴⁰ 12 September 1642, Axel Oxenstierna to Alexander Leslie, in Fraser, *The Melvilles*, II, 90–92.

idea, and when it finally came as a negative Oxenstierna explained that the response had been intentionally delayed until the situations in Ireland and England had resolved themselves.⁴¹ The Swedes' uncertainty over the reliability of official Scottish and English relations understandably outweighed their desire for an alliance at that point.

The Scottish Estates' desire for international recognition and support had already been displayed through their quest for a coalition with the Dutch during the Bishops' Wars. It was then renewed in their search for a confederation with Sweden. The Scottish Covenanters continued to export their particular form of religious revolution by supporting an army in Ireland and entering the Solemn League and Covenant with England. At the start of 1644, they therefore proposed to send out agents to try and tie up new alliances between Scotland and the Dutch Republic and Scotland and Sweden.⁴²

When the Scottish and English Parliaments, under the confederation of the Solemn League and Covenant, made joint approaches to Sweden in 1644, these two nations came to be perceived as a single unit in alliance against Charles I and his Royalist supporters. Although Charles remained the constitutional head of his kingdoms, the Swedes knew that he had lost any real power in both of them. Yet the Scottish *de facto* government now found itself in an awkward position: the Swedish regency government was giving way to monarchic authority whilst the Crown in Scotland and England continued to lose ground to the parliamentary committees.

Simultaneously Oxenstierna was aware that any official contacts with these authorities could lead to political complications which Sweden could not afford. These concerns largely reverberated around issues of trade and recruitment. As Christian IV insisted on imposing tolls on all Swedish ships going through the Sound, in breach of the agreement from 1613 which exempted ships transporting soldiers, Oxenstierna debated how to rectify the situation with the Riksråd.⁴³ A logical move would be to approach the parliamentary governments in Scotland and England to apply pressure on Denmark-Norway,

⁴¹ 30 August 1642, *SRP*, IX, 376.

⁴² For more on the alliance with the Dutch see Young, 'The Scottish Parliament and European Diplomacy', in Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 87–92.

⁴³ Christian IV permitted soldier transit from Amsterdam to Pillau tollfree in June 1633, *KCFB*, III, 133. Murdoch discusses how one of Christian IV's factors in Danzig sold royal passes for Pillau, see *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 109–110.

although this involved the risk that their support would be construed as a move against Charles I. This could consequently result in Danish-Norwegian attacks on Scottish and English subjects passing through the Sound.⁴⁴ Swedish concerns over foreign policy now extended to England and Scotland in conjunction. However, it appeared that an alliance of sorts existed between the three states. When discussing Christian IV's posturing in the summer of 1643 the Swedes noted that he would have no success in gaining recruits from Scotland, England or even Germany.⁴⁵ Indeed the Swedish desire for a full military alliance with Scotland and England had more to do with their war against Denmark-Norway than with supporting the parliamentary forces in power in the Stuart kingdoms. In January 1644 the idea of seeking specifically 'English' aid against Denmark was first discussed with Hugh Mowatt, the Scottish resident in Sweden as he was viewed as a conduit to negotiations with England.⁴⁶ Mowatt's own motivation concerned an Anglo-Scottish-Swedish confederation, for which he reignited negotiation by offering to seek an alliance in Scotland and England against Denmark-Norway on behalf of the Swedish Crown.⁴⁷ When the Swedes notified the Scottish and English Parliaments of the Scandinavian hostilities they re-affirmed Kristina's affection for both Scotland and England, and emphasised the need to restore free trade in the Sound. Although Oxenstierna knew that Charles I could not present any real danger to Sweden in his isolated position, he always ensured that the Stuart king was also corresponded with, so as not to officially show favouritism over any one of the British factions.⁴⁸

The Swedes deployed their own envoys to gain military assistance for their projects. In early March, a Swede called 'Du Gar:' arrived in London requesting that 20 to 30 Parliamentary ships be sent into the Sound, and that further ships from both Scotland and England

⁴⁴ 17 February 1643, *SRP*, X, 25.

⁴⁵ 2 June 1643, *SRP*, X, 177. A month later Scottish recruitment was again discussed alongside Finnish recruitment, 8 July 1643, *ibid.*, 210.

⁴⁶ 10 and 20 January 1644, *SRP*, X, 435 and 441, and 25 September 1645, *SRP*, XI, 204.

⁴⁷ 20 January 1644, *SRP*, X, 441. Unfortunately all the details of Oxenstierna's discussion with the Riksråd in January 1644 regarding Mowatt's mission are lost. Mowatt also served as a Swedish representative in the United Provinces.

⁴⁸ 23 January and 14 March 1644, *SRP*, X, 444–5, 465. Six months later the need to have the Scottish and English Parliaments on Sweden's side was again restated, see 27 June 1644, *SRP*, X, 555.

be sent to Sweden in anticipation of a confederal alliance between the three states.⁴⁹ The parliaments of Scotland and England were also informed in March of the impending arrival of Hugh Mowatt who would serve as the more senior Swedish envoy to both kingdoms.⁵⁰ The Riksråd sanctioned Mowatt's instructions to include the levy of 2,000 to 3,000 Scots as part of the military build up against Denmark-Norway.⁵¹ Mowatt was authorised to organise the levy through Alexander Leslie, and to obtain the funds necessary for it.⁵² Mowatt continued his journey onwards to Scotland where he arrived in June. A committee was set up in the Scottish Parliament to deal with "the Swedish letter", that is, a letter from Queen Kristina concerning four issues: the war in Germany; Sweden's war with Denmark-Norway; an alliance between Scotland and Sweden, and Mowatt's embassy.⁵³ Chancellor Loudoun engaged in direct correspondence with his counterpart in Sweden, Oxenstierna, particularly in regard to the issue of the Scots acting as mediators in negotiations between Sweden and England.⁵⁴ It was decided then that the ratification of a league

⁴⁹ This was noted by the local population, see *The Journal of Thomas Juxon, 1644–1647*, Lindley and Scott, eds., 48: "The Swedes have sent to his excellency that there might be an amity between the parliament and them, and that they would assist them with ships etc". The envoy was possibly Laurence de Geer, son of Louis who had long served as a financier and procurer of ships to the Swedish crown, 5 March 1644, Meikle, *Scots Commissioners*, 9.

⁵⁰ 26 March 1644, Axel Oxenstierna to John Campbell, Earl of Loudoun. Two copies of this letter survive. For a version in Scots see Dumfries House: Marquis of Bute's Archives, Loudoun and Rowallow Deeds, Bundle 1/1. For a Latin draft see SRA, Det odelade kansliet Riksregistranturet, 225, f.119. I would like to thank Allan Macinnes for the Scots version and Helmut Backhaus for the Latin one.

⁵¹ The recruitment numbers were decided on 15 February 1644, *SRP*, X, 455. Admiral Flemming's information and the final authorisation for recruitment dated from 22 and 28 March 1644 *ibid.*, 472 and 480–1.

⁵² Final authorisation for the recruitment was dated 28 March 1644, 480–1.

⁵³ *APS*, VI, part I, 141; see also Young, 'The Scottish Parliament and European diplomacy', in Murdoch ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 95–97 for a full discussion of this letter. The Royalists were well aware of these negotiations. Charles I urged Colonel Cochrane to point out to Christian IV that in the English Parliament it had been mooted that a naval fleet should be sent to the Danish waters to "take away his customs of the Sound" while 2,000 Scottish soldiers and 1,000 Scottish sailors had been recruited to join the Swedes in an attempted occupation of the Sound. See Park, *The Harleian Miscellany*, 568. Instructions to Cochrane; DRA, TKUA England A II 15. Proposal of John Cochrane (?) to Christian IV, c. June 1644; Gerolamo Agostini, 13 January 1645, *CSPV*, XXVII, 171; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 126–127.

⁵⁴ 16 August 1644, Meikle, *Scots Commissioners*, 36; Dumfries House: Marquis of Bute's Archives, Loudoun and Rowallow Deeds, Bundle 2/2, Axel Oxenstierna to John Campbell, Earl of Loudoun, no date, but c. August 1644.

between Sweden and the two British states would depend on England's approval. When Mowatt left Scotland for meetings in London with English parliamentary representatives, his arrival at the English Parliament in 1644 constituted Sweden's first official act of recognition toward towards that body and that fact was noted as such by the later ambassador to Sweden, Bulstrode Whitelocke.⁵⁵ Despite the Scots' willingness to enter into a league with Sweden, they felt prohibited by the dual nature of the Solemn League and Covenant from actually signing such a document unilaterally. It would soon become clear, however, that the English Parliamentarians had no such scruples.

At the end of August 1644, the Swedes claimed that Christian IV had taken his intrusive behaviour over shipping one step further, demanding to be informed of all shipments through the Sound. This included information relating to Scottish and English recruits for Sweden, which the Riksråd claimed had previously been allowed through unquestioned.⁵⁶ In reality the Riksråd misrepresented this situation as earlier records show the Swedes usually informed Christian IV of troop movement through the Sound.⁵⁷ Yet to the Swedes, renewed scrutiny of their military transports posed more problems since they were intending to build up their forces for an attack on Norway. Such an invasion formed an instrumental part of the confederation conditions then being discussed with England and Scotland.

Mowatt arrived in London in December with instructions to offer a defensive and offensive alliance from the Scots to the English Parliament "contra all mortals", which must have included Charles I.⁵⁸ He noted that Sir Henry Vane was trying to interfere with his negotiations but to no avail, and the matter was referred to the Committee of Both Kingdoms.⁵⁹ Thereafter, the Scots took a multi-pronged approach to keeping the debate alive with Mowatt writing to Oxenstierna and

⁵⁵ December 1644, R. Spalding, ed., *The Diary of Bulstrode Whitelocke 1605–1675* (Oxford: 1990), 161–2.

⁵⁶ 22 August 1644, *SRP*, X, 612.

⁵⁷ See *Kancelliets Brevbøger 1637–1639*, ed. Marquard, 171, 213, 348, and 672–3 concerning various missives to Frederik Urne on allowing Swedish, Scottish and English troops through the Sound between May 1637 and February 1639.

⁵⁸ *The Journal of Thomas Juxon, 1644–1647*, Lindley and Scott, eds., 71 and 77. See also Gerolamo Agostini, 23 December 1644, *CSPV*, XXVII, 165. Agostini does not refer to Mowatt by name but calls him a Commissioner of the Swedish crown "though of Scottish nationality".

⁵⁹ 31 January 1645, Hugh Mowatt to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, AOSB, E583. Mowatt was quite disparaging of Vane, calling him an emulator of Juno and full of tricks, "Hic Junonis æmulus, cum artibus et technis, in quibus totus est . . .".

Queen Kristina, while Alexander Leslie also wrote in support of the alliance.⁶⁰ The Swedes' major concern remained the issue of how exactly confederation with the new authorities in Scotland and England would affect Sweden's international standing. An official treaty would lead Denmark-Norway and the Dutch into forming a mutual defensive alliance as a means to oppose any British-Swedish naval activities. In fact, the Swedish confederation which Mowatt had offered Scotland and England at the end of March was very much dressed up with the Dutch in mind.⁶¹ The Scots were aware of this and, whether the Swedes knew of it or not, they had sought to outmanoeuvre the possibility of a Danish-Dutch alliance with one of their own. At exactly the moment the Swedes expressed their fears, Thomas Cunningham reported back to Scotland that his own negotiations in the Dutch Republic were being very well received.⁶²

In May 1645 the Scottish Estates and representatives of the English House of Peers and Commons signed a joint letter to Kristina which was brought over to Sweden in early July by the envoy and Swedish veteran Colonel Christopher Potley.⁶³ In it excuses were made regarding the delay in responding to her earlier propositions — presumably for aid against Denmark-Norway, and the civil wars were given as the cause. The real reason for their hesitation emerged at the end of their letter: should Sweden and Denmark-Norway reach a peace before the Scottish and English alliance with Sweden was settled, the Parliamentary representatives sought a guarantee of immunity from Danish tolls, and particularly that Christian IV would not provide assistance to Charles I against them. The Scottish and English Parliaments, unlike Charles Stuart, had no particular allegiance to Christian IV, apart from wanting to maintain trade relations, and thus the Anglo-Scottish conditions should not have proved worrying for the Swedes.

⁶⁰ 12 April 1645, Hugh Mowatt to Queen Kristina, SRA, AOSB, E583; 3, 17 and 24 April 1645, Alexander Leslie to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, IX, 495–500. Mowatt sent his correspondence to Oxenstierna via Leslie so that Oxenstierna could get his view of the proceedings, see 4 August 1645, Hugh Mowatt to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, AOSB, E583.

⁶¹ 28 March 1645, Spalding, ed., *Diary of Whitelocke*, 166.

⁶² Young, 'The Scottish Parliament and European Diplomacy', in Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War*, 91–92.

⁶³ Potley sought release from his 30 years of Swedish service on 1 May 1645, see Letter from the representatives of the Parliaments of Scotland and England, SRA, Anglica 521. The letter was read out in the Riksråd on 1 July 1645, see *SRP*, XI, 98. According to Mowatt, he had sent Potley on the mission, see 4 and 20 August 1645, Hugh Mowatt to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, AOSB, E583.

However, an unforeseen complication arose for the Scottish Estates. When the joint letter arrived in Sweden in July the alliance was taken by the Swedes as being between them and the English Parliament, despite the letter arriving addressed from both parliaments.⁶⁴ It is not clear when this unilateral understanding of the approach arose, but thereafter Scottish interests were marginalised, by the queen at least. When “English matters”, as the Riksråd scribe put it, were discussed in July 1645, the Swedes seemed keen to play a balancing act, favouring neither the English Parliament nor Charles I but maintaining communication with both.⁶⁵ Although the first overtures of an alliance had been made to the Scottish Parliament, indeed specifically by a Scottish diplomat, Kristina saw the affair as solely concerning England.

Part of the reason for this may have stemmed from Mowatt falling foul of Oxenstierna, who believed that the resident had failed to keep him informed of affairs in Britain. However, Mowatt’s surviving correspondence shows that the letters were sent, but simply had not been received, largely due to pirate activity on the seas and to an event beyond Mowatt’s control when a courier was delayed while travelling via the Netherlands.⁶⁶ There is a possibility that Potley was involved in delaying delivery of Mowatt’s correspondence. As an English agent he would have been following the example of the English commissioners of the Solemn League and Covenant in Denmark-Norway in April 1645 who left Scotland and Ireland out of the new Anglo-Danish agreement.⁶⁷ By August the Riksråd felt that an alliance with the Dutch had to be coordinated with both an English and a Hansa treaty. The English Parliament could be used against Denmark, as Christian IV was likely to support Charles I.⁶⁸ Thereafter Oxenstierna

⁶⁴ 20 August 1645, Hugh Mowatt to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, AOSB, E583: “literis conventus ordinum Angliæ et delegatorum Scotiæ ad Sere.ssmam Reginam dominam meam clemtissimam in Sueciam transmisi, quibus amborum regnorum adsensus subentissimus ad fœdus cum Suecis”.

⁶⁵ 3 July 1645, *SRP*, XI, 100.

⁶⁶ 31 January, 12 and 27 September 1645, Hugh Mowatt to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, AOSB, E583.

⁶⁷ As early as April 1645 the English Parliament and Christian IV of Denmark-Norway signed a treaty, and no mention was made of the Solemn League and Covenant, the Committee of Both Kingdoms or Scotland. See M. Sellers, ed., *The Acts and Ordinances of the Eastland Company* (London: 1906), 159–165. For the Danish negotiations see Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 137.

⁶⁸ 21 August 1645, *SRP*, XI 167–168. The term ‘English’ may have been shorthand for British, but given Kristina’s attitude it probably referred solely to England.

advised that Sweden send envoys to England and consequently Kristina commissioned new instructions to Mowatt and dictated a letter to the English Parliament in October.⁶⁹

With communication channels unreliable the Swedish authorities were left confused as to just where the domestic developments in Scotland and England were headed. They continued to fear that a sudden resolution of affairs in Britain would leave Kristina in an awkward position with the House of Stuart if she allied herself with the English Parliament. Oxenstierna argued that as long as Charles I was not in control of his own kingdoms, and Charles and Christian IV were in a mutual defence alliance, Sweden was forced to form an alliance with the English Parliament. However as the Swedes had recently ceased hostilities with Denmark-Norway there was a risk that the English Parliament's offer had come too late. Kristina did not want to support a war by a people against their sovereign while there was no military need for it, as this would be making a national declaration against Charles' rights to his kingdoms. Other councillors also wondered whether it was proper for Sweden to be allied to a lesser entity than a kingdom. They argued that as the English Parliament had not sent their own envoy to Stockholm the Swedes even questioned the validity of the 'English' offer.⁷⁰

Oxenstierna defended the English Parliament, arguing that events did not always develop the way one expected them to, and that Parliament was making the best of its situation. In the ensuing debate various points for and against a treaty with the Parliament were propounded, including the Chancellor's comparison to Sweden's alliance with Portugal in 1643 whereby Kristina had officially recognised Portugal and disregarded Spain's kingship over the state. Even the issue of making the Parliamentary treaty an economic one was seen to be problematic and offensive to Charles I.⁷¹

However Kristina had reasons to pressure Charles I: not only had he maintained his alliance with Denmark-Norway, but he had never been particularly useful to her father, Gustav II Adolf, in his campaigns, and was now even less so. Kristina felt that Charles only held sway with the Catholics in his kingdoms whilst the British

⁶⁹ 2 October 1645, *SRP*, XI, 207. I have not located a copy of this letter.

⁷⁰ 2 October 1645, *SRP*, XI, 207. This does beg the question in what capacity the Swedes thought Colonel Potley had arrived.

⁷¹ 2 October 1645, *SRP*, XI, 206–7.

Parliaments led the Protestants, and by implication those Parliaments were the most relevant authorities to deal with. Despite this debate and radically decisive statement on the issue, no Swedish action was forthcoming and a final decision was postponed.⁷²

It was not just the Swedes who were becoming frustrated. In November Mowatt wrote repeatedly to Oxenstierna and Queen Kristina asking what the delay was on the Swedish side and why Potley had not yet returned. Indeed this proved to be a feature of Mowatt's letters for the following year.⁷³ He forwarded a letter from Chancellor Loudoun which clarified the Scottish worries: as no indication had been forthcoming of Kristina's obligations in the confederation, it was believed that she had lost interest in Scotland, and indeed in Mowatt and his mission. Even the weather conspired against the resident who noted in mid-January 1646 that the Thames had been frozen for five weeks.⁷⁴ The Swedish agent had literally been left out in the cold.

Not until 1646 did the matter reappear amongst Riksråd discussions, but by then things were changing rapidly. Although it had previously been decided to recall Mowatt, he continued to send reports from London, particularly that there was serious discord brewing between the two parliaments, and that civil war was likely.⁷⁵ This last news prompted yet another call for Mowatt's retraction as it was feared his presence could lead to complications. Leslie rebuked Oxenstierna on the Swedish delay in ratifying an alliance with the English Parliament, warning that it might turn to Spain if Sweden would not present herself as an ally.⁷⁶ Mowatt and Leslie both reported that Sweden's reputation was in decline in London, with Leslie emphasising that Mowatt's impoverished personal state only further diminished Sweden's status.⁷⁷ It appears that the Swedes merely

⁷² 2 October 1645, *SRP*, XI, 208–9.

⁷³ 14 and 28 November 1645, 21 January, 20 March, 16 April, 1 and 28 May, 9 November 1646, Hugh Mowatt to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, AOSB, E583; 28 November 1645, Hugh Mowatt to Queen Christina, SRA, AOSB, E583. See also Mowatt's letters to various recipients, 20 February 1646 and 20 March 1646, SRA, *Anglica II/VII*.

⁷⁴ 21 January 1646, Hugo Mowatt to Louis de Geer, SRA, De Geer Samlingen, E3514.

⁷⁵ Mowatt's recall was decided on 30 April 1646, *SRP*, XI, 343; 28 May 1646, Hugh Mowatt to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, AOSB, E583.

⁷⁶ ? May 1646, Leslie to Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 504.

⁷⁷ ? May 1646, Leslie to Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 504. For Mowatt's own claims of distress and loss of face as a Swedish diplomat, consult any of his letters in SRA, AOSB, E583.

decided to write a “general” letter without any expression of binding significance.⁷⁸ To Swedish eyes the situation in England was so confused that Sweden did not need to take any action with the Scottish Estates, the English Parliament or Charles I.⁷⁹ However, other ambassadors at the Swedish court had begun to notice Swedish involvement in the British developments. In January 1646 Pierre Chanut arrived as the French resident in Stockholm and he immediately reported to Paris that an envoy of sorts from the English Parliament (presumably Potley) was in Stockholm and engaging in discussions with Axel Oxenstierna.⁸⁰ If Kristina was trying to keep her involvement with the English Parliament secret, she had failed, and she intriguingly chose this time to rekindle her interest in the Scottish Parliament.⁸¹

Although Mowatt was officially recalled from his mission in London he was still there in February 1647, continuing to urge the alliance and the recruitment of Scottish soldiers.⁸² Unfortunately the Committee of Both Kingdoms followed up with another letter only to inform the queen that her conditions (now to include a reconciliation between the king and his subjects) had not yet been fulfilled.⁸³ The agenda within the British Isles was about to change and, as Mowatt had predicted, a new British civil war was about to break out. The Long Parliament in England “unilaterally shut down the Committee of Both Kingdoms” in 1647, effectively ending the Scottish-English alliance and paving the way for another civil war in England and armed confrontation with the Scottish Engagers.⁸⁴

In December 1647, Oxenstierna told the Riksråd that he had met the new Swedish resident in England, Michael Le Blon, who had informed him that Charles I had escaped and made his way to Wales

⁷⁸ 30 May 1646, *SRP*, XI, 372. The debate appears not to have been transcribed.

⁷⁹ 3 October 1646, *SRP*, XI, 467–8.

⁸⁰ ? May 1646, Alexander Leslie to Axel Oxenstierna, *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 504; C. Weibull, *Drottning Christina och Sverige 1646–1651* (Stockholm: 1970), 80.

⁸¹ 12 February 1647, Hugh Mowatt to the Scottish Estates, 4 November 1646, *SRP*, XI, 496. All that was noted as regards the letter is a small debate over how to address the Scots, and the common form of ‘noble and well-bred’ was used to cover the lords and marquises in Scotland. This was just a few days after they had received a copy of Chancellor Loudoun’s oration to Charles I, 30 October 1646, *ibid.*, 487.

⁸² 12 February 1647, Hugh Mowatt to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, AOSB, E583.

⁸³ 16 September 1647, Scottish and English letter to Queen Christina, SRA, Anglica 521. This letter also praises Mowatt’s diligence during his stay in London.

⁸⁴ J. Morrill, ‘The Scottish National Covenant in its British Context’, in Morrill, ed., *National Covenant*, 20; Young, ‘The Scottish Parliament and European Diplomacy’, in Murdoch, ed., *Scotland and the Thirty Years’ War*, 100–101.

and was possibly headed for Scotland. In fact Charles fled to the Isle of Wight, and remained there. Oxenstierna feared the disruption that the renewed unrest might cause between Scotland and England.⁸⁵ By now the Swedes seemed to have accepted the political situation in the Stuart kingdoms and were loath to see it altered again. Riksråd discussion of the 'English' situation, as they saw it, seemed to disappear and from 1647 to 1648 their information was largely supplied by newspapers from London and other locations rather than by representatives of any political affiliation.⁸⁶ Between January and June, both England and Charles I were usually only discussed with regard to issues of trade and alliances with other states.⁸⁷ After Colonel Potley's eventual return to London he soon became the preferred envoy between the English Parliament and the Swedish court. It appeared that his semi-covert presence in Sweden had far outweighed Mowatt's mission in London. The Scot finally returned to Sweden and in early September 1648 he had an audience in Stockholm with Queen Kristina where he presented his bills.⁸⁸

Renewed civil war in Scotland and England

Scottish domestic developments in the meantime had led to a renewed power struggle within Scotland. This eventually saw the 'conservative' Covenanters and pragmatic Royalists, led by the Duke of Hamilton, secure power within the Scottish Estates from the Marquis of Argyll.⁸⁹ This grouping sought to side with Charles I against the English Parliament whom many Scots felt had betrayed their trust. Alexander Leslie revealed the attitude of these formerly 'conservative' Covenanters and now outright Royalists in February 1648 when he visited the French ambassador in Edinburgh, Jean Montereul, and expressed hatred for the English and called them traitors.⁹⁰ Leslie also wondered why

⁸⁵ 10 December 1647, *SRP*, XII, 236.

⁸⁶ 8 July and 4 November 1647, 9 June, and 25 August 1648, *SRP*, XII, 339, 399.

⁸⁷ 5 January, 27 April, 29 May and 25 August 1648, *SRP*, XII, 256, 318, 332 and 399.

⁸⁸ He appears to have finally received financial compensation of some degree. In 1650 he received half the 6,150 riksdaler he was due, and in 1653 he received another 1,075 rixdaler. Finally in 1655 he signed a receipt from Laurence de Geer for 500 rixdaler, 28 July 1655, *SRA*, De Geer Samlingen, E3514.

⁸⁹ Young, *Scottish Parliament*, 185.

⁹⁰ Fotheringham, *Montereul Correspondence*, II, pp. 401–2.

the Prince of Wales delayed his arrival in Scotland and the French were not sending military aid to Scotland. A new Covenanter army, the Engagers, decided to support Charles I militarily after obtaining royal agreement to introduce conditional religious reforms in England along Scottish lines, showing that religious motivation was still strong.⁹¹ This manoeuvre led to another civil war in England and ended in defeat for the Engagers at Preston on the 17th of August 1648. The leader of the Engagers, the Duke of Hamilton was captured and executed soon after Preston, though under his English title as Earl of Cambridge. The Marquis of Argyll reasserted his power within the Scottish Estates after the 'radical' Covenanters seized power from the Engagers in the aftermath of the Whiggamore Raid. This also left Scotland secure from any follow-up operation by Cromwell who welcomed the return of the radical leadership to power.⁹² Charles I was removed by the Army from the Isle of Wight and brought for trial to London. At the end of December, James King informed Oxenstierna of rumours that the English Parliament and Charles I were nearing reconciliation, but King did not give the rumours much credence.⁹³ Indeed, he was right to cast doubt. Events in England would soon cause an outcry as the English Parliament first tried and then executed Charles I.⁹⁴

Conclusion

The turbulent domestic developments of the Stuart kingdoms after 1641 are largely a history separate from Scottish-Swedish relations. Many of the foremost Scottish officers in Swedish service had left Sweden to serve either the Covenanters or the Stuart cause, and Charles I's loss of authority left the British Isles without a clearly recognisable leader to whom the Swedes could turn.⁹⁵ The Swedes themselves

⁹¹ See A.I. Macinnes, 'The First Scottish Tories?' in *SHR*, vol. lxvii, I: no. 138, (1988), 57; Young, *Scottish Parliament*, 185.

⁹² Young, *Scottish Parliament*, 210.

⁹³ 2 December 1648, *RAOSB*, second series, IX, 968. "Ich glaube is aber shwerlich." This appears to be the last surviving letter from King to Oxenstierna. Prior to this he corresponded jointly with Patrick Ruthven to Oxenstierna.

⁹⁴ See 'The charge against the King', 'The sentence of the high court of justice' and 'The death warrant of Charles I', *Constitutional Documents*, ed. Gardiner, 371-4, 377-380, and 310 respectively.

⁹⁵ Spalding, *History and troubles*, II, 283. In 1644 for example, the list of names

were mainly occupied with war with Denmark-Norway and bringing the Thirty Years' War to a close, and almost every mention of England and her parliament is connected to how it could be used in Sweden's favour against her Nordic neighbours.⁹⁶ Nonetheless, stalwarts of the unofficial Scottish-Swedish alliance such as Alexander Leslie and James King also sought to turn their contacts into a firm political alliance through the confederation of the two states. Leslie initially promoted the confederation in the name of the Stuart king in 1641 during the temporary peace with Charles I, and afterwards pursued it in the name of the Scottish Estates along with Hugh Mowatt.

Scottish-English unity during the Solemn League and Covenant was short-lived as the situation in England deteriorated throughout the decade. Royal authority was simply not an issue and the British-Swedish relations became almost totally independent of the Stuart monarch's interests, particularly through constitutional assemblies and Parliamentary committees. Events in the Stuart kingdoms were complex with a lack of unity throughout this period, and all had to contend with armed insurrections, or at least the threat of them, from their neighbours. Along with this there were changes in membership of the main factions: Cochrane, the persuasive diplomat of the 1640s, moved into the Royalist camp, and to the Swedes it seemed that Alexander Leslie and his colleagues eventually followed suit. The reality was rather that dissension in the Covenanting movement allowed for the disaffection of some Covenanters and a weakening of their support for the time being.

Kristina and the Riksråd's political vacillation over developments in the British Isles might seem confusing to the external observer. However, firm commitment to any one faction would certainly have been ill-advised, as Oxenstierna had warned. Swedish agreement to confederation with the Scottish and English Parliaments did not just impact on the international dimension but also on the domestic situation, even calling into question the status of the Swedish Church

of Royalists captured and imprisoned, reveals quite a few of them to have been in Swedish or Danish service: the Earl of Nithsdail, Lord Rae, Patrick Ruthven, James King, John Cochrane, Ludovick Lyndsay (the Earl of Crawford), Alexander Irving and Leslie of Auchintoul. General Alexander Leslie had promised the prisoners that they would be well-treated and was apparently appalled at their incarceration in the Edinburgh tollbooth instead of the Castle as was usual.

⁹⁶ See for example 2 April 1645, *SRP*, XI, 43, and *SRP*, IX, X and XI, *passim*.

with regard to bishops.⁹⁷ The particularly close relationship enjoyed by the Scots in Swedish service meant that an initially favourable stance toward Scotland, at least amongst the 'old guard', was understandable, and throughout the Solemn League and Covenant most diplomatic interaction with Sweden was undertaken by the Scots. However the Scottish support for a 'British' union with Sweden proved an intangible concept for the Swedes, in the same way that an understanding of 'British' troops had appeared elusive to Gustav II Adolf. Colonel Potley's mission further clouded the issue and resulted in a shift towards England in official diplomatic relations. This was partially brought on by the Scots being too quick to share the Swedish alliance with their brethren in England. One last opportunity arose for the Scots after the executioner's axe fell on their king's neck. The Scots' search for allies to reinstate their monarch's heir was their last chance to prove themselves the dominant force in Scandinavian politics originating from the British Isles.

⁹⁷ When the Swedish estates debated the role of their bishops in 1644 some of the Riksråd decried the Scottish solution of ridding the church of its bishops as extreme. Oxenstierna, however, defended the Scots, simply explaining that civil war complicated issues, see 4 December 1644, *SRP*, X, 676.

CHAPTER EIGHT

QUEEN KRISTINA AND CHARLES II, 1649–1651

Hafver man för detta favoriserat Skottarne, så hafver man nu mehre
orsak att görat, quia regum communis est causa¹

The mid-1640s had seen tentative and ultimately unsuccessful attempts at achieving a British-Swedish confederation under the combined auspices of the Scottish and English Parliaments. Although the confederation was not formally concluded at the time, Swedish commercial relations with England's Parliamentary regime benefited from the negotiations. However a more pressing issue arose in early 1649 when Prince Charles approached the Scandinavian monarchs in a last-minute attempt at rescuing his father from English captivity, as it became clear that Charles I was in danger of losing his life.² The subsequent execution of Charles I led to an extreme reaction in favour of the beleaguered Stuart monarchy across Europe, and particularly in Sweden. The radical shift in Swedish political focus towards the British Isles was encouraged by three successive Royalist missions seeking Swedish support both before and after the demise of Charles I at the hands of his subjects. Sweden was not the only target of these envoys. Elsewhere, Colonels John Cochrane and John Henderson were also 'on embassy' for the Royalists travelling into Denmark-Norway, Poland-Lithuania and the north German cities including Hamburg. In addition to raising considerable quantities of supplies, Cochrane arranged to have English Republicans assaulted on the street and he encouraged a culture of violence against those viewed as regicides. This incensed the English Council of State enough to write to the merchants and the Senate of Hamburg condemning Cochrane's activities as a "pest to human society".³

¹ 21 February 1649, *SRP*, XIII, 17.

² 23 January 1649, Charles Prince of Wales to Frederik III, DRA, TKUA England A I and 29 January 1649, Prince Charles to Kristina, SRA, Anglica 517.

³ 9 August 1649, *CSPD 1649–50*, 269–71. Cochrane was a staunch Stuart supporter, working in both Denmark and Sweden for Charles I, until after the debacle of Montrose's Scottish invasion in 1650. Spalding, *History of the Troubles*, I, 345;

As elsewhere, several groups of British agents operated in Sweden after 1649, all promoting a variety of conflicting agendas. These ranged from the maintenance of Swedish neutrality towards the British Isles, to the demand for outright support for military intervention of behalf of Charles II. Consensus, even among the latter group, remained elusive as one party strove to fight for Charles II under Montrose and another in the name of the Scottish Covenanter Government. Although Charles II appeared to support both groups, they were in competition with each other. This left the Swedes grappling to get to grips with the numerous envoys, ambassadors and agents, many of them Swedish veterans and noblemen who successively pressed their case with the authorities.

Just as with the earlier Riksråd debates during the Bishops' Wars, these partisans did not work in a vacuum. Indeed between 1648–1651 there were some 30 Scotsmen amongst the Swedish nobility, of which no fewer than 15 actually became naturalised and ennobled in this period. In addition to these individuals, however, Scottish interest at court and in the Riksråd was widespread.⁴ For example, one of the regular attendees of the Riksråd during debates about Royalist plans for Scotland was Bengt Skytte, who was half-Scottish and had been knighted in London by Charles I. His mother, Margaret Neave, was a significant property owner in Stockholm and still claimed land in Scotland. Another influential lady at court was Lady Jane Ruthven, Lady in Waiting to Queen Kristina and daughter of the Royalist ambassador, General Patrick Ruthven.⁵ The queen also employed

Maclean, 'Montrose's Preparations', in Hatton and Anderson, eds., *Studies in Diplomatic History*, 14; S. Murdoch, 'The Search for Northern Allies: Stuart and Cromwellian Propagandists and Protagonists in Scandinavia 1649–1660', in B. Taithe and T. Thornton, eds., *Propaganda, Political Rhetoric and Identity 1300–2000* (Gloucestershire: 1999), 82; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 153–154.

⁴ December 1650, Colonel Potley to the English Parliament, PRO SP95, Va, f.36. Potley provided a list of the Royalists left in Sweden in 1650. These included Lieutenant-General King, Lord Napier, Sir William Bellenden, Colonel Ogilvie, Colonel Berkeley, Sir Robert Stuart, Captain King, Colonel Lindsay and Lord Ruthven (Patrick Ruthven's grandson). These were notably all Scotsmen. The list was not complete however as names of the Royalists permanently resident in Sweden, such as John Maclean and Colonel John Nairn, did not appear.

⁵ G. Masson, *Queen Christina* (London: 1968), 198. Masson notes that Kristina was very attached to Lady Jane and other members of her family. We know from letters signed by Lady Jane that she kept the company of many of the Scottish military establishment. One signed in Stockholm in 1652 is witnessed by Colonel Ludovick Leslie, Captain James Sinclair and Captain William Ord, see 15 January 1652, Lady Jane Ruthven to English Parliament, NAS, Messers Hope, Todd and Kirk, WS Papers, GD246/Box 26/Bundle 5, item 19.

Andrew Stuart the younger as one of her pages (whom she ennobled in 1652), while one of her personal bodyguards was Major John Urquhart (ennobled in 1648). Both Lady Jane Ruthven and Major Urquhart had a proven interest in the cause of Charles Stuart and the major sent cannon home as a gift to his Royalist relatives in 1650.⁶

At this point Europe was targeted by proponents of the Royalist cause, of British origin and elsewhere. The famous work *Eikon Basilike* was widely read in Britain and Europe and reached 60 editions in French, Latin, Dutch, German and Danish.⁷ This work was undoubtedly penned by an Englishman and elevated Charles I to iconic status. But it was not just British royalists who strove to attack the English Republic by pen. Even from the Swedish court, Caspar Salmasius published *Defensio Regia* in 1649 damning the English Republic ‘as a stain on the story of humanity’.⁸ Pressure from high-ranking members of the Scottish-Swedish community and the activities of the Royalist propagandists combined to present the Swedish authorities with a diplomatic quagmire.

Patrick Ruthven

The first of the Royalist emissaries to arrive was General Patrick Ruthven, Lord Brentford, who had maintained his correspondence with Axel Oxenstierna during his time with the Stuart court in exile.⁹ Ruthven had remained at The Hague on Prince Charles’ orders during the Prince’s first attempt to liberate Charles I after the defeat of the Scottish Engagement in 1648. He arrived at the Swedish court in February 1649 as the prince’s representative and carrying letters to present to Queen Kristina. These provided details of the king’s humiliating situation as a prisoner of his own subjects, comments designed to appeal directly to the queen’s sense of regal propriety.¹⁰

⁶ The information on his activities surrounding the cannon is contained in *RPCS*, third series, I, 17. 1 August 1661, ‘Supplication of Alexander Urquhart of Cromarty’.

⁷ See F.F. Madan, *A New Bibliography of the Eikon Basilike of King Charles I* (London: 1950), and Murdoch, ‘The Search for Northern Allies’, in Taithe and Thornton, eds., *Propaganda*, 81.

⁸ W.R. Parker, *Milton a biography* (Oxford: 1968), 372; Murdoch, ‘The Search for Northern Allies’, in Taithe and Thornton, eds., *Propaganda*, 87.

⁹ See his letters dated 5/15 October 1646, 26 March/4 April and 6/16 December 1647, 25 August/4 September 1648, *RAOSB*, IX, 394–398.

¹⁰ 29 January 1649, Prince Charles to Kristina, *SRA*, Anglica 517.

Ruthven obtained an audience with Kristina on 20 February, and their meeting was discussed in the next day's Riksråd meeting.¹¹ The Riksråd appeared more interested in Ruthven's thoughts than those of his superior, and earnestly discussed Ruthven's belief that Charles I would not have ended up in his predicament if he had heeded the advice of others.¹² Nonetheless, the specifics of the Stuart request were considered, in particular the need for munitions and six ships with the utmost speed.¹³ Ruthven had also been instructed to seek the decommissioning of Scottish officers from Swedish service, with Kristina's permission, and to gain her absolute support for the Royalist party. Further, a Scottish officer was to be allowed to 'repair to the king if there shall be occasion without demand' while the queen was to be prevailed upon to intercede with other monarchs on behalf of Charles.¹⁴ In the discussion reference was immediately made to the precedent set during the Oxenstierna regency when Scottish envoys received favourable treatment. However, the fact that these envoys represented different factions of the various British disputes apparently posed few problems to the Swedish government. It was the possibility that the queen herself might become directly involved which worried them. The Riksråd suggested that Kristina remain neutral as before in this essentially domestic crisis of a powerful state, and reminded her that Charles I had always been a contrary character who had refused to endanger his own position for even one of his crowns. Kristina was, however, adamant that as Sweden had already helped the Scots through Alexander Leslie in the 1639–1640 period, she was now ready to undertake Sweden's support in her own name.¹⁵ Kristina adopted a self-defensive posture supporting the Stuart king's royal prerogative over his contrariness. The friction between the queen and her Riksråd was apparent, highlighting the

¹¹ 21 February 1649, *SRP*, XIII, 16. Before even hearing the main issue of Ruthven's mission Kristina took great offence at the letter he had delivered from Prince Charles in which his title was placed above Kristina's, a serious breach of etiquette, given the discrepancy in rank. Ruthven quickly blamed himself and the secretary and promised that a more appropriate version would be sent immediately. These quarrels over titles continued (see below). Kristina's concerns over etiquette in royal correspondence did not deter her from cultivating relations with Cromwell, an interloper of non-noble lineage.

¹² 26 February 1649, *SRP*, XIII, 345.

¹³ 21 February 1649, *SRP*, XIII, 16–18.

¹⁴ 1648? Notes by Robert Long, HMC, *Pepys Manuscripts*, 246.

¹⁵ See 21 February 1649, *SRP*, XIII, 17.

Riksråd's unwillingness to engage in pro-Stuart policies and so the session ended without a resolution.

By early March the whole point became moot as news of Charles I's execution sent shock waves reverberating around Europe.¹⁶ Kristina noted that she would commence mourning as soon as she received official notification from the Prince of Wales of his father's death.¹⁷ Appearance was all-important to Kristina, who specified that Sweden should follow whatever the French response was to the death, but that the Swedish resident in Holland could send condolences to Prince Charles who was now the *de facto* king of Britain (sic).¹⁸ The next day Kristina received Charles II's notification of his father's death dated The Hague, 25 February.¹⁹ She now chose this moment to reply to two of Charles II's earlier letters affirming her desire to see the Stuart monarchy reinstated, adding to her councillors that it was not his fault his father had made such a mess of his domestic politics.²⁰ Although support for the Stuarts seems to have been the position of the majority of the Riksråd, it was not as unanimous as later letters and correspondence suggest. The Danish resident in Stockholm, Peder Juel, informed his government that Oxenstierna was ready to excuse the English Parliament for Charles I's death, but in the Riksråd itself calls were actually made by General Magnus de

¹⁶ See for example: 16 July 1650, Bradshaw to Strickland, *HMSC Sixth Report*, 430; *Danmark-Norges Traktater*, V, 16; 6 February 1650, English Parliament to the city of Danzig, *Milton State Papers*, XIII, 44–5; W.C. Abbott, *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell* (Harvard: 1938–1947), II, 267; L. Leowenson, 'Did Russia intervene after the execution of Charles I', *Bulletin of Historical Research*, xviii, (1940–1), 15; J.T. Peacy, 'Order and Disorder in Europe: Parliamentary Agents and Royalist Thugs 1649–1650', in *The Historical Journal*, vol. 40, no. 4 (1997), 956; Murdoch, 'The Search For Northern Allies', in Taithe and Thornton, eds., *Propaganda*, 80–81; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 146–149.

¹⁷ 3 March 1649, *SRP*, XIII, 24. Charles II himself learnt of his father's execution on the 4/14 of February 1649. See Jones, *Charles II*, 13.

¹⁸ 8 March 1649, *SRP*, XIII, 26. Charles II's letter to Kristina, of 25 February 1649, *SRA*, *Anglica* 517.

¹⁹ 9 March 1649, *SRP*, XIII, 26. Although Kristina ordered her secretary to reply, expressing first condolences and then congratulations on gaining the throne, a debate followed regarding how to address the new king, who was not yet installed in his kingdom (sic). This continual emphasis on the correct address was a result of Charles I never having accorded Kristina her proper title, an insult Kristina believed Charles II would continue. Kristina decided that it would be best to be courteous as it cost nothing but words to do so and that one should be kind to those in trouble. This debate over titles was still ongoing in February 1650 when the Riksråd noted that again Charles II had not addressed Kristina as 'Your Majesty' in a letter to her. 20 February 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 51.

²⁰ 10 March 1648/9, *PRO SP95/5*, f.31. The second of Charles II's letters announced the death of his father, king Charles I.

la Gardie to send the Swedish army to England to avenge the execution.²¹ Ruthven's mission now extended to obtaining weapons for an invasion of Ireland on behalf of Charles II, officially under the auspices of the Marquis of Ormonde but actually for Prince Rupert.²² Ruthven reported that the Riksråd were willing to provide the requested aid although Kristina wanted Charles II to link up with the Scottish government rather than travel to Ireland.²³ What they did not know was that the Irish invasion was part of a deal brokered between the Marquis of Montrose and Prince Rupert whereby the marquis guaranteed he would lead his own operation in Scotland.²⁴ Unaware of the Montrosian wildcard, Kristina ascertained the cost and supply options for the weapons. It was decided that muskets could be taken from Stockholm, Vadstena, Jönköping and Gothenburg, and sent from Gothenburg, where John Maclean could deal with them.²⁵ Once again the use of a Scot would deflect critics claiming personal involvement by the queen, just as had happened during the Bishops' Wars.

By the end of March it was agreed that 6,000 muskets, 5,000 pikes, 3,000 bandoleers, 4,000 infantry swords, 50 drums, 1,800 pistols, 600

²¹ 3 April and 10 April 1649, Fryxell, *Handlingar rörande sverges historia*, part one, 87–8. Any Danish interpretation of Oxenstierna's reaction was probably coloured by the hard-line anti-Danish stance the Chancellor had pursued as regent, and by the agent's desire to show the Swedish government in a bad light to the Danish-Norwegian king.

²² In late May and early June relations from London revealed that Prince Rupert was in Ireland and was about to besiege Dublin. 31 May and 7 June 1649, *SRP*, XIII, 104 and 117. See also 30 March 1649, *SRP*, XIII, 41; T. Carte, *The Life of James Duke of Ormonde; containing an account of the most remarkable affairs of his time and particularly of Ireland under his government; with an appendix and a collection of letters serving to verify the most material facts in the said history*, (6 vols., Oxford: 1851), III, 445; 26 January 1648/49, Marquis of Ormonde to John Lord Byron with letters to the Queen and Prince of Wales, HMC, *Pepys Manuscripts*, 248–249.

²³ 24 and 31 March 1649, Patrick Ruthven to Charles II, HMC, *Pepys Manuscripts*, 292; 30 March 1649, *SRP*, XIII, 41.

²⁴ P. Morrah, *Prince Rupert of the Rhine* (London: 1976), 235.

²⁵ That the weapons must not appear to come from Kristina was stated on 17 March 1649, Patrick Ruthven to Charles II, HMC, *Pepys Manuscripts*, 292. There are eight letters dated 7 April 1649 regarding military deliveries to John Maclean from Kristina and her government, see KRA, Krigskollegium kancelliet, B.1. His supplies came from various points in Sweden: 1,200 muskets, 900 pikes and 500 bandoleers from Stockholm castle; 1,200 muskets, 300 pikes, 1,000 soldiers' swords, 1,000 bandoleers, 40 colours, 430 pairs of pistols from Jönköping magazine; 400 muskets, 1,900 pikes and 500 bandoleers from Gothenburg magazine; 1,100 pikes, 40 colours, 30 drums and 500 pairs of pistols from Vadstena magazine; 1,200 muskets, 800 pikes, 1,000 bandoleers, 600 cavalry swords, 2,000 cavalry harnesses, 3,000 soldiers' swords, 30 colours, 20 drums and 820 pairs of pistols from 3 combined sources in Stockholm.

cavalry swords, and 2,000 cavalry harnesses were to be sent to Charles II.²⁶ Indeed, Sweden was providing enough weapons for a sizeable army on its own. Despite this Ruthven requested more field pieces, fuses and powder and lead for the pieces in early April. Not only was this second request agreed to but the Swedish State Marshal, Jakob de la Gardie, noted that 12 cannon, and some tons of powder could also be provided.²⁷ When Lieutenant-Colonel Dicks was to be dispatched to Sweden to collect the supplies he was provided with Charles II's letter of thanks to Kristina.²⁸ At the end of May 1649, Charles II sent Lieutenant-General James King as a new envoy to Sweden, along with a letter authorising his mission requesting further subsidies and naval support, again hinting at the second front.²⁹ However, the Swedish government seemed over-reliant on inaccurate newsletters and the confusion this caused. Upon hearing that the Levellers, whom the Riksråd believed were Royalists, had been defeated by Parliamentary forces, the Swedes felt sure that Charles' cause was lost.³⁰ Despite the continued news of the English Parliament's

²⁶ 31 March 1649, *SRP*, XIII, 43; 25 April/4 May 1649, Charles II to Marquis of Ormonde, HMC, *Pepys Manuscripts*, 253. This letter notes that Ruthven had successfully gained 1,000 cavalry arms, 900 pistols and a quantity of powder and match. It also stated that the arms were cash on delivery and obliged Ormonde to ensure the Swedish factors and agents were to be well treated. The quantity concurs with Carte who lists that the supplies contained 1,000 cavalry arms, back, breast and headpieces, 900 pairs of pistols, 300 troopers' swords, 3,000 muskets, 2,500 pikes, 2,000 infantry swords, 6 pieces of brass cannon and carriages, and ammunition, *Life of Ormonde*, III, 445. When compared with the list above it just represents half of what Maclean obtained.

²⁷ 2 April 1649, *SRP*, XIII, 43. Maclean was to receive 12,003 lb shot, 42 loads of powder and 12 lb regimental pieces (cannon) with all their furnishings, 7 April 1649, orders to master of artillery William Ogilvie and Colonel Måns Ulfspärre, KRA, Krigskollegium kancelliet, B.1.

²⁸ 30 September 1649, Sir Edward Hyde to Secretary Edward Nicholas, *Clarendon Papers*, II, 23; 15 June, 1649, *SRP*, XIII, 131. The Marquis of Ormonde had been informed of weapons lying at Gothenburg for him, 21 May 1649, Robert Long to Ormonde, *HMC Report on the manuscripts of the Marquess of Ormonde* (London: 1899), II, 93. According to Carte, Ormonde was to receive the cavalry supplies, *Life of Ormonde*, III, 445. It appears that Ruthven had to give up his Swedish land endowments to pay for some of the military supplies, see *DNB*, XVII. Cowan states that Montrose arranged through Robert Long, Charles II's secretary, to have Ormonde's supplies divided between himself and Ormonde, *Montrose*, 273. For Dicks, see 2 May 1649, 'Proposition', HMC, *Pepys Manuscript*, 302. Again, the Scots proved more efficient in obtaining supplies than the Irish confederates had been in the 1649–1651 period, see Ohlmeyer, 'Independent Ireland', in Ohlmeyer ed., *Ireland from Independence to Occupation*, 105–106.

²⁹ 28 May 1649, Charles II to Kristina, SRA, Anglica 517.

³⁰ 28 June and 5 July 1649, *SRP*, XIII, 157 and 165: "I Londen var tacksejel[se]

successes, at the end of August Kristina believed the whole population of the British Isles would turn to Charles II if he returned to Britain to assume the throne.³¹ Swedish garrisons in ‘Low Germany and Holstein’ were targeted as possible places to gain military support. The fact that the governor of Swabia was Major-General Robert Douglas, the governor of Pomerania was Major-General Arvid Forbes and the governor of Buxtehude for the Swedes was a long time Scottish veteran, Colonel Patrick More, may explain Royalist optimism at getting their support.³² It is also worth pointing out that More was a member of the Ruthven family through his mother Christian Ruthven.³³ However, Montrose’s association with these missions was indicative of yet another complex angle to Scottish-Swedish relations.

*A spanner in the works: Sweden and the Montrosian Expedition*³⁴

When Ruthven began his negotiations he did so from the point of view that there was a form of unity of purpose among the Royalists, i.e. the overthrow of the regicides in London. Ironically his mission

giord öfver den victorien the Parla. hafva hafft öfver Levelers af Kungens partie”. In September 1649 even Charles’ supporters believed there was a possibility of a treaty between the king and the Levellers, 30 September 1649, Sir Edward Hyde to Secretary Edward Nicholas, *Clarendon Papers*, II, 23.

³¹ 26 July and the 28 and 30 August 1649, *SRP*, XIII, 191, 218, 232 and 383. This was in spite of July accounts that the parliaments in England and Scotland were stabilising their authority in their respective countries, see 5 July 1649, *SRP*, XIII, 165. Not only did the Swedes count the Levellers as Royalists, but they also believed that Marquis Ormonde took Dublin for the king in August, showing how misled the Swedish government was by newspapers.

³² May 1649, ‘Despatches for the Marquis of Montrose’, HMC, *Pepys Manuscripts*, 257. Montrose was tasked with approaching these garrisons in ‘Low Germany and Holstein’ as well as specifically approaching ‘General Major [Robert] Douglas’. That these garrisons were perhaps ready to participate was mentioned in a letter from the Hague, 31 August 1649, John Simpson to Humphrey Boswell, HMC, *Pepys Manuscripts*, 272.

³³ According to Balfour-Paul, Patrick Ruthven’s aunt, Christian (*sic*), may have been More’s mother, thereby making Ruthven and More cousins, see *Scottish Peerage*, IV, 102–103.

³⁴ Although this episode in Scottish-Swedish relations is well documented, the most comprehensive account in English by J.N.M. Maclean does not use Swedish government sources like *SRP*, while the most comprehensive Swedish survey by B. Steckzén does not give sources at all and appears to misunderstand some of the complexities of Scottish politics. See Steckzén, *Svenskt och Brittiskt*, 122–170; Maclean, ‘Montrose’s Preparations’, in Hatton and Anderson, eds., *Studies in Diplomatic History*, 7–31.

actually facilitated subsequent negotiations between the Montrosian representative and the Swedish government, although Ruthven remained the leading Royalist contact.³⁵ However, the arrival of Montrose in Scandinavia inevitably also led to confrontation between the Montrosian and Covenanter factions. The events leading up to the ill-fated Montrosian campaign of 1650 had begun five years earlier when James Graham, Marquis of Montrose, had been declared a traitor by the Scottish Parliament in February 1645. He was already in Charles I's service acting as the king's titular governor-general of Scotland. Charles II retained Montrose in his service and by June 1649 authorised his idea for an armed invasion of Scotland on behalf of the Stuart cause. As Charles II did not have the capacity to supply financial or military support to Montrose, missions for assistance from northern states, including Hamburg, Denmark and Sweden were approved, and Kristina learned of Montrose's plans in early July as part of this.³⁶ Just ten days later Kristina replied negatively to Charles, informing him that she could not accept his proposals, at least not in the form transmitted by his agent, Colonel Sir William Bellenden.³⁷ It is possible that some of the Scots in Kristina's service and immediate environment would have influenced her decision, presumably those who were more favourable toward the Covenanters.

After reaching Scandinavia, Montrose remained a time in Denmark, where he made his *Declaration* and announced his imminent campaign in support of Charles II. The place of publication for this document was given as Gothenburg, unsurprising given the size and strength

³⁵ Although Cowan notes that "Montrose sent personally accredited representatives to Sweden, Saxony and Denmark", *Montrose*, 272, he only succeeded because of Patrick Ruthven's earlier mission. Even the supplies he initially got from Sweden were those which Ruthven had organised on behalf of the Marquis of Ormonde, *ibid.*, 273. See also 6/16 March 1649–50, letter from Rollen, *Letters and papers illustrating the relations between Charles the second and Scotland in 1650*, ed. S.R. Gardiner, (Edinburgh: 1894), 29–31; E. Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, *The History of the Great Rebellion* (7 vols., Oxford University Press: 1849), V, 42; and J. Willcock, *The great Marquess, life and times of Archibald, 8th Earl and 1st (and only) Marquess of Argyll (1607–1661)* (Edinburgh: 1903), 229; Maclean, 'Montrose's Preparations', in Hatton and Anderson, eds., *Studies in Diplomatic History*, 8 and 11.

³⁶ 6 July 1649, Charles II to Kristina, SRA, Anglica 517; Steckzén, *Svenskt och Brittiskt*, 145 and 151.

³⁷ 17 July 1649, SRA, Anglica E532. The Riksråd did not record a visit from Bellenden in 1649. Carte notes a letter dated August (which I have not found) telling Charles that despite his Scottish subjects in Sweden "pressing her to intercede" for him, Kristina still could not do so, *Life of Ormonde*, III, 459.

of the Scottish community there and implying that the marquis had obtained a level of Swedish support.³⁸ He left Denmark early in November having obtained crucial financial and military supplies there, and made his way to Gothenburg.³⁹ This location was an obvious choice for many reasons. Warships could come and go without entering the Danish Sound (an easy place for the English navy to blockade looking for Royalists), and the journey to Scotland from there was quite short. Montrose also had an ally to stay with in the person of John Maclean. Like many former Covenanters, Maclean did not agree with the English Parliament's act of regicide while he also maintained an active grudge against Marquis of Argyll, leader of the Covenanters in Scotland. Not only was Argyll a long-time enemy of Maclean's family in Scotland for the arrest of John's brother Lachlan in early 1640, but Argyll was also the leading force in the Scottish Parliament.⁴⁰ The marital relationship between the Maclean and Cochrane families (their children had intermarried) must have further encouraged Maclean's involvement.⁴¹ Montrose remained with Maclean for three months, during which time the governor of Älvsborg region, Per Ribbing, and the Admiral, Mårten Anckarhielm, had orders to leave Montrose unmolested.⁴² Despite the protection the Swedish government gave both Montrose and his mission, the marquis never made any contact with either the Swedish government or court. However, he was in steady receipt of Scottish officers and even shiploads of soldiers for his use.⁴³

³⁸ See British Library, Thomason Tract E.1294 (3), *Declaration of his Excellency James Marques of Montrose, Earl of Kincairn, Lord Graeme, Baron of Montdev, Lieutenant Governor and Captaine Generall for his Majestie of the Kingdom of Scotland*, (Gothenburg: 1649) and Wishart, *Memoirs of Montrose*, 265.

³⁹ Already in September news reached England of the imminent departure of a ship from Amsterdam with supplies for Montrose destined for Scotland. See 15 September 1649, *CSPD 1649–1650*, 311. See also Wishart, *Deeds of Montrose*, 260; Cowan, *Montrose*, 273; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 151–152, 154–155 and 158.

⁴⁰ Cowan, *Montrose*, 90; Maclean, 'Montrose's Preparations', in Hatton and Anderson, *Studies in Diplomatic History*, 17.

⁴¹ Catherine Cochrane married Colonel Jacob Maclean who went on to follow the Stuart Court around Europe. John Cochrane himself was married to Grace Butler a cousin of the Marquis of Ormonde in Ireland, who was to have organised the Irish uprising in Charles Stuart's name. See *SAA*, V, 143.

⁴² Steckzén, *Svenskt och Brittiskt*, 155.

⁴³ Wishart, *Memoirs of Montrose*, 262, and Turner, *Memoirs*, 91.

James King returned to Stockholm at the end of 1649 with Charles' orders to negotiate on behalf of Montrose at the court.⁴⁴ In early January, he managed to get the Swedish government to sell him the frigate *Harderinnan* with full equipment and 2 months worth of provisions for 50 men for the sum of 4,893 daler.⁴⁵ He further received provisions from both the Stockholm and Kalmar armouries in early January, which in total could easily arm 4,000 to 5,000 men.⁴⁶ Although international newsletters of the time stated authoritatively that neither Montrose nor King obtained supplies in the name of Charles Stuart from the Swedish court, a 'Letter from Sweden' dated 26 January 1650, mentioned that John Maclean had provided 60,000 riksdaler personally for the campaign, though it has been demonstrated elsewhere that this was an exaggeration. The true figure was closer to 16,000 riksdaler.⁴⁷ Charles II requested that Kristina appoint a Swedish ambassador for Scotland and highlighted the number of his loyal subjects living in Sweden and asked that Maclean be allowed to transport material for him without the imposition of heavy taxes.⁴⁸ The queen sent copies of two of these letters to Axel Oxenstierna seeking his advice on how best to proceed.⁴⁹ It is evident he advised her to support King Charles. By April 1650 it was also clear that this support was to be military as well as 'humanitarian' and Charles II himself wrote and thanked her for her support.⁵⁰ Republican

⁴⁴ Warrant to Sir Edward Nicholas From Charles II, March 19/29 March 1649/50 in Abbott, *Oliver Cromwell*, II, 254. See also Gardiner, ed., *Charles the Second and Scotland*, 38–39.

⁴⁵ Zettersten, *Svenska Flottans Historia*, II, 570. *Harderinnan* had been purchased from Louis De Geer in 1645, carried 8 guns and had a crew of 54 sailors.

⁴⁶ Steckzén, *Svenskt och Brittiskt*, 155–8. The supplies were: 3 light cannon, 2,400 muskets, 1,700 pikes, 3,000 infantry swords, 600 cavalry swords, 820 pairs of pistols, 2,000 cavalry harnesses, 30 'bardisaner', and 20 drums along with cannonshot and powder. The close similarity to the earlier supplies for Charles may mean that the first batch had never left Sweden. Other sources list supplies for 1,500 men or more, see also 26 June 1649, Cochrane to Duke James of Courland in Morland-Simpson, 'Civil War Papers', 173, fn. 6.

⁴⁷ 26 January 1650, Gardiner, ed., *Charles the Second and Scotland*, 5–6. See also 14 March 1650, letter from Elsinore, 35–36. A letter from Bremen, although confirming Montrose's position, denied the involvement of Kristina, 26 March 1650, 42. For the true figures see Maclean, 'Montrose's Preparations', in Hatton and Anderson, eds., *Studies in Diplomatic History*, 29.

⁴⁸ 15/25 February 1650, *CSPD 1650*, 610; Wishart, *Memoirs of Montrose*, 273, 275 and 509–10, including a letter from Kristina to John Maclean authorising the conveyance of weapons and ammunition to him.

⁴⁹ 20 February 1650, Kristina to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, *AOSB*, E582.

⁵⁰ 2 April 1650, *CSPD 1650*, 80–1. This source claims the letter was never sent.

English sources noted that Montrose had even gained more than he had hoped for from the Swedish queen including weapons.⁵¹

Significant support was also supplied to the Royalists through the Scottish network in Sweden.⁵² The Gothenburg shipping manifests from 1649 list a ship carrying goods for John Maclean departing from Gothenburg for Scotland on 17th December.⁵³ In January of 1650 the vanguard of Montrose's army consisted of one warship and two merchant ships, 200 recruited soldiers from Denmark, one boatload of weapons and about 30–40 Scottish officers under the command of Major William Guthrie.⁵⁴ These headed for Orkney, intending to secure a landing on the mainland of Scotland from there. The English agent in Stockholm, Colonel Christopher Potley, alerted his countrymen to Montrose's departure from Sweden.⁵⁵ In the meantime, Montrose

⁵¹ 9/19 February 1649/50, letter from Bremen, 14 and 6/16 March 1650, letters from Elsinore and Rouen, Gardiner, ed., *Charles the Second and Scotland*, 31, 35–36. See also Wishart, *Memoirs of Montrose*, 273.

⁵² Clarendon noted “there were many officers of good name and reputation in Sweden of the Scottish nation [...] who undertook, as well for others as themselves, that if the Marquis engaged himself in the Kingdom of Scotland, they would give him notable assistance in money, arms and men”, *History of the Rebellion*, V, 122.

⁵³ See no. 110 in Göteborgs Drätselkammare 1649, Göteborg Landsarkiv, I.V.A. no. 1, ref. 819; A further document listing the weapons provided by Sweden exists in NAS. The two lists do not match exactly however, although there are many similarities. The Scottish document specifically described weapons shipped from Gothenburg for Montrose's use, and dates from January 1650. The Gothenburg information listed 8 cannon, with 1,000 cannonballs, 1,536 muskets, 1,510 pikes, 2,750 swords, 1,040 bandoliers, 150 sets of horse armour, 36 barrels of shot, matches for matchlock guns, 24 drums, 20 bags of musketshot, 1 case of shot moulds, 2,600 spikes, 112 spades, 12 carriages and 100 cavalry harnesses. See 6 January 1650, Manifest of Weapons loaded at Gothenburg, NAS, GD220/6/2085.

⁵⁴ NAS, GD220/6/2085. See also NAS, GD40/10/4, for a list of the contents of a ship belonging to ‘John Maclure’ (John Maclean) naming arms and ammunition. In late January the Riksråd were provided with drawings sent from Gothenburg of how the royalist Scottish general Montrose had adorned the standards and flags for the people he had assembled. On the royal standard was a bloodied head with the inscription “cum deo et ultricibus armis” and on another there were 6 hands, but the inscription is missing from the records, see 24 January 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 11. Other sources list the royal standard for the infantry as “Deo et Victricibus Armis” and the cavalry standard as “Quos Pietas Virtus et Honor fecit Amicos”, see Gardiner, ed., *Charles the Second and Scotland*, 6; Wishart, *Memoirs of Montrose*, 280–1; and Steckzén, *Svenskt och Brittiskt*, 158. On Montrose's own standard there was a lion leaping from one mountain to another with the inscription “nihil medium”.

⁵⁵ Steckzén, *Svenskt och Brittiskt*, 159. Charles II was even believed to be headed toward Denmark and Sweden from whence he would enter Scotland at the head of Montrose's army. 2/12 February 1650, letter from Paris, Gardiner, ed., *Charles the Second and Scotland*, 7.

had waited in the Gothenburg archipelago for word from Charles II as to when he should depart for Scotland with his main force now assembled. In mid-February he eventually sailed for Bergen where he recruited some more notable Scots including Colonel Thomas Gray.⁵⁶ They finally headed out to the Orkneys in March to join his advance party though only two of his three ships reached Kirkwall — one ship with 200 soldiers was lost at sea.⁵⁷ Charles II had a letter waiting for him there, but even this did not specify what Montrose was to do or when.⁵⁸ Montrose daily expected his reinforcements from Bremen and other ports to join him, but knew that his time was running out.⁵⁹

In early April Montrose finally landed on mainland Scotland with his forces barely 2,000 men strong. The campaign ended swiftly in defeat, with Montrose on the run in the Highlands. His desperate bid to seek refuge resulted in his being handed over to the Scottish Parliament and ultimately executed at the end of May, just as ships docked in Gothenburg carrying some of Montrose's remaining officers, including his brother Sir Henry Graham.⁶⁰ The Riksråd got news of Montrose's defeat in early April 1650.⁶¹ Charles II's negotiations with the Scottish Covenanter commissioners at Breda led to his sudden about-face regarding Montrose's expedition. This must have been humiliating for the Royalists in Sweden as Charles II's last-minute withdrawal from the campaign had financially damaged John Maclean, ruined Generals King and Ruthven, and alienated both Colonels Cochrane and Henderson.⁶² The king had effectively sacrificed the

⁵⁶ Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 155. See also 9 February 1650, letter from Bremen, in Gardiner, ed., *Charles the Second and Scotland*, 10. Montrose was alleged to have sent at least 200 soldiers and officers, twelve brass field pieces and arms and ammunition, whilst in Bremen a further group of Scottish, English and Dutch soldiers awaited Montrose's commands.

⁵⁷ English propagandists claimed 1,000 men drowned. See Abbott, *Oliver Cromwell*, II, 254.

⁵⁸ Steckzén, *Svenskt och Brittiskt*, 160.

⁵⁹ Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 155–157 and footnotes.

⁶⁰ Steckzén, *Svenskt och Brittiskt*, 163. Cowan, *Montrose*, 291. This included Captain Hall's frigate and the former Swedish warship *Harderinna*. Kristina ordered that no further provisions were to be supplied to this vessel, except for those which General King had already received. See 1 and 11 May 1650, John Maclean to the Admiralty College and the college's reply to him and letter to Admiral Anckarhielm, KRA, Amiralitetskollegium kansliet, serie B.Ia.

⁶¹ 5 April 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 120.

⁶² Steckzén, *Svenskt och Brittiskt*, 154; Douglas, *Robert Douglas*, 152 and 157; Maclean, 'Montrose's Preparations', in Hatton and Anderson, eds., *Studies in Diplomatic History*,

most important contacts he had in Sweden (and the North), leaving an open door for Republican propagandists and hurting his own reputation in the process.⁶³ Richard Bradshaw gleefully reported that the favour of the Hamburg people had turned from reviling the English for having killed Charles I to being angry with ‘the Scots’ for executing Montrose.⁶⁴

Sweden, Kristina and the Breda negotiations

The ‘Scots’ in question were of course the Covenanters. Charles II became engaged in negotiations with the Marquis of Argyll and the Scottish Estates even before he sent Montrose on his ill-fated campaign. Already in July 1649 Charles thought he had come to an agreement with the Scottish commissioners, pending two articles concerning the Covenant for which negotiations continued into 1650.⁶⁵ He requested that Kristina mediate between him and the Scots and send her commissioner to Breda. The Scottish commissioners, fully aware of Montrose’s meetings with Charles, had repeatedly asked the king to ban Montrose from his presence. Once Montrose began to levy forces and request military support from other foreign powers the commissioners even questioned Charles directly as to his involvement with the marquis, but the king never responded to the queries.⁶⁶

This led to the arrival in Stockholm of Hugh Mowatt in July 1649 with a letter from the Scottish Estates. This letter caused great wonder as it was sealed with the signet of the Marquis of Argyll, a ‘radical’

26–30. Maclean lost the four ships *Unicorn* (12 guns), *King David* (24 guns), *Mary* (12 guns, and *Catherine* (unarmed) — all taken by the English Republican navy. General James King was forced to mortgage his Swedish properties to Colonel Robert Douglas, who later inherited the estates on King’s death in 1652. General Ruthven had already mortgaged his estates.

⁶³ By September 1650 Sir John Cochrane, absconded with all the funds, supplies and even the ship he had procured from the Duke of Courland for Montrose’s cause. This act of defiance by one of Charles’ most active loyalists revealed just how deeply the Stuart king had wounded his supporters. Other sources deem it simply as an individual’s failure to support Charles II wholeheartedly, see S. Seliga and L. Koczy’s, *Scotland and Poland: a Chapter of forgotten history* (Glasgow: 1969), 8. This is challenged by Murdoch’s ‘The Search for Northern Allies’, in Taithe and Thornton eds., *Propaganda*, 84.

⁶⁴ 18 June 1650, Richard Bradshaw to Sir Oliver Fleming, *RCHM*, Sixth Report, 426.

⁶⁵ 8 July 1649, SRA, *Anglica*, 532.

⁶⁶ March–June 1649, *APS*, VI, 451, 453, and 458.

Covenanter whom the Swedes would have considered Charles Stuart's fiercest Scottish opponent. The letter concerned the disturbances in 'Great Britain', the death of Charles I and contained a special appendix explaining particularly how the Scottish Estates distanced themselves from the regicide.⁶⁷ The letter also detailed how the Estates had invited Charles II to Scotland to take on a regiment in defence of his father, but that he had not accepted the offer. The Estates were at this point seeking Kristina's intercession on their behalf with Charles II, whom they had declared king as soon as the news of his father's death had reached Edinburgh.⁶⁸ Indeed there followed a succession of letters to the Swedish queen and Riksråd from the Scottish Estates and notable Scottish subjects regretting the disturbances in Great Britain, and particularly the death of the king.⁶⁹

Kristina wondered whether or not to answer the Scottish letters as she was concerned that the authors were trying to excuse themselves from traitorous behaviour, revealing how little she knew of the political situations in Scotland and England.⁷⁰ A few months later Alexander Leslie defended himself and the Scottish population from accusations that they had partaken in and supported Charles's execution. Leslie emphasised the depth of his disapproval over the king's death in a letter to Oxenstierna.⁷¹ It was at this point that the newspapers from London began to provide accounts of the particularly Scottish state of affairs and the Scots' relationship to Charles II. In November Kristina read out a report that 20,000 Scots had marched into England in support of the king the previous year. This was apparently the first news in Sweden of the 'Engagement' between some of the Covenanters and Charles I.⁷² As a result the Swedish

⁶⁷ 16 July 1649, *SRP*, XIII, 180. "huru thet hafver nu utslagit mädh Kungens undergång, hvilket alt dhe villa eskylla sigh före". See also the Scottish Estates's letter to Kristina, dated 14 June 1649, as described in *APS*, VI, 459. However the appendix is missing. Leslie had informed Oxenstierna about such a letter in June. See 16 June 1649, *RAOSB*, IX, 513.

⁶⁸ *APS*, VI, 157.

⁶⁹ 14, 19 and 22 June 1649, Scottish Parliament to Queen Kristina and 19 and 22 June 1649, Chancellor Louden to Riksråd, *SRA*, *Scotica*, I; 16 July 1649, *SRP*, XIII, 182. Many of these latter letters also contained private business, but are interesting in the maintenance of contact as they deal with Swedish veterans, thus reminding the Swedes of the military debt to Scotland.

⁷⁰ As the Queen had little or no contact with the Scots in her service she had no direct reliable source of information on Scottish affairs.

⁷¹ 21 September 1649, *RAOSB*, IX, 514–5.

⁷² 1 October and 15 November 1649, *SRP*, XIII, 273 and 308.

queen contemplated whether to write back to Scotland and let them know how the rest of the world saw the events — and whether to inform the Prince of Wales of the Scottish Estates' correspondence, along with copies of Kristina's answer. Oxenstierna advised the queen to write only to the Prince of Wales and to avoid personal involvement in the complex issues.

Of greater significance to Scottish-Swedish relations was the Commissioners' demands that Charles sign both the National Covenant and the Solemn League and Covenant.⁷³ Some of the Riksråd could not understand how the Commissioners expected the king to sign their Covenants, whereas Kristina herself seemed unsure as to what the Covenants even were. One of the Riksråd then described the hard conditions the Scottish Estates had placed on Prince Charles during the negotiations at Breda. These were to release all his father's servants, to pass an act excluding Engagers and Royalists from taking public office in Scotland, the Act of Classes, and to confirm the Presbyterian religion in Scotland. Kristina's reaction was that as the matter was still unclear she could not yet support the Scots, not least because of the unofficial manner in which they had approached her.

When the Riksråd learned of the Scottish Commissioners' presentation to Charles II, in February 1650, Kristina knew that he had already been presented with and rejected these conditions the previous year.⁷⁴ She also remarked that Charles I's trust in the Scots had only resulted in his 'betrayal' to the English Parliament, buying into Montrosian propaganda and not quite grasping the full complexity of British politics at the time. Although Kristina declared that she wanted a happy conclusion to Charles II's difficulties, she still believed that his reinstatement in Scotland was the key to regaining the English crown, implying that she valued the latter over the Scottish crown. In consultation with Oxenstierna she proposed that the Riksråd should consider her mediation in this affair, as it would not only be a Christian act to help Charles, but it also involved mutual royal concerns.⁷⁵

At the end of 1649, Charles II wrote directly to Kristina asking for help against the Scottish Estates and the English Parliament with authorisation for another Stuart envoy, Robert Meade.⁷⁶ This must

⁷³ See copies of Charles II's debates with the Scottish Commissioners as copied to the Swedes in, SRA, Scotica, I.

⁷⁴ 7 February 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 41.

⁷⁵ 20 February 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 52.

⁷⁶ This was in response to a letter brought to him by Sir William Bellenden,

have surprised Kristina and her government as it came after negotiations with the Scottish Estates, concerned a clearly different mission from James King, Patrick Ruthven and Montrose. Charles was now preparing for war in Scotland. Kristina answered and apologised for not being able to help him in any way adding, "I cannot consent to your propositions without wronging the welfare of a state the interests whereof ought to be dearer to mee than any other consideration whatsoever".⁷⁷ This was quite a turnaround from her original stance just half a year earlier. It may have been a letter designed to be intercepted by anti-Stuart agents, as it would serve them to show that the Royalists had no friends in Sweden. Or perhaps it was to keep her double-dealings secret from the English Parliament. More likely Kristina simply did not want to be part of Charles II's duplicity against his own loyal supporters.⁷⁸ Kristina decided that it was up to the Scots and the Irish to reinstall Charles II rather than wait for foreign intervention or for the English to overthrow their Parliament. The Stuart king needed a Scottish foothold before foreign potentates could support him, even for a military incursion into England — as the English would not let him in without a swordfight.⁷⁹

Just a fortnight later Kristina declared that Charles would never regain the throne due to his arrogant behaviour, referring to both Charles' mistreatment of his supporters and to his lack of direct communication with her.⁸⁰ On Oxenstierna's advice Kristina doubted that she could ever assist Charles II. She considered involving France or Spain on Charles' behalf, but she did not trust them not to lead him out of the ashes into the fire. Oxenstierna concluded that Charles had to win over the Scots until the English, along with the Irish, sought to attack Scotland. Then either the Scots would reinstate him, or some other kind of split would develop between the kingdoms as

who seemed to be working as a courier between the two monarchs, 10/20 November 1649, Charles II to Kristina, SRA, Anglica 517. The letter introduced Robert Meade as Charles' agent. An undated letter from Kristina to Charles II refers to Charles's envoy Bellenden and the royal proposal he brought with him. See Kristina to Charles II, SRA, Anglica 532. A modern hand has written 17/7 presumably referring to both old and new style dating.

⁷⁷ No date, PRO SP95, Va, no. 32.

⁷⁸ 20 February 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 50–51.

⁷⁹ 20 and 25 February 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 51–2. See also Wishart, *Memoirs of Montrose*, 273 and 509–10.

⁸⁰ Indeed Kristina was one of several heads of state who were dismayed at the Stuart king's lack of communication. 3/13 February 1650, *CSPD 1650*, 505. This information came from Meade in Gothenburg.

seemed likely to happen. Kristina remained doubtful of the conditions the Scots Commissioners had laid upon Charles II. She believed this would deprive him of his most loyal supporters, and that it was wrong of Charles to threaten even those who had rebelled against him, for if pardoned the king could expect service from them.⁸¹

Oxenstierna had met Robert Meade by 19 March, and Kristina sought her Chancellor's latest advice on mediating for Charles II with the Scots.⁸² He felt it was important to know exactly what the mediation entailed and that the Swedish queen should be careful not to harm her own reputation by helping Charles. Kristina was adamant that Charles should not be reduced to being a titular king, and argued vehemently for Charles' royal prerogative to do as he pleased. She felt that Charles should leave Breda and start behaving like a king and assert his authority. Being a king was what God and nature had intended Charles to be, in Kristina's opinion, whereas accepting the Scottish Commissioners' conditions would make a mockery of all kings, and indeed place the very institution of monarchy under threat. She noted that his advisors wanted him to accept conditions which Kristina doubted they would themselves agree to if placed in his position. She felt that if he yielded to the pressures, Charles would become the kind of king that his advisors would take their hats off to one minute and then cut off his head the next. Kristina advised that Charles should instead provide a general amnesty, perhaps punishing the most guilty, such as the signatories of the late king's death warrant. Meade had mentioned that an amnesty was a focal point for any negotiation with the king. Kristina believed that the English had, in fact, exchanged one tyrant, as they had called him, for many in the Parliament. The Swedish queen firmly stated that, as both sides had asked her, there would be no harm in attempting mediation, particularly to re-establish Charles II in Scotland. However, Oxenstierna's mistaken belief that the Stuart king did not have any Scottish ministers, combined with Kristina's opinion that Charles could not rely on the Scots as they had betrayed his father, made this seem an impossible task.⁸³

⁸¹ 11 March 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 74–75.

⁸² 19 March 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 82–84.

⁸³ 19 March 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 83: Oxenstierna's words were "Han [Charles II] hafver inge schotsche ministerer" while Kristina stated that "Kongen hafver svårt att betro sigh Skåttarne, som hafva selgdt hans fader".

Kristina decided that whoever the Swedes sent as envoy would be instructed to keep her country out of Stuart affairs if war was imminent, but to retain a general interest in remedying the situation. Kristina considered using Laurence Cantersten, already a Swedish envoy in the Netherlands, for whom instructions, authorisation and letters were prepared by the next out-going post on the 19 March 1650.⁸⁴ Three days later the Swedish queen replied to the Scottish Parliament's letter of June 1649 commending her agent Cantersten as a mediator between their representatives and Charles II in Breda.⁸⁵ Kristina also wrote to Charles urging him to come to agreement with his Scottish subjects.⁸⁶

At the end of May, Kristina informed the Riksråd that the Scottish Commissioners had accepted Charles II as their king after the Breda talks, and her mediation had been successful, although she made no mention that the Stuart king had in fact accepted the Covenants.⁸⁷ Charles too found that the Breda talks went well, particularly due to Kristina's intervention, and he thanked her for providing him with a copy of the letter she had sent to Scotland, presumably the one to the Scottish Estates.⁸⁸ After the Breda Treaty, Charles became very confident of his position and even offered his powers of mediation to Kristina in regard to the ongoing Swedish-Polish negotiations. The queen did not reject the offer, but opined that Charles was still

⁸⁴ 19 March 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 82–4. See also the Danish resident in Sweden, Peder Juel's, letter to his government of 3 April 1650 in Fryxell, *Handlingar rörande Sverges historia*, part one, 90.

⁸⁵ 22 March 1650, Kristina to the Scottish Parliament, and Kristina to Charles II, *SRA*, Scotica 1; 30 March 1650, Fryxell, *Handlingar rörande sverges historia*, part one, 89 and 90. 22 March 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 99. The draft of her letter to Charles was read out at the Riksråd meeting.

⁸⁶ 26 April/4 May 1650, letter from Breda, in Gardiner, ed., *Charles the Second and Scotland*, 79.

⁸⁷ 24 May 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 166. Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion*, V, 117–119; 11/25 May 1650 letter from Paris, Gardiner, ed., *Charles II and Scotland*, 103–4; and Young, *Scottish Parliament*, 246–258.

⁸⁸ 14 May 1650, Charles II to Kristina, *SRA*, Anglica 517. There had even been a Swedish offer to take Charles II into Sweden, see 26 April 1650, Sir Edward Hyde to Secretary Edward Nicholas, *Clarendon Papers*, II, 55. Indeed there were rumours of a marriage match between the two monarchs. 6/16 May 1650, J.P. to ?, Gardiner, ed., *Charles the Second and Scotland*, 86–7; see also 9/19 May 1650, Letter from Breda, 91. Both these letters imply that Kristina's secretary Cantersten was responsible for the matrimonial suggestion. Kristina's invitation to Charles was confirmed on 11/21 May, Captain Meade to Secretary Nicholas, 101. See also Wishart, *Memoirs of Montrose*, 271–272.

far more in need of mediation himself than he was ready to supply it to others.⁸⁹

Reports arrived in Sweden from the Dutch Republic in mid July announcing that Charles II had landed in Scotland and was soon to be crowned by his loyal subjects there.⁹⁰ The English Parliamentary forces launched an attack on Scotland which ended with the Royalist defeat at Dunbar in September 1650.⁹¹ Dunbar broke the power of the Radical Covenanters and the former Engager party grew in strength. The new Scottish regime ordered that the remainders of the weapons gathered in Bergen and Gothenburg for the Montrosian campaign be sent for in October 1650, presumably to replenish their own reduced military supplies and in preparation for their continued campaign.⁹² Despite Dunbar, Charles was once again reinstated in his Scottish kingdom and was at last crowned King of Great Britain and Ireland on his native island.⁹³

However, the Swedish involvement on Charles II's behalf had lasted barely a year, and after the failure of Montrose's expedition Swedish fervour for the Stuart cause abated. Official relations with the British Isles were soon to take another turn completely, as the English republic grew ever stronger. Concern for Stuart Scotland swiftly gave way to political interest in England. News that other foreign states were undertaking relations with Cromwell probably also pressured Sweden into becoming engaged in similar relations.⁹⁴

The Swedish crossover in favour of the English Parliament begins

Just as Charles II was crowned Kristina had learned that the most recent supply of military succour that she had granted to him had been sacrificed along with the Marquis of Montrose. Justifiably shocked

⁸⁹ 4 July 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 214.

⁹⁰ 18 July 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 227. The Scots soon imposed further conditions on Charles II such as ending all communication with Ormonde and guaranteeing the introduction of Presbyterianism into Ireland and England, see R. Hutton, *The British Republic 1649–1660* (London: 1990), 94.

⁹¹ See D. Hurst, 'The English Republic and the meaning of Britain', in Bradshaw and Morrill, eds., *British Problem*, 197 and 200.

⁹² Noted in Wishart, *Memoirs of Montrose*, 247 fn.

⁹³ Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 163–164.

⁹⁴ 26 January 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 16.

at their betrayal by Charles II, the major players among the Scottish Royalists in Sweden washed their hands of their erstwhile master. Those Royalists who had pressured the Swedes so hard to support the Stuart cause had now become estranged and creeping doubts about the relationship with the House of Stuart returned. Swedish reservations encouraged by the disaffected Montrosian Scots were compounded by some influential propaganda emanating from England. John Milton's *Defence of the English People* arrived in Stockholm in 1651 and was seen as an eloquent counterblast to the pro-Royalist work of Salmasius.⁹⁵ Kristina decided that the Englishman's argument in favour of the new English Republic was convincing, to the extent that she allegedly banished Salmasius from the kingdom.⁹⁶

Developments in England were not only politically of interest but the Swedes were concerned about how it could affect trade. They were very aware of a possible alliance between England and Spain as promoted by some Puritans in England.⁹⁷ The decline in the amount of goods destined for England and Scotland passing through the Sound, particularly with Sweden as the point of origin, from 1650 until 1655 indicated the extent of the loss of Scottish influence in Sweden.⁹⁸ When the newspapers of London reported that Charles II had sent an ambassador to Spain in March this not only had implications for both Sweden and the English Parliament in terms of trade, but worried Sweden greatly in case Charles should form a military alliance with Spain and turn against Sweden.⁹⁹ No evidence has been found to suggest that Charles contemplated such an alliance. His ambassadors, though well received, achieved little in Spain. Indeed the Spanish were the first to recognise the English Republic.¹⁰⁰

In September 1650, after hearing foreign news reports, the Riksråd discussed how the English Parliament seemed ready to undertake

⁹⁵ Milton on the other hand published a panegyric to Kristina in his '*Second Defence of the people of England*', see *Works of Milton*, eds. Patterson et al., III, 102–109; Murdoch, 'The Search for Northern Allies', in Taithe and Thornton, eds., *Propaganda*, 87.

⁹⁶ As reported in *Mercurius Politicus*, *The Nicholas Papers*, I, 317–318; Murdoch, 'The Search for Northern Allies', in Taithe and Thornton, eds., *Propaganda*, 87.

⁹⁷ 11 March 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 73. See also F.G. Montague, *The History of England from the accession of James I to the restoration 1603–1660* (London: 1907), 388; and Abbott, *Oliver Cromwell*, II, 489.

⁹⁸ Bang, ed., *Tabeller over skibsfart og varetransport gennem Øresund 1497–1660*, I, 358–379. See Appendix A.

⁹⁹ 14 February 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 49.

¹⁰⁰ Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion*, VI, 95–106 and 164; and Abbott, *Oliver Cromwell*, II, 381.

action against Scotland following victory in Ireland. If successful it would render Parliament very strong through an ample supply of ships and experienced naval officers. There was obviously an admiration bordering on trepidation as to how the English events were unfolding and its impact on the North Sea countries.¹⁰¹ It was early October before the Swedish court heard news of the Scottish Covenanters' defeat at Dunbar. Worries were aired as to the possible effects this might have on Swedish trade. Kristina was also aware of the unrest in France which she viewed as particularly inconvenient after the recent English victory. French support was one of the Stuarts' few constants at this period. Charles had only recently made his peace with the Scottish Commissioners at Breda, and yet the Swedes received a copy of a declaration purportedly from Charles against the Scottish Estates at this very point.¹⁰² In typical fashion the Riksråd did not note the contents of this document, and a copy of it has not yet been found in Sweden. This may relate to the 1650 Remonstrance which Charles was forced to sign by the Kirk and Estates commissioners of Scotland.¹⁰³

All the while the English Parliament wanted to send an agent to Kristina's court from late 1649 in the form of Colonel Potley.¹⁰⁴ His work on behalf of the Parliament was timely for the Swedes as other states began to consider formally accepting the English Republic. Dutch recognition was imminent in the face of Charles II's lack of authority and the Danes, allies of the United Provinces, also hoped for a settlement,¹⁰⁵ whilst the Swedes expected that Dutch jealousy over English trade successes would prevent any Anglo-Dutch alliance.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰¹ 12 September 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 298.

¹⁰² 3 October 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 327–8. This coincided with failed Royalist attempts in Scotland to gain Charles' support for military action. See Young, *Scottish Parliament*, 262.

¹⁰³ 15 October 1650, letter of the Dean of Tuam to the Marquis of Ormonde, in Gardiner, ed., *Charles the Second and Scotland*, 142. Another possibility is that the supposed declaration of Charles against the Estates was a piece of disinformation organised by disaffected Scots living in Sweden.

¹⁰⁴ Bulstrode Whitelocke, who himself later served as the Parliament's ambassador to Sweden in 1653, had recommended Potley's commission by the English council of state as envoy to Denmark and Sweden, in March 1649. 31 March 1649, Spalding, ed., *Diary of Whitelocke*, 235. The Riksråd recorded no formal visit from a Parliamentary envoy that year, but then Ruthven had been instructed to ensure that the Swedes would not receive any envoy. Potley might well have had a commission, the Swedes did not accept it. See 1648? Notes by Robert Long, *HMC, Pepys Manuscripts*, 246.

¹⁰⁵ *Danmark-Norges Traktater*, V, 136.

¹⁰⁶ 6 December 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 424. An English embassy was sent to the Hague

The Portuguese ambassador to Sweden told Oxenstierna that his king was also preparing to recognise England as a republic in respect of her military superiority over Charles II. With Sweden already allied to Portugal, Swedish ships were prone to attack from either England or the Netherlands as long as these countries remained enemies of Portugal and so they were keen for these recognitions to take place.¹⁰⁷ The Swedes were moving further and further away from the Stuart cause.

By August 1651 the number of potential benefits Sweden could enjoy as a consequence of friendship with England outweighed continued alliances with the Stuarts. One councillor felt that the English Parliament should be kept favourable to Sweden and that Scotland was only of concern to Sweden because the Scots had accepted Charles II as their rightful king, and this had influenced Kristina. Oxenstierna argued that what counted was that contacts with Scotland's nobility would be lost if Scotland were subsumed under England. Even so Oxenstierna's final advice was to seek friendship with England as the damage otherwise would be too great for Sweden.¹⁰⁸ He was right to suggest this as Scotland soon fell under the Cromwellian usurpation. The Riksråd learned of the defeat of Scottish forces at Inverkeithing, soon followed by the total defeat of the Royalist army at Worcester in September.¹⁰⁹

Although this should have settled any Swedish hesitation, Kristina was still largely ambivalent toward the two major opposing factions from Britain. In September 1652, the Spanish envoy to Sweden, Don Antonio Pimentel, informed his king that neither naval nor any other form of military aid was being prepared in Sweden for Charles II or for the English Parliamentary forces.¹¹⁰ Despite this there were still some Scots in Sweden who were in contact with Charles II. Lieutenant-General Robert Douglas received a letter from the king in November 1652 commending him for his support, and asking how the situation

to form an alliance, but the offer was rejected. In response, the Navigation Act was passed in the English Parliament in August 1651. It was almost a direct attack on the Dutch shipping trade (only English owned and manned ships or those of the same origin as the goods imported were allowed into the British Isles), and soon the Anglo-Dutch war erupted. See *Danmark-Norges Traktater*, V, 17 Howatt, *Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy*, 70–2; Abbott, II, 419–20 and 541–571.

¹⁰⁷ 17 January and 5 August 1651, *SRP*, XV, 4, 7, and 76.

¹⁰⁸ 14 August 1651, *SRP*, XV, 97–99.

¹⁰⁹ 21 August 1651, *SRP*, XV, 100.

¹¹⁰ 7 September 1652, Pimentel to Filip IV, *Don Antonio Pimentels Depescher från drottning Christinas hov 1652–1656, jämte svarskrivelser och spanska statrådsprotokoll*, Historiska Handlingar, ed. N. Berencreutz, (Stockholm: 1961), part 37, I, 20.

was in Sweden with regard to the Stuart cause. According to Charles, Lieutenant-General Middleton was en route for Sweden to test Kristina's interest, and he would heed any advice Douglas had to give him.¹¹¹

Colonel Potley's report had revealed to the English Parliament how shallow Kristina's regard for the Stuart cause was, indicating the possibility of closer relations between the English Republic and Sweden. When issues of trade and security forced this issue, the queen, despite her determination to remain out of the hostilities fermenting between the English and the Dutch, found herself drawn into the conflict. The English Parliamentary navy had begun taking and confiscating Swedish merchant ships and their goods, using the excuse that the Dutch were covertly trading in England with Swedish ships.¹¹² Once missions seeking restitution and recompense were initiated between Sweden and the English Parliament, formal diplomatic relations were established, which eventually led to a full-blown English-Swedish treaty. The Scottish-Swedish alliance was under serious threat.

¹¹¹ 16 November 1652, C.H. Firth, ed., *Scotland and the Commonwealth, letters and papers relating to the military government of Scotland from August 1651 to December 1653* (Edinburgh: 1895), 61. Sir Edward Hyde noted in March 1653 that Charles' letter to Douglas was addressed with a higher title than Douglas was due. See 21 March 1653, Sir Edward Hyde to Lieutenant-General Middleton, in Firth, ed., *Scotland and the Commonwealth*, 105.

¹¹² Spalding, ed., *Diary of White Locke*, 11. It is possible that the Dutch were doing this, but probably not in significant numbers.

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CONCLUSION

ENGLAND AND THE DEMISE OF THE SCOTTISH-SWEDISH ALLIANCE

En ny epok i de svensk-engelska förbindernas historia¹

While the various Scottish factions had struggled to gain support from Sweden during the 1640s, the English were far from idle in the following decade. Early in 1650 Kristina informed the Riksråd that an unnamed envoy from England was on his way to Sweden (probably Colonel John Potley) and she was in a quandary as to how to receive him.² She did not want to offend Parliament, but wondered how she could recognise the authority of the envoy when no other nation had done so, especially in view of the gravity of the act that Parliament had committed against its king.³ However, given Potley's thirty years of service to the Swedish Crown, his presence was tolerated. After all, it was useful to maintain some conduit by which the Swedes could communicate with the English authorities, particularly given the importance of mutual trade to both nations. Indeed, both countries had used commercial warfare to gain the attention of the other. The English parliamentary fleet had already begun arresting Swedish ships in 1647.⁴ This activity increased after 1650 as they began routinely to seize Swedish ships and goods. Particular targets were the Swedish

¹ S.I. Olofson, *Efter Westfaliska Freden: Sveriges Yttre Politik 1650–1654* (Stockholm: 1957), 238.

² Clarendon noted the Swedish reception of an English envoy, probably Potley, See *History of the Rebellion*, VI, 122. He also erroneously stated that Montrose did not get any support from Sweden at all. Olofson talks of an Englishman called Pulyñ travelling as a private person in Sweden who informed the English of Montrose's operations. Since no trace of a Colonel Paulyn has been found and his activities match those of Potley, it is likely that Olofson simply got the name wrong. See Olofson, *Efter Westfaliska Freden*, 238.

³ 1 February 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 31. Within a week, the Riksråd received notice from the Swedish agent Cantarsten of an alliance recently agreed between England and Spain, which would no doubt have worried the Swedes greatly. See 7 February 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 41. The Swedes also received London newspapers dated 18 January with the same information, 14 February 1650, *SRP*, XIV, 49.

⁴ 9 July 1647, *SRA*, Anglica 532.

African Company vessels, trading to and from the Indies, which were frequently brought up and adjudged in London.⁵ Nevertheless, the English Parliament was confident enough to approach Queen Kristina with references to a long tradition of 'peace, traffick and commerce of long continuance' between the two states.⁶ This was a remarkable piece of engineering of recent history, considering the spate of suspicion and ill feeling that had existed between the two states, particularly as Sweden had so recently militarily supported Charles II.

The Swedes implemented a three-pronged attack to address the issue of their seized ships. Oxenstierna recommended that the Swedish resident in The Hague, Peter Spiring, make written contact in Kristina's name to the English Parliament about these ships.⁷ It was also resolved to send Harold Appelbom as Kristina's envoy to the English Parliament to deal with issues of free trade, and that another Swedish representative, Benjamin Bonnel, should travel there as a representative of the shipping company to seek the restitution of the ship *Stockholm*.⁸ It is of interest to note that none of these agents was Scottish, or had connections with the British Isles, and thus the Swedes had no means of obtaining direct personal contact with the authorities in England in the manner that had functioned so well during the earlier decades of the seventeenth century. The Swedes had reached breaking point in terms of the naval infringements they were suffering at the hands of the English Parliament. Kristina was even set to engage English ships with her own navy as discussed in the Riksråd. When the English Parliament released a proclamation regarding trade in early November, Oxenstierna bemoaned the growing might of England to the disadvantage of the other European countries.⁹ In December Kristina decided that Spiring would remain in England. Writing to Cromwell himself, as the major instigator of the regicide, continued to be a

⁵ The records of these activities can be found in SRA, Anglica VII, 541, 'Handlingar ang. Kaperier, 1650–1660'. For De Geer in particular see G. Landberg, *Den Svenske Utrikespolitikens Historia*, part 1, III, (Stockholm: 1952), 79.

⁶ 10 March 1651, SRA, Anglica 521 and *Milton State Papers*, XIII, 55.

⁷ 26 September 1651, Kristina to the English Republic, SRA, Anglica 532. The original letter has 'Not Accepted' noted on the bottom of it. In fact Spiring's authorisation was only accepted with a new letter dated 24 January 1652 to the Parliament of the English Republic (2 copies), SRA, Anglica 532. One of these copies contains an enclosure of a copy of a letter dated 4 October 1651 from Kristina to the English Parliament regarding negotiations around trade and navigation. It is not clear if that one had been sent or not.

⁸ 14 and 28 August 1651, *SRP*, XV, 96 and 101.

⁹ 7 November 1651, *SRP*, XV, 180.

problem to the Swedes, who thought it would be better to see what Spain did first.¹⁰ In any case, the Swedes matched the recent historical fiction of the English Parliament and re-wrote their latest involvement in British politics. Their agents were told to point out to the English Parliament that the Scots had only received humanitarian aid from Sweden, and even that was of a private nature.¹¹ Given the numerous governmental records which prove the contrary, this convenient lie by the Swedish diplomatic service, in the same vein as the Parliament's opening salvo, served to facilitate contact.

When naval troubles between England and Sweden again broke out in 1652, full diplomatic relations between the two kingdoms appeared to provide the best, and only solution to avoid all-out war. However, the Swedes waited until Denmark-Norway's ambassador arrived in England before sending their own, as they did not want to be seen in a rush to establish relations with the new Commonwealth.¹² They obviously felt the trade missions of the three envoys sent to the English Parliament in 1651 were not in any way official diplomatic contacts, despite Spiring's royal authorisation. Spiring unfortunately died in London whilst awaiting the acceptance of his accreditation there and Appelbom inherited the role of Kristina's senior representative.¹³ In the wait for a new ambassador to be sent to England the queen commanded that a new written approach be penned to complement Spiring's initial letter.¹⁴ In the meantime the English also prepared envoys for a mission to Sweden in March 1652.

The first representatives from the English Parliament to arrive in Sweden were the Englishman Daniel Lisle and the Scotsman John Durie.¹⁵ Ostensibly these men merely sought to promote their pan-protestant Irenicist message. Unofficially however they also sought to establish political links between Sweden and the new regime in Britain. Kristina was once again irritated by faulty titling on the envoys'

¹⁰ 12 December 1651, *SRP*, XV, 196.

¹¹ Olofson, *Efter Westfaliska Freden*, 239.

¹² 18 March 1652, *SRP*, XV, 296. The Danish envoy was Henrik Villumsen Rosenvinge, *Danmark-Norges Traktater*, V, 136.

¹³ 1 March 1652, *SRP*, XIV, 275; 27 March 1652, Kristina's authorisation to Appelboom, *SRA*, Anglica, 532; G.H. Turnbull, *Hartlib, Dury, and Comenius: gleanings from Hartlib's papers* (London: 1947), 270.

¹⁴ 10 and 11 May 1652, *SRP*, XV, 316 and 319–20. See also Landberg, *Svenska Utrikespolitikens Historia*, part 1, III, 33 and 74.

¹⁵ Turnbull, *Hartlib, Dury and Comenius*, 270–1; S. Mandelbrote, 'John Dury and the Practise of Irenicism', in N. Aston, ed., *Religious Change in Europe 1650–1914* (Oxford: 1997), 53.

letters and does not seem to have met them. Durie wrote to Hartlib to tell him of the business that he conducted with a Mr. Wolzgen: “who gave me little hope that anything would be obtained here for greater pacification than was already granted”.¹⁶ The Riksråd also received another letter from the English State Council noting the ancient friendship there had always been between England and Sweden, highlighting in particular how Swedish subjects were always well received in ‘the commonwealth’.¹⁷ Again, this was more symptomatic of English hopes for improved relations than an accurate account of the state of affairs. The seizure of Swedish cargo ships travelling to France and Portugal, and returning from Guinea continued to cause official complaints from Sweden until the end of 1652.¹⁸

The Anglo-Dutch war was also of concern to the Riksråd, which contemplated whether the English would be able to destroy Dutch trade. This would have been of benefit to Sweden, and Oxenstierna actually wanted to exploit the Anglo-Dutch war to Sweden’s advantage. He also saw it as beneficial to everyone that England should be under attack, as otherwise the Republic would become overbearingly strong.¹⁹ This unfavourable attitude to England seemed to be Oxenstierna’s alone whilst Kristina continued to seek improved diplomatic relations. As Ralph Josselin observed at the time, ‘The Swedes and wee gaze but each are sending their agents’.²⁰ The English believed Kristina was offering mediation to the Dutch toward achieving a peace between the two warring states, and that 20 Swedish men-of-war had been sent into the North Sea to protect their shipping.²¹ This had no effect on the continued loss of Swedish merchant ships to the English and the confiscation of their cargoes.²² As the

¹⁶ Turnbull, *Hartlib, Dury and Comenius*, 271. Despite this, Lisle, who was unwell and had not been able to participate in discussions, became jealous of Durie’s limited success.

¹⁷ 28 May 1652, SRA, Anglica 521.

¹⁸ 1 November 1652, Appelbom to the English Parliament, SRA, Anglica 532.

¹⁹ 7 October 1652, *SRP*, XV, 352. See also 27 November 1652, Fryxell, *Handlingar rörande Sverges historia*, part one, 94.

²⁰ 24 January 1652/3, *The Diary of Ralph Josselin 1616–1683*, ed., A. Macfarlane (Oxford: 1976), 295.

²¹ 9 and 17 May 1653, in B. Whitelocke, *Memorials of the English Affairs from the beginning of the reign of Charles the First to the happy restoration of king Charles the second*, (4 vols., Oxford: 1853), IV, 10 and 11 respectively.

²² This continued even whilst ambassador Whitelocke was on a mission in Sweden. See 2 July 1653, in Whitelocke, *Memorials*, IV, 20. See also 22 February 1654, in Whitelocke, *Memorials*, IV, 85.

English were considered the *de facto* masters of the North Sea, Kristina felt it was necessary to initiate the use of convoys from Gothenburg to protect Swedish ships. Shipping difficulties were raised in the Riksråd which bemoaned how Swedish vessels travelling to England and the Dutch Republic had to go at their own risk, despite Sweden being technically at peace with all sides.²³ The Riksråd worried that England might be strong enough to undertake an incursion into Denmark-Norway, which would leave Sweden highly vulnerable to an English attack should relations deteriorate further. In a stance similar to that adopted by Gustav II Adolf in 1629, the Swedes decided that Denmark's independence must be maintained, but only for their own self preservation. It was, however, generally believed that England would not focus on the Baltic but rather on ruining Dutch trade, which would naturally impact on the future of commerce in the north.²⁴

As the situation worsened, the Swedes were again approached by the Dutch, who sent their envoy, Konrad von Beuningen, toward the end of September. The Riksråd met von Beuningen, and Oxenstierna expressed Kristina's regrets at the outbreak of war between England and the Dutch Republic. With two nations so near in religion and in close relations, she hoped that soon a peaceful conclusion would be found. She knew that the Dutch expected help from Sweden according to the terms of the mutual treaty they had signed in 1645. Indeed, the Dutch Republic hoped Sweden would forbid the transportation of any ammunition and other military supplies to England. Oxenstierna replied that the Swedish queen could not get involved in this war, as she had turned down an English request for help just prior to this. In addition, Sweden had not received help from the Dutch Republic during their last war with Denmark in 1645, and their treaty with the Republic referred only to situations in the Baltic Sea anyway. Kristina then added that the Dutch Republic had even allied itself against Sweden, thus negating any treaty agreement between the two nations. As a result the queen insisted that she would certainly not prevent any of her subjects from trading with England no matter what their cargo. The heated exchange continued at length without much progress, and the Dutch envoy

²³ Probably around 1 August (no date) 1653, *SRP*, XV, 429.

²⁴ 18 July 1653, *SRP*, XV, 419–20 and 423.

finally left the meeting.²⁵ The situation only resolved itself a year later after the signing of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of London in 1654. This has been described as “a remarkable triumph for the English” on paper at least, granting them new colonies, improved trading rights and compensation for lost shipping.²⁶ The Dutch, on the other hand, received very little. More importantly, politically the English obtained assurances from the Dutch that Charles II would receive no help from them and the treaty boosted English prestige abroad.²⁷

However, the Stuart court in exile continued to press its case with Kristina and her government, and indeed with some of the Scots resident in Sweden.

Stuart-Vasa relations 1653–4

Despite the presence of Colonel Potley at Kristina’s court, Charles II still hoped to use formal means to obtain Swedish support. In May 1653 Sir William Bellenden returned to Sweden on a covert mission for the Stuart king to gain Kristina’s confidence before the arrival of any official Parliamentary ambassador.²⁸ Bellenden’s remit included convincing Kristina of the benefit of an alliance with Denmark-Norway and the United Provinces. However, his first report to Charles did not bode well as Kristina had expressed disappointment at the lack of correspondence from the Stuart king.²⁹ This did not dissuade Charles from his efforts and at the end of the year John Middleton received authorisation to see Kristina from Sir Edward Hyde, Charles II’s secretary of state.³⁰ The king wanted Middleton to collect any remaining military supplies that John Maclean had assembled for the failed Montrosian campaign in 1650. Bellenden

²⁵ 24 September 1653, *SRP*, XV, 476–80.

²⁶ Hutton, *British Republic*, 108.

²⁷ A positive by-product for the English came in the treaty with Denmark-Norway which was virtually dictated by Cromwell as part of the agreement with the Dutch, see *Danmark-Norges Traktater*, V, 145–5.

²⁸ Charles II had informed Karl Casimir, soon to be King Karl X, of Bellenden’s mission, and Count Magnus de la Gardie, the Swedish Treasurer, 2 and 10 May 1653 *Clarendon Papers*, II, 202 and 455, and Warner, *The Nicholas Papers*, II, 73.

²⁹ *Clarendon Papers*, II, 202.

³⁰ 25 December 1653/4 January 1654 Sir Edward Hyde to Lieutenant-General Middleton, *Scotland and the Protectorate, letters and papers relating to the military government of Scotland from January 1654 to June 1653*, ed. C.H. Firth, (Edinburgh: 1899), 3. There is no Riksråd mention of either of these Stuart envoys visiting Sweden at this time, however, and no further details have been discovered.

had in the meantime had to inform the king of General Robert Douglas' recent illness which had prevented him from replying any earlier to Charles' letter sent almost a year previously. Bellenden added that there was little hope of public assistance from Kristina, although there was still a possibility of achieving it privately.³¹ Douglas replied himself to Charles in September 1653 explaining how the position of trust he held in Sweden prevented him from overtly supporting him, but that he could take action privately.³² This confirms that the Swedish government was officially still neutral, if not openly pro-English. Douglas' loyalty to Charles II extended to the Scot providing the king with 5,200 rixdalers, and the news that he was trying to get more funds together from other Scottish subjects living in Sweden.³³ Thus the Scottish Royalist community still had an operational network in Sweden. However, this was just as a new period of social unrest began in Scotland. The Royalists there, led by William Cunningham, the ninth Earl of Glencairn, initiated military action against the Cromwellian occupying forces.³⁴ Once Scotland came directly under English military rule any real chance of Swedish support for Charles II remained distant.³⁵ This had ongoing reverberations for Swedish-Stuart contacts and thereafter Charles' communications with Sweden became sporadic.³⁶ Even when Charles directly approached Scots in Sweden, such as Alexander Erskein, he received reactions similar to those of Douglas. Loyalty to the Swedish Crown and employment there was presented as these individuals' priority, and only once that was completed could employment by, or for, the Stuarts be considered.³⁷ One stalwart was James Maclean, the Scottish

³¹ 10 September, old style, 1653, Sir William Bellenden to Secretary Edward Nicholas, *Clarendon Papers*, II, 255.

³² 14/24 September 1653, Robert Douglas to Charles II, Firth, ed., *Scotland and the Protectorate*, 223–4: "be pleased to kno that from my infancie I hav followed the service of this Croune, whair I am now satlid, and so deipe in ther interistis be the trost reposid in me that I cane nather act personaly, nor furnish such advice as it may be is necessary for the advancement of your Majestis affairs".

³³ 24 September 1654, Robert Douglas to Charles II, *Clarendon Papers*, II, 256. These funds would be organised by William Davison, a merchant at Amsterdam.

³⁴ F.D. Dow, *Cromwellian Scotland 1651–1660* (Edinburgh: 1979), 42, 53, 57–8. See also J. Nicoll, *A Diary of public transactions and other occurrences, chiefly in Scotland, from January 1650 to June 1667* (Edinburgh: 1836), *passim*.

³⁵ G.E. Aylmer, *The King's Servants: the civil service of Charles I, 1625–1642* (London: 1974), 37.

³⁶ Indeed the Stuart faction sought support from the Netherlands, see DRA, TKUA England A1, February 1653, Charles II to Frederick III; 5/15 September and 17/27 November 1653, Nicholas to Wentworth and Nicholas to Hyde, respectively, *Nicholas Papers*, II, 21–22 and 26.

³⁷ See *Calendar of Clarendon State Papers preserved in the Bodleian library*, II, 195.

burgess and merchant resident in Stockholm who provided a particular service to William Bellenden, who was still in Stockholm in 1654. When Bellenden feared that his letters were being intercepted at the post-house, he arranged for his correspondence to be addressed to Maclean's home.³⁸

Whilst contacts with the Stuart camp had more or less ceased, and Dutch approaches were rebuffed, official relations between Kristina and the English Parliament appeared to be gathering pace. The Danish resident in Sweden, Peder Juel, informed his sovereign that an English ambassador was expected in Stockholm in April 1653, and at the same time Bulstrode Whitelocke, himself soon to be sent to Sweden as an ambassador, recorded the arrival of a Swedish 'public minister', presumably Israel Lagerfelt, in London.³⁹ Lagerfelt presented Swedish complaints concerning freedom of shipping and trade in the seas around England, Scotland and Ireland to the English Parliament. In response the English defended their right to scrutinise ships in the area given their ongoing war with the Dutch, and they in turn wanted to be given equal freedoms in the Baltic as any other nation.⁴⁰ Kristina and her government had demonstrated their willingness and desire for closer relations with England, and the changing power structure in both states required that an official embassy be organised. It was not until Whitelocke's embassy to the Vasa court in 1653–4 that an agreement for restitution was made for ships lost by Sweden and relations were formalised between the two states.⁴¹ Ironically, it was during this parliamentary representative's visit to Sweden that elements of the Scottish community in Sweden, several of them Royalists, once again played significant roles in this latest version of British-Swedish state relations.

Whitelocke's embassy to Sweden, 1653–4

By 1653 the English Parliament had more than one motivation in seeking an alliance with Sweden. First, there was the issue of trade,

³⁸ 2 March, old style, 1654, Sir William Bellenden to Edward Nicholas, *Clarendon Papers*, II, 350.

³⁹ 30 April 1653, Fryxell, *Handlingar rörande sverges historia*, part one, 96. Whitelocke, *Memorials*, IV, 2.

⁴⁰ 15 September 1653, *SRP*, XV, 468. See also 23 July 1653, *SRA*, Anglica 532.

⁴¹ Landberg, *Svenska Utrikespolitikens Historia*, part 1, III, 79.

particularly as Dutch negotiations were dragging on. Second, the English needed the assurance that Sweden would not provide support to Charles II, particularly given that a Royalist uprising was underway in Scotland. Whitelocke arrived at Gothenburg harbour in November with full letters of accreditation from the English Parliament. Two months later, once Oliver Cromwell had become the new 'Lord Protector' of England, Scotland and Ireland, new letters of accreditation arrived in Sweden.⁴² In Whitelocke the English had an ambassador so capable that Sweden was transformed into an actively sympathetic nation and a hostile aggressor against the House of Stuart and her allies. Whitelocke's high-profile presence pandered to Kristina's need to be a European 'focal point', making it unlikely she would provide covert support for Scotland.⁴³

Whitelocke's first visitor was the Swedish governor of Gothenburg, who brought his translator, the Scotsman, Colonel David Sinclair. The Colonel was not a neutral Scot: he was a son-in-law of John Maclean, who had provided so much material and financial support to the Marquis of Montrose in 1650. Sinclair paid the ambassador a further visit alone during which he informed him of Gothenburg's highly militarised defences. After a visit from Kristina's vice-admiral (a Dutchman), Whitelocke was introduced to yet another Scotsman living in Gothenburg, Colonel John Nairn, who was in command of a regiment in the town.⁴⁴ A few days after Whitelocke's arrival he also met John Maclean himself, the first of several meetings between them.⁴⁵ The fact that Whitelocke had to conduct English Republican business through a Scottish interpreter should not go unnoticed, nor should the visits from such a prominent Royalist as Maclean. Further, that Gothenburg was served by two Scottish colonels would also

⁴² 21 October 1653, and 23 December 1653, SRA, Anglica 532 and 521. The naming of Cromwell as Lord Protector of the former British kingdoms, was received quite favourably by Kristina, Whitelocke, *Memorials*, IV, 84. See also Masson, *Queen Christina*, 199. It was just after Whitelocke learned of Cromwell's new status as Supreme Governor that both Kristina and Corfits Ulfeldt, the exiled Danish chamberlain, told Whitelocke how Chancellor Oxenstierna would have liked to take control the way that Cromwell had done in England, but never quite succeeded during Kristina's minority. See 13 and 24 January 1654, Spalding, ed., *Diary of Whitelocke*, 326 and 329 respectively.

⁴³ 14 September and 29 October 1653, in Whitelocke, *Memorials*, IV, 37 and 45 respectively. See also 13 October 1653, *SRP*, XV, 495.

⁴⁴ 15 November 1653, Spalding, ed., *Diary of Whitelocke*, 301–2. Unfortunately the diary gives no account of their conversation.

⁴⁵ 23 November 1653, Spalding, ed., *Diary of Whitelocke*, 304. See also Wishart, *Memoirs of Montrose*, fn 86, 273.

have left a certain impression regarding the level of trust these men enjoyed in Sweden. The ambassador must have understood that these Scots were esteemed and important members of Swedish society thereby exposing him to the strength and nature of Scottish influence in Sweden. There is certainly no similar record of Englishmen settled in Sweden being introduced to Whitelocke.

By December it was known that the aim of Whitelocke's mission was to obtain an alliance with Sweden against Denmark-Norway with the intention of gaining control of the Sound.⁴⁶ The second time Whitelocke obtained a private audience with Kristina at the end of December 1653, the Swedish queen initiated the discussion seeking to learn how England would approach this matter.⁴⁷ Whitelocke was also made aware of the Swedes' frustration over the continual arrest of their ships by the Cromwellian navy in March 1654.⁴⁸ The Swedes waited to make any formal decision with Whitelocke until they knew the outcome of the Anglo-Dutch negotiations.⁴⁹ Upon learning of the treaty signed at London, Kristina agreed to enter into a commercial agreement with England six days later, albeit this was confined "largely to professions of amity and promises of better trading relations".⁵⁰ By awaiting ratification of the Dutch agreement, the Swedes had saved diplomatic face by not being the first to undertake formal relations with England, and, at a stroke opened up the prospect for important commercial opportunities.

Not only did any Stuart agents seeking audience with Kristina in 1653 and early 1654 meet with closed doors, but the Swedish queen also rejected Charles' request for support outright and made sure that

⁴⁶ 4 December 1653, Sir Edward Nicholas to Sir Edward Hyde, Warner, *The Nicholas Papers*, II, 30.

⁴⁷ 29 December 1653, Spalding, ed., *Diary of Whitelocke*, 319. Although Kristina referred to a proposed marriage match with Charles II, the Stuart did not feature in her discussions with the ambassador.

⁴⁸ 1 March 1654, in Whitelocke, *Memorials*, IV, 87.

⁴⁹ 16 March 1654, in Whitelocke, *Memorials*, IV, 89. It has been argued that Cromwell was only concerned with the Dutch, particularly as shown in the Navigation Act of 1651 which aimed to curb their trade, see T. Venning, *Cromwellian Foreign Policy* (Basingstoke: 1995), 153 and 252. However the negotiations toward a Dutch alliance were simultaneous with Whitelocke's embassy to Sweden, which also involved issues of trade, as indeed did the embassies of Richard Bradshaw to Denmark-Norway.

⁵⁰ Kirby, *Northern Europe in the Early Modern Period*, 182; Hutton, *British Republic*, 108. It was not concluded until November 1656 when the Swedish ambassador delivered the signed alliance between Cromwell and Sweden, see 27 November 1656, *SRP*, XVI, 704, and Landberg, *Svenska Utrikespolitikens Historia*, part 1, III, 78.

Whitelocke saw a copy of her letter to that effect.⁵¹ The queen had other issues on her mind and just about a fortnight later she confided in the English ambassador about her intentions to abdicate and settle her cousin, Karl, on the throne.⁵² Whitelocke appeared to be privy to Kristina's every thought, and he was present when the Swedish queen gave her abdication speech in the Parliament, just before he left Sweden to return to England.⁵³ Kristina very publicly demonstrated her favouritism toward England by ceremoniously awarding Whitelocke royal gifts upon the completion of his embassy, whereas the Dutch ambassador von Beuningen had left empty-handed, and the Stuart envoys remained unaccepted at Court.⁵⁴ Several of the Scots settled in Sweden also played a role in the Englishman's departure, from General Robert Douglas who was one of the dignitaries the ambassador specifically visited before departure, to Vice-Admiral Richard Clerck who transported Whitelocke to Lübeck on his return journey toward England.⁵⁵ Along with those who had greeted the ambassador on his arrival, this involvement of Scottish-born men at the highest ranks of Swedish society indicates their successful integration in Swedish society.

By this time those who had been key figures of Scottish-Swedish ties were dead, disenchanted or had retired. James King died in Stockholm in 1652, whereas both Patrick Ruthven and Alexander Leslie had left the British political scene, with Leslie first imprisoned by Cromwell and then exiled in England. Leslie's last letters to

⁵¹ Kristina had 'Pimentelli' (Don Antonio Pimentel) bring the letter to Whitelocke. See 2 January 1654, Spalding, ed., *Diary of Whitelocke*, 321, and Berencreutz, *Don Antonio Pimentels Depescher*, 77.

⁵² 21 January 1654, Spalding, ed., *Diary of Whitelocke*, 328. Kristina sent news of her resignation from the throne to the prince Palatine, who would be her successor. See 30 March 1654, in Whitelocke, *Memorials*, 92.

⁵³ 11 May 1654, Spalding, ed., *Diary of Whitelocke*, 361.

⁵⁴ 5 May 1654, Fryxell, *Handlingar rörande Sverges historia*, part one, 101. Kristina had once told Whitelocke that if Sweden took Zealand from Danish control she wanted him to command the English and Swedish forces there! See 21 January 1654, Spalding, ed., *Diary of Whitelocke*, 328. At this time France was also indicating a favourable approach to Cromwell, stating that Charles Stuart and his court could easily be banished from exile in France, whilst Cromwell's position could be condoned, hopefully leading to an Anglo-French treaty. See Spalding, ed., *Diary of Whitelocke*, 343, fn. 2.

⁵⁵ 16, 18 and 19 May 1654, Spalding, *Diary of Whitelocke*, 362–5. See also 30 May 1654, Spalding, ed., *Diary of Whitelocke*, 369. *SBL*, VIII, 619. Major Richard Clerck had been married to Lunetta Maclean, the daughter of the merchant James Maclean who was in close contact with John Maclean.

Sweden were addressed to Oxenstierna, seeking Kristina's aid in obtaining release from captivity in London Tower.⁵⁶ That the general of the Scottish Covenanting army should have found himself incarcerated by the English Parliament indicated the extent of the changes in the British Isles. Leslie later deplored the fact that he had ever left active Swedish service in Germany. He was confident that if the Scots had kept him in charge of the Scottish army the results would have been far better for both Scotland and Charles I. Similarly, Charles II's other former northern envoys, John Cochrane and John Henderson, pursued their own agendas.

Whitelocke was personally debriefed by Cromwell upon his return from Sweden in 1654, particularly regarding the characters of Kristina and Karl, and also the Archbishop of Uppsala, obviously with a view to estimating their reactions to his political overtures. He also sought details of Swedish government, although he already understood Chancellor Oxenstierna to be a "great wise man".⁵⁷ Although Cromwellian relations with the Swedish monarchy looked set to flourish and the English Council ordered that the articles of the Anglo-Swedish treaty be ratified under the Great Seal in August 1654, by July the following year this had yet to be undertaken.⁵⁸ The delay in ratification cannot have been pleasing to the new Swedish king, Karl X Gustav, and did not show any urgency from the Cromwellian side. Nonetheless, Karl informed Oliver Cromwell of his accession to the Swedish Crown, a move the new Protector apparently appreciated and immediately replied in the terms of two equals.⁵⁹ Thereafter, Karl X authorised an embassy to England mainly for trade purposes, but also touching on a military alliance, revealing a Swedish impatience for full and official alliance with the Republic.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ 27 October 1651, 18 March 1653, and late 1653, *RAOSB*, IX, 516, 986–7, and 988.

⁵⁷ Spalding, ed., *Diary of Whitelocke*, 388–9; Abbott, *Oliver Cromwell*, III, 353–5.

⁵⁸ 1 August 1654, English Council Proceedings, *CSPD 1654*, 281; and 5 June and 10 July 1655, English Council Proceedings, *CSPD 1655*, 198 and 235. PRO SP95, V, f.152 contains an undated 'Propositions to a treaty with Sweden' involving customs and the rights of English merchants.

⁵⁹ Kristina had had little direct contact with Cromwell, being mainly in touch with the Scottish and English parliaments. See Cromwell's letter to Karl X in SRA, Anglica 521 dated 29 August 1654 and in *Milton State Papers*, dated 4/11 July 1654, 143–4. Cromwell congratulated the Swedish king on the birth of his son in the manner of one crowned head to another, 9 February 1656, SRA, Anglica 521. See also *Milton State Papers*, 204–207.

⁶⁰ Landberg, *Svenska Utrikespolitikens Historia*, part 1, III, 86.

Apparently Cromwell had taken offence at not being used as a mediator in Sweden's ever-recurring troubles with Poland and in November 1654 the Swedish envoy, Peter Coyet, received instructions for a despatch to England.⁶¹ Although Coyet was only the forerunner of the actual ambassador, Christer Bonde, he was authorised to deal with several issues, military as well as trade-related, and remained in Sweden until 1656. Cromwell accepted Coyet's mission and was content to discuss the ratification of a new version of the 1654 treaty and the Swedish request for Scottish recruits with him. However, to Coyet's dismay the Protector continued to display a lack of urgency in effecting a definitive decision regarding the troops, but Cromwell claimed this was due to the lack of detailed information regarding the request.⁶² When Swedish hostilities with the United Provinces erupted during his mission, Cromwell again expected to serve as a mediator, and Coyet was left to assuage his disappointment. The Swedish ambassador was successful in this and Cromwell stated his intentions to hinder the Dutch where he could from attacking Sweden, especially by blocking their fleet.⁶³

Six months into Coyet's mission the ambassador Christer Bonde arrived, in late summer 1655, and the two Swedes' missions overlapped each other until Coyet's departure the following year.⁶⁴ Coyet in the meantime informed his sovereign that Cromwell hoped to dominate all of Europe in conjunction with the Swede — Cromwell at sea, and Karl X on land — and this encouraged the Swedish king to expect military support from Cromwell.⁶⁵ Karl X's military successes in Poland were leading to continual rumours of the establishment of

⁶¹ M. Roberts, ed., *Swedish Diplomats at Cromwell's court 1655–1656: the missions of Peter Julius Coyet and Christer Bonde* (London: 1988), 49. Venning dates Coyet's mission from May 1655, *Cromwellian Foreign Policy*, 192.

⁶² 30 March 1655, Peter Coyet to Karl X, in Roberts, ed., *Swedish Diplomats*, 52–53; Abbott, *Oliver Cromwell*, III, 691 and 718. Cromwell claimed not to know the number or manner of transportation of the troops required. Coyet also pushed the compensation sought by Swedish merchants in England which Cromwell promised to sort out.

⁶³ 6 and 13 July 1655, Peter Coyet to Karl X, in Roberts, ed., *Swedish Diplomats*, 90 and 93–94; 26 July 1655, *SRP*, XVI, 252–3.

⁶⁴ Bonde quickly described the political situation in England to his government, as he understood it. The power play there had changed from a struggle between monarchy and republicanism to a fight between “the house of Stuart and Cromwell” in a situation where Cromwell knew he could not win the popularity of the English people. See 27 July 1655, C. Bonde to Karl X, in Roberts, ed., *Swedish Diplomats*, 108.

⁶⁵ 8 June 1655, Coyet to Karl X, in Roberts, ed., *Swedish Diplomats*, 78. Cromwell was embroiled in war with Spain in the Caribbean at this time.

a Protestant Emperor, in the person of the King of Sweden.⁶⁶ The belief was that in such a case, the United Provinces would attempt an alliance with Sweden which Cromwell would not countenance.⁶⁷ However, by December, Bonde could inform Karl X that Protector Cromwell was well inclined to a full alliance with Sweden.⁶⁸

The Swedes wanted a repeat of Whitelocke's successful mission from 1653–1654, which had concerned both military and commercial issues.⁶⁹ The shortage of metal for military purposes in England at the time was a matter of no small significance given the precarious standing of the Cromwellian state with ongoing conflicts in Scotland and the war with the Dutch. It was a bargaining lever in Sweden's favour, as Karl X now sought to obtain military support in return. Ironically it appears that some, if not most, of the manpower Cromwell did supply to Sweden consisted of Scottish Royalist refugees (with the exception of the navy). Cromwell's willingness to comply with the requests shows a desire to rid Scotland of the royalist soldiers who had served under Middleton and Glencairn in the 1654–5 uprising. For them it was as well to bide their time in useful service abroad until they could again serve Charles II.⁷⁰ These were not free men leaving to serve an allied country as their forebears had done in the previous decades, albeit their veteran countrymen facilitated their integration into the Swedish military machine. Rather they were symptomatic of a radically changed military order where Scotland now played second fiddle to English dominance. In terms of the political sphere, however, the Scots largely no longer played the central role in direct Swedish-Scottish, or even Swedish-British Isles relations which they had done for the previous seventy five years. Bonde was not a man who had spent long years in close contact with Scottish officers and being based in London he was not

⁶⁶ 8, 19 and 21 October 1655, Sir Joseph Jane to Sir Edward Nicholas, Warner, *The Nicholas Papers*, III, 75, 131 and 228. France's reaction to such a development was of great concern too.

⁶⁷ 23 November 1655, Sir Joseph Jane to Sir Edward Nicholas, Warner, *The Nicholas Papers*, III, 138.

⁶⁸ 14 December 1655, Christer Bonde to Karl X, in Roberts, ed., *Swedish Diplomats*, 219.

⁶⁹ Whitelocke had obtained a supply of copper from Sweden for casting into ordinance. Already in March 1654 the English Admiralty commissioners were seeking brass metal from Sweden for gun manufacture. 22 March and 3 August 1654, *CSPD 1654*, 465 and 537.

⁷⁰ For a complete discussion of this peculiar Scottish levy to Sweden see Grosjean, 'Royalist Soldiers and Cromwellian Allies? The Cranstoun Regiment in Sweden 1655–1658' in Murdoch and Mackillop, eds., *Fighting for Identity*.

exposed to the complexities of the factions within Scottish society.⁷¹

A new mission to Sweden was mooted in January 1656 under Whitelocke, but was postponed as Karl X was on campaign in Poland. In fact negotiations regarding the inclusion of the Dutch in a British-Swedish agreement, as well as the mutual supply of troops between Sweden and England, were major obstacles toward signing a treaty. They were not the only ones. Bonde reported that Cromwell's attempts to impose conditions which would label many of Sweden's main maritime exports as contraband in time of war prevented him from achieving the alliance.⁷² By February 1656, Cromwell was prepared to offer Bonde 'secret negotiations' and by April a mutual defensive alliance was being offered by the English.⁷³ However, the appointed commissioners could not agree to it and it looked as if the embassy would end in failure.⁷⁴ Despite this, only two months later, Bonde secured the commercial treaty on 17 July 1656.⁷⁵

Bonde's mission was successful in obtaining both the ratification of the treaty of commerce between Sweden and the Protectorate and the promise of military recruits in July 1656, just before Bonde returned to Sweden and barely two months after Coyet had departed. The latest trade alliance contained three new articles differing from the 1654 treaty: protecting the rights of English and Scottish merchants to trade in Sweden's continental dominions, and the rights of Swedish merchants in America, as well as fishing rights for Swedes in Protectorate territory.⁷⁶ Though Bonde had only secured a commercial

⁷¹ In the domestic political scene the Scots were also still active. There were at least thirteen Scotsmen who held seats in Oliver Cromwell's parliaments, where thirty positions were allocated for Scotland. One of these, Colonel David Barclay, was even a former soldier in the Swedish army. The number of seats held by Scotsmen during Richard Cromwell's time decreased to ten, despite the same allocation number. See P. Pinckney, 'The Scottish representation in the Cromwellian parliament of 1656', *SHR*, XLVI, 2, no. 142, (1967), 95–114. Also, J.A. Casada, 'The Scottish representatives in Richard Cromwell's parliament', *SHR*, LI, 2, no. 152, (1972), 124–147.

⁷² 14 December 1655, Christer Bonde to Karl X, in Roberts, ed., *Swedish Diplomats*, 219.

⁷³ 1 February and 18 April 1656, Christer Bonde to Karl X, in Roberts, ed., *Swedish Diplomats*, 248 and 277.

⁷⁴ 25 April 1656, Christer Bonde to Karl X, in Roberts, ed., *Swedish Diplomats*, 280–282.

⁷⁵ 18 April 1656, Christer Bonde to Karl X, in Roberts, ed., *Swedish Diplomats*, 318–319.

⁷⁶ See no. 214 in *Recueil des Traités, conventions et autres actes diplomatiques de la Suède*, ed. C. Sandgren, (Stockholm: 1910), 756. There was no specific mention of the Irish in this treaty.

alliance, he had set the positive tone required that would allow Karl X to get significant English military assistance anyway. When the English fleet under Admiral George Ayscue and Vice Admiral Owen Coxe engaged in operations on behalf of Sweden in 1658, even the military dynamic of Scots in the Swedish navy changed forever. Englishmen now took on leading roles in naval operations and, more significantly, in Swedish shipbuilding.⁷⁷

The diplomatic relationship which had originally largely been maintained by individual Scotsmen and the Swedish state, was now orchestrated by Englishmen representing both Cromwell and Sweden. General George Fleetwood, for example, was specifically commissioned to meet with Cromwell in 1655 “as a native Englishman” regarding an alliance, and one of the Swedish commissioners in London, Benjamin Bonnel, whom Karl X relied on, was an Englishman.⁷⁸ Fleetwood in particular played a central and consistent role during these six years in recruitment for Karl X, dealing as often with English as Scottish officers and troops. He was still Karl X’s envoy of choice to Richard Cromwell in 1659.⁷⁹ Cromwell’s envoys to Sweden, such as Colonel Christopher Potley, Edward Rolt and Philip Meadows, were all English. This period really represented the end for the Scottish-Swedish relationship at the higher diplomatic level. Scotland no longer drove a Stuart-British agenda, leaving the Scottish kingdom in a secondary position to England. The Restoration of the Stuarts in 1660 did nothing to restore the Scottish-Swedish alliance and the continued relationship of the Scots in Sweden after that date was very much of a personal (usually commercial) nature.⁸⁰

Scottish-Swedish relations re-interpreted

The influx of Scottish military and economic migrants to Sweden in the period from 1569 to 1654 has been shown to form a continu-

⁷⁷ For Ayscue and Coxe see KRA, *Biografiska Anteckningar om Officerare vid Örlogsflottan 1600–1699*, unpublished manuscript, 57 and 354–355; R.C. Anderson, ‘English Officers in Sweden’ in *Mariners Mirror*, XII (1926), 458. For the shipbuilders Francis Sheldon and Robert Turner in particular see Zettersten, *Svenska Flottans Historia*, II, 625 and 630.

⁷⁸ Roberts, ed., *Swedish Diplomats*, 97.

⁷⁹ See 14 April 1658, *CSPD 1657–8*, 545; also 18 June 1659, *CSPD 1659–60*, 379.

⁸⁰ Here, the collapse of the unofficial alliance mirrors the official one between Scotland and Denmark-Norway. See Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart*, 186.

ous and escalating movement. More importantly, these migrants played significant roles in not only Swedish, but also Scottish and subsequently British, political developments of the time. Indeed this study called into question the assumed importance of certain nations and their histories over others. This was evident in two events usually seen as 'local affairs', namely the 1638–40 Bishops' Wars in Scotland, and the 1649–50 royalist campaigns on behalf of King Charles II. These were far from domestic issues as displayed by the international involvement of Swedish and Dutch support for the Covenanters and the intermittent Swedish, Danish and French campaigns for the Stuart restoration. Neither Sweden nor Scotland could have successfully carried out their domestic and international policies without the distinct help of the other.

While the Stuart monarchy became entwined with the concept of 'British' as a unified identity encompassing both Scotland and England, the Scots in Swedish service tended to retain a sense of Scottishness. Not only was the belief in a distinctly Scottish identity important to many of the officers, but this extended to those born of Scottish parents outside Scotland, or even those of mixed Scottish-Swedish parentage. As these Scots integrated into Swedish society and became loyal to their host Crown they subsequently paid less heed to Scotland's official alliance with the royal house of Denmark-Norway, and could then function as a bridge between the gap that formed between the Stuarts and the Vasas. The Stuart-Oldenburg alliance, as carried over to England under James VI and I, served as a defining parameter to Scottish and later English royal contacts with Sweden, and thus the Stuart kings remained 'suspect' in Swedish eyes, because of their allegiance to Christian IV. Although James VI and I served several times as a mediator for Sweden in her various military disputes before 1625, close relations never developed. The case was similar with Charles I, who, despite his official military supplies to Sweden in 1631, was always considered a 'good Dane'. Relations were further weakened by Charles' contacts with Spain, which left the Swedes with the impression that he was a 'good Catholic' as well.

That the Scots, of the three Stuart kingdoms, had the largest impact on Sweden's military achievements at this time is not surprising. Both English and Irish involvement in Sweden has thus far been found to be low-scale if not minimal during the first half of the seventeenth century, whilst the Scots proved to be a dependable and almost unending military resource during a century of warfare, from the time of Johan III (1569–1592) right through to Karl XI (1660–1697).

Recruitment included a high incidence of private enlistment from Scotland, particularly as regards officers, which simply did not occur in England or Ireland. The two main motivating factors for foreign service — loyalty to the House of Stuart and particularly to Queen Elizabeth of Bohemia — were not equally shared by the English and Irish, being a new and imposed loyalty. This was confirmed by the small number of troops from these two kingdoms in the northern armies. This contrast is demonstrated even after the ruption of civil war in the British Isles, when Hugo Mowatt, on his mission for Queen Kristina to the Committee of Both Kingdoms in 1645, confidently informed Oxenstierna that once peace was established at home the Scottish officers and soldiers would gladly devote themselves to Swedish service rather than to the French army. This preference for the Swedish Crown over the French, despite the 80 year ‘auld-alliance’, was explained by the opportunity for upward social mobility Sweden offered, in contrast with the few who returned lame and mutilated from the French army.⁸¹

Further to the social improvements obtainable through Swedish service, officers and soldiers also gained advances in military technology and tactics, some of which were developed by the Scots themselves. The military experience and opportunities provided by not only Swedish but also Dutch and French service was simply not available within Britain. In addition to the Scottish military inventions which benefited the Swedes both during and after the Thirty Years’ War, the veterans of Swedish service were integral to mobilising Britain during the Bishops’ Wars. The extent of Scottish military expertise was revealed when Scotland went from a lack of standing army in 1637 to a fully equipped and trained Covenanting army in 1638, which consistently saw off its Royalist counterpart during the Bishops’ Wars and continued to do so until the break up of the Solemn League and Covenant.

Another aspect of Scottish service in Sweden that has been ignored or misrepresented is the heavy Scottish representation within the higher echelons of Swedish society. Ennoblement and access to property rights became almost a *de facto* reward for military service in Sweden, and provided another motive for enlistment as Mowatt highlighted. Although the Swedish custom of reward has been noted before, the level of Scottish involvement in this was previously sub-

⁸¹ 28 November 1645, Hugo Mowatt to Axel Oxenstierna, SRA, AOSB, E583.

merged under faulty use of labels such as English, British, German, or even Swedish when defining the individuals. By not identifying the Scots as one coherent group, the personal networks and family allegiances established both in Swedish and Scottish society could not previously be investigated.

The Swedes appear not to have taken issue with the Scots' religious adherence to Calvinism. Most mentions of religion in the sources occur with regard to some of the Scottish Catholic officers who served in the Swedish army, all of whom had advanced to at least the rank of colonel. This in itself offered proof that religion was not an obstacle. It was not considered unusual that Calvinists could settle in Sweden for economic or military reasons, as exemplified by such Dutch and German communities, and these were the two most common incentives that motivated Scots to migrate to Sweden. In terms of the established groups, the usual practice was for the Scots to become members of other accepted German churches, at least in Gothenburg and Stockholm. Indeed as Michael Roberts has already pointed out "there was no active persecution" against the non-Lutheran Protestants living in Sweden during this time, and this finding was upheld.⁸²

The most important persona for the unofficial Scottish-Swedish alliance was probably Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna. He was the focal political figure in Sweden during the first half of the seventeenth century both as Chancellor and as Regent. His command of international diplomacy was integral to the success that the unofficial alliance enjoyed from 1611 to 1654. His admiration for the Scottish nation was frequently noted in Riksråd debates, particularly with regard to the Scots' prowess and fidelity as soldiers. He was also personally responsible for accepting and facilitating the Scottish requests for military support in the Bishops' Wars. He was the last Swedish regent to form close friendships with the main protagonists of Scottish-Swedish relations. His successor, Kristina, a young teenager during these times, never developed personal contacts with characters such as Leslie or Ruthven before her accession to the throne. It was thus with the death of Oxenstierna, followed by the abdication of Queen Kristina, both of which occurred in 1654, that the final bell rang for the unofficial Scottish-Swedish alliance.

⁸² Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus*, I, 370.

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A traditional limitation in English-language studies of Scandinavia is the selective use of sources, usually to the disadvantage of Swedish material. The archival data concerning this period of history is rich, in both unpublished and printed sources, but much of it needs to be re-evaluated. In particular the diaries of Robert Monro and Patrick Gordon, the material in *The Swedish Discipline*, and the collected correspondence of James Spens must be approached as part of a larger Scottish influence rather than isolated examples of Scots in Swedish service.¹ The letters of the Scottish envoys both to and from the Swedish government and monarchy highlight the Swedish trust placed in these Scots, and combined with the personal information in the Swedish peerage lists, an entire Scottish network emerges from within Swedish society.

Records of early official Swedish-Scottish relations are somewhat limited by the late development of regular state contacts between the two countries. Intermittent communication certainly occurred between the Scottish and Swedish courts after Sweden's independence in 1523, as evidenced by both the Scottish Privy Council and Vasa Court records.² Not until the second half of the reign of Gustav II Adolf did Sweden begin to maintain permanent diplomatic foreign missions through legates, correspondents and residents.³ Once these were in place, correspondence appears to have been maintained regularly and thoroughly. Indeed the most vital printed Swedish source for seventeenth-century Swedish political developments is the *Svenska Riksrådets Protokoll*, which records the sometimes twice daily meetings of the Swedish state council from the reign of Gustav II Adolf until the early reign of Karl XI. The verbatim debates preserved between the various councillors with their monarchs, Oxenstierna and foreign

¹ Monro, *His Expedition*; Patrick Gordon, *Tagebuch der Generalen Patrick Gordon*, eds. M.A. Obolenski, and M.C. Posselt, (Moscow: 1849–52) and *Passages from the Diary of General Patrick Gordon of Auchleuchries, A.D. 1635–A.D. 1699* (Aberdeen: 1859).

² See *KGR* (29 vols., Stockholm: 1861–1916).

³ S. Tommos, *The Diplomatica Collection in the Swedish National Archives* (Stockholm: 1980), 6. One of the first was Anders Svensson who was Sweden's first permanent agent in Denmark from 1621.

envoys offer a fascinating insight into the workings of the Swedish government. They also allow for specific analysis of the individual's influence on state policies. The sections relevant to Scotland, or England and Ireland, have never before been systematically collated, translated, published or analysed in English or Swedish.

The nature of seventeenth-century European politics means that material exists in a multitude of languages, and often the correspondence of one person will be in Latin, German, Dutch, French, Swedish and Scots. This applies not only to Swedish members of government and the Swedish military, but also the Scottish officers serving in the Swedish armies. This linguistic variety highlights the integrated role of Scottish officers, as they were in direct communication with the highest echelons of European political society.

The most useful sources in terms of identifying and listing Scottish soldiers in the Swedish army are held in the Stockholm *Krigsarkiv*, where thousands of names were recorded on military muster rolls, and where the *Personregister* gives details of rank, regiment and years served. Figures of officer enlistment were largely based on the archive's index to the muster rolls. The index is not a completely accurate source of information: certain officers listed as separate individuals can easily be shown to have been the same person, particularly when their service dates ran consecutively. Sometimes dates of service in several different units would overlap. Similarly, officers who were later known to be dead were often still named in regimental lists years later. This indicates that the process of both registering and removing names on a muster roll was inefficient. For the navy, ships commanders listed in the *Krigsarkiv* were also sourced. Although no muster rolls as such were found, there were printed lists of officers which were drawn up when officers received special rewards for service, such as land donations or titles.⁴

Despite the relative wealth of material, it is important to note the gaps in sources. In addition to the countless number of lost dispatches, in 1634 the ship carrying Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna's papers from Wismar was plundered, incurring some loss. Perhaps the largest losses resulted from the Stockholm Palace fires of the 1640s and in 1697. In the earlier incidents the palace Chancellery section burnt to the ground, and in 1697 it is estimated that two-

⁴ However, there is a list of officers in 'Biografiska Anteckningar om Officerare vid Örlogsflottan 1600–1699' in *Svenska Sjöofficerare* (Stockholm: 1971), II.

thirds of the royal archive material was destroyed. This included surviving royal letters from before 1645, treaties with foreign powers, as well as many original letters from royalty. In addition the letters of Alexander Leslie to Chancellor Oxenstierna between November 1637 and June 1638 are missing, precisely at the time when Leslie would have been contacted by Scotland to return and organise resistance to King Charles I in reaction to his proposed religious reforms. The late 1637 to mid 1638 letters of Patrick Ruthven have also disappeared.⁵ Of Queen Kristina's reign, 1644–1654, the extant Swedish council records are meagre, and none remain of her later years. The *Kammarkollegii* record books, invaluable sources including detailed accounts of financial transactions between the Swedish government and many of the Scots officers in its service, are also incomplete and the one for 1656 is lost. Nevertheless, there is an abundance of records to work with in Sweden which appear to have been neglected by English-language historians, particularly with references to Scots who entered Swedish society and who served Sweden militarily.⁶

⁵ Tommos, *The Diplomatica Collection*, 6–8.

⁶ These are not mentioned in C.S. Terry, *The Life and Campaigns of Alexander Leslie first Earl of Leven* (London: 1899), or Fallon, 'Scottish Mercenaries' for example.

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Stockholm Riksarkivet

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Anglica

Ämnessamlingar, Strödda historiska handlingar

De Geer samlingen

Oxenstienska samlingen

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'Svenske Sändebud till Udlandske Hof och deras Sändebud till Sverige' manuscript compiled in 1841.

Stockholm Krigsarkivet

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Katalog öfver rullor

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Militieräkenskaper 1537–1619

Viggo Keys Samlingen

Stockholm Riddarhusarkivet

Katalog öfver sköldebref

Förteckning över Riddarhusets Arkiv

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Danish House and from Oliver and Richard Cromwell to King Frederik III. 1 vol. A II 7 Documents concerning the Political Relations with England 1588–1644. Letters from various English (sic.) Government and court officials and others to King Christian IV, Prince Christian and both chancellors Christian Friis of Borreby and Kragerup as well as to Dr. Jonas Charisius. 1 vol.

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Compiled by Alison Duncan

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Fig. 1. Field Marshal Robert Douglas (1611–1662), *Kungliga Biblioteket, Stockholm*.



Fig. 2. Major General David Drummond (1593-1638), *Skokloster*, © LSH photo, Göran Schmidt.



Fig. 3. Major General James King (1589–1652), *Skokloster*, © LSH photo, Göran Schmidt.



Fig. 4. Field Marshal Alexander Leslie (c. 1580–1661), attributed to George Jameson, Alexander Leslie 1st Earl of Leven, *Scottish National Portrait Gallery, Edinburgh.*



Fig. 5. Lieutenant General Patrick Ruthven (c. 1573–1650), *Skokloster*, © LSH photo, Göran Schmidt.



Map 1. Significant military locations during the 1611–1612 Kalmar War.



Map 2. Significant campaign areas in 1. Russia 1609-1612, 2. Livonia 1618-1629 and 3. Poland-Lithuania 1618-1629.



Map 3. Significant Swedish garrisons during the Thirty Years' War 1630–1648.