

# SELECTIONS

FROM THE

# EDINBURGH REVIEW;

COMPRISING

THE BEST ARTICLES IN THAT JOURNAL,  
FROM ITS COMMENCEMENT TO THE PRESENT TIME.

WITH

A PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION,  
AND EXPLANATORY NOTES.

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EDITED BY MAURICE CROSS,  
SECRETARY TO THE BELFAST HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

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## PART FIRST.

### METAPHYSICS AND MORAL SCIENCE.

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#### EXPOSITION OF KANT'S PHILOSOPHY.\*

PHILOSOPHY†, in relation to the process which it adopts, is considered by Kant as of three kinds. It is *dogmatical*, when it founds a system on principles assumed as certain; *sceptical*, when it shows the insufficiency of those principles which the dogmatist has assumed; and *critical*, when, after adopting the objections of the sceptic, it does not rest satisfied with doubt, but proceeds to enquire, from what principle of our nature the illusions of the dogmatist have arisen, and, by a minute analysis of the *cognitive powers* of man, traces the whole system of his knowledge through all the modifications of its original *elements*, by his *independent and fundamental forms of thought*. It is in this analysis, that the spirit of the critical philosophy is to be found; and, till the process have become familiar, the whole system must appear peculiarly unintelligible: but, when the reduction of all our feelings to their objective and subjective elements is well understood, though we may still be perplexed by the cumbrous superfluity of nomenclature, we are able to discover, through the veil that is cast over us, those dim ideas which were present to the author's mind. According to Kant, then, it is necessary, in investigating the principles of knowledge, to pay regard to the two sets of laws, on which the nature of the *object* and of the *subject* depends. It is from their joint result, as directing the *influence* of the thing perceived, and as directing the *susceptibilities* of the percipient, that knowledge, which is thus in every instance *compound*, arises; and this compound of objective and subjective elements might be modified equally, by the change of either set of laws; as the impression of a seal may be varied alike, by a change of figure in the gem, or by a difference of resistance in the parts of the wax which are exposed to its pressure. The subjective elements are by Kant denominated *forms*; and each function of the mind has its peculiar forms, with which it invests its objects, uniting with them so intimately, as to render apparently *one* that feeling, which cannot exist but as *combined* of different elements. Nothing, therefore, is known to us *as it is*; since we acquire the knowledge of an object only by the exertion of those laws which necessarily modify to us the real qualities of the object known. Philosophy, therefore, in relation to its belief of external things, is *empirical*, when it believes them to exist exactly as they appear to us in each particular case; it is *transcendent*, when, using reason to correct the false representation of

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\* Vol. i. page 257. January, 1803.

† The introductory observations to this Essay consist of a brief outline of the Life of Kant, with remarks on the manner in which his System of Philosophy has been expounded by M. Villers. See E. Review, Vol. i. pages 253—256.

the senses, it believes that the objects of our senses exist in a manner *really* known to us, after this correction, though different from their immediate appearance in particular cases. In both these views it has relation only to their *objectivity*, or to their qualities as independently existing in themselves; and is therefore erroneous, as those qualities cannot be discovered by us. It is *transcendental*, when, considering them in relation to our own powers, it investigates the *subjective elements*, which necessarily, in the exertion of our independent laws of cognition, modify the qualities or elements of the object as perceived. Since it is thus impossible to know the *world as it is*, we must content ourselves with the knowledge of the *phenomenal world*, and with that *reality* which is merely *subjective*. The system of our world is thus *idealism*, but an idealism in which we may safely confide; though we must be assured of erring, whenever we ascribe to it *objective certainty*. There exists, however, an independent system of *noumena*\*, or *things in themselves*, though we cannot know them as such, from the unavoidable modification of every *objective element* by our own forms of cognition. To determine what is subjective in each peculiar perception, the nature of the *subject* must be investigated. This subject is *self*, the being to which we give the name of I, when we say, *I know, I will*. It has three great faculties; *cognition*, by which we know; *volition*, by which we act; and *judgment*, which is in some measure intermediate, being neither wholly speculative, nor absolutely practical, but determining to action, and thus forming the bond of our knowledge and our will.

*Pure cognition* is divided into *pure sensibility*, *pure intelligence* †, and *pure reason*; the products of sensibility being *sensations*, the products of intelligence *conceptions*, and the products of reason *ideas*. This division is not inconsistent with the absolute fundamental unity of the cognitive being, that unity, of which we are conscious in all the diversity of our feelings, and without which *we* could not exist. The threefold action is even in some measure aided by the unity itself; for, from a law of our nature, we strive, by a perpetual synthesis of comparison and arrangement, to bring the diversity of our sensations, as nearly as possible, to the oneness of which we are conscious in ourselves.

Pure sensibility, comprehending all those feelings in which *space* and *time* are involved, is *external*, when it refers them to space, and *internal* when it refers them to time. In itself nothing is *larger* or *smaller*, or *before* or *after*; for space and time, the *forms of sensibility*, by which a *subjective world* arises to us, are not, in any degree, objective and real, but are modes of *our own* existence as sentient beings. It is impossible for us to imagine

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\* This word is evidently an abbreviation of the Greek *νοουμενα*, which, in our opinion, would be much more applicable to external things *after* they had undergone the *forms* of our *cognition*. If the terms must be adopted, we should be inclined to reverse the use of them, and call a *phenomenon* whatever affects the external sensibility, and *noumena* the subsequent *compounds* of perception.

† The original term is *verstand* (*entendement*), which may be more simply translated *understanding*; but the term we have chosen, which is merely the Latin corresponding word with an English termination, however singular its use may at first appear, is preferred by us to its more common synonym, from the very circumstance that it is less common. In the use of a term to which we have been long accustomed, there is much danger of error, when the limitation of its meaning is not precisely the same; and *understanding*, in its usual acceptation, is significant, not of a single function of the mind, as in the transcendental vocabulary, but of the union of all the intellectual faculties.

any body which does not exist in space ; it is impossible for us to imagine any feeling which does not exist in time. With the abstraction of these, every thing to us perishes ; but the certainty of space and time remains with us, though every object were conceived to be annihilated. Hence, space is an indispensable condition of the possibility of bodies, but bodies are not necessary to the possibility of space. That it exists in ourselves *à priori*, and independently of experience, is shown by the impossibility of acquiring it from without. Space includes three dimensions. Sight, smell, taste, hearing, are evidently incapable of affording these : nor is touch, to which Condillac ascribes its origin, more susceptible. We gain the idea, says he, when our hand passes over a surface : but he has already supposed a surface and a hand ; and what resemblance is there of a simple feeling to a body of three dimensions ? Nor can space be supposed to arise from abstraction, for by abstraction we separate only simple qualities : but space is not a simple quality, capable of being perceived separately in bodies ; it is the necessary condition of their existence, implied in the first perception of the infant, which supposes an object external to itself. In every sensation there must be elements both objective and subjective ; the subjective must be permanent as ourselves, the objective fleeting as the occasion. Space, therefore, being invariably present amid all the apparent changes of quality, is subjective in *us* ; occasioned indeed by the sensation, and rising *in* it ; but not an objective part of it, depending on *experience*. If that were its origin, we should be allowed to conclude, only, that all the bodies yet known to us are extended, and not that all bodies must have extension. Yet the certainty of this we believe with equal force ; since, space being a subjective condition of knowledge, we feel that every impression, by a law of our nature, must be invested with its *form*. On this, the *apodictic* or demonstrative certainty of geometry depends ; for, as pure space is the form of the external sensibility of all men, the *extensive properties* of pure space must, to all men, be the same. It is a peculiar distinction of mathematical ideas, that they consider not *intensive* but *extensive qualities*, all the degrees of which are equally capable of being rendered sensible, so as to correspond exactly with a sensible object. Of degrees merely intensive, as of the varieties of *force* in physics, and of *benevolence* in ethics, no delineation can be given.

The *internal sensibility*, by which we discover our own mode of being, with all the changes that take place within us, gives us the idea of time, in the succession in which it represents to us our feelings. All the arguments which prove space to be a form of our cognition, are equally applicable to time. By this, we invest our internal affections with succession, as we created to ourselves a subjective world by the investiture with space. From succession we derive our idea of number ; and time being, like space, an universal form, the apodictic certainty of arithmetic is easily explained.

If we had sensibility alone, the world would be merely a number of detached beings ; it would not be that great whole which we call *nature*. This is produced to us by *intelligence* ; that power, which, receiving the products of sensibility, establishes their relations, and, arranging them in classes, forms *conceptions*. As, in sensation, there are the necessary forms of space and time ; so are there necessary forms of intelligence, to which Kant, adopting the well-known term invented by Aristotle, gives the name of *categories*. These are reduced to four orders ; *quantity*, *quality*, *relation*, and *modality* : to the first of which belong the catego-

ries : 1. *unity* ; 2. *plurality* ; 3. *totality* : To the second, 4. *affirmation* or *reality* ; 5. *negation* or *privation* ; 6. *limitation* : To the third, 7. *substance* and *accident* ; 8. *causation*, or the laws of cause and effect ; 9. *reciprocity of action* and *reaction* : To the fourth, 10. *possibility* and *impossibility* ; 11. *existence* and *non-existence* ; 12. *necessity* and *contingence*. No act of intelligence can take place without the union of these four forms of thought, in some one of their modifications. Like space and time, however, they are no part of the object, but exist *à priori*, and independently of all experience in the subject who *intelligises*. Thus, to take an instance from the categories of quantity, the idea of number cannot form a part of any object. We hear a sound ; we again hear a sound : but, when we say that we have heard *two* sounds, we have invested a product of sensibility with a form of our own intelligence. These fundamental conceptions may be combined, so as to form other conceptions equally independent of experience ; as when, from substance and causation, we derive the conception of *force* : or they may be united with the pure forms of sensibility ; as when, from the addition of temporary succession to existence and non-existence, we form the conception of *commencement*. For determining to which of the categories our sensation belongs, there are four *forms of reflection*, corresponding with the four orders : for the first, *identity* and *diversity* ; for the second, *conformity* and *contrariety* ; for the third, *interiority* and *exteriority*, by which is meant the distinction of the attributes of an object as originally existing in itself, or as acquired from without ; for the fourth, *matter* and *form*. These four *reflective conceptions*, though like the categories, existing *à priori*, differ from them, as not being applied to the *products of sensibility*, to fix their relations and mode of being, but to the *conceptions* of objects, to fix their appropriate place in the system of our knowledge.

*Pure reason* is the third mode of our cognitive faculty. It is applied to our *conceptions*, and is that which considers them as *absolute*. Its three great *ideas* are, *absolute unity*, *absolute totality*, and *absolute causation*. These become *objects* to us, or *ideals of pure reason*, by investing them with our own felt and fundamental unity ; which individualises absolute unity, as in the *human soul* ; or absolute totality, as in the *universe* : and the ideas acquired from *practical reason*, of absolute power and goodness, are, in like manner, individualised in *God*. Every act of *reasoning* implies an absolute idea. Thus, when we say, *all bodies gravitate, and the air, being a body, must therefore have weight*, the validity of our conclusion depends on the universality of the major proposition. To these absolute ideas we are led, by an irresistible impulse of our nature towards infinitude. They are forms existing *à priori* in the mind ; for our senses give us the perception only of that which is divisible, limited, caused. With the unity of the human mind, or the infinity of the universe, or the great source of phenomenal nature, no corporeal organ can make us acquainted.

Each of the cognitive functions having thus its peculiar forms, we are guilty of an *amphiboly*, when we ascribe to one the pure forms of another ; as when, in the material atoms of the philosophy of Epicurus, we invest our external sensations with the idea of *absolute simplicity* ; or when, adding to the same sensations the absolute idea of *causation*, we erect a theory of atheistic materialism. In like manner, the combination of absolute ideas with our internal sensibility, “ of which the form is time, and the general representation spirit,” gives rise to all those systems of spiritualism, which suppose a simple, unextended soul. The perplexing

controversies on the divisibility of matter are the product of a double amphiboly, which confounds sensation and conception.

The preceding summary comprehends the laws of cognition. But man does not exist to *know* alone. He wills; he acts; he is the subject of *practical reason*. The knowledge of his powers and his duties he cannot acquire from external impressions on his sensibility, from any arrangement by his intelligence of the products of his sensibility, nor from the addition of the forms of pure reason to the conceptions of his intelligence. But man is known to himself by consciousness. All other beings he knows only subjectively. Himself, however, the sole exception in nature, he knows in objective *noumenal* reality. He has not, therefore, to reason, or apply those forms which belong to his conceptions. He has only to observe his own nature; and in it he feels that he possesses freedom of volition, because he feels that he is able to will: he recognises a principle of duty which commands him, under the certainty of future responsibility, to act or to abstain. There are two imperious voices which say to him, *Be happy, Be virtuous*. In many cases, it is impossible to obey both. But the one is a voice of more rigid command than the other. It says not, *if thou wilt, if thou can*, like that which bids him be happy: it pronounces with legislative authority, *thou oughtest, thou must*; and self-content, and self esteem, are the immediate punishment and reward with which it sanctions its will. His choice, however, is not constrained. He may prefer to duty the pleasures which are more immediate; but, in daring to disobey, he has already begun to endure the penalty. The duties commanded by this internal voice, are reduced by Kant to two maxims: *Regard constantly every reasonable being as an end in himself, and not as a mean of benefiting others; and act in such a manner, that the immediate motive of thy will might\*, with advantage, become an universal law in the government of all reasonable beings*. These laws exist *à priori* in the mind; and, therefore, are not subject to the laws of cognition. At the same time that we are conscious of their force, we discover the necessity of future reward and punishment; and, confident of immortality, “we feel, in the sanctuary of our being, that, quitting this phenomenal world, we shall find virtue and happiness united in the world of *things in themselves*.” To responsibility, it is necessary, that there should be a judge. This judge has absolute goodness; because from him our ideas of the *just* and *good* proceed. Since all finite reasonable beings have the same practical reason, there must be a *supreme universal infinite reason*, which, manifesting itself to all, announces the same laws. “This supreme reason, this absolute goodness, this judge, the rewarder of virtue, is God:” not, indeed, the God of speculation, *whose existence may be asserted or denied by arguments of equal force*. He is not the result of the ratiocination of man. “He does not need to rest on the two premises of a syllogism, as the colossus of Rhodes stood elevated on its pedestals of rock.† He is the true God, of whom no argument can deprive us; because, not having his origin in cognition, he is not subject to its forms: a God who is *not eternal, not in space, not in time, not a substance, not a cause*, and of whom it is not less absurd to say that he *exists*, than to say that he is *blue* or *square*.”

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\* We have added the words *with advantage*. In the original, it is merely *may be such as to become an universal law (puisse devenir)*, which, if it be not elliptical, is wholly unintelligible.

† Il n'a pas besoin des deux prémisses d'un syllogisme pour se tenir debout, comme le colosse de Rhodes appuyé sur ses deux rochers. P. 159.



In this short view of the principles of Transcendentalism, we have endeavoured, as much as possible, to avoid the perplexity of new terms. Of these its author has been profusely liberal; and to them he is probably indebted for a large share of that favour which his system has received. In minuteness of nomenclature, there is an appearance of nice distinction, which prepossesses us with respect for the acuteness of the inventor's powers: and as, in the infinity of objects which present themselves to our observation or fancy, the resemblances and dissimilarities are infinite, there are no bounds to the multitude of classes in which they may be arranged. The resemblances in a new system are, probably, as real as in those which preceded it; and we therefore think that we have made a large accession to our knowledge, because, by a new analysis and synthesis, we have combined the results of our former experience in a varied collection of terms. Of the doctrines themselves, considered independently of nomenclature, our opinion is very different from that of the admiring disciple who now offers them to our veneration; and we are particularly astonished, that, in the country of Leibnitz, their celebrity should have been so great. We see in them a forced combination of jarring principles, rather than a perspicuous and analysing originality of reflection. The self-reviewer, who professes to examine with accuracy the first elements of his belief, doubts and asserts on the same principle; and after having overturned the dogmatism of others with the most unbounded scepticism, and raised dogmatism anew, on the loose materials of that foundation which his scepticism had overthrown, he thinks that he has avoided the objections which may be urged against both, because he has given a new name to the combination of the two. In this manner he has indeed made a partial attack more difficult, because he can entrench himself at will in either system: but his theory is not the less incoherent and feeble, when assailed as a whole. The merit of Kant appears to us to consist less in invention, than in occasional deductions from the opinions of others. It is that part of his system which may be considered as a commentary on the innate susceptibilities of Leibnitz, for which alone we consider the world as indebted to him; and perhaps, in the present circumstances of philosophy, even the extravagant length to which he has pursued a just principle, may have been of favourable influence. Against the more inviting system of *sensualism*, in which all knowledge is supposed to consist of original impressions from without, or of abstractions or new combinations of original impressions, which has spread so rapidly from the writings of the late French metaphysicians, and which charms us even while we deny it, by its appearance of simple truth, a plain statement of the doctrine of anterior susceptibilities would perhaps have had little effect. It required a bolder enunciation of its force to surprise into discussion; and discussion, excited as it has been, in one country at least, to such enthusiasm of enquiry, will terminate, we trust, in the mutual correction of the errors of Condillac and of Kant.

In examining the validity of the doctrines of transcendentalism we shall follow the order in which they were stated.

The existence of a system which is neither dogmatical in its first principles, nor altogether sceptical, it is impossible to admit. We demonstrate only from something which we take for granted; and this first principle must be stated or understood *dogmatically*. The critical philosopher, it is said, goes along with the sceptic in exposing the illusions of the dogmatist; but if every principle assumed be dogmatism, with the sceptic he must also rest. To go farther, and enquire into the

source of each illusion, is to do nothing more than dogmatise in a new way; for he must believe the illusion to have taken place, because a certain source of illusion existed, which he must demonstrate from some principle acknowledged before, and therefore confessedly in need of support; or from another principle, which he assumes without proof. In what, then, does he differ from the theorists who have gone before him? All, at least in modern times, have been critical, as all have professed to examine the faculties of the cognitive being. Of this examination there are various degrees of accuracy, and the theory of transcendentalism may therefore be a better dogmatism than others; but still it is not distinguished by any new character, so as to deserve a peculiarity of name. In the mere belief of the subjectivity of perception, it certainly is not original; for it would be difficult to find a philosopher of the present age who retains the belief of the actual unmodified representation, by the senses, of the qualities of external matter. In one circumstance, however, we differ from the transcendentalist. We own the subjectivity of our perceptions; but we are convinced of the impossibility of analysing them into objective and subjective elements; since to us, by the laws of our nature, these elements must ever *co-exist*. It would not be more absurd to assert, that an eye, on which blue and yellow rays were continually poured together in one unvaried sensation, could, by the mere exertion of internal powers of thought, discover the nature of the compound beam.

As an illustration of the possibility of this analysis, M. Villers adduces the probable reflections of a camera obscura, which, by the power in him vested, he has endowed with animation.\* To the sensorium of this transcendentalist, the light is supposed to pass through a coloured medium; and the subjectivity of the colour, as a part of its sensations, it is affirmed to be capable of discovering, by the exertion of its own unaided powers. To us, indeed, who know that light has been decomposed in passing, it is easy to make the inference, that all the objects in nature are not red; but we cannot suppose the machine itself, however subtile, to be capable of such an inference. It may, indeed, attain that acuteness of scepticism, which denies the existence of external objects; but it cannot separate their believed existence from their redness; since it is only as *definite redness* they can be known by it to exist. It certainly cannot separate the extension from the redness, so as to conceive the redness to belong *wholly* to itself, and, without this complete analysis, no progress is made in transcendentalism. Still less is it possible, as in another illustration adduced by M. Villers, that, by the elliptical figure of the image it reflects, a cylindrical mirror should discover its own figure; for,

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\* Even though the reasoning from transcendental machinery had been just, there is something so ludicrous in the conception, that an author, who designed it only for illustration, would have been very cautious of repeating it. But with M. Villers it is a favourite figure; and he introduces it sometimes in such a manner, that we are uncertain whether it be his wish that we should laugh with him at the follies of metaphysics, or content ourselves with being seriously convinced of the truth of his argument. The following passage is surely more in the manner of Voltaire, than of the grave professor of Königsberg—"If our camera obscura should think of theorising upon the redness, as belonging to objects out of itself, and existing really, it would, without doubt, find many good reasons for explaining it, by the disposition of the parts of objects, by the refraction of light, and a hundred other fine things, which other camerae obscuræ of its own stamp would admire, but to which a camera obscura with a little knowledge of transcendentalism would listen only with a smile of derision." P. 242.

the cylinder, forming no part of the image, more would be necessary than the mere separation of co-existing qualities. The supposed illustrations, however, even when admitted in all their circumstances, show nothing more than the impossibility of that which they are intended to prove; for if the camera obscura, like the human philosopher who finds all his sensations invested with space, should conceive the redness with which its sensations are invested to be a mere form of its own sensibility, it would consider, as subjective only, what was, in truth, a combination of *objective* and *subjective* elements, and would thus arrange a system of very erroneous philosophy; which, if published in the shape of a "review of pure reason," might perplex, and mislead, and set at variance, with endless controversy, all the telescopes, and mirrors, and magic lanterns, of a whole optical museum.

The faculties of the mind are, by Kant, said to be three, and the division is supposed to be compatible with its fundamental unity. But the mind, he allows, is not an object of *cognition*; it has *noumenal* existence in our consciousness. The categories, therefore, cannot be applied to it; for they are applicable only to *phenomena*. But unity and number are subjective categories; and hence we cannot justly say that there are *three* faculties of *one* mind. We fear that this argument will be considered as a subtilty merely verbal; a charge, which the combatant of verbal subtilties must often expect. But at the same time that it shows the absurdity of asserting the unreality of number, on principles which, in the first proposition they include, have assumed it as certain, it marks strongly the dogmatism of that philosophy which considers itself as the great overthrower of dogmatism. For proof of the unity of the cognitive being, recourse seems to have been had to the *common sense* of the later Scotch philosophers; but to Kant it is not common sense; for, denying the reality of an external world as capable of being known by us, he cannot appeal to universal belief. If his own feeling, therefore, be considered by him as a just ground of certainty, he must believe himself incapable of error; and if he be incapable of error, it is absurd to enquire into the sources of illusion. What that is, which has three faculties, it is indeed impossible to conceive. When we say, that it is extended, or *matter*, and when we say that it is unextended, or *spirit*, we are alike accused of an amphiboly, or a paralogism; which are very fine words, expressive of mistake. It is not to *mind* itself that the categories are applicable; for mind would then be a phenomenon, and not a reality. It is not a *substance*, it is not in *time*, it has no *existence*, nor *possibility* of existence: without *succession*, it exerts three progressively succeeding faculties, and exerts them too, without having in itself any power of *causation*. On the strict principles of transcendentalism, it does not appear to us more reasonable to believe the actual existence of a being that knows, and judges, and wills, than to acknowledge the infinity of external space. To say, that the one is a form of thought, and the other a reality, is to say nothing; for both feelings are equally strong, and equally unsubstantial.

But we will admit to the transcendentalist his solitary noumenon, and its separate functions. The affections of the mind are awkwardly arranged, as knowledge, judgment, and will. Of the peculiar nature of judgment, indeed, which, in the common acceptation of the term, appears to be included in the second and third offices of the cognitive faculty, M. Villers has left us wholly uncertain; but from the subjects which he enumerates, as forming a part of his promised review of it, it

seems to be nearly synonymous with *taste*, or perhaps to include the more active office of *imagination*. But the division is not merely awkward, as involving in one term affections of little similarity; there are also many affections which it seems impossible to reduce to it. The joy which we feel on a fortunate occurrence, our sorrow on a disagreeable one, our complete despair when every exertion has been vain, may rise indeed from knowledge, but are not themselves knowledge, nor judgment, nor will.

A similar objection may be made to the subdivisions of the cognitive faculty. If the mere addition of one form of thought, as of the *absolute* in pure reason, authorise a change of term in the function, cognition, instead of three distinct titles, should have as many as its subjective forms.

On considering the theory of sensibility, the first observation that occurs to us is the singular mixture of opinions which it presents. The truth of space and time is denied by the usual sceptical arguments. No new enquiries of transcendentalism are made; because, with that opinion, enquiry would be useless: yet, as if some new foundation had been given for the belief, the transcendental sceptic asserts the existence of noumena, which, though perceived only subjectively, yet influence our sensibility, and entitle it to the name of *external*. The idea of any thing external to ourselves is confessed to involve space; yet, with the denial of space, the reality of objects external to ourselves is affirmed; and the affirmation is peculiarly frivolous, since *real* objects not having causation, which is *phenomenal* only, cannot affect our sensibility. It is not enough to say against that solitude of self, which the consistent disciple of Berkeley must adopt, "that our mind revolts, and is indignant at the very idea," p. 81.; or that "he professes a belief which is not human, and which, therefore, among human beings, can never be the doctrine of a numerous sect," p. 32.: for the argument is of equal force against transcendentalism, which, if consistent, is precisely the same doctrine, with a new name. The professors of both, if they really disbelieve the existence of space, may indeed be assured, that their sect never can be a large one; because to them there is no other being to whom they can make known their creed. The theory of Kant, therefore, appears to us to be nothing more than the common *assertion* of every sceptic, together with that practical *belief* which every sceptic feels, but which, for the credit of his theory, he usually keeps within the silence of his own mind. We are convinced that there is no human being who does not, by his actions at least, evince his reliance on an external world, and the succession of time; though we are convinced also, that there is no one who can give a reason for the faith that is in him. We therefore do not deny the justice of Kant's conclusion; for its unanswerable force, in mere argument, was felt long before the philosopher of Königsberg was known. But, the truth of space and of the world being to our reasoning scepticism the same, we cannot deny space, and admit the reality of sensible objects. The theory which combines these may be celebrated as original; but its originality consists only in the combination of opinions which before were considered as incompatible.

Against Condillac it is urged, that, in ascribing our idea of space to touch, he has already supposed a surface and a hand; but Kant, in ascribing it to *external sensibility*, has already supposed an *object*. His argument for the subjectivity of space, from the permanence of the subject, and the fleeting nature of the object, still more strikingly presupposes space and time: for, if there be no real succession, all things are

equally permanent; and unless we have previously known that, of the great multitude of our feelings, a certain number only have proceeded from external objects, during all which the *form* of space was permanent, that very form must be allowed to be fleeting; for all the affections of our mind are not referable to three dimensions. We may remark also, that, on the principles of Kant, our dreams and reveries are, in truth, as little illusive as our waking perceptions, the reference to space being all which constitutes external sensation; and the man who dreams that he has murdered an adversary, has therefore murdered a human being as truly as if, in the intercourse of the day, he had stabbed his friend. Smell, taste, and hearing, as they do not involve length, breadth, and thickness, should be referred by Kant to *internal*, rather than *external* sensibility. From the observations of those who have been couched, the same appears certain of vision; and Kant must, therefore, with Condillac, whose opinion he attacks, ascribe our knowledge of three dimensions, not objectively indeed, but subjectively to the single organ of touch.

To say that space must be subjective, because we cannot conceive a possible body without length, breadth, and thickness, is but a verbal sophism; for we give the name of *body* only to that which has those dimensions. It might be inferred with equal justice, that there are no objective elements in our perception of the human figure, because, without experience, we believe that every future *man* must have all those parts which are comprehended in a just definition of man. To the transcendentalist, who supposes totality and plurality to be conceptions *posterior* to sensation, there is, besides, a peculiar and insurmountable difficulty, of which he seems not to have been aware, in that *immediate* investiture with space which he affirms to be necessary to sensation. Space having several dimensions, necessarily involves parts; and a body must therefore be considered as a *whole*, previously to all conception of *totality*, or *sensation cannot be invested with space*. This objection appears to us completely decisive against the whole theory of *cognition*: for, if an exertion of *intelligence* be not necessary to *connect* in *one body* the separate dimensions, it is as little necessary in reducing to one great assemblage the boundless phenomena of *nature*.

We do not see for what reason time is considered as *peculiarly* a form of internal sense; for we invest with succession the changes without, as much as those within, and believe that ages had revolved before ourselves had being, in the same manner as we believe that there is an infinity of space to which we have never penetrated.

The explanation of the apodictic certainty of geometry and arithmetic is surely not transcendental. The propositions of these sciences cannot have relation to *the forms of thought of every thinking being*; because man is to himself the only object known *as he is*. Other beings are noumenal to him, and their real forms of thought beyond the possibility of his knowledge. Besides, though the three dimensions of space were known to him as universal, little could be inferred from them alone; and a figure of 1000 sides, the properties of which are equally apodictic as those of a triangle, is certainly an idea as little present to the general mind as any in physical science. But though all the possibilities of figure and of numeral combination were universal forms, the feeling of duty, and of God, is allowed to be equally universal: yet it is almost by their controversies alone, that ethics and theology are known to us as sciences. Their universality, therefore, does not render the *relations* of the universals apodictic; nor ought the transcendentalist to ascribe the exactness of

mathematical ideas to their capability of sensible delineation; for their incapability of this is very justly urged by him as one of the most powerful reasons for believing that there are ideas not acquired from experience. The two great conceptions on which geometry depends are, as M. Villers himself has said, an indivisible *point* and *infinity*, which no corporeal organ can originally afford us, and which it is in like manner impossible for us to delineate in any sensible representation; and he triumphantly asks, whether it be possible for the eye to distinguish a polygon of 999 sides from one of 1000, though the different relations of their angles be exactly understood? A sensible delineation would be applicable only to a few cases, and not to every possible case. We have complete certainty, without any diagram, that the shortest line between any two points is a right line; and, without this previous certainty, a thousand trials could not convince us, as there might still be an untried curve to which our stubborn proposition would be obliged to yield.

Of the table of *forms of intelligence*, little more is necessary to be said, than that, like the more ancient arrangement by Aristotle, it is altogether useless. The only valuable arrangement of relations is that by which objects are combined in the common order of the sciences; and we receive as much real knowledge, in being told that we have *spoken prose* all our lives, or that in every proposition something must be *affirmed* or *denied*, as in being told, that we must always predicate quantity, quality, relation, and modality. Instead of saying, that the intelligence has twelve categories, which existed *à priori* and independently, it would have been at least equally just, and certainly much more simple, to say, that *in every case of felt relation*, the mental affection which constitutes that feeling was not a part of the separate perceptions. It did not, indeed, exist *à priori*, for the perceptions were prior; nor independently of experience, for, without the perceptions it never would have arisen: but it existed from a law of *the mind itself*, which was so constituted, that, on the perception of certain objects, the *new feeling* of relation should arise. This feeling is to us completely different from either perception considered separately; and we have always been astonished, that the total want of resemblance did not occur with immediate confutation to the authors of those systems of *sensualism*, which endeavour to reduce all our knowledge, *as parts*, to our original external perceptions.

Whatever be the value of the table of *categories*, the *reflective conceptions* appear to us in no respect different. The *conformity* of two sensations is felt, at least, as immediately as their *reaction*; and both conceptions equally fix the appropriate place of our sensations in the system of our knowledge.

It is a singular confusion of cause and effect, to say, that the reflective forms are distinguished from the categories, as being applied only to the comparison of our conceptions\*, when it is owned that it is from previous reflection the conceptions themselves arise.† If it be only after the observed *conformity* of successive sensations, that we say there are before us *two* objects of a species, the category of number is certainly not the prior feeling. The conformity is more truly a conception, since it is the immediate application of intelligence to the products of sensibility.

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\* Elles ne s'emploient qu'à comparer entre elles les conceptions des objets. P. 299.

† C'est aussi par la réflexion transcendente que l'entendement examine et décide auxquelles de nos catégories il convient de rapporter des objets donnés à la sensibilité. P. 298.

If *puré reason* be merely the mode by which our conceptions become to us absolute, it will be difficult to bring under it that regular series of propositions to which we commonly give the name of *reasoning*. When we say, *all bodies gravitate*; this proposition, which is, in truth, nothing more than a common instance of generalisation, may be allowed to be a product of reason. But when we add, *the air is a body*; *the air must have weight*; these propositions are acts of intelligence, and have nothing absolute in them, more than any common application of the categories. Nor is totality always necessary even to one of the propositions; for we have reasonings of probability, which depend on discordant results of the past. Thus, when we say, *from the appearance of the sky, it will probably rain soon*, we do not assert any thing absolute; yet we reason; for reasoning does not require *universals*, but *generals*. To the exercise of pure reason there is no tendency peculiarly irresistible. The idea of infinity rises in our mind by a law of our nature; but by a law not more powerful than that by which, in certain circumstances, we acquire the sensations of sight or touch.

Of *ideals*, as opposed to *ideas*, we do not understand the difference; for nothing is gained by adding our own *oneness* to absolute *unity* or *totality*, which, in the very conception, are *one*; and it certainly is not meant, that we apply to those ideas any other circumstance of our consciousness, than the *fundamental unity*; for the *ideal* of the universe is not invested with our knowledge or passions. The difference of the ideal of the human soul, and of that *unity of consciousness* which must be felt, previously to the existence of the ideal, is too nice for our discernment.

The amphibolies, paralogisms, &c. of which Kant speaks, are impossible, as they suppose a standard which is not in our possession; a corrector of reference, where reference cannot err; a mode of knowing objects different from that of the constituting forms of our cognition. Till the transcendentalist give us a new mode of discernment, we must believe *whatever* is invested with space and time to be, *by that very investiture*, a *sensation*; *whatever* is invested with the categories, to be a *conception*; and *whatever* is absolute, to be an *idea*: so that the error of our application, if in truth there be an error, must, to us, be for ever unknown.

Even on the supposition of amphibolies as capable of being discovered, the peculiar instances are not well explained. If external sensation give us the knowledge only of that which is extended, the mere consideration of it, as absolute, may afford the idea of infinite extension; but not of an indivisible monade. Nor does materialism, in the atheistic sense of the term, arise from the addition of absolute causation to external sensibility; for causation means only the power of producing a change, and has no other reference to the causing substance; which may have existed from eternity, or begun to exist, without a cause, or by divine volition, at the very moment in which its energy was exerted. Between *simple causation*, a category *justly* applicable to external sense, and *absolute causation*, there is, in truth, no difference; for both mean only the power of producing a change: and if it be not *cause*, but *effect*, which is considered as absolute, the application of this would rather lead to spiritual Theism. That *spirit* is the general representation of that internal sensibility, of which the form is time, is a proposition more of mysticism than of philosophy. Absolute time is eternity; which, if it be an archetype of any thing, has no nearer resemblance to *spirit*, as commonly understood, than to *matter*; and if all that is necessary be the want of dimension, the

sensations of sound or smell being as little extended as love or hate, or any other internal feeling, might, with equal reason, be considered as the object of the supposed amphiboly of the human soul.

The perplexities which arise from the consideration of matter, either as infinitely divisible, or ultimately indivisible, receive no solution from all that M. Villers has stated. Our error, he says, consists in confounding *matter*, as a mere object in space presented by our sensibility, with *matter* as presented by our intelligence in all the aggregate of conceived relations.\* “As an object of sensation, matter must always be reducible to an atom, or first element, which itself also must be in space, and therefore extended; because nothing imperceptible can belong to our sensibility. But, when considered as an object of intelligence, there must always appear a possible division or reduction from the state of matter into that of unextended thought, *since it is already as a thought we consider it*; and as there is no apparent transition from the one state to the other, we connect them by *interposed infinity*, as in the system of monades.” In both cases the *matter* of sensibility is said to be confounded with the *matter* of intelligence, and to be combined with the transcendental ideas of *absolute simplicity* and *reality*. The attempt to explain a difficulty with such increase of difficulty, is like the kindness which would free us from the doubtfulness of twilight, by casting us into utter darkness. In both the cases adduced we see much confusion of another kind; but we do not see that confusion of the representations of separate faculties, which M. Villers condemns. *In both*, the perception of matter, as an object in space, is derived from sensibility; but, *in both*, matter is considered *categorically*: for we cannot think of division, without the conceptions of plurality, possibility, &c. The *atomist*, therefore, does not err, by confounding the representations of separate powers of cognition, but by using, in reference to products of the same power, terms which are contradictory; for that which is in space, having still dimension, must still be potentially divisible; nor does its infinite divisibility arise, in any manner, from the necessity of combining it with thought, by the medium of infinity. If that were the only reason of inferring it, the difficulties which are its con-

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\* We think it necessary to add the whole passage from the original, as we may have been led into a misapprehension of its meaning, by the attention which M. Villers has paid to an excellent rule of rhetoric: a subject, in itself most obscure, he has certainly succeeded in treating with all appropriate obscurity. “La question agitée si long-tems, et abandonnée ensuite par désespoir, de la divisibilité ou nondivisibilité de la matière à l’infini, ne tirait tout sa difficulté que d’une double amphibolie de cette sorte; les uns voulaient appliquer tout le jeu de l’entendement à la matière comme objet de notre sensibilité; les autres prenaient pour un objet de notre sensibilité la conception de matière; ils confondaient en attribuant l’intuition à l’entendement, et la conception à la sensibilité. Celui qui opère sur la matière en tant qu’objet *senti* et *perçu*, doit toujours, en résultat, trouver un premier élément qui soit quelque chose d’étendu et de perceptible, qui occupe un lieu dans l’espace, car on ne peut supposer à la sensibilité aucun objet imperceptible; d’où le système des atômes matériels, et la *philosophie corpusculaire d’Epicure*. Celui, au contraire, qui opère sur la matière en tant qu’objet *pensé* et *conçu*, doit apercevoir une division toujours possible de l’état de matière jusqu’à l’état de *pensée*, puisque c’est sur une pensée qu’il opère: or comme entre ces deux états, l’esprit ne voit pas de mode de transition, il y met l’infini; d’où le système des monades. Le tort de l’un et de l’autre, c’est de confondre la matière en tant que représentation de la *sensibilité*, avec la matière en tant que représentation de l’*entendement*. Il y a aussi deux *idées* transcendentes, celle du *simple absolu*, et celle du *réel absolu* qui jouent ici un rôle.” P. 297.



sequence, might be very easily obviated by the simple denial of the antecedent: for there is, in truth, no transition, in such enquiries, from matter to thought, but from matter as existing combined to matter as existing separately; or, if we be denied the knowledge of any thing but our own affections, from one thought to another. If there were, indeed, a necessary transition from matter to thought, the interposed infinity, having nothing common with either, could not connect them, more than the sensations of light and fragrance could be connected by a sound. There is, therefore, no aid to the perplexed metaphysician in the principles of transcendentalism, which, if adopted, only establish with greater force that infinity of parts which he is unable to comprehend: for the conception of an object, *as a whole* in space, is a just application of a category which necessarily involves divisibility; and every object of sensibility, being confessedly reducible to elements which are still extended, "since we cannot suppose sensibility to have any object which is not perceptible," must, at every stage, be justly conceivable as a whole in space: and we are therefore entitled, without an error of philosophy, to assert, that matter is infinitely divisible. There is, indeed, one sense, in which the result of the reasoning of M. Villers may be understood, and which, in spite of the laboured antithesis of the opposite opinions, we believe to have been that which suggested confusedly his transcendental explanation. It may be said, that in asserting the infinite divisibility of matter, we take for granted matter as an object known to us, while it is of our own feelings only we have real knowledge; and a feeling, being *one*, is not infinitely divisible. Had this been stated, we should have had less scruple in giving our *verbal* assent; because the argument is, in truth, unanswerable: but it is unanswerable, precisely as the arguments of Berkeley and Hume against an external world. However impossible it be for us to disbelieve it, we certainly are not justified by any process of ratiocination in assuming the existence of objects without; but, having assumed their existence, it is equally impossible for us to conceive their parts as without dimension, at any stage of potential division. The complete denial of external things is the only shelter to which we can safely have recourse. If that alternative, impossible to our *feelings*, be not adopted, we must submit to the acknowledgment of the infinite divisibility of matter, in all its perplexities of language and of thought.

To the validity of *practical reason*, it is necessary that we admit the objective certainty of *self*, and of all those modifications of self of which we are conscious. That objections may be made to this appeal, M. Villers is fully sensible.—“Perhaps this immediate consciousness, this internal perception of *man* is but a new product of that speculative reason which has already deceived me; an *ideal* forged by itself; an illusion; a phantom! It seems to me, indeed, that it exists independently of all speculation; that it is the great and *living* being within me. But this very belief may be a mistake. From whom shall I receive a pledge of its reality, a proof that it is something more than a simple conception of fancy?” P. 367. After all this rigour of scepticism, he proceeds to give the desired proof with that complete pomp of demonstration which is implied in the French *voici*\*, for which the more modest English has no corresponding idiom. “The destiny of my being is not simple knowledge. I am formed also, as its higher developement, to will and to act: I must influence, and be influenced by every thing which surrounds me. Hence proceeds an order of

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\* Voici la reponse à ces doutes: voici la garantie demandée.

realities, which have in me their source and principle. My actions, and the volitions which determine my actions, not given me from without, but created and modified by myself alone, have therefore an existence, to me more truly real than that of external things. They arise from the centre of my being, in the fundamental reality of my own internal consciousness; while external things, arriving at that centre only after the modifying influence of the medium through which they passed, have but a secondary reality, of which I may justly doubt. My actions are determined by my will; and my will is the immediate result of that consciousness in which I exist independently of things. My actions, and their directing volitions, are therefore a proof that the feeling of *self* is not an illusion. Their reality is the desired pledge of its reality. I will: and by the sublime truths which my volition affords me, I am raised to the rank of a being who lives in all the plenitude of life." To this parade of language, of which, in abridging the verbal amplitude, we have retained all the reasoning, we must do the justice of saying, that we have seldom seen an objection more magnificently evaded. The position which was intended to be proved has, indeed, been assumed in every sentence; but it has been assumed with such just regard to the principles of harmonics, that, after more than two pages of majesty and melody, we feel something like the remorse of ingratitude, in reverting to the original question. The question was, whether the feeling of self, in all its modifications, be not an illusion like that of the phenomenal world? and we are told, that because man is destined to act, and his action is the immediate result of his will, and of his will he is conscious; there are therefore self, and will, and action. Had M. Villers merely said, that because we are conscious of self, self exists; though we should perhaps have denied the agreement of the position with his general scepticism, we should at least have acknowledged its force as felt by ourselves. But when he contends that the mere combination of a series of feelings, which all equally depend on the truth of the question itself, as being all equally real, or equally phenomenal, is a proof of the reality of the feelings combined, we are less disposed to be merciful to inconsistency, and must require from him who considers consciousness as a thing to be proved, some mode of reconciling the belief of the reality of a combination of feelings, with the previous ignorance of their reality, as separate. It is not because man is an active being that he has objective certainty of himself: for the same certainty is equally felt in the most passive of our sensations; and, in truth, we know that *we act*, only because we have taken for granted that which is considered as proved by action. Our *will*, before the experience of action, is to our consciousness a passive feeling, and our knowledge of the *action* is transcendently less certain, because it can be acquired only from the phenomenal world of space and time, in which the changes produced by our action take place. Even though the explanation were in all its other circumstances just, how many forms of intelligence and sensibility does it consider as realities! The destiny of man, the developement of his being, the system of things created by himself, the succession of his will and action, have no meaning, unless we admit time, and causation, and number, and the categories of modality; so that the highest of all realities, the elevating sublimities of our being, are only the illusions of unsubstantial forms, which are at once the cause and the effect of every certainty we feel.

The doctrines of practical reason are four; the liberty of will, the obligation to virtue, our existence in a future state, and our responsibility to a supreme Creator and Judge. On all these subjects, the transcendentalist

has more than usual inconsistency. He declares that they are not objects to be *known* or *proved*\* in the strict sense of the terms. He rejoices that he knows nothing of them. "He would even fear to know any thing of his duties, of God, and of his soul; convinced that if they were objects of his knowledge, they must be in themselves illusions, phenomena purely human of his mode of seeing and conceiving." P. 360. Nothing, therefore, is more evident than that the forms of cognition are not justly applicable to objects which belong not to cognition: such an application would be an amphiboly, or a paralogism, or an error of perhaps still longer name; yet there is not an idea of practical reason in which the forms of our *knowledge* are not involved.

*Freedom of will* implies *number*, because there is choice; it implies *existence*, and *possibility*, and *causation*, because there is power; it implies *time*, because there is the succession of will and action: *it is therefore an error to say that the will is free*.† But though the application of the categories were allowable, the feeling supposed does not justify the assertion. Consciousness informs us only of the present, or, if memory too may be included, of that which is really past. It does not inform us of that *which might have been the past*. Thus it tells us that we did will a particular action; or, that we do will a particular action; or, from that law by which we infer the future from the past, that if we shall will a particular action, the action will ensue. But it is conjecture, and not consciousness, which tells us, that the circumstances of the past having been the same, we might have chosen a different action. It is not enough, therefore, for Kant to say that we have freedom of will, because we are conscious of the power of willing; for the most rigid necessarian does not deny that power. He contends for it even more earnestly than the defender of what has been called its freedom: for action, as far as it is not governed by the motive decisions of reason, resembles more the convulsions of the morbid body than the graceful and spontaneous movements of the healthy limb.

Of moral duty it may be said, in like manner, that *transcendentally* it cannot exist. The voice of conscience, commanding to certain actions, implies succession, causation, existence, and other forms which are applicable only by an error of philosophising. We have, in certain cases, the feeling of duty; but we have also, in certain cases, the feeling of external independent space. Of this latter, it is at *least equally* difficult to divest ourselves; and we are convinced that in the mind of others, if of others we may be allowed to speak objectively, the feeling of duty can as readily be laid aside as that of external things. The liveliness of conviction, the universality, every circumstance is the same. But there is no really existing space: it is therefore probable, that the voice of conscience is in like manner an illusion. Such appears to us the reasoning of the rigid transcendentalist. But the disciple of Kant, less consistent, admits and

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\* How unfortunate is it for a person, who looks forward with such fear to the knowledge of his duties, that he should afterwards be obliged (though, we make no doubt, with great reluctance) to confess, that they are now irresistibly established by the most rigid *proofs*! — avec une rigueur de *méthode* et de *preuves*, qui ne laissent nul recours raisonnable à l'opiniâtreté qui ne veut pas être convaincu. P. 388.

† This species of strict confutation, *ex concessis*, will not appear unmerciful to those who have observed the lavish use which the transcendentalists themselves have made of arguments of a similar kind. The only difference is, that we argue from the principles of him whom we oppose; and that they conceive they have triumphed, when they have merely shown the inconsistency of their own opinions with those of any other theorist.

rejects with equal readiness where the evidence of both is the same. Nor is the confessed illusion merely of equal strength of evidence: the belief of it seems absolutely necessary to the existence of duty. What room is there for the exertion of virtue, where other beings cannot be known to us as objects? We surely cannot increase the happiness of him of whose desires we are ignorant, nor relieve a misery which exists but in our own forms of thought.

In the maxims which are given to us as a summary of virtue, we observe no peculiar merit; and on the transcendental theory of morality, which supposes it to be a voice within us, independent of experience in its origin, and incapable of being aided by any maxims, or stilled by any of the seductions of life, the parade of precept seems to have very little meaning. It is not more absurd to command a human being to invest his external sensations with space, than to command him to listen to sounds which are ever speaking to his heart, and from which it is impossible for him, in any situation, to withhold his attention. If any new duty could be taught by it, a maxim might be of value. But duty can receive no addition, since it is wholly independent of experience. It cannot be taught; for we teach only that which can be *known*: and duty is merely *felt*.

If, however, maxims be of importance, the negative part of the first should certainly have been omitted: for, though it be perhaps better, upon the whole, that we should consider every thinking being as an end in himself, so far as *not to injure him* for the good of another, there are innumerable situations in common life in which an individual may be employed, without injury, but at the same time without reference to himself, for the good of a third person. Even where himself is the great object, it is surely no want of virtue to consider him also as a mean, in the good which our action, with respect to him, may produce to others. The beautiful progression of good, by which a virtuous action is diffused in its effects over a multitude of unknown beings, is at once a delightful contemplation and a powerful excitement to the benevolent mind. Had the first liberators of an injured country, if we may be allowed to take a melancholy example from the recent events of our own time, foreseen a period of future invasion of its rights, and trusted, in rousing their little band, that their example might, after many ages, inspire their descendants to a similar resistance of oppression; we surely cannot think that their zeal would have been less ardent, or that, as an object of our interest, it would excite feelings of less virtuous sublimity.

The second maxim, when stripped of the mysterious majesty of its terms, is only the common doctrine of *utility*; but with an expression so very complicated and artificial that it loses all the effect of a proverb, for which alone such maxims are valuable. *An universal law of nature* is not an object apprehensible by the multitude. It might have been more simply, and therefore better stated, — *Do that which it would be of advantage, upon the whole, that every one should in a similar situation imitate.* Even this, however, is without that quick-felt application to self, which is of such power in the proverbial Christian maxim, and which much more than compensates the cases to which that maxim is inapplicable.

The belief of the reality of a future state forms a very inconsistent part of a theory which denies the actual succession of time: nor, omitting this fundamental objection, do we understand the poetry with which the state of future being is described. The mind cannot quit the phenomenal world, unless it cease to exist with all its necessary and independent forms. Though *around* it (for we have yet no noumenal lan-

guage) be a system of *things in themselves*, there is a subject, as well as objects; and this subject cannot fail to modify the external influences. Our knowledge of external things must be combined, as at present, of objective and subjective elements; and the world may change its laws, but in all its changes it must to us be *phenomenal*.

In reviewing the Transcendental theism, we own that it is very difficult for us to restrain that feeling of the *ludicrous*, which, on a system so respectable, in its celebrity at least, we are unwilling to indulge. An absolute unity, which is neither one, nor more than one, a creator of all things without causation or priority, a judge of the past without succession of time, a being who does not exist\*, are so utterly inconceivable by us, that if theism depend on the conception of them, we must overcome the strongest reluctance of our nature, and be atheists, when the most delightful of our feelings has ceased to be possible.

The animadversions we have made on the Transcendental theory have, we trust, justified our assertion, that its originality consists merely in intermingling, as parts of one system, without regard to its general harmony, the practical belief which the sceptic has always felt, with the tenets which he speculatively avows. The critical philosophy has not connected these discordant opinions; it has merely placed them together; and, when thus exhibited, we do not feel more strongly the possibility of their coalescence. It is acknowledged by M. Villers, that Kant is thoroughly acquainted with the metaphysical writings of every country in Europe; and we think we trace in him a peculiar acquaintance with those of our own language. The *egotism* of Berkeley and Hume is largely incorporated in his system, and combined with the opposing tenets of the school of Dr. Reid. If, to the *common sense* of that school, we add the *innate susceptibilities* of Leibnitz, and the denial by Hume of *necessary connexion in causation, and of the reality of external perception*, we bring before us the *theory of cognition* of Kant. But the force of common sense, and of the distinction of innate ideas, is invalidated by the denial of the reality of our external knowledge; and the denial of the reality of our perception of objects in space, is invalidated by the adoption of the principle of common sense.†

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\* M. Villers adds, in a note, as if astonished at the fact, that it was for denying the existence of God that Fichte was declared an atheist by the theologians of Dresden. P. 341.

† This able review of the Philosophy of Kant was written by Dr. Brown, late Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. Several other valuable articles were contributed to the early Numbers of the E. Review by that eminent metaphysician; amongst others may be mentioned a severe *critique*, in Vol. ii. p. 147., on the work of *Villers* upon the subject of Phrenology—a science to the doctrines of which Dr. Brown, in the latter part of his life, became more favourable. I have transcribed some interesting particulars of Dr. Brown's short-lived connection with the E. Review, from the account of his Life and Writings, edited by the *Rev. David Welsh*; a production in which the impartiality of the biographer is no less conspicuous than the sincerity and gratitude of the friend. See Appendix.

ON REID'S SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY, AND DUGALD  
STEWART'S ELUCIDATION OF IT.\*

IN proceeding to the consideration of Mr. Stewart's observations on the spirit and scope of Dr. Reid's philosophy, we feel ourselves divided between a suspicion of the author's partiality to the memory and the tenets of his venerable instructor, and an unfeigned deference and respect for every thing that Mr. Stewart may deliver upon a subject which he has studied so profoundly. We hope that no one will suspect us of any design to insinuate that Mr. Stewart has represented the doctrines of Dr. Reid in any other light than that in which they really appeared to him : but it is not always easy to point out the imperfections of a system to which the mind has been long habituated ; and in criticising the works of a departed friend, we neither expect nor wish for that severe impartiality which may be exacted as a duty from a stranger. Although it is impossible, therefore, to entertain greater respect for any names than we do for those that are united in the title of this work, we must be permitted to say, that there are several things with which we cannot agree, both in the system of Dr. Reid, and in Mr. Stewart's elucidation and defence of it.

The present section begins with a remark, the justice of which we are not at all disposed to controvert, that the distinguishing feature of Dr. Reid's philosophy is the systematical steadiness with which he has adhered to the course of correct observation, and the admirable self-command by which he has confined himself to the clear statement of the facts he has collected. Mr. Stewart, however, follows up this observation with a warm encomium on the inductive philosophy of Lord Bacon, and a copious and eloquent exposition of the incalculable utility and advantage that may be expected from applying to the science of mind those sound rules of experimental philosophy that have undoubtedly guided us to all the splendid improvements in modern physics. From the time, indeed, that Mr. Hume published his treatise of human nature, down to the latest speculations of Condorcet and Mr. Stewart, we have observed this to be a favourite topic with all metaphysical writers, and that those who have differed in almost every thing else have agreed in magnifying the importance of such enquiries, and in predicting the approach of some striking improvement in the manner of conducting them.†

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\* Account of the Life and Writings of Thomas Reid, D. D., F. R. S. Edinburgh, late Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. By Dugald Stewart, F. R. S. Edinburgh. Read at different Meetings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. 8vo. pp. 225. Edinburgh and London, 1803. — Vol. iii. page 272. January, 1803.

† The opinions maintained in this Essay, on the comparative unimportance of metaphysical enquiries, elicited a clever reply from Dugald Stewart, in the Preliminary Dissertation to his Philosophical Essays. The Edinburgh Reviewers, in their beautiful *critique* on that masterly work, took occasion to reiterate their sentiments, and to defend them with that plausibility of argument and felicity of expression which are the distinguishing characteristics of the eminent critic to whom the article has been ascribed. A writer in the *Quarterly Review*, of first-rate talent, entered the field of controversy, and combated, with consummate skill, the positions of his northern contemporary, which, he conceived, were calculated to undervalue the importance and to discourage the study of mental science.— See Vol. vi. of the *Q. Review*, page 5. A part of the article here alluded to is embodied in the Appendix to this work.

Now, in these speculations, we cannot help suspecting that those philosophers have been misled in a considerable degree by a false analogy, and that their zeal for the promotion of their favourite studies has led them to form expectations somewhat sanguine and extravagant, both as to their substantial utility and as to the possibility of their ultimate improvement. In reality, it does not appear to us that any great advancement in our knowledge of the operations of mind is to be expected from any improvement in the plan of investigation, or that the condition of mankind is likely to derive any great benefit from the cultivation of this interesting but abstracted study.

Inductive philosophy, or that which proceeds upon the careful observation of facts, may be applied to two different classes of phenomena. The first are those that can be made the subject of proper experiment, where the substances are actually in our power, and the judgment and artifice of the enquirer can be effectually employed to arrange and combine them in such a way as to disclose their most hidden properties and relations. The other class of phenomena are those that occur in substances that are placed altogether beyond our reach, the order and succession of which we are generally unable to control, and as to which we can do little more than collect and record the laws by which they appear to be governed. These substances are not the subject of *experiment*, but of *observation*; and the knowledge we may obtain, by carefully watching their variations, is of a kind that does not directly increase the power which we might otherwise have had over them. It seems evident, however, that it is principally in the former of these departments, or the strict *experimental philosophy*, that those splendid improvements have been made which have erected so vast a trophy to the prospective genius of Bacon. The astronomy of Sir Isaac Newton is no exception to this general remark: all that mere *observation* could do to determine the movements of the heavenly bodies, had been accomplished by the star-gazers who preceded him; and the law of gravitation, which he afterwards applied to the planetary system, was first calculated and ascertained by *experiments* performed upon substances which were entirely at his disposal.

It will scarcely be denied, either, that it is almost exclusively to this department of experiment that Lord Bacon has directed the attention of his followers. His fundamental maxim is, that knowledge is power; and the great problem which he constantly aims at resolving is, in what manner the nature of any substance or quality may, by experiment, be so detected and ascertained as to enable us to manage it at our pleasure. The greater part of the *Novum Organum* accordingly is taken up with rules and examples for contriving and conducting experiments; and the chief advantage which he seems to have expected from the progress of these enquiries appears to be centred in the enlargement of man's dominion over the material universe which he inhabits. To the mere observer, therefore, his laws of philosophising, except where they are prohibitory laws, have but little application; and to such an enquirer, the rewards of his philosophy scarcely appear to have been promised. It is evident, indeed, that no *direct* utility can result from the most accurate observation of occurrences which we cannot control; and that for the uses to which such observation may afterwards be turned we are indebted, not so much to the observer, as to the person who discovered the application. It also appears to be pretty evident that, in the art of observation itself, no very great or fundamental improvement can be expected. Vigilance and attention are all that can ever be required in an observer; and though a talent

for methodical arrangement may facilitate to others the study of the facts that have been collected, it does not appear how our knowledge of these facts can be increased by any new method of describing them. Facts that we are unable to modify or direct, in short, can only be the objects of observation; and observation can only inform us that they exist, and that their succession appears to be governed by certain general laws.

In the proper experimental philosophy, every acquisition of knowledge is an increase of power; because the knowledge is necessarily derived from some intentional disposition of materials which we may always command in the same manner. In the philosophy of observation, it is merely a gratification of our curiosity. By experiment, too, we generally acquire a pretty correct knowledge of the causes of the phenomena we produce, as we ourselves distribute and arrange the circumstances upon which they depend; while in matters of mere observation, the assignment of causes must always be in a good degree conjectural, inasmuch as we have no means of separating the preceding phenomena, or deciding, otherwise than by analogy, to which of them the succeeding event is to be attributed.

Now, it appears to us to be pretty evident that the phenomena of the human mind are almost all of the latter description. We feel, and perceive, and remember, without any purpose or contrivance of ours, and have evidently no power over the mechanism by which those functions are performed. We may observe and distinguish those operations of mind, indeed, with more or less attention or exactness; but we cannot subject them to experiment, nor alter their nature by any process of investigation. We cannot decompose our perceptions in a crucible, nor divide our sensations with a prism; nor can we, by art and contrivance, produce any combination of thoughts or emotions, besides those with which all men have been provided by nature. No metaphysician expects by analysis to discover a new power, or to excite a new sensation in the mind, as a chemist discovers a new earth or a new metal; nor can he hope, by any process of synthesis, to exhibit a mental combination different from any that nature has produced in the minds of other persons. The science of metaphysics, therefore, depends upon observation, and not upon experiment; and all reasonings upon mind proceed accordingly upon a reference to that general observation which all men are supposed to have made, and not to any particular experiments which are known only to the inventor. The province of philosophy in this department, therefore, is the province of observation only; and, in this department, the greater part of that code of laws which Bacon has provided for the regulation of experimental induction is plainly without authority. In metaphysics, certainly, knowledge is not power; and instead of producing new phenomena to elucidate the old by well-contrived and well-conducted experiments, the most diligent enquirer can do no more than register and arrange the appearances, which he can neither account for nor control.

But though our power can in no case be directly increased by the most vigilant and correct observation, our knowledge may often be very greatly extended by it. In the science of mind, however, we are inclined to suspect that this is not the case. From the very nature of the subject, it seems necessarily to follow, that all men must be practically familiar with all the functions and qualities of their minds, and with almost all the laws by which they appear to be governed. Every one knows exactly what it is to perceive and to feel, to remember, imagine, and believe; and though he may not always apply the words that denote these operations with



perfect propriety, it is not possible to suppose that any one is ignorant of the things. Even those laws of thought, or connections of mental operation, that are not so commonly stated in words, appear to be universally known, and are found to regulate the practice of those who never thought of enouncing them in an abstract proposition. A man who never heard it asserted that memory depends upon attention, yet attends with uncommon care to any thing that he wishes to remember; and accounts for his forgetfulness, by acknowledging that he had paid no attention. A groom, who never heard of the association of ideas, feeds the young war-horse to the sound of a drum; and the unphilosophical artists that tame elephants and train dancing dogs, proceed upon the same obvious and admitted principle. The truth is, that as we only know the existence of mind by the exercise of its functions according to certain laws, it is impossible that any one should ever discover or bring to light any functions or any laws of which men would admit the existence, unless they were previously convinced of their operations on themselves. A philosopher may be the first to state these laws, and to describe their operation distinctly in words; but men must be already familiarly acquainted with them in reality before they can assent to the justice of his descriptions.

For these reasons, we cannot help thinking that the labours of the metaphysician, instead of being assimilated to those of the chemist or experimental philosopher, might, with less impropriety, be compared to those of the grammarian, who arranges into technical order the words of a language which is spoken familiarly by all his readers; or of the artist, who exhibits to them a correct map of a district, with every part of which they were previously acquainted. We acquire a perfect knowledge of our own minds, without study or exertion, just as we acquire a perfect knowledge of our native language, or our native parish; yet we cannot, without much study and reflection, compose a grammar of the one, or a map of the other. To arrange in correct order all the particulars of our practical knowledge, and to set down, without omission and without distortion, every thing that we actually know upon a subject, requires a power of abstraction, recollection, and disposition, that falls to the lot of but few. In the science of mind, perhaps, more of those qualities are required than in any other; but it is not the less true of this, than of all the rest, that the materials of the description must always be derived from a previous acquaintance with the subject, — that nothing can be set down technically that was not practically known, — and that no substantial addition is made to our knowledge by a scientific distribution of its particulars. After such a systematic arrangement has been introduced, and a correct nomenclature applied, we may indeed conceive more clearly, and will certainly describe more justly, the nature and extent of our information; but our information itself is not really increased, and the consciousness by which we are supplied with all the materials of our reflections does not become more productive by this disposition of its contributions.

But though we have been induced in this way to express our scepticism, both as to the probable improvement and practical utility of metaphysical speculations, we would by no means be understood as having asserted that these studies are absolutely without interest or importance. With regard to perception, indeed, and some of the other primary functions of mind, it seems now to be admitted, that philosophy can be of no use to us, and that the profoundest reasonings lead us back to the creed and the ignorance of the vulgar. As to the laws of association, however, the case is somewhat different: instances of the application of such laws

are indeed familiar to every one, and there are few who do not of themselves arrive at some imperfect conception of their general limits and application; but that they are sooner learned, and more steadily and extensively applied, when our observations are assisted by the lessons of a judicious instructor, seems scarcely to admit of doubt: and though there are no errors of opinion, perhaps, that may not be corrected without the help of metaphysical principles, it cannot be disputed, that an habitual acquaintance with these principles leads us more directly to the source of such errors, and enables us more readily to explain and correct some of the most formidable aberrations of human understanding. After all, perhaps, the chief value of such speculations will be found to consist in the exercise which they afford to the faculties, and the delight which is produced by the consciousness of intellectual exertion. Upon this subject we gladly borrow from Mr. Stewart the following admirable quotations:—

“ An author well qualified to judge, from his own experience, of whatever conduces to invigorate or to embellish the understanding, has beautifully remarked, that ‘ by turning the soul inward on itself, its forces are concentrated, and are fitted for stronger and bolder flights of science; and that, in such pursuits, whether we take, or whether we lose the game, the chase is certainly of service.’ In this respect, the philosophy of the mind (abstracting entirely from that pre-eminence which belongs to it in consequence of its practical applications) may claim a distinguished rank among those preparatory disciplines, which another writer of equal talents has happily compared to ‘ the crops which are raised, not for the sake of the harvest, but to be ploughed in as a dressing to the land.’ ”—P. 166, 167.

In following out his observations on the scope and spirit of Dr. Reid’s philosophy, Mr. Stewart does not present his readers with any general outline or summary of the peculiar doctrines by which it is principally distinguished. This part of the book, indeed, appears to be addressed almost exclusively to those who are in some degree initiated in the studies of which it treats, and consists of a vindication of Dr. Reid’s philosophy from the most important objections that had been proposed to it by his antagonists. The first is made by the materialist, and is directed against the gratuitous assumption of the existence of mind. To this Mr. Stewart answers, with irresistible force, that the philosophy of Dr. Reid has in reality no concern with the theories that may be formed as to the *causes* of our mental operations, but is entirely confined to the investigation of those phenomena which are known to us by internal consciousness, and not by external perception. On the theory of materialism itself he makes some admirable observations; and, after having stated the perceptible improvement that has lately taken place in the method of considering those intellectual phenomena, he concludes with the following judicious and eloquent observations:—

“ The authors who form the most conspicuous exceptions to this gradual progress consist chiefly of men whose errors may be easily accounted for, by the prejudices connected with their circumscribed habits of observation and enquiry;—of Physiologists, accustomed to attend to that part alone of the human frame which the knife of the Anatomist can lay open;—or of Chemists, who enter on the analysis of Thought fresh from the decompositions of the laboratory, carrying into the Theory of Mind itself (what Bacon expressively calls) ‘ the smoke and tarnish of the furnace.’ Of the value of such pursuits, none can think more highly than myself; but I must be allowed to observe, that the most distinguished pre-eminence in them does not necessarily imply a capacity of collected and abstracted reflection, or an understanding superior to the prejudices of early association and the illusions of popular language. I will not go so far as Cicero, when he ascribes to those who possess these advantages a more than ordinary vigour of intellect: ‘ *Magni est in-*

*genii revocare mentem a sensibus, et cogitationem a consuetudine abducere?* I would only claim for them the merit of patient and cautious research; and would exact from their antagonists the same qualifications — P. 110, 111.

The second great objection that has been made to the doctrines of Dr. Reid is, that they tend to damp the ardour of philosophical curiosity, by stating as ultimate facts many phenomena which might be resolved into simpler principles, and perplex the science of mind with an unnecessary multitude of internal and unaccountable properties.\* It is certainly better to damp the ardour of philosophers, by exposing their errors and convincing them of their ignorance, than to gratify it by subscribing to their blunders. It is one step towards a true explanation of any phenomenon, to expose the fallacy of an erroneous one; and though the contemplation of our failures may render us more diffident of success, it will probably teach us some lessons that are far from diminishing our chance of obtaining it. To the charge of multiplying unnecessarily the original and instinctive principles of our nature, Mr. Stewart has not made quite so satisfactory an answer. The greater part of what he says, indeed, upon this subject, is rather an apology for Dr. Reid than a complete justification of him. In his classification of the active powers, he admits that Dr. Reid has multiplied, without necessity, the number of our original affections, and that, in the other parts of his doctrine, he has manifested a leaning to the same extreme. It would have been better, perhaps, if Mr. Stewart had rested the defence of his author upon those concessions, and upon the general reasoning with which they are very skilfully associated, to prove the superior safety and prudence of this tardiness to generalise and assimilate; for, with all our deference for the talents of the author, we find it impossible to agree with him in those particular instances in which he has endeavoured to expose the injustice of the accusation. After all that Mr. Stewart has said, we can still see no reason for admitting a principle of credulity, or a principle of veracity, in human nature; nor can we discover any sort of evidence for the existence of an instinctive power of interpreting natural signs.

Dr. Reid's only reason for maintaining that the belief we commonly give to the testimony of others is not derived from reasoning and experience, is, that this credulity is more apparent and excessive in children, than in those whose experience and reason is mature. Now, to this it seems obvious to answer, that the experience of children, though not extensive, is almost always entirely *uniform* in favour of the veracity of those about them. There can scarcely be any temptation to utter falsehood to an infant; and even if that should happen, there is seldom such a degree of memory or attention as would be necessary for its detection. In all cases besides, it is admitted that children learn the general rule before they begin to attend to the exceptions; and it will not be denied that the general rule is, that there is a connexion between the assertions of mankind and the realities of which they are speaking. Falsehood is like those irregularities in the construction of a language, which children always overlook for the sake of the general analogy.

The principle of *veracity* is in the same situation. Men speak and assert, in order to accomplish some purpose; but if they did not generally speak truth, their assertions would answer no purpose at all—not even that of deception. To speak falsehood, too, even if we could suppose it

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\* We have here classed under one head the objections which Mr. Stewart distinguishes into two.

to be done without a motive, requires a certain exercise of imagination and the inventive faculties, which is not without labour: truth is suggested spontaneously, not by the principle of veracity, but by our consciousness and memory. Even if we were not rational creatures, therefore, but spoke merely as a consequence of our sensations, we would speak truth much oftener than falsehood; but being rational, and addressing ourselves to other beings with a view of influencing their conduct or opinion, it follows, as a matter of necessity, that we must almost always speak truth: even the principle of credulity would not otherwise be sufficient to render it worth while for us to speak at all.

With regard to the principle by which we are enabled to interpret the natural signs of the passions, and of other connected events, we cannot help entertaining a similar scepticism. There is no evidence, we think, for the existence of such a principle, and all the phenomena may be solved by the help of memory and the association of ideas. The 'inductive principle' is very nearly in the same predicament; though the full discussion of the argument that might be maintained upon that subject would occupy more room than we can now spare.

After some very excellent observations on the nature and the functions of instinct, Mr. Stewart proceeds to consider, as the last great objection to Dr. Reid's philosophy, the alleged tendency of his doctrines, on the subject of *common sense*, to sanction an appeal from the decisions of the learned to the voice of the multitude. Mr. Stewart, with great candour, admits that the phrase was unluckily chosen, and that it has not always been employed with perfect accuracy, either by Dr. Reid or his followers; but he maintains, that the greater part of the truths which Dr. Reid has referred to this authority, are in reality originally and unaccountably impressed on the human understanding, and are necessarily implied in the greater part of its operations. These, he says, may be better denominated, "Fundamental laws of belief;" and he exemplifies them by such propositions as the following: "I am the same person to-day that I was yesterday.—The material world has a real existence.—The future course of nature will resemble the past." We shall have occasion immediately to offer a few observations on some of these propositions.

With these observations Mr. Stewart concludes his defence of Dr. Reid's philosophy: but we cannot help thinking that there was room for a farther vindication, and that some objections may be stated to the system in question, as formidable as any of those which Mr. Stewart has endeavoured to obviate. We shall allude very shortly to those that appear the most obvious and important. Dr. Reid's great achievement was undoubtedly the subversion of the ideal system, or the confutation of that hypothesis which represents the immediate objects of the mind in perception, as certain *images* or *pictures* of external objects conveyed by the senses to the sensorium. This part of his task, it is now generally admitted, that he has performed with exemplary diligence and complete success: but we are by no means so entirely satisfied with the uses he has attempted to make of his victory. After considering the subject with some attention, we must confess that we have not been able to perceive how the destruction of the ideal theory can be held as a demonstration of the real existence of matter, or a confutation of all those reasonings which have brought into question the popular faith upon this subject. The theory of images and pictures, in fact, was in its original state more closely connected with the supposition of a real material prototype, than the theory of direct perception; and the sceptical doubts

that have since been suggested appear to us to be by no means exclusively applicable to the former hypothesis. He who believes that certain forms or images are actually transmitted through the organs of sense to the mind, must believe, at least, in the reality of the organs and the images, and probably in their origin from real external existences. He who is contented with stating that he is conscious of certain sensations and perceptions, by no means assumes the independent existence of matter, and gives a safer account of the phenomena than the idealist.

Dr. Reid's sole argument for the real existence of a material world, is founded on the irresistible belief of it that is implied in perception and memory; a belief, the foundations of which he seems to think it would be something more than absurd to call in question. Now, the reality of this general persuasion or belief no one ever attempted to deny. The question is only about its justness or truth. It is conceivable, certainly, in every case, that our belief should be erroneous; and there can be nothing absurd in suggesting reasons for doubting of its conformity with truth. The obstinacy of our belief in this instance, and its constant recurrence, even after all our endeavours to familiarise ourselves with the objections that have been made to it, are not absolutely without parallel in the history of the human faculties. All children believe that the earth is at rest, and that the sun and the fixed stars perform a diurnal revolution round it. They also believe that the place which they occupy on the surface is absolutely the uppermost, and that the inhabitants of the opposite surface must be suspended in an inverted position. Now, of this universal, practical, and irresistible belief, all persons of education are easily abused in speculation, though it influences their ordinary language, and continues, in fact, to be the habitual impression of their minds. In the same way, a Berkleian might admit the constant recurrence of the illusions of sense, although his speculative reason were sufficiently convinced of their fallacy.

The phenomena of dreaming and of delirium, however, appear to afford a sort of *experimentum crucis* to demonstrate that a real external existence is not necessary to produce sensation and perception in the human mind. Is it utterly absurd and ridiculous to maintain, that all the objects of our thoughts may be "such stuff as dreams are made of?" or that the uniformity of Nature gives us some reason to presume, that the perceptions of maniacs and of rational men are manufactured, like their organs, out of the same materials? There is a species of insanity known among medical men by the epithet *notional*, in which there is frequently no general depravation of the reasoning and judging faculties, but where the disease consists entirely in the patient mistaking the objects of his thought or imagination for real and present existences. The error of his perceptions, in such a case, is only detected by comparing them with the perceptions of other people; and it is evident that he has just the same reason to impute error to them, as they can have individually for imputing it to him. The majority, indeed, necessarily carries the point as to all practical consequences; but is there any absurdity in alleging that we have no internal, infallible, and necessary assurance of that in which the internal conviction of an individual must be supported, and may be overruled by the testimony of his fellow-creatures?

Dr. Reid has himself admitted, that "we might probably have been so made, as to have all the perceptions and sensations which we now have, without any impression on our bodily organs at all." It is surely altogether as reasonable to say that we might have had all those perceptions,

without the aid or intervention of any material existence at all. Those perceptions might still have been accompanied with a belief, too, that would not have been less universal or irresistible for being utterly without a foundation in reality. In short, our perceptions can never afford any complete or irrefragable proof of the real existence of external things; because it is easy to conceive that we might have such perceptions without them. We do not know, therefore, with certainty, that our perceptions are ever produced by external objects; and in the cases to which we have just alluded, we find perception and its concomitant belief, where we do know with certainty that it is *not* produced by any external existence.

It has been said, however, that we have the same evidence for the existence of the material world as for that of our own thoughts or conceptions; as we have no reason for believing in the latter, but that we cannot help it; which is equally true of the former. Now, this appears to us to be very inaccurately argued. Whatever we doubt, and whatever we prove, we must plainly begin with consciousness: that alone is certain—all the rest is inference. Does Dr. Reid mean to assert, that our perception of external objects is not a necessary preliminary to any proof of their reality, or that our belief in their reality is not founded upon our consciousness of perceiving them? Our perceptions, then, and not the existence of their objects, is what we cannot help believing; and it would be nearly as reasonable to say that we must take all our dreams for realities, because we cannot doubt that we dream, as it is to assert that we have the same evidence for the existence of an external world, as for the existence of the sensations by which it is suggested to our minds.

We dare not venture farther into this subject; yet we cannot abandon it without observing, that the question is entirely a matter of philosophical and abstract speculation; and that by far the most reprehensible passages in Dr. Reid's writings, are those in which he has represented it as otherwise. When we consider, indeed, the exemplary candour, and temper, and modesty, with which this excellent man has conducted the whole of his speculations, we cannot help wondering that he should ever have forgotten himself so far as to descend to the vulgar raillery which he has addressed, instead of argument, to the abettors of the Berkleian hypothesis. The old joke, of the sceptical philosophers running their noses against posts, tumbling into kennels, and being sent to a madhouse, is repeated at least ten times in different parts of Dr. Reid's publications, and really seems to have been considered as an objection not less forcible than facetious. Yet Dr. Reid surely could not be ignorant, that those who have questioned the reality of a material universe, never affected to have perceptions, ideas, and sensations of a different nature from other people. The debate was merely about the *origin* of these sensations, and could not possibly affect the conduct or feelings of the individual. The sceptic, therefore, who has been taught by experience that certain perceptions are connected with unpleasant sensations, will avoid the occasions of them as carefully as those who look upon the objects of their perceptions as external realities. Notions and sensations he cannot deny to exist; and this limited faith will regulate his conduct exactly in the same manner as the more extensive creed of his antagonists. We are persuaded that Mr. Stewart would reject the aid of such an argument for the existence of an external world.

The unexpected length to which these observations have extended, deters us from prosecuting any farther our remarks on Dr. Reid's philo-

sophy. The other points in which it appears to us that he has left his system vulnerable, are, his explanation of our idea of *cause and effect*, and his speculations on the question of *liberty and necessity*. In the former, we cannot help thinking that he has dogmatised, with a degree of confidence which is scarcely justified by the cogency of his arguments, and has endeavoured to draw ridicule on the reasoning of his antagonists, by illustrations that are utterly inapplicable. In the latter, he has made something more than a just use of the prejudices of men and the ambiguity of language, and has more than once been guilty, if we be not mistaken, of what, in a less respectable author, we should not have scrupled to call the most palpable sophistry. We are glad that our duty does not require us to enter into the discussion of this very perplexing controversy; though we may be permitted to remark, that it is somewhat extraordinary to find the dependence of human actions on motives so positively denied by those very philosophers with whom the doctrine of causation is of such high authority.

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### PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS. BY DUGALD STEWART.\*

MIND, NOT THE PROPER SUBJECT OF EXPERIMENT, BUT OF OBSERVATION.—  
EFFECTS OF THE CULTIVATION OF MODERN PHYSICS, AND OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND CONTRASTED.

IN the second part of the Preliminary Dissertation, we will confess that we take a lively interest; as Mr. Stewart has there taken occasion to make a formal reply to some of our hasty speculations, and has done us the honour of embodying several of our transitory pages in this enduring volume. If we were at liberty to yield to the common weaknesses of authors, we should probably be tempted to defend ourselves in a long dissertation; but we know too well what is due to our readers and to the public, to think of engaging any considerable share of their attention with a controversy which may be considered in some measure as personal to ourselves; and therefore, however honourable we think it, to be thus singled out for equal combat by such an antagonist, we shall put what we have to say within a very narrow compass.

The observations to which Mr. Stewart has here condescended to reply occur in an early Number of our publication †, and were intended to show, that as mind was not the proper subject of *experiment*, but of *observation*, so there could be no very close analogy between the rules of metaphysical investigation, and the most approved methods of enquiry as to those physical substances which are subjected to our disposal and control;—that as all the facts with regard to mind must be derived from

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\* Vol. xvii. page 173. November, 1810.

† See an able review of Stewart's Life of Reid, vol. iii. page 269, &c. That the reader may clearly understand the nature of the controversy between the Edinburgh Review and the distinguished author of the Philosophical Essays, he should peruse the whole of the second chapter of the Preliminary Dissertation to that work, page 26, &c., which was intended as a reply to the observations of the critic in his strictures upon Reid's Philosophy.

previous and universal consciousness, it was difficult to see how any arrangement of them could add to our substantial knowledge; and that there was, therefore, no reason either to expect discoveries in this branch of science, or to look to it for any real augmentation of our *power*. The argument upon this head was summed up in the following passage, which Mr. Stewart has not thought it necessary to quote in the Dissertation before us, though it was certainly intended to contain that ultimate view of the subject, by which we were most willing to abide, and most desirous to be tried.

“ For these reasons, we cannot help thinking that the labours of the metaphysician, instead of being assimilated to those of the chemist or experimental philosopher, might, with less impropriety, be compared to those of the Grammarian, who arranges into technical order the words of a language which is spoken familiarly by all his readers; or of the Geographer, who exhibits to them a correct map of a district, with every part of which they were previously acquainted. We acquire a perfect knowledge of our own minds without study or exertion, just as we acquire a perfect knowledge of our native language or our native parish; yet we cannot, without much study and reflection, compose a grammar of the one, or a map of the other. To arrange in correct order all the particulars of our practical knowledge, and to set down, without omission and without distortion, every thing that we actually know upon a subject, requires a power of abstraction, recollection, and disposition, that falls to the lot of but few. In the science of mind, perhaps, more of those qualities are required than in any other; but it is not the less true of this than of all the rest, that the materials of the description must always be derived from a previous acquaintance with the subject,—that nothing can be set down technically that was not practically known,—and that no substantial addition is made to our knowledge by a scientific distribution of its particulars. After such a systematic arrangement has been introduced and a correct nomenclature applied, we may indeed conceive more clearly, and will certainly describe more justly, the nature and extent of our information; but our information itself is not really increased; and the consciousness by which we are supplied with all the materials of our reflections, does not become more productive by this disposition of its contributions.”

With regard to perception and the other primary functions of mind, it was added, that this doctrine seemed to hold without any limitation; and as to the associating principle, while it was admitted that the case was somewhat different, it was observed, that all men were in reality aware of its existence, and acted upon it in all practical cases, though they might never have made its laws a subject of reflection, nor ever stated its general phenomena in the form of an abstract proposition.

To all this Mr. Stewart proceeds to answer, by observing, that the distinction between experiment and observation is really of no importance whatever, in reference to this argument; because experiments are merely phenomena that are observed; and the inferences and generalisations that are deduced from the observation of spontaneous phenomena, are just of the same sort with those that are inferred from experiment, and afford equally certain grounds of conclusion, provided they be sufficiently numerous and consistent. The justice of the last general proposition we do not mean to dispute; and assuredly, if any thing inconsistent with it is to be found in our former speculations, it must have arisen from that haste and inadvertence which, we make no doubt, have often betrayed us into still greater errors. But it is very far from following from this, that there is not a very material difference between experiment and observation; or that the philosophy of mind is not necessarily restrained within very narrow limits, in consequence of that distinction. Substances which are in our power are the objects of experiment; those which are



not in our power, of observation only. With regard to the former, it is obvious that, by well-contrived experiments, we may discover many things that could never be disclosed by any length of observation. With regard to the latter, an attentive observer may, indeed, see more in them than strikes the eye of a careless spectator; but he can see nothing that *may* not be seen by every body; and, in cases where the appearances are very few, or very interesting, the chance is, that he *does* see nothing more, — and that all that is left to philosophy is, to distinguish them into classes, and to fit them with appropriate appellations. Now, mind, we humbly conceive, considered as a subject of investigation, is the subject of observation only; and is known nearly as well by all men, as by those who have most diligently studied its phenomena. “We cannot decompose our sensations,” we formerly observed, “in a crucible, nor divide our perceptions with a prism.” The metaphor was something violent; but the meaning obviously was, that we cannot subject those faculties to any analogous process, nor discover more of their nature than consciousness has taught all the beings who possess them. Is it a satisfactory answer, then, for Mr. Stewart to say, that we may analyse them by reflection and attention, and other instruments better suited than prisms or crucibles to the intellectual laboratory which furnishes their materials? Our reply is, that we cannot analyse them at all; and can never know more of them than has always been known to all to whom they had been imparted; and that for this plain reason, that the truth of every thing that is said with regard to the mind can be determined by an appeal to consciousness alone, and would not be even intelligible, if it informed men of any thing that they did not previously feel to be true.

With regard to the actual *experiments* to which Mr. Stewart alludes, as having helped to explain the means by which the eye judges of distances and magnitudes, these, we must observe, are, according to our conception, very clearly experiments, not upon mind, but upon matter; and are only entitled to that name at all, in so far as they are carried on by means of the power we possess of disposing certain pieces of matter in certain masses and intervals. Strictly considered, they are optical experiments on the effects produced by distance on the appearance of bodies; and are nearly akin to experiments on the effects produced on their appearance by the interposition of *media* of different refracting powers, whether in the shape of prisms, or in any other shape. At all events, they certainly are not investigations carried on solely by attending to the subjects of our consciousness, which is Mr. Stewart’s own definition of the business of the philosophy of mind.

In answer to our remark, that “no metaphysician expects, by analysis, to discover a new power, or to excite a new sensation in the mind, as the chemist discovers a new earth or a new metal,” Mr. Stewart is pleased to observe —

“That it is no more applicable to the anatomy of the mind, than to the anatomy of the body. After all the researches of physiologists on this last subject, both in the way of observation and of experiment, no discovery has yet been made of a new organ, either of power or of pleasure, or even of the means of adding a cubit to the human stature; but it does not therefore follow that these researches are useless. By enlarging his knowledge of his own internal structure, they increase the *power of man* in that way in which alone they profess to increase it. They furnish him with resources for remedying many of the accidents to which his health and his life are liable; for recovering, in some cases, those active powers which disease has destroyed or impaired; and, in others, by giving sight to the blind, and hearing to the deaf, for awakening powers of perception which were dormant be-

fore. Nor must we overlook what they have contributed, in conjunction with the arts of the optician and of the mechanist, to extend the sphere of those senses, and to prolong their duration." *Prelim. Diss.* p. xlvi. xlvii.

Now, ingenious and elegant as this parallel must be admitted to be, we cannot help regarding it as utterly fallacious, for this simple reason — that the business of anatomy is to lay open, with the knife, the secrets of that internal structure, which could never otherwise be apparent to the keenest eye; while the metaphysical enquirer can disclose nothing of which all his pupils are not previously aware. There is no opaque skin, in short, on the mind, to conceal its interior mechanism; nor does the metaphysician, when he appeals to the consciousness of all thinking beings for the truth of his classifications, perform any thing at all analogous to the dissector, when he removes those outward integuments, and reveals the wonders of the inward organisation of our frame. *His* statements do not receive their proof from the previous, though perhaps undigested knowledge of his hearers, but from the actual revelation which he makes to their senses; and his services would evidently be more akin to those of the metaphysician, if, instead of actually disclosing what was not previously known, or suspected to exist, he had only drawn the attention of an incurious generation to the fact that they had each ten fingers and ten toes, or that most of them had thirty-two teeth, distinguishable into masticators and incisors.

When, from these, and some other considerations, we had ventured to infer, that the knowledge derived from mere observation could scarcely make any addition to our power, Mr. Stewart refers triumphantly to the instance of astronomy; and, taking it almost for granted, that all the discoveries in that science have been made by observation alone, directs the attention of his readers to the innumerable applications which may be made of it to purposes of unquestioned utility.

“In compensation,” he observes, “for the inability of the astronomer to control those movements of which he studies the laws, he may boast, as I already hinted, of the immense accession of a more useful power which his discoveries have added to the human race, on the surface of their own planet. It would be endless to enumerate all the practical uses to which his labours are subservient. It is sufficient for me to repeat an old, but very striking reflection, that the only accurate knowledge which man possesses of the surface of the earth, has been derived from the previous knowledge he had acquired of the phenomena of the stars. Is it possible to produce a more apposite, or a more undeniable proof of the universality of Bacon’s maxim, that ‘*knowledge is power*,’ than a fact which demonstrates the essential aid which man has derived, in asserting his dominion over this lower world, from a branch of science which seems, at first view, fitted only to gratify a speculative curiosity; and which, in its infancy, served to amuse the leisure of the Chaldean shepherd?” *Prelim. Diss.* p. xxxviii. xxxix.

To this we have to answer, in the first place, that astronomical science has *not* been perfected by observation alone; but that all the elements which have imparted to it the certainty, the simplicity, and the sublimity which it possesses, have been derived from *experiments* made upon substances in the power of their contrivers; — from experiments performed with small pieces of matter on the laws of projectile motion — the velocities of falling bodies — and on centrifugal and centripetal forces. The knowledge of these laws, like all other valuable knowledge, was obtained by experiment only; and their application to the movements of the heavenly bodies was one of those splendid generalisations which derive their chief merit from those inherent imperfections of observation by which they were rendered necessary. But, in the second place, we must ob-

serve, that, even holding astronomy to be a science of mere observation, the power which Mr. Stewart says we have obtained by means of it, is confessedly a power, not over the substances with which that science is conversant, but over *other* substances which stand in some relation to them; and to which, accordingly, that science is capable of being applied. It is over the earth and the ocean that we have extended our dominion by means of our knowledge of the stars. Now, applying this case to that of the philosophy of mind, and assuming, as we seem here entitled to assume, that it has invested us with no new power over mind itself, — what, we would ask, are the *other* objects over which our power is increased by means of our knowledge of mind? Is there any other substance to which that knowledge can possibly be applied? Is there any thing else that we either know better, or can dispose of more effectually in consequence of our observations on our own intellectual constitution? It is evident, we humbly conceive, that these questions must be answered in the negative. The most precise knowledge which the metaphysician can acquire by reflecting on the subjects of his consciousness, can give him no new power over the mind in which he discovers those subjects; and it is almost a self-evident proposition, that the most accurate knowledge of the subjects of consciousness can give him no power over any thing but mind.

There is one other little point connected with this argument which we wish to settle with Mr. Stewart. In speaking of the useful *applications* that may be ultimately made of the knowledge derived from observation, we had said, that for the power or the benefit so obtained, mankind were indebted — not to the observer, but to him who suggested the application. Mr. Stewart admits the truth of this; but adds, that the case is exactly the same with the knowledge derived from experiment; and that the mere empiric is on a footing with the mere observer. Now, we do not think the cases exactly the same; and it is in their difference that we conceive the great disadvantage of observation to consist. Whoever makes an experiment, must have the power at least to repeat that experiment; and, in almost every case, to repeat it with some variation of circumstances. Here, therefore, is one power necessarily ascertained and established; and an invitation held out to increase that power, by tracing it through all the stages and degrees of its existence: while he who observes a phenomenon, over which he has no control, neither exercises any power, nor holds out the prospect of acquiring any power, either over the subject of his observation, or over any other substance. He who first ascertained, by experiment, the expansive force of steam, and its destruction by cold, or the identity of lightning and electricity, and the consequent use of the conducting rod, plainly bestowed, in that instant, a great power upon mankind; of which it was next to impossible that some important application should not be speedily made. But he who first observed the periodic immersions and emersions of the satellites of Jupiter, certainly neither acquired nor bestowed any power in the first instance; and seems to have been but a remote and casual auxiliary to him whose genius afterwards found the means of employing these phenomena to guide him through the trackless waters of the ocean. Experiment, therefore, necessarily implies power; and, by suggesting analogous experiments, leads naturally to the interminable expansion of enquiry and of knowledge: but observation, for the most part, centres in itself; and tends rather to gratify and allay our curiosity, than to rouse or inflame it.

After having thus attempted to prove that experiment has no prerogative above mere observation, Mr. Stewart thinks it worth while to recur again to the assertion, that the philosophy of mind does admit of experiments; and, after remarking, rather rashly, that “the whole of a philosopher’s life, if he spends it to any purpose, is one continued series of experiments on his own faculties and powers,” he goes on to state, that

“—hardly any experiment can be imagined which has not already been tried by the hand of nature; displaying, in the infinite varieties of human genius and pursuits, the astonishingly diversified effects resulting from the possible combinations, of those elementary faculties and principles, of which every man is conscious in himself. Savage society, and all the different modes of civilisation;—the different callings and professions of individuals, whether liberal or mechanical;—the prejudiced clown;—the factitious man of fashion;—the varying phases of character from infancy to old age;—the prodigies effected by human art in all the objects around us;—laws, — government, — commerce, — religion; — but above all, the records of thought, preserved in those volumes which fill our libraries; what are they but *experiments*, by which nature illustrates, for our instruction, on her own grand scale, the varied range of man’s intellectual faculties, and the omnipotence of education in fashioning his mind?” *Prel. Diss.* xlv. xlvi.

If experiment be rightly defined the intentional arrangement of substances in our power for the purpose of observing the result, then these are not experiments; and neither imply, nor tend to bestow, that power which enters into the conception of all experiment. But the argument, in our apprehension, is chargeable with a still more radical fallacy. The philosophy of mind is distinctly defined, by Mr. Stewart himself, to be that which is employed “on phenomena of which we are conscious;” its peculiar object and aim is stated to be, “to ascertain the laws of our constitution, in so far as they can be ascertained by attention to the subjects of our consciousness;” and, in a great variety of passages, it is explained, that the powers by which all this is to be effected are, reflection upon our mental operations, and the faculty of calm and patient attention to the sensations of which we are conscious. But if this be the proper province and object of the philosophy of mind, what benefit is the student to receive from observing the various effects of manners and situation, in imparting a peculiar colour or bias to the character of the savage and the citizen, “the prejudiced clown and factitious man of fashion?” The observation of such varieties is, no doubt, a very curious and a very interesting occupation; but we humbly conceive it to form no part, or, at least, a very small and inconsiderable part, of the occupation of a student of philosophy. It is an occupation which can only be effectually pursued in the world by travelling and intercourse with society; and, at all events, by vigilant observation of what is presented to our senses. The philosophy of mind, however, is to be cultivated in solitude and silence — by calm reflection on our own mental experiences, and patient attention to the subjects of our consciousness. Are we *conscious* of those varieties of temper and character that distinguish the different conditions of human life? — or, even independently of Mr. Stewart’s definition, is it reconcilable to common usage or general understanding, to call our attention to such particulars the study of the philosophy of mind? Is it not, on the contrary, universally understood to be almost the limited province of that philosophy, to explain the nature and distinctions of those primary functions of the mind, which are possessed in common by men of *all* vocations and *all* conditions? — to treat of perception and attention, and memory and imagination, and volition and judgment, and all the other powers or faculties into which our intellectual nature may be distinguished?

— Is it not with *these*, that Locke, and Berkeley, and Reid, and all the other philosophers who have reasoned or philosophised about mind, have been occupied? — or, what share of Mr. Stewart's own invaluable publications is devoted to those slighter shades of individual character, to which alone his supposed experiments have any reference? The philosophy of the human mind, we conceive, is conversant only with what is common to all human beings, and with those faculties of which every individual of the species is equally conscious: and though it may occasionally borrow illustrations, or even derive some reflected light, from the contemplation of those slighter varieties that distinguish one individual from another, this evidently forms no part of the study of the subjects of our consciousness, and can never be permitted to rank as a legitimate part of that philosophy.

This exhausts almost all that we have to say in defence of our supposed heresies as to the importance and practical value of the philosophy of mind, considered with reference to the primary and more elementary faculties of man. With regard to the associating principle, we have still a word or two to add. In our original observations we admitted, that this principle seemed to stand in a situation somewhat different from the simpler phenomena of the mind; and that the elucidations which philosophy had furnished with regard to its operations, did not seem so distinctly impressed on our consciousness as most of her other statements. We allowed, therefore, that some utility might be derived from the clear exposition of this more complicated part of our mental organisation, in respect both to the certainty and the extent of its application; at the same time that we felt ourselves constrained to add, that, even as to this habit of the mind, philosophy could lay no claim to the honours of a *discovery*, since the principle was undoubtedly familiar to the feelings of all men, and was acted upon, with unvarying sagacity, in almost every case where it could be employed with advantage; though by persons who had never thought of embodying it in a maxim, or attending to it as a law of general application. The whole scheme of education, it was observed, has been founded on this principle, in every age of the world. “The groom,” it was added, “who never heard of ideas or associations, feeds the young war-horse to the sound of the trumpet; and the unphilosophical artists who tame elephants, or train dancing dogs, proceed on the same obvious and familiar principle.”

As this part of our speculations has incurred more of Mr. Stewart's disapprobation than any thing which we have hitherto attempted to defend, we think ourselves called upon to state the substance of his objections in his own eloquent and impressive words. After quoting the sentence we have already transcribed, he proceeds —

“This argument, I suspect, leads a little too far for the purpose of its author, inasmuch as it concludes still more forcibly (in consequence of the great familiarity of the subject) against physics, strictly so called, than against the science of mind. The savage, who never heard of the accelerating force of gravity, yet knows how to add to the momentum of his missile weapons, by gaining an eminence; though a stranger to Newton's third law of motion, he applies it to its practical use, when he sets his canoe afloat, by pushing with a pole against the shore: in the use of his sling, he illustrates, with equal success, the doctrine of centrifugal forces, as he exemplifies (without any knowledge of the experiments of Robins) the principle of the rifle-barrel in feathering his arrow. The same groom who, ‘in feeding his young war-horse to the sound of the drum,’ has nothing to learn from Locke or from Hume concerning the laws of association, might boast, with far greater reason, that, without having looked into Borelli, he can train that animal to his various

paces; and that, when he exercises him with the *longe*, he exhibits an experimental illustration of the centrifugal force, and of the centre of gravity, which was known in the riding-school long before their theories were unfolded in the *Principia* of Newton. Even the operations of the animal which is the subject of his discipline seem to involve an acquaintance with the same physical laws, when we attend to the mathematical accuracy with which he adapts the obliquity of his body to the rate of his circular speed. In both cases (in that of the man as well as of the bruté) this practical knowledge is obtruded on the organs of external sense by the hand of nature herself: but it is not on that account the less useful to evolve the general theorems which are thus embodied with their particular applications; and to combine them in a systematical and scientific form, for our own instruction and that of others. Does it detract from the value of the theory of pneumatics to remark, that the same effects of a *vacuum*, and of the elasticity and pressure of the air, which afford an explanation of its most curious phenomena, are recognised in an instinctive process coeval with the first breath which we draw, and exemplified in the mouth of every babe and suckling?" *Prel. Diss.* lx. lxi.

Now, without recurring to what we have already said as to the total absence of power in all cases of mere observation, we shall merely request our readers to consider, what is the circumstance that bestows a value, an importance, or an utility, upon the discovery and statement of those general laws, which are admitted, in the passage now quoted, to have been previously exemplified in practice. Is it any thing else than their capacity of a more extensive application — the possibility or facility of employing them to accomplish many things to which they had *not* been previously thought applicable? If Newton's third law of motion could never have been employed for any other purpose than to set afloat the canoe of the savage, — or if the discovery of the pressure of the atmosphere had led to nothing more than an explanation of the operation of sucking, — would there have been any thing gained by stating that law, or that discovery, in general and abstract terms? Would there have been any utility, any dignity, or real advancement of knowledge, in the technical arrangement of these familiar phenomena under a new classification?

There can be but one answer to these interrogatories. But we humbly conceive, that all the laws of mental operation which philosophy may collect and digest are exactly in this last predicament. They have no application to any other phenomena than the particular ones by which they are suggested, and which they were familiarly employed to produce. They are not capable of being extended to any other cases; and all that is gained by their digestion into a system, is a more precise and methodical enumeration of truths that were always notorious.

From the experience and consciousness of all men, in all ages; we learn that when two or more objects are frequently presented together, the mind passes spontaneously from one to the other, and invests both with something of the colouring which belongs to the most important. This is the law of association; which is known to every savage, and to every clown, in a thousand familiar instances: and, with regard to its capacity of useful application, it seems to be admitted, that it has been known and acted upon by parents, pedagogues, priests, and legislators, in all ages of the world, and has even been employed, as an obvious and easy instrument, by such humble judges of intellectual resources as common horse-jockies and bear-dancers.

If this principle, then, was always known, and regularly employed wherever any advantage could be expected from its employment, what reason have we to imagine that any substantial benefit is to be derived

from its scientific investigation, or any important uses discovered for it, in consequence merely of investing it with a precise name, and stating, under one general theorem, the common law of its operation? If such persons as grooms and masters of menageries have been guided, by their low intellects and sordid motives, to its skilful application as a means of directing even the lower animals, is it to be believed that there can be many occasions for its employment in the government of the human mind, of which men have never yet had the sense to bethink themselves? Or, can it be seriously maintained, that it is capable of applications as much more extensive and important than those which have been vulgarly made in past ages, as are the uses of Newton's third law of motion, compared with the operation of the savage in pushing his canoe from the shore? If Mr. Stewart really entertained any such opinion as this, it was incumbent upon him to have indicated, in a general way, the departments in which he conceived that these great discoveries were to be made, and to have pointed out some, at least, of the new applications, on the assumption of which alone he could justify so ambitious a parallel. Instead of this, however, we do not find that he has contemplated any other spheres for the application of this principle than those which have been so long conceded to it, — the formation of taste, and the conduct of education: and, with regard to the last and most important of these, he has himself recorded an admission, which to us, we will confess, appears a full justification of all that we have now been advancing, and a sufficient answer to the positions we have been endeavouring to combat. "In so far," Mr. Stewart observes, "as education is effectual and salutary, it is founded on those principles of our nature which *have forced themselves upon general observation*, in consequence of the experience of ages." That the principle of association is to be reckoned in the number of these, Mr. Stewart certainly will not deny; and our proposition is, that *all* the principles of our nature which are capable of any useful application, have thus forced themselves on general observation many years ago, and can now receive little more than a technical nomenclature and description from the best efforts of philosophy.

The sentiments to which we have ventured to give expression in these and our former hasty observations, were suggested to us, we will confess, in a great degree, by the striking contrast between the wonders which have been wrought by the cultivation of modern physics, and the absolute nothingness of the effects that have hitherto been produced by the labours of the philosophers of mind. We have only to mention the names of Astronomy, Chemistry, Mechanics, Optics, and Navigation; — nay, we have only to look around us, in public or in private, — to cast a glance on the machines and manufactures, the ships, steam engines, and elaboratories, by which we are perpetually surrounded, — or to turn our eyes on the most common articles of our dress and furniture, — on the mirrors, engravings, books, fire-arms, watches, barometers, thunder-rods, and opera-glasses, that present themselves in our ordinary dwellings, to feel how vast a progress has been made in exploring and subduing the physical elements of nature, and how stupendous an increase the power of man has received, by the experimental investigation of her laws. Nor is any thing in this astonishing survey more remarkable than the feeling with which it is always accompanied, that what we have hitherto done in any of these departments is but a small part of what we are yet destined to accomplish; and that the enquiries which have led us so far, will infallibly carry us still farther. When we ask, however, for the trophies of

the philosophy of mind, or enquire for the vestiges of *her* progress in the more plastic and susceptible elements of human genius and character, we are answered only by ingenuous silence or vague anticipations, and find nothing but a blank in the record of her achievements. The knowledge and the power of man over inanimate nature has been increased ten-fold in the course of the last two centuries: the knowledge and the power of man over the mind of man remains almost exactly where it was at the first development of his faculties. The natural philosophy of antiquity is mere childishness and dotage, and their physical enquirers are mere pigmies and drivellers, compared with their successors in the present age; but their logicians, and metaphysicians, and moralists, and, what is of infinitely more consequence, the practical maxims and the actual *effects* resulting from *their* philosophy of mind, are very nearly on a level with the philosophy of the present day. The end and aim of all that philosophy is to make education rational and effective, and to train men to such sagacity and force of judgment, as to induce them to cast off the bondage of prejudices, and to follow happiness and virtue with assured and steady steps. We do not know, however, what modern work contains juster or more profound views on the subject of education than may be collected from the writings of Xenophon and Quintilian, Polybius, Plutarch, and Cicero: and, as to that sagacity and justness of thinking, which, after all, is the fruit by which this tree of knowledge must be ultimately known, we are not aware of many modern performances that exemplify it in a stronger degree, than many parts of the histories of Tacitus and Thucydides, or the Satires and Epistles of Horace.— In the conduct of business and affairs, we shall find Pericles, and Cæsar, and Cicero but little inferior to the philosophical politicians of the present day; and, for lofty and solid principles of practical ethics, we might safely match Epictetus and Antoninus (without mentioning Aristotle, Plato, Plutarch, Xenophon, or Polybius) with most of our modern speculators.

Where, then, it may be asked, are the performances of this philosophy, which makes such large promises? or, what are the grounds upon which we should expect to see so much accomplished, by an instrument which has hitherto effected so little? It is in vain for Mr. Stewart to say, that the science is yet but in its infancy, and that it will bear its fruit in due season. The truth is, that it has, of necessity, been more constantly and diligently cultivated than any other. It has always been the first object with men of talent and good affection to influence and to form the minds of others, and to train their own to the highest pitch of vigour and perfection; and, accordingly, it is admitted by Mr. Stewart, that the most important principles of this philosophy have been long ago forced upon general observation, by the feelings and experience of past ages. Independently, however, of this, the years that have passed since Mr. Locke drew the attention of Europe to this study, and the very extraordinary genius and talents of those who have since addicted themselves to it, are far more than enough to have brought it, if not to perfection, at least to such a degree of excellence as no longer to leave it a matter of dispute, whether it was really destined to add to our knowledge and our power, or to produce any sensible effects upon the happiness and condition of mankind. That society has made great advances in comfort and intelligence during that period, is indisputable; but we do not find that Mr. Stewart himself imputes any great part of this improvement to our increased knowledge of our mental constitution; and indeed it is quite obvious,



that it is an effect resulting from the increase of political freedom, — the influences of reformed Christianity, — the invention of printing, — and that improvement and multiplication of the mechanical arts, that have rendered the body of the people far more busy, wealthy, inventive, and independent, than they ever were in any former period of society.

To us, therefore, it certainly does appear, that the lofty estimate which Mr. Stewart has again made of the *practical* importance of his favourite studies, is one of those splendid visions by which men of great genius have been so often misled, in the enthusiastic pursuit of science and of virtue. That these studies are of a very dignified and interesting nature, we admit most cheerfully; — that they exercise and delight the understanding, by reasonings and enquiries, at once subtle, cautious, and profound, and either gratify or exalt a keen and aspiring curiosity, must be acknowledged by all who have been initiated into their elements. Those who have had the good fortune to be so initiated by the writings of Mr. Stewart, will be delighted to add, that they are blended with so many lessons of gentle and of ennobling virtue, — so many striking precepts and bright examples of liberality, high-mindedness, and pure taste, — as to be calculated, in an eminent degree, to make men love goodness and aspire to elegance, and to improve at once the understanding, the imagination, and the heart. This, however, must be the limit of our praise; and therefore, while we admire the eloquence and are warmed with the spirit of the following noble passage, in which Mr. Stewart winds up the praises of his favoured studies, we cannot help regarding it as a piece of splendid declamation on the merits of a subject that required no such recommendation.

“ I have only to repeat once more,” says Mr. Stewart, “ before the close of this Dissertation, that the correction of one single prejudice has often been attended with consequences more important and extensive than could be produced by any positive accession to the stock of our scientific information. Such is the condition of man, that a great part of a philosopher’s life must necessarily be spent, not in enlarging the circle of his knowledge, but in unlearning the errors of the crowd, and the pretended wisdom of the schools; and that the most substantial benefit he can bestow on his fellow-creatures, as well as the noblest species of power to which he can aspire, is to impart to others the lights he has struck out by his meditations, and to encourage human reason, by his example, to assert its liberty. To what did the *discoveries* made by Luther amount, but to a detection of the impostures of the Romish church, and of absurdities sanctioned by the authority of Aristotle? Yet, how vast the space which is filled by his name in the subsequent history of Europe! and how proud his rank among the benefactors of mankind! I am doubtful if Bacon himself did so much by the logical rules he gave for guiding the enquiries of his followers, as by the resolution with which he inspired them to abandon the beaten path of their predecessors, and to make excursions into regions untrodden before; or if any of his suggestions concerning the plan of experimenting, can be compared in value to his classification and illustration of the various prejudices or *idols* which mislead us from the pure worship of Truth. If the ambition of Aristotle has been compared, in the vastness of its aim, and the plenitude of its success, (and who can say that it has been compared unjustly?) to that of his royal pupil who conquered the world; why undervalue the efforts of those who first raised the standard of revolt against his universal and undisputed despotism? Speedily after the death of Alexander, the Macedonian empire was dismembered among his principal officers. The empire founded by the philosopher continued one and undivided for the period of two thousand years; and, even at this day, fallen as it is from its former grandeur, a few faithful and devoted veterans, shut up in its remaining fortresses, still bid proud defiance, in their master’s name, to all the arrayed strength of human reason. In consequence of this slow and gradual emancipation of the mind, the means by which the final result has been accom-

plished attract the notice only of the reflecting enquirer ; resembling, in their silent, but irresistible operation, the latent and imperceptible influence of the roots, which, by insinuating themselves into the crevices of an ancient edifice, prepare its infallible ruin, ages before its fall ; or that of the apparently inert moisture, which is concealed in the fissures of a rock, when enabled, by the expansive force of congelation, to rend asunder its mass, or to heave it from its basis.

“ As it is seldom, in such instances, easy to trace to particular individuals what has resulted from their exertions, with the same precision with which, in physics or mechanics, we refer to their respective inventors the *steam-engine* or the *thunder-rod*, it is not surprising, that the attention of the multitude should be so little attracted to the intellectual dominion of superior minds over the moral world : but the observer must be blind indeed, who does not perceive the vastness of the scale on which speculative principles, both right and wrong, have operated on the present condition of mankind ; or who does not now feel and acknowledge, how deeply the morals and the happiness of private life, as well as the order of political society, are involved in the final issue of the contest between true and false philosophy.” *Prel. Diss.* lxxi. — lxxiv.

We have not kept our word very faithfully with our readers ; and have been insensibly betrayed into a much longer discussion than we had anticipated. We shall endeavour to make amends, however, by giving them a very brief abstract of the pure metaphysics that ensue.\*

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#### ALISON'S THEORY OF TASTE.†

WE look upon this as, on the whole, the best and most pleasing work which has yet been produced on the subjects of Taste and Beauty. Less ornate and adventurous than Burke, and less lively and miscellaneous than Price or Knight, the author, we think, has gone deeper into his subject than any of those writers ; at the same time that he has been more copious (perhaps too copious) in his examples and illustrations, and more constantly awake (perhaps to an excess here also) to those feelings of enthusiastic delight which the contemplation of such subjects is apt to excite in the minds best qualified to discuss them. His analysis, therefore, though very patient and comprehensive, has no feature of the chilling metaphysics of the schools ; and, while the love of his subject has led him into great fulness of detail, and the sensibility of his heart lent a glow of warm colouring to every part of his composition, the reader need be under no fear of encountering either the refinements of ingenious dogmatism, or the ravings of sentimental folly. The book, perhaps, is a little too long, and the style a little too verbose ; nor are the argumentative and theoretical parts kept sufficiently distinct from the illustrative and ornamental : but the whole is, in no ordinary degree, both beautiful and instructive, and seems excellently adapted to promote both the love and the knowledge of the curious speculations on which it is employed. Of its beauty, we are afraid we shall be able to give our readers but a

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\* The remainder of this admirable Essay is devoted to an abstract of the topics embraced in Mr. Stewart's works, intermingled with many eloquent and flattering observations on the genius, learning, and principles of the Author.

† *Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste.* By Archibald Alison, LL. B. F. R. S., Prebendary of Sarum, &c. &c. &c. 2 Vols. 8vo. pp. 830. Edinburgh, 1811. — Vol. xviii. page 1. May, 1811.

very inadequate impression ; but, of its information, we may hope to present them with a tolerably intelligible abstract.

In all disquisitions on the subject of Taste, there are evidently two separate objects of enquiry, — the first relating to the nature of *the Faculty* ; the other to the nature of *its Objects*. At one time we endeavour to ascertain what it is that constitutes Taste, — at another, what it is that constitutes Beauty ; and are always necessarily engaged in determining, either what is *the state of our minds*, when we are conscious of the peculiar emotions excited by the perception of sublimity or beauty, or what are *the qualities in objects* which have the power of exciting these emotions. It is the more necessary, too, to attend to this distinction, and to keep clearly in view the indispensable importance of *both* branches of the enquiry ; because most of the theories that have hitherto been proposed upon the subject, appear to us to proceed upon a partial forgetfulness of one or other of them, and are calculated to afford an answer to one only of the two questions which we have announced as involved in the discussion. Those who have contended that beauty consists in curve lines, — in smoothness, smallness, or fragility, — in regularity, or moderate variety, or in any other fixed or physical property, — have, for the most part, neglected altogether to explain *how* these properties should affect the mind with a sense of sublimity or beauty, or to determine the precise nature of the emotions which they excited ; while those, on the other hand, who maintain that these emotions consist merely in the perception of utility, or of relation, or of what is ordinary and true, seem sometimes to forget that every theory, even as to the nature of our emotions, must be ultimately verified by a careful examination of the objects that are found to produce them, and by a large induction as to the whole accompanying phenomena.

But though it be thus radically necessary to remember that there are two subjects of enquiry, it is, if possible, still more essential to recollect that they must be discussed together ; that we can never ascertain what is beauty, without having clear notions of the state of mind which it produces, and in its power of producing which its essence consists ; and that it is utterly impossible to ascertain what is the nature of the effect produced by beauty on the mind, till we can decide what are the common properties that are found in all the objects which produce it. All investigations, therefore, into the principles of Taste, and into the elements of Beauty, ought obviously to go together ; and as the evidence must always be one and the same, by which the truth of our conjectures as to the nature of either can be determined, nothing can be more injudicious or unsatisfactory than any attempt to separate them in the discussion. Mr. Alison is not deserving of praise for any thing more than for his constant and invariable attention to this important consideration.

It is the opinion of this excellent writer, to express it in one sentence, — that the emotions which we experience from the contemplation of sublimity or beauty, are not produced by any physical or intrinsic quality in the objects which we contemplate ; but by the recollection or conception of *other* objects which are associated in our imaginations with those before us, and consequently suggested by their appearance, and which are interesting or affecting, on the common and familiar principle of being the natural objects of love, or of pity, or of fear or veneration, or some other common and lively sensation of the mind. This is the first and most important proposition in his theory, — of which, accordingly, it may be stated as the fundamental principle, that all objects are beautiful or

sublime, which signify or suggest to us some simple emotion of love, pity, terror, or any other social or selfish affection of our nature ; and that the beauty or sublimity which we ascribe to them, consists entirely in the power which they have acquired, by association or otherwise, of reminding us of the proper objects of these familiar affections. Mr. Alison adds, that the sensation of sublimity or beauty is not fully developed by the mere suggestion of some natural object of interest or affection ; but is distinctly felt only when the imagination is stimulated to conceive a connected train or series of such objects, in unison with that which was first suggested by the particular form, which is called beautiful, only for having been the parent of such a train.

We think all this equally true and important ; and are satisfied, on the whole, with the manner in which Mr. Alison has proved and illustrated it in the work before us. Yet it is a manner which is fitter for a large book, than such a short paper as we can now afford to furnish ; and we think we can conduct our readers to the same conclusions by a less operose process than a detailed analysis of all Mr. Alison's speculations.

The first notion that most people have about taste, or the capacity of perceiving beauty, seems to be, that it is a peculiar sense or faculty, of which beauty is the appropriate object, — as light is of the sense of seeing, — or sound, of hearing : and this being once settled, there is, with many, an end of the whole question. Beauty is that which gratifies the faculty of taste ; and taste is that by which we are made sensible of beauty : and this is all that is to be known of the one or the other ! Even of those who are not perfectly contented with this definition of beauty, there are many who seem satisfied with that of taste, which it accompanies ; and the majority, even of philosophical enquirers into those matters, seem to have acquiesced in the doctrine of a separate sense or faculty, the intimations of which admit of no correction or explanation. This is obviously implied, at all events, and, we rather think, is occasionally expressed, in all the theories that resolve beauty into combinations of curve lines — into relaxation of the fibres — into smoothness — proportion — fragility, or any other physical qualities ; the authors of such speculations being generally satisfied with reducing all the various forms of beauty to their own favoured elements, and assuming it as a final principle and fixed law of our constitution, of which no account could be rendered, that those elements produced a distinct operation upon some inward sense or faculty, the result of which was the emotion or perception of beauty. How extremely inaccurate and unmeaning all this is, however, must be apparent to every one who will take the trouble to reflect upon it ; and may be made evident, in a very few words, even to those who decline that trouble.

If beauty be the object of a peculiar sense or faculty, then its nature must be as familiarly and certainly known to all who possess that sense, as the nature of light or sound is to those who can see or hear. It must always be recognised by the same properties and effects. No two persons who possess the sense, can ever differ as to its presence or absence on any particular occasion ; and, when once admitted to exist in certain forms, colours, or proportions, must inevitably be discovered wherever the same forms and proportions are presented. How notoriously the fact is otherwise, it is needless for us to say. Instead of consisting in one substance or element, like light, sound, or heat, it is supposed to reside entire and separate, in colours, forms, and motions ; nay, in proportions, sentiments, arguments, and imitations ; and to exist, conspicuous and distinct, in landscapes, buildings, animals, verses, flowers, tunes, smiles,

demonstrations, and a thousand other shapes as anomalous. Instead of being recognised by all persons who possess the sense to which it is adapted, in every object in which it is plainly perceived by any one such person, it is notorious, that not only individuals, but whole nations, daily perceive the most exquisite beauty in objects where other individuals can see no traces of it; and, finally, the very same persons who have once rapturously admitted the beauty of certain forms, colours, or proportions, in one set of objects, daily confess that they can discover no sort of beauty in the very same forms and proportions, when they happen to occur in a different set of objects. The forms, colours, and proportions that are respectively beautiful in a tree, a tiger, or a mountain, are not beautiful to any eye in a temple or a woman.

These very obvious considerations appear to us to be conclusive against the supposition of an intrinsic or elementary beauty addressing itself immediately to a peculiar sense or faculty, of which it is the appropriate object; and, obvious as they are, they seem also to furnish objections, not less decisive, against almost all the other theories that have been hitherto proposed on the subject. The absurdity, however, of supposing a separate sense or faculty for the perception of beauty, was too glaring to be long acquiesced in, even by the most ingenious philosophers; and, accordingly, it seems to have been very early suspected that the peculiar emotion we receive from the perception of beauty, might only be a modification of some other more simple and familiar emotion; and that all the beauty might consist in suggesting this emotion. Accordingly, as many objects that are beautiful were observed to be also extremely commodious and useful, and as the ideas of use and convenience are naturally pleasing, it occurred to some ingenious persons, that beauty might perhaps consist altogether in Utility; and that the mysterious pleasure which we derive from the sight of it might be referred to those agreeable recollections, or natural sympathies, which we know to accompany the conception of convenience and comfort. Now, this, we think, was a great step, and in the right way; — and, upon this principle, a very satisfactory explanation was given of a great part of the beauty of the proportions and forms of buildings, the limbs of animals, and other objects of this description. When applied, however, to things of a different description, this theory was found utterly to fail. Many things were eminently useful, in which even the authors of the theory could discover no beauty; and many things were indisputably beautiful, which could only be connected with utility by the most revolting and ludicrous strainings of the imagination. Ploughs, and dunghills, and bank-bills, were very useful; but no one could be persuaded to think them beautiful; and people were in raptures with the beauty of rosebuds, and statues, and idle young women, that were allowed to be of no use whatsoever. It was evidently a great mistake, therefore, to suppose, that our sense of beauty was nothing more than a perception of utility.

Other theories, still more fantastical, were suggested by the same narrowness of view, and the same love of simplicity. Because every thing monstrous was found to excite disgust, beauty was held to consist in what was most ordinary and common; and because it was found possible to magnify every quality to a disagreeable excess, it was happily conjectured, that beauty might be nothing but mediocrity. A still more notable hypothesis was founded on the pleasure which we sometimes receive from tracing the connection of complicated phenomena; and the nature of beauty was marvellously elucidated, by affirming that it arose

from the perception of relation. Others proposed to clear up the mystery, by resolving it into a feeling of moral approbation ; and others made it manifest, that it arose merely from a strict observation of truth !

Of propositions that appear to have no meaning, it is not easy to offer any confutation ; but of such of the preceding theories as we have the good fortune to comprehend, we would rather say that they were partially true, than that they were radically erroneous ; and that the error consisted more in supposing that any one explanation would serve for all cases, than in the insufficiency of that proposed for the cases by which it was obviously suggested. It seems to be perfectly true, for instance, that certain combinations of colours and of sounds are originally agreeable to the eye and the ear, and constitute a sort of beauty, which may be said to be the direct and peculiar object of our perception ; and of which no other account can be given, than that, by the constitution of our nature, such objects are agreeable to us. In the same way, it is true, and to a far greater extent, that the perception of utility, fitness, and design, does communicate to us a certain sensible gratification, and constitutes the chief beauty of many objects of our admiration. The error lies, therefore, not in stating these as sources of beauty, but in holding that there are no other sources, and announcing as universal theorems what are only solutions of particular problems.

The grand mistake, indeed, which seems to have misled almost all the enquirers into this curious subject, consists in their taking it for granted, that beauty, in whatever variety of objects it might be found, was always in itself one and the same ; and that, in order to explain the beauty of any particular thing, it was necessary to show that it had some quality in common with all other things that were beautiful. How very hopeless an undertaking this was, may be collected even from the slight and imperfect enumeration we have already given of the classes of things that are allowed to possess beauty. And, indeed, when we consider, that things great and little, — regular and irregular, — simple and complicated, — useless and useful, — natural and artificial, — nay, that things material and immaterial, — intellectual and moral, — are all equally susceptible of beauty ; it must appear pretty evident, that this is the only quality in which they can agree ; and that they can have nothing in common but this very beauty, which is supposed to depend upon their previous possession of some common quality.

But what do we really mean when we say that all these things agree in being beautiful ? Do we mean any thing more than that we call them all by this one name, and that they resemble each other in being agreeable ? For, is it really true that they are all agreeable *in the same manner* ? or that they affect us with one and *the same kind of sensation* ? Is it not notorious, on the contrary, that there are almost as many kinds of beauty as there are varieties of mental emotion ; that some are melancholy, and some cheerful, — some humble and simple, and others commanding and magnificent ; — and that we are moved accordingly by the contemplation of all those varied species, either to pensive tenderness, — to love, pity, and regret, — or to gay and airy imaginations, — or to still and tranquil thought, — or to admiration, humility, and awe ? But if it be true, that the emotions which we receive from beauty are thus various in themselves, and that they partake thus largely of the character of other emotions, why should we not conclude that they are but modifications of these more familiar affections, — and that the beauty which we impute to external objects is nothing more than their power of reflecting these several inward affections ?

This, accordingly, is the theory adopted by Mr. Alison; and, we think, made out by him by the most satisfactory evidence. We must still be permitted, however, to take our own way for a little longer, in unfolding it.

There are two things — and two only — that require a little explanation. First, What are the primary affections, by the suggestion of which we think the sense of beauty is produced? And, secondly, What is the nature of the connection by which we suppose that the objects we call beautiful are enabled to suggest these affections?

With regard to the first of these points, it fortunately is not necessary either to enter into any tedious details, or to have recourse to any nice distinctions. All sensations that are not absolutely indifferent, and are, at the same time, either agreeable when experienced by ourselves, or attractive when contemplated in others, may form the foundation of the emotions of sublimity or beauty. The love of sensation, as we have elsewhere taken occasion to observe, seems to be the ruling appetite of human nature; and many sensations, in which the painful seems greatly to preponderate, are consequently sought for with avidity and recollected with interest, even in our own persons. In the persons of others, emotions still more painful are contemplated with eagerness and delight; and therefore we must not be surprised to find that many of the pleasing sensations of beauty or sublimity resolve themselves ultimately into recollections of feelings that may appear to have a very opposite character. The sum of the whole is, that every feeling which it is agreeable to experience, to recal, or to witness, may become the source of beauty in external objects, when it is so connected with them as that their appearance reminds us of that feeling. Now, in real life, and from daily experience and observation, we know that it is agreeable, in the first place, to recollect our own pleasurable sensations, or to be enabled to form a lively conception of the pleasures of other men, or even of sentient beings of any description. We know likewise, from the same sure authority, that there is a certain delight in the remembrance of our past, or the conception of our future emotions, even though attended with great pain, provided they be not forced too rudely on the mind, and be softened by the accompaniment of any milder feeling. And finally, we know, in the same manner, that the spectacle or conception of the emotions of others, even when in a high degree painful, is extremely interesting and attractive, and draws us away not only from the consideration of indifferent objects, but even from the pursuit of light or frivolous enjoyments. All these are plain and familiar facts, of the existence of which, however they may be explained, no one can entertain the slightest doubt; and into which, therefore, we shall have made no inconsiderable progress, if we can resolve the more mysterious fact of the emotions we receive from the contemplation of sublimity or beauty.

Our proposition then is, that these emotions are not original emotions, nor produced directly by any qualities in the objects which excite them; but are reflections or images of the more radical and familiar emotions to which we have already alluded; and are occasioned, not by any inherent virtue in the objects before us, but by the accidents, if we may so express ourselves, by which these may have been enabled to suggest or recal to us our own past sensations or sympathies. We could almost venture, indeed, to lay it down as an axiom, that, except in the plain and palpable case of bodily pain or pleasure, we can never be interested in any thing but the fortunes of sentient beings; — and that every thing partaking of the nature of mental emotion must have for its object the feelings, past,

present, or possible, of something capable of sensation. Independently, therefore, of all evidence, and without the help of any explanation, we should have been apt to conclude that the emotions of beauty and sublimity must have for their objects the sufferings or enjoyments of sentient beings; —and to reject, as intrinsically absurd and incredible, the supposition, that material objects, which obviously do neither hurt nor delight the body, should yet excite, by their mere physical qualities, the very powerful emotions which are sometimes excited by the spectacle of beauty.

Of the feelings, by their connection with which external objects become beautiful, we do not think it necessary to speak more minutely;—and therefore it only remains, under this preliminary view of the subject, to explain the nature of that connection by which we conceive this effect to be produced. Here also there is but little need for minuteness or fulness of enumeration. Almost every tie by which two objects can be bound together in the imagination, in such a manner as that the presentment of the one shall recal the memory of the other, — or, in other words, almost every possible relation which can subsist between such objects, — may serve to connect the things which we call sublime or beautiful with feelings that are interesting or delightful. Mr. Alison has not made any attempt to class or enumerate these various relations; but has grouped them all together under the sweeping name of Associations. Nor, indeed, can he be much blamed for the omission, when it is considered, on the one hand, that any enumeration which he could have given must necessarily have been imperfect; and, on the other, that the general nature of the law which he wished to illustrate must, in the long run, have been fully impressed upon the minds of all those who attended to his copious and well-chosen examples. To us, however, who have less room for examples, and less reliance on the attention of our readers, some slight attempt at describing and classing the most common of those connections appears to be more important, and may even enable us to introduce the few examples upon which we can venture with more effect and advantage.

It appears to us, then, that objects are sublime or beautiful, 1st, when they are the natural signs and perpetual concomitants of happiness or suffering, or, at any rate, of some lively feeling or emotion in ourselves or in some other sentient beings; or, 2dly, when they are the arbitrary or accidental concomitants of such feelings; or, 3dly, when they bear some analogy or fanciful resemblance to circumstances or situations with which these emotions are necessarily connected. In endeavouring to illustrate the nature of these several relations, we shall be led to lay before our readers some proofs that appear to us satisfactory of the truth of the general theory.

The most obvious and the strongest association that can be established between inward feelings and external objects is, where the object is necessarily and universally connected with the feeling by the law of nature, so that it is always presented to the senses when the feeling is impressed upon the mind.—Take, for example, the sound of thunder.—Nothing, perhaps, in the whole range of nature is more strikingly and universally sublime; yet it seems obvious that the sublimity is produced, not by any quality that is perceived by the ear, but altogether by the impression of power and of danger that is necessarily made upon the mind, whenever that sound is heard. That it is not produced by any peculiarity in the sound itself is certain, from the mistakes that are frequently made with regard to it. The noise of a cart rattling over the stones is often mistaken for thunder; and as long as the mistake lasts, this very vulgar and insig-



nificant noise is actually felt to be prodigiously sublime. It is so felt, because it is then associated with ideas of prodigious power and undefined danger;—and the sublimity is destroyed the moment the association is dissolved, though the sound itself, and its effect on the organ, continue exactly the same. This, therefore, is an instance in which sublimity is distinctly proved to consist, not in any physical quality of the object to which it is ascribed, but in its necessary connection with that vast and uncontrolled power which is the natural object of awe and veneration.

We may now take an example a little less plain and elementary. The most beautiful object in nature, perhaps, is the countenance of a young and beautiful woman;—and we are apt at first to imagine, that, independently of all associations, the forms and colours which it displays are, in themselves, lovely and engaging, and would appear charming to all beholders, with whatever other qualities or impressions they might happen to be connected. A very little reflection, however, will probably be sufficient to convince us of the fallacy of this impression, and to satisfy us that what we admire is not a combination of forms and colours, which could never excite any mental emotion; but a collection of signs and tokens of those feelings and affections which are universally recognised as the proper objects of love and sympathy. Laying aside the emotions arising from difference of sex, and supposing female beauty to be contemplated by the pure and unenvying eye of a female, it seems quite obvious that among its ingredients we should trace the signs of two different sets of qualities, that are neither of them the object of sight, but of a higher faculty,—in the first place, of youth and health; and in the second place, of innocence, gaiety, sensibility, intelligence, delicacy, or vivacity. Now, without enlarging upon the natural effect of these suggestions, we shall just suppose that the appearances, which must be admitted at all events to be actually significant of the qualities we have enumerated, had been by the law of nature attached to the very opposite qualities;—that the smooth forehead, the firm cheek, and the full lip, which are now so distinctly expressive to us of the gay and vigorous periods of youth,—and the clear and blooming complexion, which indicates health and agility, had been in fact the forms and colours by which old age and sickness were characterised; and that, instead of being found united to those sources and seasons of enjoyment, they had been the badges by which nature pointed out that state of suffering and decay which is now signified to us by the livid and emaciated face of sickness, or the wrinkled front, the quivering lip, and hollow cheek of age. If this were the familiar law of our nature, can it be doubted that we should look upon these appearances, not with rapture, but with aversion,—and consider it as absolutely ludicrous or disgusting to speak of the beauty of what was interpreted by every one as the lamented sign of pain and decrepitude?

Such, we conceive, would be the inevitable effect of dissolving the subsisting connection between the animating ideas of hope and enjoyment, and those visible appearances which are now significant of those emotions, and derive their whole beauty from that signification. But the effect would be still stronger, if we could suppose the *moral* expression of those appearances to be reversed in the same manner. If the smile, which now enchants us as the expression of innocence and affection, were the sign attached by nature to guilt and malignity,—if the blush which expresses delicacy, and the glance that speaks intelligence, vivacity, and softness, had always been found united with brutal passion or idiot moodiness; is it

not certain that the whole of their beauty would be extinguished, and that our emotions from the sight of them would be exactly the reverse of what they now are?

This, we think, no idolater of beauty will be hardy enough to deny; but our natural prejudices still cling to us; and, while we are forced to admit that the countenance which we now think most lovely would cease entirely to please, if the qualities which constituted its beauty were significant of nothing but painful feelings and hateful dispositions, we are apt to fancy, that, though disagreeable, it might still be thought beautiful,—and be regarded, as we now regard many a beautiful face, which we know to indicate neither innocence, intelligence, nor gentleness. It is proper, therefore, that we should endeavour to explain this seeming anomaly, of admitted beauty where there is no expression of any amiable or attractive emotion.

There are three considerations that may serve to remove the difficulty. In the first place, it should be remembered, that our impression of the beauty of the human countenance is derived from an habitual recollection of the interesting or amiable qualities of which it is *generally* found to be the sign; and this impression, being formed from experience of what is really the case in the far greater number of instances, cannot be entirely effaced by our conviction, that, in a particular instance, the sign has been disjoined from the thing signified. This discovery, indeed, is always accompanied by a feeling of pain and disappointment; but this will often be found to mingle with the pleasing expectations to which it has succeeded, and to constitute a compound emotion, which is far from being purely disagreeable—like the mixed feelings of respect, sorrow, and indignation, with which we look upon a polluted sanctuary. In the second place, there is almost always, in these cases, the expression of youth and health; an expression, in itself, indelibly pleasing, and which does not always become less interesting for the contrasts which guilt or misery may occasionally throw over the hopes and joys of which it is naturally significant. In the last place, it is necessary to remember, that the female form is to men the object of a passion which is satisfied with the attributes of youth and health,—which has little relation to the finer elements of beauty, and is naturally gratified both by the existence and the indications of feelings that are allowed to be guilty and degrading. This passion, however, is, in the progress of society, so intimately blended with higher and purer feelings, that its influence has given a colouring to the general language on the subject of female beauty, and sanctioned the application of that name to qualities which could never have obtained it upon any other principle. The operation, indeed, of this disturbing force has given a very perplexing bias to all our conceptions of human beauty, and has sensibly affected the speculations of several ingenious enquirers into the nature of beauty in general, at the same time that it has made it somewhat difficult and embarrassing to point out the particular sources of their errors. The same general principle will serve to account for the other anomaly, of countenances that express intelligence and goodness, without admitting of being called beautiful. Where youth and health are not wanting in such cases, it will commonly be found that there are evident traces of some physical imperfection or disaster, connected with the revolting ideas of suffering and pain, and in some measure weakening or disturbing the expression of the more pleasing qualities. Without venturing further, however, upon this dangerous ground, we think we have said nearly enough to satisfy our attentive readers that the beauty of the

human countenance is derived chiefly from suggesting to us conceptions of human feelings and dispositions; and that our emotions are not excited by a mere assemblage of colours and waving lines, but by the legible characters of hope and joy, of innocence, sensibility, and kindness, which form the proper objects of our love, and the most delightful occasions of our sympathy.

That the beauty of a living and sentient creature should depend, in a great degree, upon qualities peculiar to such a creature, rather than upon the mere physical attributes which it may possess in common with the inert matter around it, cannot, indeed, appear a very improbable supposition to any one. But it may be more difficult for some persons to understand how the beauty of mere dead matter should be derived from the feelings and sympathies of sentient beings. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, that we should give an instance or two of this derivation.

It is easy enough to understand how the sight of a picture or statue should affect us nearly in the same way as the sight of the original: nor is it much more difficult to conceive, how the sight of a cottage should give us something of the same feeling as the sight of a peasant's family; and the aspect of a town raise many of the same ideas as the appearance of a multitude of persons. We may begin, therefore, with an example a little more complicated. Take, for instance, the case of a common English landscape — green meadows, with fat cattle — canals or navigable rivers — well fenced, well cultivated fields — neat, clean, scattered cottages — humble antique church, with churchyard elms, and crossing hedge-rows — all seen under bright skies, and in good weather: — There is much beauty, as every one will acknowledge, in such a scene. But in what does the beauty consist? Not certainly in the mere mixture of colours and forms; for colours more pleasing, and lines more graceful, (according to any theory of grace that may be preferred,) might be spread upon a board, or a painter's pallet, without engaging the eye to a second glance, or raising the least emotion in the mind; — but in the picture of human happiness that is presented to our imaginations and affections, — in the visible and unequivocal signs of comfort, and cheerful and peaceful enjoyment, — and of that secure and successful industry that ensures its continuance, — and of the piety by which it is exalted, — and of the simplicity by which it is contrasted with the guilt and the fever of a city life, — in the images of health, and temperance, and plenty which it exhibits to every eye, — and in the glimpses which it affords to warmer imaginations, of those primitive or fabulous times when man was uncorrupted by luxury and ambition, and of those humble retreats in which we still delight to imagine that love and philosophy may find an unpolluted asylum. At all events, however, it is human feeling that excites our sympathy, and forms the object of our emotions. It is man, and man alone, that we see in the beauties of the earth which he inhabits; — or, if a more sensitive and extended sympathy connect us with the lower families of animated nature, and make us rejoice with the lambs that bleat on the uplands, or the cattle that ruminates in the valley, or even with the living plants that drink the bright sun and the balmy air beside them, it is still the idea of enjoyment — of feelings that animate the existence of sentient beings — that calls forth all our emotions, and is the parent of all the beauty with which we proceed to invest the inanimate creation around us.

Instead of this quiet and tame *English* landscape, let us now take a Welch or a Highland scene; and see whether its beauties will admit of

being explained on the same principle. Here, we shall have lofty mountains, and rocky and lonely recesses, — tufted woods hung over precipices, — lakes intersected with castled promontories, — ample solitudes of unploughed and untrodden valleys, — nameless and gigantic ruins, — and mountain echoes repeating the scream of the eagle and the roar of the cataract. This, too, is beautiful; and, to those who can interpret the language it speaks, far more beautiful than the prosperous scene with which we have contrasted it. Yet, lonely as it is, it is to the recollection of man and of human feelings that its beauty also is owing. The mere forms and colours that compose its visible appearance are no more capable of exciting any emotion in the mind, than the forms and colours of a Turkey carpet. It is sympathy with the present or the past, or the imaginary *inhabitants* of such a region, that alone gives it either interest or beauty; and the delight of those who behold it will always be found to be in exact proportion to the force of their imaginations, and the warmth of their social affections. The leading impressions, here, are those of romantic seclusion and primeval simplicity; — lovers sequestered in these blissful solitudes, “from towns and toils remote,” — and rustic poets and philosophers communing with nature, at a distance from the low pursuits and selfish malignity of ordinary mortals: — then there is the sublime impression of the Mighty Power which piled the massive cliffs upon each other, and rent the mountains asunder, and scattered their giant fragments at their base; — and all the images connected with the monuments of ancient magnificence and extinguished hostility, — the feuds, and the combats, and the triumphs of its wild and primitive inhabitants, contrasted with the stillness and desolation of the scenes where they lie interred; and the romantic ideas attached to their ancient traditions, and the peculiarities of their present life, — their wild and enthusiastic poetry, — their gloomy superstitions, — their attachment to their chiefs, — the dangers, and the hardships, and enjoyments of their lonely huntings and fishings, — their pastoral shielings on the mountains in summer, — and the tales and the sports that amuse the little groups that are frozen into their vast and trackless valleys in the winter. Add to all this the traces of vast and obscure antiquity that are impressed on the language and the habits of the people, and on the cliffs and caves and gulfy torrents of the land; and the solemn and touching reflection, perpetually recurring, of the weakness and insignificance of perishable man, whose generations thus pass away into oblivion, with all their toils and ambition, while Nature holds on her unvarying course, and pours out her streams, and renews her forests, with undecaying activity, regardless of the fate of her proud and perishable sovereign.

We set all this down at random, from the vague and casual recollection of the impressions we have ourselves received from this sort of scenery, — by no means as an exact transcript of the images and feelings which it must excite in all beholders, but merely as a specimen of the manner in which it operates on the heart and imagination, and of the nature of that connection which is established between our natural sympathies and the visible peculiarities of our mountain landscape. The truth is, that there is an endless variety in the trains of thought to which this kind of scenery is calculated to give rise; and that it differs essentially, in this respect, from the scenery of a more cultivated region, where there is scarcely any very decided expression but that of comfort and tranquillity. To make amends, however, it must be admitted, that this last expression is much more clear and obvious to beholders of every degree and

description. There is scarcely any one who does not feel and understand the beauty of smiling fields and comfortable cottages ; but the beauty of lakes and mountains is not so universally distinguishable. It requires some knowledge of our species, — some habits of reflection, — some play of fancy, — some exercise of affection, to interpret the lofty characters in which Nature here speaks to the heart and the imagination ; and reflects, from the broken aspects of the desert, the most powerful images of the feelings and the fortunes of man. Though it has been the fashion, therefore, for all recent travellers to affect a prodigious admiration for these *picturesque* regions, we cannot help suspecting that their beauty has been truly felt by a very small number ; and were exceedingly delighted by the frank confession of two Cockney tourists, who lately published an account of their expedition to the Scottish Highlands ; in which they fairly state, that they could discover no beauty in our naked mountains and dreary lakes, and were astonished how any intelligent person could voluntarily pass his time in the “ cold and laborious ” pastimes which they afforded, when he might have devoted it to “ the gay vivacity of plays, operas, and polite assemblies.” They accordingly post back to London as fast as possible ; and after yawning, in a sort of disconsolate terror, along the banks of Lochlomond, enlarge, with much animation, on the beauty and grandeur — of Finsbury Square !

We have said enough, we believe, to let our readers understand what we mean by external objects being the natural signs or concomitants of human sympathies or emotions. Yet we cannot lift up our eyes, in this delightful season, without being tempted to add one other illustration, and to ask, on what other principle we can account for the beauty of Spring ? Winter has shades as deep, and colours as brilliant ; and the great forms of nature are substantially the same, through all the revolutions of the year. We shall seek in vain, therefore, in the accidents of mere organic matter, for the sources of that “ vernal delight and joy,” which subject all finer spirits to an annual intoxication, and strike home the sense of beauty even to hearts that seem proof against it under all other aspects. And it is not among the dead, but among the living, that this beauty originates. It is the renovation of life and of joy to all animated beings, that constitutes this great jubilee of nature : the young of animals bursting into existence, — the simple and universal pleasures which are diffused by the mere temperature of the air, and the profusion of sustenance, — the pairing of birds, — the cheerful resumption of rustic toils, — the great alleviation of all the miseries of poverty and sickness, — our sympathy with the young life, and the promise and the hazards of the vegetable creation, — the solemn, yet cheering, impression of the constancy of Nature to her great periods of renovation, — and the hopes that dart spontaneously forward into the new circle of exertions and enjoyments that is opened up by her hand and her example. Such are some of the conceptions that are forced upon us by the appearances of returning Spring, and that seem to account for the emotions of delight with which these appearances are hailed, by every mind endowed with any degree of sensibility, somewhat better than the brightness of the colours, or the agreeableness of the smells, that are then presented to our senses.

They are kindred conceptions that constitute all the beauty of childhood. The forms and colours that are peculiar to that age, are not necessarily or absolutely beautiful in themselves ; for, in a grown person, the same forms and colours would be either ludicrous or disgusting. It is their indestructible connection with the engaging ideas of innocence, — of

careless gaiety, — of unsuspecting confidence ; — made still more tender and attractive by the recollection of helplessness, and blameless and happy ignorance, — of the anxious affection that watches over all their ways, — and of the hopes and fears that seek to pierce futurity, for those who have neither fears, nor cares, nor anxieties for themselves.

These few illustrations will probably be sufficient to give our readers a general conception of the character and the grounds of that theory of beauty which we think is established in the work before us. They are all examples, it will be observed, of the *first* and most important connexion which we think may be established between external objects and the sentiments or emotions of the mind ; or cases, in which the visible phenomena are the natural and universal accompaniments of the emotion, and are consequently capable of reviving that emotion, in some degree, in the breast of every beholder. If the tenor of those illustrations has been such as to make any impression in favour of the general theory, we conceive that it must be very greatly confirmed by the slightest consideration of the *second* class of cases, or those in which the external object is not the natural and necessary, but only the occasional or accidental, concomitant of the emotion which it recalls. In the former instances, some conception of beauty seems to be inseparable from the appearance of the objects ; and being impressed, in some degree, upon all persons to whom they are presented, there is evidently room for insinuating that it is an independent and intrinsic quality of their nature, and does not arise from association with any thing else. In the instances, however, to which we are now to allude, this perception of beauty is not universal, but entirely dependent upon the opportunities which each individual has had to associate ideas of emotion with the object to which it is ascribed, — the same thing appearing beautiful to those who have been exposed to the influence of such associations, and indifferent to those who have not. It is not easy, therefore, to conceive any more complete evidence, both that there is no such thing as absolute or intrinsic beauty, and that it depends altogether on those associations with which it is thus found to come and to disappear.

The accidental or arbitrary relations that may thus be established between natural sympathies or emotions and external objects, may be either such as occur to whole classes of men, or are confined to particular individuals. Among the former, those that apply to different nations or races of men are the most important and remarkable, and constitute the basis of those peculiarities by which national tastes are distinguished. Take again, for example, the instance of female beauty ; and think what different and inconsistent standards would be fixed for it in the different regions of the world, — in Africa, in Asia, and in Europe, — in Tartary and in Greece, — in Lapland, Patagonia, and Circassia. If there was any thing absolutely or intrinsically beautiful in any of the forms thus distinguished, it is inconceivable that men should differ so outrageously in their conceptions of it : if beauty were a real and independent quality, it seems impossible that it should be distinctly and clearly felt by one set of persons, where another set, altogether as sensitive, could see nothing but its opposite ; and if it were actually and inseparably attached to certain forms, colours, or proportions, it must appear utterly inexplicable that it should be felt and perceived in the most opposite forms and proportion, in objects of the same description. On the other hand, if all beauty consist in reminding us of certain natural sympathies and objects of emotion, with which they have been habitually connected, it is easy to perceive

how the most different forms should be felt to be equally beautiful. If female beauty, for instance, consist in the visible signs and expressions of youth and health, and of gentleness, vivacity, and kindness, then it will necessarily happen that the forms, and colours, and proportions which nature may have connected with those qualities, in the different climates or regions of the world, will all appear equally beautiful to those who have been accustomed to recognise them as the signs of such qualities ; while they will be respectively indifferent to those who have not learned to interpret them in this sense, and displeasing to those whom experience has led to consider them as the signs of opposite qualities. The case is the same, though perhaps to a smaller degree, as to the peculiarity of national taste in other particulars. The style of dress and architecture in every nation, if not adopted from mere want of skill, or penury of materials, always appears beautiful to the natives, and somewhat monstrous and absurd to foreigners ; and the general character and aspect of their landscape, in like manner, if not associated with substantial evils and inconveniences, always appears more beautiful and enchanting than the scenery of any other region. The fact is still more striking, perhaps, in the case of music,—in the effects of those national airs, with which even the most uncultivated imaginations have connected so many interesting recollections,—and in the delight with which all persons of sensibility catch the strains of their native melodies in strange or in distant lands. It is owing chiefly to the same sort of arbitrary and national association, that white is thought a gay colour in Europe, where it is used at weddings,—and a dismal colour in China, where it is used for mourning ; that we think yew-trees gloomy, because they are planted in churchyards,—and large masses of powdered horse-hair majestic, because we see them on the heads of chancellors and judges.

Next to those curious instances of arbitrary or limited associations that are exemplified in the diversities of national taste, are those that are produced by the differences of instruction or education. If external objects were sublime or beautiful in themselves, it is plain that they would appear equally so to those who were acquainted with their origin, and to those to whom it was unknown. Yet it is not easy, perhaps, to calculate the degree to which our notions of beauty and sublimity are now influenced, over all Europe, by the study of classical literature ; or the number of impressions of this sort which the well-educated consequently receive, from objects that are utterly indifferent to uninstructed persons of the same natural sensibility. We gladly avail ourselves, upon this subject, of the beautiful expressions of Mr. Alison.

“ The delight which most men of education receive from the consideration of antiquity, and the beauty that they discover in every object which is connected with ancient times, is in a great measure to be ascribed to the same cause. The antiquarian, in his cabinet, surrounded by the relics of former ages, seems to himself to be removed to periods that are long since past, and indulges in the imagination of living in a world, which, by a very natural kind of prejudice, we are always willing to believe was both wiser and better than the present. All that is venerable or laudable in the history of these times present themselves to his memory : the gallantry, the heroism, the patriotism of antiquity, rise again before his view, softened by the obscurity in which they are involved, and rendered more seducing to the imagination by that obscurity itself, which, while it mingles a sentiment of regret amid his pursuits, serves at the same time to stimulate his fancy to fill up, by its own creation, those long intervals of time of which history has preserved no record. The relics he contemplates seem to approach him still nearer to the ages of his regard : the dress, the furniture, the arms of the times, are so many assist-

ances to his imagination, in guiding or directing its exercise; and, offering him a thousand sources of imagery, provide him with an almost inexhaustible field in which his memory and his fancy may expatiate. There are few men who have not felt somewhat, at least, of the delight of such an employment. There is no man in the least acquainted with the history of antiquity who does not love to let his imagination loose on the prospect of its remains, and to whom they are not in some measure sacred, from the innumerable images which they bring. Even the peasant, whose knowledge of former times extends but to a few generations, has yet in his village some monument of the deeds or virtues of his forefathers; and cherishes, with a fond veneration, the memorial of those good old times to which his imagination returns with delight, and of which he loves to recount the simple tales that tradition has brought him.

“And what is it that constitutes that emotion of sublime delight, which every man of common sensibility feels upon the first prospect of Rome? It is not the scene of destruction which is before him,—it is not the Tyber, diminished in his imagination to a paltry stream, flowing amid the ruins of that magnificence which it once adorned,—it is not the triumph of superstition over the wreck of human greatness, and its monuments erected upon the very spot where the first honours of humanity have been gained. It is ancient Rome which fills his imagination,—it is the country of Cæsar, and Cicero, and Virgil, which is before him,—it is the mistress of the world which he sees, and who seems to him to rise again from her tomb, to give laws to the universe. All that the labours of his youth, or the studies of his maturer age have acquired, with regard to the history of this great people, open at once before his imagination, and present him with a field of high and solemn imagery, which can never be exhausted: take from him these associations,—conceal from him that it is Rome that he sees; and how different would be his emotion!” I. 39—42.

The influences of the same studies may be traced, indeed, through almost all our impressions of beauty,—and especially in the feelings which we receive from the contemplation of rural scenery; where the images and recollections which have been associated with such objects, in the enchanting strains of the poets, are perpetually recalled by their appearance, and give an interest and a beauty to the prospect of which the uninstructed cannot have the slightest perception. Upon this subject, also, Mr. Alison has expressed himself with his usual warmth and elegance. After observing, that, in childhood, the beauties of nature have scarcely any existence for those who have as yet but little general sympathy with mankind, he proceeds to state, that they are usually first recommended to notice by the poets, to whom we are introduced in the course of education; and who, in a manner, create them for us, by the associations which they enable us to form with their visible appearance.

“How different, from this period, become the sentiments with which the scenery of nature is contemplated by those who have any imagination! The beautiful forms of ancient mythology, with which the fancy of poets peopled every element, are now ready to appear to their minds, upon the prospect of every scene. The descriptions of ancient authors, so long admired, and so deserving of admiration, occur to them at every moment, and with them, all those enthusiastic ideas of ancient genius and glory, which the study of so many years of youth so naturally leads them to form. Or, if the study of modern poetry has succeeded to that of the ancient, a thousand other beautiful associations are acquired, which, instead of destroying, serve easily to unite with the former, and to afford a new source of delight. The awful forms of Gothic superstition, the wild and romantic imagery, which the turbulence of the middle ages, the Crusades, and the institution of Chivalry have spread over every country of Europe, arise to the imagination in every scene; accompanied with all those pleasing recollections of prowess, and adventure, and courteous manners, which distinguished those memorable times. With such images in their minds, it is not common nature that appears to surround them; it is nature embellished and made sacred by the memory of Theocritus and



Virgil, and Milton and Tasso ; their genius seems still to linger among the scenes which inspired it, and to irradiate every object where it dwells ; and the creation of their fancy seem the fit inhabitants of that nature which their descriptions have clothed with beauty." I. 64, 65.

It is needless, for the purpose of mere illustration, to pursue this subject of arbitrary or accidental association through all the divisions of which it is susceptible ; and indeed the task would be endless ; since there is scarcely any class in society which could not be shown to have peculiar associations of interest and emotion with objects which are not so connected in the minds of any other class. The young and the old — the rich and the poor — the artist and the man of science — the inhabitant of the city and the inhabitant of the country — the man of business and the man of pleasure — the domestic and the dissipated, — nay, even the followers of almost every different study or profession, have perceptions of beauty, because they have associations with external objects that are peculiar to themselves, and have no existence for any other persons. But, though the detail of such instances could not fail to show, in the clearest and most convincing manner, how directly the notion of beauty is derived from some more radical and familiar emotion, and how many and various are the channels by which such emotions are transmitted, enough, and more than enough, has been already said, to put our readers in possession of the principles and general bearings of an argument which we must not think of exhausting.

Even the little, however, which has now been said on the subject of associations, which, though not universal, are common to whole classes of persons, will make it unnecessary to enlarge on those that are peculiar to each individual. It is almost enough, indeed, to transcribe the following short passage from Mr. Alison.

“ There is no man who has not some interesting associations with particular scenes, or airs, or books, and who does not feel their beauty or sublimity enhanced to him by such connections. The view of the house where one was born, of the school where one was educated, and where the gay years of infancy were passed, is indifferent to no man. They recal so many images of past happiness and past affections, they are connected with so many strong or valued emotions, and lead altogether to so long a train of feelings and recollections, that there is hardly any scene which one ever beholds with so much rapture. There are songs, also, that we have heard in our infancy, which, when brought to our remembrance in after years, raise emotions for which we cannot well account ; and which, though perhaps very indifferent in themselves, still continue from this association, and from the variety of conceptions which they kindle in our minds, to be our favourites through life. The scenes which have been distinguished by the residence of any person, whose memory we admire, produce a similar effect. ‘ *Movemur enim, ne scio quo pacto, locis ipsis, in quibus eorum, quos diligimus, aut admiramur adsunt vestigia.*’ The scenes themselves may be little beautiful, but the delight with which we recollect the traces of their lives blends itself insensibly with the emotions which the scenery excites ; and the admiration which these recollections afford seems to give a kind of sanctity to the place where they dwelt, and converts every thing into beauty which appears to have been connected with them.” I. 23—25.

There are similar impressions, — as to the sort of scenery to which we have been long accustomed, — as to the style of personal beauty by which we were first enchanted, — and even as to the dialect, or the form of versification which we first begun to admire, that bestow a secret and adventitious charm upon all these objects, and enable us to discover in them a beauty which is invisible, because it is non-existent to every other eye.

In all the cases we have hitherto considered, the external object is

supposed to have acquired its beauty by being actually connected with the causes of our natural emotions, either as a sign of their existence, or as being locally present to their ordinary occasions. There is a relation, however, of another kind, to which it is necessary to attend, both to elucidate the general grounds of the theory, and to explain several appearances that might otherwise expose it to objections. This is the relation which external objects may bear to our internal feelings, and the power they may consequently acquire of suggesting them, in consequence of a sort of resemblance or analogy which they seem to have to their natural and appropriate objects. The language of poetry is founded, in a great degree, upon this analogy; and all language indeed is full of it; and attests, by its structure, both the extent to which it is spontaneously pursued, and the effects that are produced by its suggestion. We take a familiar instance from the elegant writer before us.

“What, for instance, is the impression we feel from the scenery of spring? The soft and gentle green with which the earth is spread, the feeble texture of the plants and flowers, the young of animals just entering into life, and the remains of winter yet lingering among the woods and hills,—all conspire to infuse into our minds somewhat of that fearful tenderness with which infancy is usually beheld. With such a sentiment, how innumerable are the ideas which present themselves to our imagination! ideas, it is apparent, by no means confined to the scene before our eyes, or to the possible desolation which may yet await its infant beauty, but which almost involuntarily extend themselves to analogies with the life of man, and bring before us all those images of hope or fear, which, according to our peculiar situations, have the dominion of our hearts!—The beauty of autumn is accompanied with a similar exercise of thought: the leaves begin then to drop from the trees; the flowers and shrubs, with which the fields were adorned in the summer months, decay; the woods and groves are silent; the sun himself seems gradually to withdraw his light, or to become enfeebled in his power. Who is there, who, at this season, does not feel his mind impressed with a sentiment of melancholy? or who is able to resist that current of thought, which, from such appearances of decay, so naturally leads him to the solemn imagination of that inevitable fate, which is to bring on alike the decay of life, of empire, and of nature itself?”  
I. 16, 17.

A thousand such analogies, indeed, are suggested to us by the most familiar aspects of nature. The morning and the evening present the same ready picture of youth and of closing life as the various vicissitudes of the year. The withering of flowers images out to us the languor of beauty, or the sickness of childhood. The loud roar of troubled waters seems to bear some resemblance to the voice of lamentation or violence; and the softer murmur of brighter streams, to be expressive of cheerfulness and innocence. The purity and transparency of water or of air, indeed, is itself felt to be expressive of mental purity and gaiety; and their darkness or turbulence, of mental gloom and dejection. All fine and delicate forms are typical of delicacy and gentleness of character; and almost all forms, bounded by waving or flowing lines, suggest ideas of ease, pliability, and elegance. Rapid and impetuous motion seems to be emblematical of violence and passion;—slow and steady motion, of deliberation, dignity, and resolution;—fluttering motion, of inconstancy or terror;—and waving motion, according as it is slow or swift, of sadness or playfulness. A large and massive building gives us the idea of firmness and constancy of character;—a rock battered by the waves, of fortitude in adversity. Stillness and calmness in the water or the air, seem to shadow out tenderness, indolence, and placidity;—moonlight we call pensive and gentle;—and the unclouded sun gives us an impression of exulting vigour, and domineering ambition, and glory.

It is not difficult, with the assistance which language affords us, to trace the origin of all these, and a thousand other associations. In many instances, the qualities which thus suggest mental emotions, do actually resemble their constant concomitants in human nature, as is obviously the case with the forms and motions which are sublime or beautiful; and, in some, their effects and relations bear so obvious an analogy to those of human conduct or feeling, as to force itself upon the notice of the most careless beholder. But, whatever may have been their original, the very structure of language attests the vast extent to which they have been carried, and the nature of the suggestions to which they are indebted for their interest or beauty. It is very remarkable, indeed, that while almost all the words by which the affections of the mind are expressed seem to have been borrowed originally from the qualities of matter, the epithets by which we learn afterwards to distinguish such material objects as are felt to be sublime or beautiful, are all of them epithets that had been previously appropriated to express some quality or emotion of mind. Colours are said to be gay or grave — motions to be lively, or deliberate, or capricious — forms to be delicate or modest — sounds to be animated or mournful — prospects to be cheerful or melancholy — rocks to be bold — waters to be tranquil — and a thousand other phrases of the same import; all indicating, most unequivocally, the sources from which our interest in matter is derived; and proving, that it is necessary, in all cases, to confer mind and feeling upon it, before it can be conceived as either sublime or beautiful. The great charm, indeed, and the great secret of poetical diction, consists in thus lending life and emotion to all the objects it embraces; and the enchanting beauty which we sometimes recognise in descriptions of very ordinary phenomena, will be found to arise from the force of imagination, by which the poet has connected with human emotions a variety of objects to which common minds could not discover their relation. What the poet does for his readers, however, by his original similes and metaphors in these higher cases, even the dullest of these readers do, in some degree, every day for themselves; and the beauty which is perceived when natural objects are unexpectedly vivified by the glowing fancy of the former, is precisely of the same kind that is felt when the closeness of the analogy enables them to force human feelings upon the recollection of all mankind. As the poet sees more of beauty in nature than ordinary mortals, just because he perceives more of these analogies and relations to social emotion, in which all beauty consists; so, other men see more or less of this beauty, exactly as they happen to possess that fancy, or those habits, which enable them readily to trace out these relations.

From all these sources of evidence, then, we think it is pretty well made out, that the beauty or sublimity of external objects is nothing but the reflection of emotions excited by the feelings or condition of sentient beings; and is produced altogether by certain little portions, as it were, of love, joy, pity, veneration, or terror, that adhere to those objects that are present on occasion of such emotions. Nor, after what we have already said, does it seem to be necessary to reply to more than one of the objections to which we are aware that this theory is liable. If beauty be nothing more than a reflection of love, pity, or veneration, how comes it, it may be asked, to be distinguished from these sentiments? They are never confounded with each other, either in our feelings or our language: — Why, then, should they all be confounded under the common name of beauty? and why should beauty, in all cases, affect us in a way so differ-

ent from the love or compassion of which it is said to be merely the reflection?

Now, to these questions we are somewhat tempted to answer, after the manner of our country, by asking, in our turn, whether it be really true that beauty always affects us in one and the same manner, and always in a different manner from the simple and elementary affections, which it is its office to recal to us? In very many cases it appears to us, that the sensations which we receive from objects that are felt to be beautiful, and that in the highest degree, do not differ at all from the direct movements of tenderness or pity towards sentient beings. If the epithet of beauty be correctly (as it is universally) applied to many of the most admired and enchanting passages in poetry, which consist entirely in the expression of affecting sentiments, the question would be speedily decided; and it is a fact, at all events, too remarkable to be omitted, that some of the most powerful and delightful emotions that are uniformly classed under this name, arise altogether from the direct influence of these pathetic emotions, without the intervention of any material imagery. We do not wish, however, to dwell upon an argument, which certainly is not applicable to all parts of the question; and, admitting that, on many occasions, the feelings which we experience from beauty are sensibly different from the primary emotions in which we think they originate, we shall endeavour, in a very few words, to give an explanation of this difference, which seems to be perfectly consistent with the theory we have undertaken to illustrate.

In the first place, it should make some difference on the primary affections to which we have alluded, that, in the cases alluded to, they are *reflected* from material objects, and not directly excited by their natural causes. The light of the moon has a very different complexion from that of the sun, and yet it is in substance the sun's light. In the next place, the emotion, when suggested in the shape of beauty, comes upon us, for the most part, disencumbered of all those accompaniments which frequently give it a peculiar and less satisfactory character, when it arises from direct intercourse with its living objects. The compassion that is suggested by beauty of a gentle and winning description, is not attended with any of that disgust and uneasiness which frequently accompany the spectacle of real distress; nor with that important suggestion of the duty of relieving it, from which it is almost inseparable. Nor does the temporary delight which we receive from beauty of a gay and animating character, call upon us for any such expenditure of spirits, or active demonstrations of sympathy, as are sometimes demanded by the turbulence of real joy. In the third place, the emotion of beauty being partly founded upon illusion, is far more transitory in its own nature, and is both more apt to fluctuate and vary in its character, and more capable of being dismissed at pleasure, than any of the primary affections, whose shadow and representative it is. In the fourth place, and this is the circumstance most relied on by Mr. Alison, the perception of beauty implies a certain exercise of the imagination that is not required in the case of direct emotion, and is sufficient, of itself, both to give a new character to every emotion that is suggested by the intervention of such an exercise, and to account for our classing all the various emotions that are so suggested under the same denomination of beauty. When we are injured, we feel indignation,—when we are wounded, we feel pain,—when we see suffering, we feel compassion,—and when we witness any splendid act of heroism or generosity, we feel admiration—without any effort of the

imagination, or the intervention of any picture or vision in the mind. But when we feel indignation, or pity, or admiration, in consequence of seeing some piece of inanimate matter that merely suggests or recalls to us the ordinary causes or proper objects of these emotions, it is evident that our fancy is set to work, and that the effect is produced by means of a certain poetical creation, or a train of images and conceptions that are conjured up in the mind. We draw out, for our own contemplation, a long train of figures and combinations, which we dispose in such a way as to produce the most lively effect on our feelings; and are employed, therefore, partly in composing and delineating this inward and ideal picture of the objects of our emotions, and partly only in receiving the emotions which it excites. It is this active and heated state of the imagination, and this divided and busy occupation of the mind, that constitute the great peculiarity of the emotions we experience from the perception of beauty.

Finally, we think it of importance to observe, that this peculiarity is further strengthened by the great variety, and, as it were, lubricity of the pictures and emotions which are excited by the most common instances of beauty. When we experience any emotion directly, there is no choice, and no doubt in the matter. When we see wrong, we feel indignation; and when joy or sorrow are placed before us, we receive the sympathetic infection. We cannot avoid being moved in the way in which we are moved; and though we may make short excursions into the border land of imagination, we feel nothing either strongly or distinctly, but the unvarying reality before us. The case, however, is remarkably different when we have nothing before us but objects that are merely connected with ideas of sorrow or enjoyment, and capable, in consequence, of suggesting these emotions. Here there is, in the first place, no necessity or certainty that the emotion will be suggested at all; and, in the second place, no definite or particular image or tablature in which it is to be embodied. All that we have, is a general and vague impression of a particular class of emotions, and an undefined sort of consciousness of the capability of the objects before us to suggest trains of ideas well fitted to give them scope. The objects themselves, however, do very rarely prescribe the precise nature of these ideas: and, while an immense multitude of loose analogies and kindred recollections roll dimly over the mind, we are left to form them into such groups and combinations as we ourselves may select; and are tempted every moment to change the form of our cloudy creation, and to wander from one set of images and impressions to another. Even when we look upon a single form of beauty — upon an ancient statue for example, or a Gothic turret — we are apt to experience this fluctuation of the imagination, — this unsteadiness and perpetual shifting in the particular objects of emotion, and to feel that there is nothing that is peculiarly appropriate to the form before us; and that the fancy wavers among an indistinct crowd of equal competitors. This, however, is still more remarkably the case when the beauty that enchants us is of a more compound and complicated nature, and consists, as in the case of a fine landscape, of a great variety of parts and features, each of which may possess a peculiar character or shade of expression.

Take, for example, the scenery so beautifully, and yet imperfectly, described by Mr. Scott, on the borders of Loch-Katrine. The images which it is calculated to suggest will agree, perhaps, in being ideas of seclusion — of a life set free from the restraints of the world, and hidden

from its observation — of sympathy with the simple joys and animating toils of its natives — and of awe and veneration for the Power which has left the traces of its might on the cliffs and mountains : but the particular train of images, by the help of which those general impressions may be moulded into distinct objects of emotion, is evidently altogether loose and undetermined, and must depend upon the taste, dispositions, and information of every different beholder. Thus, Fitz-James, with a due attention to his joyous and social character, is made to fill up the outline by planting an ideal castle, filled with hunters and fair ladies, on the steep, — and an abbey of jolly ecclesiastics on the meadow, — and by rousing the mountain echoes with the hunting-horn and the matin bell and chant : while Rousseau, in describing a kindred scene, displays in a manner much more characteristic the romantic tenderness of his fancy, when he says, that it seemed like an asylum which Nature had spared for two faithful lovers, escaped alone from the ruin and desolation of the universe. To a mind familiar with the imagery of Celtic poetry, the same scene, it is obvious, might have presented a vision of white-armed virgin archers, and grey-haired bards, and warriors arming to redress the wrongs of damsels : — while, to a wilder or more gloomy fancy, it might have disclosed a picture of moonlight fairies and goblins ; — or dens of ambushed banditti, — or the onset of revengeful clans, and the triumphs of patriarchal chieftains. There is no limit, indeed, to the varieties of human interest that may be suggested to a powerful imagination by a scene so striking and so various ; and we only multiply those coarse and unseemly sketches, in order to show how exclusively it is human interest, or at least feeling and sentiment of some sort, that is the ultimate object of all those emotions which it is the characteristic of beauty to excite. Even where the object is simple and ordinary, the emotion of beauty which it excites is generally quite vague and indeterminate. Few common objects, for example, are more beautiful than a column of smoke rising slowly above trees, in a calm sky — so common is it, indeed, that it very often gives us no emotion at all ; but if it once strike us as beautiful, we may be certain that we have associated with it many ideas of human interest and feeling — many abortive little sketches of groups and persons connected with such an appearance. Mr. Wordsworth, we think (for we quote from memory), has noticed and exemplified the pliability of this very image in a very striking manner. The smoke comes to his eye, he says,

“ *With some uncertain notice, as may seem,  
Of houseless wanderers in the summer wood ;  
Or of some hermit’s cell, where by his fire  
The hermit sits alone.*”

Cowper, we think, makes the same appearance significant of the encampment of gipsies, and all their picturesque establishment ; and it is easy to see, that, to a creative fancy, it might suggest an infinite number of similar conceptions.

We have been betrayed into this long, and we fear tedious, detail, in order to show that the emotions which are suggested to us by the appearance of beauty have seldom any fixed or determinate objects, as all emotions that are raised directly, and not by such suggestions, must necessarily have ; and that the objects which the imagination is stimulated to conceive, are apt to shift and fluctuate before us — in many cases extending into a long train or series of connected impressions, and in others presenting only dim and broken outlines, that fleet away in

irregular succession. This peculiarity, we are inclined to think, joined to those that have been already noticed, is fully sufficient to account for the difference that is felt to exist between the emotions of beauty, and the more simple and original emotions into which we hold that the former may be resolved. The suggestions of beauty seem, in this respect, to bear the same analogy to the direct impression of our affections that the expression of instrumental music does to that of poetry, or language in general. The most beautiful and expressive air that ever was invented, when played without words, communicates only a vague and indeterminate emotion to the mind; at the same time that it stimulates it to fill up the blank in the imagination with some scene or story corresponding to its general character. We may be able, for instance, to say with certainty that a particular air is pathetic and plaintive; but what particular sort of sorrow it expresses is left for every hearer to imagine. To some, accordingly, it will impart a vision of mothers wailing over their dead children; and to others, of divided lovers, complaining of perfidy or fortune. To one, it will speak of the desolation of captive warriors; to another, of the moanings of secluded penitence: and this very vagueness and uncertainty, joined with the excitement of the imagination which it produces, give a compass and extent to its power of expression, that familiarly distinguish it, though founded on the very same feelings, from the fixed, and limited, and precise expression of poetry. The case seems to be the same with visible beauty. The qualities in which it consists are but another set of *characters* for communicating those emotions that are more clearly, but not always so forcibly, expressed by the pen of the poet. They constitute a sort of hieroglyphics, or picture-writings, that express the emotion by means of the relations and analogies of things, and not by any contrivance of direct or conventional reference. They require, therefore, to be eked out by the fancy and the knowledge of the reader; and rather rouse the imagination to a discovery, than enlighten it by a revelation. Those characters and pictures, at the same time, are just as little the ultimate objects of emotion as the letters and syllables of the poet. They are mere signs and instruments in both cases; and produce their effects on the mind, not by any relation which they themselves have to our feelings, but by suggesting to us, more or less directly, those emotions with which they have been associated.

What we have now said is enough, we believe, to give an attentive reader that general conception of the theory before us, which is all that we can hope to give in the narrow limits to which we are confined. It may be observed, however, that we have spoken only of those sorts of beauty that we think capable of being resolved into some passion, or emotion, or pretty lively sentiment of our nature; and though these are undoubtedly the highest and most decided kinds of beauty, it is certain that there are many things called beautiful which cannot claim so lofty a connection. It is necessary, therefore, to observe, that though every thing that excites any feeling worthy to be called an *emotion* by its beauty or sublimity will be found to be related to the natural objects of human passions or affections, there are many things which are pleasing or agreeable enough to be called beautiful, in consequence of their relation merely to human convenience and comfort; many others that please by suggesting ideas of human skill and ingenuity; and many that obtain the name of beautiful, by being associated with human fortune, vanity, or splendour. After what has been already said, it will not be necessary either to exemplify or explain these subordinate phe-

nomena. It is enough merely to suggest, that they all please upon the same great principle of sympathy with human feelings; and are explained by the simple and indisputable fact, that we are pleased with the direct contemplation of human comfort, ingenuity, and fortune. All these, indeed, obviously resolve themselves into the great object of sympathy — human enjoyment. Convenience and comfort is but another name for a lower, but very indispensable ingredient of that emotion. Skill and ingenuity readily present themselves as means by which enjoyment may be promoted; and high fortune, and opulence, and splendour pass, at least at a distance, for its certain causes and attendants. The beauty of fitness and adaptation of parts, even in the works of nature, is derived from the same fountain, — partly by means of its obvious analogy to works of human skill, and partly by suggestions of that creative power and wisdom to which human destiny is subjected. The feelings, therefore, associated with all those qualities, though scarcely rising to the height of emotion, are obviously in a certain degree pleasing or interesting; and, when several of them happen to be united in one object, may accumulate to a very great degree of beauty. It is needless, we think, to pursue these general propositions through all the details to which they so obviously lead. We shall confine ourselves, therefore, to a very few remarks upon the beauty of architecture and the beauty of versification, both which, we think, are obviously of this description.

There are few things about which men of *virtu* are more apt to rave than the merits of the Grecian architecture; and most of those who affect an uncommon purity and delicacy of taste, talk of the intrinsic beauty of its proportions as a thing not to be disputed, except by barbarian ignorance and stupidity. Mr. Alison, we think, was the first who gave a full and convincing refutation of this mysterious dogma; and, while he admits, in the most ample terms, the beauty of the objects in question, has shown, we think, in the clearest manner, that it arises entirely from the combination of the following associations: — 1st, The association of utility, convenience, or fitness for the purposes of the building; 2d, Of security and stability, with a view to the nature of the materials; 3d, Of the skill and power requisite to mould such materials into forms so commodious; 4th, Of magnificence, and splendour, and expense; 5th, Of antiquity; and, 6thly, Of Roman and Grecian greatness. His observations are summed up in the following short sentence.

“The proportions,” he observes, “of these orders, it is to be remembered, are distinct subjects of beauty, from the ornaments with which they are embellished, from the magnificence with which they are executed, from the purposes of elegance they are intended to serve, or the scenes of grandeur they are destined to adorn. It is in such scenes, however, and with such additions, that we are accustomed to observe them; and, while we feel the effect of all these accidental associations, we are seldom willing to examine what are the causes of the complex emotion we feel, and readily attribute to the nature of the architecture itself the whole pleasure which we enjoy. But, besides these, there are other associations we have with these forms, that still more powerfully serve to command our admiration: for they are the GRECIAN orders; they derive their origin from those times, and were the ornament of those countries, which are most hallowed in our imaginations; and it is difficult for us to see them, even in their modern copies, without feeling them operate upon our minds as relics of those polished nations where they first arose, and of that greater people by whom they were afterwards borrowed.” II. 156, 157.

This analysis is to us perfectly satisfactory. But, indeed, we cannot conceive any more complete refutation of the notion of an intrinsic and inherent beauty in the proportions of the Grecian architecture, than the



fact of the admitted beauty of such very opposite proportions in the Gothic. Opposite as they are, however, the great elements of beauty are the same in this style as in the other, — the impressions of religious awe and of chivalrous recollections coming in place of the classical associations which constitute so great a share of the interest of the former. It is well observed by Mr. Alison, that the great durability and costliness of the productions of this art have had the effect, in almost all regions of the world, of rendering their fashion permanent, after it had once attained such a degree of perfection as to fulfil its substantial purposes.

“Buildings,” he observes, “may last, and are intended to last, for centuries. The life of man is very inadequate to the duration of such productions; and the present period of the world, though old with respect to those arts which are employed upon perishable subjects, is yet young in relation to an art which is employed upon so durable materials as those of architecture. Instead of a few years, therefore, centuries must probably pass before such productions demand to be renewed; and, long before that period is elapsed, the sacredness of antiquity is acquired by the subject itself, and a new motive given for the preservation of similar forms. In every country, accordingly, the same effect has taken place: and the same causes which have thus served to produce among us, for so many years, an uniformity of taste with regard to the style of Grecian architecture, have produced also among the nations of the East, for a much longer course of time, a similar uniformity of taste with regard to their ornamental style of architecture; and have perpetuated among them the same forms which were in use among their forefathers, before the Grecian orders were invented.” II. 166, 167.

With regard, again, to versification, we do not know whether there be any where a more ingenious or philosophical speculation, than that short one, in which Mr. Alison has attempted to show, that it must have been first adopted, in ages antecedent to the use of writing, merely for the purpose of distinguishing elaborate composition from casual discourse, and pointing out to particular attention whatever was thought to deserve it, either by the importance of the matter, or the felicity of the expression. The substance of this speculation, which affords by far the best solution we have met with, of the singular fact of the priority of metrical to prose composition, will be found in the following passage.

“The use of language is acquired so early in life, and is practised upon common occasions with so little study or thought, that it appears to a rude people, as it does to the common people of every country, rather as an inherent power of our nature than as an acquisition of labour or study; and, upon such occasions, is considered as no more expressive of design or skill than the notes of birds or the cries of animals. When therefore men first began to think of composition, and to expect admiration from their skill in it, they would very naturally endeavour to make it as expressive as they could of this skill, by distinguishing it as much as possible from common language. There was no way so obvious for this, as by the production of some kind of regularity or uniformity; by the production either of regularity in the succession of these sounds, or of uniformity or resemblance in the sounds themselves. Such qualities in composition would immediately suggest the belief of skill and design, and would of consequence excite all that admiration which, in the commencement of every art, such qualities so strongly and so justly raise. The same cause, therefore, which induced the sculptor to give to his performances that form which was most strongly expressive of his skill, would induce the poet to employ that regularity or uniformity of sounds which was most immediately expressive also of his skill, and which was most likely to excite the admiration of his people. Rhyme or measure then (according to the nature of the language and the superior difficulty of either) would naturally come to be the constituent mark of poetry, or of that species of composition which was destined to affect or to please. It would be the simplest resource which the poet could fall upon, to distinguish his productions from common language; and it would accordingly please, just in proportion to the perfection of its regularity, or to the degree

in which it was expressive of his labour and skill. The greater and more important characteristics of the art, a rude people must necessarily be unacquainted with; and what would naturally constitute the distinction to them between poetry and common language, would be the appearance of uniformity or regularity in the one, and the want of them in the other.

“As thus the first instances of composition would be distinguished by some species of uniformity, every kind of composition would gradually borrow, or come to be distinguished by, the same character. If it was necessary for the poet to study rhyme or measure, to distinguish his verses from common language, it would be equally necessary for the lawgiver to study the same in the composition of his laws, and the sage in the composition of his aphorisms. Without this character, they had no distinction from usual or familiar expression; they had no mark by which they might be known to be the fruit of thought or reflection, instead of the immediate effusion of fancy. Before the invention of writing, the only expedient by which it seems possible that composition could be distinguished from common language, must have been some species of uniformity or regularity, which might immediately convey the belief of art or design, and thus separate it from that vulgar language which appeared to imply neither. It is hence that, in every country, proverbs, or the ancient maxims of wisdom, are distinguished by alliteration, or measure, or some other artifice of a like nature; that in many countries the earliest laws have been written in verse; and, in general, that the artificial composition which is now appropriated to poetry alone, and distinguished by the name of Poetical Composition, was naturally the prevailing character of composition, and applied to every subject which was the fruit of labour or meditation; as the mark, and indeed the only mark that then could be given, of the employment of this labour and meditation.

“The invention of writing occasioned a very great revolution in composition. What was written, was of itself expressive of design. Prose, therefore, when written, was equally expressive of design with verse or rhyme; and the restraints which these imposed led men naturally to forsake that artificial composition, which now no longer had the value it bore before this invention. The discovery of writing seems, therefore, naturally to have led to composition in prose.”  
II. 80—84.

But though this appears to us to be a perfectly just and satisfactory explanation of the origin of metrical composition, we cannot exactly agree with Mr. Alison in thinking, that the beauty of versification is to be referred *altogether* to our associations with those standard works which were produced in an early age under this form. Many things that were first introduced for humble and vulgar purposes, have been afterwards turned to purposes of ornament and delight; and it is no doubt true, as Mr. Knight has remarked, that it would very early occur to those who wished their compositions to be remembered, not only as elaborate, but beautiful, to choose such combinations of regular sound as could be most smoothly and distinctly articulated; and to dispose their emphatic words in the places where the force of the voice would naturally be thrown. It is to this observance,—to sympathy with the skill and success of the poet,—and to the recollection of the great body of beautiful compositions that exist under the same form, that we are inclined to ascribe the whole beauty of versification: and we must own, that we think the last-named author very greatly exaggerates its importance when he contends, that, without its assistance, it would be absolutely impossible to sustain that elevation of tone, and lofty flow of utterance, which is necessary to the existence of poetry, considered as the language of enthusiasm. Real enthusiasm, in so far as we have observed, has no tendency to express itself in measured language. We have no sort of notion that Demosthenes would have increased the effect of his Philippics, or Cicero of his *Catilinarians*, by turning them into Iambics; and are sure that we feel

no want of the tone of enthusiasm, when we hear Mrs. Siddons or Kemble declaim the prose speeches of Shakspeare. On the contrary, we think it is almost established as a common remark, that this very uniform elevation of tone, and regular flow of sound, which are inseparable from verse, and essential, according to Mr. Knight, to the animation of poetry, is found to pall upon the ear much sooner than prose of the most disorderly construction. There are very few people, we believe, who do not feel cloyed and satiated before they have read fifty solid pages of the finest poetry in the world, — though there are not many reading men who would be at all oppressed with a much larger allowance of prose: and, with regard to the assistance which one reading aloud may be supposed to derive from the verse, as directing him how to bring out the sense with effect, we are really at a loss to conceive what aid he could receive from such a guide, unless Mr. Knight is of opinion, that all verses of the same structure should be read with the same accent and intonation, whatever may be their subject or meaning. To us, we will confess, it appears that, in reading either verse or prose, it is necessary to know the meaning and scope of the sentence, before it is possible to modulate the voice with propriety in pronouncing it; and that, after the meaning is known, it is just as easy to give it this modulation in prose as in verse. In both cases, it may be necessary to glance over a long and complicated sentence before we can safely venture upon delivering it; but this is just as necessary in measured as in unmeasured composition; and, when we are once possessed of its meaning and its structure, it is generally easier to give a just utterance to the latter than the former.

Long as we have been in the exposition of this simple theory, we cannot finally conclude our account of it, without adding one or two words upon the mere organic or physical delight which appears in some few cases to procure the appellation of beautiful to the objects that produce it, and to which such extravagant importance has been assigned by some writers of great note. Certain combinations of sounds, called musical concords, are agreeable to those who possess a musical ear, apparently by a primary law of our constitution, and independent of any association; and certain colours, and combinations of colours, or of lights and shades, are supposed to be instinctively agreeable in the same way.

The last of these facts has made a prodigious figure in many theories of beauty; and even in the acute and philosophical publication of Mr. Knight, a very high degree of intrinsic beauty is supposed to reside in tints, and combinations of tints, and the mere optical impression of broken or mingling masses of light and shadow. Now, we are so far from agreeing in these propositions, that we are somewhat inclined to be sceptical as to the existence of any such organical delight; and at all events to hold, that if there be any pleasures of the eye which cannot be referred to the association of human sympathies, they are exceedingly feeble and insignificant. The eye sees nothing but light; and that light most commonly coloured. It is hurt with excessively bright light, just as the ear is hurt with excessively loud sound, the nostrils by very pungent odours, or the whole body by excessive heat or pressure: and moderate light is agreeable, just as moderate sound or moderate heat is, by giving us some intimation of our existence, and stimulating the powers of sensation and attention. We do not call moderate heat or moderate pressure *beautiful*, however, though they may be agreeable; and it is not very easy to say, why moderate light, which is only another name for colour not too glaring, should be honoured with that appellation. As to particular colours,

again, we are rather slow in believing that any one is intrinsically more beautiful than another, or that they ever possess any beauty except by association with interesting objects. It is certain, at least, that there is no colour that would be beautiful every where. Bright and soft green is beautiful, because it is the livery of the spring; and soft and bright blue, because we see it in the summer sky; and pink and vermilion, because they blush on the cheeks of innocence:—but vermilion would not be beautiful on the grass, — nor green on the cheek, — nor blue on either. As to harmony, or composition of tints, again, of which we hear so much in the language of painters, we have sometimes been inclined to doubt a little whether it means any thing, when used without reference to the practical difficulties of the art, but the natural or common appearance of coloured objects, seen through the same atmosphere; or, if it be a source of pleasure, we are sure it is a very trifling pleasure, and scarcely deserving of the name of beauty. Suppose all the colours in nature disposed on a broad pannel, according to the nicest rules of this supposed harmony, and in lines as beautifully waving as any artist can devise, is there any grown creature that would call the display beautiful, or condescend to look twice at it? We do not entirely deny, that there is a certain natural beauty or fitness in the combination of what have been called the accidental or complementary colours; but we maintain that it is so extremely slight and insignificant as scarcely to merit any attention.

With regard, again, to the effect of broken masses of light and shadow, it is proper, in the first place, to remember, that by the eye we see *colour only*; and that lights and shadows, as far as the mere organ is concerned, mean nothing but variations of tint. It is very true, no doubt, that we soon learn to refer many of those variations to light and shade, and that they thus become *signs* to us of depth, and distance, and relief. But is not this, of itself, sufficient to refute the idea of their affording any primitive or organic pleasure? In so far as they are mere variations of tint, they may be imitated by unmeaning daubs of paint on a palette;—in so far as they are *signs*, it is to the mind that they address themselves, and not to the organ. They are signs, too, it should be recollected, and the only signs we have, by which we can receive any correct knowledge of the existence and condition of all external objects at a distance from us, whether interesting or not interesting. Without the assistance of variety of tint, and of lights and shadows, we could never distinguish one object from another, except by the touch. These appearances, therefore, are the perpetual vehicles of almost all our interesting perceptions; and are, consequently, associated with all the emotions we receive from visible objects. It is pleasant to see *many* things in one prospect, because some of them are probably agreeable; and it is pleasant to know the condition of those things, because the qualities or associations, by means of which they interest us, generally depend upon that knowledge. The mixture of colours and shades, however, is necessary to this enjoyment, and consequently is a sign of it, and a source of associated interest or beauty.

Mr. Knight, however, goes much farther than this, and maintains, that the beauty which is so distinctly felt in many pictures of objects in themselves disagreeable, is to be ascribed entirely to the effect of the brilliant and harmonious tints, and the masses of light and shadow that may be employed in the representation. The filthy and tattered rags of a beggar, he observes, and the putrefying contents of a dunghill, may form beautiful objects in a picture; because, considered as mere objects of sight, they may often present beautiful effects of colouring and shadow; and these

are preserved or heightened in the imitation, disjoined from all their offensive accompaniments. Now, if the tints and shades were the exclusive sources of our gratification, and if this gratification was diminished, instead of being heightened, by the suggestion which, however transiently, *must* still intrude itself, that they appeared in an imitation of disgusting objects, it must certainly follow, that the pleasure and the beauty would be much enhanced, if there was *no imitation of any thing*, and if the canvas merely presented the tints and shades, unaccompanied with the representation of any particular object. Again, if it were really possible for any one, but a student of art, to confine the attention to the mere colouring and shadowing of any picture, there is nothing so disgusting but what might form the subject of a beautiful imitation. A piece of putrid veal, or a cancerous ulcer, or the rags that are taken from it, may display the most brilliant tints, and the finest distribution of light and shadow. Does Mr. Knight, however, seriously think that either of these experiments would succeed? Or are there, in reality, no other qualities in the pictures in question to which their beauty can be ascribed but the organic effects of their colours? We humbly conceive that there are; and that far less ingenuity than his might have been able to detect them.

There is, in the first place, the pleasing association of the skill and power of the artist,—a skill and power which we know may be employed to produce unmingled delight, whatever may be the character of the particular effort before us. But, in the second place, we do conceive that there are many interesting associations connected with the subjects which have been represented as purely disgusting. The aspect of human wretchedness and decay is not, at all events, an *indifferent* spectacle; and, if presented to us without actual offence to our senses, or any call on our active beneficence, may excite a sympathetic emotion, which is known to be far from undelightful. Many an attractive poem has been written on the miseries of beggars; and why should painting be supposed more fastidious? Besides, it will be observed, that the beggars of the painter are generally among the most interesting of that interesting order;—either young and lovely children, whose health and gaiety, and sweet expression, form an affecting contrast with their squalid garments, and the neglect and misery to which they seem to be destined,—or old and venerable persons, mingling something of the dignity and reverence of age with the broken spirit of their condition, and seeming to reproach mankind for exposing heads so old and white to the pelting of the pitiless storm. While such pictures suggest images so pathetic, it looks almost like a wilful perversity to ascribe their beauty entirely to the mixture of colours which they display, and to the forgetfulness of these images. Even for the dunghill, we think it is possible to say something,—though, we confess, we have never happened to see any picture of which that useful compound formed the peculiar subject. There is the display of the painter's art and power here also; and the dunghill is not only useful, but is associated with many pleasing images of rustic toil and occupation, and of the simplicity, and comfort, and innocence of agricultural life. We do not know that a dunghill is at all a disagreeable object to look at, even in plain reality; provided it be so far off as not to annoy us with its odour, or to soil us with its effusions. In a picture, however, we are safe from any of these disasters; and, considering that it is usually combined, in such delineations, with other more pleasing and touching remembrancers of humble happiness and contentment, we really do not see

that it was at all necessary to impute any mysterious or intrinsic beauty to its complexion, in order to account for the satisfaction with which we can then bear to behold it.

Having said so much with a view to reduce to its just value, as an ingredient of beauty, the mere organical delight which the eye is supposed to derive from colours, we shall leave our readers to apply the same principles to the alleged beauty of sounds that are supposed to be insignificant. In this case, it is indeed much clearer that *there is* such an organical delight, and that it constitutes a larger share of the beauty of sounds, than tints and shadows do of the beauty of visible objects: but all that rises to the dignity of an emotion is the gift of association here also — of association with the passionate tones of the human voice — with the scenes to which the beautiful sounds are appropriate — with the poetry to which they have been married — the purposes to which they are devoted, or the mere skill and genius of the artist by whom they have been arranged.

Such is a very hasty and imperfect sketch of the theory unfolded in the volumes before us, with singular beauty of language, and copiousness of illustration. After all we have said, we are aware that to some it may appear strained and fantastical, and to others trite and unprofitable. To the infidels of the former class, we can only recommend the diligent perusal of Mr. Alison's whole work; to the scoffers of the second, we must beg leave to state one or two of the beneficial results of this theory, which we humbly conceive to be of some little importance, and to have escaped the notice even of its ingenious inventor.

In the first place, then, we conceive, that it establishes the substantial identity of the sublime, the beautiful, and the picturesque; and, consequently, puts an end to all controversy that is not purely verbal as to the difference of those several qualities. Every material object that interests us, without actually hurting or gratifying our bodily feelings, must do so, according to this theory, in one and the same manner; that is, by suggesting or recalling some emotion or affection of ourselves or some other sentient being, and presenting, to our imagination at least, some natural object of love, pity, admiration, or awe. The interest of material objects, therefore, is always the same, and arises in every case, not from any physical qualities they may possess, but from their association with some idea of emotion. But, though material objects have but one means of exciting emotion, the emotions they do excite are infinite. They are mirrors that may reflect all shades and colours; and, in point of fact, do seldom reflect the same hues twice. No two interesting objects, perhaps, whether known by the name of beautiful, sublime, or picturesque, ever produced exactly the same emotion in the beholder; and no one object, it is most probable, ever moved any two persons to the very same conceptions. As they may be associated with all the feelings and affections of which the human mind is susceptible, so they may suggest those feelings in all their variety, and, in fact, do daily excite all sorts of emotions — running through every gradation, from extreme gaiety and elevation, to the borders of horror and disgust.

Now, it is certainly true, that all the variety of emotions raised in this way, on the single basis of association, may be classed, in a rude way, under the denominations of sublime, beautiful, and picturesque, according as they partake of awe, kindness, or admiration; and we have no other objection to this nomenclature, except its extreme imperfection, and the

delusions to which we know that it has given occasion. If objects that interest by their association with ideas of power, and danger, and terror, are to be distinguished by the peculiar name of sublime, why should there not be a separate name also for objects that interest by associations of mirth and gaiety,—another for those that please by suggestions of softness and melancholy,—another for such as are connected with impressions of comfort and tranquillity,—and another and another for those that are related to pity, and admiration, and love, and regret, and all the other distinct emotions and affections of our nature? These are not in reality less distinguishable from each other than from the emotions of awe and veneration that confer the title of sublime on their representatives; and while these are all confounded under the comprehensive appellation of beauty, the distinction is only apt to mislead us into an erroneous opinion of our accuracy, and to make us believe, both that there is a greater conformity among the things that pass under the same name, and a greater difference between those that pass under different names, than is really the case. We have seen already, that the radical error of almost all preceding enquirers has lain in supposing that every thing that passed under the name of beautiful must have some quality in common with every thing else that obtained that name; and it is scarcely necessary for us to observe, that it has been almost as general an opinion, that sublimity was not only something radically different from beauty, but actually opposite to it; whereas, the fact is, that it is far more nearly related to some sorts of beauty than many sorts of beauty are to each other; and that both are founded exactly upon the same principle of suggesting some past or possible emotion of some sentient being.

We cannot leave this subject of sublimity, however, without alluding in one word to a very common, though, we confess, to us a very unaccountable oversight into which almost all writers have fallen,—and to a very useless controversy that has been consequently raised with regard to it. Mr. Burke, and several other authors, looking to the most common and powerful operation of sublimity, have described it as having its foundation in terror,—and being produced exclusively by the suggestions of danger or suffering. Mr. Knight, on the other hand, has contended, with no little warmth, that it originates in the conception of power; and consists altogether in that sympathetic elevation of spirit which is produced by the contemplation of great might and energy; and that there is nothing so contrary or opposite to this ennobling and lofty sentiment as the degrading passion of fear. Now, men of common sense—to say nothing of men-of genius—can scarcely ever be utterly in the wrong, we conceive, as to matters of common experience; and can hardly contradict each other directly, except by looking each upon a different side of the subject. The truth is accordingly, we apprehend, that both these views are to a certain extent just; and that both authors are wrong, in overlooking what had attracted the exclusive attention of their opponent. The radical error lies, as usual, in supposing that sublimity can be only of one description; and that all sublime objects must produce one and the same sort of emotion. Now, the fact is, we think, very clearly, that there are at least two sorts of sublimity, in the same way as there are many sorts of beauty;—and that some produce a kind of awe, humiliation, and terror, and some a sort of inward glorying and elevation of spirit, according to the nature of the suggestions which they supply to the imagination. It is very true, as Mr. Knight has observed, that terror, in its

direct form, is a very painful feeling ; and that, when it rises to any great height, it is incompatible with any agreeable or attractive emotion. But it is, notwithstanding, perfectly certain and obvious, that the spectacle or imagination of terror in others, — provided it be not a dastardly and groundless fear, but a natural and irresistible dread impressed by sufficient causes, — is an object of attractive sympathy. One half of the interest of tragedy is founded upon this feeling, — and far more than one half of the powerful and never-failing interest of all stories of ghosts and apparitions, and of many romances and tales of terror, both of ancient and modern date. We look upon it, therefore, as no less notable a heresy in Mr. Knight to deny that there is any delight or attraction in our sympathy with terror, as it was to deny that we had any pleasure in sympathising with distress. But the shortest and most satisfactory way of settling the matter will be, to suggest a few obvious instances of the different sorts of sublimity to the reader's recollection.

All that class of sublime objects, to which we popularly apply the epithets of dreary, gloomy, dismal, awful, or terrible, excite ideas of danger, and depress the mind with a sense of humiliation and awe. Gloomy caverns, and vaults, and all the apparatus and accompaniments of sepulture, and all the remembrancers of mortality, — all indications of power armed with seeming anger, which it is at once impious and impossible to resist, — the dark and stormy ocean, — lands swept with hurricanes, or shaken with earthquakes, — eclipses and thunder, — the dreariness of swampy forests, — the roar of troubled and impassable cataracts, — these, and a multitude of similar objects, stand unquestionably in the very first rank of sublimity ; yet their primary effect is, undoubtedly, to quell and subdue the spirit with a sense of its own weakness and insignificance, and to excite those emotions of lowly awe and solemn adoration, with which an inferior nature instinctively contemplates the visible indications of irresistible danger and uncontrollable power.

On the other hand, the recital of great and magnanimous actions, and, in one word, all the signal exertions and triumphs of human or imitable power, are apt to exalt the soul with that inward glorying and exultation, of which Longinus and all subsequent critics have spoken, — to kindle a kind of generous emulation in the minds of the spectators, and to elevate them, by an ambitious sympathy, to the height of the noble daring of which they see that their nature is capable.

The greater part of the common objects of sublimity, however, are of a mixed character, and may excite emotions either of humiliation and awe, or of aspiring ambition, according to the temper and dispositions of those to whom they are presented ; — rousing the lofty and the daring to defy the power, or to rival the exertions which they suggest ; or overcoming the timid and feeble with the sense of their own littleness and danger. To the brave and ardent spirit of military youth, the sound of the war-trumpet, the noise of artillery, and the trampling and shouts of charging legions, is animating and exalting ; — to women, or to timid men, it is awful and terrible ; — but to both it is unquestionably sublime — and perhaps most sublime to those who feel the greatest admixture of terror. Take a sublime scene in nature in the same way — such as is represented in some of Salvator's landscapes, — a wild and desolate assemblage of solitary mountains, with cliffs, and abysses, and dark streams and caverns, with banditti, or hunters like banditti, scattered over its loneliness ; — an intrepid and adventurous nature is only kindled to a loftier temper by the influences of such a prospect, — and feels strong to scale the cliffs,



and pursue the savage game they conceal, and to contend with the desperate competitors that may cross his way in the chase; while a pacific and ordinary character shrinks with dismay from such a picture of danger and discomfort, and is oppressed under the load of too overwhelming a sublimity. It is only necessary to have travelled a stage in our central Highlands with a native, and with a city family, in order to understand perfectly all the different effects of sublimity.

The only other advantage which we shall specify as likely to result from the adoption of Mr. Alison's theory, is, that it seems calculated to put an end to all these perplexing and vexatious questions about the standard of taste, which have given occasion to so much impertinent and so much elaborate discussion. If things are not beautiful in themselves, but only as they serve to suggest interesting conceptions to the mind, then every thing which does in point of fact suggest such a conception to any individual, *is beautiful* to that individual; and it is not only quite true that there is no room for disputing about tastes, but that all tastes are equally just and correct, in so far as each individual speaks only of his own emotions. When a man calls a thing beautiful, he may indeed mean to make two very different assertions:—he may mean that it gives him pleasure, by suggesting to him some interesting emotion; and, in this sense, there can be no doubt that, if he merely speak truth, the thing *is beautiful*; and that it pleases him precisely in the same way that all other things please those to whom they appear beautiful. But if he mean to say that the thing possesses some quality which ought to make it appear beautiful to every other person, and that it is owing to some prejudice or defect in them if it appear otherwise, then he is as unreasonable and absurd as he would think those who should attempt to convince him that he felt no emotion of beauty.

All tastes, then, are equally just and true, in so far as concerns the individual whose taste is in question; and what a man feels distinctly to be beautiful, *is beautiful* to him, whatever other people may think of it. All this follows clearly from the theory of Mr. Alison: but it does not follow from it, that all tastes are equally good or desirable, or that there is any difficulty in describing that which is really the best, and the most to be envied. The only use of the faculty of taste is to afford an innocent delight, and to aid the cultivation of a finer morality; and that man certainly will have the most delight from this faculty who has the most numerous and the most powerful perceptions of beauty. But, if beauty consist in the reflection of our affections and sympathies, it is plain that he will see the most beauty whose affections are warmest and most exercised,—whose imagination is the most powerful,—and who has most accustomed himself to attend to the objects by which he is surrounded. In so far as mere feeling and enjoyment are concerned, therefore, it seems evident that the best state must be that which belongs to the best affections, the most active fancy, and the most attentive habits of observation. It will follow pretty exactly too, that all men's perceptions of beauty will be nearly in proportion to the degree of their sensibility and social sympathies; and that those who have no affections towards sentient beings, will be just as insensible to beauty in external objects, as he, who cannot hear the sound of his friend's voice, must be deaf to its echo.

In so far as the sense of beauty is regarded as a mere source of enjoyment, this seems to be the only distinction that deserves to be attended to: and the only cultivation that taste should ever receive, with a view to the gratification of the individual, should be through the indirect

channel of cultivating the affections and powers of observation. If we aspire, however, to be *creators* as well as observers of beauty, and place any part of our happiness in ministering to the gratification of others — as artists, or poets, or authors of any sort — then, indeed, a new distinction of tastes, and a far more laborious system of cultivation, will be necessary. A man who pursues only his own delight, will be as much charmed with objects that suggest powerful emotions, in consequence of personal and accidental associations, as with those that introduce similar emotions by means of associations that are universal and indestructible. To him, all objects of the former class are really as beautiful as those of the latter — and, for his own gratification, the creation of that sort of beauty is just as important an occupation: but if he conceive the ambition of creating beauties for the admiration of others, he must be cautious to employ only such objects as are the *natural* signs and *inseparable* concomitants of emotions, of which the greater part of mankind are susceptible; and his taste will *then* deserve to be called bad and false, if he obtrude upon the public, as beautiful, objects that are not likely to be associated in common minds with any interesting impressions.

For a man himself, then, there is no taste that is either bad or false; and the only difference worthy of being attended to, is that between a great deal and a very little. Some, who have cold affections, sluggish imaginations, and no habits of observation, can scarcely see beauty in any thing; while others, who are full of kindness and sensibility, and who have been accustomed to attend to all the objects around them, feel it almost in every thing. It is no matter what other people may think of the objects of their admiration; nor ought it to be any concern of theirs that the public would be astonished or offended if they were called upon to join in that admiration. So long as no such call is made, this anticipated discrepancy of feeling need give *them* no uneasiness; and the suspicion of it should produce no contempt in any other persons. It is a strange aberration indeed of vanity that makes us despise persons for being happy — for having sources of enjoyment in which we cannot share; — and yet this is the true account of the ridicule we bestow upon individuals who seek only to enjoy their peculiar tastes unmolested; — for, if there be any truth in the theory we have been expounding, no taste is bad for any other reason than because it is peculiar — as the objects in which it delights must actually serve to suggest to the individual those common emotions and universal affections upon which the sense of beauty is every where founded. The misfortune is, however, that we are apt to consider all persons who communicate their tastes, — and especially all who create any objects for their gratification, — as in some measure dictating to the public, and setting up an idol for general adoration; and hence this intolerant interference with almost all peculiar perceptions of beauty, and the unsparing derision that pursues all deviations from acknowledged standards. This intolerance, we admit, is often provoked by something of a spirit of *proselytism* and arrogance in those who mistake their own casual associations for natural or universal relations; and the consequence is, that mortified vanity dries up the fountain of their peculiar enjoyment, and disenchants, by a new association of general contempt or ridicule, the scenes that had been consecrated by some innocent but accidental emotion.

As all men must have some peculiar associations, all men must have some peculiar notions of beauty, and, of course, to a certain extent, a taste that the public would be entitled to consider as false or vitiated.

For those who make no demands on public admiration, however, it is hard to be obliged to sacrifice this source of enjoyment; and, even for those who labour for applause, the wisest course, perhaps, if it were only practicable, would be, to have two tastes, — one to enjoy, and one to work by; one founded upon universal associations, according to which they finished those performances for which they challenged universal praise, — and another guided by all casual and individual associations, through which they looked fondly upon nature, and upon the objects of their secret admiration.\*

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### ON THE DOCTRINE OF PERFECTIBILITY.†

THE Introduction to this admirable work ends with an eloquent profession of the author's unshaken faith in the philosophical creed of Perfectibility: — upon which, as it does not happen to be our creed, and is very frequently brought into notice in the course of the work, we must here be indulged with a few preliminary observations.

This splendid illusion, which seems to have succeeded that of Optimism in the favour of philosophical enthusiasts, and rests, like it, upon the notion that the whole scheme of a beneficent Providence is to be developed *in this world*, is supported by Mad. de Staël upon a variety of grounds: and as, like other illusions, it has a considerable admixture of truth, it is supported, in many points, upon grounds that are both solid and ingenious. She relies chiefly, of course, upon the experience of the past; and, in particular, upon the marked and decided superiority of the moderns in respect of thought and reflection, — their more profound knowledge of human feelings, and more comprehensive views of human affairs. She ascribes less importance than is usually done to our attainments in mere science, and the arts that relate to matter; and augurs less confidently as to the future fortune of the species from the exploits of Newton, Watt, and Davy, than from those of Bacon, Bossuet, Locke, Hume, and Voltaire. In eloquence, too, and in taste and fancy, she admits that there has been a less conspicuous advancement; because, in these things, there is a natural limit or point of perfection, which has been already attained: but there are no boundaries to the increase of human knowledge, or to the discovery of the means of human happiness; and every step that is gained in those higher walks, is gained, she conceives, for posterity and for ever.

The great objection derived from the signal check which the arts and civility of life received from the inroads of the Northern barbarians on the decline of the Roman power, and the long period of darkness and

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\* The ingenious theory expounded in this masterly Essay with such beauty of language and splendour of illustration, was, I believe, at a subsequent period, embodied in an Essay on Beauty, published in the Supplement to the Encyclopædia Britannica, and announced as the production of Mr. Jeffrey. Those who are familiar with the composition of that captivating writer will easily discern, in the review of Alison's work on Taste, the marked peculiarities of his rich and dazzling style. The reader will not, I presume, complain of the length of this interesting article, which I could not venture to abridge without incurring the risk of impairing its excellence.

† Madame de Staël sur la Littérature. — Vol. xxi. page 8. February, 1813.

degradation which ensued, she endeavours to obviate by a very bold and ingenious speculation. It is her object here to show, that the invasion of the Northern tribes not only promoted their own civilisation more effectually than any thing else could have done, but actually imparted to the genius of the vanquished a character of energy, solidity, and seriousness, which could never have sprung up of itself in the volatile regions of the South. The amalgamation of the two races, she thinks, has produced a mighty improvement on both; and the vivacity, the elegance, and versatility of the warmer latitudes, been mingled, infinitely to their mutual advantage, with the majestic melancholy, the profound thought, and the sterner morality of the North. This combination, again, she conceives, could have been effected in no way so happily as by the successful invasion of the ruder people, and the conciliating influence of that common faith, which at once repressed the frivolous and mollified the ferocious tendencies of our nature. The temporary disappearance, therefore, of literature and politeness, upon the first shock of this mighty collision, was but the subsidence of the sacred flame under the heaps of fuel which were thus profusely provided for its increase; and the seeming waste and sterility that ensued, was but the first aspect of the fertilising flood and accumulated manure under which vegetation was buried for a while, that it might break out at last with a richer and more indestructible luxuriance. The human intellect was neither dead nor inactive, she contends, during that long slumber, in which it was collecting vigour for unprecedented exertions; and the occupations to which it was devoted, though not of the most brilliant or attractive description, were perhaps the best fitted for its ultimate and substantial improvement. The subtle distinctions, the refined casuistry, and ingenious logic of the School divines, were all favourable to habits of careful, and accurate thinking; and led insensibly to a far more thorough and profound knowledge of human nature — the limits of its faculties and the ground of its duties — than had been attained by the more careless enquirers of antiquity. When men, therefore, began again to reason upon human affairs, they were found to have made an immense progress during the period when all appeared to be either retrograde or stationary; and Shakspeare, Bacon, Machiavel, Montaigne, and Galileo, who appeared almost at the same time, in the most distant countries of Europe, each displayed a reach of thought and a power of reasoning which we should look for in vain in the eloquent dissertations of the classical ages. To them succeeded such men as Jeremy Taylor, Molière, Pascal, Locke, and La Bruyère, — all of them observers of a character to which there is nothing at all parallel in antiquity; and yet only preparing the way, in the succeeding age, for Montesquieu, Hume, Voltaire, Smith, Burke, Malthus, and so many others, who have made the world familiar with truths, which, however important and demonstrable at all times, certainly never entered into the conception of the earlier inhabitants of the world. Those truths, and others still more important, of which they are destined to be the parents, have already, according to Mad. de Staël, produced a prodigious alteration, and an incalculable improvement on the condition of human nature. Through their influence, assisted no doubt by that of the Gospel, slavery has been abolished, trade and industry set free from restriction, and war disarmed of half its horrors; while, in private life, women have been restored to their just rank in society; sentiments of justice and humanity have been universally cultivated; and public opinion been armed with a power which renders every other both safe and salutary.

Many of these truths, which were once the derided discoveries of men of original genius, are now admitted as elementary principles in the reasonings of ordinary people; and are every day extending their empire, and multiplying their progeny. Mad. de Staël sees no reason to doubt, therefore, that they will one day inherit the whole earth; and, under their reign, she takes it to be clear, that war, and poverty, and all the misery that arises from vice and ignorance, will disappear from the face of society; and that men, universally convinced that justice and benevolence are the true sources of enjoyment, will seek their own happiness in a constant endeavour to promote that of their neighbours.

It would be very agreeable to believe all this — in spite of the grudging which would necessarily arise, from the reflection that we were born so much too soon for virtue and enjoyment in this world. But it is really impossible to overlook the manifold imperfections of the reasoning on which this splendid anticipation is founded; — though it may be worth while to ascertain, if possible, in what degree it is founded in truth.

The first thing that occurs to a sober-minded listener to this dream of perfectibility, is the extreme narrowness of the induction from which these sweeping conclusions are so confidently deduced. A progress that is in its own nature infinite and irresistible, must necessarily have been both universal and unremitting; and yet the evidence of its existence is founded, if we do not deceive ourselves, upon the history of a very small portion of the human race, for a very small number of generations. The proposition is, that the human species is advancing, and has always advanced, to a state of perfection, by a law of their nature, of the existence of which their past history and present state leaves no room to doubt. But when we cast a glance upon this high-destined species, we find this necessary and eternal progress scarcely begun in the old inhabited continent of Africa — stationary, as far back as our information reaches, in China — and retrograde, for a period of at least twelve centuries, and up to this day, in Egypt, India, Persia, and Greece. Even in our own Europe, which contains probably less than one tenth part of our kind, it is admitted, that, for upwards of a thousand years, this great work of moral nature not only stood still, but went visibly backwards over its fairest regions; and though there has been a prodigious progress in England, and France, and Germany, during the last two hundred years, it may be doubted whether any thing of this sort can be said of Spain or Italy, or various other portions of this favoured quarter of the world. It may be very natural for Mad. de Staël, or for us, looking only to what has happened in our own world, and in our own times, to indulge in those dazzling views of the unbounded and universal improvement of the whole human race; but such speculations would appear rather wild, we suspect, to those whose lot it is to philosophise among the unchanging nations of Asia; and would probably carry even something of ridicule with them, if propounded upon the ruins of Thebes or Babylon, or even among the profaned relics of Athens or Rome.

We are not inclined, however, to push this very far. The world is certainly something the wiser for its past experience; and there is an accumulation of useful knowledge, which we think likely to increase. The invention of printing and fire-arms, and the perfect communication that is established over all Europe, insures us, we think, against any considerable falling back in respect of the sciences, or the arts and attainments that minister to the conveniences of ordinary life. We have no idea that any of the important discoveries of modern times will ever again be lost or

forgotten; or that any future generation will be put to the trouble of inventing, for a second time, the art of making gunpowder or telescopes — the astronomy of Newton, or the mechanics of Watt. All knowledge which admits of demonstration will advance, we have no doubt, and extend itself; and all processes will be improved that do not interfere with the passions of human nature, or the apparent interest of its ruling classes. But with regard to every thing depending on probable reasoning, or susceptible of debate, and especially with regard to every thing touching morality and enjoyment, we really are not sanguine enough to reckon on any considerable improvement; and suspect that men will go on blundering in speculation, and transgressing in practice, pretty nearly as they do at present, to the latest period of their history.

In the nature of things, indeed, there can be no end to disputes upon probable, or what is called moral evidence; nor to the contradictory conduct, and consequent hostility and oppression, which must result from the opposite views that are taken of such subjects: and that, partly, because the elements that are to be taken into the calculation are so vast and numerous, that many of the most material must always be overlooked by persons of ordinary talent and information; and partly because there not only is no standard by which the value of those elements can be ascertained and made manifest, but that they actually have a different value to almost every different individual. With regard to all nice, and indeed all debateable questions of happiness or morals, therefore, there never can be any agreement among men; because, in reality, there is no truth in which they can agree. All questions of this kind turn upon a comparison of the opposite advantages and disadvantages of any particular course of conduct or habit of mind; but these are of very different magnitude and importance to different persons; and their decision, therefore, even if they all saw the whole consequences, or even the same set of consequences, must be irreconcilably diverse. If the matter in deliberation, for example, be, whether it is better to live without toil or exertion, but, at the same time, without wealth or glory, or to venture for both upon a scene of labour and hazard — it is easy to see, that the determination which would be wise and expedient for one individual, might be just the reverse for another. Ease and obscurity are the *summum bonum* of one description of men; while others have an irresistible vocation to strenuous enterprise, and a positive delight in contention and danger. Nor is the magnitude of our virtues and vices referable to a more invariable standard. Intemperance is less a vice in the robust, and dishonesty less foolish in those who care but little for the scorn of society. Some men find their chief happiness in relieving sorrow — some in sympathising with mirth. Some, again, derive most of their enjoyment from the exercise of their reasoning faculties; others from that of their imagination; while a third sort attend to little but the gratification of their senses, and a fourth to that of their vanity. One delights in crowds, and another in solitude; — one thinks of nothing but glory, and another of comfort; — and so on, through all the infinite variety of human tastes, temperaments, and habits. Now, it is plain, that each of those persons should pursue a different road to the common object of happiness; and that they must necessarily clash and jostle with each other, even if each were fully aware of the peculiarity of his own notions, and of the consequences of all that he did in obedience to their impulses. It is altogether impossible, therefore, we humbly conceive, that men should ever settle the point as to what is the wisest course of conduct, or the best disposition of mind; or, consequently, take

even the first step towards that perfection of moral science, or that cordial concert and co-operation in their common pursuit of happiness, which is the only alternative to their fatal opposition.

This impossibility will become more apparent when it is considered, that the only instrument by which it is pretended that this moral perfection is to be attained, is such a general illumination of the intellect as to make all men fully aware of the consequences of their actions; and that it is not, in general, through ignorance of their consequences that actions producing misery are actually performed. When the misery is inflicted upon others, the actors most frequently disregard it, upon a fair comparison with the pain they should inflict on themselves by forbearance; and even when it falls on their own heads, they will generally be found rather to have been unlucky in the game than to have been unacquainted with its hazards; and to have ventured with as full a knowledge of the risks, as the fortunes of others can ever impress on the enterprising. There are many men, it should always be recollected, to whom the happiness of others gives very little satisfaction, and their sufferings very little pain,—and who would rather eat a luxurious meal by themselves, than scatter plenty and gratitude over twenty famishing cottages. No enlightening of the understanding will make such men the instruments of general happiness; and wherever there is a competition, — wherever the question is stirred, as to whose claims shall be renounced or asserted, we are all such men, in a greater or a less degree. There are others, again, who presume upon their own good fortune, with a degree of confidence that no exposition of the chances of failure can ever repress; and in all cases where failure is possible, there must be a risk of suffering from its occurrence, however prudent the venture might have appeared. These, however, are the chief sources of all the unhappiness which results from the conduct of man; — and they are sources which we do not see that the improved intellect or added experience of the species is likely to close or diminish.

Take the case, for example, of war, — by far the most prolific and extensive pest of the human race, whether we consider the sufferings it inflicts, or the happiness it prevents, — and see whether it is likely to be arrested by the progress of intelligence and civilisation. In the first place, it is manifest, that instead of becoming less frequent or destructive, in proportion to the rapidity of that progress, our European wars have been incomparably more constant, and more sanguinary, since Europe became signally enlightened and humanised; and that they have uniformly been most obstinate and most popular in its most polished countries. The brutish Laplanders, and bigoted and profligate Italians, have had long intervals of repose; but France and England are now pretty regularly at war, for about fourscore years out of every century. In the second place, the lovers and conductors of war are by no means the most ferocious or stupid of their species, — but for the most part the very contrary; — and their delight in it, notwithstanding their compassion for human suffering, and their complete knowledge of its tendency to produce suffering, seems to us sufficient almost of itself to discredit the confident prediction of those who assure us, that when men have attained to a certain degree of intelligence, war must necessarily cease among all the nations of the earth. There can be no better illustration indeed, than this, of the utter futility of all those dreams of perfectibility, which are founded on a radical ignorance of what it is that constitutes the real enjoyment of human nature, and upon the play of how many principles and opposite *stimuli* that happiness depends, which, it is absurdly imagined,

would be found in the mere negation of suffering, or in a state of Quakerish placidity, dulness, and uniformity. Men delight in war, in spite of the pains and miseries which it entails upon them and their fellows, because it exercises all the talents, and calls out all the energies, of their nature—because it holds them out conspicuously as the objects of public sentiment and general sympathy—because it gratifies their pride of art, and gives them a lofty sentiment of their own power, worth, and courage,—but principally because it sets the game of existence upon a higher stake, and dispels, by its powerful interests, those feelings of *ennui* which steal upon every condition from which hazard and anxiety are excluded, and drive us into danger and suffering as a relief. While human nature continues to be distinguished by those attributes, we do not see any chance of war being superseded by the increase of wisdom and morality. We should be pretty well advanced in the career of perfectibility, if all the inhabitants of Europe were as intelligent, and upright, and considerate as Sir John Moore, or Lord Nelson, or Lord Wellington,—but we should not have the less war, we take it, with all its attendant miseries. The more wealth, and intelligence, and liberty, there is in a country indeed, the greater love there will be for war; for a gentleman is uniformly a more pugnacious animal than a plebeian, and a free man than a slave. The case is the same with the minor contentions that agitate civil life, and shed abroad the bitter waters of political animosity, and grow up into the rancours and atrocities of faction and cabal. The actors in these scenes are not the lowest or most debased characters in the country, but, almost without exception, of the very opposite description. It would be too romantic to suppose that the whole population of any country should ever be raised to the level of Fox and Pitt, Burke, Windham, or Grattan; and yet, if that miraculous improvement were to take place, we know that they would be at least as far from agreeing as they are at present; and may fairly conclude, that they would contend with far greater warmth and animosity.

For that great class of evils, therefore, which arise from contention, emulation, and diversity of opinion upon points which admit of no solution, it is evident that the general increase of intelligence would afford no remedy; and there even seems to be reason for thinking that it would increase their amount. If we turn to the other great source of human suffering, the abuse of power and wealth, and the other means of enjoyment, we suspect we shall not find any ground for indulging in more sanguine expectations. Take the common case of youthful excess and imprudence, for example, in which the evil commonly rests on the head of the transgressor,—the injury done to fortune by thoughtless expense—to health and character by sensual indulgence—and to the whole felicity of after life by rash and unsorted marriages. The whole mischief and hazard of such practices, we are persuaded, is just as thoroughly known and understood at present, as it will be when the world is five thousand years older; and as much pains are taken to impress the ardent spirits of youth with the belief of those hazards, as can well be taken by the monitors who may discharge that office in the most remote futurity. The truth is, that the offenders do not offend so much in ignorance as in presumption. They know very well that men are oftener ruined than enriched at the gaming-table; and that love marriages, clapt up under age, are frequently followed by divorces: but they know too that this is not always the case; and they flatter themselves that their good luck and good judgment will class them among the exceptions, and not



among the ordinary examples of the rule. They are told well enough, for the most part, of the excessive folly of acting upon such a presumption in matters of serious importance:—but it is the nature of youth to despise much of the wisdom that is pressed upon them, and to think well of their fortune and sagacity, till they have actually had experience of their slipperiness. We really have no idea that their future teachers will be able to change this nature; or to destroy the eternal distinction between the character of early and mature life; and therefore it is, that we despair of the cure of the manifold evils that spring from this source; and remain persuaded, that young men will be nearly as foolish, and as incapable of profiting by the experience of their seniors, ten thousand years hence as they are at this moment.

With regard to the other glittering curses of life—the heartless dissipations—the cruel seductions—the selfish extravagance—the rejection of all interesting occupation or serious affection, which blast the splendid summit of human fortune with perpetual barrenness and discomfort,—we can only say, that as they are miseries which exist almost exclusively among the most polished and intelligent of the species, we do not think it very probable, at least, that they will be eradicated by rendering the species more polished and intelligent. They are not occasioned, we think, by ignorance or improper education; but by that eagerness for strong emotion and engrossing occupation, which still proclaim it to be the genuine and irreversible destiny of man to earn his bread by the sweat of his brows. It is a fact, indeed, rather perplexing and humiliating to the advocates of perfectibility, that as soon as a man is delivered from the necessity of subsisting himself, and providing for his family, he generally falls into a state of considerable unhappiness; and, if some fortunate anxiety, or necessity for exertion, does not come to his relief, is generally obliged to seek for a slight and precarious distraction in vicious and unsatisfactory pursuits. It is not for want of knowing that they are unsatisfactory that he persists in them, nor for want of being told of their folly and criminality;—for moralists and divines have been occupied with little else for the best part of a century; and writers of all descriptions, indeed, have charitably expended a good part of their own *ennui* in copious directions for the innocent and effectual reduction of that common enemy. In spite of all this, however, the malady has increased with our wealth and refinement, and has brought along with it the increase of all those vices and follies in which its victims still find themselves constrained to seek a temporary relief. The truth is, that military and senatorial glory is neither within the reach, nor suited to the taste, of any very great proportion of the sufferers; and that the cultivation of waste lands, and the superintendence of tippling-houses and charity schools, have not always been found such effectual and delightful remedies as the inditers of godly romances have sometimes represented. So that those whom fortune has cruelly exempted from the necessity of doing any thing, have been led very generally to do evil of their own accord, and have fancied that they rather diminished than added to the sum of human misery, by engaging in intrigues and gaming clubs, and establishing coteries for detraction or sensuality.

The real and radical difficulty is to find some pursuit that will permanently interest,—some object that will continue to captivate and engross the faculties; and this, instead of becoming easier in proportion as our intelligence increases, obviously becomes more difficult. It is knowledge that destroys enthusiasm, and dispels all those prejudices of admiration

which people simpler minds with so many idols of enchantment. It is knowledge that distracts by its variety, and satiates by its abundance, and generates by its communication that dark and cold spirit of fastidiousness and derision which revenges on those whom it possesses the pangs which it inflicts on those on whom it is exerted. Yet it is to the increase of knowledge and talents alone that the prophets of perfectibility look forward for the cure of all our vices and all our unhappiness !

Even as to intellect, and the pleasures that are to be derived from the exercise of a vigorous understanding, we doubt greatly whether we ought to look forward to posterity with any very lively feelings of envy or humiliation. More knowledge they probably will have,—as we have undoubtedly more knowledge than our ancestors had two hundred years ago ; but for vigour of understanding, or pleasure in the exercise of it, we must beg leave to demur. The more there is already known, the less there remains to be discovered ; and the more time a man is obliged to spend in ascertaining what his predecessors have already established, the less he will have to bestow in adding to its amount. The time, however, is of less consequence ; but the habits of mind that are formed by walking patiently, humbly, and passively, in the paths that have been traced by others, are the very habits that disqualify us for vigorous and independent excursions of our own. There is a certain degree of knowledge, to be sure, that is but wholesome aliment to the understanding—materials for it to work upon—or instruments to facilitate its labours:—but a larger quantity is apt to oppress and encumber it ; and as industry, which is excited by the importation of the raw material, may be superseded and extinguished by the introduction of the finished manufacture, so the minds which are stimulated to activity by a certain measure of instruction may, unquestionably, be reduced to a state of passive and languid acquiescence by a more profuse and redundant supply.

Mad. de Staël, and the other advocates of her system, talk a great deal of the prodigious advantage of having the results of the laborious discoveries of one generation made matters of familiar and elementary knowledge in another ; and for practical utility, it may be so : but nothing, we conceive, can be so completely destructive of all intellectual enterprise, and all force and originality of thinking, as this very process of the reduction of knowledge to its results, or the multiplication of those summary and accessible pieces of information in which the student is saved the whole trouble of investigation, and put in possession of the prize, without either the toils or the excitement of the contest. This, in the first place, necessarily makes the prize much less a subject of exultation or delight to him ; for the chief pleasure is in the chase itself, and not in the object which it pursues ; and he who sits at home, and has the dead game brought to the side of his chair, will be very apt, we believe, to regard it as nothing better than an unfragrant vermin. But, in the next place, it does him no good ; for he misses altogether the invigorating exercise, and the invaluable training to habits of emulation and sagacity and courage, for the sake of which alone the pursuit is deserving of applause. And, in the last place, he not only fails in this way to acquire the qualities that may enable him to run down knowledge for himself, but necessarily finds himself without taste or inducement for such exertions. He thinks, and in one sense he thinks justly, that if the proper object of study be to acquire knowledge, he can employ his time much more profitably in implicitly listening to the discoveries of others, than in a laborious attempt to discover something for himself. It is infinitely more

fatiguing to think than to remember ; and incomparably shorter to be led to an object, than to explore our own way to it. It is inconceivable what an obstruction this furnishes to the original exercise of the understanding in a certain state of information ; and how effectually the general diffusion of knowledge operates as a bounty upon indolence and mental imbecility. Where the quantity of approved and collected knowledge is already very great in any country, it is naturally required of all well-educated persons to possess a considerable share of it ; and where it has also been made very accessible, by being reduced to its summary and ultimate results, an astonishing variety of those abstracts may be stowed away in the memory, with scarcely any fatigue or exercise to the other faculties. The whole mass of attainable intelligence, however, must still be beyond the reach of any individual ; and he may go on, therefore, to the end of a long and industrious life, constantly acquiring knowledge in this cheap and expeditious manner. But if, in the course of these passive and humble researches, he should be tempted to enquire a little for himself, he cannot fail to be struck with the prodigious waste of time, and of labour, that is necessary for the attainment of a very inconsiderable portion of original knowledge. His progress is as slow as that of a man who is making a road, compared with that of those who afterwards travel over it : and he feels, that in order to make a very small advancement in one department of study, he must consent to sacrifice very great attainments in others. He is disheartened, too, by the extreme insignificance of any thing that he can expect to contribute, when compared with the great store that is already in possession of the public ; and is extremely apt to conclude, that it is not only safer, but more profitable, to follow, than to lead ; and that it is fortunate for the lovers of wisdom, that our ancestors have accumulated enough of it for our use, as well as for their own.

But while the general diffusion of knowledge tends thus powerfully to repress all original and independent speculation in individuals, it operates still more powerfully in rendering the public indifferent and unjust to their exertions. The treasures they have inherited from their predecessors are so ample, as not only to take away all disposition to labour for their farther increase, but to lead them to undervalue and overlook any little addition that may be made to them by the voluntary offerings of individuals. The works of the best models are perpetually before their eyes, and their accumulated glory in their remembrance ; the very variety of the sorts of excellence which are constantly obtruded on their notice, renders excellence itself cheap and vulgar in their estimation. As the mere possessors or judges of such things, they are apt to ascribe to themselves a character of superiority, which renders any moderate performance unworthy of their regard ; and their cold and languid familiarity with what is best, ultimately produces no other effect than to render them insensible to its beauties, and at the same time intolerant of all that appears to fall short of it. This state of public feeling, which we think inseparable from the long and general diffusion of knowledge, is admirably described by Madame de Staël, in a passage to which she has given a more limited application.

“ Mais il ne faut jamais comparer l'ignorance à la dégradation ; un peuple qui a été civilisé par les lumières, s'il retombe dans l'indifférence pour le talent et la philosophie, devient incapable de toute espèce de sentiment vif ; il lui reste une sorte d'esprit de dénigrement, qui le porte à tout hasard à se refuser à l'admiration ; il craint de se tromper dans les louanges, et croit, comme les jeunes gens qui prétendent au bon air, qu'on ne se fait plus d'honneur en critiquant même avec injustice,

qu'en approuvant trop facilement. Un tel peuple est alors dans une disposition presque toujours insouciant; le froid de l'âge semble atteindre la nation toute entière : on en sait assez pour n'être pas étonné ; on n'a pas acquis assez de connaissances pour démêler avec certitude ce qui mérite l'estime ; beaucoup d'illusions sont détruites, sans qu'aucune vérité soit établie ; on est retombé dans l'enfance par la vieillesse, dans l'incertitude par le raisonnement ; l'intérêt mutuel n'existe plus : on est dans cet état que le Dante appeloit *l'enfer des tièdes*. Celui qui cherche à se distinguer inspire d'abord une prévention défavorable ; le public malade est fatigué d'avance par qui veut obtenir encore un signe de lui." Tom. i. p. 40, 41.

In such a condition of society, it is obvious that men must be peculiarly disinclined from indulging in these bold and original speculations, for which their whole training had previously disqualified them ; and we appeal to our readers, whether there are not, at this day, apparent symptoms of such a condition of society. A childish love of novelty may, indeed, give a transient popularity to works of mere amusement ; but the age of original genius, and of comprehensive and independent reasoning, seems to be over. Instead of such works as those of Bacon, and Shakspeare, and Taylor, and Hooker, we have Encyclopædias, and geographical compilations, and county histories, and new editions of black-letter authors — and trashy biographies and posthumous letters — and disputations upon prosody — and ravings about orthodoxy and methodism. Men of general information and curiosity seldom think of adding to the knowledge that is already in the world ; and the inferior persons, upon whom that task is consequently devolved, carry it on, for the most part, by means of that minute subdivision of labour which is the great secret of the mechanical arts, but can never be introduced into literature without depriving its higher branches of all force, dignity, or importance. One man spends his life in improving a method of dying cotton red ; another in adding a few insects to a catalogue which nobody reads ; — a third in settling the metres of a few Greek Choruses ; — a fourth in deciphering illegible romances, or old grants of farms ; — a fifth in picking rotten bones out of the earth ; — a sixth in describing all the old walls and hillocks in his parish ; — and five hundred others in occupations equally liberal and important : each of them being, for the most part, profoundly ignorant of every thing out of his own narrow department, and very generally and deservedly despised by his competitors for the favour of that public which despises and supports them all.

Such, however, it appears to us, is the state of mind that is naturally produced by the great accumulation and general diffusion of various sorts of knowledge. Men learn, instead of reasoning. Instead of meditating, they remember ; and, in place of the glow of inventive genius, or the warmth of a generous admiration, nothing is to be met with, in society, but timidity on the one hand, and fastidiousness on the other — a paltry accuracy, and a more paltry derision — a sensibility to small faults, and an incapacity of great merits — a disposition to exaggerate the value of knowledge that is not to be used, and to underrate the importance of powers which have ceased to exist. If these, however, are the consequences of accumulated and diffused knowledge, it may well be questioned whether the human intellect will gain in point of dignity and energy by the only certain acquisitions to which we are entitled to look forward. For our own part, we will confess we have no such expectations. There will be improvements, we make no doubt, in all the mechanical and domestic arts ; — better methods of working metal, and preparing cloth ; — more commodious vehicles, and

more efficient implements of war. Geography will be made more complete, and astronomy more precise;—natural history will be enlarged and digested;—and perhaps some little improvement suggested in the forms of administering law. But as to any general enlargement of the understanding, or more prevailing vigour of judgment, we will own, that the tendency seems to be all the other way; and that we think strong sense, and extended views of human affairs, are more likely to be found, and to be listened to at this moment, than two or three hundred years hereafter. The truth is, we suspect, that the vast and enduring products of the virgin soil can no longer be reared in that factitious mould to which cultivation has since given existence; and that its forced and deciduous progeny will go on degenerating, till some new deluge shall restore the vigour of the glebe by a temporary destruction of all its generations.

Hitherto we have spoken only of the higher and more instructed classes of society,—to whom it is reasonable to suppose that the perfection of wisdom and happiness will come first, in their progress through the whole race of men; and we have seen what reason there is to doubt of their near approach. The lower orders however, we think, have still less good fortune to reckon on. In the whole history of the species, there has been nothing at all comparable to the improvement of England within the last century; never any where was there such an increase of wealth and luxury—so many admirable inventions in the arts—so many works of learning and ingenuity—such a progress in cultivation—such an enlargement of commerce:—and yet, in that century, the number of paupers in England has increased fourfold, and is now rated at one tenth of her whole population; and, notwithstanding the enormous sums that are levied and given privately for their relief, and the multitudes that are drained off by the waste of war, the peace of the country is perpetually threatened by the outrages of famishing multitudes. This fact of itself is decisive, we think, as to the effect of general refinement and intelligence on the condition of the lower orders; but it is not difficult to trace the steps of its operation. Increasing refinement and ingenuity lead naturally to the establishment of manufactures; and not only enable society to spare a great proportion of its agricultural labourers for this purpose, but actually encourage the breeding of an additional population, to be maintained out of the profits of this new occupation. For a time, too, this answers; and the artisan shares in the conveniences to which his labours have contributed to give birth: but it is in the very nature of the manufacturing system to be liable to great fluctuation, occasional check, and possible destruction; and, at all events, it has a tendency to produce a greater population than it can permanently support in comfort or prosperity. The average rate of wages, for the last forty years, has been insufficient to maintain a labourer with a tolerably large family;—and yet such have been the occasional fluctuations, and such the sanguine calculations of persons incapable of taking a comprehensive view of the whole, that the manufacturing population has been prodigiously increased in the same period. It is the interest of the manufacturer to keep this population in excess, as the only sure means of keeping wages low; and wherever the means of subsistence are uncertain, and liable to variation, it seems to be the general law of our nature, that the population should be adapted to the highest, and not to the average rate of supply. In India, where a dry season used to produce a failure of the crop, once in every ten or twelve years, the population was always up to the measure of the greatest abundance; and in manufacturing countries, the miscalculation is still more sanguine and erroneous. Such

countries, therefore, are always overpeopled; and it seems to be the necessary effect of increasing talent and refinement, to convert all countries into this denomination. China, the oldest manufacturing nation in the world, and by far the greatest that ever existed with the use of little machinery, has always suffered from a redundant population, and has always kept the largest part of its inhabitants in a state of the greatest poverty.

The effect then which is produced on the lower orders of society, by that increase of industry and refinement, and that multiplication of conveniences which are commonly looked upon as the surest tests of increasing prosperity, is to convert the peasants into manufacturers, and the manufacturers into paupers; while the chance of their ever emerging from this condition becomes constantly less, the more complete and mature the system is which had originally produced it. When manufactures are long established, and thoroughly understood, it will always be found, that persons possessed of a large capital can carry them on upon lower profits than persons of any other description; and the natural tendency of this system, therefore, is to throw the whole business into the hands of great capitalists; and thus not only to render it next to impossible for a common workman to advance himself into the condition of a master, but to drive from the competition the greater part of those moderate dealers by whose prosperity alone the general happiness of the nation can be promoted. The state of the operative manufacturers, therefore, seems every day more hopelessly stationary; and that great body of the people, it appears to us, is likely to grow into a fixed and degraded *caste*, out of which no person can hope to escape who has once been enrolled among its members. They cannot look up to the rank of master manufacturers; because, without capital, it will every day be more impossible to engage in that occupation, — and back they cannot go to the labours of agriculture, because there is no demand for their services. The improved system of farming furnishes an increased produce with many fewer hands than were formerly employed in procuring a much smaller return; and besides all this, the lower population has actually increased to a far greater amount than ever was at any time employed in the cultivation of the ground.

To remedy all these evils, which are likely, as we conceive, to be aggravated, rather than relieved, by the *general* progress of refinement and intelligence, we have little to look to but the beneficial effects of this increasing intelligence upon the lower orders themselves; — and we are far from undervaluing this influence. By the universal adoption of a good system of education, habits of foresight and self-control, and rigid economy, may in time no doubt be pretty generally introduced, instead of the improvidence and profligacy which too commonly characterise the larger assemblages of our manufacturing population; and if these lead, as they are likely to do, to the general institution of Friendly Societies among the workmen, a great palliative will have been provided for the disadvantages of a situation, which must always be considered as one of the least fortunate which Providence has assigned to any of the human race.

There is no end, however, we find, to these speculations; and we must here close our remarks on Perfectibility, without touching upon the *political* changes which are likely to be produced by a long course of progressive refinements and scientific improvement — though we are afraid that an enlightened anticipation would not be much more cheering in this view than in any of those we have hitherto considered. Luxury

and refinement have a tendency undoubtedly to make men sensual and selfish; and, in that state, increased talent and intelligence is apt only to render them more mercenary and servile. Among the prejudices which this kind of philosophy roots out, that of patriotism is among the first to be surmounted;—and then, a dangerous opposition to power, and a sacrifice of interest to affection, speedily come to be considered as romantic. Arts are discovered to palliate the encroachments of arbitrary power; and a luxurious, patronising, and vicious monarchy is firmly established amidst the adulations of a corrupt nation.

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### STRICTURES ON MAD. DE STAEL'S ESTIMATE OF THE METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS OF GERMANY.\*

THE few persons in Great Britain who continue to take an interest in speculative philosophy, will certainly complain of some injustice in Mad. de Staël's work in her estimate of metaphysical systems.

The moral painter of nations is indeed more authorised than the speculative philosopher to try these opinions by their tendencies and results. When the logical consequences of an opinion are false, the opinion itself must also be false: but whether the supposed pernicious influence of the adoption, or habitual contemplation of an opinion, be a legitimate objection to the opinion itself, is a question which has not yet been decided to the general satisfaction, nor perhaps even stated with sufficient precision.

There are certain facts in human nature, derived either from immediate consciousness or unvarying observation, which are more certain than the conclusions of any abstract reasoning, and which metaphysical theories are destined only to explain. That a theory is at variance with such facts, and logically leads to the denial of their existence, is a strictly philosophical objection to the theory: that there is a real distinction between right and wrong, in some measure apprehended and felt by all men: that moral sentiments and disinterested affections, however originating, are actually a part of our nature: that praise and blame, reward and punishment, may be properly bestowed on actions according to their moral character, — are principles as much more indubitable as they are more important than any theoretical conclusions. Whether they be demonstrated by reason, or perceived by intuition, or revealed by a primitive sentiment, they are equally indispensable parts of every sound mind. Every reasonable man is entitled instantly to reject a new opinion avowedly repugnant to those convictions from which he cannot depart. They are facts, which it is the office of theory to explain, and which no true theory can deny. But the mere inconvenience or danger of an opinion can never be allowed as an argument against its truth. It is indeed the duty of every good man to present to the public what he believes to be truth, in such a manner as may least wound the feelings or disturb the principles of the simple and the ignorant: and that duty is not always easily reconcilable with the duties of sincerity and free enquiry. — The collision of such conflicting duties is the painful and inevitable consequence of the ignorance of the

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\* De l'Allemagne, par Mad. de Staël, — Vol. xxii. page 227. October, 1813.

multitude, and of the immature state, even in the highest minds, of the great talent for presenting truth under all its aspects, and adapting it to all the degrees of capacity or varieties of prejudice which distinguish men. That talent must one day be formed; and we may be perfectly assured that the whole of truth can never be injurious to the whole of virtue.

In the mean time, eloquent philosophers\* would act more magnanimously, — and therefore, perhaps, more wisely, — if they were to suspend, during discussion, their moral anger against doctrines which they deem pernicious; and while they estimate actions, habits, and institutions by their tendency, if they were to weigh opinions in the mere balance of reason, virtue in action required the impulse of sentiment, and even of enthusiasm. But in theoretical researches, her champions must not appear to decline the combat on any ground chosen by their adversaries, and least of all on that of intéllect. To call in the aid of popular feelings in philosophical contests, is some avowal of weakness. It seems a more magnanimous wisdom to defy attack from every quarter, and by every weapon; and to use no topics which can be thought to imply an unworthy doubt whether the principles of virtue be impregnable by argument, or to betray an irreverent distrust of the final and perfect harmony between morality and truth.

Our moral philosophers will wonder that M. de Staël seems to be acquainted with the doctrine of utility, only in the offensive form of universal selfishness. In this respect, it is true, she resembles the German Philosophers. But the selfish system, properly so called, has long been exploded in this island. Hobbes, the last philosopher of high rank who espoused it, has indeed discovered wonderful power in the analysis of perception and reason; but his superiority forsakes him when he attempts a theory of emotion and sentiment. The character of system has been foolishly ascribed to the maxims of the Duc de la Rochefoucault; — a series of poignant and brilliant epigrams, with the usual epigrammatic exaggeration against the selfishness of the world, by a disinterested, affectionate, and gallant man. With not less absurdity, the title of the founder of an ethical theory has been bestowed on Mandeville, a satirist for the populace, with a coarse athletic understanding, and a fancy that contemplated only the low and ludicrous aspects of human nature, but eminently endowed with the talents of vulgar drollery and plebeian declamation. Perhaps it must be allowed that Paley has made too near approaches, especially in his definition of virtue, to this system. He was a person of unrivalled practical understanding. His prudential counsels are admirable; and he is one of the safest guides through human life. But he rather teaches duty, than inspires virtue. His school is more likely to form blameless and respectable men, than to send forth those moral heroes who are not afraid to die for their beloved friends or for their country. Neither his understanding nor his character peculiarly fitted him for a theorist. Nature had endowed and disposed him for the conduct of affairs. He was averse from the subtleties of speculation, and he perhaps looked with the contempt natural to the stern shrewdness of the world on that ardour and that refinement of feeling which alone can reveal to us some of the most important secrets of our own moral constitution. Reason, without sensibility, is as much without materials

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\* The observation may be applied to Cicero and Stewart, *Philos. Ess.* 186., as well as M. de Staël.



in morals, as she would be without the eye, in enquiries into the nature of light and colours. But, in justice to this eminent and excellent person, the principal ornament of the English church in the last half century, it must be added, that the species of interest held out by religion, being remote from us, unlike the vulgar objects which are commonly comprehended under the name of interest, and from its sublime and inscrutable nature, capable of being refined by a pure mind, until synonymous with indefinite progress in reason and virtue, has little of that tendency to lower the moral sentiments which cannot be denied to belong to systems of prudential ethics, founded on a perpetual calculation of the near and gross interests of the present world. Nor must it be forgotten, that the ardour of the devotional affections must render the religious moralist unconsciously disinterested in his feelings, whatever may be the selfish taint of his theory.

A scoffer might with some truth tell us, that German philosophy is founded in a repugnance to every system which has experience for its basis, or happiness for its end. M. de Staël would probably justify the repugnance, by contending that the metaphysics of experience uniformly led to scepticism, and the ethics of utility naturally terminated in selfishness. There is indeed a permanent hostility between modes of philosophy still more irreconcilable in their spirit and genius, than repugnant in their doctrines; which, since the beginning of speculation, has divided individuals, nations, and ages, rather by their temper and circumstances, than in any proportion to the force of argument. Some philosophical disputes are, in truth, the forms assumed by antagonist principles in human nature. Among the more remarkable instances of this speculative war are the controversies between scepticism and dogmatism; between calculation and enthusiasm; and between ethical systems founded on utility, and those in which, under various names, the moral principle is considered as ultimate in theory, as it is unanimously acknowledged to be supreme in practice.

It is possible in speculation to preserve the harmony of these principles, by assigning to each its due rank and its proper sphere. But, in practice, the irregular variety of events and passions and characters is perpetually impelling them beyond their end, and driving them without their province. Calm minds and tranquil periods tend towards the one — sensibility and enthusiasm, turbulence and revolution, towards the other. — Peculiar conditions of society sometimes exhibit the excess of the one and of the other at the same moment. Thus, under the tyranny of the Emperors, the Roman nobility, according to their various characters, either braved oppression with stoical enthusiasm, or escaped from it into a slightly systematised voluptuousness, which borrowed the name of Epicurus, though it breathed nothing of the spirit of that pure and amiable moralist.

There is no logical tie between the opinions ranged on either side. They are frequently disjoined, and even at variance with each other. They are examples, chosen from many others, of a permanent contest, not indeed of reason, but of the reasoning faculties, with the common feelings of mankind.

The two principles which in one of these controversies have struggled for the ascendant from the time of Epicurus and Zeno, to that of Paley and Kant, are well stated by our philosophical and eloquent author. “The conduct of a man is truly moral, only when he disregards the fortunate or unfortunate consequences of his actions, if these actions be

dictated by duty." On the other hand, "The general laws of nature and of society, place happiness and virtue in harmony with each other." Now the second of these positions is the fundamental principle of the system of utility; and all moralists of every school must assent to the truth of the first. The question is, whether the second, as the first principle of moral theory, be consistent with the first, as an undisputed rule of moral practice. That these two propositions are in some manner reconcilable, must be the opinion of M. de Staël; for she adopts them both as parts of her moral system.

*Do the actions called moral by all men agree in the quality of conducing to the general happiness?*—This is surely a reasonable and important question; and as it relates to a fact which is the subject of universal experience, it must be capable of a satisfactory answer. To this question there can be but one answer. A common quality is then discovered in all moral actions—their general utility. According to the received rules of philosophising, it should seem unnecessary to seek for any farther criterion. But whether they have any other qualities in common or not, thus much is certain, that their common quality of utility cannot be overlooked in any just theory of morals, and must on the contrary form an essential principle in such a theory. To advance a step farther, it must be admitted, that they are moral acts which, when *singly considered*, are repugnant to the interest of the agent. But it is a proper subject of enquiry, *Whether there be any habitual disposition towards virtuous action, which it is not conducive to the happiness of the individual to entertain in such a degree as to render it impossible for him to prefer an act of vice for its separate advantage?*

No philosopher has ever yet ventured to point out such a disposition. Till it be named, we must contend that the point where interest universally coincides with virtue, and where public and private happiness are identified, is discovered—not indeed in single actions, but in those habitual dispositions from which actions flow—it never can be supposed that these principles of general and personal utility, and their cooperation in this manner, are not most momentous parts of an ethical system. Whether they alone are sufficient to afford a moral theory of actions, may still be a proper subject of discussion; but no theory can be formed exclusive of them. Their truth and their importance are perfectly independent of any system respecting the nature and origin of moral approbation or disapprobation. Though utility should be the criterion of the morality of actions, it by no means follows that moral sentiment should consist only in a perception of that utility. The nature of moral sentiment is a matter of fact to be determined by separate enquiry. The doctrine of utility may be equally applied to actions and dispositions, whether we consider conscience as a modification of reason or of feeling; whether we believe it to be implanted originally in our nature, or only the necessary produce of the action of circumstances common to all men upon the structure of every human mind.

But though the doctrine of utility be perfectly reconcilable with the principles and sentiments of the most disinterested virtue—though the loftiest visions of Plato, and the sternest precepts of Zeno, may be justified by, and even deduced from, the elements of the theory of Epicurus; yet it must not be denied, that in practice there is an hostility hitherto unappeased between these different regions of the moral world; and that this hostility has been the most powerful, though often the secret cause, of the diversity of moral systems,

Those who are accustomed most strongly to feel the necessity of sacrificing advantage to duty in the course of life, naturally, however unreasonably, feel a repugnance to acknowledge that the rules of duty are founded on any species of advantage, even the most general and refined. Those who constantly contemplate the theoretical dependence of moral rules upon public advantage, may feel a disposition inconsistent with their principles, but favoured by their habits of thinking, to believe that the consideration of advantage may safely impel and guide their actions. The disinterested sentiments of practical virtue seek to establish themselves in the territory of speculation. They are impatient of superiority, though without their own province; and they tend to substitute magnificent names for intelligible principles in scientific morals. On the other hand, it is the natural tendency of the principle of utility, to pass the frontier of theory, within which its dominion is legitimate; and to pervert human life, by substituting a calculation of the consequences of each action, instead of the inviolable authority of moral rules, and the habitual ardour of virtuous affections.

This warfare perhaps will never be terminated. Opinions, apparently repugnant, may be shown to be consistent; but principles of human nature, so powerful and so adverse, are always likely to be embroiled with each other. The difficulty of a pacification is formidably increased by the very technical terms in every modification of Epicurean ethics. Pleasure, enjoyment, interest, even happiness, are terms which, in their popular import, have a reference to self, and some of them to the lowest portion of self. They have associations with sensuality and sordidness, from which no philosophical definition can purify them. They are used a thousand times in their vulgar sense, for once that they are employed by the refined epicurean. The habits of the mind are necessarily framed according to the most frequent usage. The gross acceptation of the terms steals on the most abstract reasoner, and insensibly affects his views. Hence one class of moralists recoil from the theory, which they find contaminated by such degrading ideas; and another suffer themselves unconsciously to be influenced in their moral sentiments, by the foreign impurities with which the accidents of language have encrusted their elementary notions. If ever a peace should be accomplished between these conflicting principles, it must be by a powerful, and comprehensive, and impartial representation of the whole moral system;—in which the morality of actions, the motives of conduct, and the nature of moral approbation, are perfectly distinguished from each other;—in which a broad line of demarcation separates theory from practice;—which exhibits general utility, ascertained by calculation, as the basis of moral rules, and the test of virtuous sentiments; but leaves every action to be impelled by sentiment and controlled by rule, without the toleration of any appeal to utility;—where theoretical principles are expounded with precise simplicity, and active sentiments represented in their natural force and ardour; where every part of human nature is alike exercised and invigorated; where the understandings of philosophers are satisfied, and the hearts of virtuous men moved; where science is protected from being disturbed by enthusiasm, and generous feeling guarded with still greater care from the freezing power of misplaced calculation. All the parts of so noble a representation probably exist in the works of ancient and modern philosophers. But many ineffectual attempts must precede the construction of the magnificent edifice in some distant generation, by

a firm and vigorous hand, uninfluenced by the prejudices of speculation or of practice, of sect or of age; and, as far as human infirmity will allow, even by the still more subtle and indelible prejudices of personal character.

Of a nature very analogous to this moral contest is the struggle between prudence and enthusiasm, which pervades human life, and of which one side is maintained in the three last chapters of this work, with affecting and persuasive eloquence. In public and private life, in literature and art, in legislation and even in religion itself, this dispute is every day reproduced under new forms and names. On this subject, a good understanding between the contending parties is more attainable, though a coincidence between persons of a different temperament and character could never be more than verbal. Mad. de Staël herself confounds a calm regard to happiness with that gross selfishness, which, as a vice most destructive to happiness, it is the office of the guardian principle of prudence to eradicate. On the other hand, it is among the calmest suggestions of reason, that wherever great obstacles are to be conquered, a great power must be created. There must, therefore, be many cases where prudence justifies the cultivation of enthusiasm. It is evident that no prudence could ever produce heroic sacrifices. It never was the interest of the private soldiers of an army to march into a field of battle. It may, indeed, be their duty. But it would be a strange policy which would prefer a sense of duty in an army, to the enthusiasm of honour or of patriotism. In those ordinary actions of human life which presuppose deliberation, the regard to interest may be generally relied on. In the regular movements of great bodies of men it will maintain its average influence. In whatever must be subjected to uniform rules, it must be extremely considered, because its regularity compensates for its weakness. Other passions overcome or suspend its power; but their return and movements cannot be foreseen or calculated. Prudence is ever in some degree present, and fills up the vacant place of every exhausted passion. The movements of this principle in pursuit of subsistence and wealth are so regular, that they have bestowed on political economy the character of an exact science. Its uniform presence, as much as its force, obliges the penal lawgiver to found his sanctions upon it.\* To this important principle has nature intrusted the protection of society from disorder, and of individuals from daily and hourly waste of their happiness. It guards against evil. To sensibility belongs the privilege of producing what is beautiful and good. From her spring all the affections that sweeten life; — all the sublime exertions of genius; — all the lofty virtues which shed a glory round human nature. Without the

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\* Probably Mad. de Staël has not enough considered those profound and original speculations of Mr. Bentham, which she incidentally controverts. Notwithstanding the unrivalled talent of the editor for clear and lively exposition, they require patient attention. They are the first considerable attempt to lay the foundations of a system of philosophical jurisprudence. That such a work should be begun and completed by the same man, is not consistent with the slow march of the human understanding. They have, in truth, no connection with the selfish system; nor do they exclude the most disinterested and the most ardent affections from influence over conduct. But upon all possible systems, the lawgiver must calmly regard the general interest of society. The most specious objections to Mr. Bentham have arisen from losing sight of his object, which is to present a calculation of pleasures and pains (from whatever source) as the basis of general rules of law, not as a guide in the deliberation of an individual concerning the morality of each single action. (See *Edinburgh Review*, vol. iv. p. 13.)

one, society could not be preserved;—without the other, it would not be worth preserving. Both are equally indispensable, though not equally dignified parts of the moral order of the world. But, as a coarse and brutish selfishness is the natural vice of the vast majority of men, it seems to be evident, that, in all ordinary circumstances, the excess of prudence is more to be dreaded than that of sensibility. The principles of interest and prudence have some analogy to those forces in the material world which are rendered subservient to human skill, because they can be ascertained with absolute precision,—and to those simple laws which govern the regular movements of the grandest bodies in nature.

Those of sentiment and enthusiasm have more analogy to the mighty agents, undiscoverable in their nature, conspicuous and tremendous in their effects, invisible and impalpable, which can neither be numbered, weighed, nor measured;—of which no man can tell whence they come, or whither they go; but which produce the most terrible appearances, and preserve the most beneficial conditions of the material universe; like the electric power, when its incalculable accumulation and redundance shake the heavens and the earth with tempests; or like the element, the quality, or the energy which is the unknown cause of heat, which expands matter into those vast bodies of fluid and vapour, which qualify the world to be the habitation of life.

The contest between Scepticism and Dogmatism has a close connection with one of the most interesting parts of this philosophical and eloquent work. The system of *Kant* was one of the efforts of philosophy to expel the poison of scepticism which Hume had infused into it. That great speculator had not amused himself, like Bayle, with dialectical exercises, which only inspire a disposition towards doubt, by displaying the uncertainty of the opinions most generally received. He aimed at proving, not that nothing had been known, but that nothing could be known; and that, from the very structure of the understanding, we were destined to remain in absolute and universal ignorance. It is true, that a system of universal scepticism can never be more than a mere intellectual amusement; an exercise of subtlety, not without its use in humbling the pride of dogmatism. As the dictates of experience, which regulate conduct, must be the object of belief, all objections which attack them in common with the principles of reasoning must be utterly ineffectual. Whatever attacks every principle of belief, can destroy none. As long as the principles of science are allowed to remain on the same level (be it called certainty or uncertainty) with the maxims of life, the whole system of human conviction must continue undisturbed. When the sceptic boasts of having involved the results of experience, and the elements of geometry, in the same ruin with the doctrines of religion, or the principles of philosophy, he may be answered, that no dogmatist ever claimed more than the same degree of certainty for these various opinions or conviction, and that his scepticism leaves them in that condition. In plain sense, the answer admits no reply. But the system of Kant and the works of Reid, dissimilar as they are in their form and spirit, were contemporary and independent attempts to defeat scepticism, by weapons more apparently philosophical. Both these philosophers, in the retirement of Northern Universities, began their scientific labours nearly in the same year, by a discussion of the same question that was agitated between the Leibnitzians and Newtonians about force. In a country like Germany, where the use of a dead language, and the separation of the learned class

from society, long preserved the scholastic character and style in philosophy, Kant made a premature attempt to trace every part of science to common principles in the human understanding, with the usual destiny of being often compelled to hide in magnificent expressions an ignorance which ought to be acknowledged; but with prodigious comprehension of mind, and extent of accurate knowledge; with the authoritative and dogmatic tone of a discoverer; with a technical nomenclature, extensive enough to form a new language;—in his moral writings, distinguished by an austere eloquence becoming a teacher of virtue;—in his metaphysical works, characterised by an obscurity which seems, in original thinkers, sometimes to arise from the crowd of ideas struggling for issue;—and, above all, remarkable perhaps beyond any man since Aristotle, for that genius of system which maintains simplicity of principle amidst the greatest variety of matters, and preserves symmetry and correspondence between the most remote parts of the intellectual edifice. In Scotland, where *Hutcheson* had revived speculative philosophy in a more elegant and popular form, Reid, a patient observer, and an accurate thinker, with an amiable prepossession in favour of useful and revered opinions, with singular caution, modesty, perspicuity, and elegance, composed his *Enquiry*, on which his fame among philosophers depends; and which is more distinguished, both by originality and error, than his later writings. His language has an unfortunate appearance of appealing to the multitude on the most abstruse subjects of human meditation. He has contributed to render the philosophy of thought more considered as a science of observation; and to check premature and precipitate generalisation. But neither he nor his illustrious followers have sufficiently remembered, that to philosophise is to generalise; that the perfection of science is proportioned to the simplicity of its principles; and that a multiplication of general laws is an avowal of imperfection only better than a groundless boast of perfection. No two writers were ever more unlike; and the disciples of both philosophers will be equally scandalised at the comparison. Yet both were actuated by the same impulse, and aimed at the same end. Long before the appearance of either, a grand defect of the prevalent philosophy had been found by Leibnitz, who of all writers since Bacon most abounds in those fruitful thoughts which arise from a comprehensive glance over the principles of knowledge. The ancient maxim, of which it seems impossible to trace the author, is, “*that there is nothing in the understanding which was not previously in the sense.*” Leibnitz proposed to add to this maxim, “except the understanding itself;”—and by this short addition he spread a new light over intellectual philosophy.—The system of Gassendi, of Hobbes, and of Locke, by the unhappy comparison of the original state of the mind to blank paper, led its followers to see nothing in the understanding but what came from without. They did not enough consider, if they considered at all, that the very capacity of receiving impressions must be subject to ascertainable rules; that the human understanding has a structure and functions, and laws of action which must regulate its perceptions, and render it capable of experience and of reasoning. These laws of the percipient and intellectual nature must plainly be ultimate, and never can be questioned in discussion, because all discussion is founded upon them. The neglect of them opened the way to scepticism. The extensive technical language of Kant, and the unfortunate term *Common Sense*, adopted by Reid, both denote the same ultimate laws of thought which mark the boundaries of reasoning, and against which all disputation is a vain mockery. The number of

such laws, and the criterion which distinguishes them, are subjects of important disquisition. But all theories of the understanding must either imply or express their existence. That of Hartley and Condillac attempts to reduce them to *one*, — certainly without success in the present state of knowledge. But if they were reduced to one, that one must be a fact, for the existence of which no proof could be given, and of the nature of which no explanation could be attempted. Whether they were one or a thousand, the controversy between the Dogmatist and the Sceptic would be precisely of the same nature. Universal scepticism involves a contradiction in terms. It is a belief that there can be no belief. It is an attempt of the mind to act without its structure, and by other laws than those to which nature has subjected its operations. No man can be allowed to be an opponent in reasoning who does not admit those principles, without which all reasoning is impossible.\* It is indeed a puerile play, to attempt by argument to establish or confute principles, which every step of the argument necessarily presupposes. — He who labours to establish them, must fall into a vicious circle; and he who attempts to impugn them, into irreconcilable contradiction.

The reasonings of the Pyrrhonians and the Dogmatists are balanced in a noble passage of Pascal, whose philosophical genius often shines forth with momentary splendour from the thick clouds which usually darkened his great mind. “L’unique fort des Dogmatistes, c’est qu’en parlant de bonne foi et sincèrement, on ne peut douter des principes naturels.” — “Les principes se sentent, les propositions se concluent.” — “Il n’y a jamais eu de Pyrrhonien effectif et parfait.” — “La nature soutient la raison impuissante.”

He concludes with an observation so remarkable for range of mind, and weight of authority, that it seems to us to have a higher character of grandeur, than any passage in human composition which has a mere reference to the operations of the understanding, — “La nature confond les Pyrrhoniens, et la raison les Dogmatistes.”

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STEWART’S INTRODUCTION TO THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA.  
PART I.†

“HISTORY” says Lord Bacon, “is Natural, Civil, or Ecclesiastical, or Literary; whereof the three first I allow as extant, the *fourth I note as deficient*. For no man hath propounded to himself the general state of learning, to be described and represented from age to age, as many have done the works of nature, and the state civil and ecclesiastical; without which the history of the world seemeth to me to be as the statue of Polyphemus with his eye out; that part being wanting which doth most show the spirit and life of the person. And yet I am not ignorant, that in divers particular sciences, as of the Juriconsults, the Mathematicians, the

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\* This is significantly expressed in the quaint title of an old and rare book, “*Sciri sive Sceptices et Scepticorum a jure disputationis Exclusio*,” by Thomas White, a personage of some consideration in the history of English philosophy.

† Dugald Stewart’s Introduction to the Encyclopædia, prefixed to the Supplement of the Encyclopædia Britannica. — Vol. xxvii. page 180. September, 1816.

Rhetoricians, the Philosophers, there are set down some small memorials of the schools, — of authors of books ; so likewise some barren relations touching the invention of arts or usages. But a just story of learning, containing the antiquities and originals of knowledges, and their sects, their inventions, their traditions, their divers *administrations* and *managings*, their oppositions, decays, depressions, oblivions, removes, with the CAUSES and OCCASIONS of them, and all other events concerning learning throughout the ages of the world, I may truly affirm to be wanting. The USE and END of which work I do not so much design for curiosity, or satisfaction of those who are lovers of learning, but chiefly for a more serious and grave purpose, which is this, in few words, ‘*that it will make learned men wise in the use and administration of learning.*’\* — *Advancement of Learning*, book ii.

Though there are passages in the writings of Lord Bacon more splendid than the above, few, probably, better display the union of all the qualities which characterised his philosophical genius. He has in general inspired a fervour of admiration which vents itself in indiscriminate praise, and is very adverse to a calm examination of the character of his understanding, which was very peculiar, and on that account described with more than ordinary imperfection, by that unfortunately vague and

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\* The Latin book *De Augmentis*, a translation from the published and unpublished English composition of Lord Bacon, made by men of eminent talent, and under his own inspection, may be considered, in respect to the matter, as a second original ; but wherever we possess his own diction, we should be unwilling to quote the inadequate expression in which any other man labours to do it justice. In the following instances, however, the Latin version contains passages of which his original English is not preserved :—

“*Ante omnia autem id agi volumus (quod Civilis Historiæ decus est et quasi anima) ut cum eventis causæ copulentur, videlicet ut memorentur naturæ regionum et populorum, idolesque apta et habilis, aut inepta et inhabilis ad disciplinas diversas, accidentia temporum, quæ scientiis adversa fuerint aut propitia; zeli et mixturæ religionum, malitiæ et favores legum, virtutes denique insignes et efficacia quorundam virorum ad scientias promovendas,—et similia. At hæc omnia ita tractari præcipimus ut non criticorum more in laude et censurâ tempus teratur, sed plane historicè res ipsæ narrentur, judicium parcius interponatur.*”

“*De modo hujusmodi historiæ conficiendæ, monemus ut per singulas annorum centurias libri præcipui qui per ea temporis spatia conscripti sunt in consilium adhibeantur, ut ex eorum non perlectione (id enim infinitum esset) sed degustatione, et observatione argumenti, styli, methodi, genius illius temporis literarius, velut incantatione quadam, a mortuis evocetur.*”

“*Quod ad usum attinet, hæc eo spectant non ut honor literarum et pompa per tot circumfusas imagines celebretur, nec quia, pro flagrantissimo quo literas prosequimur amore, omnia quæ ad earum statum quoque modo pertinent usque ad curiositatem inquirere et scire et conservare avemus, sed ob causam magis seriam et gravem, ea est (ut verbo dicamus) quoniam per talem, qualem descripsimus narrationem, ad virorum doctorum, in doctrinæ usu et administratione prudentiam et solertiam maximam accessionem fieri posse existimamus, et rerum intellectualium, non minus quam civilium, motus et perturbationes, vitiaque et virtutes notari posse, et regimen inde optimum educi et institui.*” — *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, *Lib. II. c. 4.*

We have ventured on this long quotation, not only for the valuable additions to the English text which it contains, but for the very striking proof which a comparison of the English and Latin text will afford, of the inferiority of the version in the passages where we have the good fortune to possess the original. Yet we know that Hobbes, one of the best of our writers, was Bacon’s favourite translator. — *III. Aubrey*, 602.



weak part of language which attempts to distinguish the varieties of mental superiority. To this cause it may be ascribed, that perhaps no great man has been either more ignorantly censured, or more unconstructively commended. It is easy to describe his transcendent merit in general terms of commendation: for some of his great qualities lie on the surface of his writings. But that in which he most excelled all other men, was in the range and compass of his intellectual view — the power of contemplating many and distant objects together, without indistinctness or confusion — which he himself has called the discursive or comprehensive understanding. This wide-ranging Intellect was illuminated by the brightest Fancy that ever contented itself with the office of only ministering to Reason: and from this singular relation of the two grand faculties of man, it has resulted, that his philosophy, though illustrated still more than adorned by the utmost splendour of imagery, continues still subject to the undivided supremacy of intellect. In the midst of all the prodigality of an imagination which, had it been independent, would have been poetical, his opinions remained severely rational.

It is not so easy to conceive, or at least to describe, other equally essential elements of his greatness, and conditions of his success. He is probably a single instance of a mind which, in philosophising, always reaches the point of elevation whence the whole prospect is commanded, without ever rising to such a distance as to lose a distinct perception of every part of it.\* It is perhaps not less singular, that his philosophy should be founded at once on disregard for the authority of men, and on reverence for the boundaries prescribed by nature to human enquiry; that he who thought so little of what man had done, hoped so highly of what he could do; that so daring an innovator in science should be so wholly exempt from the love of singularity or paradox; that the same man who renounced imaginary provinces in the empire of science, and withdrew its landmarks within the limits of experience, should also exhort posterity to push their conquests to its utmost verge, with a boldness which will be fully justified only by the discoveries of ages from which we are yet far distant.

No man ever united a more poetical style to a less poetical philosophy. One great end of his discipline is to prevent mysticism and fanaticism from obstructing the pursuit of truth. With a less brilliant fancy, he would have had a mind less qualified for philosophical enquiry. His fancy gave him that power of illustrative metaphor, by which he seemed to have invented again the part of language which respects philosophy; and it rendered new truths more distinctly visible even to his own eye, in their bright clothing of imagery. Without it, he must, like others, have been driven to the fabrication of uncouth technical terms, which repel the mind, either by vulgarity or pedantry, instead of gently leading it to novelties in science, through agreeable analogies with objects already familiar. A considerable portion doubtless of the courage with which he

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\* He himself, who alone was qualified, has described the genius of his philosophy both in respect to the degree and manner in which he rose from particulars to generals. “Axiomata infima non multum ab experientiâ nudâ discrepant. Suprema vero illa et generalissima (quæ habentur) notionalia sunt et abstracta et nil habent solidi. At media sunt axiomata illa vera, et solida et viva in quibus humanæ res et fortunæ sitæ sunt, et supra hæc quoque, *tandem* ipsa illa generalissima, talia scilicet quæ non abstracta sint, sed per hæc media vere limitantur.”—*Nov. Org. Liber I. Aphoris.* 104.

undertook the reformation of philosophy, was caught from the general spirit of his extraordinary age, when the mind of Europe was yet agitated by the joy and pride of emancipation from long bondage. The beautiful mythology and poetical history of the ancient world, not yet become trivial or pedantic, appeared before his eyes in all their freshness and lustre. To the general reader they were then a discovery as recent as the world disclosed by Columbus. The ancient literature, on which his imagination looked back for illustration, had then as much the charm of novelty as that rising philosophy through which his reason dared to look onward to some of the last periods in its unceasing and resistless course.

In order to form a just estimate of this wonderful person, it is essential to fix steadily in our minds, what he was not, what he did not do, and what he professed neither to be nor to do. He was not what is called a metaphysician. His plans for the improvement of science were not inferred by abstract reasoning from any of those primary principles to which the philosophers of Greece struggled to fasten their systems. Hence he has been treated as empirical and superficial by those who take to themselves the exclusive name of profound speculators. He was not, on the other hand, a mathematician, an astronomer, a physiologist, a chemist. He was not eminently conversant with the particular truths of any of those sciences which existed in his time. For this reason, he was underrated by men of the highest merit, who had acquired the most just reputation, by adding new facts to the stock of certain knowledge. It is not therefore very surprising to find, that Harvey, though the friend as well as physician of Bacon\*, “though he esteemed him much for his wit and style, would not allow him to be a great philosopher;” but said to Aubrey, “He writes philosophy like a Lord Chancellor,”—“in derision,”—as the honest biographer thinks fit expressly to add. On the same ground, though in a manner not so agreeable to the nature of his own claims on reputation, Mr. Hume has decided, that Bacon was not so great a man as Galileo, because he was not so great an astronomer. The same sort of injustice to his memory has been more often committed than avowed, by professors of the exact and the experimental sciences, who are accustomed to regard, as the sole test of service to knowledge, a palpable addition to its store. It is very true that he made no discoveries: but his life was employed in teaching the method by which discoveries are made. This distinction was early observed by that ingenious poet and amiable man, on whom we, by our unmerited neglect, have taken too severe a revenge, for the exaggerated praises bestowed on him by our ancestors.

“ Bacon, like Moses, led us forth at last,  
The barren wilderness he past,  
Did on the very border stand  
Of the blest promised land;  
And from the mountain top of his exalted wit,  
Saw it himself, and showed us it.”

*Cowley's Ode to the Royal Society.*

The writings of Bacon do not even abound with remarks so capable of

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\* III. Aubrey, 381. The very curious literary anecdotes of Aubrey, are so much the most important part of the publication in which they have lately appeared (Letters by eminent Persons from public Libraries at Oxford, 3 vol. London, 1813), that it ought, in all reason, to receive its title from them. An Appendix is a station of quite sufficient honour for the other materials.

being separated from the mass of previous knowledge and reflection, that they can be called new. This at least is very far from their greatest distinction: and where such remarks occur, they are presented more often as examples of his general method, than as important on their own separate account. In physics, which presented the principal field for discovery, and which owe all that they are, or can be, to his method and spirit, the experiments and observations which he either made or registered, form the least valuable part of his writings, and have furnished some cultivators of that science with an opportunity for an ungrateful triumph over his mistakes. The scattered remarks, on the other hand, of a moral nature, where absolute novelty is precluded by the nature of the subject, manifest most strongly both the superior force and the original bent of his understanding. We more properly contrast than compare the experiments in "the Natural History," with the moral and political observations which enrich the "Advancement of Learning," the Speeches, the Letters, the History of Henry VII.; and, above all, "the Essays," a book which, though it has been praised with equal fervour by Voltaire, Johnson, and Burke, has never been characterised with such exact justice, and such exquisite felicity of expression, as in the Discourse before us.\* It will serve still more distinctly to mark the natural tendency of his mind, to observe that his moral and political reflections relate to these practical subjects, considered in their most practical point of view; and that he has seldom or never attempted to reduce to theory the infinite particulars of that "civil knowledge," which, as he himself tells us, is, "of all others, most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to axiom."

His mind, indeed, was formed and exercised in the affairs of the world. His genius was eminently civil. His understanding was peculiarly fitted for questions of legislation and of policy,—though his character was not an instrument well qualified to execute the dictates of his reason. The same civil wisdom which distinguishes his judgments on human affairs, may also be traced through his reformation of philosophy. It is a practical judgment applied to science. What he effected was a reform in the maxims of state, before unsuccessfully pursued in the Republic of Letters. It is not derived from metaphysical reasoning, nor from scientific detail, but from a species of intellectual prudence, which, on the practical ground of failure and disappointment in the prevalent modes of pursuing knowledge, builds the necessity of alteration, and inculcates the advantage of administering the sciences on other principles. It is an error to represent him either as imputing fallacy to the syllogistic method, or as professing his principle of induction to be a discovery. The rules and forms of argument will always form an important part of the art of logic; and the method of induction, which is the art of discovery, was so far from being unknown to Aristotle, that it was often faithfully pursued by that great observer. What Bacon aimed at, he accomplished; which

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\* "Under the same head of Ethics, may be mentioned the small volume to which he has given the title of *Essays*; the best known and most popular of all his works. It is also one of those where the superiority of his genius appears to the greatest advantage; *the novelty and depth of his reflections often receiving a strong relief from the triteness of the subject*. It may be read from beginning to end in a few hours; and yet, after the twentieth perusal, one seldom fails to remark in it something unobserved before. This, indeed, is a characteristic of all Bacon's writings, and is only to be accounted for *by the inexhaustible aliment they furnish to our own thoughts, and the sympathetic activity they impart to our torpid faculties.*" Disc. 54.

was, not to discover new principles, but to excite a new spirit, and to render observation and experiment the predominant character of philosophy. It is for this reason that Bacon could not have been the author of a system or the founder of a sect. He did not deliver opinions—he taught modes of philosophising. His early immersion in civil affairs fitted him for this species of scientific reformation. His political course, though in itself unhappy, probably conduced to the success, and certainly influenced the character of the contemplative part of his life. Had it not been for his active habits, it is likely that the pedantry and quaintness of his age would have still more deeply tainted his significant and majestic style. The force of the illustrations which he takes from his experience of ordinary life, is often as remarkable as the beauty of those which he so happily borrows from his study of antiquity. But if we have caught the leading principle of his intellectual character, we must attribute effects still deeper and more extensive to his familiarity with the active world. It guarded him against vain subtlety, and against all speculation that was either visionary or fruitless. It preserved him from the reigning prejudices of contemplative men, and from undue preference to particular parts of knowledge. If he had been exclusively bred in the cloister or the schools, he might not have had courage enough to reform their abuses. It seems necessary that he should have been so placed as to look on science in the free spirit of an intelligent spectator. Without the pride of Professors, or the bigotry of their followers, he surveyed from the world the studies which reigned in the schools; and, trying them by their fruits, he saw that they were barren, and therefore pronounced that they were unsound. He himself seems indeed to have indicated as clearly as modesty would allow in a case that concerned himself, and where he departed from an universal and almost natural sentiment, that he regarded scholastic seclusion, then more unsocial and rigorous than it now can be, as a hinderance in the pursuit of knowledge. In one of the noblest passages of his writings, the conclusion of his Fragments “Of the Interpretation of Nature,” he tells us, “That there is no composition of estate or society, nor order or quality of persons, which have not some point of contrariety towards true knowledge; that monarchies incline wits to profit and pleasure—commonwealths to glory and vanity—universities to sophistry and affectation—cloisters to fables and unprofitable subtlety—study at large to variety; and that it is hard to say whether mixture of contemplations with an active life, or retiring wholly to contemplations, do disable or hinder the mind more.”

But, though he was thus free from the prejudices of a science, a school, or a sect, other prejudices, of a lower nature, and belonging only to the inferior class of those who conduct civil affairs, have been ascribed to him by encomiasts as well as by opponents. He has been said to consider the great end of science to be the increase of the outward accommodations and enjoyments of human life. We cannot see any foundation for this charge. In labouring indeed to correct the direction of study, and to withdraw it from these unprofitable subtleties, it was necessary to attract it powerfully towards outward acts and works. He no doubt duly valued “the dignity of this end, the endowment of man’s life with new commodities;” and he strikingly observes, that the most poetical people of the world had admitted the inventors of the useful and manual arts among the highest beings in their beautiful mythology. Had he lived to the age of Watt and Davy, he was not of that vulgar and contracted mind as to cease to admire grand exertions of intellect, because

they are useful to mankind. But he would certainly have considered these great works rather as tests of the progress of knowledge than as parts of its highest end. His important questions to the doctors of his time were, "Is truth ever barren? Are we the richer by one poor invention, by reason of all the learning that hath been these many hundred years?" His judgment we may also hear from himself—"Francis Bacon thought in this manner. The knowledge whereof the world is now possessed, especially that of nature, extendeth not to *magnitude and certainty of works.*" He found knowledge barren—he made her fertile; and he did not underrate the utility of particular inventions: but it is evident that he valued them most, as they are themselves among the highest exertions of superior intellect; as they are monuments of the progress of knowledge; as they are the bands of that alliance between action and speculation, where an appeal to experience and utility checks the proneness of the philosopher to extreme refinements; which teaches men to revere, and excites them to pursue, science by these splendid proofs of its beneficial power. Had he seen the change in this respect, chiefly in his own country, produced in part by the spirit of his philosophy, and which has made some degree of science almost necessary to the subsistence and fortune of large bodies of men, he would assuredly have regarded it as an additional security for the future growth of the human understanding. He must always have viewed with complacency those inventions which demonstrate to the most ignorant that "Knowledge is Power." In the pursuit of knowledge, however, he proposed to himself a practical end, and an end (even in the modern acceptance of the word) of unquestionable utility. He taught, as he tells us, the means, not of the "amplification of the power of one man over his country, nor of the amplification of the power of that country over other nations; but the amplification of the power and kingdom of mankind over the world." "A restitution of man to the sovereignty of nature." (*Of the Interpretation of Nature.*) "The enlarging the bounds of human empire to the effecting all things possible." (*New Atlantis.*) From the enlargement of reason, he did not separate the growth of virtue; for he thought that "truth and goodness were one, differing but as the seal and the print; for truth prints goodness." (*Advancement of Learning, Book I.*)

These general observations may at first seem but remotely connected with Lord Bacon's Plan of a History of Philosophy. But perhaps more consideration will show a closer relation between them than appears on a cursory glance. There could scarcely have been any passage of his works better calculated to justify our notion of the constitution and education of his mind, than that which we have placed at the commencement of this article. The whole of its peculiar phraseology, all its illustrations and metaphors, are taken from civil life. As civil history teaches statesmen to profit by the faults of their predecessors, he proposes that the history of philosophy should teach, by example, "learned men to become wise in the administration of learning." Early immersed in civil affairs, and deeply imbued with their spirit, his mind in this place contemplates science only through the analogy of government, and considers principles of philosophising as the easiest maxims of policy for the guidance of reason. It seems to us, also, that in describing the objects of a history of philosophy, and the utility to be derived from it, he discloses the principle of his own exertions for knowledge—a reform in its spirit and maxims, justified by experience of their injurious effects, and conducted with a judgment analogous to that civil prudence which guides a

wise lawgiver. If (as may not improbably be concluded from this passage) the reformation of science was suggested to Lord Bacon by a review of the history of philosophy, it must be owned, that his outline of that history has a very important relation to the general character of his philosophical genius. The smallest circumstances attendant on that outline serve to illustrate the powers and habits of thought which distinguished its author. It is an example of his faculty of anticipating, not insulated facts or single discoveries, but that of which the complexity and refinement seem much more to defy the power of prophecy—the tendencies of study, and the modes of thinking which were to prevail in distant generations,—that the parts which he has chosen to unfold or enforce in the Latin versions are those which a thinker of the present age would deem both most excellent and most arduous in a history of philosophy,—“the causes of literary revolutions; the study of contemporary writers, not merely as the most authentic sources of information, but as enabling the historian to preserve in his own description the peculiar colour of every age, and to recall its literary genius from the dead.”

This outline has the uncommon distinction of being at once original and complete. In this province Bacon had no forerunner; and the most successful follower will be he who, like the author of the present admirable Discourse, most faithfully observes his precepts. Here, as in every province of knowledge, he concludes his review of the performances and prospects of the human understanding, by considering their subservience to the grand purpose of improving the condition, the faculties, and the nature of man,—without which indeed science would be no more than a beautiful ornament, and literature would rank no higher than a liberal amusement.

Yet it must be acknowledged, that he rather perceived than felt the connexion of Truth and Good. Whether he lived too early to have sufficient experience of the moral benefit of civilisation, or his mind had early acquired too exclusive an interest in science, to look frequently beyond its advancement; or whether the infirmities and calamities of his life had blighted his feelings, and turned away his eyes from the active world;—to whatever cause we may ascribe the defect, certain it is, that his works want one excellence of the highest kind, which they would have possessed if he had habitually represented the advancement of knowledge as the most effectual means of realising those hopes of benevolence for the human race.

It is obvious, that Bacon had the history of science more in view than that of literature; and though he cannot be supposed to have excluded such great provinces of knowledge as the mathematical and physical sciences, yet he seems, from his language, more to have contemplated the history of that philosophy which discovers the foundation of the sciences in the human understanding, and which becomes peculiarly connected with the practical sciences of morals and politics—because, like them, it has human nature for its object. It is that which is most immediately affected by the events and passions of the world; and on it depends the colour and fashion of all other researches. Respecting the history of philosophy, thus understood, we must at this day “note the deficiency,” which was remarked by the philosopher.—Brucker is a learned compiler of the most praiseworthy candour and industry; but it must be owned, that he is a very unphilosophical historian of philosophy. In later times, the Germans have cultivated this department more

successfully than any other nation. "Tiedeman's Spirit of Speculative Philosophy" is a book of great value to enquirers into this subject.—"Fulleborne's Contributions to the History of Philosophy;"—"Buhle's History of Modern Philosophy," are useful publications. "Tenneman's History of Philosophy," (not yet completed) is the best work on the subject which the Continent has produced. The fault common to them all is, that being deeply imbued with the metaphysical speculations of their own age and country, and being animated by them to undertake the history of philosophy, they have almost unconsciously spread the doctrines and the technical language of their contemporaries over the description of the opinions of past times. In other Continental countries, we know of no attempts worthy of particular notice, since the excellent fragments of Gassendi. The first general history, only indeed of ancient philosophy, on a large scale, in modern times, was that of Stanley, formed on the model of Gassendi, and suggested to the author by his learned relation Sir John Marsham. It is a work of uncommon merit for the time in which it was written, and continued during more than a century to be the standard book on this subject for all Europe, until it was succeeded by Brucker. Since Stanley, we have had no general work of this kind; but some abridgments of more or less perspicuity and convenience. Incidental information respecting the subject, of a valuable kind, and often too abundant, is indeed to be found in the Intellectual System of Cudworth, whose mind, nourished by the doctrines of the Grecian philosophy, had acquired its modes of thinking, and deeply imbibed its characteristic prejudices. He seems as if he had studied and taught in the school of Alexandria. Even his English style, nervous and copious as it is, has the appearance of a translation from a Platonist. Though it be foreign from our present subject, we should have expressed our wonder, that large manuscript works of this celebrated English philosopher, preserved from destruction by accident, should be suffered to remain unpublished in the British Museum, if it were not a much greater subject of astonishment, or rather of reproach, that notwithstanding the gratitude due to the beginner of reformation, and the growing cultivation of our ancient language, there should yet be no edition of the English works of Wickliffe. The press of the two Universities would be properly employed in works which a commercial publisher could not prudently undertake.

Since the time of Cudworth, many of the demands of Bacon have been satisfied by Adam Smith's beautiful account of the ancient Ethical Systems, which clearly show what efforts it must have cost him to prevent the unseasonable display of sensibility and eloquence in his great work. The influence of the state of society, and the revolutions of government, as well as of the characters of individuals and nations on moral systems, are here admirably exemplified. He imbibes the spirit of the philosophy which he describes, and delivers the morality of the Stoical school with the austerity and loftiness of a Stoical sage, tempered by modern mildness, and retained within the bounds of nature by his own repugnance to exaggeration and paradox. It was unfortunate that this fine fragment should have been formed with that subordinate regard to his own peculiar theory, which placed him at a lower point of view than that from which the historian should survey the opinions or the actions of men.

At length a faithful disciple has filled up the outline of Bacon, for those sciences, and during that period, which are most interesting to us,

but which require the greatest talent, both because they awaken the strongest prejudices, and because the materials are already in some measure known to those superficial judges whose severity bears a pretty exact proportion to their ignorance of the difficulty of such a work.

This Discourse is the most splendid of Mr. Stewart's works, and places the author at the head of the elegant writers on Philosophy in our language. Though these are matters on which our brethren in the South may question our competence, we will venture to give a still more hazardous opinion, — that notwithstanding some doubtful expressions, of which we may take notice in the sequel, the Discourse is, on the whole, a composition which no other living writer of English prose has equalled. Few writers rise with more grace from a plain groundwork to the passages which require more animation or embellishment. He gives to his narrative, according to the precepts of Bacon, the colour of the time, by a selection of happy expressions from original writers. The frequent allusions to the ancient literature of the East and the West, are becoming ornaments of a history of letters. Among the secret arts by which he diffuses elegance over his diction, it may be most useful to remark the skill which, by deepening or brightening a shade in a secondary term, or by opening partial and preparatory glimpses of a thought to be afterwards unfolded, unobservedly heightens the import of a word, and gives it a new meaning without any offence against old use. It is in this manner that philosophical originality may be reconciled to literary stability, and that we may avoid new terms, which are generally the easy resource of the unskilful or the indolent, and often a characteristic mark of writers who neither know nor love their language.

He reminds us of the character given by Cicero of one of his contemporaries, who expressed "refined and profound thought in soft transparent diction." He is another proof that the mild sentiments have their eloquence, as well as the vehement passions. It will be difficult to name a work in which so much refined philosophy is joined with so fine a fancy, — and so much elegant literature with such a delicate perception of the distinguishing excellences of great writers, and with an estimate in general so just of the services rendered to knowledge by a succession of philosophers. It is pervaded by a philosophical benevolence, which keeps up the ardour of his genius without disturbing the serenity of his mind. It is felt in his reverence for knowledge, in the generosity of his praise, and the tenderness of his censure. It is still more sensible in the general tone with which he relates the successful progress of the human understanding among many formidable enemies. Those readers are not to be envied who limit their admiration to particular parts, or to excellences merely literary, without being warmed by the glow of that honest triumph in the advancement of knowledge, and of that assured faith in the final prevalence of truth and justice, which breathe through every page, and give the unity and dignity of a moral purpose to the whole of this classical work.\*

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\* This noble and discriminating panegyric on the merits of Dugald Stewart as a writer, has been embodied, with some additional remarks, in the Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy, prefixed to the new edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, and written by Sir James Mackintosh. In a note to that erudite production, the distinguished author has acknowledged that he wrote the criticism on Mr. Stewart's Second Preliminary Dissertation in Vol. xxxvi. page 220. of the E. Review. The



The greater part of the observations contained in Mr. Stewart's Preface, on the plans of Bacon and other philosophers for a classification of the sciences, are certainly just. They chiefly prove, however, that such an arrangement, though it must be sometimes attempted, is never likely to be unexceptionable. He seems, too, to suppose that the plans of Bacon and Locke are for different distributions of the same subject. But they plainly related to different matters. That of Bacon respected all the objects of those faculties of the human mind called Intellectual, which, in the philosophy of his age, were distinguished from the Senses on the one hand, and from the Will on the other. The object of Locke was more limited. His distribution is only "of what falls under the compass of the Understanding;" meaning, by that term, what Bacon denotes by "Reason." Mr. Locke, therefore, proposed only a subdivision of one of Bacon's classes,—that, namely, of "Philosophy;" and Dr. Smith uses the same language when speaking of a similar distribution adopted by the Greeks. It is plain, indeed, that an arrangement which includes history and the fine arts, cannot be intended to apply to the same subject with one which excludes them. That of Bacon, therefore, is a distribution of all the objects of Mind;—that of Locke, only of what are strictly called Sciences.

We cannot think with Mr. Stewart, that some objects of mind are not properly referred to one faculty, because none can be *exclusively* referred to one. Poetry is surely with perfect propriety considered as the produce of imagination; memory only supplies materials—reason ministers aids, or sometimes guides imagination; but the faculty which predominates must be imagination. Nor does it appear to us that the connexion often discovered in the progress of knowledge between sciences apparently remote, such as the illustration of ancient history from etymology, or of geology from comparative anatomy, can at all affect the principle of classification. None of these connexions imply resemblance, or could be allowed to modify the arrangement of the sciences. Shakspeare abounds with illustrations of human nature, and courts exhibit very curious modifications of the human character: but neither the art of tragic poetry, nor the science of a courtier, can be placed in any arrangement of knowledge near the philosophy of the human mind.

The principal difficulty in all such classifications is, that there being several purposes to be obtained by them, one of these purposes can hardly be completely fulfilled without some sacrifice of the others. There are at least three principles on which such an arrangement may be attempted; by attending chiefly—either, I. to the *faculty* to which each object of the human mind most eminently relates, which is that chosen by Bacon, but not confined by him to science; or, II. to the *manner* in which human reason considers each of its objects, which is that chosen by Mr. Locke, but limited to science; or, III. to the connexion subsisting between *the things known themselves*, which is that chosen for the purpose of this Discourse, and, like that of Mr. Locke, confined to science. As we conceive the second and third to be only different subdivisions of one of Bacon's three classes, it would be needless to include it in any general comparison. The difference between the second and the third will be most quickly felt in instances. The theory

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fact of his having, in his recent work, paid an eloquent tribute to the talents of his friend, in language very nearly the same as in the above paragraph, may be regarded as a proof that he is likewise the writer of this Essay.

of the human Passions belongs, according to Mr. Locke's division, to a perfectly different class of sciences from the right regulation and proper discipline of them. The first is Physical, for it is an answer to a question, *What is?* The second is Moral, for it is an answer to a question, *What ought to be?* These are sciences, of which one may be greatly illustrated by the other, and of which one must indeed be founded in the other, but which are nevertheless in themselves not only distinct, but having not the least likeness to each other. According to this principle of arrangement, the sciences ought to be classed according to the aspects under which the understanding contemplates its objects. However remote or dissimilar the objects may be which the mind considers in one view, they are, under that view, the subjects of the same science; as every material substance, when its colour is the quality contemplated, becomes the subject of Optics.

The plan of Mr. Stewart (which he does not offer, indeed, as any general classification) is to class together all the sciences which regard Mind, and to form a distinct class of those which relate to Matter. This, however, evidently blends physical with moral enquiries. The philosophy of the Human Mind is as much a science of fact as any part of Natural Philosophy. But Ethics, as we have already observed, is an answer to the question, "*What ought man to do?*"—and this word "*ought*" introduces the mind at once into a new region, and presents a conception, to which the sciences founded on experience have nothing akin. This classification, then, brings together sciences totally unlike. But that of Mr. Locke is, it must be owned, liable to at least an equally strong objection, though of a totally different nature. It brings together sciences which are seldom cultivated by the same persons; such, for example, as Mechanics, and the Theory of Imagination and Taste. It is therefore inconvenient when the object is practical, or, in other words, at the only time when the distribution of the sciences is of much importance,—when any thing is to be taught or observed concerning them. In the distribution of literary labour, for example, in the Introductory Discourses to this Supplement, it is certainly convenient that the same writer should review the progress of all the sciences with which he is peculiarly conversant; and, for that purpose, it is convenient to class them by their relation to a common subject, which, notwithstanding the dissimilarity of their nature, is the cause of their being generally studied by the same persons. Bacon's subdivisions of his class of Philosophy into Natural and Human, are entirely founded on the affinity of the things known, and would much resemble the arrangement of Mr. Stewart, if Bacon's "*Human Philosophy*" had not comprehended both the body and mind of Man, bringing together, in a singular order, Anatomy and Jurisprudence. That great author seems, however, to have been little solicitous about systematic distribution, and to have been content with any map of knowledge in which he could place his observations without confusion. He lays it down, indeed, "*as a rule, that all partitions of knowledge be accepted rather for lines and veins than for sections and separations, and that the continuance and entireness of knowledge be preserved.*"

The very general division seems to us a much less useful subject of consideration than the subdivisions. The number and exactness of these last, in the Physical sciences, must be regarded both as an indication and as a cause of their great advances in modern times. That there should, for example, be a separate preface to this Supplement required by Che-

mistry\*, — that it should thus claim an equal share of attention with all the other sciences which regard matter and quantity, — that it should have risen, within sixty years, from an appendage to Pharmacy to this high rank among the objects of human knowledge, is itself a proof of the activity and success of physical research, more striking, if not more conclusive, than any other. The very defective nomenclature, and imperfect subdivision of the moral and political sciences, is attended with practical inconveniences, of which a better example cannot perhaps be given, than the want of a line of demarcation between Politics and Political Economy, and the confusion of political with economical reasonings, in the most important legislative discussions. Of the more general

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\* It is but justice to say, that the present Supplement affords a most promising specimen of the skill and care of the editor; and that we have nowhere seen any collection of treatises, especially on scientific subjects, which contained, in the same compass, nearly so much exact and original information as the two parts which have just been published. The Encyclopedical Dictionaries, which have of late succeeded each other with extraordinary rapidity, have, in more than one instance, shown strong tendencies to improvement, though these favourable symptoms have nowhere manifested themselves so clearly as in this Supplement. — A work, indeed, which is to be supported in any considerable degree by the contributions of such men as Stewart, Playfair, Leslie, Brande, Ivory, Thomson, Smith, and others of the same rank, in the sciences, — and in the literary department by Scott, Alison, Barrow, and more of their standing, cannot fail to possess extraordinary excellence: — nor are there many ways in which these eminent persons could employ themselves with such an assurance of doing extensive good. Such compilations are so convenient to all readers, for quick reference, and such important sources of knowledge to those who want either wealth or leisure, or fixed residence, for the command of many books, that their execution is of great consequence in its effect on the general cultivation of the understanding. Their importance is increased in a country where multitudes of intelligent young men, dispersed over the colonies, when they can obtain an Encyclopædia and a Collection of English Poets, consider themselves as well provided with a library; and indeed it must be owned, that a subaltern in Canada or Bengal, who carries with him no more than these books, possesses more knowledge, and not much less delightful literature, than could have had a place in the equipage of Julius Cæsar, in one of his campaigns in Gaul.

If these compilations were not thus to be considered as forming the principal part, if not the whole, of the library of persons so circumstanced, it would be matter of regret that so much historical and biographical matter has been introduced into them. The articles which relate to the sciences are generally the best. Those that are literary, moral, or political, are in most danger of being executed with less ability. The biographical and historical accounts will have the best chance of answering their purpose, when they most abstain from literary criticism or political reflections, and most exclusively aim at conveying the greatest number of facts in few words, and in such a form that a glance is sufficient to catch the information sought. Chronological tables and maps, both minute and numerous, would be substantial improvements. The tabular form is very useful in a book of reference, both because it quickly informs the eye, and limits the writers to facts alone. Geographical articles, originally copied from old books, are apt to be transcribed from edition to edition of such works, with a disgraceful negligence of new information. The biography of foreign nations in modern times is not tolerably delineated in any English compilation since the “General Dictionary,” except in the “General Biography” of Dr. Aikin. The French *Encyclopédie*, notwithstanding the extraordinary merit of many philosophical and literary essays which it contains, is, in most of the ordinary articles, of very little value, — chiefly from too frequent forgetfulness of its purpose, which was, not to be an ingenious miscellany, but a well-ordered and accessible repository of knowledge.

classification, we cannot but say, as Lord Bacon says on a like occasion, "Remote and superficial generalities are no more aiding to practice, than an universal map is to direct the way between London and York."

We have been somewhat surprised at the degree of praise bestowed on D'Alembert, in a place where his mathematical merits could not come into consideration. We are far from adopting the quaint description of one of his works in Gray's Letters, that "*it is as hard as a stone, as dry as a stick, and as cold as a cucumber.*" Though we are aware of the influence which the independence and simplicity of his character, and his union of exact science with general philosophy and polite literature, may perhaps unconsciously have exercised over the mind of his panegyrist, we cannot think it an act of judicious admiration, more than once to have placed his name in the immediate neighbourhood of the name of Bacon.

As some atonement for the length of our remarks, we subjoin a part of the conclusion of the preface, as a specimen of the manner of thinking and writing which prevails in this Discourse.

"I am not without hopes, that this disadvantage may be partly compensated by its closer connection with (what ought to be the ultimate end of all our pursuits) the intellectual and moral improvement of the species.

"I am, at the same time, well aware, that in proportion as this last consideration increases the importance, it adds to the difficulty, of my undertaking. It is chiefly in judging of questions 'coming home to their business and bosoms,' that casual associations lead mankind astray; and of such associations, how incalculable is the number arising from false systems of religion, oppressive forms of government, and absurd plans of education! The consequence is, that while the physical and mathematical discoveries of former ages present themselves to the hand of the historian like masses of pure and native gold, the truths which we are here in quest of may be compared to *iron*, which, although at once the most necessary and the most widely diffused of all the metals, commonly requires a discriminating eye to detect its existence, and a tedious, as well as nice process, to extract it from the ore.

"To the same circumstance it is owing, that improvements in moral and in political science do not strike the imagination with nearly so great force as the discoveries of the mathematician or the chemist. When an inveterate prejudice is destroyed by extirpating the casual associations on which it was grafted, how powerful is the new impulse given to the intellectual faculties of man! Yet how slow and silent the process by which the effect is accomplished! Were it not, indeed, for a certain class of learned authors, who, from time to time, heave the log into the deep, we should hardly believe that the reason of the species is progressive. In this respect, the religious and academical establishments in some parts of Europe are not without their use to the historian of the human mind. Immovably moored to the same station by the strength of their cables, and the weight of their anchors, they enable him to measure the rapidity of the current by which the rest of the world are borne along.

"*This*, too, is remarkable in the history of our prejudices, that, as soon as the film falls from the intellectual eye, we are apt to lose all recollection of our former blindness. Like the fantastic and giant shapes which, in a thick fog, the imagination lends to a block of stone, or to the stump of a tree, they produce, while the illusion lasts, the same effect with truths and realities; but the moment the eye has caught the exact form and dimensions of its object, the spell is broken for ever; nor can any effort of thought again conjure up the spectres which have vanished."

The author was doubtless at liberty to fix the period at which he chose to commence his work. The revival of letters, or, to speak more strictly, the renewed study of the Greek and Roman writers, is one of the most conspicuous landmarks of literary history. But it is not equally clear that all the reasons assigned for the choice of this period are equally

conclusive. The middle age is spoken of with a contempt too undistinguishing. The inactivity of the human mind was very far from being alike in all the portions of this long period. During the darkest part of it, which extends from the fall of the Western empire to the beginning of the thirteenth century, the numerals called Arabic were introduced. Paper was fabricated from linen. Gunpowder and the compass were discovered. Before its termination, oil painting, printing, and engraving closed this series of improvements, unequalled in use and brilliancy, since those first inventions which attended the rise of civilisation, and which therefore preceded history. These inventions were proofs of mental activity as well as incitements to it; and it may even be doubted, whether the human mind could have rendered a greater service to the science of the succeeding age, than in thus preparing the soil which it was to cultivate, and constructing new instruments for its use. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, however, it cannot be doubted that the faculties of men throughout Europe were generally and very signally turned towards various studies. About the same period we find the cultivation of the Roman Law, the rise of the School Philosophy, and the commencement of Poetry in modern languages, in Sicily, in Tuscany, in Provence, in Catalonia, in Normandy, in England, in Scotland, and in Suabia. These dissimilar studies, appearing to us, at this distance, to arise suddenly in countries remote from each other, and at a period of small intercourse between nations, mark a general revolution in the mind of Europe. The government, laws, and manners of the middle age have been studied with a diligence due to the investigation of the source of the diversity of institutions and national character which still prevails in Europe. The literature of the same period has of late almost every where inspired a general curiosity and interest. Most nations have returned with renewed affection to the earliest monuments of the genius of their forefathers; and, amidst circumstances which abundantly counteract the extravagant whimsies of a few writers, there is no danger of permanent excess in that disposition. It is an useful fashion which makes a refined age familiar with those powers and graces which are familiar to each language, and with those original qualities which distinguished the first literary efforts of each, when they must have arisen spontaneously out of the national character; — which turns each nation from the imitation of foreign models to the improvement of their own native and characteristic excellences; which contributes somewhat to strengthen national spirit, and in any degree, however small, to confirm the love of every people for their own country.

It would be folly to compare the importance of the study of the ancient laws and literature of Europe with that of the history of the metaphysical speculations of any period, and especially where those speculations, with whatever power of mind they were conducted, must be owned to have been peculiarly unsuccessful. — But the philosophy of the middle age may deserve some notice. As long as the scholastic systems continued to be formidable enemies to free enquiry and sound philosophy, it might be an excusable policy to display only their vices, which were sufficiently enormous. But since they have ceased to be dangerous, we may safely be just to them. They are in truth the source from which most of the metaphysical discussions of modern times have sprung. Under the scholastic discipline the understanding of Europe was educated; and, from its first operation, probably acquired much of its peculiar character. A system in which every European of liberal education during three

centuries was trained, cannot have been without a powerful influence on the reasonings and opinions of succeeding times. Whatever occupies so long the force of the general understanding, however unprofitably as far as regards positive results, cannot be un instructive in its course, and by its example. The widest deviations from our modes of thought and expression, and even from the course of right reason, are the subject of the more curious problems in the theory of intellect. Even in a practical view, the contemplation of them weans the mind from the narrowness incident to those who think constantly in the forms and words of their own time and country, turns reflection into unaccustomed channels, dispels the illusion of combinations of language to which we have been long habituated, and may present a new side of a principle or an opinion which a better mode of philosophising kept out of view. For these reasons, we are interested by an account of the most extravagant speculations of China or Japan\*; and the less they resemble our own, the more they excite our curiosity.

A contempt for the exertions of intellect under forms different from ours, is as sure a mark of a narrow mind as that hostility, almost to be called hatred, which is sometimes betrayed by men of talent against those sciences which they are incapable of learning. Neither disposition could find any place in a mind like that of Mr. Stewart, formed in the school of Bacon, of which it is the peculiar character to estimate the relative value of all sciences with an equal eye, and to explain the causes of philosophical failures in a manner which avoids all injustice to the

\* Two literary phenomena of a singular nature have very recently been exhibited in India. The first is a Hindu Deist. *Rammohun Roy*, a Bramin, has published a small work, in the present year, at Calcutta, entitled "*An Abridgment of the Vedant, or Resolution of all the Veds; the most celebrated work of Braminical theology; establishing the unity of the Supreme Being, and that he alone is the object of worship.*" It contains a collection of very remarkable texts from the Vedas, in which the principles of Natural Religion are delivered, not without dignity; and which treat all worship to inferior beings, together with the observance of rites and seasons, and the distinctions of food, as the aids of an imperfect religion, which may be altogether disregarded by those who have attained to the knowledge and love of the true God. His contemporaries and his ancestors he considers as idolaters, notwithstanding the excuse of an allegorical theology which some Europeans have made for them. This Socinian Bramin is made to complain, with feeling, in the English version, of the obloquy which he has incurred among his countrymen by the purity of his faith. He alludes nowhere to any other system of religion; and passes over, in absolute silence, the labours, and indeed the existence, of the Missionaries. The second is a work about to be published at Bombay by *MULLA FEROUZ*, a Parsee priest, and probably the first of that sect, for many ages, who has made any proficiency in the general literature of the East. He proposes to publish the "*Dusatcer*," with an English translation and notes,—a singular and somewhat mysterious book, of which he tells us "that no copy is known to exist but that in his possession." It is said to be the source from whence the *Dabistan* (Edin. Rev. vol. xxvi. p. 288.) is borrowed. The original is said to be in a language or dialect of which there is no other specimen; and so ancient, that an old Persian version which accompanies it, professes to have been made before the conquest of Persia by the Mahometans. It is quoted by several writers in comparatively modern times; and the Persian version is often cited as an authority by Persian dictionaries of the seventeenth century. Its pretensions, therefore, as a mere monument of language, are very high, and cannot fail to attract the curiosity of all Orientalists to this re-appearance of the followers of Zoroaster in the literary world.

talents of the philosophers whose speculations have been unsuccessful. Yet he has spoken of the schoolmen with a nearer approach to acrimony than has been justifiable, since their remaining authority at Salamanca or Louvain has ceased to be dangerous to the free exercise of reason.

The character of the scholastic system, in general, is that of a collection of dialectical subtleties, contrived for the support of the doctrines of the corrupted Christianity of that age by a body of Divines — some of extraordinary powers of discrimination and argument, strengthened in the long meditation of their cloister by the extinction of every other talent and the exclusion of every other pursuit — to whom their age and their condition denied the means of studying polite letters, of observing nature, or knowing mankind. Thus driven back as it were upon themselves — cut off from all the materials on which the mind can operate — and doomed to employ all their powers in the defence of what they must never presume to examine, the condition of these men seemed without one advantage; unless it should be thought such, that it cultivated to the highest degree of subtlety the logical talents of acute disputants, and rendered them on their own ground invincible Polemics. Till the thirteenth century, their logic was the mere slave of their theology. The labour of the schools was employed only to rivet the fetters of reason. But the effect of the wretched and prohibited versions of Arabic translations of Aristotle, then for the first time introduced into the West, soon proved that it is impossible in any way to excite the activity of the human faculties without ultimately promoting the independence of reason. This pretended Aristotelianism was as much resisted at that period by persecution, as it was supported by the same means about three centuries later. The schoolmen were the innovators and reformers of the thirteenth century. As soon as they conquered the prohibitions, and quoted liberally the real or supposed opinions of Aristotle, Philosophy began to assert her independence, to blend her authorities with those of Theology, and insensibly to claim a sphere of her own, within which her jurisdiction was exclusive. A division of the authority to which they were subject, was the first step towards emancipation. The most conspicuous schoolman of this second period was Aquinas\*, whose *Secunda Secundæ* continued for three hundred years to be the ethical code of Christendom. No work of a private man, probably, ever had so many commentators as this once famous treatise. *Suarez*, the last celebrated person among them, was a contemporary of Lord Bacon. The first reformers of learning distinguish it by honourable commendations from the other productions of the schools. Erasmus considered Aquinas as superior in genius to any man since his time; and Vives owns him to be the soundest writer among the schoolmen. How

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\* The historians of Italian literature have latterly thought that Aquinas, of a noble family in that part of Lower Italy which had never utterly relinquished its ancient connection with Greece, and educated at the famous monastery of Monte Cassine, where some sparks of ancient literature were kept alive in the darkest times, was not without some tincture of Grecian learning. Whether there be any grounds for a like opinion concerning Roger Bacon, we shall be unable to determine, till the Oxford press shall present us with a complete edition of the works of that great ornament of the University; who ought not to be mentioned, in any sketch of the scholastic age in which he appeared, as a stranger; being, in truth, a philosopher of the seventeenth century, formed, by some unaccountable combination of causes, in the schools of the thirteenth.

ever the *Secunda* might be disgraced by being the manual of Henry VIII., it is a matter of some interest to see the book which was the first moral instructor of Sir Thomas More. Fontenelle, a Cartesian, exempt from any prejudice in favour of a schoolman or a saint, says, that "in another age, Aquinas might have become a *Des Cartes*." To his moral treatise Leibnitz chiefly alludes, in the just observation frequently repeated by him, that "there was gold in the impure mass of Scholastic philosophy, and that Grotius had discovered it." The same great philosopher, indeed, often confessed his own obligations to the schoolmen, and the value of some part of their works, at the moment when such an avowal required most courage — when their authority had been just entirely abolished, and before the dread of its restoration was extinguished. Under the shelter of his authority, we may venture to own, that we have read this work in the nineteenth century with pleasure and advantage. Whatever may be the thought of his theological morals, it is certain, that no moralist has stated the nature and grounds of all the common duties of mankind with more fulness and perspicuity. The number and refinement of the practical observations in this work, which have been repeated by modern philosophers, have sometimes given rise to suspicion of plagiarism against these last, instead of the much more reasonable inference, that the superior understanding of this ingenious recluse had anticipated remarks, which, without any knowledge of his writings, were naturally presented to succeeding writers by their observation of human life in a more civilised age.

To find the exact agreement of such a work as that of Aquinas with the moral precepts of our own age, has some tendency to heighten our reverence for the rule of life which thus preserves its unchangeable simplicity, amidst the fluctuations of opinion, under the most unlike and repugnant modes of thinking, and in periods of the most singular, or, if it so pleases the reader, of the most perverted speculation.

Those who are accustomed to remark the faint and distant indications of the progress of the human mind, will observe that, in the twelfth century, the first revolt against the tyranny of Rome broke out in France; that Aquinas and Dante flourished at the same time, in the same country; that when, in the next age, polite literature had begun to drive the School philosophy over the Alps, and when it seemed to have established its chief seat in England, the ferment excited by the subtleties of Scotus, and by the bold novelties of Occam, were almost contemporary with Chaucer, and seemed to have called forth Wickliffe.

*Scotus* is probably the extreme point which verbal subtlety can reach. The genius of the scholastic system could advance no farther. William of Ockham (in Surrey), born about the beginning of the fourteenth century, the circumstances of whose life are obscure, and whose writings it is extremely difficult to procure, is generally known as the reviver of the Nominalists, justly distinguished above other schoolmen by Mr. Stewart and by Leibnitz; but he was, in truth, also the restorer of an independent philosophy in the middle age. He defended the rights of the Civil Magistrate against the usurpations of the Church, and gave an example of free enquiry, in speculations which had become inaccessible to Reason by their alliance with the Papal Theology. The century which passed between his death and the revival of letters was a period of active progress towards mental independence. His works against the Papal authority are preserved in collections which are to be found in all great libraries. They are represented by Selden as "the best that had been written in



former ages on the Ecclesiastical Power ;” and the testimony of Selden has peculiar weight on behalf of a Popish schoolmen. But those writings on which his great reputation in his own age was founded, are now very rare. Brucker, who appears to have seen none of them, contents himself with a few passages of modern writers, in commendation or censure of Occam: but a very clear and satisfactory account of them, supported by numerous extracts, is contained in “Tenneman’s History of Philosophy,” Vol. viii. part 2., published at Leipsic in 1811.

This memorable English philosopher retained many opinions which he had imbibed from Scotus, and, among others, that justly obnoxious position, which makes the distinction of Right from Wrong depend on the Will of God. But he is the first, from the downfall of ancient philosophy, who had the boldness, in express words, to reject human authority, even that of his master: — “I do not support this opinion because he lays it down, but *because I think it true*; and therefore, if he has elsewhere maintained the opposite, I care not.”\* This language, now so trivial that no slave can disclaim it, and every schoolboy would think it too commonplace to be repeated, was, in the fourteenth century, far more important than the most brilliant discoveries, and contained the germ of all reformation in philosophy and religion. Luther and Bacon were actuated by no other principle in the deliverance of the human understanding.

It is well known that Occam was the author of the opinion, that the words which are called universal are to be considered as signs which equally indicate any one out of many particular objects. This opinion was revived by Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, Hartley, and Condillac; abused with great ingenuity by Horne Tooke; and followed by Mr. Stewart, who has on this occasion made common cause with philosophers in whose ranks he is not usually found. Few metaphysical speculations have been represented as more important by its supporters and opponents. Perhaps, however, when the terms are explained, and when the darkness is dissipated with which controversy never fails to cloud a long contested question, it may appear that this subject has not yet been examined on true principles. But whatever may be the future fate of the controversy, it cannot be denied, that the reasonings in defence of Nominalism are stated with singular ingenuity, and even perspicuity, in the passages of Occam which now lie before us. Among many other observations, perfectly unlike his age, we find him limiting the philosophy of the human mind to what can be known by experience of its operations, and utterly excluding all questions relating to the nature of the thinking principle. “We are conscious that we understand and will; but whether these acts be performed by an immaterial and incorruptible principle, is a matter of which we are not conscious, and which is no farther the subject of demonstration than it can be known by experience. All attempts to prove it must be founded on the assumption of something doubtful.”† But the most remarkable of all the reasonings of this original thinker, are those which he employs against the then received doctrine “of sensible and intelligible species” (or *appearances*) of things which are the immediate objects of the mind when we perceive or think. These images or likenesses of objects alone were

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\* This curious passage is quoted by Tenneman, from Occam. Prolog. ad Lib. 1. Sententiarum, Quest. 1. edit. 1585;—probably the last, if not the only edition of a work once of great authority, and even now of no contemptible interest,

† Occam, *ibid.* in Tenneman.

supposed to be contemplated by the senses and the understanding, and to be necessary to perception and mental apprehension. *Biel*, a follower of Occam, in expounding the doctrine of his master, tells us, that “a species was the similitude or image of a thing known, naturally remaining in the mind after it ceases to be the object of actual knowledge; or otherwise, that likeness of a thing, which is a previous condition of knowledge, which excites knowledge in the understanding, and which may remain in the mind in the absence of the thing represented.”\* The supposed necessity of such *species*, moving from the object to the organ of sense, is, according to Occam, founded on the assumed principle, that what moves must be in contact with what is moved. But this principle he asserts to be false; and he thinks it sufficiently disproved by the fact, that the loadstone attracts iron to it without touching it. He thought nothing necessary to sensation but the power of sensation, and the thing which is its object. All intermediate beings he regarded as arbitrary figments. We cannot pursue these quotations farther. It is easy to conceive his application of a similar mode of reasoning to “the *intelligible species*,” which, indeed, he who denied abstract ideas had already virtually rejected. It is plain, indeed, that Occam denied both parts of this opinion; not only that which is called Aristotelian, concerning the *species* supposed to move from outward objects to the organs of sense; but also that which, under the name of the Ideal Theory, has been imputed by Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart to Des Cartes, and all succeeding philosophers, who are considered as teaching the actual *resemblance* of our thoughts to external things, and thereby laying their philosophy open to the inferences afterwards made from it by Berkeley about the origin of our perceptions, and by Hume against the possibility of knowledge. The philosophical reader will be struck with the connection between this rejection of “images or likenesses of things” as necessary to perception, and the principle, that we know nothing of mind but its actions; and cannot fail, in a system of reasoning, of which these are specimens, illustrated by an observation of the less observed appearances of outward nature, and animated by a disregard of authority in the search for truth, to perceive tendencies towards an independent philosophy, to be one day built by reason upon a wide foundation of experience. The rejection of the doctrine of “Species” must be considered by Mr. Stewart as still more remarkable than it is by us. In his view of things, Occam thus escaped a fundamental error, which has led the greatest philosophers of modern times into scepticism. But as we cannot think that the terms, “Image, Likeness,” &c. were ever steadily applied to ideas by modern philosophers, otherwise than as metaphors used for illustration, so we regard their exclusion only in the very respectable light of a reform in philosophical language, with a view to prevent figurative expressions from being, however transiently, confounded with real things.

Richard Suisset, “the famous English mathematician † of the middle age,” was a follower of Occam, the persecution and defence of whose philosophy was the principal occupation of the speculative during the fourteenth century; soon after the end of which it was lost in the

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\* Gabriel Biel, II. Sent. in Tenn.

† The list of English mathematicians of the fourteenth century, given by Montucla, among whom is Chaucer, shows the terms of the text to be too exclusive, and seems indeed, as he observes, to presage the future success of the English nation in that department. *Montu. I.* 529.

Lutheran controversies, which were in some degree its issue. On a general review of this period, Roger Bacon and Suisset should probably be considered rather as philosophers of the scholastic age than schoolmen; Aquinas is the most clear, sober, and practical of school philosophers; Scotus, from qualities not of the same nature, most perfectly represents the genius and character of that philosophy; and Occam was the reformer who undermined its foundations, and prepared the way for its destruction.

The arrival of the Grecian refugees in Italy, being the most memorable event which distinguishes any moment in the early progress of modern literature, has been commonly considered as the era of the revival of letters: and the expression may be justifiable, if we bear in mind the previous preparation of Italy for classical learning; the men of genius who had, before that period, cultivated most modern languages; the superior efficacy of printing; the Reformation; and probably the discovery of America; and if we also hesitate, whether the preservation of Constantinople, and the education of western students in her schools, might not have contributed to quicken the literary progress of Europe as much as the destruction and emigration which actually occurred. Certainly, if the Greek empire had been saved, it might have been as speciously argued, that we owed our literature to the salvation of that great school and repository of learning, as it has been asserted for the last three centuries, that the cultivation of letters in the West is to be ascribed to the flight of Grecian exiles into Italy. But, however that may be, the revival of letters is an epoch in the history of philosophy.

Literature, which lies much nearer to the feelings of mankind than science, has the most important effect on the sentiments with which the sciences are regarded, the activity with which they are pursued, and the mode in which they are cultivated. It is the instrument, in particular, by which ethical science is generally diffused. As the useful arts maintain the general honour of physical knowledge, so polite letters allure the world into the neighbourhood of the sciences of Morals and of Mind. Wherever the agreeable vehicle of literature does not convey their doctrines to the public, they remain the occupation of a few recluses in the schools, with no root in the general feelings, and liable to be destroyed by the dispersion of a handful of doctors, and the destruction of their unlamented seminaries. Nor is this all. Polite literature is not only the true guardian of the moral sciences, and the sole instrument of spreading their benefits among men, but it becomes, from these very circumstances, the regulator of their cultivation and their progress. As long as they are confined to a small number of men in scholastic retirements, there is no restraint upon their natural proneness to degenerate either into verbal subtleties or into showy dreams. It is peculiar to these vices, that, having no boundaries prescribed by reason, their course may be prolonged for ever. As long as speculation remained in the schools, all its followers were divided into mere dialecticians or mystical visionaries, both alike unmindful of the real world, and disregarded by its inhabitants. The revival of literature produced a revolution at once in the state of society and in the mode of philosophising. It attracted readers from the common ranks of society, who were gradually led on from eloquence and poetry to morals and philosophy. Philosophers and moralists, after an interval of almost a thousand years, during which they had spoken only to each other, once more discovered that they might address the great body of mankind with the hope of fame and of usefulness. Intercourse with this

great public supplied new materials and imposed new restraints. The feelings, the common sense, the ordinary affairs of men, presented themselves again to the moralist.

Philosophers, compelled to speak in terms intelligible and agreeable to their new hearers, were compelled to abandon the language of the scholastic age, and to adapt both the object of their enquiries, and their manner of reasoning, to the general understanding and sentiments. Literature led out Philosophy from the schools, enabled her to teach and to serve mankind, and recalled her to experience and utility, from thorny distinctions and splendid visions. Then philosophers began to write in the modern languages. Before that period, little prose had been written in any of them, except Chronicles or Romances. Boccacio had, indeed, acquired a classical rank by compositions of the latter kind; and historical genius had risen in Froissart and Comines to a height which has not been equalled among the same nation in times of greater refinement. But Latin was still the language in which all those subjects were treated, then deemed of higher dignity, which occupied the life of the learned by profession. In general, this system continued till it was totally subverted by the Reformation, which, by the employment of the living languages in public worship, gave them a dignity unknown before; and, by the versions of the Bible, and the practice of preaching and writing on theology and morals in the common tongues, did more for polishing modern literature, for diffusing knowledge, and for improving morality, than all the other events and discoveries of that active age.

Among the first writers who took a part in this Revolution, was Sir Thomas More. His short historical narrative is in this respect remarkable. He, too, is the first person named among us who seems to have acquired part of his importance by public speaking. His controversial tracts, in other respects compositions of great curiosity, must be considered as the offspring of the Reformation. In speaking of the English language, as fit for translating the Bible, he uses terms of honour towards it, which would not have been applied to any vulgar tongue before learning had left the schools. "For as for that our tonge is called barbarouse, is but a fantasye. For so is, as every lerned man knoweth, every straunge language to other. And if they wolde call it barayne of wordes, there is no doubt but it is plenteouse enoughe to express our myndes in any thinge whereof one man hath used to speke with another."\*

Machiavel is the first still celebrated writer who discussed grave questions in a modern language. This peculiarity is the more worthy of notice, because he was not excited by the powerful stimulant of the Reformation. That event was probably regarded by him as a disturbance in a barbarous country, produced by the novelties of a vulgar monk, unworthy of the notice of a man wholly occupied by the affairs of Florence, and the hope of expelling strangers from Italy; and having reached, at the appearance of Luther, the last unhappy period of his agitated life. The justness of the discriminating praise bestowed on this famous writer, in the following beautiful passage, will be acknowledged by every reader of his works; and the observation required by the censure, will be rather for explanation than dispute:—

"No writer, certainly, either in ancient or in modern times, has ever united, in a more remarkable degree, a greater variety of the most dissimilar and

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\* A Dialogue of Sir Thomas More, Knight, touching the pestilent Sect of Luther and Tindal, iii. 16. London, 1530.

seemingly the most discordant gifts and attainments;—a profound acquaintance with all those arts of dissimulation and intrigue, which, in the petty cabinets of Italy, were then universally confounded with political wisdom;—an imagination familiarised to the cool contemplation of whatever is perfidious or atrocious in the history of conspirators and of tyrants;—combined with a graphical skill in holding up to laughter the comparatively harmless follies of ordinary life. His dramatic humour has been often compared to that of Molière; but it resembles it rather in comic force, than in benevolent gaiety, or in chastened morality. Such as it is, however, it forms an extraordinary contrast to that strength of intellectual character, which, in one page, reminds us of the deep sense of Tacitus, and in the next, of the dark and infernal policy of Cæsar Borgia. To all this must be super-added a purity of taste, which has enabled him, as an historian, to rival the severe simplicity of the Grecian masters; and a sagacity in combining historical facts, which was afterwards to afford lights to the school of Montesquieu.

“Eminent, however, as the talents of Machiavel unquestionably were, he cannot be numbered among the benefactors of mankind. In none of his writings does he exhibit any marks of that lively sympathy with the fortunes of the human race, or of that warm zeal for the interests of truth and justice, without the guidance of which the highest mental endowments, when applied to moral or to political researches, are in perpetual danger of mistaking their way. What is still more remarkable, he seems to have been altogether blind to the mighty changes in human affairs, which, in consequence of the recent invention of printing, were about to result from the progress of reason and the diffusion of knowledge. Through the whole of his *Prince* (the most noted as well as one of the latest of his publications) he proceeds on the supposition, that the sovereign has no other object in governing but his own advantage; the very circumstance which, in the judgment of Aristotle, constitutes the essence of the worst species of tyranny. He assumes also the possibility of retaining mankind in perpetual bondage by the old policy of the *double doctrine*; or, in other words, by enlightening the few, and hoodwinking the many;—a policy less or more practised by statesmen in all ages and countries; but which (wherever the freedom of the press is respected) cannot fail, by the insult it offers to the discernment of the multitude, to increase the insecurity of those who have the weakness to employ it. It has been contended, indeed, by some of Machiavel’s apologists, that his real object in unfolding and systematising the mysteries of *King-craft*, was to point out indirectly to the governed the means by which the encroachments of their rulers might be most effectually resisted; and, at the same time, to satirise, under the ironical mask of loyal and courtly admonition, the characteristic vices of princes. But, although this hypothesis has been sanctioned by several distinguished names, and derives some verisimilitude from various incidents in the author’s life, it will be found, on examination, quite untenable; and accordingly it is now, I believe, very generally rejected. One thing is certain, that if such were actually Machiavel’s views, they were much too refined for the capacity of his royal pupils. By many of these his book has been adopted as a manual for daily use; but I have never heard of a single instance in which it has been regarded by this class of students as a disguised panegyric upon liberty and virtue. The question concerning the *motives* of the author is surely of little moment, when experience has enabled us to pronounce so decidedly on the practical *effects* of his precepts.

“‘About the period of the Reformation,’ says Condorcet, ‘the principles of religious Machiavelism had become the *only* creed of princes, of ministers, and of pontiffs; and the same opinions had contributed to corrupt philosophy. What code, indeed, of morals,’ he adds, ‘was to be expected from a system of which one of the principles is,—that it is necessary to support the morality of the people by false pretences,—and that men of enlightened minds have a right to retain others in the chains from which they have themselves contrived to escape?’ The fact is, perhaps, stated in terms somewhat too unqualified; but there are the best reasons for believing that the exceptions were few, when compared with the general proposition.

“The consequences of the prevalence of such a creed among the rulers of mankind were such as might be expected. ‘Infamous crimes, assassinations, and poisonings (says a French historian), prevailed more than ever. They were thought

to be the growth of Italy, where the rage and weakness of the opposite factions conspired to multiply them. Morality gradually disappeared, and with it all security in the intercourse of life. The first principles of duty were obliterated by the joint influence of atheism and of superstition.'

"And here may I be permitted to caution my readers against the common error of confounding the double doctrine of Machiavelian politicians, with the benevolent reverence for established opinions, manifested in the noted maxim of Fontenelle,—'that a wise man, even when his hand was full of truths, would often content himself with opening his little finger?' Of the advocates for the former it may be justly said, that 'they love darkness rather than light, *because their deeds are evil*;' well knowing (if I may borrow the words of Bacon), 'that the open daylight doth not show the masks and mummeries, and triumphs of the world, half so stately as candlelight.' The philosopher, on the other hand, who is duly impressed with the latter, may be compared to the oculist, who, after removing the cataract of his patient, prepares the still irritable eye, by the glimmering dawn of a darkened apartment, for enjoying in safety the light of day.

"Machiavel is well known to have been, at bottom, no friend to the priesthood; and his character has been stigmatised by many of the order with the most opprobrious epithets. It is nevertheless certain, that to *his* maxims the royal defenders of the Catholic faith have been indebted for the spirit of that policy which they have uniformly opposed to the innovations of the Reformers. The *Prince* was a favourite book of the Emperor Charles V.; and was called the *Bible* of Catharine of Medicis. At the court of the latter, while Regent of France, those who approached her are said to have professed openly its most atrocious maxims; particularly *that* which recommends to sovereigns not to commit crimes by halves. The Italian cardinals, who are supposed to have been the secret instigators of the massacre of St. Bartholomew, were bred in the same school.

"It is observed by Mr. Hume, that 'there is scarcely any maxim in the *Prince* which subsequent experience has not entirely refuted.'—'Machiavel,' says the same writer, 'was certainly a great genius; but having confined his study to the furious and tyrannical governments of ancient times, or to the little disorderly principalities of Italy, his reasonings, especially upon monarchical governments, have been found extremely defective. The errors of this politician proceeded, in a great measure, from his having lived in too early an age of the world to be a good judge of political truth.'

"To these very judicious remarks, it may be added, that the bent of Machiavel's mind seems to have disposed him much more strongly to combine and to generalise his historical reading, than to remount to the first principles of political science, in the constitution of human nature, and in the immutable truths of morality. His conclusions accordingly, ingenious and refined as they commonly are, amount to little more (with a few very splendid exceptions) than empirical results from the events of past ages. To the student of ancient history they may be often both interesting and instructive; but to the modern politician, the most important lesson they afford is, the danger, in the present circumstances of the world, of trusting to such results, as maxims of universal application, or of permanent utility.

"The progress of political philosophy, and, along with it, of morality and good order, in every part of Europe, since the period of which I am now speaking, forms so pleasing a comment on the profligate and shortsighted policy of Machiavel, that I cannot help pausing for a moment to remark the fact. In stating it, I shall avail myself of the words of the same profound writer, whose strictures on Machiavel's *Prince* I had already occasion to quote. 'Though all kinds of government,' says Mr. Hume, 'be improved in modern times, yet monarchical government seems to have made the greatest advances towards perfection. It may now be affirmed of civilised monarchies, what was formerly said of republics alone, that they are a government of laws, not of men. They are found susceptible of order, method, and constancy, to a surprising degree. Property is there secure, industry encouraged, the arts flourish, and the prince lives secure among his subjects, like a father among his children. There are, perhaps, and have been for two centuries, near two hundred absolute princes, great and small, in Europe;

and, allowing twenty years to each reign, we may suppose that there have been, in the whole, two thousand monarchs, or *tyrants*, as the Greeks would have called them. Yet of these there has not been one, not even Philip II. of Spain, so bad as Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, or Domitian, who were four in twelve among the Roman emperors.

“ For this very remarkable fact it seems difficult to assign any cause equal to the effect, but the increased diffusion of knowledge (imperfect, alas! as this diffusion still is) by means of the press; which, while it has raised, in free states, a growing bulwark against the oppression of rulers, in the light and spirit of the people, has, even under the most absolute governments, had a powerful influence — by teaching princes to regard the wealth and prosperity and instruction of their subjects as the firmest basis of their grandeur — in directing their attention to objects of national and permanent utility. How encouraging the prospect thus opened of the future history of the world! And what a motive to animate the ambition of those who, in the solitude of the closet, aspire to bequeath their contributions, how slender soever, to the progressive mass of human improvement and happiness!” Pp. 32—37.

Had the above passage of the text of this discourse appeared to us precisely to correspond to the valuable note on the same subject, we should have willingly abstained from any part in the eternal dispute concerning the object of Machiavel in the composition of “The Prince.” To the doctrine of the note we have little to object; but that the extract from M. *Sismondi*, though in the main just, has not all the usual clearness of that justly celebrated writer. “The Prince” is an account of the means by which tyrannical power is to be acquired and preserved. It is a theory of that class of phenomena in the history of mankind. It is essential to its purpose, therefore, that it should contain an enumeration and exposition of tyrannical arts; and, on that account, it may be viewed and used as a manual of such arts. A philosophical treatise on poisons would, in like manner, determine the quantity of each poisonous substance capable of producing death — the circumstances favourable or adverse to its operation — and every other information essential to the purpose of the poisoner, though not intended for his use. But it is also plain, that the calm statement of tyrannical arts is the bitterest of all satires against them. “The Prince” must therefore have had this double aspect, though neither of the objects which they seem to indicate had been actually in the contemplation of the author. It may not be the object of the chemist to teach the means of exhibiting antidotes, any more than of administering poisons; but his readers may employ his discoveries for both objects. *Aristotle*\* had long before given a similar theory of tyranny, without the suspicion of an immoral intention: nor was it any novelty in more recent times, among those who must have been the first teachers of Machiavel. The schoolmen followed the footsteps of Aristotle too closely to omit so striking a passage; and Aquinas explains it, in his commentary, like the rest, in the unsuspecting simplicity of his heart. To us accordingly, we confess, the plan of Machiavel seems, like those of former writers, to have been purely scientific: and so Lord Bacon seems to have understood him, where he thanks him for an exposition of immoral policy. In that singular passage, where Lord Bacon lays down the theory of the advancement of fortune, (which, when compared with his life, so well illustrates the fitness of his understanding,

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\* Arist. Politic. Lib. V. c. iii. In reading this chapter, it must not be forgotten, that by “Tyrant” Aristotle means a single person possessing absolute power; usually among the Greeks, obtained by means so bad, as, even in his time, to have given to the word a shade of its modern sense.

and the unfitness of his character for the affairs of the world,) he justifies his application of learning to such a subject, on a principle which extends to "The Prince;" — "*that there be not any thing in being or action which should not be drawn and collected into contemplation and doctrine.*"

Great defects of character, we readily admit, are manifested by the writings of Machiavel. But if a man of so powerful a genius had shown a nature utterly depraved, it would have been a painful, and perhaps single, exception from the laws of human nature; and no depravity can be conceived greater than a deliberate intention to teach perfidy and cruelty. That a man who was a warm lover of his country, who bore cruel sufferings for her liberty, and who was beloved by the best of his countrymen\*, should fall into such unparalleled wickedness, may be considered as wholly incredible. No such depravity is consistent with the composition of the history of Florence. It is only by exciting moral sentiment, that the narrative of human actions can be rendered interesting. Divested of morality, they lose their whole dignity, and all their power over feeling. History would be thrown aside as disgusting, if it did not inspire the reader with pity for the sufferer, — with anger against the oppressor, — with anxiety for the triumph of right; — to say nothing of the admiration for genius, and valour, and energy, which, though it disturbs the justice of our historical judgments, partakes also of a moral nature. The author of "The Prince," according to the common notion of its intention, could never have inspired these sentiments, of which he must have utterly emptied his own heart. To possess the power, however, of contemplating tyranny with scientific coldness, and of rendering it the mere subject of theory, must be owned to indicate a defect of moral sensibility. The happier nature, or fortune of Aristotle, prompts him to manifest distinctly his detestation of the flagitious policy which he reduces to its principles.

As another subject of regret, not as an excuse for Machiavel, a distant approach to the same defect may be observed in Lord Bacon's "History of Henry the Seventh;" where we certainly find too little reprehension of falsehood and extortion, — too cool a display of the expedients of cunning, sometimes dignified by the name of wisdom, — and throughout, perhaps, too systematic a character given to the measures of that monarch, in order to exemplify, in him, a perfect model of kingcraft; pursuing safety and power by any means; acting well in quiet times, because it was most expedient, — but not restrained from convenient crimes. This history would have been as delightful as it is admirable, if he had felt the difference between wisdom and cunning as warmly in that work as he has discerned it clearly in his philosophy. Many historical speculators have, indeed, incurred some part of this fault. Enamoured of their own solution of the seeming contradictions of a character, they become indulgent to the character itself; and, when they have explained its vices, are disposed, unconsciously, to write as if they had excused them. A writer who has made a successful exertion to render an intricate character intelligible, who has brought his mind to so singular an attempt as a theory of villany, and has silenced his repug-

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\* Among other proofs of the esteem in which he was held by those who knew his character, we may refer to the affectionate letters of Guicciardini, who, however independent his own opinions were, became, by his employment under the popes of the house of Medici, the supporter of their authority, and, consequently, a political opponent of Machiavel, the most zealous of the Republicans.



nance and indignation sufficiently for the purposes of rational examination, naturally exults in his victory over so many difficulties, delights in contemplating the creations of his own ingenuity, and the order which he seems to have introduced into the chaos of malignant passions; and may at length view his work with that complacency which diffuses clearness and calmness over the language in which he communicates his imagined discoveries.

It should also be remembered, that Machiavel lived in an age where the events of every day must have blunted his moral feelings, and wearied out his indignation. As we acquit the intention of the writer, his work becomes a weightier evidence of the depravity which surrounded him. In this state of things, after the final disappointment of all his hopes, when Florence was subjected to tyrants, and Italy under the yoke of foreigners; having undergone torture for the freedom of his country, and doomed to beggary in his old age, after a life of public service; it is not absolutely unnatural that he should resolve to compose a theory of the tyranny under which he fell, and that he should manifest his indignation against the cowardly slaves who had yielded to it, by a stern and cold description of its maxims. Full of disgust and loathing for men who, by submission to despotism, had betrayed the cause of human nature, he seemed to take revenge on their baseness, by a determination to philosophise, with a sort of savage indifference, on the crimes of their tyrants. His last chapter, in which he seems once more to breathe a free air, has a character totally different from all the preceding. His exhortation to the Medici to deliver Italy from foreigners again speaks his ancient feelings. Perhaps he might have thought it possible to pardon any means employed by an Italian usurper to expel the foreign masters of his country. This ray of hope might have supported him in delineating the means of usurpation, by which he might have some faint expectation that he might entice the usurper to become a deliverer. Knowing that the native governments were too base to defend Italy, and that all others were leagued to enslave her, he might, in his despair of all legitimate rulers, have hoped something for independence, and perhaps at last even for liberty, from the energy and genius of an illustrious tyrant. From Petrarch, with whose pathetic verses he concludes, to Alfieri, the national feeling of Italy seems to have taken refuge in the minds of her writers. They write more tenderly of their country as it is more basely abandoned by their countrymen. Nowhere has so much been well said, or so little nobly done. While we blame the character of the nation, or lament the fortune which in some measure produced it, we must, in equity, excuse some irregularities in the indignation of men of genius, when they see the ingenious inhabitants of their beautiful and renowned country (now apparently for ever) robbed of that independence which is enjoyed by obscure and barbarous communities.

It is a just and refined observation of Mr. Hume, that the mere theory of Machiavel was perverted (to waive the more important consideration of morality) by the atrocities which, among the Italians, then passed under the name of policy. The number of men who took a part in political measures in the republican governments of Italy, spread the taint of this pretended policy farther, and made it a more national quality than in the Transalpine monarchies. But neither the civil wars of France and England, nor the administration of Henry the Seventh, Ferdinand, and Louis the Eleventh (to say nothing of the succeeding religious wars), will allow us to consider it as peculiarly Italian. It arose from the cir-

cumstances of Europe in those times. In every age in which contests are long maintained by chiefs too strong, or bodies of men too numerous for the ordinary control of law, for power, or privileges, or possessions, or opinions to which they are ardently attached, the passions excited by such interests, heated by sympathy, and inflamed to madness by resistance, soon throw off moral restraint in the treatment of enemies. Retaliation, which deters individuals, provokes multitudes to new cruelty; and the atrocities which originated in the rage of ambition and fanaticism, are at length thought necessary for safety. Each party adopts the cruelties of the enemy, as we now adopt a new discovery in the art of war. Men become savage in their own defence. The craft and violence thought necessary for existence are admitted into the established policy of such deplorable times.

But though this be the tendency of such circumstances in all times, it must be owned that these evils prevail among different nations, and in different ages, in a very unequal degree. Some part of these differences may depend on national peculiarities, which cannot be satisfactorily explained. But, in the greater part of them, experience is striking and uniform. Civil wars are comparatively regular and humane, under circumstances that may be pretty exactly defined;—among nations long accustomed to popular government, to free speakers and free writers; familiar with all the boldness and turbulence of numerous assemblies; not afraid of examining any matter human or divine; where great numbers take an interest in the conduct of their superiors of every sort, watch it, and often censure it; where there is a public, and where that public boldly utters decisive opinions; where no impassable lines of demarcation destine the lower classes to eternal servitude, and the higher to envy and hatred and deep curses from their inferiors; where the administration of law is so purified by the participation and eye of the public, as to become a grand school of humanity and justice; and where, as the consequence of all, there is a general diffusion of the comforts of life, a general cultivation of reason, and a widely diffused feeling of equality and moral pride. The species seems to become gentler as the galling curbs are gradually disused. Quiet, or at least mild disorder, is promoted by the absence of all the expedients once thought essential to preserve tranquillity.— Compare Asia with Europe: the extreme is there seen. But if all the intermediate degrees be examined, it will be found that civil wars are milder, in proportion to the progress of the body of the people in importance and wellbeing. Compare the civil wars of the two Roses with those under Charles the First. Compare these again with the humanity and wisdom of the Revolution of sixteen hundred and eighty-eight. Examine the civil war which led to the American Revolution. We there see anarchy without confusion, and governments abolished and established without spilling a drop of blood. Even the progress of civilisation, when unattended by the blessings of civil liberty, produces many of the same effects. When Mr. Hume wrote the excellent observations quoted by Mr. Stewart, Europe had for more than a century been exempt from those general convulsions which try the moral character of nations, and ascertain their progress towards a more civilised mind. We have since been visited by one of the most tremendous of these tempests. Our minds are yet filled with the dreadful calamities, and the ambiguous and precarious benefits which have sprung from it. The contemporaries of such terrific scenes are seldom in a temper to

contemplate them calmly.\* And yet, though the events of this age have disappointed the expectations of sanguine benevolence concerning the state of civilisation in Europe, dispassionate posterity will probably decide that *it has stood* the test of general commotions, and proved its progress by their comparative mildness. One period of frenzy was, indeed, horribly distinguished, perhaps beyond any equal time in history, by popular massacres and judicial murders, among a people peculiarly susceptible of a momentary fanaticism. It was followed by a war in which one party contended for universal dominion, and all the rest struggled for existence. But how soon did the ancient laws of war between Eu-

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\* The Fourth Book of Sir T. More's Dialogue, quoted above, contains curious instances of the nature of such contemporary judgments, to which the admirable character of that great man gives a peculiar importance. He was so deeply impressed by the horrors of the revolt of the Saxon peasants, that he considers the Lutherans as necessarily anarchists and rebels, who think "*all rule and authority only tyranny*." Now, was thys doctrine in Almayne of the comen uplandish people so plesauntly harde that it blinded them,—and there gathered them together a boisterous company of that unhappy sect, and first rebelled against an abbot, and after against a byshop; wherewyth the temporal lords had good game and sport,—tyll those uplandish Lutherans set also upon the temporal lords, and then they slew upon the point of LXX. thousand Lutherans in one somer, and subdued the remanant in that part of Almayne to a right myserable servitude."

He goes on to inform his countrymen, that of the "same ungracious sect" were those who perpetrated so many atrocities at the sack of Rome, under the constable of Bourbon, who, among other enormities, "*would rost a child to dethe, the father and mother lokyng on*." In the next chapter, he warns the readers, that these were not the usual outrages of war. "*In the Lutherany, the sect itself is the cause of the malice*." The rise of the Lutherans, Sir T. regards as "a great token that the world is nere at an end:" and after calling them "a bestly sect, far more abominable than ancient heretics, and even than Mahometans," he adds, "*that the chyefteyns of these execrable heresyys both teake and use more sensuall and lycentyous lvyngye than ever did Machomet*."

When he comes, however, formally to consider the "BURNEYNGE OF HERETYKES," we discover some symptoms of his excellent nature, and of the liberal opinions of his youth. He struggles hard to represent the burning of heretics as a mere punishment of rebellion. "The fere of these outrages, and myscheves to folowe upon such sects, with the profe that we have had in some countrees thereof, have been the cause that prynces and people have been constrayned to punnysh heretykes by terrible dethe."—"While they forbare vyolence there was little vyolence done to them." At length comes a maxim of toleration, so extensive and bold that it is put into the mouth of another speaker in the Dialogue. "*By my soule, said your frende, I wold all the world were all agreed to take all vyolence and compulsion away, uppon all sydys, Crysten and Hethen, and that no man were constrayned to byleve but as he cold be by grace, wisdom, and good workys enduced; and then he that wolde go to God, go on a Goddys name, and he that wyll go to the Devyll, the Devyll go with hym!*" As truth would prevail over falsehood, Sir Thomas allows that this would be a tolerable compromise with Heathens or Mahometans. "*Where there be many mo to be wonne to Cryste on that syde than to be lost from hym on this syde*."—"And yet, as to *heretykes* rysynge among ourselfe, they should be in nowyse suffered, but to be oppressed and overwhelmed in the begynnyngye; for we cannot wyne to Cryst one the mo though we wonne them all home agayne, for they were our owne before." Distrusting this notable argument, however, he returns to the more decent plea of self-defence. "Never were they, by any temporal punyshment of their bodyes, any thyng sharpely handled, tyll that they began to be vyolent themselfe."

In five years after this publication, Sir Thomas More was put to death on the same pretence of resistance to authority.

ropean adversaries resume their ascendant, which had indeed been suspended more in form than in fact! How slight are the traces which the atrocities of faction and the manners of twenty years' invasion and conquest have left on the sentiments of Europe! On a review of the disturbed period of the French Revolution, the mind is struck by the disappearance of classes of crimes which have often attended such convulsions — no charge of poison — few assassinations properly so called — no case hitherto authenticated of secret execution. If any crimes of this nature can be proved, the truth of history requires that the proof should be produced. But those who assert them without proof must be considered as calumniating their age, and bringing into question the humanising effects of order and good government.

But to return for a moment longer to Machiavel. The dispute about the intention of his *Prince* has thrown into shade the merit of his discourses on Livy. The praise bestowed on them by Mr. Stewart is scanty. That "they furnish lights to the school of Montesquieu," is surely inadequate commendation. They are the first attempts in a new science — the philosophy of history; and, as such, they form a brilliant point in the progress of reason. For this Lord Bacon commends him. "The form of writing which is the fittest for this variable argument of negotiation is that which Machiavel chose wisely and aptly for government, namely, discourse upon histories or examples; for, knowledge drawn freshly, and in our view, out of particulars, findeth its way best to particulars again; and it hath much greater life on practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example, than when the example attendeth upon the discourse." It is observable, that the Florentine Secretary is the only modern writer who is named in that part of "the advancement of learning which relates to civil knowledge." The apology of Albericus Gentilis for the morality of the "Prince" has been often quoted, and is certainly weighty as a testimony, when we consider that the writer was born within twenty years of the death of Machiavel, and educated at no great distance from Florence. It is somewhat singular, that the context of this passage should never have been quoted. "To the knowledge of history," says Albericus, "must be added that part of philosophy which treats of morals and politics; — for this is the soul of history, which explains the causes of the actions and sayings of men, and of the events which befall them: — and on this subject I am not afraid to name Nicholas Machiavel, as the most excellent of all writers, in his golden Observations on Livy. He is the writer whom I now seek, because he reads history not with the eyes of a grammarian, but with those of a philosopher."\* The book on Embassies from which the above passage is extracted is dedicated to Sir Philip Sidney, who about the same time had two books dedicated to him by Jordano Bruno, long protected in his house, which he left from a quarrel with Greville. Our readers know that, many years after, Bruno was burnt alive at Rome, "in order," to use the atrocious words of Gaspar Scioppius, an applauding eye-witness, "that he might tell in the other worlds which he had imagined, how the Romans treated blasphemers." It is natural to find Sir Philip Sidney the patron of learned exiles; but it adds a new lustre to his fame, that he was the refuge even of extravagant and unintelligible sophists, for

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\* Alb. Gent. de Legat. lib. iii. c. 9. Lond. 1585. "In lectione historicâ non grammatizet, sed philosophetur."

whose writings he could have no respect, when the sacred right of free enquiry was violated in their persons.

We do not remember the argument against the modern theory of utility ascribed by Mr. Stewart to Buchanan. Among modern moralists, utility always signifies the interest of all men. In Buchanan, and perhaps in all writers before the eighteenth century, it denotes the private utility of the individual, and requires an enlarging epithet to give it a different signification. But the mention of Buchanan excites our regret that Mr. Stewart should have excluded from his plan the history of those questions respecting the principles and forms of government, which form one of the principal subjects of political philosophy properly so called. No writer could have more safely trusted himself in that stormy region. He was much less likely to have been tainted by its turbulence, than to have composed it by the serenity of his philosophical character. Every history of the other parts of moral and political science is incomplete, unless it be combined with that of political opinion: the link which, however unobserved, always unites the most abstruse of ethical discussions with the feelings and affairs of men. The moral philosophy of Hobbes was made for his political system—and that again arose from the state of his country in his time. Every part of the works of Locke have a certain reference, more or less palpable, to the circumstances of his age; without perceiving which, it is not easy to seize the spirit, or to estimate the merit, of that excellent man. If Mr. Stewart had not denied us the gratification of seeing this subject also treated by his pen, we should have seen (what is a want in philosophical history) a just account of the *monarchomists* of the sixteenth century;—of whom, one school depressed Kings in order to exalt the Pope; and another, with an admirable spirit, if not always with accurate philosophy, prescribed bounds to civil power, and justified revolt against tyranny. Among the latter were Buchanan, Althusen, and Hubert Languet, another friend of Sir Philip Sidney, and an example that the champion of every sort of liberty, philosophical, religious, or civil, found a natural protector in his generous mind.

The numerous Italian innovators of that age, Telesio, Patritius, Pomponatius, Campanella, &c. are, as far as we know them, chiefly worthy of being now noticed, as a proof that the revolt against Aristotle and the schools had been maintained for near a century before Bacon; to whom we do not so much owe the zeal of the insurrection as the wisdom of the Reformation. But as there now happens to lie before us one of the rarest works of Pomponatius, we shall state in a very few words its singular contents. It is a treatise “On Incantations, or on the wonderful Effects of merely natural Causes.”\* It is a philosophical theory of alchemy, magic, astrology, divination, and the gift of miracles and prophesyings. The facts which attest the existence of all these, appear to him too numerous and well attested to be reasonably disputed. But as he, on the other hand, excludes all supernatural agency, either of benevolent or malignant beings, he refers these phenomena to the power of physical causes hitherto not diligently observed. The heavenly bodies, of which the revolutions influence all terrestrial things, may, in his opinion, be supposed also to affect the constitution of the body and mind of man. Their influ-

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\* Pomponatius de Incantat.—Basil, 1556—thirty years after the author’s death.

ence may be greatest at the moment of birth, but they may also exercise great power at certain moments during life. Individuals most strongly affected by this agency, may thus naturally acquire the power of producing effects which seem to other men supernatural. All talents and powers were, according to him, the result of the disposition of the elements which compose our body, which was itself regulated by the action of the celestial spheres: whoever knows that action, may foresee all future events, because they depend on it,—and may acquire those extraordinary powers which it confers. It was his opinion, that astrology was perfectly conformable to reason and experience; and this ingenious peripatetic does not doubt, “that one man may transform his fellow-men into wolves or hogs.” These follies may deserve to be once mentioned, as an instance of that pernicious flexibility which belongs to all extreme generalisations; by which they may be rendered compatible, in the same individual, with the boldest scepticism and the most childish credulity. Such generalities are indeed only reconcilable with every thing, because they mean nothing.

Has Mr. Stewart seized the characteristic feature which gives Montaigne a place in the history of philosophy? Not certainly his philosophical discoveries, for he has made none; nor the justness of his opinions, which may be often questioned; nor the dramatic egotism with which he paints himself, and pours forth those easy boldnesses of expression which seem to belong to a more picturesque and nervous language than modern French. These are great, but not properly philosophical merits. But he seems to have a distinct character as a philosopher. As Machiavel was the first who discussed grave questions in a vulgar tongue, and created a philosophy of history, so Montaigne was the first conspicuous writer who, in a modern language, philosophised on the common concerns of men, and the ordinary subjects of private reflection and conversation. The degree which nature claims in the diversity of talent, the efficacy of education, the value of the learned languages, the usages of society, the passions that actuate private life, the singular customs of different nations, are the subjects chiefly handled in his Essays. In the period from Socrates to Plutarch, such questions had been well treated before. But Montaigne was evidently the founder of popular philosophy in modern times. That his house was the only unfortified country house of a gentleman in France, is a remarkable instance of the universal insecurity which prevailed at the accession of Henry the Fourth. The grossness of his anecdotes is, no doubt, to be mainly imputed to the coarseness which still belonged to the gentry. But it may in part also be ascribed to the infancy of the art of writing in a generally spoken language. Authors had not yet discovered that the same degree of indelicacy is shocking in our own tongue, which they had long indulged without notice in their barbarous Latin;—where the words being unusual, did not seem so gross, and where they were not understood by women, whose delicacy the grossest men desire in some measure to preserve.

We are somewhat surprised at finding it more than once intimated in the present Discourse, that the progress of the fame of Bacon was slow, both at home and abroad. We must distinguish between his Fame and his Philosophy. That the philosophical spirit which he excited should be slowly diffused, and his rules of investigation still more slowly followed in practice, seem necessary consequences of their nature. “His philosophy,” says D’Alembert, “was too wise to astonish;—he therefore

founded no sect." But, that his fame in every department was not immediately established, and his genius acknowledged and revered, we cannot find any satisfactory reason for believing. We have seen, that Harvey's doubt of his philosophical merit was treated by contemporaries as a singularity. The silence of Hakewell amounts to little. His book is an attempt to defend the more singular side, in one of those questions which were hackneyed in the schools; such as — whether the world decayed — whether women were equal to men, &c. — in which he labours to perform his part in the disputation, by every sort of theological, historical, or philosophical argument, that his ingenuity could devise, or his recollection supply. As an ingenious disputant, he must have fallen upon some reasons similar to the principles of Bacon — which he places among his other topics, but with no steady view of the laws which determine the progress of knowledge and of society. From the foundation of the Royal Society, Mr. Stewart regards his fame as fixed. Now the Philosophical Society, which became royal at the Restoration, began its meetings about the beginning of the Civil War, which was only a few years after Bacon's death. We have not many writers of note in the intermediate time. Mr. Stewart himself has referred to the language of Sir Kenelm Digby; and he has quoted a noble panegyric on Bacon's eloquence, and an affecting tribute to his character, by Ben Jonson; unquestionably the most eminent writer of that period, and whom tradition represents as one of the translators of the "Advancement of Learning" into Latin. It is very observable, that Jonson speaks also of his most thorny work, the "Novum Organum," which he says "really openeth all defects of learning whatsoever."\* James Howell, the noted letter-writer, has an account of Bacon's death; whom, after other praises, he calls "a man of recon-dite science, born for the salvation of learning, and, I think, the eloquentest that was born in this Isle." Sir Henry Wotton, one of the most accomplished men of his time, wrote his epitaph; where he is called "the Light of the Sciences:" thus selecting his philosophical merit as a higher or better known distinction than his rank or station. Francis Osborn, one of those collectors of literary talk who are no bad reporters of general opinion, often speaks of Bacon. Among other curious particulars, he gives us the only information which we possess of one species of knowledge displayed by him in conversation. "My memory doth not direct me towards an example more splendid in this kind than the Lord Bacon, who in all companies did appear a good proficient, if not a master, in those arts entertained for the subject of every one's discourse. His most casual talk deserveth to be written. As I have been told, his first copies required no great labour to render them competent for the nicest judgment. I have heard him entertain a country Lord in the proper terms relating to hawks and dogs; and at another time out-cant a London

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\* These passages afford a new proof of the falsehood of those charges of niggardly and envious praise against Ben Jonson, which have just been finally confuted in the preface to Mr. Gifford's excellent edition. That preface contains a most extraordinary instance of the danger of relying on second-hand evidence. Every English compilation for the last fifty years, including those which are now issuing from the press, quotes a sentence, with a parallel between the excellent qualities of Shakspeare and the odious vices of Jonson, as being part of the account which Drummond of Hawthornden gives of Ben. No such sentence is in Drummond's otherwise unfriendly account. It was first ascribed to him by a man of the name of Shiell, in a book called Cibber's Lives of the Poets.

chirurgian. Nor did an easy falling into arguments appear less an ornament in him. The ears of his hearers received more gratification than trouble; and were no less sorry when he came to conclude, than displeased with any who did interrupt him.—All which rendered him no less necessary than admirable at the council table,—when, in reference to impositions, monopolies, &c., the meanest manufactures were an usual argument; and in this he baffled the Earl of Middlesex, who was born and bred a citizen.” Osborn, it may be observed, though not a contemporary, writes from the tradition of Bacon’s time. His most considerable work, indeed, was so far from being disregarded, that it received the homage of vehement opposition. “They would have cashiered Bacon’s ‘Advancement of Learning,’” says Osborn, “as an *heretical* and impertinent piece, *but for an invincible strength of contrary judgments that came to his rescue from beyond the sea.*” In another place, he tells us, that Queen Elizabeth had been prejudiced against Raleigh, “for sailing aloof from the beaten track of the schools, as being both against God and her father’s honour, whose faith (if he owed any) was grounded on school divinity. Whereupon she chid him; *and he was ever after branded with the title of an Atheist, though a known asserter of God and providence.* A like censure fell upon venerable Bacon, till overbalanced by a greater weight of glory from strangers.”

From these last observations of Osborn, we may be tolerably assured that the fame of Bacon had speedily pervaded the Continent. Gassendi called his reformation an heroic enterprise. Latin versions of his works were published repeatedly in Holland and Germany, before the end of the century, with epithets of praise, which, if applied to any other person, would have been hyperbolic. The letters of Grotius prove the estimation in which he was held by the highest class of writers. And in France, where his celebrity is said only to have begun at the publication of the *Encyclopédie*, we find the Abbé Gallois, in one of the first Numbers of the earliest Literary Journal, speak of him as we should now:—“It may be said that this great chancellor is one of those who have most contributed to the advancement of the sciences.” (*Journal des Sçavans*, 8. Mars, 1666.) The context of this passage, published in the year of the establishment of the Royal Academy of Sciences, seems to show, that the experimental philosophers of France, as well there as of England, then considered Bacon as their master. Twenty years before the *Encyclopédie*, Voltaire calls Bacon “the Father of Experimental Philosophy;” though he blames his countrymen for that partiality toward him, which led them to place so small a work as the “History of Henry the Seventh” on a level with Thuanus.

That Des Cartes never read Bacon, is an assertion of *Thomas* (in his *Eloge de Des Cartes*) which very naturally excites the surprise and scepticism of Mr. Stewart. “Some authors assure us,” says Thomas, “that Des Cartes had not read the works of Bacon; and he himself tells us, in one of his letters, that he read those of Galileo at a very late period.” It seems evident from this passage, however incredible it may appear, that Thomas, when about to compose a professed panegyric on Des Cartes, had not deigned to examine either the Letters\* of that great philosopher, or his Life† by Baillet, the obvious and authentic sources of information respecting his studies and his personal history. “Des Cartes was at

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\* Paris, 1663.

† Paris, 1691.



Paris," says Baillet, "in 1626" (several years before the publication of his philosophical works), when he received the news of the "death of Bacon.\* This news sensibly affected all those who aspired to the re-establishment of true philosophy, and who knew that Bacon had been engaged in that great design for several years."—"We see, in several parts of his Letters, that he did not disapprove the method of Bacon." Des Cartes visited London in 1631; and in 1633 he writes from his retreat in Holland to his Parisian correspondent, Father Mersenne, that he wished to see "*A History of the Appearances of the Heavenly Bodies, according to the VERULAMIAN METHOD, without reasons or hypotheses.*" In another letter about the same time, he says,—“I have little to add, respecting experiments, to what Verulam has said,” &c. Bacon is spoken of in other places; but these are sufficient. Nor does M. Thomas seem much more exact in what regards Galileo. It is certain that, in Des Cartes's journey into Italy, he did not visit that illustrious man. The letter of Des Cartes, which is supposed to prove that he read Galileo's works at a late period, is limited to some disputes respecting mechanical discoveries and optical inventions, which Des Cartes vindicates himself from having taken, without acknowledgment, from Galileo. If Thomas had read that letter, he would hardly have omitted all mention of a circumstance so very remarkable, as the general disrespect with which it speaks of the illustrious Tuscan, of whose merit the letter-writer was, or affected to be, ignorant, after having read some of his works.—This ignorance, or affectation, would be commonly referred to jealousy or conscious plagiarisms,—the vulgar solution of all injustice between men of letters. But neither the character nor the genius of Des Cartes render this supposition probable in his case. Throughout all his writings, however, we see a dread of the animosity of the church; a determination to sacrifice every collateral object for the security and undisturbed accomplishment of his philosophical reformation; and to conciliate and propitiate, by all possible concessions on other subjects, those who had the power of protecting or interrupting the quiet of his pursuit of science. Hence we find this bold innovator in philosophy the most submissive of all Catholics. Hence, notwithstanding our own predilections, his partiality for Aquinas, whom he called his guide and his favourite author. Hence, also, it probably proceeded that, in his correspondence with a Catholic ecclesiastic, he may have been betrayed into some injustice towards a great philosopher, who had drawn the eyes of the inquisitive to the danger of modern discoveries. When he heard of the imprisonment of Galileo, he resolved to throw his manuscripts into the fire. We are as far as possible from insinuating, that a man of probity, like Des Cartes, could have been insincere in that warm language of piety of which his letters are full. But his exclusive passion for a reformation in philosophy insensibly concurred with his religious sentiments, in turning his mind from men to subjects connected with the speculations alone capable of endangering his philosophical liberty, which, as he tells us, he would not exchange for all that kings had to offer.

Des Cartes, too, as well as Hobbes, was among the unreading philosophers, who avoided books, lest they might stand between them and nature. The former says, "I study here intensely without a book." It was the well-known saying of the latter, "that if he had read as much

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\* The language of Baillet is another proof of Bacon's fame in France, from 1626 to 1691.

as others, he might have been as ignorant." They feared that reading might prevent them from thinking, and that they might enslave their understandings to those whose opinions they studied. At that time there was a natural excess of independent thinkers. But Bacon and Leibnitz preserved their originality, without the aid of this voluntary ignorance. There are even some subjects on which it is impossible to be new, without knowing what is old. No man could improve the general manner of philosophising, or discover unobserved defects in a science, or least of all, trace out the connection of the various sciences, without that knowledge of past opinions and discoveries which Bacon brought to that undertaking.

That Des Cartes did perceive the total dissimilarity between the actions of the thinking principle, and any class of phenomena commonly called material, — and that Mr. Locke agreed in the same observation, though neither always resisted the temptation of stating their illustrations with a vivacity which often seems to indicate a momentary confusion of intelligence with mechanism,—we have always believed; and we are very much gratified by Mr. Stewart's concurrence in the opinion; — perhaps it may have some influence on the extent of that commendation to which he may think the opponents of (what they call) the ideal theory justly entitled. It is not our present business to speak of the followers of Mr. Locke. But we cannot help observing, that justice always requires that their physiological hypotheses should be perfectly detached from their theory of mind. The general laws of thought which they lay down, may, and ought to be examined, without any reference to the bodily changes with which these philosophers have chosen to connect them. On all systems, some changes in the corporeal organs precede thought. Into their nature no man has penetrated. But if it were perfectly known, it would not follow that the least light would be thrown on the intellectual functions. The physiology might be complete, and the philosophy of mind might remain in utter darkness. Or the reverse might be truly said, — and should at least be considered by those who weigh the merit of modern Lockian philosophers.

It can scarcely be considered as a peculiar merit of Des Cartes, that he acknowledged the supreme and exclusive jurisdiction of consciousness on all questions relating to the operations of the human mind. In the controversy respecting liberty and necessity, the only question at issue between the disputants related to a matter of fact on which they both appealed to the evidence of consciousness — namely, whether, all previous circumstances being the same, the choice of man be not also at all times the same. Des Cartes, we are told, first exposed "the logical error of attempting to define words which convey notions too simple to *admit of analysis*."\* But upon carefully examining the passages of Des Cartes and Locke here referred to, we cannot but think the latter philosopher entitled to claim this improvement. Des Cartes, in observing on his fundamental proposition, "I think — therefore I exist," says, that he presupposes the notions of "thought, existence, and certainty, and that it is impossible for what thinks not to exist †;" and that "these notions,

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\* The want of the words in italics in Des Cartes, and their full developement in Locke, is what seems to deprive Des Cartes of a just claim to a real anticipation of Locke's important observation.

† A curious instance of presupposing the very point which he makes a show of proving. The same vicious circle, no doubt, runs through the whole; but here it shows itself most openly.

*most simple and known by themselves*, are obscured by attempts to define them." Now this seems to us a cursory remark, carried no farther than was necessary to answer the objection which suggested it. Far from showing the impossibility of such definitions, Des Cartes scarcely ventures distinctly to *assert* it. His language is comparative and vague, relating to a degree of simplicity, not to a class of simple ideas. His examples are not taken from the perceptions of the external senses, but from those abstract or mental terms of which his proposition is composed. The utmost that can be granted is, that in seeking for a justification of a controverted proposition, he might have caught a faint and fugitive notion of the general truth. But the excellent passage in Locke arises from no controversy. It relates to a distinct class of ideas, called simple ideas; and demonstrates, that it is impossible to define them; because no words can convey them to him who has not the ideas previously; and because definition is analysis — and it is the distinctive character of these ideas, that they cannot be decomposed. Mr. Locke takes examples from perceptions of external sense, such as colour and motion, which removes all ambiguity; and he considers the question only in that general survey of language, where it finds its place, and shows its full importance as a part of a system.

The "Meditations" of Des Cartes were undoubtedly the source of most of the controversies of a metaphysical nature, since the downfall of the schoolmen. He was the antagonist of Gassendi. His more famous contemporary, Hobbes, was one of the objectors to the "Meditations\*;" and Mr. Locke, again, was properly excited by Hobbes and Des Cartes. Spinoza was the avowed follower of the latter, as well as Malebranche, who, through his scholar Norris, and perhaps Collier, may be regarded as the forerunner of Berkeley, from whom the opinions of Mr. Hume, and the controversies to which they gave rise, immediately flowed. Des Cartes made an attempt to give a new system of all the sciences; an attempt excusable only when lectures were the only means of instruction, and when one professor might have been obliged to conduct his pupil through the whole circle of education. In this impracticable plan, he is perhaps the only great metaphysician who was much more a natural philosopher than a moralist. Of all subjects, he seems the least to have studied ethics. The moralist of the Cartesian school was Malebranche; whose treatise on morals † is distinguished by the ingenuity and originality of "The Inquiry after Truth," and by a stronger shade of that mysticism which naturally colours his philosophy. It has a remarkable resemblance to the general principles of a "Disputation on Virtue," by Jonathan Edwards, the acute and profound metaphysician of the North American Calvinists.

We must now return to a subject on which we most widely differ from Mr. Stewart. The part of knowledge which relates to the strict duties of men and nations towards each other, according to the precise rules of justice, independent of all consideration of positive law, has been treated, in modern times, apart from general ethics on the one hand, and from the municipal institutions of any state on the other. The parts, or the whole of this science, have received many names, — the Law of Nature

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\* He is the writer of the *Objectiones Tertiæ*, subjoined to the "Meditations," where we discover the greater part of the peculiarities of his Philosophical System.

† Rotterdam and London, 1684.

and Nations, — Public Law, International Law, &c. It arose from the Scholastic Philosophy; and its first dawn may be discovered about the middle of the sixteenth century in Spain. For some time before that period, the schools had tended to more independence of opinion. Among other marks of it, we may observe, that the commentaries on the *Secunda* began to be succeeded by treatises “*de Justitiâ et Jure*,” in which the great doctors of the schools were indeed still cited, but which justified, in some measure, their assumption of a more independent title. That title, together with some degree of the independent spirit which it denoted, arose from the increasing study of the Roman law, — a science which, as it treated many of the same questions with the ethics of the schools, naturally tended to rival their authority; and which, together with the casuistry rendered necessary by auricular confession, materially affected the character of this rising science, very long after its emancipation from the schools. In the other cultivated countries of Europe, the reformers of religion and philosophy had thrown off the scholastic yoke. In Spain, the schoolmen were left to their natural progress. *Francis de St. Victoria*, frequently cited by Grotius, seems to have been the first man who acquired reputation by this study. He died a professor of Salamanca, in 1546. His works we have never been able to procure. Of his scholar, *Dominic Soto*, we can speak with greater certainty, having perused his work “*de Justitiâ et Jure*,” a book dedicated to the unfortunate Don Carlos; and which he desires may be called a *Carolopædia*. He was confessor to Charles V., and was sent as a theologian to the council of Trent. His book, the substance of lectures long delivered at Salamanca, was published there in 1560, in the sixty-second year of his age. It is a work which contains many symptoms of the improvements arising from the revival of letters, which had penetrated into the Spanish schools. Among other positions, the following may be thought curious, though the very reasonable limitation be the part most peculiar to him, among the writers of that period: — “The king cannot justly be deprived of his kingdom by the community, *unless* his government becomes tyrannical.” It ought not to be forgotten, for the honour of those now forgotten jurists, that *Victoria* condemned the wars then waged by his countrymen against the Americans, under the pretext or even for the purpose of spreading Christianity; and that *Soto* decided against the lawfulness of enslaving the same unhappy tribes, in a dispute on that subject between Sepulveda and Las Casas, of which the decision was left to him by the emperor. What is still more remarkable, *Dominic Soto* was the first writer who condemned the African slave trade, and did honour to his new science, by employing its principles for the reprobation of that system of guilt and misery which his countrymen now almost singly strive to prolong. “If the report,” says he, “which has lately prevailed be true, that Portuguese traders entice the wretched natives of Africa to the coast by amusements, and presents, and every species of seduction and fraud, and compel them to embark in their ships as slaves; — neither those who have taken them, nor those who buy them from the takers, nor those who possess them, can have safe consciences, until they manumit these slaves, however unable they may be to pay ransom.” \*

In countries where a large body of men are professionally bound to

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\* *Soto de Justitiâ et Jure*, lib. iv. Quæst. i. Art. 2.

give moral counsel, as the Catholic clergy are in auricular Confession, it is evident that they must be aided by books, and that these books, at any expense of philosophical justness, must reduce such cases to rules, which will enable very ordinary men to give prompt, brief, and clear advice. Hence the rise of casuistry, and its greater influence in giving rise to this science of natural law, in the most Catholic of extensive monarchies. To this also may be added, that Spain, under Charles and Philip, having become the first military and political power in Europe, maintaining large armies, and carrying on long wars, was likely to be the first which felt the want of that more practical part of the law of nations which reduces war to some regularity, provides for the discipline of armies, and arranges the distribution of booty and spoil. The first long war in modern times, — that for the emancipation of Holland, produced a practical treatise on this part of the subject, by *Balthazar Ayala*, who appears to have been judge advocate of the Spanish army in Flanders.\* The naval war between England and Spain probably contributed to direct the attention of Albericus Gentilis to the same subjects. He appears to have given opinions as counsel in the cases of Spanish claimants in English courts of prize, in consequence of which he wrote the earliest reports of adjudged cases in maritime law; a work which was in itself a proof that these studies were rising in practical importance, and that the materials accumulated, as well as the occasions of controversy, already required the hand of a writer of skill and authority.

The Belgic war may be said to have formed such a writer in the person of Grotius.† The causes of the revolt against Spain, turned his attention to the limits of authority, and the measures of submission. The long war in Flanders showed the utility, to all parties, of rules for the mitigation of hostilities. The impudence with which the policy called Machiavelian was professed by some of the statesmen of that age, especially at the court of Catharine de Medicis, excited his desire to vindicate against these odious sophists the universal and inviolable authority of justice. The habits of his profession as a lawyer, and of his private studies as a classical scholar, had necessarily a powerful influence on the form and style of his work. The modern world had, in his time, too recently emerged from disorder to afford respectable examples; and it was

\* Two other of these early writers on the Law of War, Arias and Lupus, were also Spaniards.

† Albericus Gentilis was certainly the forerunner of Grotius. The opinion entertained, at the time, of the difference between them, will be best seen in the following words of Zouch, the pupil and successor of Gentilis and Hugo Grotius at Oxford. "He chiefly followed Albericus Gentilis and Hugo Grotius, of whom the former justifies all his positions by authorities of law, the latter tried his doctrines *by the test of reason.*"

Præfat. ad R. Zouch *Juris Fecialis, sive Juris inter Gentes Explicatio*, 1659. By the most learned contemporaries of Grotius, it was thought his distinction to have treated the Law of Nations in a philosophical spirit, and to have soared above the servile erudition of his predecessors. Zouch wrote before the appearance of Puffendorff. He was distinguished by talents as well as learning; and to him we owe the introduction of the term "Law between Nations;" or, as it has been called by Helvetius, and Mr. Bentham, "International Law;" which steadily distinguishes the modern sense of "Law of Nations," from the acceptance of that phrase among the Roman lawyers, in whose language it denoted a system of those rules by which all men (except, perhaps, brutish savages) regulated, or professed to regulate, their actions.

not pedantry in him to confine himself to the venerated authorities of antiquity. The poets of one nation were then little known to any other ; and he has quoted those of Greece and Rome, — too abundantly, indeed, as was the vice of his age ; not, however, as arguments or authorities, but as the repositories of those moral sentiments with which civilised men had sympathised from age to age, and as silencing the immoral sophistry of unprincipled politicians by the unanimous voice of mankind.

Grotius and Thuanus may be considered as two moral phenomena, of a like auspicious nature. Placed at the end of the sixteenth century, they both reviewed the age of blood which had just expired ; not to palliate the enormities or to exasperate the enmities of Protestants or Papists, but to teach both sects wisdom by the survey of their common calamities ; and to persuade both to prepare a refuge for their posterity from the like misfortunes, by at length agreeing to lay the foundation of the still imperfect and unfinished system of religious liberty. Whether the tolerant spirit of Grotius arose principally from his experience of the evils of persecution, or from the mildness of his personal character, or from that connivance at religious differences which began to be introduced by the policy of commerce into Holland, he seems, at all events, to have been the only conspicuous Protestant before the time of King William, who publicly comprehended Roman Catholics within his charity and toleration. His treatise on the “ Law of War ” appeared at the moment when war first ceased to be lawless. It is altogether an error to consider it as a philosophical work ; and it is a consequence of this error, that it is tried by tests foreign to the author’s purpose. Grotius was a classical scholar, a theologian, and, by his offices, what might be called a constitutional lawyer. In his age, the final victory of polite letters over the schools kept alive some jealousy of very precise discrimination, as too nearly resembling scholastic barbarism. The work of Grotius is entirely practical. Leibnitz indeed thought, that a philosophical treatise on this subject (which did not exist in his time, and does not exist in ours) might have been produced “ by the profound understanding of Hobbes, if he had not adopted principles fundamentally false ; or by the judgment and learning of the incomparable Grotius, if he had not been distracted by the cares of a busy and unfortunate life.”\* But though a purely practical work, it is entitled to a place in the history of moral philosophy, of which not the least important part is the influence of ethical reasonings on mankind. It is a manual of rules for making, conducting, and concluding war ; in which, after such a cursory survey of the more general principles of morals as seemed to the author sufficient to illustrate the nature of law, and to establish the immutable distinction of right from wrong, he proceeds to inculcate the general adoption of the best usage introduced on these subjects in times then recent, and to persuade all nations to pursue it by reasons of justice, by considerations of interest, by the sanction of religion, as well as by its coincidence with the writings of the wisest men in all ages, and with the most famous examples of venerable antiquity.

Had it been a work professedly of science, it might be well charged with too slight a foundation of principle ; with a confusion of the separate

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\* Leibnitz — Letter to Molanus in 1700. In one of the late writings of Leibnitz, to which Mr. Stewart ascribes the greatest authority, we see his opinion of the capacity of Grotius : and the value of his commendation is certainly enhanced by the discriminating terms applied to Hobbes and Grotius.

provinces of right and humanity, of reason and usage ; and with a profusion of authorities, where a few would have left the true purpose for which they were cited more visible. But it may be doubted, whether nicer distinction and more sparing citation, would not, in his own time, have weakened the practical efficacy and persuasive power of the work. It first presented to kings and statesmen the concurrent testimony of all whom they had been accustomed to reverence — historians, poets, orators, philosophers, divines, schoolmen, lawyers, ancient and modern, Christian and pagan, of all creeds and nations and ages, to the wisdom and reasonableness of abstaining from unjust and even unprofitable wars ; of conducting hostility with no unnecessary harshness ; of observing faith, and exercising mercy ; and of eagerly returning to peace. Perhaps the impression then made by the display of the universal homage rendered to these simple principles (of which a naked proof might seem superfluous), has contributed to that reverence for them which has since distinguished the European nations above the rest of mankind. That the book of Grotius became the companion of Gustavus Adolphus during the war undertaken by that virtuous hero for civil and religious liberty, is a very striking proof of its extraordinary fitness for its purpose. A purely philosophical work of the highest excellence might have distracted his mind from his great end. Perhaps no work can be named of equally extensive practical effects, till the appearance of the “ Spirit of Laws.”

The name of Grotius gave a lustre to this part of knowledge for more than a century. His successors rather derived credit from his name, than improved the science which he left them. About forty years after the appearance of the treatise on the “ Law of War,” Puffendorff followed, on nearly the same subject, though evidently treading in the footsteps of Hobbes. And without adopting the judgment of Leibnitz, that Puffendorff “ was very little a lawyer, and not at all a philosopher,” it may be truly said, that as his work made pretensions to a scientific character, and had very little either of that literature or eloquence, or familiarity with the details of controversy between states, which could give it any species of practical character, he has much less excuse than Grotius for laying insecure foundations ; and is more reprehensible for the confusion of discordant matters. From him, however, in consequence of his more scholastic form, rather than from Grotius, flowed those innumerable abridgments of natural law, which occupied the European universities till very modern times. Vattel, a diffuse, unscientific, and superficial, but clear and liberal writer, still maintains his place as the most convenient abridgment of a part of knowledge which calls for the skill of a new builder.

It is chiefly on account of the moderate abilities of the greater part of the followers of Grotius, that their number and influence are observable circumstances in the condition of Europe. That great writers should impel and direct public opinion, is the ordinary course of things. Since Grotius, however, none of this class of writers could have such pretensions. Yet, from the peace of Munster to the French Revolution, writers on this subject incessantly succeeded each other. It became a principal part of the education of all politicians ; the treatises concerning it were appealed to by all sovereigns and states in their controversies ; it was thought an advantage by the most powerful and ambitious prince to have them on his side ; and whatever was positive and practical in those systems, whatever regulated the conduct and rights of individuals under the general usage of European war, was adopted by the tribunals of one

country from the writers and courts of foreign and even hostile communities. No other age of the world had witnessed such an appearance (if it should be thought no more) of respect from the mighty to the private reason of the humble and obscure teachers of justice. The opinion of men without power or office, or even superior genius, was appealed to by conquering monarchs, discussed by statesmen, and never publicly disregarded, but by those who had renounced all pretensions to the exterior of morality. Moral appearances are always important realities. The very act of apparent submission to such humble authorities by the rulers of the world, implies improvement, and produces much more. Divested of all extraordinary claims on public deference, and having little advantage but that likelihood of right opinion which arises from the absence of interest and passion, the respect shown to them could proceed only from a growing reverence for that justice which they taught. Every such appeal was a lesson taught by the sovereign to his subjects, of the homage due from both alike to the supreme authority of Reason. These were among the means which rendered the public opinion of Europe an arbiter of some authority in the disputes of states, and in the controversies of princes with their subjects. Combined with the secure independence enjoyed in the same period by the smallest states, under the protection of the balanced strength and mutual jealousy of the greater, with the right of asylum practically granted to all political and religious refugees, with the right of free discussion exerted against their oppressors by those refugees, in the free and Protestant countries of England and Holland, it formed so effective a control on tyranny at home and conquest abroad, that it was scarcely any longer a metaphor to call Europe a commonwealth, in which the energy arising from national distinction was reconciled with the order and safety of general laws. Even the confusion of different subjects under the same general title\*, gave to the moral exhortations of private jurists somewhat of the weight belonging to the opinion of a lawyer on real cases of positive law. The degree of respect shown to their authority, served in some degree as a measure not only of the morality of statesmen, but of the general happiness of the times. It decreased as violence and insecurity prevailed. In our times, it began to be openly renounced in the most wretched period of rage and fear. Furious enthusiasm, or uncontrolled despotism, for a time seemed to have banished it from Christendom. If it has been resisted in quiet and free countries, it has only been with regard to those ambiguous acts to which the apprehension of great danger might have tempted even such communities. With a slight alteration in the saying of a philosopher, we may truly say, that no man ever became an enemy to the law of nations till that law had first been his enemy.

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\* To show how the confusion ought to be rectified, would be to draw an outline of at least two very important treatises; of which one, relating to the *Proper Law* between Nations, is at the present moment a very great *desideratum*. But, without now entering on so unseasonable a task, we may observe, that Mr. Stewart seems to us to lay somewhat too much stress on this confusion.—What shall be said of the very distinct sciences comprehended under the common name of Moral Philosophy in our Scottish universities? But if this should be thought too local an observation, what definition of Natural Philosophy will, on the one hand, distinguish it from Chemistry, and, on the other, comprehend all the branches taught under the name of Natural Philosophy throughout Europe?



With these opinions, we cannot but wonder, and even somewhat regret, that Mr. Stewart should have so far departed from the usual mildness and wariness of his equitable judgments, as, in speaking of these writers, to say, that, “*Notwithstanding all their industry and learning, it would be very difficult to name any class of writers whose labours have been of less utility to the world.*” (Disc. 131.) It would be more just, in our opinion, to have said, that notwithstanding the mediocrity of their general talents, and their frequent offences against the order of science, it would be difficult to name any class of writers whose labours have been of more utility to the world. To promote the civilisation of mankind, by contributing to diffuse a reverence for the principles of justice, is certainly far more useful to the world, and (if that inferior object were worthy of notice) indirectly even more useful to science itself, than to make any addition, however splendid, to the stock of knowledge. A class of writers, remote from power, without sympathy for ambition, and happily disabled by inexperience from making allowance for the real exigencies of state necessity, addressing themselves to the great body of readers, similarly circumstanced and disposed with themselves, and expecting all their credit and popularity from the approbation of that important and daily increasing body, became necessarily the advocates of liberal principles, and the preachers of strict justice between all nations. In this manner, they became, as Mr. Stewart states, the forerunners of the beneficent science of political economy — spreading the same spirit which it breathes, and reaching, with a sort of practical coarseness, some of its results; though their reasonings did not, we conceive, lead by any logical process to the establishment even of its first principles. The connection is rather historical than philosophical. But at all times they carried on that avowed war against the policy (we think harshly) called Machiavelian, which was solemnly declared by Grotius in almost the concluding sentiment of his work — “That doctrine can have no permanent utility which renders man the enemy of his fellow-men.”\*

It is with considerable regret that we find ourselves precluded, by time and space, from throwing the most cursory glance over the writings of Hobbes †, who fills so great a station in metaphysical history; a profound and original thinker, distinguished by a fearless consistency in following every principle through its logical consequences — whose diction is perhaps the most perfect example of the union of clearness and brevity on abstruse subjects, and in proposing new opinions; but whose discourse of human nature is probably the work of man, which, without the circle of mathematical knowledge, has the smallest number of ambiguous or unnecessary words. In the philosophy of understanding, he has doubtless

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\* “Non potest diu prodesse doctrinâ quæ hominem hominibus insociabilem facit.” *Grotius de Jure Bel. et Pac.* lib. iii. cap. xxv. et ult. — “Monita ad fidem et ad pacem.”

† Hobbes is to be added to the number of those philosophers who have exerted imagination in their censure of imagination. In one passage he condemns metaphors in very strongly metaphorical language. “But for metaphors they are utterly to be excluded: for, seeing *they openly profess deceit, to admit them into counsel or reasoning, were absolute folly.*” — *Leviath.* p. 1. c. 8. The truth is, that a writer will seldom be quoted whose mind is so mutilated as to want an imagination which will force the way, like Hobbes, in metaphorical objections to metaphors; or like Malebranche, in ungrateful hostility against fancy; or like Rousseau, in eloquent declamation against the arts, without sparing eloquence itself.

anticipated the greater part of those speculations which are presented as discoveries by his successors. In that which regards the sentient and active part of human nature, he has set out from principles, or rather assumptions, so utterly false as to contract and debase his ethics, and to render his politics a mere system of slavery. Should we be so happy as to meet Mr. Stewart when, in the sequel of this discourse, he renders that justice to Locke which there has been of late a disposition to deny to that incomparable person, we may have again an opportunity to consider the writings of Hobbes—undoubtedly the mine from which Mr. Locke extracted part of his treasure: and if ever a contrast between the intellect and character of two great philosophers can be instructive, it seems to be in that which is so striking between the mode and spirit in which Hobbes and Locke have cultivated the same science, and sometimes expounded the same truths. We are told by Mr. Stewart, that “the theory so fashionable at present, which resolves the whole of morality into the principle of *Utility*, is more nearly akin to Hobbism than some of its partisans are aware of.” (Disc. 138.) — “It is curious to observe,” says he, in another place, “how nearly Hobbes and Locke set out from the same assumptions, though they differ so widely in their practical conclusions.” (Disc. 62.) There is one sense in which the first of these observations must be allowed to be more absolutely just than it is represented to be. It is that in which Leibnitz regards many ethical systems which hold very different language, as being no more than modifications of a principle differing only in name from that of utility. “The next question,” says he, “is, whether the preservation of human society be the principle of the law of nature.\* This the excellent writer denies, in opposition to Grotius, who founds the obligation of that law in its tendency to maintain society; to Hobbes, who derives it from mutual fear; and to Cumberland, who derives it from mutual benevolence—both which last systems are equally resolvable into its tendency to preserve society.”

The theory of talent, and the various forms of intellectual character, an equally important and imperfectly cultivated subject, leads Mr. Stewart to observe, that the distinction of Locke between wit and judgment, is substantially the same with that of Malebranche between the sound sense which discerns real differences and the superficial thinker who imagines or supposes resemblances; and finally, with that of Bacon, who says, that “the great and radical division of minds, *in relation to philosophy and the sciences*, is into the Acute, who can discover the smallest shade of difference—and the Sublime and Discursive, who recognise the slender resemblances of things the most unlike.”

But it seems to us, that no two of these distinctions relate precisely to the same subject. Those of Bacon and Malebranche agree in being applied to the reasoning powers, and to their employment in the pursuit of truth. The distinction is expressly so limited by Bacon; and the words of Malebranche, where he speaks of “supposing resemblances” as the vice of “shallow intellects,” clearly imply the same limitation. Malebranche contrasts the healthy state of reason with its chief disease. The division of Lord Bacon is into the two grand classes of merely intellectual power—the acute and the comprehensive understanding; of which last he is himself the most sublime example that human nature has yet exhi-

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\* The law of nature, here, evidently is coextensive with morality. The passage is in the Letter to Molanus, cited above, and written in 1700.

bited—by the wide range of his reason, independent of all consideration of his splendid imagination, which was only the minister and interpreter of what Leibnitz calls his “*divine genius*.”\* The distinction of Locke appears to us to be entirely of another kind. It is not like that of Bacon—the description of two sorts of intellect, both confined to objects of science;—nor like that of Malebranche, a mere contrast between cursory and patient observers. It is a discrimination between the two powers of wit and judgment. It is so far from being limited to philosophising, like the two others, that one of the members is totally without the province of philosophy. Wit can never have any influence on reasoning, but to disturb it. The titles of the chapter and section of Locke, of which the last is “The Difference between Wit and Judgment,” manifestly point to a distinction between mental powers essentially different, and employed for different purposes. In all but the terms, it corresponds to the distinction of Hobbes (*Hum. Nat.* c. 10.) between fancy and judgment. But, says Hobbes, “both fancy and judgment are comprehended under the name of wit.” This word has, indeed, in the course of two centuries, passed through more significations than most others in our language. Without going farther back than the reign of James I., wit is used by Sir J. Davies as the most general name for the intellectual faculties, of which reason, judgment, wisdom, &c. are subdivisions. (*Immort. of Soul*, sect. XXV.) In the time of Cowley and Hobbes, it came to denote a superior degree of understanding, and more particularly a quick and brilliant reason. In the famous description of facetiousness by Barrow, the greatest proof of mastery over language ever given by an English writer, wit seems to have retained the acceptation of intellectual superiority. In Dryden’s character of Lord Shaftesbury, it has the same signification; and is very nearly synonymous with the modern words talent or ability. But in the course of forty years, from the publication of Hobbes to that of Locke, it had come to denote that particular talent which consists in lively and ingenious combinations of thought. In Mr. Addison’s papers on wit, we find an approach to the modern sense of the term. To Mr. Locke’s account, which he adopts with warm commendation, he expressly adds, (what was perhaps implied in Mr. Locke’s language,) that it must be such “an assemblage of ideas as will give delight and *surprise*.” From a shade in the meaning of this last word, has gradually arisen that more limited sense of *ludicrous surprise*, which seems now an essential part of the import of wit, except where some of its more ancient significations are revived by epithets, or preserved in phrases which have descended from former times.

Having mentioned Mr. Addison, in this Discourse very beautifully called the English Fenelon, we cannot refrain from expressing our satisfaction at the justice rendered by Mr. Stewart to the admirable Essays on the Pleasures of Imagination. Perhaps they may deserve a still more ample consideration, when he comes to consider the philosophy of the eighteenth century, in which they seem to have opened a new path of speculation. If we are to measure the previous progress by the notes on Boileau’s Longinus, the most eminent writer who had treated a similar subject about the same time, we must allow that Mr. Addison has made a step in philosophy. We are not indeed aware, that any writer before him had classed together the pleasures of contemplating beauty in nature

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\* “*Divini Ingenii Vir, Franciscus Bacon de Verulamio.*”

and the arts, or had distinguished that class of sentiments from the pleasures of sense, as well as those attendant on the exertion of the understanding; or had set the example of classifying them by subdivision, under such heads as Novelty, Beauty, and Sublimity. His own claim to originality may indeed be received as a proof of its justice. The modesty of his character, the result of the purity of his taste, as well as of his virtue, is an ample security against undue pretensions. “The Characteristics” had indeed been published a very short time before: but the moral colour of that ingenious and often beautiful work, rather rendered it more difficult to distinguish and separate the pleasures of imagination, which were lost in the splendour of a stronger light.

Soon after the time of Mr. Addison, the application of philosophy, to what he called the pleasures of imagination, became a favourite pursuit in the several countries of Europe. In this country, it was cultivated by a long succession of ingenious writers, of whom some, and these the greatest men of their age, are in this province the disciples of Mr. Addison. On a subject of a very different nature, the two hundred and eighty-seventh Number of the “Spectator” may be recommended to the perusal of those who doubt the vigour and the originality of Mr. Addison’s understanding. “That form of government,” says he, “appears to me the most reasonable which is most conformable to the equality that we find in human nature, provided it be consistent with public peace.”—“It is odd to consider the connection between despotic government and barbarity; and how the making of one person more than man makes the rest less. Above nine parts of the world in ten are in the lowest state of slavery, and consequently sunk into the most gross and brutal ignorance. European slavery is indeed a state of liberty, if compared with that which prevails in the other three divisions of the world; and, therefore, it is no wonder that those who *grovel* under it, have many tracks of light. Riches and plenty are the natural effects of liberty; and where these abound, learning and all the liberal arts will immediately lift up their heads and flourish. Ease and plenty are the great cherishers of knowledge; and, as most of the despotic governments of the world have neither of them, they are naturally overrun with ignorance and barbarity.” The seeds of curiosity scattered abroad by the Essay of Mr. Locke, who had recalled the busy and the lettered to those enquiries, from which they had been scared by the odious opinions and haughty dogmatism of Hobbes, began thus early, in the minds of ingenious men, to produce the fruits of a liberal philosophy on government, as well as of elegant speculation concerning literature and the arts.

“Among the divines who appeared at this era, it is impossible to pass over in silence the name of Barrow, whose theological works (adorned throughout by classical erudition, and by a vigorous though unpolished eloquence,) exhibit in every page marks of the same inventive genius which, in mathematics, has secured to him a rank second alone to that of Newton. As a writer, he is equally distinguished by the redundancy of his matter, and by the pregnant brevity of his expression; but what more peculiarly characterises his manner, is a certain air of powerful and of conscious facility in the execution of whatever he undertakes.” Disc. 69.

We quote this equally discriminating and beautiful passage, not for the unnecessary purpose of praise, nor assuredly with any view to dispute it, nor for the sake of vindicating Barrow from a contradiction imputed to him by Mr. Stewart in the subsequent page, between two passages, in one of which he represents “inordinate self-love” as the parent of most

vices, while in the other he allows, that "a self-love working for what is finally beneficial, will be allowed by common sense," which, we must fairly own, appears to us to be no contradiction at all, but a just statement of two equally important and perfectly reconcilable truths. But we take the occasion supplied by this quotation, to express our wonder that we should find no mention of another English divine, who seems to us by his genius, by the singularities of his ethical writings, and by the vicissitudes of his reputation, to deserve a place in the history of moral philosophy. We advert to Jeremy Taylor, who, though he survived the restoration, belonged to an older school than Barrow. Of unbounded fame in his own time, his devotional writings, which often possess unparalleled beauty, preserved their popularity for more than a century. But in the age of calm and cool philosophy which prevailed among English divines, we scarcely find more than one or two notices of his name among the writings of the learned; and it is only within the last twenty years that he has again become known to many general readers. Two of his works give him a more peculiar claim to the attention of the historian of morals. Probably the last English divine who used the scholastic forms, and was deeply imbued with the metaphysics and theology of the schools, he is the only celebrated Englishman (perhaps the only celebrated Protestant of so late a period) who composed a system of casuistry. Notwithstanding the disadvantages of the form, there are few treatises on morals which (if due allowance be made for obsolete modes of speaking, still more than of thinking,) are more sober, more practical, and more liberal. Of the numerous learned authorities with which he has sprinkled his margin, the names are now scarcely known to the curious enquirer. He seems to survey the learning of a former world. The Discourse on the Liberty of Prophesying is memorable—as the first treatise professedly written in defence of toleration in this country, if not in Europe. Like most divines who have been venerated after their death, he obtained the name of a heretic for his charity, which evidently extended, though he durst not avow it, even to Roman Catholics themselves.\* These two works, with his Discourse on Friendship, though they do not contain his most splendid passages, are the most uniformly reasonable, and the most judiciously composed, of his writings. It is, perhaps, peculiar to him, that to the acuteness and subtlety of a schoolman, he added the feeling and fancy of a poet. Had he lived out of the schools, and looked at man and nature instead of scholastic treatises, it seems that he would have wanted no poetical power but the art of versification. As Gray called Froissart "Herodotus without his style," perhaps we may venture to say that Taylor was Fenelon without his taste. They had the same tender

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\* At the conclusion of the "Liberty of Prophesying" is a Jewish story, told in the manner of a chapter of Genesis, in which God is represented as rebuking Abraham for having driven an idolator out of his tent. This story, Taylor says, is somewhere to be found in the Jewish writers. Till the original be discovered, in some Rabbinical legend, we may ascribe the beauty of the imitation, if not the invention of the incidents, to Taylor himself. Franklin gave the same story, with some slight variations, to Lord Kaimes, who published it in his "Sketches of the History of Man." But the words of Lord Kaimes do not imply that Franklin gave it as his own, though a charge of plagiarism has been grounded on the coincidence. He probably had never read Taylor. He perhaps found the story without an author's name, in some newspaper or magazine, and sent it as a curiosity to Kaimes. A man so rich as Franklin had no temptation to steal.

heart, and flowery imagination; the same tolerant spirit; the same proneness to mystical devotion; and, though in an unequal degree, the same disposition to an ascetic morality, of which the austerities almost become amiable, when they are joined to unusual gentleness and humility. Taylor, in his writings, wanted only the great art of rejection to make the parallel more perfect. In his Devotions alone, where his sensibility is restrained, and his fancy overawed by the subject, he is of unequalled excellence. In general, his taste is more impure, his composition more irregular, his popular discourses more pedantic and scholastic, than those of his great predecessors of Elizabeth's age — of Hooker, of Raleigh, and of Bacon. All those great men, placed near the sources of our written language, in those rare and short intervals when they resist the allurements of Latin phraseology and arrangement, have a freshness of expression, a choice of picturesque and significant words, very difficult to be attained, after the separate language of books has been long formed. The profuse imagery of Taylor, and his tender sentiments, are sure to catch the eye of the most cursory reader. A careful perusal will also discover, in many quiet and modest passages, chiefly of his argumentative and merely ethical works, an easy and soft flow of native English, not unworthy of the age which produced the prose of Cowley, who, like Taylor, was tender and fertile; but who, happily for his fame, in his prose, and in some of his verse, showed a taste less fatally indulgent to the vices of his genius.

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STEWART'S INTRODUCTION TO THE ENCYCLOPÆDIA.  
PART II.\*

WE return with singular satisfaction to the continuance of this admirable Discourse, after having bestowed on the First Part a space, less indeed than its importance merited, but more ample than either the busy or the indolent part of our readers would have willingly allotted to the history of speculation.†

The increase of materials has compelled Mr. Stewart, in this continuation, to limit himself to Metaphysical Philosophy, and to reserve the progress of Moral and Political Science in the Eighteenth Century for distinct discourses. He has thus excluded from his present work what formed the most popular, and not the least important part of the former; and, in the opinion of many, he has left himself little more than the history of controversies which will remain for ever undecided, and of revolutions in which the mind necessarily returns to the point from which it set out. They will dispute the propriety of his very title; and deny that metaphysics have made any progress, though they have undergone many changes. Never, perhaps, since England was a lettered nation, was the disinclination to such enquiries more prevalent than it now is. There is a general disposition to acquiesce on these subjects, in a sort of practical scepticism, the result of indolence and despondency, rather than to weary

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\* A General View of the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political Science, since the Revival of Letters. Part II. By Dugald Stewart, Esq. F.R.SS. Lond. and Edin. &c. &c. (Supplement to the Encyclopædia Britannica, Vol. V. Part I.)—Vol. xxxvi. page 220. October, 1821.

† Vol. xxvii. p. 180.

the understanding in researches which seem hitherto to have yielded no fruit. These prejudices will be strengthened in the mind of many English readers, when, on opening this Essay, they see in it the naked and seemingly lifeless trunk of metaphysical speculation, stripped of those branches which display its fruitfulness while they hide its rugged forms, and not only cover it with some of their own grace and beauty, but exhibit its power of nourishing the most useful sciences, and of affording shelter and security to the most important labours of practical reason.

The study of this beautiful Discourse itself will, indeed, prove the best corrective of those prejudices which its title and outline may have alarmed. It required the accurate and delicate observation of Mr. Stewart, to exhibit the real, though slow, amendment of opinion, and even accession to knowledge concerning the human mind, in the course of the eighteenth century, by distinguishing this true progress of philosophy, in which a single step is of unspeakable importance, from those presumptuous and impotent enquiries, to which the vulgar apply the name of metaphysics, and which, in all ages, have rendered that study unacceptable to many wise men.

It must also be owned, that the former Discourse had the advantage not only of a more comprehensive plan, but of a more splendid subject than the present. The age to which it relates may justly be numbered among the grand epochs in the progress of human knowledge. Of these epochs, four at least are conspicuous.

The *first* of them is the period of unknown antiquity, when the cultivation of knowledge began to be an exclusive occupation, and a separate profession among those colleges of priests, who, whether established on the banks of the Ganges, the Euphrates, or the Nile, appear to have been the earliest instructors of the human species. These guardians of infant science combined it with religion, and thereby rendered it venerable in the eyes of their untutored contemporaries; but, at the same time, enslaved it to their own superstition, and for ever stopped its progress at the point where it was bound to opinions held to be sacred and immutable. The useful institution of a distinct body of teachers, thus degenerated into a rigorous exclusion of all other men from learning; and, according to the general system of Eastern society, the first division of mental labour was followed by an hereditary monopoly. Impenetrable barriers on every side surrounded knowledge, which hindered it equally from spreading or advancing.

The *second* memorable period, is the emancipation of knowledge in Greece. It is now vain to enquire by what steps the Egyptian and Phœnician colonists, who carried the arts of civil life to the Pelasgic savages, were gradually led to forsake the peculiar institutions of their forefathers, while they preserved the inventions and manners by which society had been improved. The great revolution, which gave to civilisation a freer and more flexible form among the Hellenic nations, is anterior to the dawn of authentic history. At the moment of their first appearance to us, the Eastern monopolies were overthrown; philosophy had thrown off the fetters of superstition; learning was accessible to all men; there was scarcely any separate, still less any hereditary, priesthood; and knowledge occasionally descended to some individual among that degraded body of slaves, which, by the unhappy constitution of their society, contained the greater part of mankind. Every faculty of human nature was excited to the most intense avidity; and every part of science presented a boundless prospect of improvement. The progress of know-

ledge, no longer checked as in Asia by internal causes, was exposed to danger only from the political causes which affected the quiet and safety of the nations by which it was cultivated, and which finally overthrew the rude governments and feeble independence of these splendid, but turbulent and insecure communities. The structure of their society was not sufficiently strong to afford a lasting protection to the cultivation of knowledge. Greece lost both liberty and independence as soon as the Macedonians became civilised enough to learn the art of war. The Roman genius did not long survive the downfall of freedom; and universal despotism extinguished national emulation, patriotic feeling, and enterprising ambition, together with talents for literature, skill in arts, and even military spirit, throughout the civilised world. All the objects of generous pursuit which excite the activity of reason and genius, were placed at an immeasurable distance from every Roman provincial. The empire was too vast to be the country of any man; and the province in which each individual was born, was too much degraded to be regarded with complacency or pride. Mental refinement, as well as energy, had perished; and nothing but the outward appearance and vulgar enjoyments of civilisation, were left to be swept away by those illustrious barbarians, who were destined to rekindle the higher principles of human nature.

The *third* period is that known by the name of the middle age, which comprehends the interval between the fall of ancient civilisation and the formation of that system of society which distinguishes Europe in modern times. In the earlier part of this period, the mind seemed once more about to be shackled, and learning was again threatened with Oriental bondage. Law and science were the exclusive possession of the priesthood. The whole of the little knowledge then possessed by mankind was not too much for a single profession. An infallible church had almost imposed her yoke upon science, and seemed once more on the point of arresting its progress, by combining the principles of philosophy with the doctrines of her immutable theology. Had not the celibacy of the clergy prevented the sacerdotal office from becoming hereditary, perhaps the Asiatic system might then have been completely re-established. But, on the contrary, as the ecclesiastical profession required labour and study, which the barbarous ignorance of the nobles disdained, the church was the road by which men of the lowest rank rose to the highest station, and thus became one of the democratical principles of society during the middle age. A logic, at first allowed only to defend received opinions, at length gave rise to philosophical controversies, which, disguised as they were under a barbarous jargon, contained the seeds of the deepest and boldest speculations concerning the first principles of human knowledge. The revival of the Roman jurisprudence rescued law from absolute dependence on the clergy, and raised up formidable rivals to that body; the cultivation of the vernacular language, and the study of ancient literature, diffused instruction and spirit among the laity; and the mind of man was gradually roused to that revolt against all human authority over reason, which is the grand source of subsequent improvement in science, in art, in government, and in morals.

The *fourth* epoch is that of the second emancipation of science, armed with better instruments, supplied with far more abundant materials, and secured from attack or decay by a happier order of society. The reformers, who intended only to arrange the state of theological opinion, restored man to the free exercise of reason. The innumerable inventions and discoveries which began in the middle of the fifteenth cen-



ture, promoted equally the increase and the diffusion of knowledge. Civilisation became impregnable ; the ascendant of civilised nations over the other parts of the human species was no longer capable of being shaken ; and, from the beginning of this new career of society, it became impossible to arrest its progress, or permanently to enslave the understanding.

In the general history of the human mind, the Verulamian reformation of philosophy may doubtless be regarded as a portion of that great revolution by which the fourth epoch is distinguished. But in the history of science it may, with propriety, be separated from the general movement of society, and considered apart, as forming a fifth epoch in the progress of knowledge.

Columbus, Luther, and Bacon are perhaps, in modern times, the men of whom it may be said, with the greatest probability, that, if they had not existed, the whole course of human affairs in after ages would have been varied. We formerly said so much of the genius of Bacon, and of the reformation which he effected in philosophy, that it would be vain to attempt any additional observation on that subject. But, since our former article, the most important of Bacon's writings has been illustrated by a commentary — small indeed in extent, but, in our opinion, of inestimable value, as it exhibits a perfect model of the method by which the whole of that great work might be adapted to the present state of science. We allude to Mr. Playfair's observations on those parts of the "Novum Organum" which relate to the various sorts of prejudice, and the comparative value of facts in physical enquiry, contained in his admirable "Discourse on the Progress of the Physical and Mathematical Sciences." The phraseology of Bacon is on these subjects unhappy ; his technical terms are quaint ; they must have been obscure even in his own age ; and they are still more unsuitable to the modes of thought, as well as expression, which belong to a more advanced state of knowledge. His examples are chosen from an imperfect collection of facts, of which some were inaccurately observed, and others are now either too trivial or too obscure to carry into the mind with due force the ideas which they are intended to illustrate. As far as these faults depend on the words employed, they probably arise from the use of Latin (for of this work we have no English original), which, not being addressed to the world at large, was then likely to betray a writer into that scholastic obscurity which had been so long the character of philosophical works in that language, and of which there is no trace in the English writings of Bacon. The commentary of Mr. Playfair combines the utmost clearness with a brevity greater than that of the text ; and his examples are chosen from the most striking and splendid discoveries of modern science. The following passage of that incomparable Discourse seems to us to be a perfect specimen of such a commentary on the whole "Novum Organum," as would perhaps be the greatest service which any individual qualified for so arduous a task could now render to philosophy.

"Passing over several classes which seem of inferior importance, we come to the *instantiæ crucis*, the division of this experimental logic which is most frequently resorted to in the practice of inductive investigation. When, in such an investigation, the understanding is placed *in equilibrio*, as it were, between two or more causes, each of which accounts equally well for the appearances, as far as they are known, nothing remains to be done but to look out for a fact which can be explained by the one of these causes, and not by the other ; if such a one can be found, the uncertainty is removed, and the true cause is determined. Such facts perform the office of a cross, erected at the separation of two roads, to direct the traveller which he is to take, and, on this account, Bacon gave them the name of *instantiæ crucis*.

“ Suppose that the subject enquired into were the motion of the planets, and that the phenomena which first present themselves, or the motion of these bodies in longitude, could be explained equally on the Ptolemaic and the Copernican system,— that is, either on the system which makes the earth, or that which makes the sun, the centre of the planetary motions, — a cautious philosopher would hesitate about which of the two he should adopt; and, notwithstanding that one of them was recommended by its superior simplicity, he might not think himself authorised to give to it a decided preference over the other. If, however, he consider the motion of these bodies in latitude, that is to say, their digressions from the plane of the ecliptic, he will find a set of phenomena which cannot be reconciled with the supposition that the earth is the centre of the planetary motions, but which receive the most simple and satisfactory explanation from supposing that the sun is at rest, and is the centre of those motions. The latter phenomena would therefore serve as *instantiæ crucis*, by which the superior credibility of the Copernican system was fully evinced.

“ Another example which I shall give of an *instantia crucis* is taken from chemistry, and is, indeed, one of the most remarkable experiments which has been made in that science.

“ It is a general fact observed in chemistry, that metals are always rendered heavier by calcination. When a mass of tin or lead, for instance, is calcined in the fire, though every precaution is taken to prevent any addition from the adhesion of ashes, coals, &c., the absolute weight of the mass is always found to be increased. It was long before the cause of this phenomena was understood. There might be some heavy substance added, though what it was could not easily be imagined; or some substance might have escaped, which was in its nature light, and possessed a tendency upwards. Other phenomena, into the nature of which it is at present unnecessary to enquire, induced chemists to suppose, that, in calcination, a certain substance actually escapes, being present in the regulus, but not in the calx of the metal. This substance, to which they gave the name of phlogiston, was probably that which, by its escape, rendered the metal heavier, and must, therefore, be itself endued with absolute levity.

“ The *instantia crucis* which extricated philosophers from this difficulty, was furnished by an experiment of the celebrated Lavoisier. That excellent chemist included a quantity of tin in a glass retort, hermetically sealed, and accurately weighed together with its contents; he then applied the necessary heat; and when the calcination of the tin was finished, he found the weight of the whole precisely the same as before. This proved that no substance, which was either light or heavy, in a sensible degree, had made its way through the glass. The experiment went still farther. When the retort was cooled and opened, the air rushed in, so that it was evident that a part of the air had disappeared or had lost its elasticity. On weighing the whole apparatus, it was now found that its weight was increased by ten grains; so that ten grains of air had entered into the retort when it was opened. The calx was next taken out, and weighed separately, and it was found to have become heavier by ten grains precisely. The ten grains of air then which had disappeared, and which had made way for the ten grains that rushed into the retort, had combined with the metal during the process of calcination. The farther prosecution of this very decisive experiment led to the knowledge of that species of air which combines with metals when they are calcined. The doctrine of phlogiston was of course exploded, and a creature of the imagination replaced by a real existence.

“ The principle which conducts to the contrivance of an *experimentum crucis* is not difficult to be understood. Taking either of the hypotheses, its consequences must be attempted to be traced, supposing a different experiment to be made. This must be done with respect to the other hypothesis, and a case will probably at last occur, where the two hypotheses would give different results. The experiment made in those circumstances will furnish an *instantia crucis*.

“ Thus, if the experiment of calcination be performed in a close vessel, and if phlogiston be the cause of the increase of weight, it must either escape through the vessel, or it must remain in the vessel after separation from the calx. If the former be the case, the apparatus will be increased in weight; if the latter, the phlogiston

must make its escape on opening the vessel. If neither of these be the case, it is plain that the theory of phlogiston is insufficient to explain the facts.

“ The *experimentum crucis* is of such weight in matters of induction, that in all those branches of science where it cannot easily be resorted to (the circumstances of an experiment being out of our power, and incapable of being varied at pleasure), there is often a great want of conclusive evidence. This holds of agriculture, medicine, political economy, &c. To make one experiment similar to another in all respects but one, is what the *experimentum crucis*, and, in general, the process of induction, principally requires; but it is what, in the sciences just named, can seldom be accomplished. Hence the great difficulty of separating the causes, and allotting to each its due proportion of the effect. Men deceive themselves in consequence of this continually, and think they are reasoning from fact and experience, when, in reality, they are only reasoning from a mixture of truth and falsehood. The only end answered by facts so incorrectly apprehended, is that of making error more incorrigible.

“ Such were the speculations of Bacon, and the rules he laid down for the conduct of experimental enquiries, before any such enquiries had been instituted. The power and compass of a mind which could form such a plan beforehand, and trace not merely the outline, but many of the most minute ramifications, of sciences which did not yet exist, must be an object of admiration to all succeeding ages. He is destined, if, indeed, any thing in the world be so destined, to remain an *instantia singularis* among men; and, as he had no rival in the times that are past, so is he likely to have none in those which are to come. Before any parallel to him can be found, not only must a man of the same talents be produced, but he must be placed in the same circumstances; the memory of his predecessor must be effaced, and the light of science, after being entirely extinguished, must be again beginning to revive. If a second Bacon is ever to arise, he must be ignorant of the first.

“ The range which Bacon’s speculations embraced was altogether immense. He cast a penetrating eye on the whole of science, from its feeblest and most infantine state, to that strength and perfection from which it was then so remote, and which it is perhaps destined to approach too continually, but never to attain. More substitutes might be found for Galileo than for Bacon. More than one could be mentioned who, in the place of the former, would probably have done what he did; but the history of human knowledge points out nobody of whom it can be said, that, placed in the situation of Bacon, he would have done what Bacon did;—no man whose prophetic genius would have enabled him to delineate a system of science which had not yet begun to exist!—who could have derived the knowledge of what *ought to be* from what *was not*, and who could have become so rich in wisdom, though he received from his predecessors no inheritance but their errors. I am inclined, therefore, to agree with D’Alembert, ‘that when one considers the sound and enlarged views of this great man, the multitude of the objects to which his mind was turned, and the boldness of his style, which unites the most sublime images with the most rigorous precision, one is disposed to regard him as the greatest, the most universal, and the most eloquent of philosophers.’”

There is no composition on the history of the Physical and Exact Sciences, in our language, which can be compared to that of Mr. Playfair in philosophical eloquence, except the noble work of his great predecessor Mr. Maclaurin on the Newtonian Discoveries, which in some places rises to a true sublimity, without ever losing the serenity and clearness of philosophy.\* The manner of these two great mathematicians, however, is very different; and indicates a difference in their habitual mode of contemplating science. Mr. Maclaurin seems to have admired most the grandeur of nature as disclosed by philosophy; Mr. Playfair to have fixed his admiration on the energy with which human reason lays open nature to our view. The manner of thinking of the former was most naturally favourable to eloquence. The second, in a more advanced state of pro-

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\* See the concluding passage of his first chapter, which has, in our opinion, rarely been equalled in grandeur.

gress, when outward nature began to be viewed with abated wonder, found a new object of admiration in those intellectual victories and conquests which had long before inspired the genius of his *master*, Bacon.

It is not easy rigorously to adhere to method in the observations which we are now about to offer. Mr. Stewart's Discourse is necessarily somewhat miscellaneous, and our remarks must be so in a greater degree. Our limits are much more confined; usage does not allow us to avail ourselves, to any considerable extent, of the resource of formal division; and we are not at liberty to subjoin those illustrative notes in which digression might sometimes find a convenient refuge. Among the most important subjects of the Discourse, the first, and that on which we purpose most to enlarge, relates to the genius and writings of Locke and Leibnitz, which we shall attempt to illustrate from some of their works, which Mr. Stewart has, for the present, left untouched. We shall next offer some remarks on the practical tendency which he and other celebrated writers ascribe to certain speculative opinions, which we thus early own is not the part of this Discourse which we have read with the most entire assent or unmixed satisfaction; and we shall probably conclude with a very few observations on the writings of some of the modern metaphysicians of England and Scotland. On German philosophy, we think it better to say nothing than too little. We have not room to say enough; and our readers, probably, would not have patience to bear it. In the course of this criticism, we shall occasionally glean a few unnoticed or little known particulars in the history of philosophy. We may sometimes supply small deficiencies, or rectify inaccuracies inevitable in the extensive range of such a work as that of Mr. Stewart. We shall not always refuse ourselves the indulgence of discussing some of the opinions and arguments of which it is our chief business to take an historical review; and, on a subject to which we so seldom return as metaphysical philosophy, we shall deem ourselves entitled, if not bound, shortly to take notice of such works as have recently appeared, which are connected with the subject, and have any claim on the attention of its cultivators. In those parts of our task which have been last mentioned, of which it would be hard always to determine the proper place in the most methodical composition, we reserve to ourselves some right occasionally to follow our humour, or to indulge our indolence.

At the head of the metaphysical speculations of the eighteenth century, the great names of Leibnitz and Locke are placed with indisputable propriety. Whatever may be thought of the truth of their doctrines, or of their comparative rank in philosophical genius, it cannot be doubted that they exercised the chief influence on the opinions of the succeeding age. The spirit of every system which has since arisen is derived, directly or indirectly, from one or other of them.

There never were, perhaps, two contemporary philosophers whose genius was so dissimilar as that of Locke and Leibnitz; and whose philosophical systems were so much at variance, not only in particular doctrines, but in general spirit and tendency. The character of Locke's writings cannot be well understood, without considering the circumstances of the writer. Educated among the English dissenters, during the short period of their political ascendancy, he early imbibed that deep piety and ardent spirit of liberty which actuated that body of men; and he probably imbibed also, in their schools, the disposition to metaphysical enquiries which has every where accompanied the Calvinistic theology. Sects, founded in the right of private judgment, naturally tend to

purify themselves from intolerance, and in time learn to respect, in others, the freedom of thought, to the exercise of which they owe their own existence. By the independent divines who were his instructors, our philosopher was taught those principles of religious liberty which they were the first to disclose to the world.\* When free enquiry led him to milder dogmas, he retained the severe morality which was their honourable singularity, and which continues to distinguish their successors in those communities which have abandoned their rigorous opinions. His professional pursuits afterwards engaged him in the study of the physical sciences, at the moment when the spirit of experiment and observation was in its youthful fervour, and when a repugnance to scholastic subtleties was the ruling passion of the scientific world. At a more mature age, he was admitted into the society of great wits and ambitious politicians. During the remainder of his life, he was often a man of business, and always a man of the world, without much undisturbed leisure, and probably with that abated relish for merely abstract speculation, which is the inevitable result of converse with society and experience in affairs. But his political connections, agreeing with his early bias, made him a zealous advocate of liberty, in opinion and in government; and he gradually limited his zeal and activity to the illustration of such general principles as are the guardians of these great interests of human society. Almost all his writings (even his Essay itself) were occasional, and intended directly to counteract the enemies of reason and freedom in his own age. The first Letter on Toleration, the most original perhaps of his works, was composed in Holland, in a retirement where he was forced to conceal himself from the tyranny which pursued him into a foreign land; and it was published in England, in the year of the Revolution, to vindicate the Toleration Act, of which the author lamented the imperfection.†

His "Treatise on Government" is composed of three parts, of different character, and very unequal merit. The confutation of Sir Robert Filmer, with which it opens, has long lost all interest, and is now to be considered as an instance of the hard fate of a philosopher who is compelled to engage in a conflict with those ignoble antagonists who acquire a momentary importance by the defence of pernicious falsehoods.

The same slavish absurdities have, indeed, been at various times revived. But they never have assumed, and probably never will again

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\* Orme's Memoirs of Dr. Owen, London, 1820, pp. 99—110. In this very able volume, it is clearly proved that the Independents were the first teachers of religious liberty. The industrious, ingenious, and tolerant writer, is unjust to JEREMY TAYLOR, who had no share (as Mr. Orme supposes) in the persecuting councils of Charles II. It is an important fact in the history of Toleration, that Dr. Owen, the Independent, was Dean of Christchurch in 1651, when Locke was admitted a member of that College, "*under a fanatical tutor,*" as Antony Wood says.

† "We have need," says he, "of more generous remedies than have yet been used in our distempers. It is neither declarations of indulgence, nor acts of comprehension such as have yet been practised or projected amongst us, that can do the work among us. Absolute liberty, just and true liberty, equal and impartial liberty, is the thing that we stand in need of. Now, though this has indeed been much talked of, I doubt it has not been much understood — I am sure not at all practised, either by our governors towards the people in general, or by any dissenting parties of the people towards one another." How far are we, at this moment, from adopting these admirable principles! and with what absurd confidence do the enemies of religious liberty appeal to the authority of Mr. Locke for continuing those restrictions on conscience which he so deeply lamented!

assume, the form in which they were exhibited by Filmer. Mr. Locke's general principles of government were adopted by him, probably without much examination, as the doctrine which had for ages prevailed in the schools of Europe, and which afforded an obvious and adequate justification of a resistance to oppressive government. He delivers them as he found them, without even appearing to have made them his own by new modifications. The opinion, that the right of the magistrate to obedience is founded in the original delegation of power by the people to the government, is at least as old as the writings of Thomas Aquinas.\* And in the beginning of the seventeenth century, it was regarded as the common doctrine of all the divines, jurists, and philosophers, who had at that time examined the moral foundation of political authority.† It then prevailed indeed so universally, that it was assumed by Hobbes as the basis of his system of universal servitude. The divine right of kingly government was a principle very little known, till it was inculcated in the writings of English court divines after the accession of the Stuarts. The purpose of Mr. Locke's work did not lead him to enquire more anxiously into the solidity of these universally received principles; nor were there at the time any circumstances in the condition of the country, which could suggest to his mind the necessity of qualifying their application. His object, as he says himself, was "to establish the throne of our great Restorer, our present King William; to make good his title in the consent of the people, which being the only one of all lawful governments, he has more fully and clearly than any prince in Christendom; and to

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\* "Non cujuslibet ratio facit legem, sed multitudinis, aut principis, vicem multitudinis gerentis."—Prima Pars, Sec. Part. Sum. Theolog. Tho. Aquinat. Quest. 90. Art. 3.

† "Opinionem jam factam Communem Omnium Scholasticorum."—Antonio de Dom. De Repub. Ecclesias. lib. vi. c. 2.

Antonio de Dominis, Archbishop of Spalato in Dalmatia, having imbibed the free spirit of Father Paul, inclined towards Protestantism, or at least towards such reciprocal concessions as might reunite the churches of the West. During Sir Henry Wolton's remarkable embassy at Venice, he was persuaded to go to England, where he was made Dean of Windsor. Finding, perhaps, the Protestants more inflexible than he expected, he returned to Rome, possibly with the hope of more success in that quarter. But, though he publicly abjured his errors, he was soon, in consequence of some free language in conversation, thrown into a dungeon, where he died. His own writings are forgotten; but mankind are indebted to him for the admirable "History of the Council of Trent" by Father Paul, of which he brought the MSS. with him to London.

Suaren, about the same time, states the same principle of popular delegation as the common opinion of all lawyers and theologians from the time of Aquinas.—"Dicendum ergo est, potestatem condendi leges ex solâ rei naturâ in nullo singulari homine existere, sed in hominum collectione. Hæc conclusio est Communis et certa sumitur ex D. Thom. quatenus sensit principem habere potestatem condendi leges, quam in illum transtulit communitas."—Suaren de Leg. lib. iii. c. 2.

In the subsequent part of the same chapter, he anticipates, and, in a few words, refutes the absurd system of Filmer, who ascribes absolute power and divine right to kings as inheriting the sovereign authority of Adam. In the fourth chapter, he observes, that though men are under a moral obligation to establish civil government, yet the choice of the form is left to themselves. Although the learned Jesuit is of opinion that monarchy is the best form of government, yet he adds, "lege naturæ non coguntur homines habere hanc potestatem in uno, vel in pluribus, vel in collectione omnium; ergo hæc determinatio necessario fieri debet arbitrio humano."—Lib. iii. c. 4.

justify to the world the people of England, whose love of their just and natural rights, with their resolution to preserve them, saved the nation when it was on the very brink of slavery and ruin."

But it was essential to his purpose to be exact in his more particular observations. That part of his work is, accordingly, remarkable for general caution, and every where bears marks of his own considerate mind. By calling William a "Restorer," he clearly points out the characteristic principle of the Revolution; and sufficiently shows that he did not consider it as intended to introduce novelties, but to defend or recover the ancient laws and liberties of the kingdom. In enumerating cases which justify resistance, he confines himself, almost as cautiously as the Bill of Rights, to the grievances actually suffered under the late reign; and where he distinguishes between a dissolution of government and a dissolution of society, it is manifestly his object to guard against those inferences which would have rendered the Revolution a source of anarchy, instead of being the parent of order and security. In one instance only, that of taxation, where he may be thought to have introduced subtle and doubtful speculations into a matter altogether practical, his purpose was to discover an immoveable foundation for that ancient principle of rendering the government dependent on the representatives of the people for pecuniary supply, which first established the English Constitution,—which improved and strengthened it in a course of ages,—and which, at the Revolution, finally triumphed over the conspiracy of the Stuart Princes. If he be ever mistaken in his premises, at least his conclusions are, in this part of his work, equally just, generous, and prudent. Whatever charge of haste or inaccuracy may be brought against his abstract principles, he thoroughly weighs, and maturely considers, the practical results. Those who consider his moderate plan of Parliamentary Reform as at variance with his theory of government, may perceive, even in this repugnance, whether real or apparent, a new indication of those dispositions which exposed him rather to the reproach of being an inconsistent reasoner, than to that of being a dangerous politician.

In these works, however, the nature of the subject has, in some degree, obliged most men of sense to treat them with considerable regard to consequences; though there are memorable and unfortunate examples of an opposite tendency. The metaphysical object of the "Essay on Human Understanding," therefore, illustrates the natural bent of the author's genius more forcibly than those writings which are connected with the business and interests of men; and where some consideration of prudence and utility might have been expected from the most rash speculator.

The reasonable admirers of Locke would have pardoned Mr. Stewart, if he had pronounced more decisively, that the First Book of that work is inferior to the others; and we have satisfactory proof that it was so considered by the author himself, who, in the abridgment of the Essay which he published in Leclerc's Review, omits it altogether, as intended only to obviate the prejudices of some philosophers against the more important contents of his work.\* It must be owned, that the very terms "Innate

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\* "J'ai taché d'abord de prouver que notre esprit est au commencement ce qu'on appelle un *tabula rasa*; c'est à dire, sans idées et sans connoissances. Mais comme ce n'a été que pour détruire les préjugés de quelques philosophes, j'ai cru que dans ce petit abrégé de mes principes, je devois passer toutes les disputes préliminaires qui composent le livre premier."—*Biblioth. Universelle, Janv. 1688.*

Ideas and Innate Principles," together with the division of the latter into "Speculative and Practical," are not only vague, but equivocal; that they are capable of different senses; and that they are not always employed in the same sense throughout this discussion. Nay, it will be found very difficult, after the most careful perusal of Mr. Locke's first book, to state the question in dispute clearly and shortly, in language so strictly philosophical as to be untainted by any hypothesis. As the antagonists chiefly contemplated by Mr. Locke were the followers of Des Cartes, perhaps the only proposition for which he must necessarily be held to contend was, that the mind has no ideas which do not *arise* from impressions on the senses, or from reflections on our own thoughts and feelings. But it is certain, that he sometimes appears to contend for much more than this proposition; that he has generally been understood in a larger sense; and that, thus interpreted, his doctrine is not irreconcilable to those philosophical systems with which it has been supposed to be most at variance.

These general remarks may be illustrated by a reference to some of those ideas which are more general and important, and seem more dark than any others, perhaps only because we seek in them for what is not to be found in any of the most simple elements of human knowledge.

The nature of our notion of Space, and more especially of that of Time, seems to form one of the mysteries of our intellectual being. Neither of these notions can be conceived separately. Nothing outward can be conceived without space; for it is space which gives outness to objects, or renders them capable of being conceived as outward. Nothing can be conceived to exist, without conceiving some time in which it exists. Thought and feeling may be conceived, without at the same time conceiving space; but no operation of mind can be recalled which does not suggest the conception of a portion of time, in which such mental operation is performed. Both these ideas are so clear that they cannot be illustrated, and so simple that they cannot be defined: nor indeed is it possible, by the use of any words, to advance a single step towards rendering them more or otherwise intelligible than the lessons of nature have already made them. The metaphysician knows no more of either than the rustic. If we confine ourselves merely to a statement of the facts which we discover by experience concerning these ideas, we shall find them reducible, as has just been intimated, to the following;—namely, that they are simple; that neither space nor time can be conceived without some other conception; that the idea of space always attends that of every outward object; and that the idea of time enters into every idea which the mind of man is capable of forming. Time cannot be conceived separately from something else; nor can any thing else be conceived separately from time. If we are asked whether the idea of time be innate, the only proper answer consists in the statement of the fact, that it never arises in the human mind otherwise than as the concomitant of some other perception; and that, thus understood; it is not innate, since it is always directly or indirectly occasioned by some action on the senses. Various modes of expressing these facts have been adopted by different philosophers, according to the variety of their technical language. By Kant, space is said to be the *form* of our perceptive faculty, as applied to outward objects; and time is called the *form* of the same faculty, as it regards our mental operations;—by Mr. Stewart, these ideas are considered "as suggested to the understanding"\* by sensation or reflection, though,

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\* Philosoph. Essays, Essay I, chap. 2.



according to him, “the mind is not directly and immediately *furnished*” with such ideas, either by sensation or reflection;—and, by a late eminent metaphysician, they were regarded as *perceptions*, in the nature of those arising from the senses, of which the one is attendant on the idea of every outward object, and the other concomitant with the consciousness of every mental operation.\* Each of these modes of expression has its own advantages. The first mode brings forward the universality and necessity of these two notions; the second most strongly marks the distinction between them and the fluctuating perceptions naturally referred to the senses; while the last has the opposite merit of presenting to us that incapacity of being analysed, in which they agree with all other simple ideas. On the other hand, each of them (perhaps from the imperfection of language) seems to insinuate more than the mere results of experience. The technical terms introduced by Kant have the appearance of an attempt to explain what, by the writer’s own principles, is incapable of explanation. Mr. Wedgwood may be charged with giving the same name to mental phenomena, which coincide in nothing but simplicity; and Mr. Stewart seems to us to have opposed two modes of expression to each other, which, when they are thoroughly analysed, represent one and the same fact.

Leibnitz, as we shall afterwards see, thought that Locke’s admission of ideas of reflection furnished a ground for negotiating a reconciliation between his system, and the opinions of those who, in the etymological sense of the word, are more metaphysical; and it may very well be doubted, whether they much differed from the innate ideas of Des Cartes, especially as the latter philosopher explained the term, when he found himself pressed by acute objectors. “I never said or thought †,” says Des Cartes, “that the mind needs innate ideas, which are something different from its own faculty of thinking; but, as I observed certain thoughts to be in my mind, which neither proceeded from outward objects, nor were determined by my will, but merely from my own faculty of thinking, I called these innate ideas, to distinguish them from such as are either adventitious (*i. e.* from without), or compounded by our

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\* We have ventured, on this single occasion, to refer to a philosopher, little known beyond the circle of his friends—the late Mr. Thomas Wedgwood, one of the most ingenious, profound, and original thinkers of this age; by whose long sufferings and untimely death the science of mind was deprived of the services of one of the very few who were qualified to enlarge its boundaries. The fruits of his meditations are unhappily lost with himself; since it would be vain for any other man to attempt to follow his footsteps along that secluded path, where, with characteristic and probably unequalled delicacy of observation, he watched the most evanescent and transient circumstances in the subtlest processes of thought. But the remembrance of his affection and generosity, the higher part of his nature, and the paramount objects of his life, will always be fresh in the hearts of those from whom his modesty could not hide their unwearied activity. A just and singularly beautiful account of the character of this admirable person is to be found in a late edition of the “*Biographia Literaria*” of Mr. Coleridge; but the eloquent writer has (for what reason we know not) omitted the name of Mr. Wedgwood.

† Notæ in *Programma cui titulus Explicatio Mentis Humanæ*, 1647. The two propositions, against which the passage in the text is directed, are the following:—“*Mens non indiget ideis innatis, sed sola ejus facultas cogitandi ipsi ad actiones suas peragendas sufficit. Atque ideo omnes communes notiones menti insculptæ ex rerum observatione vel traditione, originem ducunt.*”

imagination. I call them innate, in the same sense in which generosity is innate in some families, gout and stone in others; because the children of such families come into the world with a disposition to such virtue, or to such maladies.\* In a letter to Mersenne†, he says, “by the word *idea*, I understand all that can be in our thoughts, and I distinguish three sorts of ideas;—*adventitious*, like the common idea of the sun; *framed* by the mind, such as that which astronomical reasoning gives us of the sun; and *innate*, as the idea of God, mind, body, a triangle, and generally all those which represent true, immutable, and eternal essences.” It must be owned, that, however nearly the first of these representations may approach to Mr. Locke’s ideas of reflection, the second deviates from them very widely, and is not easily reconcilable with the first. The comparison of these two sentences, strongly impeaches the steadiness and consistency of Des Cartes in the fundamental principles of his system.

A principle in science is a proposition from which many other propositions may be inferred. That principles, taken in this sense of propositions, are part of the original structure or furniture of the human mind, is an assertion so unreasonable, that perhaps no philosopher has avowedly, or at least permanently adopted it. But it is not to be forgotten, that there must be certain general laws of perception, or ultimate facts respecting that province of mind, beyond which human knowledge cannot reach. Such facts bound our researches in every part of knowledge, and the ascertainment of them is the utmost possible attainment of science. Beyond them there is nothing, or at least nothing discoverable by us. These observations, however universally acknowledged when they are stated, are often hid from the view of the system-builder when he is employed in rearing his airy edifice. There is a common disposition to exempt the philosophy of the human understanding from the dominion of that irresistible necessity which confines all other knowledge within the limits of experience; arising probably from a vague notion that the science, without which the principles of no other are intelligible, ought to be able to discover the foundation even of its own principles. Hence the question among the German metaphysicians, — “*What makes experience possible?*” Hence the very general indisposition among metaphysicians to acquiesce in any mere fact as the result of their enquiries, and to make vain exertions in pursuit of an explanation of it, without recollecting that the explanation must always consist of another fact, which must either equally require another explanation, or be equally independent of it. There is a sort of sullen reluctance to be satisfied with ultimate facts, which has kept its ground in the theory of the human mind long after it has been banished from all other sciences. Philosophers are, in this province, often led to waste their strength in attempts to find out what supports the foundation; and, in these efforts to prove first principles, they inevitably find that their proof must contain an assumption of the thing to be proved, and that their argument must return to the point from which it set out.

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\* This remarkable passage of Des Cartes is to be found in a French translation of the *Programma and Notes*, probably by himself.—*Lettres de Des Cartes*, I. Lett. 99. It is justly observed by one of his most acute antagonists, that Des Cartes does not steadily adhere to the sense of the word “innate,” but varies it in the exigencies of controversy, so as to give it at each moment the import which best suits the nature of the objection with which he has then to contend.—*Huet. Censur. Phil. Cartes*, 93.

† Lett. de Des Cartes, II. Lett. 54.

Mental philosophy can consist of nothing but facts; and it is at least as vain to enquire into the cause of thought, as into the cause of attraction. What the number and nature of the ultimate facts respecting mind may be, is a question which can only be determined by experience: and it is of the utmost importance not to allow their arbitrary multiplication, which enables some individuals to impose on us their own erroneous or uncertain speculations as the fundamental principles of human knowledge. No general criterion has hitherto been offered, by which these last principles may be distinguished from all other propositions. Perhaps a practical standard of some convenience would be, *that all reasoners should be required to admit every principle of which the denial renders reasoning impossible.* This is only to require that a man should admit, in general terms, those principles which he must assume in every particular argument, and which he has assumed in every argument which he has employed against their existence. It is, in other words, to require that a disputant shall not contradict himself; for every argument against the fundamental laws of thought absolutely assumes their existence in the premises, while it totally denies it in the conclusion.

Whether it be among the ultimate facts in human nature, that the mind is disposed or determined to assent to some propositions, and to reject others, when they are first submitted to its judgment, without inferring their truth or falsehood from any process of reasoning, is manifestly as much a question of mere experience as any other which relates to our mental constitution. It is certain that such inherent inclinations may be conceived, without supposing the ideas of which the propositions are composed to be, in any sense, innate; if, indeed, that unfortunate word would be capable of being reduced by definition to any fixed meaning. "Innate," says Lord Shaftesbury, "is the word Mr. Locke poorly plays with: the right word, though less used, is connate. The question is not about the time when the ideas enter the mind, but *whether the constitution of man be such*, as at some time or other (no matter when), the ideas will not necessarily spring up in him." These are the words of Lord Shaftesbury in his Letters, which, not being printed in any edition of the Characteristics, are less known than they ought to be; though, in them, the fine genius and generous principles of the writer are less hid by occasional affectation of style, than in any other of his writings.\*

The above observations apply with still greater force to what Mr. Locke calls "Practical Principles." Here indeed he contradicts himself; for, having built one of his chief arguments against other speculative or practical principles, on what he thinks the incapacity of the majority of mankind to entertain those very abstract ideas, of which these principles if innate would imply the presence in every mind, he very inconsistently admits the existence of one innate practical principle, "a desire of happiness, and an aversion to misery †," without considering that happiness and misery are also abstract terms, which excite very indistinct conceptions in the minds of "a great part of mankind." It would be easy also to show, if this were a proper place, that the desire of happiness, so far from being an innate, is not even an original principle; that it presupposes the existence of all those particular appetites and desires of

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\* Dr. Lee, an antagonist of Mr. Locke, has stated the question of innate ideas more fully than Shaftesbury, or even Leibnitz. He has also anticipated some of the reasonings of Buffier and Reid. — *Lee's Notes on Locke*, folio, London, 1702.

† Essay on Hum. Underst. book 1. c. 3. § 3.

which the gratification is pleasure, and also the exercise of that deliberate reason which habitually examines how far each gratification, in all its consequences, increases or diminishes that sum of enjoyment which constitutes happiness. If that subject could be now fully treated, it would appear that this error of Mr. Locke, or another equally great, that we have only one practical principle, the desire of pleasure, is the root of most false theories of morals; and that it is also the source of many mistaken speculations on the important subjects of government and education, which at this moment mislead the friends of human improvement, and strengthen the arms of its enemies. But morals fell only incidentally under the consideration of Mr. Locke; and his errors on that greatest of all sciences were the prevalent opinions of his age, which cannot be justly called the principles of Hobbes, though that extraordinary man had alone the boldness to exhibit these principles in connection with their odious but strictly logical consequences.

The exaggerations of this First Book, however, afford a new proof of the author's steady regard to the highest interests of mankind. He justly considered the free exercise of reason as the highest of these, and that on the security of which all the others depend. The circumstances of his life rendered it a long warfare against the enemies of freedom in philosophising, freedom in worship, and freedom from every political restraint which necessity did not justify. In his noble zeal for liberty of thought, he dreaded the tendency of a doctrine which might "*gradually prepare mankind to swallow that for an innate principle which may serve his purpose who teacheth them.*"\* He may well be excused, if, in the ardour of his generous conflict, he sometimes carried beyond the bounds of calm and neutral reason his repugnance to doctrines which, as they were then generally explained, he justly regarded as capable of being employed to shelter absurdity from detection, to stop the progress of free enquiry, and to subject the general reason to the authority of a few individuals. Every error of Mr. Locke in speculation may be traced to the influence of some virtue; at least every error except some of the erroneous opinions generally received in his age, which, with a sort of passive acquiescence, he suffered to retain their place in his mind.

It is with the Second Book that the "Essay on Human Understanding" properly begins; and this book is the first considerable contribution in modern times towards the experimental † philosophy of the human mind. The road was pointed out by Bacon; and, by excluding the fallacious analogies of thought to outward appearance, Des Cartes may be said to have marked out the limits of the proper field of enquiry. But, before Locke, there was no example in intellectual philosophy of an ample enumeration of facts, collected and arranged for the express purpose of legitimate generalisation. He himself tells us, that his purpose was, "*in a plain historical method, to give an account of the ways by which our understanding comes to attain those notions of things we have.*" In more modern phraseology, this would be called an attempt to ascertain,

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\* Essay, Book I. c. 4. § 24.

† This word, "experimental," has the defect of not appearing to comprehend the knowledge which flows from *observation*, as well as that which is obtained by *experiment*. The German word "*empirical*" is applied to all the information which *experience* affords; but it is in our language degraded by another application. We therefore must use "*experimental*" in a larger sense than its etymology warrants.

by observation, the most general facts relating to the origin of human knowledge. There is something in the plainness, and even homeliness of Locke's language, which strongly indicates his very clear conception, that experience must be his sole guide, and his unwillingness, by the use of scholastic language, to imitate the example of those who make a show of explaining facts, while in reality they only "*darken council by words without knowledge.*" He is content to collect the laws of thought, as he would have collected those of any other object of physical knowledge, from observation alone. He seldom embarrasses himself with physiological hypotheses\*, or wastes his strength on those insoluble problems which were then called metaphysical. Though, in the execution of his plan, there are many and great defects, the conception of it is entirely conformable to the Verulamian method of induction, which, even after the fullest enumeration of particulars, requires a cautious examination of each subordinate class of phenomena, before we attempt, through a very slowly ascending series of generalisations, to soar to comprehensive laws. "*Philosophy,*" as Mr. Playfair excellently renders Bacon, "*has either taken much from a few things, or too little from a great many; and in both cases has too narrow a basis to be of much duration or utility.*" Or, to use the very words of the Master himself, — "We shall then have reason to hope well of the sciences, when we rise by continued steps from particulars to inferior axioms, and then to the middle, — and only at last to the most general." — *Nov. Org.* lib. i. § civ. It is not so much by an appeal to experience (for some degree of that appeal is universal), as by the mode of conducting it, that the followers of Bacon are distinguished from the framers of hypotheses. It is one thing to borrow from experience just enough to make a supposition plausible; it is quite another to take from it all that is necessary to be the foundation of just theory.

In this respect perhaps, more than in any other, the philosophical writings of Locke are contradistinguished from those of Hobbes. That extraordinary man saw, with astonishing rapidity of intuition, some of the simplest and most general facts which may be observed in the operations of the understanding; and perhaps no man ever possessed the same faculty of conveying his abstract speculations in language of such clearness, precision, and force, as to engrave them on the mind of the reader. But he did not wait to examine whether there might not be other facts

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\* A stronger proof can hardly be required than the following sentence of his freedom from physiological prejudice. "This laying up of our ideas in the repository of the memory, signifies no more but this, that the mind has the power in many cases to revive perceptions, with another perception annexed to them, that it has had them before." The same chapter is remarkable for the exquisite, and almost poetical beauty, of some of its illustrations. "Ideas quickly fade, and often vanish quite out of the understanding, leaving no more footsteps or remaining characters of themselves than shadows do flying over a field of corn." — "The ideas, as well as children of our youth, often die before us, and our minds represent to us those tombs to which we are approaching; where, though the brass and marble remain, yet the inscriptions are effaced by time, and the imagery moulders away. Pictures drawn in our minds are laid in fading colours, and, unless sometimes refreshed, vanish and disappear." — Book II. Chap. 10. This pathetic language must have been inspired by experience; and, though Locke could not have been more than fifty-six when he wrote these sentences, it is too well known that the first decays of memory may be painfully felt long before they can be detected by the keenest observer.

equally general relating to the intellectual powers; and he therefore “took too little from a great many things.” He fell into the double error of hastily applying his general laws to the most complicated processes of thought, without considering whether these general laws were not themselves limited by other not less comprehensive laws, and without trying to discover how they were connected with particulars, by a scale of intermediate and secondary laws. This mode of philosophising was well suited to the dogmatic confidence and dictatorial tone\* which belonged to the character of the philosopher of Malmesbury, and which enabled him to brave the obloquy attendant on singular and obnoxious opinions. “The plain historical method,” on the other hand, chosen by Mr. Locke, produced the natural fruits of caution and modesty; taught him to distrust hasty and singular conclusions; disposed him, on fit occasions, to entertain a mitigated scepticism; and taught him the rare courage to make an ingenuous avowal of ignorance. This contrast is one of our reasons for doubting whether Locke be much indebted to Hobbes for his speculations; and certainly the mere coincidence of the opinions of two metaphysicians is slender evidence, in any case, that either of them have borrowed his opinions from the other. Where the premises are different, and they have reached the same conclusion by different roads, such a coincidence is scarcely any evidence at all. Locke and Hobbes agree chiefly on those points in which, except the Cartesians, all the speculators of their age were also agreed. They differ on the most momentous questions—the sources of knowledge, the power of abstraction, the nature of the will; on the two last of which subjects, Locke, by his very failures themselves, evinces a strong repugnance to the doctrines of Hobbes. They differ not only in all their premises, and many of their conclusions, but in their manner of philosophising itself. Locke had no prejudice which could lead him to imbibe doctrines from the enemy of liberty and religion. His style, with all its faults, is that of a man who thinks for himself; and an original style is not usually the vehicle of borrowed opinions.

We have said more than we intended on Mr. Locke’s Essay, or on subjects which that Essay has suggested. Few books have contributed more to rectify prejudice—to undermine established errors—to diffuse a just mode of thinking—to excite a fearless spirit of enquiry—and yet to contain it within the boundaries which nature has prescribed to the human understanding. An amendment of the general habits of thought is, in most parts of knowledge, an object as important as even the discovery of new truths, though it is not so palpable, nor in its nature so capable of being estimated by superficial observers. In the mental and moral world, which scarcely admits of any thing which can be called discovery, the correction of the intellectual habits is probably the greatest service which can be rendered to science. In this respect the merit of

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\* “If I am not mistaken, the distinguishing character of Lucretius (I mean of his soul and genius) is a certain kind of noble pride, and positive assertion of his opinions. He is every where confident of his own reason, and assumes an absolute command, not only over his vulgar readers, but even his patron Memmius. From his time to ours, I know none so like him as our poet and philosopher of Malmesbury.” — *Dryden, Pref. to Second Misc. which contains Translations from Lucretius.*

Though it is an act of remarkable good nature in Dryden to call Hobbes a poet, yet his translations of the Iliad and Odyssey are perhaps the only long works in verse ever undertaken by any man in the eighty-sixth year of his age.

Locke is unrivalled. His writings have diffused throughout the civilised world the love of civil liberty—the spirit of toleration and charity in religious differences—the disposition to reject whatever is obscure, fantastic, or hypothetical in speculation—to reduce verbal disputes to their proper value—to abandon problems which admit of no solution—to distrust whatever cannot be clearly expressed—to render theory the simple expression of facts—and to prefer those studies which most directly contribute to human happiness. If Bacon first discovered the rules by which knowledge is improved, Locke has most contributed to make mankind at large observe them. He has done most, though often by remedies of silent and almost insensible operation, to cure those mental distempers which obstructed the adoption of these rules; and thus led to that general diffusion of a healthful and vigorous understanding, which is at once the greatest of all improvements, and the instrument by which all other improvements must be accomplished. He has left to posterity the instructive example of a prudent reformer, and of a philosophy temperate as well as liberal, which spares the feelings of the good, and avoids direct hostility with obstinate and formidable prejudice. These benefits are very slightly counterbalanced by some political doctrines liable to misapplication, and by the scepticism of some of his ingenious followers—an inconvenience to which every philosophical school is exposed, which does not steadily limit its theory to a mere exposition of experience. If Locke made few discoveries, Socrates made none. Yet both did more for the improvement of the understanding, and not less for the progress of knowledge, than the authors of the most brilliant discoveries. Mr. Locke will ever be regarded as one of the great ornaments of the English nation; and the most distant posterity will speak of him in the language addressed to him by the poet—

“ O Decus Angliacæ certe, o Lux altera gentis !”

*Gray, De Princ. Cogitand.*

The “ Treatise on the Law of War and Peace,” the “ Essay on Human Understanding,” the “ Spirit of Laws,” and the “ Inquiry into the Causes of the Wealth of Nations,” are the works which have most directly influenced the general opinion of Europe during the two last centuries. They are also the most conspicuous landmarks in the progress of the sciences to which they relate. It is remarkable that the defects of all these great works are very similar. The leading notions of none of them can, in the strictest sense, be said to be original, though Locke and Smith in that respect surpass their illustrious rivals. All of them employ great care in ascertaining those laws which are immediately deduced from experience, or directly applicable to practice; but apply metaphysical and abstract principles with considerable negligence. None pursues the order of science, beginning with first elements, and advancing to more and more complicated conclusions; though Locke is perhaps less defective in method than the rest. All admit digressions which, though often intrinsically excellent, distract attention, and break the chain of thought. None of them are happy in the choice, or constant in the use, of technical terms; and in none do we find much of that rigorous precision which is the first beauty of philosophical language. Grotius and Montesquieu were imitators of Tacitus,—the first with more gravity—the second with more vivacity; but both were tempted to forsake the simple diction of science, in pursuit of the poignant brevity which that great historian has carried to a vicious excess. Locke and Smith chose an easy, clear, and free, but somewhat loose and verbose, style—more concise in

Locke — more elegant in Smith, — in both exempt from pedantry, but not void of ambiguity and repetition. Perhaps all these apparent defects contributed in some degree to the specific usefulness of these great works; and, by rendering their contents more accessible and acceptable to the majority of readers, have more completely blended their principles with the common opinions of mankind.

Before we proceed to the consideration of the writings of Leibnitz, we cannot deny ourselves the pleasure of inserting in this place (with whatever departure from order) two letters between Sir Isaac Newton and Mr. Locke, published, for the first time, in this Discourse, which bear equal testimony to the meekness and humility of one of these great philosophers, and to the generous forgiveness of the other.

“ Sir Isaac Newton, himself an intimate friend of Locke’s, appears, from a letter of his which I have read in his own handwriting, to have felt precisely in the same manner with the author of the *Characteristics*. Such, at least, were his *first* impressions; although he afterwards requested, with a humility and candour worthy of himself, the forgiveness of Locke for this injustice done to his character. ‘ I beg your pardon (says he) for representing that you struck at the root of morality in a principle you laid down in your book of Ideas, and designed to pursue in another book; and that I took you for a Hobbist.’ In the same letter Newton alludes to certain unfounded suspicions which he had been led to entertain of the propriety of Locke’s conduct in some of their private concerns; adding, with an ingenuous and almost infantine simplicity, ‘ I was so much affected with this, that when one told me you was sickly and would not live, I answered, ’twere better if you were dead. I desire you to forgive me this uncharitableness.’ This letter is subscribed, *your most humble and most unfortunate servant, Is. Newton.*

“ The rough draught of Mr. Locke’s reply to these afflicting acknowledgments was kindly communicated to me by a friend some years ago. It is written with the magnanimity of a philosopher, and with the good-humoured forbearance of a man of the world; and it breathes throughout so tender and so unaffected a veneration for the good as well as great qualities of the excellent person to whom it is addressed, as demonstrates at once the conscious integrity of the writer, and the superiority of his mind to the irritation of little passions. I know of nothing from Locke’s pen which does more honour to his temper and character; and I introduce it with peculiar satisfaction, in connection with those strictures which truth has extorted from me on that part of his system which, to the moralist, stands most in need of explanation and apology.

“ ‘ MR. LOCKE TO MR. NEWTON.

“ ‘ SIR,

*Oates, 5th October, 93.*

“ ‘ I have been ever since I first knew you so kindly and sincerely your friend, and thought you so much mine, that I could not have believed what you tell me of yourself, had I had it from any body else. And though I cannot but be mightily troubled that you should have had so many wrong and unjust thoughts of me, yet, next to the return of good offices, such as from a sincere good will I have ever done you, I receive your acknowledgment of the contrary as the kindest thing you could have done me, since it gives me hopes I have not lost a friend I so much valued. After what your letter expresses, I shall not need to say any thing to justify myself to you: I shall always think your own reflection on my carriage both to you and all mankind will sufficiently do that. Instead of that, give me leave to assure you, that I am more ready to forgive you than you can be to desire it; and I do it so freely and fully that I wish for nothing more than the opportunity to convince you that I truly love and esteem you; and that I have still the same good will for you as if nothing of this had happened. To confirm this to you more fully, I should be glad to meet you any where, and the rather, because the conclusion of your letter makes me apprehend it would not be wholly useless to you. I shall always be ready to serve you to my utmost, in



any way you shall like, and shall only need your commands or permission to do it.

“ ‘ My book is going to press for a second edition ; and, though I can answer for the design with which I writ it, yet, since you have so opportunely given me notice of what you have said of it, I should take it as a favour if you would point out to me the places that gave occasion to that censure, that, by explaining myself better, I may avoid being mistaken by others, or unwillingly doing the least prejudice to truth or virtue. I am sure you are so much a friend to both, that, were you none to me, I could expect this from you. But I cannot doubt but you would do a great deal more than this for my sake, who, after all, have all the concern of a friend for you, wish you extremely well, and am, without compliment,’ &c. &c.

“ (For the preservation of this precious memorial of Mr. Locke, the public is indebted to the descendants of his friend and relation the Lord Chancellor King, to whom his papers and library were bequeathed. The original is still in the possession of the present representative of that noble family ; for whose flattering permission to enrich my Dissertation with the above extracts, I feel the more grateful, as I have not the honour of being personally known to his lordship.”)

The genius of Leibnitz, as well as the character of his philosophy, was diametrically opposite to that of Locke. Their names are the most conspicuous in the two schools of philosophy, which, for want of better names, may be called *experimental* and *speculative*, though some of their followers have gone nearer to both extremes than their masters, while others have remained at various points in the space between them. The tendency of Leibnitz's mind was wholly speculative. He applied the whole force of his understanding to the first principles of knowledge, and almost disregarded those subordinate laws which immediately regulate the phenomena. Though one of the greatest mathematicians of his age, he partook in a very small degree its experimental spirit. Singular as it may seem, this highly abstract character of his system inclined his mind to tolerate, and almost to acquiesce in, most received opinions. It is a favourite maxim, which he often repeats, “ *that most received doctrines will bear a good sense.*” \* By a good sense, he means a construction which makes them reconcilable with his philosophy. His object not being to correct particular opinions, but to make proselytes to his general principles, he was always ready to conclude a peace with powerful prejudices. Hence, the Leibnitzian system is full of accommodation and compromise with popular opinion, while it deviates most widely from the general principles of former philosophers ; and this peculiarity is in part the cause of his often conveying his doctrines in no very clear terms, where perspicuity might have embarrassed his negotiations with prejudice. Though Leibnitz was not insincere, the tendency of this mode of philosophising is towards indistinct opinions and equivocal language. Mr. Locke, on the other hand, the tendency of whose philosophy was practical, could make no compromise with established errors ; for he gained nothing unless he corrected general opinion on important points.

It does not seem to be generally known, at least in this country, that Leibnitz actually composed a work which was intended to be an answer to the “ *Essay on Human Understanding.*” This very important work is not contained in Dutens's edition of his works, and for that reason, perhaps, does not appear to have been known to Mr. Stewart. It was published at Amsterdam in 1765, by Raspe, from Leibnitz's manuscripts in the library at Hanover, under the title of “ *New Essays on the Human Understanding.*”

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\* Nouv. Ess. liv. i. chap. 2.

It consists of a series of remarks on Locke, whom he examines, chapter by chapter, and was written, as he tells us, when he was either travelling or at Herenhausen with the court of Hanover.\* One reason of his opposition to Mr. Locke he says was, that the latter philosopher “weakened too much the *generous philosophy* of the Platonists, which Des Cartes had in part restored, and had substituted for it opinions which lowered mankind, and even injured morality, contrary to the intention of the author, which was very good.” Another general observation of Leibnitz coincides remarkably with the remarks in the present Discourse, on the difference between the philosophy of Mr. Locke and that of Gassendi. “Perhaps the opinions of our able author are not so far from mine as they appear to be. For, after having employed the whole of his first book against innate knowledge, taken in a certain sense, he acknowledges, in the beginning of the second, that there are ideas which do not originate from the senses, but which arise from reflection. Now, reflection is nothing but attention to that which passes within us; and the senses do not convey to us what we already possess within ourselves. Can it then be denied that there is much innate in the mind? The mind is itself innate, and there are included in it substance, duration, change, action, perception, pleasure, and a thousand other objects of our intellectual ideas. These objects being always present to our understandings (though from distractions and wants we are not always conscious of them), why should it be thought wonderful that we should call the ideas, with all that depends upon them, innate?” (p. 7.) “The ideas of existence, of possibility, of identity, are so evidently innate, that they enter into all our thoughts and reasonings, and I consider them as essential to our understanding.” (p. 58.) “The axiom received among philosophers will be objected to me, that *there is nothing in the understanding which does not come from the senses*. But we must except the understanding itself and its affections (*i. e.* its properties). But the mind contains existence, substance, the one, the same, cause, perception, reasoning, and many other notions which the senses cannot give. *This agrees pretty well with the author of the Essay, who ascribes a considerable part of our ideas to the reflection of the mind on its own nature.*” (p. 67.) “*All the primitive truths, either of reason or of fact, have this in common, that they cannot be proved by any thing more certain.*” † (p. 331.)

The coincidence of some of these remarks with those of Mr. Stewart on the “*Essay on Human Understanding*,” and of others of them with the doctrines of the modern opponents of Mr. Locke, cannot fail to attract the attention of those who are conversant with metaphysical controversies. The language is very different; the writers are trained in different schools, and have reached their conclusions by different roads. There is no suspicion of plagiarism. But the opinions and reasonings have a strong resemblance to each other. We shall venture on one or two more

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\* *Nouv. Ess. sur l'Intendement Humain*, Amsterdam, 1765, Preface, p. xii. This work is mentioned by Leibnitz in his second letter to Remond in Dutens's edition, vol. ii. Some short remarks of the same nature he had before sent to Mr. Burnet of Kemnay; Dutens, vi. 232. These last Mr. Locke saw and slighted; see his Letter to Mr. Molyneux, 10th April 1697. They are printed in his works, and are indeed very cursory: *Locke's Work*, iii. 561. folio, London, 1714.

† The primitive truths of reason in the system of Leibnitz are identical propositions.

extracts from a book which is very rare, as well as important in the history of philosophy.

“The reality of sensible objects is sufficiently established by the connection of constant observation. As reason and observation give us the *means of judging of the future in its relation to our welfare*, and as the events correspond with our reasonable judgments, we can neither ask nor have a greater certainty on these subjects. *To doubt seriously, is to doubt in relation to practice.*” (p. 412.) “It is not impossible, metaphysically speaking, that there should be a dream as durable and connected as the life of man; but it is a supposition as contrary to reason, as that of a book formed by throwing types in a dice-box.\* And *it is true, that, provided the phenomena are connected, it is of no consequence whether they are called dreams or not, since experience shows that we are not disappointed in the measures which we take concerning phenomena, when these measures are founded on the principles of reason.*” (p. 389.) It is curious to observe, in these last passages, how clearly Leibnitz foresaw such an opposition as that of Berkeley to the existence of matter, and how low he rated the practical consequences of the question. He did not, like Dr. Johnson, suppose that striking his foot against a stone was a refutation of idealism; nor did he, like Dr. Beattie, imagine that the idealist, if he were consistent with himself, should have no fear of falling over a precipice. He saw that, in the ideal theory, the distinction between reality and illusion is as clear as in any other account of the origin of our perceptions, though there is some difference in the terms which were employed to denote that distinction. The idealist, indeed, is no more to be charged with inconsistency for complying with common language, than the Copernican who says that the sun rises and sets. Many of the expressions of Leibnitz on this subject, have a striking resemblance to the admirable deductions of *Turgot*, contained in the article *EXISTENCE* in the *Encyclopædia*.

The extreme difficulty which Mr. Stewart feels in entering into the notion of *Monads*, seems to us somewhat singular, especially considering the manner in which he speaks of the indivisible points or centres of attraction and repulsion, which, according to the system of Boscovich, constitute the material world.† It is not easy to discover such a distinction between these two modes of thinking or of speaking, as will justify us in considering that of Boscovich as admissible, and treating that of Leibnitz as wholly inconceivable. The external world, in the opinion of Leibnitz, is only a “*series of regular and connected phenomena.*” These phenomena consist in the action and reaction of the parts of what is called Matter on each other. Every part acts on every other part — every action affects the whole; or, in other words, the state of one part remains the same, when that of any other part is changed. These reci-

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\* This observation is rather indicative of the compromising spirit of Leibnitz, than of his real opinion.

† See Boscovich's Supplements to the ingenious poem of *Stacy*, 1755. That these two philosophical Jesuits enjoyed professorships at Rome, and that the “*Principia*” of Newton were published there by papal permission, are honourable proofs that the spirit of toleration had made great progress in Italy since the time of Galileo. A system of Ethics, founded on the principles of English philosophers, has appeared at Rome within these two years. It is written by *Sebastiani*, the editor of *Lycophron*, and deserves to be mentioned, not only for its own merit and singularity, but as a creditable example of the liberal administration of the Roman state.

procal actions Leibnitz referred to certain agents analogous to the thinking principle of man in their simplicity, and endowed with what he calls *Perception*; but which, as he restricts it, seems to be only the power of being so acted on by other agents as to exhibit the material phenomena. He says, indeed, that they represent the whole universe, or that each is a mirror of the whole; but these phrases amount only to this, that all the parts of the universe are connected, and that an intellect of sufficient power would discover in each the manner in which it is affected by the changes of all the rest. "Each monade," says Kaestner \*, "represents the world only as a thermometer represents the warmth, or a barometer the weight, of the atmosphere." We do not contend for the truth, still less for the usefulness, of these representations. But they seem to us intelligible; and the language is not more objectionable than that of Boscovich, when he tells us that "*points* are *endowed* with *powers* of attraction and repulsion." The truth is, that the Leibnitzian philosophy is a system of immaterialism, though differently modified from that of Berkeley, and deduced from different principles. If Mr. Stewart has any quality which has an unfavourable influence on his mind as an historian of philosophy, perhaps it is that honest and steady adherence to his own principles which renders him incapable of the momentary assumption of the opinions of other men, which is often necessary faithfully to represent, or even perfectly to conceive them.

We do not intend to make any observation on the atheistical or pantheistical system of Spinoza; but, as a matter of historical curiosity, to point out two mistakes into which Mr. Stewart has fallen in his account of that celebrated Jew. He supposes that those writers who ascribe a Hebrew origin to Spinozism, mean thereby to impute its rise to the immorality of the author's countrymen at Amsterdam. The fact is, that the most ancient Rabbinical philosophy, which, like many other Oriental speculations, had a tendency towards pantheism, is generally, as well as reasonably, supposed to have influenced the opinions of Spinoza. Neither is it true, as is here asserted †, that the political opinions of Spinoza coincided with those of Hobbes. On the contrary, he inclines against monarchy ‡; he observes, that as one man cannot really rule a multitude, the most absolute monarchy becomes a practical aristocracy in the hands of the ministers and advisers of the king; and that monarchy is then most secure, when it is so constituted as to direct its administration to the public good. Some of his limitations of monarchical power are, indeed, fantastic. His arguments in favour of a large aristocracy §, which he commends as the form of government *most favourable to liberty*, are ingenious, and, as far as relate to a comparison with absolute monarchy, perfectly solid. His chapter on Democracy is unfinished. It contains nothing very remarkable, but a formal argument in defence of the exclusion of women from political privileges. There is another most material

\* *Nouv. Ess.* Preface, p. vi.—Abraham Kaestner, who wrote this able preface, was a distinguished mathematician and professor of mathematics, for nearly half a century, at Goettingen, where he died in 1800, at the age of eighty-one, probably the last Leibnitzian in Europe.

† *Disc.* p. 75. *note*.

‡ "Servitutis igitur non pacis interest omnem potestatem ad unum transferre; nam pax ut jam diximus non in belli privatione, sed in animorum unione consistit." *Tract. Pol.* cap. vi. § 4.

§ Cap. viii. Cap. xi.

question, concerning which Spinoza differs radically from Hobbes. In the eyes of the philosopher of Malmesbury, the religion of each country depends absolutely on the sovereign. Not content with regarding an established Church as a creature of the State, he considers belief in the doctrines, or divine authority of religion itself, as an act of obedience due to the supreme power. Open dissent is with him rebellion.\* Spinoza, on the other hand, not content with contending for toleration, of which his experience in Holland had taught him the benefits, objected altogether to an established church; a circumstance the more deserving of notice, because we believe him to be the earliest writer who opposed religious establishments on grounds of general policy †, which are wholly unconnected in argument with his own anti-religious opinions.

It would be inexcusable to revive the mention of such a controversy as that which relates to liberty and necessity, for any other purpose than to inculcate mutual candour, and to censure the introduction of invidious topics. If there were any hope of terminating that endless and fruitless controversy, the most promising expedient would be a general agreement to banish the technical terms hitherto employed on both sides from philosophy, and to limit ourselves rigorously to a statement of those facts in which all men agree, expressed in language perfectly purified from all tincture of system. The agreement in facts would then probably be found to be much more extensive than is often suspected by either party. Experience is, and indeed must be, equally appealed to by both. All mankind feel and own, that their actions are at least very much affected by their situation, their opinions, their feelings, and their habits; yet no man would deserve the compliment of confutation, who seriously professed to doubt the distinction between right and wrong, the reasonableness of moral approbation and disapprobation, the propriety of praising and censuring voluntary actions, the justice of rewarding or punishing them according to their intention and tendency. No reasonable person, in whatever terms he may express himself concerning the will, has ever meant to deny that man has powers and faculties which justify the moral judgments of the human race. Every advocate of free will admits the fact of the influence of motives, from which the Necessarian infers the truth of his opinion. Every Necessarian must also admit those attributes of moral and responsible agency, for the sake of which the advocate of liberty considers his own doctrine as of such unspeakable importance. Both parties ought equally to own, that the matter in dispute is a question of fact relating to the mind, which must be ultimately decided by its own consciousness. The Necessarian is even bound to admit, that no speculation is tenable on this subject, which is not reconcilable to the general opinions of mankind, and which does not afford a satisfactory explanation of that part of common language which at first sight appears to be most at variance with it.

After the actual antecedents of volition had been thus admitted by

\* Leviathan, Part iii.

† “ Ad religionem quod attinet, nulla planè templa urbium sumptibus ædificanda, nec jura de opinionibus statuenda, nisi seditiosæ sint et civitatis fundamenta evertant. Ii igitur quibus religionem publicè exercere conceditur, templum si velint suis sumptibus ædificent.” *Tract. Politic.* cap. vi. § 40. The general reason is assigned in the following chapter. “ Cæterum religionis sive Deum colendi jus nemo in alium transferre potest.” *Id.* cap. vii. § 26. This is a reason founded on the sacredness of religion.

one party, and its moral consequences by another, the subject of contention would be reduced to the question, What is the state of the mind in the interval which passes between motive and action? or, to speak with still more strict propriety, By what words is that state of the mind most accurately described? If this habit of thinking could be steadily and long preserved, so evanescent a subject of dispute might perhaps in the end disappear, and the contending parties might at length discover that they had been only looking at opposite sides of the same truth. But the terms Liberty and Necessity embroil the controversy, inflame the temper of disputants, and involve them in clouds of angry zeal, which render them incapable, not only of perceiving their numerous and important coincidences, but even of clearly discerning the single point on which they differ. Every generous sentiment, and every hostile passion of human nature, have for ages been connected with these two words. They are the badges of the oldest, the widest, and the most obstinate warfare waged by metaphysicians. Whoever refuses to try the experiment of renouncing them, at least for a time, can neither be a peace-maker nor a friend of dispassionate discussion; and, if he stickles for mere words, he may be justly suspected of being almost aware that he is contending for nothing but words.

But if projects of perpetual peace should be as Utopian in the schools as in the world, it is the more necessary to condemn the use of weapons which exasperate animosity, without contributing to decide the contest. Of this nature, in our opinion, are the imputations of irreligion and immorality, which have for ages been thrown on those divines and philosophers who have espoused Necessarian opinions. Mr. Stewart, though he anxiously acquits individuals of evil intention, has too much lent the weight of his respectable opinion to these useless and inflammatory charges. We are at a loss to conceive how he could imagine that there is the slightest connection between the doctrine of necessity and the system of Spinoza. That the world is governed by a Supreme Mind, which is invariably influenced by the dictates of its own wisdom and goodness, seems to be the very essence of theism; and no man who substantially dissents from that proposition, can deserve the name of a pure theist. But this is precisely the reverse of the doctrine of Spinoza, which, in spite of all its ingenious disguises, undoubtedly denies the supremacy of mind. This objection, however, has already been answered, not only by the pious and profound Jonathan Edwards\*, an avowed Necessarian, but by Mr. Locke, whose opinions about this question are not very distinct, and even by Dr. Clarke himself, the ablest and most celebrated of the advocates of liberty.† To these religious philosophers we need only refer our readers for a satisfactory vindication of the Necessarians on this subject.‡

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\* Enquiry into Free Will, Part iv. c. 7.

† Demon. of the Being and Attributes, &c.

‡ The most conclusive authority is that of Butler, who, though an opponent of necessity, expressly acquits it of inconsistency with morality and religion. The sixth chapter of the first part of his Analogy is entitled, "Of the Opinion of Necessity considered as influencing Practice;" and concludes thus:—"From these things we may learn in what sense to understand that general assertion, that the opinion of necessity is essentially destructive of all religion. *First*, in a practical sense; that by this notion *atheistic men pretend to satisfy and encourage themselves in vice*: and, *secondly*, in the strictest sense, that it is a contradiction to the whole constitution of nature, and to what we every moment experience in

The charge of immoral tendency, however, deserves more serious consideration, as it has been repeatedly enforced by Mr. Stewart, and brought forward also by Dr. Copplestone\*; the only writer of our time who has equally distinguished himself in paths so distant from each other as classical literature, political economy, and metaphysical philosophy. His general candour and temperance give weight to his accusation; and it is likely to be conveyed to posterity by a volume, which is one of the best models of philosophical style that our age has produced.†

The sermons of Dr. Copplestone do, indeed, directly relate to theology. But, in this case, it is impossible to separate that subject from philosophy. Necessity is a philosophical opinion relating to the human will. Predestination is a theological doctrine, concerning the moral government of the world. But since the writings of Leibnitz and Jonathan Edwards, all supporters of predestination endeavour to show its reasonableness by the arguments of the Necessarian. It is possible, and indeed very common, to hold the doctrine of necessity, without adopting many of the dogmas which the Calvinist connects with it. But it is not possible to make any argumentative defence of Calvinism, which is not founded on the principle of necessity. The moral consequences of both (whatever they may be) must be the same; and both opinions are, accordingly, represented by their opponents as tending, in a manner very similar, to weaken the motives to virtuous action.‡

There is no topic which requires such strong grounds to justify its admission into controversy, as that of moral consequences; for, besides its incurable tendency to inflame the angry passions, and to excite obloquy against individuals, which renders it a practical restraint on free enquiry, the employment of it in dispute seems to betray apprehensions derogatory from the dignity of morals, and not consonant either to the dictates of reason or to the lessons of experience. The rules of morality are too deeply rooted in human nature, to be shaken by every veering breath of

ourselves; and so overturns every thing. But by no means is this assertion to be understood as if necessity, supposing it could possibly be reconciled with the constitution of things, and what we experience, were not also reconcilable with religion; for, upon this supposition, it is demonstrably so."

It is evident that the above passage affirms three things.

*First*, That necessity is destructive of religion and morality, when it is, in practice, misapplied to that purpose by bad men—which may also be said of liberty, or of any other opinion.

*Secondly*, That if it has other qualities which would prove it to be false, it is in that case also destructive of religion—which is impertinent to the question. And,

*Thirdly*, That if it be true, it is not inconsistent with religion and morality—which is all that it can be incumbent on a Necessarian to maintain.

\* Discourses preached before the University of Oxford. London, 1821.

† See a sermon of Archbishop King, republished by Mr. Whately, an ingenious and learned member of Oriel College; a distinguished society, which, besides its other merits, is at present the school of speculative philosophy in England. The note of this ingenious gentleman in p. 100., and the chapter of Tucker, to which he refers, would, we conceive, be assented to by most Necessarians;—allowance being made for the strong and perhaps excessive propensity of Tucker to accommodate his statements to popular conception and established opinions,—a disposition which was not without influence on the mind of his great follower, Paley.

‡ In a note to the Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, prefixed to the new edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, Sir James Mackintosh acknowledges that this article was written by him, and explains more fully his views upon the doctrine of predestination. See Appendix to this work.

metaphysical theory. Our moral sentiments spring from no theory. They are as general as any part of our nature ; the causes which generate, or unfold and nourish them, lie deep in the unalterable interests of society, and in those primitive feelings of the human heart which no circumstances can eradicate. The experience of all ages teaches, that these deep-rooted principles are far less affected than is commonly supposed by the revolutions of philosophical opinion, which scarcely penetrate beyond the surface of human nature. Exceptions there doubtless are ; the most speculative opinions are not pretended to be absolutely indifferent in their moral tendency ; and it is needless to make an express exception of those opinions which directly relate to practice, and which may have a considerable moral effect. But, in general, the power of the moral feelings, and the feebleness of speculative opinions, are among the most striking phenomena in the history of mankind. What teacher, either philosophical or religious, has ever been successful in spreading his doctrines, who did not reconcile them to our moral sentiments, and even recommend them by pretensions to a purer and more severe morality? Wherever there is a seeming or a real repugnance between speculative opinions and moral rules, the speculator has always been compelled to devise some compromise which, with whatever sacrifice of consistency, may appease the alarmed conscience of mankind. The favour of a few is too often earned by flattering their vicious passions ; but no immoral system ever acquired popularity. Wherever there is a contest, the speculations yield, and the principles prevail. The victory is equally decisive, whether the obnoxious doctrine be renounced, or so modified as no longer to dispute the legitimate authority of conscience.

Nature has provided other guards for virtue against the revolt of sophistry and the inconstancy of opinion. The whole system of morality is of great extent, and comprehends a variety of principles and sentiments, of duties and virtues. Wherever new and singular speculation has been at first sight thought to weaken some of the motives of moral activity, it has almost uniformly been found, by longer experience, that the same speculation itself makes amends, by strengthening other inducements to right conduct. There is thus a principle of compensation in the opinions, as in the circumstances of man ; which, though not sufficient to level distinction and to exclude preference, has yet such power, that it ought to appease our alarms and to soften our controversies. A moral nature assimilates every speculation which it does not reject. If these general reasonings be just, with what increased force do they prove the innocence of error, in a case where, as there seems to be no possibility of difference about facts, the mistake of either party must be little more than verbal ?

We have much more ample experience respecting the practical tendency of religious than of philosophical opinions. The latter were formerly confined to the schools, and are still limited to persons of some education. They are generally kept apart from our passions and our business, and are entertained, as Cicero said of the Stoical paradoxes, more as a subject of dispute than as a rule of life. Religious opinions, on the contrary, are spread over ages and nations ; they are felt, perhaps, most strongly by the more numerous classes of mankind ; wherever they are sincerely entertained, they must be regarded as the most serious of all concerns ; they are often incorporated with the warmest passions of which the human heart is capable ; and, in this state, from their eminently social and sympathetic nature, they are capable of becoming the



ruling principle of action in vast multitudes. Let us therefore appeal to experience, on the moral influence of Necessarian opinions in their theological form. By doing so, we shall have an opportunity of contemplating the principle in its most active state, operating upon the greatest masses, and for the longest time. Predestination, or doctrines much inclining towards it, have, on the whole, prevailed in the Christian churches of the West since the days of Augustine and Aquinas. Who were the first formidable opponents of these doctrines in the Church of Rome? The Jesuits, — the contrivers of courtly casuistry, and the founders of lax morality. Who, in the same church, inclined to the stern theology of Augustine? The Jansenists — the teachers and the models of austere morals. What are we to think of the morality of Calvinistic nations, especially of the most numerous classes of them, who seem, beyond all other men, to be most zealously attached to their religion, and most deeply penetrated with its spirit? Here, if any where, we have a practical and a decisive test of the moral influence of a belief in Necessarian opinions. In Protestant Switzerland, in Holland, in Scotland, among the English Nonconformists and the Protestants of the north of Ireland, in the New-England states, Calvinism long was the prevalent faith, and is probably still the faith of a considerable majority. Their moral education was at least completed, and their collective character formed, during the prevalence of Calvinistic opinions. Yet where are communities to be found of a more pure and active virtue? Perhaps these, and other very striking facts, might justify speculations of a somewhat singular nature, and even authorise a retort upon our respectable antagonists. But we have no such purpose. It is sufficient for us to do what in us lies to mitigate the acrimony of controversy, to teach disputants on both sides to respect the sacred neutrality of morals, and to show that the provident and parental care of nature has sufficiently provided for the permanent security of the principles of virtue.

If we were to amuse ourselves in remarks on the practical tendency of opinions, we might with some plausibility contend, that there was a tendency in infidelity to produce Toryism. In England alone, we might appeal to the examples of Hobbes, Bolingbroke, Hume, and Gibbon; and to the opposite cases of Milton, Locke, Addison, Clarke, even Newton himself, for the last of these great men was also a Whig. The only remarkable example which now occurs to us of a zealous believer who was a bigoted Tory, is that of Dr. Johnson; and we may balance against him the whole, or the greater part of the life of his illustrious friend, Mr. Burke. We would not, however, rest much on observations founded on so small an experience, that the facts may arise from causes wholly independent of the opinion. But another unnoticed coincidence may serve as an introduction to a few observations on the scepticisms of the eighteenth century.

The three most celebrated sceptics of modern times, have been zealous partisans of high authority in government. It would be rash to infer, from the remarkable examples of this coincidence, in Montaigne, Bayle, and Hume, that there is a natural connection between Scepticism and Toryism; or, even, if there were a tendency to such a connection, that it might not be counteracted by more powerful circumstances, or by stronger principles of human nature. It is more worth while, therefore, to consider the particulars in the history of these three eminent persons, which may have strengthened or created this propensity.

Montaigne, who was methodical in nothing, does not indeed profess

systematic scepticism. He was a freethinker who loosened the ground about received opinions, and indulged his humour in arguing on both sides of most questions. But the sceptical tendency of his writings is evident; and there is, perhaps, nowhere to be found a more vigorous attack on popular innovations, than in the latter part of the 22d Essay of his First Book. But there is no need of any general speculations to account for the repugnance to change, felt by a man who was wearied and exasperated by the horrors of forty years' civil war.

The case of Bayle is more remarkable. Though banished from France as a Protestant, he published, without his name, a tract, entitled, "Advice to the Refugees," in the year 1690, which could be considered in no other light than that of an apology for Louis XIV., an attack on the Protestant cause, and a severe invective against his companions in exile. He declares, in this unavowed work, for absolute power and passive obedience, and inveighs, with an intemperance scarcely ever found in his avowed writings, against "the execrable doctrines of Buchanan," and the "pretended sovereignty of the people," without sparing even the just and glorious Revolution, which had at that moment preserved the constitution of England, the Protestant religion, and the independence of Europe. It is no wonder, therefore, that he was considered as a partisan of France, and a traitor to the Protestant cause; nor can we much blame King William for regarding him as an object of jealous policy. Many years after, he was represented to Lord Sunderland as an enemy of the allies, and a detractor of their great captain the Duke of Marlborough. The generous friendship of the illustrious author of "The Characteristics" — the opponent of Bayle on almost every question of philosophy, government, and, we may add, religion — preserved him, on that occasion, from the sad necessity of seeking a new place of refuge in the very year of his death.\* The vexations which Bayle underwent in Holland from the Calvinist ministers, and his long warfare against their leader Jurieu, who was a zealous assertor of popular opinions, may have given this bias to his mind, and disposed him to "fly from petty tyrants to the throne." His love of paradox may have had its share; for passive obedience was considered as a most obnoxious paradox in the schools and societies of the oppressed Calvinists. His enemies, however, did not fail to impute his conduct to a design of paying his court to Louis XIV., and to the hope of being received with open arms in France; motives which seem to be at variance both with the general integrity of his life, and with his favourite passion for the free indulgence of philosophical speculation.

The scepticism of Bayle must, however, be distinguished from that of Hume. The former of these celebrated writers examined many questions in succession, and laboured to show that doubt was, on all of them, the result of examination. His, therefore, is a sort of inductive scepticism, in which general doubt was an inference from numerous examples of uncertainty in particular cases. It is a kind of appeal to experience, whether so many failures in the search of truth ought not to deter wise men from continuing the pursuit. Content with proving, or seeming to himself to prove, that we have not attained certainty, he does not attempt to prove that we *cannot* reach it.

The doctrine of Mr. Hume, on the other hand, is not that we have not reached truth, but that we never can reach it. It is an absolute and universal system of scepticism, professing to be derived from the very

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\* Supplement de Chauffepied, art. Bayle, and Bayle's own Letters.

structure of the understanding, which, if any man could seriously believe it, would render it impossible for him to form an opinion upon any subject — to give the faintest assent to any proposition — to ascribe any meaning to the words truth and falsehood — to believe, to enquire, or to reason ; and, on the very same ground, to disbelieve, to dissent, or to doubt — to adhere to his own principle of universal doubt ; and, lastly, if he be consistent with himself, even to *think*. It is not easy to believe that speculations so shadowy, which never can pretend to be more than the amusements of idle ingenuity, should have any influence on the opinions of men of great understanding, concerning the most important concerns of human life. But perhaps it may be reasonable to allow, that the same character which disposes men to scepticism, may dispose them also to acquiesce in considerable abuses, and even oppressions, rather than to seek redress in forcible resistance. Men of such a character have misgivings in every enterprise ; their acuteness is exercised in devising objections — in discovering difficulties — in foreseeing obstacles ; they hope little from human wisdom and virtue, and are rather secretly prone to that indolence and indifference which forbade the Epicurean sage to hazard his quiet for the doubtful interests of a contemptible race. They do not lend a credulous ear to the Utopian projector ; they doubt whether the evils of change will be so little, or the benefits of reform so great, as the sanguine reformer foretells that they will be. The sceptical temper of Mr. Hume may have thus insensibly moulded his political opinions. But causes still more obvious and powerful had probably much more share in rendering him so zealous a partisan of regal power. In his youth, the presbyterians, to whose enmity his opinions exposed him, were the zealous and only friends of civil liberty in Scotland\* ; and the close connection of liberty with Calvinism, made both more odious to him. The gentry in most parts of Scotland, except in the west, were then Jacobites ; and his early education was probably among that party. The prejudices, which he perhaps imbibed in France against the literature of England, extended to her institutions ; and in the state of English opinion, when his history was published, if he sought distinction by paradox, he could not so effectually have obtained his object by the most startling of his metaphysical dogmas, as by his doubts of the genius of Shakspeare, and the virtue of Hampden.

We shall not follow Mr. Stewart through his observations on the philosophers of the continent. We agree with him in considering Condillac's Theory of the Origin of Knowledge as being not an improvement, but an exaggeration of the Lockian philosophy ; the ultimate result of the least valuable parts of the " Essay on Human Understanding." After all, it is not more remarkable, that, among the followers of Locke, there should be materialists, idealists, and absolute sceptics, than that Antisthenes and Aristippus, as well as Xenophon and Plato, should have issued from the school of Socrates. The resemblance is chiefly observable, as it shows that the impulse which is commonly given to the human mind by tur-

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\* We remember to have been struck by some remarks on this subject in the preface to a new edition of the Edinburgh Review of 1755, which appeared in London three or four years ago. This republication will gratify the lovers of literary anecdote, as it publishes, for the first time, the names of the writers of each article in that Review — Dr. Smith, Dr. Robertson, Lord Roslyn, &c. It is also very curious as a record of the state of literature and speculation in Scotland in the middle of the eighteenth century.

bulence and fanaticism, was, in one instance at least, imparted to it by the two wisest and most humble philosophers of the ancient and modern world. There is, perhaps, no name in the history of philosophy which has been so unjustly neglected as that of Buffier. His "Treatise on the First Truths," the only work of his known in this country, is but a part of a general system of the sciences\*, and cannot be fully estimated without observing its relations to the other parts of the system. With all the merits of that treatise, it is little more than an expansion of that immortal fragment, where the genius of Pascal has assembled, in the space of two pages, all that ever has been, or ever can be, said for and against universal scepticism.† Common sense, according to this philosophical Jesuit, is a disposition implanted by nature in all men, to believe certain propositions which relate to objects, without the proper sphere of consciousness, and which are not deduced from any anterior proposition. This principle, he observes, has nothing in common with innate ideas; for it is a disposition which does not act till the ideas, which are its natural objects, are presented to the mind. First truths, in his view of them, are distinguished by this quality, that nothing more clear than themselves can be urged in support of them, or in opposition to them. Like Condillac, he has applied his philosophy to the arts, of which language is either the object or the instrument—to eloquence, to poetry, and to grammar. Poetry he calls a very animated eloquence‡: a gross error, which some fine passages of Voltaire and Corneille may extenuate, but which no man who felt *Phedre* and *Athalie* could heartily entertain. His excellent work on Grammar was perhaps the first example of philosophical grammar in the French language. A considerable space in his course is occupied by a treatise on Ethics, in which all the duties of life are deduced from the tendency of their observance to ensure the happiness of the agent as connected with that of his fellow men. "I desire to be happy," says Buffier; "but I live in society with other men, who likewise desire to be happy. Let us try to discover the means by which I may increase my own happiness, while I augment, or at least do not diminish, that of others."—"This is the foundation of all human wisdom; the source from which all virtues, purely natural, flow; the general principle of all morals, and of all human society." This is that principle of utility, which, under different forms, has been considered as the basis of ethics by so many moralists; from Cicero, who represents it to be the first object of morality, "*ut eadem sit utilitas uniuscujusque et universorum,*" to the poet who teaches us, "*that true self-love, and social, are the same.*" It ought to be added, that the writings of Buffier are remarkable for that perfect clearness of expression which, since Des Cartes and Pascal§, has

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\* Cours de Sciences sur des Principes nouveaux et simples; pour former le Langage, l'Esprit, et le Cœur, dans l'usage ordinaire de la Vie. Par le Père Buffier de la Compagnie de Jesus. Folio. Paris, 1732. This collection of his works is so rare, that we have never seen any copy but that which is now in our own possession.

† Pensées de Pascal, Partie 2de, Art. 1er. See Edinburgh Review, vol. xxii. pp. 235—238.

‡ He adds indeed, "which employs versification instead of ordinary language, and fiction instead of reasoning." But this addition does not correct the radical vice of the conception.

§ There are few passages more valuable to the student of philosophy, than the second and third articles of the First Part of "Pascal's Thoughts;" especially the Eight Rules for Definitions, Axioms, and Definitions formed from the example of

been so generally diffused among French writers, that it may now be regarded as one of the enviable peculiarities of their language.\*

We have already said, that we shall not be tempted, by this Discourse, into the extensive field of German speculation. Perhaps it would have been better if Mr. Stewart had preferred silence on this subject, to judgments formed with imperfect means of information. At all events, it would have been more conformable to those generous principles which usually influence his criticism, to have presumed favourably, or at least to have spoken cautiously, of philosophers whom he cannot hear in their own defence, than to have given full scope to the prepossessions of his school and his country, and to have lent some countenance to the prejudices of the vulgar against their opinions and their talents.

The metaphysical paroxysm of Germany has, however, disappeared. Kant and his successors, together with their opponents, have ceased to occupy that degree of public attention which it was not agreeable to the common course of human affairs that writers on such subjects should ever enjoy. Such vicissitudes, in former times, suggested the observation of Mr. Hume. "A pleasant comedy, which paints the manners of the age, and exposes a faithful picture of Nature, is a durable work, and is transmitted to the latest posterity. But a system, whether physical or metaphysical, owes commonly its success to its novelty; and is no sooner canvassed with impartiality, than its weakness is discovered." Farther reflection, though it may not lead us altogether to dissent from this fine and striking remark, will warrant some hesitation in adopting the opinion, that philosophical systems are worthless. To the common observer, indeed, they seem to pass away, without leaving behind a trace of their transitory sway. But the succession of opinions and of schools constitutes the long education of the human understanding. Each system will, on due examination, be found to be best adapted to the condition of the minds of men at the period of its rise: and there is none which does not throw a stronger light on some particular part of the edifice of knowledge. Every one brings into view some truth overlooked, or slightly examined by others; and the most defective cures some distemper of the understanding, however it may produce or aggravate other intellectual maladies. The very prevalence of a set of opinions is a sufficient proof that, for the time, they are better fitted than any other to rouse, to strengthen, and to sharpen the faculties of mankind. In this great process, opposite errors gradually correct each other, and every side of every question is fully and minutely surveyed. The torrent soon subsides, and is dried up; but each, in its course, deposits some particles of genuine ore, and furnishes some facts and observations for that fabric of truth which slowly, but constantly, arises, even amidst the errors which seem to obstruct its progress.

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Geometricians, but in some degree applicable to all reasoning; which seem to us admirable for their simplicity and perspicuity, and for a sort of homely usefulness, which is one of the rarest merits of a metaphysician.

\* A late publication at Paris seems strongly to indicate a disposition, among French philosophers, to consider Condillac's "Account of the Origin of Knowledge" as incomplete and unsatisfactory. "Leçons de Philosophie. Par M. Laromiguière. Paris, 1820, édition 2de." We know this work hitherto only from some able criticisms on it in the "*Journal des Savans*." From these we should conjecture, that the speculations of the author bore some resemblance to those of the late most ingenious Dr. Brown, which we should rejoice in an opportunity of examining with the attention due to their great importance.

The attention of the Germans has recently been turned to other subjects, which naturally lead us to attend Mr. Stewart, for a moment, in his short observations on the philosophy of languages\*,—on the grand retrospect of Asiatic civilisation,—and on the bright prospects of improvement in America; subjects which he evidently considers as not unconnected with each other, and which he rightly deems not foreign to a “History of the Science of Human Nature.”

On the first of these subjects, the German scholars received their first impulse from Leibnitz, some of whose boldest speculations relate to the arrangement and analogies of languages, viewed in their connection with the early annals of our species. The celebrated Mr. W. Schlegel, who has presented Calderon and Shakspeare to his countrymen with an animated fidelity which has astonished the scholars of Spain and of England, and who has more recently seconded the exertions of *M. Raynouard* to recover the Grammar and History of that celebrated Romance dialect which is commonly called Provençal, has at last turned his philological powers to the elucidation of Sanscrit; and, with the aid of his brother, and of the very learned M. Bopp, has already thrown a stronger light on its resemblance, not only in words but in grammatical structure, to the ancient Persian, to Greek, and to Teutonic. He brings to his new study those rules and habits which three centuries of criticism on the ancient writers formed in Europe; and he proposes, in a series of editions of Sanscrit books, to appear as the first critic and commentator on the classics of ancient India.†

The same national talent for discovering the relations of languages would be conspicuous, if it were not lost in variety of excellence, in the works of M. Alexander de Humboldt; who, as he carried with him from Europe a larger stock of science, so he has brought back more splendid accessions to our knowledge than any other traveller; whose works may be considered as the best proof of the existence of a secret band which unites all the parts of knowledge,—of the unexpected light which physical and moral sciences the most distant and dissimilar are found to reflect on each other,—and of the power of a great master to raise the dignity of his scientific attainments, by employing them in the service of a general and comprehensive philosophy. We gather, from some scattered intimations in the late volumes of his great work, that he still meditates a visit to the Central Mountains of Asia; a design which his examination of America originally inspired. In truth, these countries are connected in a philosophical imagination by the contrast of their institutions, as well as by the resemblance of some of the grand features of nature. This singular and mixed relation has more than once brought them together in the writings of Mr. Stewart, as it probably contributed to join them as objects of interest in the comprehensive mind of M. de Humboldt. They seem to form the extreme visible points of the past and future progress of human civilisation. The whole of its course, as far as we can see, or even speciously conjecture, seems to be performed between the Ganges

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\* This part of knowledge is by no means to be confounded with the philosophy of language. The latter science considers only what is common to all languages. The former is conversant with the variety of classes into which human languages are to be divided according to their origin and structure, and exhibits the history of their various changes and mutual dependence. It is a science so new as to be yet without a name.

† See M. Schlegel's Journal, entitled *Indische Bibliothek*, Bann. 1820.

and the Mississippi. The times which passed before the social system of India, and even the origin of that system itself, are covered with impenetrable darkness. We dimly descry its ancient state, and we perceive nothing beyond it. It is still covered with the remains of the earliest laws and works of civilised men.

North America, on the other hand, presents to our observation the extraordinary spectacle of a commonwealth advancing with gigantic strides to imperial greatness, with institutions of which some are hitherto untried among powerful states. By a singular fortune, it has happened, that the same European people have conquered the most ancient seats of civilisation in the East, and founded this new order of society in the Western World. At the same moment we learn that the site of Meröe is ascertained, or the remains of Babylon surveyed, in one quarter of the globe; while in another, populous and flourishing republics spring up in the Wilderness, and industry subdues the Desert with a rapidity which exceeds the course of the most renowned warriors. In the dominions or among the descendants of the English nation, we discover the most venerable antiquity to which remembrance can stretch, and the utmost progress in the time to come, from which the most sanguine hopes of enthusiasm can anticipate improvement. This is a position of great dignity, in which perhaps no people was ever placed before. But there are many among us who seem disposed to reject the better part of this high destiny. All who, from whatever motive, either of narrow faction or of political jealousy, regard America with unfriendly eyes, are strangely forgetful of the honour which redounds to their country from that monument of the genius and courage of Englishmen. It was not thus that this great subject was viewed by the wisest men who have gone before us. "We view the establishment of the English colonies on principles of liberty," says Mr. Burke, "as that which is to render this kingdom venerable to future ages. In comparison of this, we regard all the victories and conquests of our warlike ancestors, or of our own times, as barbarous vulgar distinctions, in which many nations whom we look upon with little respect or value have equalled, if not far exceeded us. This is the peculiar and appropriated glory of England. Those who *have and who hold* to that foundation of common liberty, whether on this or on your side of the ocean, we consider as the true and the only true Englishmen. Those who depart from it, whether there or here, are attainted, corrupted in blood, and wholly fallen from their original rank and value. They are the real rebels to the fair constitution and just supremacy of England."\* These words were intended to be addressed to the people of America in January 1777, a period of civil war, by a zealous friend of the supremacy of England, after the declaration of American independence. The two English states on both sides of the Atlantic are now, indeed, liable to those vicissitudes of war and peace to which popular interests and passions expose all independent countries; but their friendly intercourse is perhaps still more endangered by popular animosities; and its continuance depends, in some measure, on their habitual temper and feelings towards each other.


The glory of England is the establishment of Liberty in a great empire. To her belong the great moral discoveries of *Habeas Corpus* and Trial by Jury, of a Popular Representation and a Free Press. These institutions

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\* Address to the British Colonists in North America, Burke, v. 147. ed. 4to.

she sent forth with her colonies into the Wilderness. By these institutions they have grown into a mighty nation. The more they multiply and spread, the more splendid will the name of that nation become, which has bestowed these inestimable blessings on the world. The laws of England, founded on principles of liberty, are still, in substance, the code of America. Our writers, our statutes, the most modern decisions of our Judges, are quoted in every court of justice from the St. Lawrence to the Mississippi. English law, as well as English liberty, are the foundations on which the legislation of America is founded. The authority of our jurisprudence may survive the power of our government for as many ages as the laws of Rome commanded the reverence of Europe, after the subversion of her empire.

Our language is as much that of America as it is that of England. As America increases, the glory of the great writers of England increases with it. The admirers of Shakspeare and of Milton are multiplied. The fame of every future Englishman of genius is more widely spread. Is it unreasonable, then, to hope that these ties of birth, of liberty, of laws, of language, and of literature, may in time prevail over vulgar, ignoble, and ruinous prejudices? Their ancestors were as much the countrymen of Bacon and Newton, of Hampden and Sidney, as ours. They are entitled to their full share of that inheritance of glory which has descended from our common forefathers. Neither the liberty of England, nor her genius, nor the noble language which that genius has consecrated, is worthy of their disregard. All these honours are theirs if they choose to preserve them. The history of England, till the adoption of counsels adverse to liberty, is their history. We may still preserve or revive kindred feelings. *They* may claim noble ancestors, and *we* may look forward to renowned descendants, — unless adverse prejudices should dispose *them* to reject those honours which they have lawfully inherited, and lead *us* to envy that greatness which has arisen from our institutions, and will perpetuate our fame.

 Circumstances have compelled us to break off abruptly at this place. We shall probably soon find a convenient opportunity of laying before our readers the observations which have occurred to us on that part of Mr. Stewart's Discourse which relates to the English and Scotch Philosophers of the eighteenth century, from Berkeley to Brown.\*

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#### COUSIN'S COURSE OF PHILOSOPHY. †

THE delivery of these Lectures excited an unexampled sensation in Paris. Condemned to silence during the reign of Jesuit ascendancy,

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\* Though Sir James Mackintosh has not redeemed this pledge in the pages of the Edinburgh Review, he has employed a more fitting medium for laying before the public his opinions of the English and Scotch philosophers. I allude to his Dissertation prefixed to the Encyclopædia Britannica, a production which cannot fail to give increased lustre and durability to his exalted and honourable reputation.

† Cours de Philosophie. Par M. V. Cousin, Professeur de Philosophie à la Faculté des Lettres de Paris. — Introduction à l'Histoire de la Philosophie. 8vo. — Vol. 1. page 194. October, 1829.



M. Cousin, after eight years of honourable retirement, had again ascended the Chair of Philosophy; and the splendour with which he recommenced his academical career, more than justified the expectation which his recent reputation as a writer, and the memory of his earlier lectures, had inspired. Two thousand auditors listened, in admiration, to the eloquent exposition of doctrines unintelligible to the many; and the oral discussion of philosophy awakened in Paris and in France an interest unexampled since the days of Abelard. The daily journals found it necessary to gratify, by their earlier analyses, the impatient curiosity of the public; and the lectures themselves, taken in short-hand, and corrected by the Professor, propagated weekly the influence of his instruction to the remotest provinces of the kingdom.

Nor are the pretensions of his doctrine disproportioned to the attention it has engaged. It professes nothing less than to be the complement and conciliation of all philosophical opinion; and its author claims the glory of placing the key-stone in the arch of science, by the discovery of elements hitherto unobserved among the phenomena of consciousness.

Before proceeding to consider the pretensions of M. Cousin to originality, and of his doctrine to truth, it is necessary to say a few words on the state and relations of philosophy in France.

After the philosophy of Des Cartes and Malebranche had sunk into oblivion, and from the time that Condillac, exaggerating the too partial principles of Locke, had analysed all knowledge into sensation, Sensualism, as a philosophical theory, became, in France, not only the dominant, but almost the one exclusive opinion. It was believed that reality and truth were limited to experience, and experience was limited to the sphere of sense; while the higher faculties of reflection and reason were thought adequately explained as perceptions, elaborated, purified, sublimated, and transformed. From the mechanical relations of sense with its objects, it was attempted to explain the mysteries of intelligence; the philosophy of mind was soon viewed as a correlative to the philosophy of organisation. The moral nature of man was at last identified with his physical; mind was a reflex of matter, — thought a secretion of the brain.

A philosophy so melancholy in its consequences, and founded on principles thus partial and exaggerated, could not be permanent: a reaction was inevitable. The recoil, which began about twenty years ago, has been gradually increasing; and now it is perhaps even to be apprehended, that its intensity may become excessive. As the poison was of foreign growth, so also has been the antidote. The doctrine of Condillac was a corruption of the doctrine of Locke; and, in returning to a better philosophy, the French are still obeying an impulsion communicated from without. This impulsion may be traced to two different sources, — to the philosophy of Scotland, and to the philosophy of Germany.

In Scotland, a philosophy had sprung up, which, though professing, equally with the doctrine of Condillac, to build only on experience, did not, like that doctrine, limit experience to the relations of sense and its objects. Without vindicating to man more than a relative knowledge of existence, and restricting the science of mind to an observation of the fact of consciousness, it, however, analysed that fact into a greater number of more important elements than had been recognised in the school of Condillac. It showed that phenomena were revealed in thought which could not be resolved into any modification of sense. It proved that intelligence supposed principles, which, as the conditions of its activity,

could not be the results of its operation; and that the mind contained notions, which, as primitive, necessary, and universal, were not to be explained as generalisations from the contingent and particular, about which alone our external experience was conversant. The phenomena of mind were thus distinguished from the phenomena of matter; and if the impossibility of materialism were not demonstrated, there was, at least, demonstrated the impossibility of its proof.

This philosophy, and still more the spirit of this philosophy, was calculated to exert a salutary influence on the French. And such an influence it did exert. For a time, indeed, the truth operated in silence; and Reid and Stewart had already modified the philosophy of France, before the French were content to acknowledge themselves their disciples. In the works of Degerando and Laromiguière, may be traced the influence of the Scottish philosophy: but it is to Royer-Collard, and, more recently, to Jouffroy, that our countrymen are indebted for a full acknowledgment of their merits, and for the high and increasing estimation in which their doctrines are now held in France. M. Royer-Collard, whose authority has, in every relation, been exerted only for the benefit of his country, and who, once great as a professor, is now not less illustrious as a statesman, in his lectures, advocated with distinguished ability the principles of the Scottish school; modestly content to follow, while no one was more entitled to lead. M. Jouffroy, by his recent translation of the works of Dr. Reid, and by the excellent preface to his version of Mr. Dugald Stewart's *Outlines of Moral Philosophy*, has likewise powerfully co-operated to the establishment, in France, of a philosophy equally opposed to the exclusive Sensualism of Condillac, and to the exclusive Rationalism of the new German school.

Germany may be regarded as the intellectual antipodes of France. The comprehensive and original genius of Leibnitz, itself the ideal abstract of the Teutonic character, had reacted powerfully on the minds of his countrymen; and Rationalism has, from his time, always remained the favourite philosophy of the Germans. On the principle of this doctrine, it is in Reason alone that truth and reality are to be found. Experience affords only the occasions on which intelligence reveals to us the necessary and universal notions of which it is the complement; and these notions afford at once the foundation of all reasoning, and the guarantee of our knowledge of existence. Kant, indeed, pronounced the philosophy of Rationalism to be a mere fabric of delusion. He declared that a science of existence was beyond the compass of our faculties; that pure reason, as purely subjective\*, was conscious of nothing but itself, and was unable

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\* In the philosophy of mind, *subjective* denotes what is to be referred to the thinking subject, the Ego; *objective* what belongs to the object of thought, the Non-Ego. It may be safe, perhaps, to say a few words in vindication of our employment of these terms. By the Greeks the word *ὑποχείμενον* was equivocally employed to express either the *object of knowledge* (the *materia circa quam*), or the *subject of existence* (the *materia in qua*). The exact distinction of *subject* and *object* was first made by the schoolmen; and to the schoolmen the vulgar languages are principally indebted for what precision and analytic subtilty they possess. These correlative terms correspond to the first and most important distinction in philosophy; they embody the original antithesis in consciousness of self and not self,—a distinction which, in fact, involves the whole science of mind; for psychology is nothing more than a determination of the subjective and objective in themselves, and in their reciprocal relations. Thus significant of the primary

to demonstrate the reality of aught beyond the phenomena of its personal modifications. But scarcely had the critical philosopher accomplished the recognition of this important principle, the result of which was, to circumscribe the field of speculation by very narrow bounds; than from the very disciples of his school there arose philosophers, who, despising the contracted limits, and the humble results, of a philosophy of observation, re-established, as the predominant opinion, a bolder and more uncompromising Rationalism than any that had ever previously obtained for their countrymen the character of philosophic visionaries —

“ Gens ratione ferox, et mentem pasta chimæris,”

Founded by Fichte, but perfected by Schelling, this doctrine regards experience as unworthy of the name of science; because, as only of the phenomenal, the transitory, the dependent, it is only of that which, having no reality in itself, cannot be established as a proper basis of certainty and knowledge. Philosophy must, therefore, either be abandoned, or we must be able to seize the one, the absolute, the unconditioned, immediately and in itself; and this they profess to do by a kind of intellectual vision. In this act, reason, soaring not only above the world of sense, but beyond the sphere of personal consciousness, boldly places itself at the very centre of absolute being, with which it is, in fact, identified; and thence surveying existence in itself, and in its relations, unveils to us the nature of the Deity, and explains, from first to last, the derivation of all created things.

M. Cousin is the apostle of Rationalism in France, and we are willing to admit that the doctrine could not have obtained a more eloquent or devoted advocate. He has consecrated himself, his life, and labours, to philosophy, and to philosophy alone; nor has he approached the sanctuary with unwashed hands. The editor of Proclus, of Des Cartes, and of Malebranche, the translator and interpreter of Plato, and the promised expositor of Kant, will not be accused of partiality in the choice of his pursuits; while his two works, under the title of *Philosophical Frag-*

and most extensive analysis in philosophy, these terms, in their substantive and adjective forms, passed from the schools into the scientific language of Tilesius, Campanella, Berigard, Gassendi, Des Cartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Wolf, &c. Deprived of these terms, the critical philosophy, indeed the whole philosophy of Germany, would be a blank. In this country, though familiarly employed in scientific language, even subsequently to the time of Locke, the adjective forms seem at length to have dropped out of the English tongue. That these words waxed obsolete, was perhaps caused by the ambiguity which had gradually crept into the signification of the substantives. *Object*, besides its proper signification, came to be abusively applied to denote *motive, end, final cause* (a meaning not recognised by Johnson). This innovation was probably borrowed from the French, in whose language the word had been similarly corrupted after the commencement of the last century, (Dict. de Trevoux, voce *Objet*.) *Subject* in English, as *sujet* in French, had been also perverted into a synonyme for *object*, taken in its proper meaning, and had thus returned to the original ambiguity of the corresponding term in Greek. It is probable that the logical application of the word (*subject of predication*) facilitated or occasioned this confusion. In using the terms, therefore, we think that an explanation, but no apology, is required. The distinction is of paramount importance, and of infinite application, not only in philosophy proper, but in grammar, rhetoric, criticism, ethics, politics, jurisprudence, theology. It is adequately expressed by no other terms; and if these did not already enjoy a prescriptive right, as denizens of the language, it cannot be denied, that, as strictly analogical, they would be well entitled to sue out their naturalisation.

*ments*, bear ample evidence to the learning, elegance, and distinguished ability of their author. Taking him all in all, in France M. Cousin stands alone: nor can we contemplate his character and accomplishments without the sincerest admiration, even while we dissent from almost every principle of his philosophy. The developement of his system, in all its points, betrays the influence of the German philosophy on his opinions. His theory is not, however, a scheme of exclusive Rationalism; on the contrary, the peculiarity of his doctrine consists in the attempt to combine the philosophy of experience, and the philosophy of pure reason, into one. The following is a concise statement of the fundamental positions of his system:—

Reason, or intelligence, has three integrant elements, three regulative principles, which at once constitute its nature, and govern its manifestations; these three ideas severally suppose each other, and, as inseparable, are equally essential and equally primitive. These ideas are recognised by Aristotle and by Kant, in their several attempts to analyse intelligence into its principles; but though the categories of both philosophers comprise all the elements, in neither list are these elements naturally co-arranged, or reduced to an ultimate simplicity.

The *first* of these ideas, principles, or elements, though fundamentally one, is variously expressed, under the terms unity, identity, substance, absolute cause, the infinite, pure thought, &c.; we would briefly call it the *unconditioned*. The *second* he denominates plurality, difference, phenomenon, relative cause, the finite, determined thought, &c.; we would term it the *conditioned*. These two elements are relative and correlative. The first, though absolute, is not conceived as existing absolutely in itself; it is conceived as an absolute cause, as a cause which cannot but pass into operation; in other words, the first element must manifest itself in the second. The two ideas are thus connected together as cause and effect; each is only realised through the other; and this their connection constitutes the *third* integrant element of intelligence.

Reason, or intelligence, in which these ideas appear, and which, in fact, they constitute and determine, is not individual, is not ours, is not even human; it is absolute, it is divine. What is personal to us, is our free and voluntary activity; what is not free and not voluntary, is adventitious to man, and does not constitute an integrant part of his individuality. Intelligence is conversant with truth; truth, as necessary and universal, is not the creature of my volition; and reason, which, as the subject of truth, is also universal and necessary, is consequently impersonal. We see, therefore, by a light which is not ours, and reason is a revelation of God in man. The ideas, therefore, of which we are conscious, belong not to us, but to absolute intelligence. They constitute, in fact, the very mode and manner of its existence. For consciousness is only possible under plurality and difference, and intelligence is only possible through consciousness.

The divine nature is essentially comprehensible. For the three ideas constitute the nature of the Deity, and the nature of ideas is to be conceived. God, in fact, exists to us only in so far as he is known; and the degree of our knowledge must always determine the measure of our faith. The relation of God to the universe is therefore manifest, and the creation easily understood. To create, is not to make something out of nothing, for this is contradictory, but to originate from self. We create so often as we exert our free causality; and something is created by us when something begins to be by virtue of the free causality which

belongs to us. To create is, therefore, to cause, not with nothing, but with the very essence of our being—with our force, our will, our personality. The divine creation is of the same character. God, as he is cause, is able to create; as he is an absolute cause, he cannot but create. In creating the universe, he does not draw it from nothing; he draws it from himself. The creation of the universe is thus necessary; it is a manifestation of the Deity, but not the Deity absolutely in himself; it is God passing into activity, but not exhausted in the act.

The universe created, the principles which determined the creation are found still to govern the worlds of matter and mind. Two ideas and their connection explain the intelligence of God; two laws in their counterpoise explain the material universe. The law of expansion is the movement of unity to variety; the law of attraction, the return of variety to unity.

In the world of mind the same analogy is apparent. The study of consciousness is psychology. Man is the microcosm of existence; consciousness, within a narrow focus, concentrates a knowledge of the universe and of God; psychology is thus the abstract of all science, human and divine. As in the external world the action and reaction of all phenomena may be reduced to two great laws; so, in the internal, all the facts of consciousness may be reduced to one fundamental fact, comprising in like manner two principles and their correlation; and these principles are again the one or the infinite, the many or the finite, and the connection of the infinite and finite.

In every act of consciousness we distinguish a self or ego, and something different from self, a non-ego; each limited and modified by the other. These, together, constitute the finite element. But at the same instant that we are conscious of these existences, plural, relative, and contingent, we are conscious likewise of a superior unity in which they are contained, and by which they are explained;—a unity absolute as they are conditioned, substantive as they are phenomenal, and an infinite cause as they are finite causes. This unity is God. The fact of consciousness is thus a complex phenomenon, comprehending three several terms: 1. The idea of the ego and non-ego as finite; 2. The idea of something else as infinite; and, 3. The idea of the relation of the finite element to the infinite. These elements are revealed in themselves and in their relations, in every act of primitive or spontaneous consciousness. They can also be reviewed by reflection in a voluntary act; but here reflection distinguishes, it does not create. The three ideas, the three categories of intelligence, are given in the original act of instinctive apperception, obscurely indeed, and without contrast. Reflection analyses and discriminates the elements of this primary synthesis; and as will is the condition of reflection, and will at the same time is personal, the categories, as obtained through reflection, have consequently the appearance of being also personal, and subjective. It was this personality of reflection that misled Kant; caused him to overlook or misinterpret the fact of spontaneous consciousness,—to individualise intelligence, and to refer to this personal reason all that is conceived by us as necessary and universal. But as, in the spontaneous intuition of reason, there is nothing voluntary, and consequently nothing personal; and as the truths which intelligence here discovers come not from ourselves; we have a right, up to a certain point, to impose these truths on others as revelations from on high; while, on the contrary, reflection being wholly personal, it would be absurd to impose on others what is the fruit of our individual operations. Spon-

taneity is the principle of religion; reflection of philosophy. Men agree in spontaneity; they differ in reflection. The former is necessarily veracious; the latter is naturally delusive.

The condition of reflection is separation; it illustrates by distinguishing; it considers the different elements apart; and while it contemplates one, it necessarily throws the others out of view. Hence, not only the possibility, but the necessity, of error. The primitive unity, supposing no distinction, admits of no error; reflection in discriminating the elements of thought, and in considering one to the exclusion of others, occasions error, and a variety in error. He who exclusively contemplates the element of the infinite, despises him who is occupied with the idea of the finite; and *vice versa*. It is the wayward developement of the various elements of intelligence, that determines the imperfections and varieties of individual character. Men under this partial and exclusive developement are but fragments of that humanity, which can only be fully realised in the harmonious evolution of all its principles. What reflection is to the individual, history is to the human race. The difference of an epoch consists exclusively in the partial developement of some one element of intelligence in a prominent portion of mankind; and as there are only three such elements, so there are only three grand epochs in the history of man.

A knowledge of the elements of reason, of their relations and of their laws, constitutes not merely philosophy, but the conditions of a history of philosophy. The history of human reason, or the history of philosophy, must be rational and philosophic. It must be philosophy itself, with all its elements, with all their relations, and with all their laws, represented in striking characters by the hands of time and of history, in the visible progress of the human mind. The discovery and enumeration of all the elements of intelligence enables us to survey the progress of speculation from the loftiest vantage ground; it discovers to us the laws by which the developement of reflection or philosophy is determined; and it supplies us with a canon by which the approximation of the different systems to the truth may be finally ascertained. And what are the results? Sensualism, idealism, scepticism, mysticism, are all partial and exclusive views of the elements of intelligence. But each is false only as it is incomplete. They are all true in what they affirm—all erroneous in what they deny. Though hitherto opposed, they are consequently not incapable of coalition; and, in fact, can only obtain their consummation in a powerful *eclecticism*, which shall comprehend them all. This eclecticism is contained in the system previously developed; and the possibility of such a universal philosophy was first afforded by the discovery of M. Cousin, in the year 1817, “that consciousness contained many more phenomena than had previously been suspected.”

The present work is at once an exposition of these principles, as a true theory of philosophy, and an illustration of the mode in which this theory is to be applied, as a rule of criticism in the history of philosophical opinion. As the justice of the application must be always subordinate to the truth of the principle, we shall confine ourselves exclusively to a consideration of M. Cousin's system, viewed absolutely in itself. This, indeed, we are afraid will prove comparatively irksome; and we must solicit indulgence not only for the unpopular nature of the discussion, but for the employment of language which, from the total neglect of these speculations in Britain, will necessarily appear abstruse to the general reader.

Now it is manifest that the whole doctrine of M. Cousin is involved in the proposition, that the unconditioned, the absolute, the infinite, is immediately known in consciousness by difference, plurality, and relation. The unconditioned, as an original element of knowledge, is the generative principle of his system; the mode in which the possibility of this knowledge is explained, affords its discriminating peculiarity. The other positions of his theory, as deduced from this assumption, may indeed be disputed, even if the antecedent be allowed; but this assumption disproved, every consequent in his theory is at once annihilated. The recognition of the absolute as a constitutive principle of intelligence, our author regards as at once the condition and the end of philosophy; and it is on the discovery of this principle in the fact of consciousness, that he vindicates to himself the glory of being the founder of the eclectic, or one catholic philosophy. The determination of this cardinal point will thus satisfy us at once touching the pretensions of the system. To explain the nature of the problem itself, and the character of the solution propounded by M. Cousin, it is necessary to premise a statement of the opinions that may be entertained regarding the unconditioned, as an immediate object of knowledge and of thought.

These opinions may be reduced to four:—1. The unconditioned is incognisable and inconceivable; its notion being only negative of the conditioned, which last can alone be positively known or conceived. 2. It is not an object of knowledge; but its notion, as a regulative principle of the mind itself, is more than a mere negation of the conditioned. 3. It is cognisable, but not conceivable; it can be known by a sinking back into identity with the absolute, but is incomprehensible by consciousness and reflection, which are only of the relative and the different. 4. It is cognisable and conceivable by consciousness and reflection, under relation, difference, and plurality.

The first of these opinions we regard as true; the second is held by Kant; the third by Schelling; and the last by our author.

1. In our opinion, the mind can conceive, and consequently can know, only the *limited, and the conditionally limited*. The unconditionally unlimited, or the *infinite*, the unconditionally limited, or the *absolute*, cannot positively be construed to the mind; they can be conceived at all only by a thinking away, or abstraction of those very conditions under which thought itself is realised; consequently, the notion of the unconditioned is only negative,—negative of the conceivable itself. For example, on the one hand we can positively conceive neither an absolute whole, that is, a whole so great, that we cannot also conceive it as a relative part of a still greater whole; nor an absolute part, that is, a part so small, that we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole, divisible into smaller parts. On the other hand, we cannot positively represent to the mind an infinite whole, for this could only be done by the infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes, which would itself require an infinite time for its accomplishment; nor, for the same reason, can we follow out in thought an infinite divisibility of parts. The result is the same, whether we apply the process to limitation in space, in time, or in degree. The unconditional negation, and the unconditional affirmation of limitation; in other words, the *infinite* and the *absolute, properly so called\**, are thus equally inconceivable to us.

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\* It is proper to observe, that though we are of opinion that the terms Infinite and Absolute, and Unconditioned, ought not to be confounded, and accurately

As the conditionally limited (which we may briefly call the conditioned) is thus the only object of knowledge and of positive thought—thought necessarily supposes conditions; to think is therefore to condition, and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the possibility of thought. How, indeed, it could ever be doubted that thought is only of the conditioned, may well be deemed a matter of the profoundest admiration. Thought cannot transcend consciousness; consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and object of thought, known only in correlation and mutually limiting each other; while, independently of this, all we know either of subject or object, either of mind or matter, is only a knowledge in each of the particular, of the different, of the modified, of the phenomenal. We admit that the consequence of this doctrine is, that philosophy, if viewed as more than a science of the conditioned, is impossible. Departing from the particular, we admit that we can never, in our highest generalisations, rise above the finite; that our knowledge, whether of mind or matter, can be nothing more than a knowledge of the relative manifestations of an existence which, in itself, it is our highest wisdom to recognise as beyond the reach of philosophy:—*Cognoscendo ignorari, et ignorando cognosci.*

The conditioned is the mean between two extremes, exclusive of each other, neither of which can be conceived as *possible*, but of which, on the principle of contradiction, one must be admitted as *necessary*. On this opinion, therefore, reason is shown to be weak, but not deceitful. The mind is not represented as conceiving two propositions subversive of each other as equally possible; but only as unable to understand as possible, either of two extremes; one of which, however, on the ground of their mutual contradiction, it is compelled to recognise as true. We are thus taught the salutary lesson, that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted into the measure of existence; and are warned from recognising the domain of our knowledge as necessarily co-extensive with the horizon of our faith. And by a wonderful revelation, we are thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught beyond the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensive reality.

2. The second opinion, that of Kant, is fundamentally the same as the preceding. Metaphysic, strictly so denominated, is the doctrine of the unconditioned. From Xenophanes to Leibnitz, the infinite, the absolute, formed the highest principle of speculation; but from the dawn of philosophy in the school of Elis till the rise of the Kantian philosophy, no serious attempt was made to investigate the nature and origin of this notion as a psychological phenomenon. Before Kant, philosophy was rather a deduction from principles than an enquiry concerning principles themselves. At the head of every system a notion figured, which the philosopher assumed in conformity to his views; but it was rarely considered necessary, and still more rarely attempted, to ascertain the genesis, or to determine the domain, of the notion, previous to its application. In his *Critique*, Kant undertakes a regular survey of consciousness. He professes to analyse the conditions of human knowledge—to mete out its limits—to indicate its point of departure,—and to determine its possibility. That Kant accomplished much, it would be prejudice to deny;

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distinguish them in the statement of our own view; yet, in speaking of the doctrines of those by whom they are indifferently employed, we have not thought it necessary, or rather we have found it impossible, to adhere to the distinction,



nor is his service to philosophy the less, that his success has been more decided in the subversion of error than in the establishment of truth. The result of his examination was the abolition of the metaphysical sciences — of rational psychology, ontology, speculative theology, &c., as founded on mere *petitiones principiorum*. Existence was revealed to us only under specific modifications, and these were known only under the conditions of our faculties of knowledge. “Things in themselves,” mind, matter, God, — all, in short, that was not particular, relative, and phenomenal, as bearing no analogy to our faculties, was beyond the verge of our knowledge. Philosophy was thus restricted to the observation and analysis of the phenomena of consciousness; and what was not explicitly or implicitly given in a fact of consciousness, transcended the sphere of a legitimate speculation. A knowledge of the unconditioned was impossible, either immediately as a notion, or mediately as an inference. A demonstration of the absolute from the relative was logically absurd; as in such a syllogism we must collect in the conclusion what is not distributed in the premises. An immediate knowledge of the unconditioned was equally impossible: but here we think his reasoning complicated, and his reduction incomplete. We must explain ourselves.

While we regard as conclusive Kant's analysis of time and space into mere conditions of thought, we cannot help viewing his deduction of the categories of understanding, and the ideas of speculative reason, as the work of a great but perverse ingenuity. The categories of the understanding are merely subordinate forms of the conditioned. Why not, therefore, generalise the conditioned as the one category of thought? — and if it were necessary to analyse this form into its subaltern applications, why not develop these immediately out of the generic principle, instead of preposterously, and by a forced and partial analogy, deducing the laws of the understanding from a questionable division of logical propositions? Why distinguish reason (*vernunft*) from understanding (*verstand*), simply on the ground that the former is conversant about, or rather tends towards, the unconditioned; when it is sufficiently apparent, that the unconditioned is conceived only as the negation of the conditioned, and also that the conception of contraries is one? In the Kantian philosophy both faculties perform the same function, both seek the one in the many; — the idea (*idee*) is only the conception (*begriff*) sublimated into the inconceivable; reason only the understanding which has “overleaped itself.” Kant has clearly shown, that the idea of the unconditioned can have no objective reality, — that it conveys no knowledge, — and that it involves the most insoluble contradictions. But he ought to have shown that the unconditioned had no objective application, because it had, in fact, no subjective affirmation, — that it afforded no real knowledge, because it contained nothing even conceivable, — and that it is self-contradictory, because it is not a notion, either simple or positive, but only a fasciculus of negations; — negations of the conditioned in its opposite extremes, and bound together merely by their common character of incomprehensibility. And while he appropriated reason as a specific faculty to take cognisance of these negations, hypostatised as positive, under the Platonic name of *ideas*; so also, as a pendant to his deduction of the categories of understanding from the logical division of propositions, he deduced the classification and number of these ideas of reason from the logical division of syllogisms. Kant thus stands intermediate between those who view the notion of the absolute as the instinctive affirmation of an eccentric consciousness, and those who regard it as the factitious negative of an eccentric generalisation.

Were we to adopt from the critical philosophy the idea of analysing thought into its fundamental conditions, and were we to carry the reduction of Kant to what we think its ultimate simplicity, we would discriminate thought into *positive* and *negative*, according as it is conversant about the conditioned or unconditioned. This, however, would constitute a logical, not a psychological distinction; as positive and negative in thought are known at once, and by the same intellectual act. The twelve categories of the understanding would be thus included under the former; the three ideas of reason under the latter; and to this intent the contrast between understanding and reason would disappear. Finally, rejecting the arbitrary limitation of time and space to the sphere of sense, we would express under the formula of — the **CONDITIONED** in **TIME** and **SPACE** — a definition of the conceivable, and an enumeration of the three categories of thought.

The imperfection and partiality of Kant's analysis are betrayed in its consequences. His doctrine leads to absolute scepticism. Speculative reason, on Kant's own admission, is an organ of mere delusion. The idea of the unconditioned, about which it is conversant, is shown to involve insoluble contradictions, and yet to be the legitimate product of intelligence. Hume has well observed, that it is of little consequence whether we possess a false reason, or no reason at all. "If the light that leads astray be light from heaven," what are we to believe? If our intellectual nature be perfidious in one revelation, it must be presumed deceitful in all; nor is it possible for Kant to establish the existence of God, freedom, and immortality, on the presumed veracity of practical reason, after having himself disproved the credibility of speculative reason.

Kant had annihilated the older metaphysic; but the germ of a more visionary doctrine of the absolute than any of those he had refuted was contained in the bosom of his own philosophy. He had slain the body, but had not exorcised the spectre, of the absolute; and this spectre has continued to haunt the schools of Germany even to the present day. The philosophers were not content to abandon their metaphysic, to limit philosophy to an observation of phenomena, and to the generalisation of these phenomena into laws. The theories of Bouterwek (in his earlier works), of Bardili, of Reinhold, of Fichte, of Schelling, of Hegel, are so many endeavours, of greater or less ability, to fix the absolute as a positive in knowledge; but the absolute, like the water in the sieves of the Danaides, has always hitherto ran through as a negative into the abyss of nothing.

3. Of these theories, that of Schelling is the only one in regard to which it is necessary to say any thing. His opinion constitutes the third of those we have enumerated touching the knowledge of the absolute; and the following is a brief statement of its principal positions.

While the lower sciences are of the relative and conditioned, philosophy, as the science of sciences, must be of the absolute and unconditioned. Philosophy, therefore, supposes a science of the absolute. If the absolute is beyond our knowledge, philosophy is itself impossible.

But how, it is objected, can the absolute be known? The absolute, as unconditioned, identical, and one, cannot be known, under conditions, by difference and plurality. It cannot, therefore, be known, if the subject of knowledge be distinguished from the object of knowledge; in the knowledge of the absolute, existence and knowledge must be identical; the absolute can only be known, if adequately known, by the absolute itself. But is this possible? We are wholly ignorant of existence in itself; the

mind knows nothing, except by quality, difference, and relation ; consciousness supposes the subject contradistinguished from the object of thought ; the abstraction of this contrast is a negation of consciousness ; and the negation of consciousness is the annihilation of thought itself. The alternative is therefore unavoidable—either in finding the absolute we lose ourselves ; retaining our individual unity, we cannot reach the absolute.

All this Schelling candidly admits. He admits that a knowledge of the absolute is impossible, in a personal consciousness ; he admits that, as the understanding knows, and can know, only by difference, it can conceive only the conditioned ; and he admits that, only if man be himself the infinite, can the infinite be known by him —

“ Nec sentire deum, nisi qui pars ipse deorum est.”

But he contends that there is a capacity of knowledge above consciousness, and higher than the understanding ; and that this knowledge is competent to human reason, as identical with the absolute itself. In this act of knowledge, which, after Fichte, Schelling calls the intellectual intuition, there exists no distinction of subject and object — no contrast of knowledge and existence ; all difference is lost in absolute indifference — all plurality in absolute unity. The intuition itself, reason, and the absolute, are identical. The absolute exists only as known by reason ; and reason knows only as being itself the absolute.

This act is necessarily ineffable :

“ The vision and the faculty divine,”

to be known, must be experienced. It cannot be conceived by the understanding, because beyond its sphere ; it cannot be described, because its essence is identity, and all description supposes discrimination. To those who cannot rise beyond a philosophy of reflection, Schelling candidly allows that the doctrine of the absolute can appear only as a series of contradictions ; and he has at least the negative merit of having clearly exposed the absurdity of a philosophy of the unconditioned, as founded on a knowledge by difference, if he has utterly failed in positively proving the possibility of such a philosophy, as founded on a knowledge in identity, and through an absorption into the absolute.

Out of Laputa or the Empire, it would be idle to enter into an articulate refutation of a theory which founds philosophy on the annihilation of consciousness. The intuition of the absolute is manifestly the work of an arbitrary abstraction, and of a self-delusive imagination. To reach the point of indifference by abstraction, we annihilate the object, and we annihilate the subject, of consciousness. But what remains ? Nothing. We then hypostatise the zero ; we baptize it with the name of Absolute, and imagine that we contemplate absolute existence, when we only speculate absolute privation. This truth has been, indeed, virtually confessed by the two most distinguished followers of Schelling. Hegel at last abandons the intuition regarding “ *pure or undetermined existence*,” as convertible with “ *pure nothing* ;” while Oken, if he adheres to the intuition, intrepidly identifies God or the Absolute with zero. Nor has the negative chimera proved less fruitful than the positive ; and Schelling has found it as difficult to evolve the one into the many, as Oken to deduce the universe and its contents from the first self-affirmation of the “ *primeval nothing*.”

Schelling has, indeed, found it impossible, without gratuitous, and even contradictory, assumptions, to explain the deduction of the finite from the infinite. By no *salto mortale* has he been able to clear the magic

circle in which he had enclosed himself. Unable to connect the absolute and the conditioned by any natural relation, he has variously attempted to account for the phenomenon of the universe, either by imposing a necessity of self-manifestation on the absolute — *i. e.* by conditioning the unconditioned; or by postulating a fall of the finite from the infinite — *i. e.* by begging the very phenomenon which his hypothesis professed its exclusive ability to explain. The great problem is still unresolved; and the question proposed by Orpheus at the dawn of speculation will probably remain unanswered till its decline —

Πῶς δέ μοι ἔν τι τὰ πάντα ἔσται καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστων;

In like manner, annihilating consciousness in order to reconstruct it, Schelling has never yet been able to connect the faculties conversant about the conditioned with the faculty of absolute knowledge. One simple objection strikes us as decisive, although we do not remember to have seen it alleged. “We awaken,” says Schelling, “from the intellectual intuition as from the state of death — we awaken through reflection.”\* We cannot, at the same moment, be in the intellectual intuition and in common consciousness; we must therefore be able to connect them by an act of memory. But how can there be a *memory* of the absolute and its intuition? As out of time, and space, and relation, and difference, it is admitted that the absolute cannot be construed to the understanding? But as memory is only possible under the conditions of the understanding, it is consequently impossible to remember any thing anterior to the moment when we awaken into consciousness; and the *clairvoyance* of the absolute, even granting its reality, is, after its conclusion, as if it had never been.

4. What we have now stated may in some degree enable the reader to apprehend the relations under which our author stands, both to those who deny and to those who admit a knowledge of the absolute. If we compare the philosophy of Cousin with the philosophy of Schelling, we at once perceive that the former is a disciple, though not a servile disciple, of the latter. But the scholar, though enamoured with his master's system as a whole, is sufficiently aware of the two insuperable difficulties of that theory. He saw that if he pitched the absolute so high, it was impossible to deduce from it the relative; and he felt that the intellectual intuition — a stumbling-block to himself — would be arrant foolishness in the eyes of his countrymen. Cousin and Schelling agree that, as philosophy is the science of the unconditioned, the unconditioned must be within the compass of science. They agree that the unconditioned is known, and immediately known; and they agree that intelligence, as competent to the unconditioned, is impersonal, infinite, divine. But while they coincide in the fact of the absolute as known, they are diametrically opposed as to the mode in which they attempt to realise this knowledge; each regarding, as the climax of absurdity and contradiction, the manner in which the other endeavours to bring human reason and the absolute into proportion. According to Schelling, Cousin's absolute is only a relative; according to Cousin, Schelling's knowledge of the absolute is a negation of thought itself. The latter is aware that the condition of all knowledge is plurality and difference; and the former, that the one condition, under which a knowledge of the absolute is possible, is indifference and unity. The one denies a notion of the absolute to consciousness; the other

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\* In Fichte u. Niethammer's Phil. Journ. vol. iii. p. 214.

affirms that consciousness is implied in every act of intelligence. And truly we conceive that each is triumphant over the other; and the result of this mutual neutralisation is that the absolute is incognisable.

In these circumstances, it might reasonably have been expected that our author should have stated the difficulties to which his theory was exposed on one side and on the other; and endeavoured to obviate the objections, both of his brother absolutists, and of those who altogether deny a philosophy of the unconditioned. This he has not done. The possibility of reducing the notion of the absolute to a negative conception is never once supposed; and if one or two mysterious (and not always correct) allusions are made to his doctrine, the name of Schelling does not occur, we believe, in the whole compass of these lectures. Difficulties, by which either the doctrine of the absolute in general, or his own particular modification of that doctrine, may be assailed, are studiously eluded, or solved only by still greater. Assertion is substituted for argument; facts of consciousness are alleged which consciousness never knew; and paradoxes that baffle argument are promulgated as intuitive truths, above the necessity of confirmation. With every feeling of respect for M. Cousin as a man of learning and genius, we must regard the grounds on which he endeavours to establish his doctrine as erroneous, inconsequent, and assumptive. In vindicating the truth of this statement, we shall show, in the *first* place, that M. Cousin is at fault in all the authorities he quotes in favour of the opinion that the absolute, infinite, unconditioned, is a primitive notion, cognisable by the intellect; in the *second*, that his argument to prove the co-reality of his three ideas proves directly the reverse; in the *third*, that the conditions under which alone he allows intelligence to be possible, necessarily exclude the possibility of a knowledge of the absolute; and in the *fourth*, that the absolute, as defined by him, is only a relative and a condition.

In the *first* place, then, M. Cousin supposes that Aristotle and Kant, in their several categories, equally proposed an analysis of the constituent elements of intelligence; and he also supposes that each, like himself, recognised among these elements the notion of infinite or absolute. In both these suppositions he is wrong.

It is a serious error in an historian of philosophy to imagine that, in his categories, Aristotle proposed, like Kant, "an analysis of the elements of human reason." It is just, however, to mention, that in this mistake M. Cousin has been preceded by Kant himself. The ends proposed by the two philosophers were different, even opposed. In their several categories, Aristotle attempted a synthesis of things in their multiplicity,—a classification of objects real, but in relation to thought;—Kant, an analysis of mind in its unity,—a dissection of thought, pure, but in relation to its objects. The predicaments of Aristotle are thus objective, of things as understood; those of Kant subjective, of the mind as understanding. The former are results *a posteriori*—the creations of abstraction and generalisation; the latter, anticipations *a priori*—the conditions of those acts themselves. It is true, that as the one scheme exhibits the unity of thought diverging into plurality, in appliance to its objects, and as the other exhibits the multiplicity of these objects converging towards unity by the collective determination of thought; while, at the same time, language usually confounds the subjective and objective under a common term;—it is certainly true, that some elements in the one table coincide in name with some elements in the other. This coincidence is, however, only equivocal. In reality, the whole Kantian

categories must be excluded from the Aristotelic list, as *entia rationis*, as *notiones secundæ*—in short, as determinations of thought, and not genera of real things; while the several elements would be specially excluded, as *partial*, *privative*, *transcendent*, &c. But if it would be unjust to criticise the categories of Kant in whole, or in part, by the Aristotelic canon, what must we think of Kant, who, after magnifying the idea of investigating the forms of pure intellect as worthy of the mighty genius of the Stagyrice, proceeds on this false hypothesis to blame the execution as rhapsodic, as incomplete, as confounding derivative with simple notions; nay, even on the narrow principles of his own *Critique*, as mixing the forms of pure sense with the forms of pure understanding? \* If M. Cousin were correct in his supposition that Aristotle and his followers had viewed his categories as an analysis of the regulative forms of thought, he would find his own reduction of the elements of reason to a double principle anticipated in the scholastic division of existence into *ens per se* and *ens per accidens*.

Nor is our author correct in thinking that the categories of Aristotle and Kant are complete, inasmuch as they are co-extensive with his own. As to the former, if the infinite were not excluded, on what would rest the scholastic distinction of *ens categoricum* and *ens transcendens*? The logicians require that predicamental matter shall be of a limited and finite nature: God, as infinite, is thus excluded; and as it is evident from the whole context of his book of categories, that Aristotle there only contemplated a distribution of the finite, so, in other works, he more than once emphatically denies the infinite as an object not only of knowledge, but of thought: — τὸ ἄπειρον ἀγνώστον ἢ ἄπειρον — τὸ ἄπειρον οὔτε νοητὸν, οὔτε αἰσθητὸν. † And while Aristotle thus regards the infinite as beyond the compass of thought, Kant views it as at least beyond the sphere of knowledge. If M. Cousin indeed employed the term category in relation to the Kantian philosophy in the Kantian acceptation, he would be as erroneous in regard to Kant as he is in regard to Aristotle; but we presume that he wishes, under that term, to include not only the “Categories of Understanding,” but the “Ideas of Reason.” Kant limits knowledge to experience, and experience to the categories of the understanding, which, in reality, are only so many forms of the conditioned; and allows to the notion of the unconditioned (corresponding to the ideas of reason) no objective reality, regarding it merely as a regulative principle in the arrangement of our thoughts. M. Cousin is thus totally wrong in regard to the one, and wrong in part in relation to the other.

In the *second* place, our author asserts that the idea of the infinite, the absolute, &c., and the idea of the finite, the conditioned &c., are equally real, because the notion of the one necessarily suggests the conception of the other.

Correlatives certainly suggest each other, but correlatives may, or may not, be equally real and positive. Contradictories necessarily imply each other, for the knowledge of contraries is one. But the reality of one contradictory, so far from guaranteeing the reality of the other, is nothing else than its negation. Thus every positive notion (the knowledge of a thing by what it is) suggests a negative notion (the knowledge of a thing by what it is not); and the highest positive notion, the notion of

\* See the Kritik d. R. V. and the Prolegomena.

† Phys. L. iii. c. 10. text 66. c. 7. text. 40. See also Metaph. L. ii. c. 2. text. 11. Analyt. Post. L. 1. c. 20. text. 39. et alibi.

the conceivable, is not without its corresponding negative in the notion of the inconceivable. But though these mutually suggest each other, the positive alone is real; the negative is only an abstraction of the other, and in the highest generalisation is even an abstraction of thought itself. It therefore behoved M. Cousin, instead of assuming the co-reality of his two elements on the fact of their correlation, to have suspected, on this very ground, that the reality of the one was inconsistent with the reality of the other. In fact, upon examination, it will be found that his two primitive ideas are nothing more than contradictory relatives. These, consequently, of their very nature, imply each other; but they imply each other only as affirmation and negation of the same.

We have already shown, that though the conditioned (conditionally limited) be one, what is opposed to it as the unconditioned is plural; that the unconditional negation of limitation gives one unconditioned, the infinite; while the unconditional affirmation of limitation affords another, the absolute. And this coincides with the opinion, that the unconditioned is positively inconceivable. But those who, with M. Cousin, regard the notion of the unconditioned as a positive and real knowledge of existence in its all-comprehensive unity, and who consequently employ the terms absolute, infinite, unconditioned, as only various expressions for the same identity, are bound to prove that their idea of unity corresponds — either with that unconditioned we have distinguished as the absolute, — or with that unconditioned we have distinguished as the infinite, — or that it includes both, — or that it excludes both. This they have not done, and, we suspect, have never attempted to do.

Our author maintains, that the unconditioned is known under the laws of consciousness; and does not, like Schelling, pretend to an intuition of existence beyond the bounds of space and time. Indeed, he himself expressly predicates the absolute and infinite of these forms. But is the absolute conceivable of time? Can we conceive time as unconditionally limited? We can easily represent to ourselves time under any relative limitation of commencement and termination; but we are conscious to ourselves of nothing more clearly, than that it would be equally possible to think without thought, as to construe to the mind an absolute commencement, or an absolute termination, of time; that is, a beginning and an end, beyond which, time is conceived as non-existent. Stretch imagination to the utmost, it still sinks paralysed within the bounds of time, and time survives as the condition of the thought itself in which we annihilate the universe: —

“ Sur les mondes détruits le Temps dort immobile.”

But if the absolute is inconceivable of this form, is the infinite more comprehensible? Can we imagine time as unconditionally unlimited? We cannot conceive the infinite regress of time; for such a notion could only be realised by the infinite addition in thought of finite times, and such an addition would, itself, require an eternity for its accomplishment. If we dream of effecting this, we only deceive ourselves by substituting the *indefinite* for the infinite, than which no two notions can be more opposed. The negation of a commencement of time involves likewise the affirmation, that an infinite time has at every moment already run; that is, it implies the contradiction, that an infinite has been completed. For the same reasons we are unable to conceive an infinite progress of time; while the infinite regress and the infinite progress, taken toge-

ther, involve the triple contradiction of an infinite concluded, of an infinite commencing, and of two infinities, not exclusive of each other. Thought is equally powerless in realising a conception either of the absolute totality, or of the infinite immensity, of space. And, as time and space, as wholes, can thus neither be conceived as absolutely limited, nor as infinitely unlimited; so their parts can be represented to the mind neither as absolutely individual, nor as divisible to infinity. The universe cannot be imagined as a whole, that may not also be imagined as a part; nor an atom be imagined as a part, that may not also be imagined as a whole. The same analysis, with a similar result, may be applied to cause and effect, and to substance and phenomenon. These, however, may both be reduced to the law of the conditioned.

The conditioned is, therefore, that only which can be positively conceived; the absolute and infinite are conceived only as negations of the conditioned in its opposite poles.

Now, as we observed, M. Cousin, and those who confound the absolute and infinite, and regard the unconditioned as a positive and indivisible notion, must show that this notion coincides either, 1st, with the notion of the absolute, to the exclusion of the infinite; or 2d, with the notion of the infinite to the exclusion of the absolute; or 3d, that it includes both as true, carrying them up to indifference; or 4th, that it excludes both as false. The last two alternatives are impossible, as either would be subversive of the highest principle of reason, which asserts, that of two contradictories, both cannot, but one must, be true. It only, therefore, remains to identify the unity of the unconditioned with the infinite, or with the absolute — with either, to the exclusion of the other. But while every one must be intimately conscious of the impossibility of this, the very fact that our author and other philosophers *a priori* have constantly found it necessary to confound these contradictions, sufficiently proves that neither term has a right to represent the unity of the unconditioned, to the prejudice of the other.

The unconditioned is, therefore, not a positive conception; nor has it even a real or intrinsic unity; for it only combines the absolute and the infinite, contradictory in themselves, into a unity *relative to us* by the negative bond of their inconceivability. It is on this mistake of the relative for the intrinsic, of the negative for the positive, that M. Cousin's theory is founded: and it is not difficult to understand how the mistake originated.

This reduction of M. Cousin's two ideas of the infinite and finite into one positive conception and its negative, implicitly annihilates also the *third* idea, devised by him as a connection between his two substantive ideas; and which he marvellously identifies with the relation of cause and effect. Before leaving this part of our subject, we may observe, that the very simplicity of our analysis is a presumption in favour of its truth. A plurality of causes is not to be postulated, where one is sufficient to account for the phenomena: *entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem*. And M. Cousin, in supposing three positive ideas, where only one is necessary, arrays every rule of philosophy against his hypothesis, even before its unsoundness is definitely brought to light.

In the *third* place, the restrictions to which our author subjects intelligence, divine and human, implicitly deny a knowledge of the absolute, both to God and man. "The condition of intelligence," says Cousin, "is difference; and an act of knowledge is only possible where there exists a *plurality of terms*. Unity does not suffice for conception; variety



is necessary; nay more, not only is variety necessary, there must likewise subsist an intimate relation between the principles of unity and variety; without which, the variety not being perceived by the unity, the one is as if it could not perceive, and the other, as if it could not be perceived. Look back for a moment into yourselves, and you will find, that what constitutes intelligence in our feeble consciousness, is, that there are there several terms, of which the one perceives the other, of which the other is perceived by the first: in this consists self-knowledge, — in this consists self-comprehension, — in this consists intelligence: intelligence without consciousness is the abstract possibility of intelligence, not, intelligence in the act; and consciousness implies diversity and difference. Transfer all this from human to absolute intelligence — that is to say, refer the ideas to the only intelligence to which they can belong — you have thus, if I may so express myself, the life of absolute intelligence; you have this intelligence with the complete developement of the elements which are necessary for it to be a true intelligence; you have all the *momenta* whose relation and motion constitute the reality of knowledge." In all this, so far as human intelligence is concerned, we cordially agree; for a more complete admission could not be imagined, not only that a knowledge of the absolute is impossible for man, but that we are unable to conceive the possibility of such a knowledge, even in the Deity, without contradicting our human conceptions of the possibility of intelligence itself. Our author, however, perceives no contradiction; and without argument or explanation, accords a knowledge of that which can only be known under the negation of all difference and plurality, to that which can only know under the affirmation of both.

If a knowledge of the absolute were possible under these conditions, it may excite our wonder that other philosophers should have viewed the supposition as the merest absurdity; and that Schelling, whose acuteness was never questioned, should have exposed himself gratuitously to the reproach of mysticism by his postulating for a few, and through a faculty above the reach of consciousness, a knowledge already given to all in the fact of consciousness itself. Monstrous as is the postulate of the intellectual intuition, we freely confess that it is only through such a faculty that we can imagine the possibility of a science of the absolute; and have no hesitation in acknowledging, that if Schelling's hypothesis appear to us undemonstrable, that of Cousin is seen to be self-contradictory.

Our author admits, and must admit, that the absolute is absolutely one: and absolute unity is convertible with the absolute negation of plurality and difference: the absolute and the knowledge of the absolute, are therefore identical. But knowledge, or intelligence, it is asserted by M. Cousin, supposes a plurality of terms — the plurality of subject and object. Intelligence, whose essence is plurality, cannot therefore be identified with the absolute, whose essence is unity; and if known, the absolute as known must be different from the absolute as existing; that is, there must be two absolutes — an absolute in knowledge, and an absolute in existence, which is doubly contradictory.

But waving this contradiction, and allowing the non-identity of knowledge and existence, the absolute as known must be known under the conditions of the absolute as existing; that is, as absolute unity. But, on the other hand, it is asserted, that the condition of intelligence as knowing, is plurality and difference; consequently the condition of the absolute as existing, and under which it must be known, and the

condition of intelligence as capable of knowing, are incompatible. For, if we suppose the absolute cognisable, it must be identified either, *First*, with the subject; or, *Second*, with the object of intelligence; or, *Third*, with the indifference of both. The first hypothesis, and the second, are contradictory of that of the absolute; for in these the absolute is supposed to be known, either as contradistinguished from the subject, or as contradistinguished from the object, of thought; in other words, it is asserted to be known as absolute unity, *i. e.* as the negation of all plurality, while the very act by which it is known, affirms plurality as the condition of knowledge itself. The third hypothesis, on the other hand, is contradictory of the plurality of intelligence; for if the subject and the object of consciousness be known as one, a plurality of terms is not the necessary condition of intelligence. The alternative is therefore necessary; either the absolute cannot be known at all, or our author is wrong in subjecting thought to the conditions of plurality and difference. It was the iron necessity of the alternative that constrained Schelling to resort to the hypothesis of a knowledge in identity through the intellectual intuition; and it could only be from an oversight of the main difficulties of the problem that M. Cousin, in abandoning the intellectual intuition, did not abandon the absolute itself. For how that whose essence is all-comprehensive unity, can be known by the negation of that unity under the condition of plurality; — how that which exists only as an identity of all difference can be known under the negation of that identity in the antithesis of subject and object, of knowledge and of existence, — these are contradictions which M. Cousin has not attempted to solve; — contradictions which he has not even ventured to state.

In the *fourth* place. — The objection of the inconceivable nature of Schelling's intellectual intuition, and a knowledge of the absolute in identity, apparently determined our author to adopt the opposite, but suicidal alternative, of a knowledge of the absolute in consciousness, and by difference. The equally insuperable objection, that from the absolute defined as absolute, Schelling had not been able, without inconsequence, to deduce the conditioned, seems in like manner to have influenced M. Cousin to define the absolute by a relative; not aware, it would appear, that though he thus facilitated the derivation of the conditioned, he annihilated in reality the absolute itself. By the former proceeding, our author virtually denies the possibility of the absolute in knowledge; by the latter, the possibility of the absolute in existence.

The absolute is defined by our author "an absolute *cause* — a cause which cannot but pass into act." Now, it is sufficiently manifest that a thing existing absolutely, (*i. e.* not under relation,) and a thing existing absolutely as a cause, are contradictory. The former is the absolute negation of all relation, the latter is the absolute affirmation of a particular relation. A cause is a relative, and what exists absolutely as a cause, exists absolutely under relation. Schelling has justly observed, that "he would deviate as wide as the poles from the idea of the absolute, who would think of defining its nature by the notion of activity."\* But he who would define the absolute by the notion of a cause, would deviate still more widely from its nature; inasmuch as the notion of a cause involves not only the notion of a determination to activity, but of a determination to a dependent kind of activity — an activity not immanent, but transient. What exists merely as a cause, exists merely for the sake of something else, — is not

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\* Bruno, p. 171.

final in itself, but simply a mean towards an end; and in the accomplishment of that end, it consummates its own perfection. Abstractly considered, the effect is therefore superior to the cause. A cause, as cause, may indeed be better than any given number of its effects; but the total complement of the effects of what exists only as a cause, is better than that which, *ex hypothesi*, exists only for the sake of their production. But an absolute cause is not only dependent on the effect for its *perfection* — it is dependent on it even for its *reality*. For to what extent a thing exists necessarily as a cause, to that extent it is not all-sufficient to itself; for to that extent it is dependent on the effect, as on the condition through which alone it realises its existence; and what exists absolutely as a cause, exists therefore in absolute dependence on the effect for the reality of its existence. An absolute cause, in truth, only exists in its effects: it never *is*, it always *becomes*.

The definition of the absolute by absolute cause is, therefore, tantamount to a negation of itself; for it defines by relation and conditions; that which is conceived only as exclusive of both. The same is true of the definition of the absolute by substance.

The vice of M. Cousin's definition of the absolute by absolute cause, is manifested likewise in its applications. Our author vaunts that his theory can alone explain the nature and relations of the Deity; and on its absolute incompetency to fulfil the conditions of a rational theism, we are willing to rest a demonstration of its futility:

“God,” says our author, “creates; he creates in virtue of his creative power, and he draws the universe, not from nonentity, but from himself, who is absolute existence. His distinguishing characteristic being an absolute creative force, which cannot but pass into activity, it follows, not that the creation is possible, but that it is necessary.”

We must be very brief. The subjection of the Deity to a necessity—a necessity of self-manifestation identical with the creation of the universe, is contradictory of the fundamental postulates of a divine nature. On this hypothesis, God is not distinct from the world; the creature is a modification of the Creator. Now, without objecting that the simple subordination of the Deity to necessity, is in itself tantamount to his dethronement, let us see to what consequences this necessity, on the hypothesis of our author, inevitably leads. On this hypothesis one of two alternatives must be admitted. God, as necessarily determined to pass from absolute essence to relative manifestation, is determined to pass either from the better to the worse, or from the worse to the better. A third possibility, that both states are equal, as contradictory in itself, and as contradicted by our author, it is not necessary to consider.

The first supposition must be rejected. The necessity in this case determines God to pass from the better to the worse; that is, operates to his partial annihilation. The force which compels this must be external and hostile, for nothing operates to its own deterioration; and, as superior to the pretended God, is either the real Deity, if an intelligent cause, or a negation of all Deity, if a blind force or fate.

The second is equally inadmissible — that God, passing into the universe, passes from a state of comparative imperfection, into a state of comparative perfection. The divine nature is identical with the most perfect nature, and is also identical with the first cause. If the first cause be not identical with the most perfect nature, there is no God; for the two essential conditions of his existence are not in combination. Now, on the present supposition, the most perfect nature is the derived; that is,

the universe in relation to its cause, is the real, the actual, the ὄντως ὄν. It would also be the divine, but that divinity supposes also the notion of cause, while the universe, *ex hypothesi*, is only an effect.

It is no answer to these difficulties for M. Cousin to say, that the Deity, though a cause which cannot choose but create, is not, however, exhausted in the act; and though passing with all the elements of his being into the universe, that he remains entire in his essence, and with all the superiority of the cause over the effect. The dilemma is unavoidable — either the Deity is independent of the universe for his being or his perfection; on which alternative our author must abandon his theory of God and the creation: or the Deity is dependent on his manifestation in the universe for his existence or his perfection; on which alternative his doctrine is assailed by the difficulties previously stated.

The length to which the preceding observations have extended, prevents us from adverting to many other opinions of our author, which we conceive to be equally unfounded. For example, to say nothing of his proof of the impersonality of intelligence, because, forsooth, truth is not subject to our will, what can be conceived more self-contradictory than his theory of liberty? Divorcing liberty from intelligence, but connecting it with personality, he defines it to be a cause which is determined to act only by its proper energy. But (to say nothing of remoter difficulties) how liberty can be conceived (supposing always a plurality of modes of activity) without a knowledge of that plurality,—how a faculty can resolve to act by preference in a particular manner, and not determine itself by final causes,—how intelligence can influence a blind power without operating as an efficient cause,—or how, in fine, morality can be founded on a liberty which, at best, only escapes necessity by taking refuge with chance,—these are problems which M. Cousin, in none of his works, has stated, and which we are confident he is unable to solve.

After the tenor of our previous observations, it is needless to say that we regard M. Cousin's attempt to establish a general peace among philosophers, by the promulgation of his Eclectic Theory, as a signal failure. But though no converts to his philosophy, and viewing with regret what we must regard as the misapplication of his distinguished talents, we cannot disown a strong feeling of interest and admiration for those qualities, even in their excess, which have betrayed him, with so many other aspiring philosophers, into a pursuit which could end only in disappointment — we mean his love of truth, and his reliance on the powers of man. Not to despair of philosophy is a "last infirmity of noble minds." The stronger the intellect, the stronger the confidence in its force; the more ardent the appetite for knowledge, the less are we prepared to canvass the uncertainty of the fruition. "The wish is parent to the thought." Loath to admit that our science is at best the reflection of a reality we cannot know, we strive to penetrate to existence in itself; and what we have laboured intensely to attain, we at last fondly believe we have accomplished. But, like Ixion, we embrace a cloud for a divinity. Conscious only of limitation, we think to comprehend the infinite, and dream of establishing our human science on an identity with the omniscient God. It is this powerful tendency of the most vigorous minds to transcend the sphere of our faculties, that makes a "learned ignorance" the most difficult acquirement of knowledge. In the words of a forgotten, but acute philosopher, — *magna, immo maxima, pars sapientiæ, est quædam æquo animo nescire velle.*

## PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. — REID AND BROWN.\*

WE rejoice in the publication of this work, — and for two reasons. We hail it as another sign of the convalescence of philosophy in a great and influential nation; and prize it as a seasonable testimony by intelligent foreigners, to the merits of a philosopher, whose reputation is, for the moment, under an eclipse at home.

We are pleased by the appearance of this translation of the works of Reid — in Paris — and under the auspices of so distinguished an editor as M. Jouffroy, less, certainly, as indicating the triumph of any particular system or school, than as a pledge, among many others, of the zealous, yet liberal and unexclusive, spirit with which the science of mind has of late been cultivated in France. The contrast which the present philosophical enthusiasm of France exhibits to the speculative apathy of Britain, is any thing, indeed, but flattering to ourselves. The new spirit of metaphysical enquiry, which the French imbibed from Germany and Scotland, arose with them precisely at the time when the popularity of psychological researches began to decline with us; and now, when all interest in these speculations seems here to be extinct, they are there seen flourishing in public favour, with a universality and vigour corresponding to their encouragement.

The only example that can be adduced of any interest in such subjects, recently exhibited in this country, is the favourable reception of Dr. Brown's *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Mind*. This work, however, we regard as a concurrent cause of the very indifference we lament, and as a striking proof of its reality.

As a *cause*; — these lectures have certainly done much to justify the general neglect of the study they were intended to promote. Dr. Brown's high reputation for metaphysical acuteness gave a presumptive authority to any doctrine he might promulgate; and the personal relations in which he stood to Mr. Stewart, afforded every assurance, that he would not revolt against that philosopher's opinions, rashly, or except on grounds that would fully vindicate his dissent. In these circumstances, what was the impression on the public mind, when all that was deemed best established, — all that was claimed as original and most important in the philosophy of Reid and Stewart, — was proclaimed by their disciple and successor to be *nought but a series of misconceptions, only less wonderful in their commission than in the general acquiescence in their truth*? Confidence was at once withdrawn from a pursuit, in which the most sagacious enquirers were thus at fault; and the few who did not relinquish the study in despair, clung with implicit faith to the revelation of the new apostle.

As a *proof*; — these lectures afford evidence of how greatly talent has, of late, been withdrawn from the field of metaphysical discussion. This work has now been before the world for ten years. In itself it combines many of the qualities calculated to attract public, and even popular

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\* Œuvres Complètes de Thomas Reid, chef de l'École Ecossaise. Publiées par M. Th. Jouffroy, avec des Fragmens de M. Royer-Collard, et une Introduction de l'Editeur. Tomes II.—VI. 8vo. Paris, 1828-9. (Not completed.)—Vol. lii. page 158. October, 1830.

attention; while its admirers have exhausted hyperbole in its praise, and disparaged every philosophic name to exalt the reputation of its author. Yet, though attention has been thus concentrated on these lectures for so long a period, and though the high ability, and higher authority, of Dr. Brown, deserved, and would have recompensed, the labour, we are not aware that, with one exception\*, any adequate attempt has yet been made to subject them, in whole or in part, to an enlightened and impartial criticism. The radical inconsistencies which they involve, in every branch of their subject, remain undeveloped; their unacknowledged appropriations are still lauded as original†; their endless mistakes in the history of philosophy stand yet uncorrected; and their frequent misrepresentations of other philosophers continue to mislead. In particular, nothing has more convinced us of the general neglect, in this country, of psychological science, than that Dr. Brown's unmerited attack on Reid, and through Reid, confessedly on Stewart, has not long since been repelled; except, indeed, the general belief that it was triumphant.

In these circumstances we felt gratified, as we said, with the present honourable testimony to the value of Dr. Reid's speculations in a foreign country; and have deemed this a seasonable opportunity of expressing our own opinion on the subject, and of again vindicating, we trust, to that philosopher, the well-earned reputation of which he has been too long defrauded in his own. If we are not mistaken in our view, we shall, in fact, reverse the marvel, and retort the accusation, in proving that Dr. Brown himself is guilty of that "series of wonderful misconceptions" of which he so confidently arraigns his predecessors.

"Turpe est doctori, cum culpa redarguit ipsum."

This, however, let it be recollected, is no point of merely personal concernment. It is true, indeed, that either Reid accomplished nothing, or the science has retrograded under Brown. But the question itself regards the cardinal point of metaphysical philosophy; and its determination involves the proof or the refutation of scepticism.

The subject we have undertaken can, with difficulty, be compressed within the limits of a single article. This must stand our excuse for not, at present, noticing the valuable accompaniment to Reid's "Essays on the Intellectual Powers," in the "Fragments of M. Royer-Collard's Lectures," which are appended to the third and fourth volumes of the translation.

\* We refer to Sir James Mackintosh's chapter on Dr. Brown, in his late admirable *Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy*, prefixed to the new edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

† We shall, in the sequel, afford a sample of these "inconsistencies," "mistakes," and "misrepresentations," of Dr. Brown: to complete the cycle, and vindicate our assertion, we here adduce one specimen of the way in which discoveries have been lavished on him, in consequence of his omission (excusable in the circumstances) to advertise the reader when he was not original. Brown's doctrine of *Generalisation* is identical with that commonly taught by philosophers—not Scottish; and, among these, by authors, with whose works his lectures prove him to have been well acquainted. But if a writer, one of the best informed of those who, in this country, have of late cultivated this branch of philosophy, could, among other expressions equally encomiastic, speak of his *return* to the *vulgar* opinion, on such a point, as of "a discovery, &c. which will, in all future ages, be regarded as one of the most important steps ever made in metaphysical science;" how incompetent must ordinary readers be to place Brown on his proper level?—how desirable would have been a critical examination of his *Lectures*, to distribute to him his own, and to estimate his property at its true value?

A more appropriate occasion for considering these may, however, occur, when the *first* volume, containing M. Jouffroy's Introduction, appears; of which, from other specimens of his ability, we entertain no humble expectations.

“Reid,” says Dr. Brown, “considers his confutation of the ideal system as involving almost every thing which is truly his. Yet there are few circumstances connected with the fortune of modern philosophy that appear to me more wonderful, than that a mind like Dr. Reid's, so learned in the history of metaphysical science, should have conceived, that on this point any great merit, at least any merit of originality, was justly referable to him particularly. Indeed, the only circumstance which appears to me wonderful, is, that the claim thus made by him should have been so readily and generally admitted.”—*Lect.* xxv. p. 155.

Dr. Brown then proceeds at great length to show, 1. That Reid, in his attempt to overthrow what he conceived “the common theory of ideas,” wholly misunderstood the catholic opinion, which was, in fact, identical with his own; and actually attributed to all philosophers “a theory which had been universally, or, at least, almost universally, abandoned at the time he wrote;” and, 2. That the doctrine of perception, which Reid so absurdly fancies he had first established, affords, in truth, no better evidence of the existence of an external world, than even the long-abandoned hypothesis which he had taken such idle labour to refute.

In every particular of this statement, Dr. Brown is completely, and even curiously, wrong. He is out in his prelusive flourish,—out in his serious assault. Reid is neither “so learned in the history of metaphysical science” as he verbally proclaims, nor so sheer an ignorant as he would really demonstrate. Estimated by aught above a very vulgar standard, Reid's knowledge of philosophical opinions was neither extensive nor exact; and Mr. Stewart was himself too competent and candid a judge, not fully to acknowledge the deficiency.\* But Reid's merits as a thinker are too high, and too securely established, to make it necessary to claim for his reputation an erudition to which he himself advances no pretension. And, be his learning what it may, his critic, at least, has not been able to convict him of a *single error*; while Dr. Brown himself rarely opens his mouth upon the older authors, without betraying his absolute unacquaintance with the matters on which he so intrepidly discourses. Nor, as a speculator, does Reid's superiority admit, we conceive, of doubt. With all our admiration of Brown's general talent, we do not hesitate to assert, that, in the points at issue between the two philosophers, to say nothing of others, he has completely misapprehended Reid's philosophy, even in its fundamental position,—the import of the sceptical reasoning,—and the significance of the only argument by which that reasoning is resisted. But, on the other hand, as Reid can only be defended on the ground of misconception, the very fact, that his great doctrine of perception could actually be reversed by so acute an intellect as Brown's, would prove that there must exist some confusion and obscurity in his own developement of that doctrine, to render such a misinterpretation possible. Nor is this presumption wrong. In truth, Reid did not generalise to himself an adequate notion of the various possible *theories of perception*, some of which he has accordingly confounded: while his error of commission in discriminating *consciousness* as a special

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\* Dissertation on the History of Metaphysical Philosophy, Part ii. p. 197.

faculty, and his error of omission in not discriminating *intuitive* from *representative* knowledge, — a distinction without which his peculiar philosophy is naught, — have contributed to render his doctrine of the intellectual faculties prolix, vacillating, perplexed, and sometimes even contradictory.

Before proceeding to consider the doctrine of perception in relation to the points at issue between Reid and his antagonist, it is therefore necessary to disintricate the question, by relieving it of these two errors, bad in themselves, but worse in the confusion which they occasion; for, as Bacon truly observes, — *citius emergit veritas ex errore quam ex confusione*. And, first, of consciousness.

Aristotle, Des Cartes, Locke, and philosophers in general, have regarded consciousness, not as a particular faculty, but as the universal condition of intelligence. Reid, on the contrary, following, probably, Hutcheson, and followed by Stewart, Royer-Collard, and others, has classed consciousness as a co-ordinate faculty with the other intellectual powers; distinguished from them, not as the species from the individual, but as the individual from the individual. And as the particular faculties have each their peculiar object, so the peculiar object of consciousness is, the operations of the other faculties themselves, to the exclusion of the objects about which these operations are conversant.

This analysis we regard as false. For it is impossible, in the *first* place, to discriminate consciousness from all the other faculties, or to discriminate any one of these from consciousness; and, in the *second*, to conceive a faculty cognizant of the various mental operations, without being also cognizant of their several objects.

*We know*, and *We know that we know*: — these propositions, *logically* distinct, are *really* identical; each implies the other. *We know* (*i. e.* feel, perceive, imagine, remember, &c.) only as *we know that we thus know*; and *we know that we know*, only as we know in *some particular manner*, (*i. e.* feel, perceive, &c.) So true is the scholastic brocard, *Non sentimus nisi sentiamus nos sentire; non sentimus nos sentire nisi sentiamus*. The attempt to analyse the cognition *I know*, and the cognition *I know that I know*, into the separate energies of distinct faculties, is therefore vain. But this is the analysis of Reid. Consciousness, which the formula *I know that I know* adequately expresses, he views as a power specifically distinct from the various cognitive faculties comprehended under the formula *I know*, precisely as these faculties are severally contradistinguished from each other. But here the parallel does not hold. I can feel without perceiving, I can perceive without imagining, I can imagine without remembering, I can remember without judging, I can judge without willing. One of these acts does not immediately suppose the other. Though modes merely of the same indivisible subject, they are modes in *relation to each other*, really distinct, and admit, therefore, of psychological discrimination. But can I feel without being conscious that I feel? — can I remember without being conscious that I remember? or, can I be conscious without being conscious that I perceive, or imagine, or reason, — that I energise, in short, in some determinate mode, which Reid would view as the act of a faculty specifically different from consciousness? That this is impossible, Reid himself admits. “Unde,” says Tertullian, — “unde ista tormenta cruciandæ simplicitatis et suspendendæ veritatis? — Quis mihi exhibebit sensum non intelligentem sentire?” But if, on the one hand, consciousness be only realised under specific modes and cannot therefore exist apart from the several facul-



ties *in cumulo*; and if, on the other, these faculties can all and each only be exerted under the condition of consciousness; consciousness, consequently, is not one of the special modes into which our mental activity may be resolved, but the fundamental form, the generic condition, of them all. Every intelligent act is thus a modified consciousness; and consciousness a comprehensive term for the complement of our intellectual energies.

But the defect of Dr. Reid's analysis is further manifested in his arbitrary limitation of the sphere of consciousness; proposing to it the various intellectual operations, but excluding their objects. "I am conscious," he says, "of perception, but not of the object I perceive; I am conscious of memory, but not of the object I remember."

The reduction of consciousness to a particular faculty entailed this limitation. For, once admitting consciousness to be cognizant of *objects* as of *operations*, Reid could not, without absurdity, degrade it to the level of a special power. For thus, in the *first* place, consciousness co-extensive with *all* our cognitive faculties, would yet be made co-ordinate with *each*: and, in the *second*, two faculties would be supposed to be simultaneously exercised about the same object, to the same intent.

But the alternative which Reid has chosen is almost equally untenable. The assertion, that we can be conscious of an act of knowledge, without being conscious of its object, is virtually suicidal. A mental operation is only what it is, by relation to its object; the object at once determining its existence, and specifying the character of its existence. But if a relation cannot be comprehended in one of its terms, so we cannot be conscious of an operation, without being conscious of the object to which it exists only as correlative. For example, we are conscious of a perception, says Reid, but are not conscious of its object. Yet how can we be conscious of a *perception*, that is, how can we *know* that a perception exists—that it is a perception, and not another mental state—and that it is the perception of a rose, and of nothing but a rose; unless this *consciousness* involve a knowledge (or consciousness) of the object, which at once determines the existence of the act—specifies its kind—and distinguishes its individuality? Annihilate the object, you annihilate the operation; annihilate the consciousness of the object, you annihilate the consciousness of the operation. In the greater number, indeed, of our intellectual energies, the two terms of the relation of knowledge exist only as identical; the object admitting only of a logical discrimination from the subject. I imagine a Hippogryph. The Hippogryph is at once the object of the act and the act itself. Abstract the one, the other has no existence: deny me the consciousness of the Hippogryph, you deny me the consciousness of the imagination; I am conscious of zero; I am not conscious at all.

A difficulty may here be started in regard to two faculties,—Memory and Perception.

Memory is defined by Reid "an *immediate* knowledge of the *past*;" and is thus distinguished from consciousness, which, with all philosophers, he views as "an *immediate* knowledge of the *present*." We may, therefore, be conscious of the act of memory *as present*; but of its object *as past*, consciousness is impossible. And certainly, if Reid's definition of memory be admitted, this inference cannot be disallowed. But memory is not an immediate knowledge of the past; an *immediate knowledge of the past* is a contradiction in terms. This is manifest, whether we look from the act to the object, or from the object to the act. To be known *immediately*,

an object must be known *in itself*; to be known in itself, it must be known as actual, now existent, *present*. But the object of memory is *past*—not present, not now existent, not actual; it cannot therefore be known in itself. If known at all, it must be known in something different from itself; i. e. *mediately*; and memory as an “*immediate knowledge of the past*,” is thus impossible. Again: memory is an act of knowledge; an act exists only as present; and a present knowledge can be immediately cognizant only of a present object. But the object known in memory is *past*; consequently, either memory is not an *act* of knowledge at all, or the object immediately known is present; and the past, if known, is known only through the *medium* of the *present*: on either alternative memory is not “an *immediate knowledge of the past*.” Thus, memory, like our other faculties, affords only an immediate knowledge of the present; and, like them, is nothing more than consciousness variously modified.\*

In regard to perception: Reid allows an immediate knowledge of the affections of the subject of thought, mind, or self, and an immediate knowledge of the qualities of an object really different from self—*matter*. To the former he gives the name of consciousness; to the latter, that of perception. Is consciousness, as an immediate knowledge, *purely subjective*, not to be discriminated from perception, as an immediate knowledge, *really objective*? A logical difference we admit; a psychological we deny.

Relatives are known only together: the science of contraries is one. Subject and object, mind and matter, are known only in correlation and contrast—and in the same common act: while knowledge, as at once a synthesis and an antithesis of both, may be indifferently defined an antithetic synthesis, or a synthetic antithesis of its terms. Every conception of self necessarily involves a conception of not-self: every perception of what is different from me, implies a recognition of the percipient subject in contradistinction from the object perceived. In one act of knowledge, indeed, the object is the prominent element; in another the subject; but there is none in which either is known out of relation to the other. The immediate knowledge which Reid allows of things different from the mind, and the immediate knowledge of mind itself, cannot therefore be split into two distinct acts. In perception, as in the other faculties, the same indivisible consciousness is conversant about both terms of the relation of knowledge. Distinguish the cognition of the subject from the cognition of the object of perception, and you *either* annihilate the relation of knowledge itself, which exists only in its terms being comprehended together in the unity of consciousness; *or* you may postulate a higher faculty, which shall again reduce to one the two cognitions you

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\* The only parallel we know to this misconception of Reid's is the opinion on which Fromondus animadverts. “In primis displicet nobis plurimorum recentiorum philosophia, qui sensuum interiorum operationes, ut phantasiationem, memorationem, et reminiscentiam, circa imagines recenter, aut olim spiritibus vel cerebro impressas, versari negant; *sed proxime circa objecta quæ foris sunt*. Ut cum quis ineminit se vidisse leporem currentem, memoria, inquit, non intuetur et attingit imaginem leporis in cerebro asservatam, *sed solum leporem ipsum qui cursu trajiciebat campum*,” &c. &c. (*Philosophia Christiana de Anima*. Lovanii, 1649. L. iii. c. 8. art. 8.) Who the advocates of this opinion were, we are ignorant; but more than suspect that, *as stated*, it is only a misrepresentation of the Cartesian doctrine, then on the ascendant.

have distinguished;—that is, you are at last compelled to admit, in an unphilosophical complexity, that common consciousness of subject and object, which you set out with denying its philosophical simplicity. *Consciousness* and *immediate knowledge* are thus terms universally convertible; and if there be an immediate knowledge of things external, there is consequently the *consciousness of an outer world*.\*

Reid's erroneous analysis of consciousness is not perhaps of so much importance in itself, as from causing confusion in its consequences. Had he employed this term as tantamount to immediate knowledge in general, whether of self or not, and thus *distinctly expressed* what he *certainly taught*, that mind and matter are both equally known to us *as existent and in themselves*; Dr. Brown could hardly have so far misconceived his doctrine, as actually to lend him the very opinion which his whole philosophy was intended to refute, viz. that an *immediate*, and consequently a *real*, knowledge of external things is impossible. But this by anticipation.

This leads us to the *second* error,—the non-distinction of representative from intuitive knowledge. The reduction of consciousness to a special faculty involved this confusion. For had Reid perceived that all our faculties are only consciousness, and that consciousness as an immediate knowledge is only of the present and actual, he would also have discovered that the *past* and *possible*, either could not be known to us all, or could be known only *in* and *through* the present and actual, i. e. *mediately*. But a mediate knowledge is necessarily a *representative* knowledge. For if the present, or actual *in* itself, makes known to us the past and possible *through* itself, this can only be done by a vicarious substitution or representation. And as the knowledge of the *past* is given in *memory*, and that of the *possible* in *imagination*, these two faculties are powers of representative knowledge. Memory is an immediate knowledge of a *present* thought, involving an absolute belief that this thought represents another act of knowledge that *has been*. Imagination (which we use in its widest signification, to include conception and simple appre-

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\* How correctly Aristotle reasoned on this subject, may be seen from the following passage:—"When we perceive" (*αἰσθανόμεθα*)—the Greeks, perhaps fortunately, had no special term for *consciousness*;—"when we perceive that we see, hear, &c. it is necessary, that by sight itself we perceive that we see, or by another sense. If by another sense, then this also must be a sense of sight, conversant equally about the object of sight, colour. Consequently, there must either be two senses of the same object, or every sense must be percipient of itself. Moreover, if the sense percipient of sight be different from sight itself, it follows either that there is a regress to infinity, or we must admit, at last, some sense percipient of itself; but if so, it is more reasonable to admit this in the original sense at once." (*De Anima*, L. iii. c. 2. text. 136.) Here Aristotle ought not to be supposed to mean that every sense is an independent faculty of perception, and, as such, conscious of itself. Compare *De Som. et Vig.* c. 2. and *Probl.* (if indeed his) sect. xi. § 33. His older commentators—Alexander, Themistius, Simplicius—follow their master. Michael Ephesius and Philoponus desert his doctrine, and attribute this self-consciousness to a peculiar faculty which they call attention (*τὸ προσεκτικόν*). This is the earliest example we know of this false analysis, which, when carried to its last absurdity, has given us *consciousness*, and *attention*, and *reflection*, as distinct powers. Of the schoolmen, *satiùs est silere, quam parum dicere*. Nemesius, and Plutarch, preserved by Philoponus, accord this reflex consciousness to *intellect* as opposed to *sense*. Plato varies in his *Theætetus* and *Charmides*.

hension) is an immediate knowledge of an *actual* thought, which, as not self-contradictory (*i. e.* logically possible), involves the hypothetical belief that it *may be* (*i. e.* is really possible).

Nor is philosophy here at variance with nature. The learned and unlearned agree, that in memory and imagination, nought of which we are conscious lies beyond the sphere of self, and that in these acts the object known is only relative to a reality supposed to be. Nothing but Reid's superstitious horror of the ideal theory, could have blinded him so far as not to see that these faculties are, of necessity, mediate and representative. In this, however, he not only overshot the truth, but almost frustrated his whole philosophy. For, he thus affords a ground — and the only ground, *though not perceived* by Brown — on which it could be argued that his doctrine of perception was *not intuitive*. For if he rejected the doctrine of ideas not less in memory and imagination, which *must* be representative faculties, than in perception, which *may* be intuitive; and if he predicates *immediate knowledge* equally of all, — it may plausibly be contended, in favour of Brown's conclusion, that Reid did not really intend to allow a proper intuitive perception, and that he only abusively gave the name of immediate knowledge to the simplest form of the representative theory, in contradistinction to the more complex. But this also by anticipation.

There exists, therefore, a distinction of knowledge, as immediate or intuitive, and as mediate or representative. The former is logically *simple*, as only contemplative: the latter logically complex; as both representative, and contemplative of the representation. In the one, the *object is single*, and the word univocal; in the other it is double, and the term æquivocal; the object known and representing, being different from the object unknown and represented. The knowledge in an intuitive act, as convertible with existence, is *assertory*; and the reality of its only object is given unconditionally, as a *fact*: the knowledge in a representative act, as not convertible with existence, is *problematical*; and the reality of its principal object is given hypothetically, as an *inference*. Representative knowledge is purely *subjective*, for its object known is always *ideal*; intuitive may either be subjective or objective, for its object may either be ideal or material. Considered in *themselves*, an intuitive cognition is complete, as absolute and irrespective of aught beyond the compass of knowledge: a representative incomplete, as relative to a transcendent something, beyond the sphere of consciousness. Considered in relation to their *objects*, the former is complete; its object being known and real; the latter incomplete, its object known, being unreal, and its real object unknown. Considered in relation to *each other*, immediate knowledge is complete, as all-sufficient in itself; mediate incomplete, as realised only through the other.\*

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\* This distinction of intuitive and representative knowledge, overlooked, or rather abolished, in the theories of modern philosophy, is correspondent to the division of knowledge by certain of the schoolmen, into *intuitive* and *abstractive*. By the latter term, they *also* expressed *abstract* knowledge in its present signification. — “*Cognitio intuitiva*,” says the *Doctor Resolutissimus*, “*est illa quæ immediate tendit ad rem sibi præsentem objective, secundum ejus actualem existentiam: sicut cum video colorem existentem in pariete, vel rosam, quam in manu teneo. Abstractiva, dicitur omnis cognitio, quæ habetur de re non sic realiter præsentem in ratione objecti immediate cogniti.*” Now, when with a knowledge of this distinction, of which Reid was ignorant, and rejecting equally with him not only species,

So far there is no difficulty, or ought to have been none. The past and possible can only be known mediately by representation. But a more arduous, at least a more perplexed, question arises, when we ask, — Is all knowledge of the present or actual intuitive? *Is the knowledge of mind and matter equally immediate?*

In regard to the immediate knowledge of mind, there is *now* at least no difficulty; it is admitted not to be representative. The problem, therefore, exclusively regards the intuitive perception of the qualities of matter.

(To obviate misapprehension, we may here parenthetically observe, that all we *do* intuitively know of self, — all that we *may* intuitively know of not-self, is only *relative*. Existence *absolutely and in itself*, is to us as zero; and while nothing *is*, so nothing is *known* to us, except those phases of being which stand in analogy to our faculties of knowledge. These we call *qualities*. When we say, therefore, that a thing is *known in itself*, we mean only, that it stands face to face, in direct and immediate relation to the conscious mind; in other words, that, *as existing*, it forms part of the circle of our knowledge — exists, *since* it is known, and is known, *because* it exists.)

If we interrogate consciousness concerning the point in question, the response is categorical and clear. When I concentrate my attention in the simplest act of perception, I return from my observation with the most irresistible conviction of *two* facts, or rather, two branches of the *same* fact; — that *I am*, — and that *something different from me exists*. In this act, I am conscious of myself as the perceiving subject, and of an external reality as the object perceived; and I am conscious of both existences in the same indivisible moment of intuition. The knowledge of the subject does not precede nor follow the knowledge of the object; — neither determines, neither is determined by, the other. The two terms of correlation stand in mutual counterpoise and equal independence; they are given as connected in the synthesis of knowledge, but as contrasted in the antithesis of existence.

Such is the fact of perception revealed in consciousness, and as it determines mankind in general in their equal assurance of the reality of an external world, as of the existence of their own minds. *Consciousness declares our knowledge of material qualities to be intuitive*. Nor is the fact, *as given*, denied even by those who disallow its truth. So clear is the deliverance, that even the philosophers who reject an intuitive perception, find it impossible not to admit, that their doctrine stands decidedly opposed to the voice of consciousness and the natural conviction of mankind. (*V. infra*, p. 201. note.)

According as the truth of the fact of consciousness in perception is *entirely* accepted, accepted *in part*, or *wholly* rejected, *six* possible and actual systems of philosophy result.

1. If the veracity of consciousness be unconditionally admitted, — if the intuitive knowledge of mind and matter, and the consequent reality of their antithesis, be taken as truths, to be explained if possible, but in themselves are held as paramount to all doubt, the doctrine is established which we would call the scheme of *Natural Realism* or *Natural Dualism*.

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but a representative perception, we say that many of the schoolmen have, in this respect, left behind them all modern philosophers; we assert a paradox, but one which we are easily able to prove. Leibnitz spoke truly, when he said — “*aurum latere in stercore illo scholastico barbariei.*”

2. If the veracity of consciousness be allowed to the equipoise of the object and subject in the act, but rejected as to the reality of their anti-thesis, the system of *Absolute Identity* emerges, which reduces both mind and matter to phenomenal modifications of the same common substance.

3. and 4. If the testimony of consciousness be refused to the co-originality and reciprocal independence of the subject and object, two schemes are determined, according as the one or the other of the terms is placed as the original and genetic. Is the object educed from the subject, *Idealism*; is the subject educed from the object, *Materialism*, is the result. 5. Again, is the consciousness itself recognised only as a phenomenon, and the substantial reality of both subject and object denied, the issue is *Nihilism*.

6. These systems are all conclusions from an original interpretation of the fact of consciousness in perception, carried intrepidly forth to its legitimate issue. But there is one scheme, which, violating the integrity of this fact, and, with the idealist, regarding the object of consciousness in perception as only a modification of the percipient subject, endeavours, however, to stop short of the negation of an external world, the reality of which, and the knowledge of whose reality, it seeks, by various hypotheses, to establish and explain. This scheme, which we would term *Hypothetical Realism*, or *Hypothetical Dualism*, although the most inconsequent of all systems, has been embraced, under various forms, by the immense majority of philosophers.

Of these systems, Dr. Brown adheres to the last. He holds that the mind *is conscious or immediately cognizant of nothing beyond its subjective states*; but he assumes the existence of an external world beyond the sphere of consciousness, exclusively on the ground of our irresistible belief in its unknown reality. Independent of this belief, there is no reasoning on which the existence of matter can be vindicated; the logic of the idealist he admits to be unassailable.

But Brown not only embraces the scheme of hypothetical realism himself, he never suspects that Reid entertained any other doctrine. Brown's transmutation of Reid from a *natural* to a *hypothetical* realist, as a misconception of the grand and distinctive tenet of a school, by one even of its disciples, is without a parallel in the whole history of philosophy: and this portentous error is prolific; *chimæra chimæram parit*. Were the evidence of the mistake less unambiguous, we should be disposed rather to question our own perspicacity, than to tax so subtle an intellect with so gross a blunder.

Before establishing against his antagonist the true opinion of Reid, it will be proper first to generalise the possible forms, under which the hypothesis of a representative perception can be realised; as a confusion of some of these as actually held, on the part both of Reid and Brown, has tended to introduce no small confusion into the discussion.

The hypothetical realist contends, that he is wholly ignorant of *things in themselves*, and that these are known to him only through a vicarious phenomenon, of which he is conscious in perception.

—“*Rerumque ignarus, imagine gaudet.*”

Now this vicarious phenomenon, or immediate object, must *either* be numerically different from the percipient intellect, *or* a modification of that intellect itself. If the latter, it must, again, *either* be a modification of the thinking substance, with a transcendent existence beyond the act of thought, *or* a modification identical with the act of perception itself.

All possible forms of the representative hypothesis are thus reduced to three, and these have all been actually maintained.

1. *The representative object not a modification of mind.*
2. *The representative object a modification of mind, dependent for its knowledge, but not for its existence, on the act of consciousness.*
3. *The representative object a modification of mind, non-existent out of consciousness — the idea and its perception only different relations of an act (state) really identical.*

In the first, the various opinions touching the nature and origin of the representative object — whether material, immaterial, or between both — whether physical or hyperphysical — whether propagated from the external object or generated in the medium — whether fabricated by the intelligent soul or in the animal life — whether infused by God or angels, or identical with the divine substance, — afford, in the history of philosophy, so many subordinate modifications of this form of the hypothesis. In the two latter, the subaltern theories have been determined by the difficulty to connect the representation with the reality, in a relation of causal dependence; and while some philosophers have left it altogether unexplained, the others have been compelled to resort to the hyperphysical theories of divine assistance and a pre-established harmony. Under the second, opinions have varied, whether the representative object be innate or factitious.

The third of these forms of representation Reid does not seem to have understood. The illusion which made him view, in his doctrine, memory and imagination as powers of *immediate* knowledge, though only *representative* faculties under the *third* form, has, in the history of opinions regarding perception, puzzled him, as we shall see in his exposition of the doctrine of Arnauld. He was not aware that there was a theory, neither identical with his intuitive perception, nor with the first and second forms of the representative hypothesis; with both of which he was sufficiently acquainted. Dr. Brown, on the contrary, who adopts the third and simplest modification of the hypothesis, appears ignorant of its discrimination from the second, and accordingly views the philosophers who held this latter form as not distinguished in opinion from himself. Of the doctrine of *intuition* he does seem almost to have conceived the possibility.

These being premised, we proceed to consider the greatest of all Brown's errors, in itself and in its consequences, — his misconception of the cardinal position of Reid's philosophy, in supposing that philosopher, as a *hypothetical* realist, to hold with himself the third form of the *representative* hypothesis, and not as a *natural* realist, the doctrine of an *intuitive* perception. We are compelled to be brief; and to complete the evidence of the following proof (if more indeed be required), we must beg our readers, interested in the question, to look up the passages, to which we are able only to refer.

In the *first* place, *knowledge* and *existence* are then only convertible when the reality is known *in itself*; for then only can we say, that it is known *because* it exists, and exists *since* it is known. And this constitutes an *immediate* or *intuitive* cognition rigorously so called. Nor did Reid contemplate any other. "It seems admitted," he says, "as a first principle, by the learned and the unlearned, that *what is really perceived must exist*, and that to *perceive what does not exist is impossible*. So far the unlearned man and the philosopher agree." — *Essays on the Intellectual Powers*, p. 142.

In the *second* place, philosophers agree, that the *idea*, or representative object in their theory, is in the strictest sense *immediately perceived*. And so Reid understands them. "I perceive not," says the Cartesian, "the external object itself;" (so far he agrees with the Peripatetic, and differs from the unlearned man;) "but I perceive an image, or form, or idea, in my own mind, or in my brain. *I am certain of the existence of the idea; because I immediately perceive it.*" (L. c.)

In the *third* place, philosophers concur in acknowledging that mankind at large believe, that the *external reality itself* constitutes the *immediate and only object of perception*. So also Reid. "On the same principle, the unlearned man says, *I perceive the external object, and I perceive it to exist.*" (L. c.) — "The vulgar undoubtedly believe, that it is the *external object* which we *immediately perceive*, and not a representative image of it only. It is *for this reason*, that they look upon it as *perfect lunacy to call in question the existence of external objects.*" (L. c.) — "The vulgar are firmly persuaded, that the *very identical objects which they perceive* continue to exist when they do not perceive them; and are no less firmly persuaded, that when ten men look at the sun or the moon they all see the *same individual object.*" (P. 166.) — Speaking of Berkeley, "The vulgar opinion he reduces to this, that the *very things which we perceive* by our senses *do really exist*. This he *grants.*" (P. 165.) — "It is therefore acknowledged by this philosopher" (Hume) "to be a natural instinct or prepossession, an universal and primary opinion of all men, that the objects which we *immediately perceive*, by our senses, are *not images in our minds*, but *external objects*, and that their existence is independent of us and our perception." — P. 201. See also pp. 143. 198, 199, 200. 206.

In these circumstances, if Reid either, 1. — maintains, that his immediate perception of external things is convertible with their reality; or, 2. — asserts that, in his doctrine of perception, the external reality stands, to the percipient mind, face to face, in the same immediacy of relation which the idea holds in the representative theory of the philosophers; or, 3. — declares the identity of his own opinion with the vulgar belief, as thus expounded by himself and the philosophers; — he could not more emphatically proclaim himself a *natural realist*, or more clearly illustrate his doctrine of perception, *to be a doctrine of intuition*. And he does *all three*.

*The first and second.* — "We have before examined the reasons given by philosophers to prove that ideas, and not external objects, are the immediate objects of perception. We shall only here observe, THAT IF EXTERNAL OBJECTS BE PERCEIVED IMMEDIATELY," (and he had just before asserted for the hundredth time that they were so perceived,) "WE HAVE THE SAME REASON TO BELIEVE THEIR EXISTENCE, AS PHILOSOPHERS HAVE TO BELIEVE THE EXISTENCE OF IDEAS, WHILE THEY HOLD THEM TO BE THE IMMEDIATE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION." — P. 589. See also pp. 118. 138.

*The third.* — Speaking of the perception of the external world — "We have here a remarkable conflict between two contradictory opinions, wherein all mankind are engaged. On the one side stand *all the vulgar*, who are unpractised in philosophical researches, and guided by the uncorrupted primary instincts of nature. On the other side, stand *all the philosophers, ancient and modern; every man, without exception, who reflects*. IN THIS DIVISION, TO MY GREAT HUMILIATION, I FIND MYSELF CLASSED WITH THE VULGAR." — P. 207.



Various other proofs of the same conclusion could be adduced ; these for brevity we omit. Brown's interpretation of the fundamental tenet of Reid's philosophy is, therefore, not a simple misconception, but an absolute reversal of its real and even unambiguous import.

But the ground on which Brown vindicates his interpretation is not unworthy of the interpretation itself. The possibility of an intuition beyond the sphere of self, he can hardly be said to have contemplated ; but, on one occasion, Reid's language seems, for a moment, to have actually suggested to him the question — Might that philosopher not possibly regard the material object, as identical with the object of consciousness in perception ? — On what ground does he reject the affirmative as absurd ? His reasoning is to this effect : *To assert an intuitive perception of matter, is to assert an identity of matter and mind (for an immediacy of knowledge is convertible with a unity of existence). But Reid was a sturdy dualist : therefore he could not maintain an immediate perception of the qualities of matter.* (*Lect. xxv.* pp. 159, 160.) In this syllogism, the major is a mere *petitio principii*, which Brown has not attempted to prove ; and which, as tried by the standard of all philosophical truth, is not only false, but even the converse of the truth ; while, admitting its accuracy, it cannot be so connected with the minor as to legitimate the conclusion.

If we appeal to consciousness, consciousness gives, even in the last analysis — in the unity of knowledge, a *quality of existence* ; and peremptorily falsifies Brown's assumption, that *not-self as known is identical with self as knowing*. Reid, therefore, as a dualist, and on the supreme authority of consciousness, might safely maintain the immediacy of perception ; — nay, as a dualist Reid *could not*, consistently, have adopted the opinion which Brown argues, that, as a dualist, he *must* be regarded to have held. Mind and matter exist to us only in their qualities ; and these qualities exist to us only as they are known by us — *i. e.* as phenomena. It is thus only from *knowledge* that we can infer *existence*, and only from the supposed repugnance or compatibility of *phenomena*, within our experience, are we able to ascend to the transcendent difference or identity of *substances*. Now, on the hypothesis that all we immediately know is only a state, or modification, or quality, or phenomenon, of the cognitive subject itself, — how can we contend that the phenomena of mind and matter, *known* only as modifications of the *same*, must *be* the modifications of *different substances* ; — nay, that only on this hypothesis of their substantial unity in knowledge, can their substantial duality in existence be maintained ? But of this again.

Brown's assumption has no better foundation than the exaggeration of a crotchet of philosophers ; which, though contrary to the evidence of consciousness, and consequently not only *without* but *against* all evidence, has yet exerted a more extensive and important influence than any principle in the whole history of philosophy. This subject deserves a volume ; we can only afford it a few sentences. — Some philosophers (as Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, Alcmaeon) maintained that knowledge implied a contrariety of subject and object. But since the time of Empedocles, no opinion has been more universally admitted, than that the *relation of knowledge* inferred the *analogy of existence*. This analogy may be supposed in two potences. What knows and what is known, are either, 1. *similar*, or 2. the *same* ; and if the general principle be true, the latter is the more philosophical. This principle immediately determined the whole doctrine of a representative perception : its lower potence is seen in the *intentional species* of the schools ; it is higher in the *gnostic reasons*

of the Platonists, in the *pre-existing species* of Avicenna and the Arabians, in the *ideas* of Des Cartes and Leibnitz, and in the *external states* of Dr. Brown. It immediately determined the hierarchical gradation of faculties or souls of the Aristotelians, — the vehicular media of the Platonists, — the theories of a common intellect of Alexander, Themestius, Averroes, Cajetanus, and Zabarella, — the vision in the deity of Mallebranche, — and the Cartesian and Leibnitzian doctrines of assistance and predetermined harmony. To no other origin is to be ascribed the refusal of the fact of consciousness in its primitive duality; and the unitarian systems of identity, materialism, idealism, are the result. But, however universal and omnipotent this principle may have been, Reid was at once too ignorant of opinions to be much in danger from authority, and too independent a thinker to accept so baseless a fancy as a fact. “Mr. Norris,” says he, “is the only author I have met with who professedly puts the question, Whether material things can be perceived by us *immediately*? He has offered four arguments to show that they cannot. First, Material objects are without the mind, and therefore there can be no *union* between the object and the percipient. Answer — This argument is lame, until it is shown to be necessary, that in perception there should be an union between the object and the percipient. Second, *Material objects are disproportioned to the mind, and removed from it by the whole diameter of Being.* — This argument I cannot answer, because *I do not understand it.*” — *Essays*, p. 202.

The principle, that the relation of knowledge implies an analogy of existence, admitted without examination in almost every school, but which Reid, with an ignorance wiser than knowledge, confesses he does not understand, is nothing more than an irrational attempt to explain, what is, in itself, inexplicable. How the similar or the same is conscious of itself, is not a whit less inconceivable, than how one contrary is immediately percipient of another. It at best only removes our admitted ignorance by one step back; and then, in place of our knowledge simply originating from the *incomprehensible*, it ostentatiously departs from the *absurd*.

The slightest criticism is sufficient to manifest the futility of that hypothesis of representation, which Brown would substitute for Reid's intuitive perception; — although this hypothesis, under various modifications, be almost coextensive with the history of philosophy. In fact, it fulfils none of the conditions of a *legitimate* hypothesis.

In the *first* place, it is unnecessary. It cannot show, that the fact of an intuitive perception, as given in consciousness, ought not to be accepted; it is unable therefore to vindicate its own necessity, in order to explain the possibility of our knowledge of external things. That we cannot illustrate *how* the mind is capable of knowing something different from self, is no reason to doubt *that* it is so capable. Every *how* (διότι) rests ultimately on a *that* (ὅτι); every demonstration is deduced from something *given* and *indemonstrable*; all that is comprehensible, hangs from some *revealed fact* which we must *believe as actual*, but *cannot construe to the reflective intellect in its possibility*. In consciousness, as the original spontaneity of reason (νοῦς, *locus principiorum*), are revealed the primordial facts of our intelligent nature. Consciousness is the fountain of all comprehensibility and illustration; but, *as such*, cannot be itself illustrated or comprehended. To ask how any fact of consciousness is possible, is to ask how consciousness itself is possible; and to ask how consciousness is possible, is to ask how a being intelligent like man is possible. Could we

answer this, the Serpent had not tempted Eve by an hyperbole: "we should be as Gods." But as we did not create ourselves, and are not even in the secret of our creation, we must take our existence, our knowledge, *upon trust*: and that philosophy is the only true, because in it alone *can* truth be realised, which does not revolt against the *authority* of our natural *beliefs*.

"The voice of Nature is the voice of God."

To ask, therefore, a *reason* for the possibility of our intuition of external things, above the *fact* of its reality, as given in our perceptive consciousness, betrays, as Aristotle has truly said, an *imbecility of the reasoning principle itself*: τούτου ζητεῖν λόγον, ἀφέντας τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀβήρωσία τις ἐστὶ διανοίας. The natural realist, who accepts this intuition, cannot explain it, because, as ultimate, it is a fact inexplicable —

"He knows *what's what*, and that's as high  
As metaphysic wit can fly,"

But the hypothetical realist, who rejects a consciousness of aught beyond the mind, cannot require of him an explanation of how such a consciousness is possible, until he himself shall have explained what is even less conceivable, the possibility of *representing* (i. e. of *knowing*) *the unknown*. Till then, each founds on the *incomprehensible*; but the former admits the veracity, the latter the falsehood of that principle, which can alone confer on this incomprehensible foundation the character of truth. The natural realist, whose watchword is — *The fact of consciousness, the whole facts and nothing but the facts*, has therefore nought to fear from his antagonist, so long as consciousness cannot be explained or redargued from without. If his system is to fall, it falls only with philosophy; for it can only be disproved, by proving the mendacity of consciousness,

"Quæ nisi sit veri, ratio quoque falsa fit omnis."

This leads us to the *second* violation of the laws of a legitimate hypothesis;—the doctrine of a representative perception *annihilates itself*, in subverting the universal edifices of knowledge. Belying the testimony of consciousness to our immediate perception of an outer world, it belies the veracity of consciousness altogether. But the truth of consciousness is the condition of the possibility of all knowledge. The first act of hypothetical realism is thus an act of suicide; philosophy, thereafter, is only an enchanted corpse, which awaits but the exorcism of the sceptic to relapse into its nothingness. But of this we shall have occasion to treat at large, in exposing Brown's misprision of the argument from common sense.

In the *third* place, it is the condition of a legitimate hypothesis that the *fact or facts*, for which it is excogitated to account, be not *themselves hypothetical*. But so far is the principal fact which the hypothesis of a representative perception is proposed to explain, from being certain; its reality is even rendered problematical by the proposed explanation itself. The facts, about which this hypothesis is conversant, are two;—the fact of the *mental modification*, and the fact of the *material reality*. The problem to be solved is their connection; and the hypothesis of *representation* is advanced, as the ratio of their correlation, in supposing that the former *as known* is vicarious of the latter *as existing*. There is, however, here a see-saw between the hypothesis and the fact: the fact is assumed as an hypothesis; the hypothesis explained as a fact; each is established, each is expounded, by the other. To account for the possibility of an

unknown external world, the hypothesis of representation is devised; and to account for the possibility of representation, we imagine the hypothesis of an external world. Nothing could be more easy than to demonstrate, that on this hypothesis, the fact of the external reality is not only petitory but improbable. This, however, we are relieved from doing, by Dr. Brown's own admission, that "*the sceptical argument for the non-existence of an external world, as a mere play of reasoning, admits of no reply;*" and we shall afterwards prove that the only ground on which he attempts to vindicate this existence—the ground of our natural belief in its reality—is one, that is not competent to the hypothetical realist. We shall see, that if this belief be true, the *hypothesis* itself is superseded;—if false, that there is no *fact* for the hypothesis to explain.

In the *fourth* place, a legitimate hypothesis must account for the phænomenon, about which it is conversant, adequately and without violence, in all its dependencies, relations, and peculiarities. But the hypothesis in question only accomplishes its end,—nay, only vindicates its utility, by a mutilation, or, more properly, by the *destruction and re-creation*, of the very phænomenon, for the reality of which it should account. The *entire* phænomenon to be explained by the supposition of a representative perception, is the fact, given in consciousness, of *the immediate knowledge or intuition of an existence different from self*. This simple phænomenon it hews down into two fragments;—into the *existence* and the *intuition*. The existence of external things, which is given only *through* their intuition, it admits; the intuition itself, though the *ratio cognoscendi*, and *to us* therefore the *ratio essendi* of their reality, it rejects. But to annihilate what is prior and constitutive in the phænomenon, is, in truth, to annihilate the phænomenon altogether. The existence of an external world, which the hypothesis proposes to explain, is no longer even a truncated fact of consciousness; for the *existence given in consciousness*, necessarily fell with the intuition on which it reposed. A representative perception is, therefore, an hypothetical explanation of a *supposititious* fact: it creates the nature it interprets. And in this respect, of all the varieties of the representative hypothesis, the *third*, or that which views in the object known a modification of thought itself, most violently outrages the phænomenon of consciousness it would explain. And this is Brown's. The *first* saves the phænomenon of consciousness in so far as it preserves always the numerical, if not always the substantial, difference between the object perceived and the percipient *mind*. The *second* does not violate at least the antithesis of the object perceived and the percipient *act*. But in the simplest form of representation, not only is the object known, denied to be itself the reality existing, as consciousness attests;—this object revealed as not-self, is identified with the mental *ego*;—nay, even, though given as permanent, with the transient energy of thought itself.

In the *fifth* place, the *fact*, which a legitimate hypothesis is devised to explain, *must be within the sphere of experience*. The fact, however, for which that of a representative perception accounts (the existence of external things), transcends *ex hypothesi* all experience,—is the object of no knowledge, is a bare *ens rationis*—a mere hyperphysical chimæra.

In the *sixth* and last place, an *hypothesis itself* is probable *in proportion as it works simply and naturally*; that is, in proportion as it is dependent on no subsidiary hypothesis—as it involves nothing petitory, occult, supernatural, as an element of its explanation. In this respect, the doctrine of a representative perception is not less vicious than in others: to explain

at all, it must not only postulate subsidiary hypotheses, but subsidiary miracles. The doctrine in question attempts to explain the *knowledge of an unknown world*, by the ratio of a representative perception: but it is impossible by any conceivable relation, to apply the ratio to the facts.—The mental modification, of which, on the doctrine of representation, we are exclusively conscious in perception, either *represents* (*i. e.* affords a mediate knowledge of) the reality\* of an external world, or it does not. The latter alternative is an affirmation of idealism; we have therefore at present only to consider the former. Now, the mind either *knows* the reality of what it represents, or it does not. On the former alternative, the hypothesis under discussion would annihilate itself, in annihilating the ground of its utility. For as the *end* of representation is knowledge; and as the hypothesis of a representative perception is only required on the supposed impossibility of that intuitive knowledge of external things which consciousness affirms;—if the mind be admitted to be cognisant of the outer reality itself, previous to representation, the *end* towards which the hypothesis was devised as a *mean*, has been already accomplished; and the possibility of an intuitive perception, as given in consciousness, is allowed. Nor is the hypothesis thus only absurd, as superfluous. The mind would be supposed to *know before it knew*; and like the crazy Pentheus to *see its objects double*—

“ (Et solem geminum et duplices se ostendere Thebas): ”

—or, the *identity of mind and self*—of *consciousness and knowledge*, is abolished; and *my intellect* knows, what *I* am not conscious of it knowing. The other alternative remains—that the mind is *blindly* determined to *represent*, and *truly* to represent, the reality it does not know. And here the mind either *blindly determines itself*, or is *blindly determined by an extrinsic and intelligent cause*. The former lemma is the more philosophical, in so far as it assumes nothing hyperphysical; but it is otherwise utterly irrational, inasmuch as it would explain an effect, by a cause wholly inadequate to its production. On this alternative, knowledge is supposed to be the effect of ignorance,—intelligence of stupidity,—life of death. We are necessarily ignorant, indeed, of the mode in which causation operates; but we know at least, that no effect arises without a cause—and a cause proportionate to its existence. The absurdity of this supposition has accordingly constrained the profoundest hypothetical realists, notwithstanding their rational abhorrence of a supernatural assumption, to embrace the second alternative. To say nothing of less illustrious schemes, the systems of Divine assistance, of a Pre-established Harmony, and of the Vision of all things in the Deity, are only so many subsidiary hypotheses,—so many attempts to bridge, by supernatural machinery, the chasm between the *representation* and the *reality*, which all human ingenuity had found, by natural means, to be insuperable. The hypothesis of a representative perception, thus presupposes a *miracle* to let it work. Dr. Brown, indeed, rejects as unphilosophical, those hyperphysical subsidies. But he only saw less clearly than their illustrious authors, the necessity which required them. It is a poor philosophy that eschews the *Deus ex machina*, and yet ties the knot which is

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\* We say only the *reality*; to include all systems, from Kant's, which does not predicate even an existence in *space* and *time* of *things in themselves*, to Locke's; who supposes the transcendent reality to resemble its idea, at least in the *primary qualities*.

only soluble by his interposition. It is not unphilosophical to assume a miracle, if a miracle be necessary; but it may, and probably is, unphilosophical, to originate the necessity itself. And here the hypothetical realist cannot pretend, that the difficulty is of nature's, not of his creation. In fact it only arises, *because* he has closed his eyes upon the light of nature, and refused the guidance of consciousness: but having swamped himself in following the *ignis fatuus* of a theory, he has no right to refer its private absurdities to the imbecility of human reason; or to generalise his own factitious ignorance, by a *Quantum est quod nescimus!* The difficulty of the problem Dr. Brown has not perceived; or perceiving, has not ventured to state,—far less attempted to remove. He has essayed, indeed, to *cut* the knot, which he was unable to *loose*; but we shall find in the sequel, that his summary postulate of the reality of an external world, on the ground of our belief in its existence, is, in his hands, of all unfortunate attempts, perhaps the most unsuccessful.

The scheme of Natural Realism, which it is Reid's immortal honour to have been the first, among not forgotten philosophers, to embrace, is thus the only system, on which the truth of consciousness and the possibility of knowledge can be vindicated; whilst the hypothetical realist, in his effort to be "wise above knowledge," like the dog in the fable, loses the substance, in attempting to realise the shadow. "*Les hommes*," says Leibnitz, with a truth of which he was not himself aware,—" *les hommes cherchent ce qu'ils savent, et ne savent pas ce qu'ils cherchent.*"

That the doctrine of an *intuitive* perception is not without its difficulties, we allow. But these do not affect its possibility; and may in a great measure be removed by a more sedulous examination of the phænomena. The distinction of *perception proper* from *sensation proper*, in other words, of the *objective* from the *subjective* in this act, Reid has already turned to good account; but his analysis would have been still more successful, had he discovered the law which universally determines their appearance;—*That perception and sensation—the objective and subjective, though both always co-existent, are always in an inverse ratio of each other.* But on this matter we cannot at present enter.

Dr. Brown is not only wrong in regard to Reid's own doctrine; he is wrong, even admitting his interpretation of that philosopher to be true, in charging him with "a series of wonderful misconceptions," in regard to the opinions universally prevalent touching the nature of ideas. We shall not argue the case upon the *higher ground*, that Reid, as a natural realist, could not be *philosophically* out, in assailing the hypothesis of a representative perception, even though one of its subordinate modifications might be mistaken by him for another; but shall prove that, supposing Reid to have been, like Brown, an hypothetical realist, under the *third* form of a representative perception, he was not *historically* wrong in attributing to philosophers in general, the *first* or *second* variety of the hypothesis. Even on this *lower ground*, Brown is fated to be unsuccessful; and if Reid be not always correct, his antagonist has failed in convicting him even of a single inaccuracy. We shall consider Brown's charge of misrepresentation in detail.

It is always unlucky to stumble on the threshold. The paragraph (Lect. 26.) in which Dr. Brown opens his attack on Reid, contains more mistakes than sentences: and the etymological discussion it involves, supposes as true, what is not simply false, but diametrically opposite to the truth. Among *other* errors—in the *first* place, the term "*idea*" was

never employed in any system, previous to the age of Des Cartes, to denote “little images derived from objects without.” In the *second*, it was never used in any philosophy, prior to the same period, to signify the immediate object of perception. In the *third*, it was not applied by the “Peripatetics or Schoolmen,” to express an object of human thought at all.\* In the *fourth*, ideas (taking this term for *species*) were not, “in all the dark ages of the scholastic followers of Aristotle,” regarded as “*little images derived from without* ;” for a numerous party of the most illustrious schoolmen rejected *species*, not only in the *intellect*, but in the *sense*. In the *fifth*, “*phantasm*” in “the old philosophy” was not the “*external cause of perception*,” but the *internal object of imagination*. In the *sixth*, the term “*shadowy film*,” which here and elsewhere he constantly uses, shows that

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\* The history of the word *idea* seems completely unknown. Previous to the age of Des Cartes, as a philosophical term, it was employed exclusively by the Platonists,—at least exclusively in a Platonic meaning; and this meaning was *precisely the reverse* of that attributed to the word by Dr. Brown;—the *idea was not an object of perception*—the *idea was not derived from without*.—In the schools, so far from being a current *psychological* expression, as he imagines, it had no other application than a *theological*. Neither, after the revival of letters, was the term extended by the Aristotelians even to the objects of *intellect*. Melancthon, indeed, (who was a kind of semi-Platonist,) uses it on *one* occasion as a synonyme for notion, or intelligible species (*De Anima*, p. 187. ed. 1555); but it was even to this solitary instance, we presume, that Julius Scaliger alludes (*De Subtilitate*, vi. 4.) when he castigates such an application of the word as neoteric and abusive. (“*Melanch.*” is on the margin).—We should have distinctly said that previous to its employment by *Des Cartes himself*, the expression had never been used as a comprehensive term for the immediate objects of thought, had we not in remembrance the *Historia Animæ Humanæ* of our countryman David Buchanan. This work, originally written in French, had for some years been privately circulated previous to its publication at Paris in 1636. Here we find the word *idea* familiarly employed, in its most extensive signification, to express the objects, not only of intellect proper, but of memory, imagination, sense; and this is the *earliest* example of such an employment. For the *Discourse on Method*, in which the term is usurped by Des Cartes in an equal latitude, was at least a year later in its publication—viz. in June, 1637. Adopted soon after also by Gassendi, the word under such imposing patronage gradually won its way into general use. In England, however, Locke may be said to have been the first who naturalised the term in its Cartesian universality. Hobbes employs it, and that historically, only once or twice; Henry More and Cudworth are very chary of it, even when treating of the Cartesian philosophy; Willis rarely uses it; while Lord Herbert, Reynolds, and the English philosophers in general, between Des Cartes and Locke, do not apply it psychologically at all. When in common language employed by Milton and Dryden, *after Des Cartes*, as *before* him, by Sidney, Spenser, Shakspeare, Hooker, &c. the meaning is Platonic. Our lexicographers are ignorant of the difference.

The fortune of this word is curious. Employed by Plato to express the real forms of the intelligible world, in lofty contrast to the unreal images of the sensible; it was lowered only when Des Cartes extended it to the objects of our consciousness in general. When, after Gassendi, the school of Condillac had analysed our highest faculties into our lowest, the *idea* was still farther degraded from its high original. Like a fallen angel, it was relegated from the sphere of divine intelligence, to the atmosphere of human sense; till at last, by a double blunder in philosophy and Greek, IDEOLOGIE (for IDEALOGIE), a word which could only *properly* suggest an *à priori* scheme, deducing our knowledge from the intellect, has in France become the name peculiarly distinctive of that philosophy of mind which exclusively derives our knowledge from sensation.—Word and thing, *idea* has been the *crux philosophorum*, since Aristotle cursed it to the present day;—τὰς δὲ ἰδέας χαϊρέτω' τερετίσματα γὰρ εἰσι.

Dr. Brown confounds the matterless species of the Peripatetics with the substantial effluxions of Democritus and Epicurus, —

Quæ, quasi *membranæ*, summo de cortice rerum  
Dereptæ, volitant ultro citroque per auras.

Dr. Brown in short only fails, in illustrating against Reid the various meanings in which “the old writers” employed the term *idea*, by the little fact, that the old writers never employed the term *idea* at all.

Nor does the progress of the attack belie the omen of its outset. We shall consider the philosophers quoted by Brown in chronological order. Of three of these only, (Des Cartes, Arnauld, Locke,) were the opinions particularly noticed by Reid; the others (Hobbes, Le Clerc, Crousaz,) Brown adduces as examples of Reid’s general misrepresentation. Of the *greater number* of the philosophers specially criticised by Reid, Brown *prudently says nothing*.

Of these, the first is DES CARTES; and in regard to him, Dr. Brown, not content with accusing Reid of simple ignorance, contends, “that the opinions of Des Cartes are *precisely opposite* to the representations which he has given of them.” (Lect. xxvii. p. 172.) Reid’s statement, in regard to Des Cartes, is, that this philosopher appears to place the idea or representative object in perception, sometimes in the *mind*, and sometimes in the *brain*; and he acknowledges that while these opinions seem to him contradictory, he is not prepared to pronounce which of them their author held, if he did not indeed hold both together. “Des Cartes,” he says, “seems to have hesitated between the two opinions, or to have passed from one to the other.” On any alternative, however, Reid attributes to Des Cartes either the *first* or the *second* form of representation. Now here we must recollect, that the question is not whether Reid be *certainly right*, but whether he be *inexcusably wrong*. Dr. Brown accuses him of the most ignorant misrepresentation — of interpreting an author whose perspicuity he himself admits, in a sense “*exactly the reverse*” of truth. To determine what Des Cartes’s doctrine of perception actually is, would be difficult, perhaps impossible; and in reference to the question at issue, certainly superfluous. It here suffices to show, that his opinion on this point is one mooted among his disciples; and that Brown, wholly unacquainted with the difficulties of the question, dogmatizes on the basis of a single passage — nay, of a passage in itself irrelevant.

Reid is justified against Brown if the Cartesian Idea be proved either a *material image in the brain*, or an *immaterial representation in the mind, distinct from the percipient act*. By those not possessed of the key to the Cartesian theory, there are many passages\* in the writings of its author, which, taken by themselves, might naturally be construed to import, that Des Cartes supposed the mind to be conscious of certain *motions in the brain*, to which, as well as to the *modifications of the intellect itself*, he applies the terms *image* and *idea*. Reid, who did not understand the Cartesian philosophy as a system, was puzzled by these superficial ambiguities. Not aware that the cardinal point of that system is, that mind and body, as essentially opposed, are *naturally* to each other as zero; and that their mutual intercourse can only be *supernaturally* maintained by the concurrence of the Deity †; Reid attributed to Des Cartes the possible opinion,

\* *Vide e. g. De Pass. § 35.*, — a passage stronger than any of those noticed by De la Forge.

† That the theory of *Occasional Causes* is necessarily involved in Des Cartes’s



that the soul was immediately cognizant of *material images in the brain*. But in the Cartesian theory, mind is only conscious of itself; the affections of body may, by the *law of union*, be the proximate *occasions*, but can never constitute the immediate *objects*, of knowledge. Reid, however, supposing that nothing could obtain the name of *image* which did not represent a prototype, or the name of *idea* which was not an object of thought, thus misinterpreted Des Cartes, who applies, abusively indeed, these terms to the *occasion* of perception, (*i. e.* the motion in the sensorium, *unknown in itself* and *resembling nothing*,) as well as to the *object* of thought (*i. e.* the representation of which we are conscious in the mind itself). In the Leibnitzio-Wolfian system, *two* elements, both also denominated *ideas*, are in like manner accurately to be contra-distinguished in the process of perception. The *idea in the brain*, and the *idea in the mind*, are, to Des Cartes, precisely what the "*material idea*," and the "*sensual idea*," are to the Wolfians. In both philosophies, the two ideas are harmonic modifications, correlative and co-existent, but in neither, is the organic affection or sensorial idea an object of consciousness. It is merely the unknown and arbitrary condition of the mental representation; and in the hypothesis both of Assistance and the Pre-established Harmony, the presence of the one idea implies the concomitance of the other, only by virtue of the hyperphysical determination. Had Reid, in fact, not limited his study of the Cartesian system to the writings of its founder, the two-fold application of the term *idea*, by Des Cartes, could never have seduced him into the belief, that so monstrous a solecism had been committed by that illustrious thinker. By De la Forge, the personal friend of Des Cartes, the verbal ambiguity is, indeed, not only noticed, but removed; and that admirable expositor applies the term "*corporeal species*" to the affection in the brain, and the terms "*idea*," "*intellectual notion*," to the spiritual representation in the conscious mind. — *De l'Esprit*, c. 10.

But if Reid be wrong in his supposition, that Des Cartes admitted a consciousness of ideas *in the brain*\*; is he on the *other alternative* wrong, and inexcusably wrong, in holding that Des Cartes supposed ideas *in the mind* not to be identical with their perceptions? Mallebranche, the most illustrious name in the school after its founder, (and who, not certainly with less ability, may be supposed to have studied the writings of his master, with far greater attention than either Reid or Brown,) ridicules, as "*contrary to common sense and justice*," the supposition that

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doctrine of *Assistance*, and that his explanation of the connection of mind and body reposes on that theory, it is impossible to doubt. For while he rejects all physical influence in the communication and conservation of motion between bodies, which he refers exclusively to the ordinary concourse of God (*Princ. P. II. Art. 36. etc.*); consequently, he deprives conflicting bodies of all proper efficiency, and reduces them to the mere occasional causes of this phenomenon. But *à fortiori*, he must postulate the hypothesis, which he found necessary in explaining the intercourse of things *substantially the same*, to account for the reciprocal action of two substances, *to him*, of so *incompatible a nature* as mind and body. De la Forge, Geulinx, Mallebranche, Cordemoi, and other disciples of Des Cartes, only explicitly evolve what the writings of their master implicitly contain. We may observe, though we cannot stop to prove, that Tennemann is wrong in denying De la Forge to be even an advocate, far less the first articulate expositor, of the doctrine of *Occasional Causes*.

\* Reid's error on this point is, however, surpassed by that of M. Royer-Collard, who represents the idea in the Cartesian doctrine of perception as exclusively situate in the brain. — *Œuvres de Reid*, p. 334.

Des Cartes had rejected ideas in "*the ordinary acceptation*," and adopted the hypothesis of their being representations, not really distinct from their perception. And while "he is as certain as he possibly can be in such matters," that Des Cartes had not dissented from the general opinion, he taunts Arnauld with resting his paradoxical interpretation of that philosopher's doctrine, "not on any passages of his metaphysic contrary to the *common opinion*," but on his own arbitrary limitation of "*the ambiguous term perception*." (*Rép. au Livre des Idées, passim*—ARNAULD, *Œuv.* xxxviii. pp. 388, 389.) That ideas are "*found in the mind, not formed by it*," and consequently, that in the act of knowledge the representation is really distinct from the cognition proper, is strenuously asserted as the doctrine of his master by the Cartesian Roëll, in the controversy he maintained with the Anti-Cartesian De Vries. (ROELLI *Dispp.*—DE VRIES *De Ideis innatis.*)—But it is idle to multiply proofs. Brown's charge of ignorance falls back upon himself; and Reid may lightly bear the reproach of "*exactly reversing*" the notorious doctrine of Des Cartes, when thus borne, along with him, by the profoundest of that philosopher's disciples.

Had Brown been aware that the point at issue between him and Reid was one agitated among the followers of Des Cartes themselves, he could hardly have dreamt of summarily determining the question by the production of one vulgar passage from the writings of that philosopher. But we are sorely puzzled to account for his hallucination, in considering this passage pertinent. Its substance is fully given by Reid in his exposition of the Cartesian doctrine. Every iota it contains, of any relevancy, is adopted by Mallebranche;—constitutes less precisely, indeed, his famous distinction of *perception* (*idée*) from *sensation* (*sentiment*): and Mallebranche is one of the two modern philosophers admitted by Brown to have held the hypothesis of representation in its first, and, as he says, its most "erroneous" form. But principles that coalesce even with the hypothesis of ideas *distinct from mind, à fortiori*, are not incompatible with the hypothesis of ideas *distinct only from the perceptive act*. We cannot enter on an articulate exposition of its irrelevancy.

To adduce HOBBS, as an instance of Reid's misrepresentation of the "common doctrine of ideas," betrays, on the part of Brown, a total misapprehension of the conditions of the question;—or he forgets that Hobbes was a materialist. The doctrine of representation, under all its modifications, is *properly* subordinate to the doctrine of a spiritual principle of thought; and on the supposition, all but universally admitted among philosophers, that the relation of knowledge implied the analogy of existence, it was devised to explain the possibility of a knowledge by an immaterial subject, of an existence so disproportioned to its nature, as the qualities of a material object. Contending, that an immediate cognition of the accidents of matter, infers an essential identity of matter and mind, Brown himself admits, that the hypothesis of representation belongs exclusively to the doctrine of dualism (*Lect.* xxv. pp. 159, 160.); while Reid, assailing the hypothesis of ideas, only as subverting the reality of matter, could hardly regard it as parcel of that doctrine, which acknowledged the reality of nothing else. But though Hobbes cannot be adduced as a competent witness *against Reid*, he is however valid evidence *against Brown*. Hobbes, though a materialist, admitted no knowledge of an external world. Like his friend Sorbière, he was a kind of *material idealist*. According to him, we know nothing of the qualities or existence of any outward reality. All that we know is the "*seeming*,"

the “*apparition*,” the “*aspect*,” the “*phænomenon*,” the “*phantasm*” within ourselves; and this *subjective object*, of which we are conscious, and which is consciousness itself, is nothing more than the “*agitation*” of our internal organism, determined by the unknown “*motions*,” which are supposed, in like manner, to constitute the world without. *Perception* he reduces to *sensation*. Memory and imagination, faculties *specifically* identical with sense, differ from it simply in the *degree* of their vivacity; and this difference of intensity, with Hobbes as with Hume, is the only discrimination between our dreaming and our waking thoughts.—A doctrine of perception identical with Reid’s!

In regard to ARNAULD, the question is not, as in relation to the others, whether Reid conceives him to maintain a form of the ideal theory which he rejects, but whether *Reid admits Arnauld’s opinion on perception and his own to be identical*. “To these authors,” says Dr. Brown, “whose opinions, on the subject of perception, Dr. Reid has misconceived, I may add one, whom *even he himself allows to have shaken off the ideal system*, and to have considered the idea and the perception, as not distinct, but the same, a modification of the mind, and nothing more.—I allude to the celebrated Jansenist writer, Arnauld, who maintains *this doctrine as expressly as Dr. Reid himself*, and makes it the foundation of his argument in his controversy with Mallebranche.” (Lect. xxvii. p. 173.)—If this statement be not untrue, then is Dr. Brown’s interpretation of Reid himself correct. A representative perception, under its *third* and simplest modification, is held by Arnauld as by Brown; and his exposition is so clear and articulate, that all essential misconception of his doctrine is precluded. In these circumstances, if Reid avow the identity of Arnauld’s opinion and his own, this avowal is tantamount to a declaration that his peculiar doctrine of perception is a scheme of representation; whereas, on the contrary, if he signalise the contrast of their two opinions, he clearly evinces the radical antithesis,—and his sense of the radical antithesis—of his doctrine of *intuition*, to every, even the simplest form of the hypothesis of *representation*. And this last he does.

It cannot be maintained, that Reid admits a philosopher to hold an opinion convertible with his, whom he states to “*profess the doctrine, universally received, that we perceive not material things immediately,—that it is their ideas, that are the immediate objects of our thoughts,—and that it is in the idea of every thing, we perceive its properties.*” This fundamental contrast being established, we may safely allow, that the original misconception, which caused Reid to overlook the difference of our intuitive and representative faculties, caused him likewise to believe, that Arnauld had attempted to unite two contradictory theories of perception. Not aware, that it was possible to maintain a doctrine of perception, in which the idea was not really distinguished from its cognition, and yet to hold that the mind had no immediate knowledge of external things; Reid supposes, in the *first* place, that Arnauld, in rejecting the hypothesis of ideas, as representative existences, really distinct from the contemplative act of perception, coincided with him in viewing the material reality, as the immediate object of that act; and, in the *second*, that he again deserted this opinion, when with the philosophers he maintained, that the idea, or act of the mind representing the external reality, and not the external reality itself, was the immediate object of perception. But Arnauld’s theory is one and indivisible; and as such no part of it is identical with Reid’s. Reid’s confusion, here as elsewhere, is explained by the circumstance, that he had never speculatively conceived the possibility of the simplest

modification of the representative hypothesis. He saw no medium between rejecting ideas as something different from thought, and his own doctrine of an immediate knowledge of the material object. Neither does Arnauld, as Reid supposes, ever assert against Mallebranche, "that we perceive external things immediately," that is, in themselves.\* Maintaining "*that all our perceptions are modifications essentially representative,*" Arnauld *every where* avows, that he denies ideas, *only as existences distinct from the act itself* of perception. (*Œuvres*, t. xxxviii. pp. 199. 187. 198. 389.)

Reid was therefore wrong, and did Arnauld less than justice, in viewing his theory "as a weak attempt to reconcile two inconsistent doctrines:" he was wrong, and did Arnauld more than justice, in supposing, that one of these doctrines was not incompatible with his own. The detection, however, of this error only tends to manifest more clearly how just, even when under its influence, was Reid's appreciation of the contrast subsisting between his own and Arnauld's opinion, considered *as a whole*; and exposes more glaringly Brown's general misconception of Reid's philosophy, and his present gross misrepresentation, in affirming that the doctrines of the two philosophers were identical, and by Reid admitted to be the same.

Nor is Dr. Brown more successful in his defence of LOCKE.

Supposing always that ideas were held to be something distinct from their cognition, Reid states it as that philosopher's opinion, "that images of external objects were conveyed to the brain; but whether he thought with Des Cartes" [*lege omnino* Dr. Clarke] "and Newton, that the images in the brain are perceived by the mind, there present, or that they are imprinted on the mind itself, is not so evident." This Dr. Brown, nor is he original in the assertion, pronounces a flagrant misrepresentation. Not only does he maintain that Locke never conceived the idea to be substantially different from the mind, as a material image in the brain; but, that he never supposed it to have an existence apart from the mental energy of which it is the object. Locke, he asserts, like Arnauld, considered the idea perceived and the percipient act, to constitute the same indivisible modification of the conscious mind. We shall see.

In his *language*, Locke is, of all philosophers, the most figurative, ambiguous, vacillating, various, and even contradictory; — as has been noticed by Reid and Stewart, and Brown himself; — indeed, we believe, by every author who has had occasion to comment on this philosopher. The opinions of such a writer are not, therefore, to be assumed from isolated and casual expressions, which themselves require to be interpreted on the general analogy of his system; and yet this is the only ground on which Dr. Brown attempts to establish his conclusions. Thus, on the matter under discussion, though *really* distinguishing, Locke *verbally* confounds the objects of sense and of intellect — the operation and its object — the object immediate and mediate — the object and its relations — the images of fancy and the notions of the understanding. Consciousness is converted with Perception, — Perception with Idea, —

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\* This is perfectly clear from Arnauld's own uniform statements; and it is justly observed by Mallebranche, in his *Reply to the Treatise on True and False Ideas* (p. 123., orig. edit.), — that "in reality," according to M. Arnauld, "*we do not perceive bodies, we perceive only ourself.*"

Idea with the object of Perception, and with Notion, Conception, Phantasm, Representation, Sense, Meaning, &c. Now, his language identifying ideas and perceptions, appears conformable to a disciple of Arnauld: and now it proclaims him a follower of Digby; — explaining ideas by mechanical impulse, and the propagation of material particles from the external reality to the brain. In one passage, the idea would seem an organic affection — the mere occasion of a spiritual representation; in another, a representative image in the brain itself. In employing thus indifferently the language of every hypothesis, may we not suspect, that he was anxious to be made responsible for none? One, however, he has formally rejected — and that is the very opinion attributed to him by Dr. Brown — that the idea or object of consciousness in perception is only a modification of the mind itself.

We do not deny, that Locke occasionally employs expressions, which, in a writer of more considerate language, would imply the identity of ideas with the act of knowledge; and, under the circumstances, we should have considered suspense more rational than a dogmatic confidence in any conclusion, did not the following passage, which has never, we believe, been noticed, appear to us to afford a positive contradiction of Dr. Brown's interpretation. It is from Locke's *Examination of Mallebranche's Opinion*, which, as subsequent to the publication of the *Essay*, must be held authentic, in relation to the doctrines of that work. At the same time, the statement is articulate and precise, and possesses all the authority of one cautiously made in the course of a polemical discussion. Mallebranche coincided with Arnauld, and consequently with Locke, *as interpreted by Brown*, to the extent of supposing, that *sensation proper* is nothing but a state or modification of the mind itself; and Locke had thus the opportunity of expressing, in regard to this opinion, his agreement or dissent. An acquiescence in the doctrine, that the *secondary* qualities, of which we are conscious in *sensation*, are merely mental states, by no means involves an admission that the *primary* qualities of which we are conscious in *perception*, are nothing more. Mallebranche, for example, affirms the one and denies the other. But if Locke be found to ridicule, as he does, *even* the opinion which *merely* reduces the secondary qualities to mental states, *à fortiori*, and this *on the principles of his own philosophy*, he must be held to reject the doctrine which would reduce not only the non-resembling sensations of the secondary, but even the resembling, and consequently extended, ideas of the primary qualities of matter, to modifications of the immaterial unextended mind. In these circumstances, the following passage is superfluously conclusive against Brown, and equally so, whether we coincide or not in all the principles it involves: —

“ But to examine their doctrine of *modification* a little farther. Different sentiments (sensations) are different modifications of the mind. The mind, or soul, that perceives, is one immaterial indivisible substance. Now I see the white and black on this paper, I hear one singing in the next room, I feel the warmth of the fire I sit by, and I taste an apple I am eating, and all this at the same time. Now, I ask, take modification for what you please, *can the same unextended, indivisible substance have different, nay, inconsistent and opposite (as these of white and black must be) modifications at the same time? Or must we suppose distinct parts in an indivisible substance, one for black, another for white, and another for red ideas, and so of the rest of those infinite sensations, which we have in sorts and degrees; all which we can distinctly perceive, and so are distinct ideas, some whereof are opposite, as heat and cold, which yet a man may feel at*

*the same time?* I was ignorant before how sensation was performed in us : this they call an explanation of it! Must I say now I understand it better? If this be to cure one's ignorance, it is a very slight disease, and the charm of two or three insignificant words will at any time remove it : *probatum est.*" (sect. 39.) This passage, as we shall see, is correspondent to the doctrine held on this point by Locke's personal friend and philosophical follower, Le Clerc.

But if it be thus evident, that Locke held neither the *third* form of representation, that lent to him by Brown—nor *even* the *second*; it follows, that Reid did him any thing but injustice, in supposing him to maintain, that ideas are objects, *either* in the *brain* or in the *mind* itself. Even the *more material* of these alternatives has been the one generally attributed to him by his critics\*, and the one adopted from him by his disciples.† Nor is this to be deemed an opinion too monstrous to be entertained by so enlightened a philosopher. It was, as we shall see, the common opinion of the age—the opinion, in particular, held by the most illustrious of his countrymen and contemporaries—by Newton, Clarke, Willis, Hook, &c.‡

Dr. Brown at length proceeds to consummate his victory by "*that most decisive evidence*, found not in treatises read only by a few, but in the popular elementary works of science of the time, the *general text books* of schools and colleges." He quotes, however, only two—the *Pneumatology* of Le Clerc, and the *Logic* of Crousaz.

"LE CLERC," says Dr. Brown, "in his chapter on the nature of ideas, gives the history of the opinions of philosophers on this subject, and states among them the very doctrine which is most forcibly and accurately opposed to the ideal system of perception. '*Alii putant ideas et perceptiones idearum easdem esse, licet relationibus differant.* Idea, uti censent, proprie ad objectum refertur, quod mens considerat;—perceptio, vere ad mentem ipsam quæ percipit: sed duplex illa relatio ad unam modificationem mentis pertinet. Itaque, secundum hosce philosophos, nullæ sunt, proprie loquendo, ideæ a mente nostra distinctæ.' *What is it, I may ask, which Dr. Reid considers himself as having added to this very philosophical view*

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\* To refer only to the *first* and *last* of his regular critics, see *Solid Philosophy asserted against the Fancies of the Ideists*, by J. S. [J. SERGEANT]. Lond. 1697, p. 161. :—a very curious book, *absolutely*, we may say *unknown*; and COUSIN, *Cours de Philosophie*, t. ii. 1829; pp. 330. 357. 325. 365,—the most important work on Locke since the *Nouveaux Essais* of Leibnitz.

† TUCKER'S *Light of Nature*, i. pp. 15. 18. ed. 2.

‡ On Newton and Clarke's opinion, see Des Maizeaux's *Recueil*, i. pp. 7, 8, 9, 15. 22. 75. 127. 169. &c.—Genovesi notices the crudity of Newton's doctrine, "Mentem in *cerebro* præsidere, atque *in eo*, suo scilicet sensorio, rerum *imagines* cernere." On Willis, see his work *De Anima Brutorum*, p. 64. *alibi*, ed. 1672.—On Hook, see his *Lect. on Light*, § 7. We know not whether it has been remarked, that Locke's doctrine of particles and impulse is precisely that of Sir Kenelm Digby; and if Locke adopts *one* part of so gross an hypothesis, what is there improbable in his adoption of the *other*?—that the object of perception is, "a material participation of the bodies that work on the outward organs of the senses." (Digby, *Treatise of Bodies*, c. 32.) As a specimen of the mechanical explanations of mental phenomena then considered satisfactory, we quote Sir Kenelm's theory of memory.—"Out of which it followeth, that the little similitudes which are in the caves of the brain, wheeling and swimming about, almost in such sort as you see in the washing of currants or rice by the winding about and circular turning of the cook's hand, divers sorts of bodies do go their courses for a pretty while; so that the most ordinary objects cannot but present themselves quickly," &c. &c. (*ibidem*).

of perception? and if he added nothing, it is surely too much to ascribe to him the merit of detecting errors, *the counter statement of which had long formed a part of the elementary works of the schools.*" In the first place, Dr. Reid certainly "added" nothing "to this very philosophical view of perception," but he *exploded it altogether.* In the second, it is false either that this doctrine of perception "*had long formed part of the elementary works of the schools,*" or that Le Clerc affords any countenance to this assertion. On the contrary, it is virtually stated by him to be the *novel paradox* of a single philosopher; nay, to carry the blunder to hyperbole, it is already, as such a singular opinion, discussed and referred to its author by *Reid himself.* Had Dr. Brown proceeded from the tenth paragraph, which he quotes, to the fourteenth, which he *could not have read,* he would have found, that the passage extracted, so far from containing the statement of an old and familiar dogma in the schools, was neither more nor less than a statement of the *contemporary hypothesis* of — ANTONY ARNAULD! and of Antony Arnauld *alone.*— In the third place, from the mode in which he cites Le Clerc, his silence to the contrary, and the general tenour of his statement, Dr. Brown would lead us to believe, that Le Clerc himself coincides in "this very philosophical view of perception." So far, however, from coinciding with Arnauld, he pronounces his opinion to be false; controverts it upon very solid grounds; and in delivering his own doctrine touching ideas, though sufficiently cautious in telling us what they are, he has no hesitation in assuring us, among other things which they cannot be, that they *are not modifications or essential states of mind.* "*Non est (idea sc.) modificatio aut essentia mentis: nam præterquam quod sentimus ingens esse discrimen inter ideæ perceptionem et sensationem; quid habet mens nostra simile monti, aut innumeris ejusmodi ideis?*" — *Pneumat.* sect. i. c. 5. § 10.

On all this no observation of ours can be either so apposite or authoritative as the reflections with which Dr. Brown himself concludes his vindication of the philosophers against Reid. Brown's precept is good, but his example is still better. One word we leave blank, which the reader may himself supply: — "That a mind so *vigorous as that of Dr.* — *should have been capable of the series of misconceptions which we have traced, may seem wonderful, and truly is so; and equally, or rather still more wonderful, is the general admission of his merit in this respect.* I trust it will impress you with one important lesson — *to consult the opinions of authors in their own works, and not in the works of those who profess to give a faithful account of them.* From my own experience, I can most truly assure you, *that there is scarcely an instance in which I have found the view I had received of them to be faithful.* There is usually something more, or something less, which modifies the general result; and by the various additions and subtractions thus made, so much of the spirit of the original doctrine is lost, that it may, in some cases, be considered as having made a fortunate escape, if it *be not at last represented as directly opposite to what it is.*" — Lect. xxvii.

The cause must, therefore, be unconditionally decided in favour of Reid, even on that testimony, which Brown triumphantly produces in court, as "*the most decisive evidence*" against him: here then we might close our case. To signalise, however, more completely, the whole character of the accusation, we shall call a few witnesses; to prove, in fact, nothing more than that Brown's own "*most decisive evidence*" is not less favourable to him, than any other that might be cited from the great majority of the learned.

MALLEBRANCHE, in his controversy with Arnauld, every where *assumes* the doctrine of ideas, really distinct from their perception, to be the one “*commonly received* ;” nor does his adversary venture to dispute the assumption. — *Rép. au Livre des Idées.* — ARNAULD, *Œuv.* t. xxxviii. p. 388.

LEIBNITZ, on the other hand, in answer to Clarke, *admits* that the crude theory of ideas held by that philosopher *was the common* : — “ Je ne demeure point d'accord des *notions vulgaires*, comme si les *Images des choses* étoient transportées, par les organes, jusqu'à l'âme. Cette notion de la *Philosophie Vulgaire* n'est point intelligible, comme les nouveaux Cartésiens l'ont assez montré. L'on ne sauroit expliquer comment la substance *immaterielle* est affectée par la *matière* : et soutenir une chose non intelligible là-dessus, c'est recourir à la notion scholastique chimérique de je ne sais quelles *espèces intentionnelles* inexplicable, qui passent des organes dans l'âme.” (*Opera*, II. p. 161.) Nor does Clarke, in reply, disown this doctrine for himself or others. — *Ibid.* p. 182.

BRUCKER, in his *Historia Philosophica Doctrinæ de Ideis* (1723), speaks of Arnauld's hypothesis as a “*peculiar opinion*,” rejected by “*philosophers in general*” (plurisque eruditis), as not less untenable than the paradox of Mallebranche. — P. 248.

Dr. Brown is fond of *text-books*. Did we condescend to those of *ordinary* authors, we could adduce a cloud of witnesses against him. As a sample, we shall quote only three, but these of the *very highest* authority.

CHRISTIAN THOMASIIUS, though a reformer of the Peripatetic and Cartesian systems, adopted a grosser theory of ideas than either. In his *Introductio ad Philosophiam aulicam* (1702), he defines thought in general, a mental discourse “*about images, by the motion of external bodies, and through the organs of sense, stamped in the substance of the brain.*” — C. 3. § 29. See also his *Inst. Jurispr. Div.* l. i. c. 1.; and *Introd. in Phil. ration.* c. 3.

S'GRAVESANDE, in his *Introductio ad Philosophiam* (1736), though professing to leave undetermined the *positive* question concerning the origin of ideas, and admitting that *sensations* are “*nothing more than modifications of the mind itself*,” makes no scruple in determining the *negative*, to dismiss, as absurd, the hypothesis which would reduce sensible *ideas* to an equal subjectivity. “*Mentem ipsam has ideas efficere, et sibi ipsi representare res, quarum his solis ideis cognitionem acquirit, nullo modo concipi potest. Nulla inter causam et effectum relatio daretur.*” — § 279. 282.

GENOVESI, in his *Elementa Metaphysicæ* (1748), lays it down as a fundamental position of philosophy, *that ideas and the act cognitive of ideas are distinct* (“*Prop. xxx. Idæ et Perceptiones non videntur esse posse una eademque res*”); and he ably refutes the hypothesis of Arnauld, which he reprobates as a paradox, unworthy of that illustrious reasoner. — *Pars II.* p. 140.

VOLTAIRE'S *Dictionnaire Philosophique* may be adduced as representing the intelligence of the age of Reid himself. “*Qu'est ce qu'une Idée? — C'est une Image qui se peint dans mon cerveau. — Toutes vos pensées sont donc des images? — Assurément,*” &c. (*voce Idée.*)

What, in fine, is the doctrine of the two most numerous schools of modern philosophy — the LEIBNITZIAN and the KANTIAN? \* Both

\* LEIBNITZ *Opera, Dutensii*, tom. ii. pp. 21. 23. 33. 214., pars ii. pp. 137. 145. 146. *Œuvres Philos. par Raspe*, pp. 66, 67. 74. 96. ets. WOLF — *Psychol. Rat.*



maintain that the mind involves representations of which it is not, and never may be, conscious; that is, both maintain the second form of the hypothesis, and one of the two that Reid understood and professedly assailed.

In Crousaz, Dr. Brown has actually succeeded in finding *one* example (he might have found twenty) of a philosopher, before Reid, holding the same theory of ideas with Arnauld and himself.

The reader is now in a condition to judge of the correctness of Brown's statement, "that with the exception of Mallebranche and Berkeley, who had peculiar and very erroneous notions on the subject, ALL the philosophers whom Dr. Reid considered himself as opposing, [what! Newton, Clarke, Hook, Norris, Porterfield, &c.? — these, be it remembered, *specially* attacked by Reid, Brown has neither ventured to defend, nor to acknowledge that he could not,] would, if they had been questioned by him, have admitted, before they heard a single argument on his part, *that their opinions with respect to ideas were precisely the same as his own.*" — Lect. xxvii. p. 174.

We have thus vindicated our original assertion — *Brown has not succeeded in convicting Reid, even of a single error.*

Brown's mistakes, regarding the opinions on perception entertained by Reid and the philosophers, are perhaps, however, even less astonishing than his total misconception of the purport of Hume's reasoning against the existence of matter, and of the argument, by which Reid invalidates Hume's sceptical conclusion. We shall endeavour to reduce the problem to its simplicity.

Our knowledge rests ultimately on certain facts of consciousness, which as primitive, and consequently incomprehensible, are given less in the form of *cognitions* than of *beliefs*. But if consciousness in its last analysis — in other words, if our *primary experience*, be a faith; the reality of our knowledge turns on the veracity of our generative beliefs. As ultimate, the quality of these beliefs cannot be inferred; their truth, however, is in the first instance to be presumed. As given and possessed, they must stand good until refuted; *neganti incumbit probatio*. Intelligence cannot gratuitously annihilate itself; nature is not to be assumed to work in vain; nor the Author of nature to create only to deceive.

Φήμη δ' οὐποτε πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἦντινα πάντες  
 Λαοὶ φμμίζουσι· Θεοῦ νύ τι ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτή.

But though the truth of our instinctive faiths must *originally* be admitted, their falsehood may *subsequently* be established: this, however, only through themselves — only on the ground of their reciprocal contradiction. Is this contradiction proved, the edifice of our knowledge is undermined; for "*no lie is of the truth.*" Consciousness is to the philosopher what the Bible is to the theologian. Both are professedly revelations of divine truth; both exclusively supply the constitutive elements

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§ 10. *ets.* — *Psychol. Emp.* § 48. KANT — *Critik d. r. V.* p. 376. ed. 2. *Anthropologie*, § 5. With one restriction, Leibnitz's doctrine is that of the lower Platonists, who maintained that the soul actually contains representations of every possible substance and event in the world during the revolution of the *great year*; although these *cognitive reasons* are not elicited into consciousness, unless the reality, thus represented, be itself brought within the sphere of the sensual organs. *Plotinus, Enn. v. lib. vii. cc. 1, 2, 3.*

of knowledge, and the regulative standard of its construction. Each may be disproved, but disproved only by itself. If one or other reveal facts, which, as mutually repugnant, cannot but be false, the authenticity of that revelation is invalidated; and the criticism which signalises this self-refutation, has, in either case, been able to convert assurance into scepticism, — “to turn the truth of God into a lie,” —

“Et violare *fidem primam*, et convellere tota  
Fundamenta quibus nixatur *vita salusque*.” — LUCRET.

As psychology is only a developed consciousness, the positive philosopher has thus a primary presumption in favour of the elements out of which his system is constructed; while the sceptic or negative philosopher must be content to argue back to the falsehood of these elements, from the impossibility which the dogmatist may experience, in combining them into the harmony of truth. For truth is one; and the end of philosophy is the intuition of unity. Scepticism is not an original or independent method; it is the correlative and consequent of dogmatism; and so far from being an enemy to truth, it arises only from a false philosophy as its indication and its cure. *Alte dubitat, qui altius credit*. The sceptic must not himself *establish*, but from the dogmatist *accept*, his principles; and his conclusion is only a reduction of philosophy to zero, on the hypothesis of the doctrine from which his premises are borrowed. Are the principles which a particular system involves, convicted of contradiction; or, are these principles proved repugnant to others, which, as facts of consciousness, every positive philosophy *must* admit; there is established a *relative scepticism*, or the conclusion, that philosophy, in so far as realised in this system, is groundless. Again, are the principles, which, as facts of consciousness, philosophy in general must comprehend, found exclusive of each other; there is established an *absolute scepticism* — the impossibility of all philosophy is involved in the negation of the one criterion of truth. Our statement may be reduced to a dilemma. Either the facts of consciousness can be reconciled, or they cannot. If they cannot, knowledge absolutely is impossible, and every system of philosophy therefore false. If they can, no system which supposes their inconsistency can pretend to truth.

As a legitimate sceptic, Hume could not assail the foundations of knowledge in themselves. His reasoning is from their subsequent contradiction to their original falsehood; and his premises, not established by himself, are accepted only as principles universally conceded in the previous schools of philosophy. On the assumption, that what was thus unanimously admitted by philosophers, must be admitted of philosophy itself, his argument against the certainty of knowledge was triumphant. Philosophers agreed in rejecting certain primitive beliefs of consciousness as false, and in usurping others as true. If consciousness, however, were confessed to yield a lying evidence in one particular, it could not be adduced as a creditable witness at all: — *falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus*. But as the reality of our knowledge necessarily rests on the assumed veracity of consciousness, it thus rests on an assumption implicitly admitted by all systems of philosophy to be illegitimate.

“*Faciunt, nœ, intelligendo, ut nihil intelligant!*”

Reid did not dispute Hume's inference, *as deduced from its antecedents*. He allowed his scepticism, *as relative*, to be irrefragable; and that philosophy could not be saved from *absolute* scepticism, unless his conceded

premises could be disallowed, by refuting the principles universally acknowledged by philosophers. This he applied himself to do. He subjected these principles to a new and rigorous criticism. If his analysis be correct, it proved them to be hypotheses, on which the credulous sequacity of philosophers had bestowed the prescriptive authority of self-evident truths; and showed, that where a genuine fact of consciousness had been surrendered, it had been surrendered in deference to some groundless assumption, which, in reason, it ought to have exploded. Philosophy was thus again reconciled with nature; consciousness was not a bundle of antilogies; certainty and knowledge were not evicted from man.

All this Dr. Brown completely misunderstands. He comprehends neither the reasoning of scepticism, in the hands of Hume, nor the argument from common sense, in those of Reid. Retrograding himself to the tenets of that philosophy, whose contradictions Hume had fairly developed into scepticism, he appeals against this conclusion to the argument of common sense; albeit that argument, if true, belies his hypothesis, and if his hypothesis be true, is belied by it. Hume and Reid he actually represents as maintaining precisely the same doctrine, on precisely the same grounds; and finds both concurring with himself, in advocating that very opinion, which the one had resolved into a negation of all knowledge, and the other exploded as a baseless hypothesis.

Our discussion, at present, is limited to a single question — to the truth or falsehood of consciousness in assuring us of the reality of a material world. In perception, consciousness gives as an ultimate fact, *a belief of the knowledge of the existence of something different from self*. As ultimate, this belief cannot be reduced to a higher principle; neither can it be truly analysed into a double element. We only believe that this something *exists*, because we believe that we *know* (are conscious of) this something as existing; and the belief of the *knowledge of the existence*, necessarily involves the *belief of the existence*. Both are original, or neither. Does consciousness deceive us in the former, it necessarily deludes us in the latter; and if the latter, *though* a fact of consciousness, be false; the former, *because* a fact of consciousness, is not true. The beliefs contained in the two propositions —

1. *I believe that a material world exists;*

2. *I believe that I immediately know a material world existing* (in other words, *I believe that the external reality itself is the object of which I am conscious in perception*); —

though distinguished by philosophers, are thus virtually identical.

The belief of an external world, was too powerful, not to compel an acquiescence in its truth. But the philosophers yielded to nature, only in so far as to coincide in the dominant result. They falsely discriminated the *belief in the existence*, from the *belief in the knowledge*. With a few exceptions, they held fast by the truth of the first; but, on grounds to which it is not here necessary to advert, they concurred, with singular unanimity, in abjuring the second. The object of which we are conscious in perception, could only, they explicitly avowed, be a representative image present to the mind; — an image which, they implicitly confessed, we are necessitated to regard as identical with the unknown reality itself. Man, in short, upon the common doctrine of philosophy, was doomed by a perfidious nature to realise the fable of Narcissus; he mistakes self for not-self,

To carry these principles to their issue was easy — and scepticism in the hands of Hume was the result. The absolute veracity of consciousness was invalidated by the falsehood of one of its facts; and the belief of the *knowledge*, assumed to be delusive, was even supposed in the belief of the *existence*, admitted to be true. The uncertainty of knowledge in general, and in particular, the problematical existence of a material world, were thus legitimately established. — To confute this reduction on the conventional ground of the philosophers, Reid saw to be impossible; and the argument which he opposed, was, in fact, immediately subversive of the dogmatic principle, and only mediately of the sceptical conclusion. This reasoning was of very ancient application, and had been even long familiarly known by the name of the *argument from common sense*.

To argue from common sense is nothing more than to render available the presumption in favour of the original facts of consciousness, — *that what is by nature necessarily BELIEVED to be, truly IS*. Aristotle, in whose philosophy this presumption obtained the authority of a principle, thus enounces the argument: — What *appears to all*, that we affirm *to be*; and he who rejects this *belief*, will, assuredly, advance nothing better worthy of credit." (*Eth. Nic.* l. x. c. 2.) As this argument rests entirely on a presumption; the fundamental condition of its validity is, that this presumption be not disproved. The presumption in favour of the veracity of consciousness, as we have already shown, is redargued by the repugnance of the facts themselves, of which consciousness is the complement; as the truth of all can only be vindicated on the truth of each. The argument from common sense therefore postulates, THAT OUR ORIGINAL BELIEFS BE NOT PROVED SELF-CONTRADICTIONARY.

The harmony of our primary convictions being supposed, the argument from common sense is decisive against every deductive inference not in unison with them. For as every conclusion is involved in its premises, and as these again must ultimately be resolved into some original belief; the conclusion, if inconsistent with the primary phenomena of consciousness, must, *ex hypothesi*, be inconsistent with its premises, *i. e.* be logically false. On this ground, our convictions *at first hand*, peremptorily derogate from our convictions *at second*. "If we know and believe," says Aristotle, "through certain original principles, we must know and believe these with *paramount certainty*, for the very reason that we know and believe all else through them;" and he elsewhere observes, that our approbation is often rather to be accorded to what is revealed by nature as actual, than to what can be demonstrated by philosophy as possible: — προσέχειν οὐ δεῖ πάντα τοῖς διὰ τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις μᾶλλον τοῖς φαινομένοις.\*

*Novimus certissima scientia, et clamante conscientia*, (to apply the language of Augustine,) is thus a proposition, either *absolutely true* or *absolutely false*. The argument from common sense, if not omnipotent, is powerless; and in the hands of a philosopher by whom its postulate cannot be allowed, its employment, if not suicidal, is absurd. — These principles established, we proceed to their application.

Dr. Brown's error, in regard to Reid's doctrine of perception, involves the other, touching the relation of that doctrine to Hume's

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\* Jacobi (*Werke*, II. *Vorr.* p. 11, ets.), following Fries, places Aristotle at the head of that absurd majority of philosophers, who attempt to demonstrate every thing. This would not have been more *sublimely false*, had it been said of the German Plato himself.

sceptical idealism. On the supposition that Reid views in the immediate object of perception a mental modification, and not a material quality, Dr. Brown is fully warranted in asserting, that he left the foundations of idealism precisely as he found them. Let it once be granted, that the object known in perception, is not convertible with the reality existing; idealism reposes in equal security on the hypothesis of a representative perception,—whether the representative image be a modification of consciousness itself,—or whether it have an existence independent either of mind or of the act of thought. The former indeed, as the simpler basis, would be the more secure; and, in point of fact, the egoistical idealism of Fichte, resting on the third form of representation, is less exposed to criticism than the theological idealism of Berkeley, which reposes on the first. Did Brown not mistake his doctrine, Reid was certainly absurd in thinking, that a refutation of idealism is involved in his refutation of the common theory of perception. So far from blaming Brown, on this supposition, for denying to Reid the *single* merit which that philosopher thought peculiarly his own; we only reproach him for leaving to Reid and to himself any possible mode of resisting the idealist at all. It was a monstrous error to reverse Reid's doctrine of perception; it is perhaps a greater, not to see that this reversal stultifies the argument from common sense; and that so far “from proceeding on safe ground” in an appeal to our original beliefs, Reid would have employed, as Brown has actually done, a weapon *harmless to the sceptic, but mortal to himself*.

The belief, says Dr. Brown, in the existence of an external world is *irresistible*, therefore it is *true*. On his doctrine of perception, which he attributes also to Reid, this inference is however incompetent, because on that doctrine he cannot fulfil the condition which the argument implies. *I cannot but believe that material things exist:—I cannot but believe that the material reality is the object immediately known in perception.* The former of these beliefs, explicitly argues Dr. Brown, in defending his system against the sceptic, *because irresistible, is true*. The latter of these beliefs, implicitly argues Dr. Brown, in establishing his system itself, *though irresistible, is false*. And here not only are two primitive beliefs, supposed to be repugnant, and consciousness therefore delusive; the very belief which is assumed as true, exists in fact only through the other, which, *ex hypothesi*, is false. Both in reality are one.\* Kant, in

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\* This reasoning can only be invalidated either, 1. By disproving the *belief* itself of the *knowledge*, as a fact; or, 2. By disproving its attribute of originality. The latter is impossible; and if possible would also annihilate the originality of the *belief of the existence*, which is supposed. The former alternative is ridiculous. That we are naturally determined to believe the object known in perception to be the external existence itself, and that it is only in consequence of a *supposed philosophical necessity*, we subsequently endeavour by an artificial abstraction to discriminate these, is admitted even by those psychologists, whose doctrine is thereby placed in overt contradiction to our original beliefs. Though perhaps superfluous to allege authorities in support of such a point, we refer, however, to the following, which happen to occur to our recollection.—DES CARTES, *De Pass. art. 26*. —MALLEBRANCHE, *Rech. l. iii. c. 1*. —BERKELEY, *Works*, i. p. 216., and quoted by Reid, *Ess. I. P.* p. 165.—HUME, *Treat. H. N.* i. pp. 330. 338. 353. 358. 361. 369., orig. ed.—*Essays*, ii. pp. 154. 157. ed. 1788.—As not generally accessible, we translate the following extracts:—SCHELLING (*Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur. Einl.* p. xix. 1st ed.)—“When (in perception) I represent an object, *object and representation are one and the same*. And simply in this our *inability to*

whose doctrine as in Brown's the object of perception constitutes only a subjective phenomenon, was too acute not to discern that, on this hypothesis, philosophy could not, without contradiction, appeal to the evidence of our elementary faiths.—“Allowing idealism,” he says, “to be as dangerous as it truly is, it would still remain a *scandal to philosophy* and human reason in general, to be compelled to accept the existence of external things on the testimony of mere *belief*.”\*

But Reid is not, like Brown, *felo de se* in his reasoning from our natural beliefs; and on his genuine doctrine of perception, the argument has a very different tendency. Reid asserts that his doctrine of perception is itself a confutation of the ideal system; and so it truly is. For it at once denies to the sceptic and idealist the premises of their conclusion; and restores to the realist, in its omnipotence, the argument of common sense. The sceptic and idealist can only found on the admission, that the *object known* is not convertible with the *reality existing*; and, at the same time, this admission, by placing the facts of consciousness in mutual contradiction, denies its postulate to the argument from our beliefs. Reid's analysis therefore in its result, THAT WE HAVE, AS WE BELIEVE WE HAVE, AN IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MATERIAL REALITY, accomplished every thing at once.

Dr. Brown is not, however, more erroneous in thinking that the argument from common sense *could* be employed by him, than in supposing that its legitimacy *was* admitted by Hume. So little did he suspect the

*discriminate the object from the representation* during the act, lies the conviction which the common sense of mankind (*gemeine verstand*) has of the reality of external things, although these become known to it only through representations.” (See also p. xxvi.)—We cannot recover, at the moment, a passage, to the same effect, in Kant; but the ensuing is the testimony of an eminent disciple.—TENNEMANN, (*Gesch. d. Phil. II.* p. 294.) speaking of Plato: “*The illusion that things in themselves are cognizable, is so natural, that we need not marvel if even philosophers have not been able to emancipate themselves from the prejudice. The common sense of mankind (gemeine menschenverstand), which remains steadfast within the sphere of experience, recognises no distinction between things in themselves [unknown reality existing] and phenomena [representation, object known]; and the philosophising reason commences therewith its attempt to investigate the foundations of this knowledge, and to recall itself into system.*”—See also JACOBI's *David Hume, passim*, (*Werke*, ii.) and his *Allwills Briefsammlung*, (*Werke*, i. p. 119. *ets.*) Reid has been already quoted.

\* *Cr. d. r. V.*—*Vorr.* p. xxxix. Kant's marvellous acuteness did not, however, enable him to bestow on his “*Only possible demonstration of the reality of an external world*” (*ibid.* p. 275. *ets.*) even a logical necessity; nor prevent his *transcendental*, from being apodeictically resolved (by Jacobi and Fichte) into *absolute*, idealism. In this argument, indeed, he collects more in the conclusion, than was contained in the antecedents; and reaches it by a double *saltus*, over-leaping the foundations both of the egoistical and mystical idealists.—Though Kant, in the passage quoted above and in other places, apparently abuses the common sense of mankind, and altogether rejects it as a metaphysical principle of truth; he at last, however, found it necessary (in order to save philosophy from the annihilating energy of his *Speculative Reason*) to rest on that very principle of an ultimate belief, which he had originally spurned as a basis even of a material reality—the reality of all the sublimest objects of our interest—God, Free Will, Immortality, &c. His *Practical Reason*, as far as it extends, is in truth only another (and not even a better) term for *Common Sense*. Fichte, too, escaped the *admitted nihilism* of his speculative philosophy, only by a similar inconsequence in his practical.—(See his *Bestimmung des Menschen.*) *Naturam expellas furca, &c.*

futility, in his own hands, of this proof, he only regards it as superfluous as opposed to that philosopher, who, he thinks, in allowing the belief in the existence of matter to be *irresistible*, allows it to be *true*. (Lect. xxviii.) Dr. Brown has committed, perhaps, more *important* mistakes than this, in regard to scepticism and to Hume; — none certainly more fundamental. Hume is converted into a dogmatist; the essence of scepticism is misconceived.

On the hypothesis *that our natural beliefs are fallacious*, it is not for the Pyrrhonist to reject, but to establish their authenticity; and so far from the admission of their strength being a surrender of his doubt, the very triumph of scepticism consists in proving them to be *irresistible*. By what demonstration is the foundation of all certainty and knowledge so effectually subverted, as by showing that the principles, which reason constrains us speculatively to admit, are contradictory of the facts, which our instincts compel us practically to believe? Our intellectual nature is thus seen to be divided against itself; consciousness stands self-convicted of delusion. “Surely we have eaten the fruit of lies!”

This is the scope of the “Essay on the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy,” from which Dr. Brown quotes. In that essay, previous to his quotation, Hume shows, on the admission of philosophers, that our *belief in the knowledge* of material things, *as impossible, is false*; and on this admission, he had irresistibly established the *speculative* absurdity of our belief in the existence of an external world. In the passage, on the contrary, which Dr. Brown *partially* extracts, he is showing that this idealism, which in *theory* must be admitted, is in *application* impossible. Speculation and practice, nature and philosophy, sense and reason, belief and knowledge, thus placed in mutual antithesis, give, as their result, the uncertainty of every principle; and the assertion of this uncertainty is — Scepticism. This result is declared even in the sentence, with the preliminary clause of which Dr. Brown abruptly terminates his quotation.

But allowing Dr. Brown to be correct in transmuting the sceptical nihilist into a dogmatic realist; he would still be wrong (on the supposition that Hume admitted the *truth* of a belief to be convertible with its *invincibility*) in conceiving, on the one hand, that Hume could ever acquiesce in the same inconsequent conclusion with himself; or, on the other, that he himself could, without an abandonment of his system, acquiesce in the legitimate conclusion. On this supposition, Hume could only have arrived at a similar result with Reid; there is no tenable medium between the *natural realism* of the one, and the *sceptical nihilism* of the other. — “Do you follow,” says Hume in the same essay, “the instincts and propensities of nature in assenting to the veracity of sense?” — I do, says Dr. Brown. (Lect. p. 176. alibi.) — “But these,” continues Hume, “lead you to believe that the *very perception or sensible image is the external object*. Do you *disclaim this principle* in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external?” — It is the vital principle of my system, says Brown, that the mind knows nothing beyond its own states (Lect. passim); philosophical suicide is not my choice; I must recall my admission, and give the lie to this natural belief. — “You here,” proceeds Hume, “depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove, that the perceptions are connected with any external objects.” — I allow, says Brown, that the existence of an external world cannot be proved by *reasoning*, and that

the sceptical argument admits of no logical reply. (Lect. p. 175.)— But (we may suppose Hume to conclude) as you truly maintain that the confutation of scepticism can be attempted only in *two* ways (ibid.);— either by showing that its arguments are inconclusive, or by opposing to them, as paramount, the evidence of our natural beliefs;— and as you now, voluntarily or by compulsion, abandon *both*, you are confessedly reduced to the dilemma, either of acquiescing in the conclusion of the sceptic, or of refusing your assent upon no ground whatever.—*Pyrrhonism* or *absurdity*?— choose your horn.

Were the scepticism into which Dr. Brown's philosophy is thus analysed confined to the negation of matter, the result would be comparatively unimportant. The transcendent reality of an outer world, considered absolutely, is to us a matter of supreme indifference. It is not the idealism itself that we must deplore, but the mendacity of consciousness which it involves. Consciousness once convicted of falsehood, an unconditional scepticism, in regard to the character of our intellectual being, is the melancholy but only rational result. *Any* conclusion may now with impunity be drawn against the hopes and dignity of human nature. Our Personality, our Immateriality, our Liberty, have no longer an argument for their defence. "Man is the dream of a shadow;" God is the dream of that dream. Dr. Brown, after the best philosophers, rests the proof of our personal identity and of our mental individuality on the ground of beliefs, which, as "intuitive, universal, immediate, and irresistible," he, not unjustly, regards as "the internal and never ceasing voice of our Creator—revelations from on high, omnipotent [and veracious] as their author." *To him* this argument is however incompetent, as contradictory.

What we know of self or person, we know only as given in consciousness. In our perceptive consciousness there is revealed as an ultimate fact a *self* and *not-self*; each given as independent—each known only in antithesis to the other. No belief is more "*intuitive, universal, immediate, or irresistible*," than that this antithesis is real and known to be real; no belief therefore is more true. If the antithesis be illusive, *self* and *not-self*, *subject* and *object*, *I* and *Thou*, are distinctions without a difference; and consciousness, so far from being "the internal voice of our Creator," is shown to be, like Satan, "a liar from the beginning." The reality of this antithesis in *different parts* of his philosophy Dr. Brown *affirms and denies*. In establishing his theory of perception, he articulately denies that mind is conscious of aught beyond itself; virtually asserts that what is there given in consciousness as *not-self* is only a phenomenal illusion—a modification of self, which our consciousness determines us to believe is the quality of something numerically and substantially different.

"*Ille ego sum sensi, sed me mea fallit imago.*"

After this implication in one part of his system that our belief in the distinction of self and not-self is nothing more than the deception of a lying consciousness; it is startling to find him, in another, appealing to the beliefs of this same consciousness as to "revelations from on high;"— nay, in an especial manner alleging "as the voice of our Creator," this very faith in the distinction of self and not-self, through the fallacy of which, and of which alone, he had elsewhere argued consciousness of falsehood.

On the *veracity* of this *mendacious* belief, Dr. Brown establishes his proof of OUR PERSONAL IDENTITY. (Lect. xii.—xv.) Touching the ob-



ject of perception, when its evidence is *inconvenient*, this belief is quietly passed over as incompetent to distinguish *not-self from self*; in the question regarding our personal identity, where its testimony is *convenient*, it is clamorously cited as an inspired witness, exclusively competent to distinguish *self from not-self*. Yet, why, if, in the one case, it mistook *self* for *not-self*, it may not, in the other, mistake *not-self* for *self*, would appear a problem not of the easiest solution.

The same belief, with the same inconsistency, is again called in to prove the INDIVIDUALITY OF MIND. (Lect. xcvi.) But if we are fallaciously determined in perception, to believe what is supposed *indivisible, identical, and one*, to be *plural and different and incompatible*, (*self = self + not-self*); how, on the authority of the same treacherous conviction, dare we maintain, that the *phenomenal unity of consciousness* affords a guarantee of the *real simplicity of the thinking principle*? the materialist may now contend, without fear of contradiction, that *self* is only an *illusive phenomenon*; that our consecutive identity is that of the Delphic ship, and our present unity merely that of a system of co-ordinate activities. To explain the phenomenon, he has only to suppose, as certain theorists have lately done, an organ to tell the lie of our personality; and to quote as authority for the lie itself, the perfidy of consciousness, on which the theory of a representative perception is founded.

On the hypothesis of a representative perception, there is, in fact, no salvation from materialism on the one side, short of idealism on the other. Our knowledge of *mind* and *matter*, as substances, is merely relative; they are known to us only in their qualities; and we can justify the postulation of *two different substances*, exclusively on the supposition of the incompatibility of the double series of phenomena to coinhere in *one*. Is this supposition disproved?—the presumption against dualism is again decisive. *Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity; a plurality of principles is not to be assumed where the phenomena can be explained by one*. In Brown's theory of perception, he abolishes the incompatibility of the two series; and his argument, as a dualist, for an immaterial principle of thought, proceeds on the ground that this incompatibility subsists. (Lect. xevi. pp. 646, 647.) This philosopher denies us an immediate knowledge of aught beyond the accidents of mind. The accidents which we refer to body, as known to us, are only states or modifications of the percipient subject itself; in other words, the qualities we call *material*, are known by us to *exist* only as they are known by us to *inhere in the same substance as the qualities we denominate mental*. There is an *apparent* antithesis, but a *real identity*. On this doctrine, the hypothesis of a double principle, losing its necessity, becomes philosophically absurd; and, on the law of parsimony, a psychological unitarianism is established. To the argument that the qualities of the *objects* are so repugnant to the qualities of the *subjects* of perception, that they cannot be supposed the accidents of the same substance, the unitarian—whether materialist, idealist, or absolutist—has only to reply, that so far from the attributes of the object being exclusive of the attributes of the subject, in this act, that the hypothetical dualist himself establishes, as the fundamental axiom of his philosophy of mind, *that the object known is universally identical with the subject knowing*. The materialist may now derive the subject from the object; the idealist derive the object from the subject; the absolutist sublimate both into indifference, nay, the nihilist subvert the *substantial* reality of either;—

the hypothetical realist, so far from being able to resist the conclusion of any, in fact, accords their resumptive premises to all.

The same contradiction would, in like manner, invalidate every presumption in favour of our liberty of will. But as Dr. Brown, throughout his scheme of ethics, advances no argument in support of this condition of our moral being, which his philosophy otherwise tends to render impossible, we shall say nothing of this consequence of hypothetical realism.

So much for the system which, its author imagines, “*allows to the sceptic no resting-place for his foot,—no fulcrum for the instrument he uses;*” so much for the doctrine which Brown would substitute for Reid’s;—nay, which he even supposes Reid himself to have maintained.

“*Scilicet hoc totum falsa ratione receptum est!*”\*

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\* The very limited space necessarily assigned in this work to reviews of a metaphysical character, has prevented me from including the following, which I had abridged for selection. Examination of Belsham’s System of Ethics, Vol. i. page 475.—Review of Drummond’s Academical Questions, Vol. vii. page 163.—Strictures on the Metaphysical Opinions of Dr. Priestley, Vol. ix. page 153.—Critiques on Beattie’s Essay on Truth, Vol. x. page 171.—Gambier’s Introduction to the Study of Moral Evidence, Vol. xii. page 202.—Forsyth’s Principles of Moral Science, Vol. vii. page 413.—Degerando’s work on the Origin of Ideas, Vol. v. page 318.; and Knight’s Enquiry into the Principles of Taste, Vol. vii. page 295. Of the Essays on Phrenology, I intended to give the last, published in Vol. xlv. page 253., which occasioned a controversy between the Editor and Mr. Combe. I find, however, that I have not room for it without rejecting other matter of more general interest. The writings of Doctors Gall and Spurzheim attracted the attention of the E. Review when the science of phrenology was in its infancy; and it must be admitted, that whatever talent may have been exhibited in the abusive attacks made upon it by the writers in that work, they have not examined its principles and pretensions with that candour and dignity which should characterise philosophical discussion. Those who are interested in the controversy are referred to Vol. ii. page 147.; Vol. xxiv. page 439.; and Vol. xxv. page 227.

## PART SECOND.

## FOREIGN POLITICS.

## EXPEDITION AGAINST COPENHAGEN.\*

THE privilege which we enjoy in this country, of discussing every public occurrence with all the freedom and the keenness which belong to our political or physical constitution, though productive of incalculable benefit on the whole, has been the source of some evils. The most considerable, perhaps, of these, is the habit to which it has formed us of limiting our attention to the subject of the day, and dismissing entirely from our reflection every topic upon which our contending parties have once fairly delivered their opinions. Among a nation of newsmongers and politicians, this can scarcely be otherwise. Novelty is the great demand of the superficial; and, where every day supplies something new and disputable, the most important measures must take their turn with the most insignificant; and discussions which are to influence the fate of future generations must give place to the paltry recriminations of individuals whose names are notorious.

There are topics, however, which it seems to be a duty to try, at least, to rescue from this periodical oblivion, and to which the public attention ought, if possible, to be directed, after they have ceased to be the watchwords of faction, or the vehicles of personal abuse. There are objects now and then to be seen above the political horizon, which, though confounded, by the dazzled and short-sighted eyes of party or of idle curiosity, with the transient meteors of the atmosphere, are yet destined to hold their course in the eyes of many generations, and to exert a visible influence on every part of the system in which they appear. There are events of great example, and of terrible warning. There are measures which leave a taint or a healing virtue behind them, long after the period of their individual consummation; and principles which, though first disclosed in events that seem but common subjects of wrangling or censure, yet entail a blessing or a curse on the nations by which they are adopted. The partition of Poland excited less sensation in England than a Westminster election, or the capture of a solitary frigate; and yet, by that blow, the keystone was struck out of the arch of European independence. The expedition to Copenhagen is less thought of at this moment than the City Address, or the merits of Sir Arthur Wellesley; and yet that one measure has probably ensured the subjugation of the North, and confirmed the alienation of the whole Continent from this country. We do not know whether any thing that we can say can recall the attention of the public to a topic which, in the language of the quidnuncs, is now so completely gone by; but the time which we have chosen for its discussion will be received, we hope, as a proof that we engage in it for better purposes

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\* An Examination of the Causes which led to the late Expedition against Copenhagen. By an Observer.—Vol. xiii. page 488. January, 1809.

than those of faction; and that we wish to address ourselves to the reason, and not to the passions or prejudices, of our readers.

It is of the utmost importance, in the outset, to consider the conjuncture at which this extraordinary proceeding was adopted. In the year 1807 we beheld the continent of Europe apparently prostrate before the armies of France. The discipline of Austria and Prussia had disappeared before their numbers, their enthusiasm, and the predominant genius of their leader. The sovereigns of those countries had seen their capitals filled with hostile armies, and their flying courts hovering on the frontiers of their former dominions. The house of Hapsburg had ceased to give emperors to Germany; and the downfall of a constitution, transmitted from the feudal ages, was beheld without astonishment, and possibly without regret. The King of Prussia saw the ancient possessions and recent acquisitions of the house of Brandenburg alike a prey to the overwhelming power of the conqueror; and, from the remote city of Königsberg, contemplated the mighty ruin with which the wretched politics of his own cabinet had overspread the regions of the North. On the banks of the Vistula the Russians still disputed the further progress of the enemy; but neither the protracted severity of a northern winter, the difficulty of procuring supplies and reinforcements at so great a distance from France, nor the reluctant and indignant submission of the intermediate countries, could encourage them to hazard a decisive action. The return of summer had permitted Bonaparte to resume offensive operations, facilitated the communication of his different armies, and led to the battle of Friedland, which appears to have convinced the Emperor of Russia of the necessity of peace. The treaty of Tilsit, concluded on the 8th of July, rather proclaimed than confirmed the power of Bonaparte, and the weakness of his adversaries.

At that period, the humiliation of the continental sovereigns was very generally mistaken in England for the forcible and complete subjugation of their territories. An interval of fifteen years of war and revolution had almost caused it to be forgotten that the fate of a brave and unanimous people cannot be permanently decided by a few pitched battles. The fortune of every country depends on the numbers and character of its inhabitants; and the immense population of Germany, with their athletic forms, hardy habits, and native courage, would not have struggled in vain, in a contest which had really called their powers into action. But the German nations had witnessed the weak and versatile policy, and experienced the oppression, of their own governments. In their military leaders they saw no talents adequate to defence; and, in the absence of all motives fitted to inspire enthusiasm, the advantage of submission or resistance became a matter of calculation, and the celerity of the enemy's marches afforded little time for deliberation. On England, indeed, the eyes of all were fixed. In her they beheld a power which had uniformly resisted, with vigour, and with comparative success, the encroachments of the continental despot. She had always supplied the enemies of France profusely with the pecuniary means of warfare; her insular situation, her invincible fleets, and the loyal unanimity of her inhabitants, held out a permanent encouragement to every nation disposed to assert their independence, and reared up a bulwark against universal dominion. Her enemies, indeed, had found occasion to disseminate more than suspicions as to the purity of the motives which prompted this conduct. But though she had stooped after sugar islands and plantations of pepper, she had been faithful to her engagements with her allies; and had adopted no

measure obviously the result of a selfish policy. In struggling to support the political system of civilised Europe, she had respected the laws by which it was regulated. She was evidently regaining character even with her commercial rivals; and the tone of high honour and inflexible justice, which sounded in her public declarations, and in the speeches of her parliamentary orators, had unquestionably established a very general sentiment of admiration and confidence. In the actual posture of affairs, indeed, these sentiments were mere latent sparks, which subsequent events might kindle or extinguish. Her influence and reputation were placed in her own keeping; and if the sketch we have ventured to delineate of the state of Europe be at all correct, it will be easy to see of what importance it was to the whole civilised world, that England should have persevered in a line of conduct calculated to conciliate confidence, and to command respect.

In her transactions with the court of St. Petersburg she had recently displayed considerable magnanimity. Her unqualified rejection of all terms of peace (during an administration confessedly pacific), in which her ally should not be included, must have left on the mind of the Russian monarch a very favourable impression of the councils then prevalent in his Majesty's cabinet. Sweden, with more zeal than prudence, had ventured to become a principal in the war. The fall of Prussia had paved the way for an attack on Swedish Pomerania; and, unless England furnished speedily a numerous and well appointed army of auxiliaries, all that was left to hope for was an unmolested retreat across the waves of the Baltic. We shall never appreciate rightly the character of the expedition against Copenhagen, unless we recollect that it was contemporary with the siege and evacuation of Stralsund and Rugen; and that the forces employed in the spoliation of a neutral state might have averted that of an ally, actually perpetrating at the same time, and at no great distance.

In the midst of so much error and so much disaster, Denmark had remained unmolested, — protected by the firm but temperate politics of her court; by the attachment of her inhabitants to the family of the sovereign, and to their own national independence; by the rigid observance of a strict neutrality; and by the moral turpitude attached to a profligate aggression. But mere innocence has always been a feeble barrier against unprincipled power; and the precautions of this state betrayed, without mitigating, her alarm for that portion of her territory exposed to invasion. From the general policy of the ruler of France, every thing was to be apprehended. The open country of Holstein opposed no barrier: its fertility and riches invited and facilitated the entrance of that army which had long hovered on its frontiers; and as it was uncertain how long it might continue to respect them, the Crown Prince, draining the rest of his dominions of their forces, had for three years kept the flower of the Danish youth assembled on the borders of Holstein, to defend the only quarter in which aggression was then conceived to be possible. Still it was apprehended, that, in the extensive plains of Holstein, numbers would assert their usual superiority: Jutland, however, protected by its poverty and its mountains, was deemed capable of a successful defence; and, whilst the fleet of Denmark was decidedly superior to any which France could bring out against her, the security of the Scandinavian isles was never supposed to be doubtful. The co-operation of the English fleets, indeed, was tacitly counted on, in any system of defence which an eventual aggression might render necessary.

Such was the posture of affairs, when a fleet, commanded by Admiral Gambier, and filled with English troops, left the shores of Great Britain. The writer of this article, who happened accidentally to be at Copenhagen when the account of this event arrived, witnessed the most unequivocal proofs of the sensations it excited amongst all classes in that capital. The sentiment of common danger had obliterated the national animosity which usually subsisted between the Swedes and Danes. It was universally supposed that the English army was destined to co-operate with the former, in the defence of Stralsund, and in reconquering the rest of Swedish Pomerania; and all that was feared was, that it would arrive too late. The illusion was however dissipated by the arrival of Mr. Jackson at Copenhagen, as plenipotentiary on the part of his Britannic Majesty, on the 1st of August, 1807.

Mr. Jackson (as might have been confidently predicted) totally failed in convincing the Crown Prince that it was incumbent on him to deprive his own kingdoms and capital, during a period critical beyond example, of a naval defence provided at an enormous expense, considering the limited revenue of Denmark, in order to add to the naval power or the security of Great Britain. Posterity will not, from this circumstance, judge unfavourably of the persuasive talents of Mr. Jackson: but a much more powerful negotiator was at hand. Lord Cathcart, with an army of 28,000 men, disembarked at Wybeck, on the 16th of August. On the 18th, Copenhagen was invested. "The mortar batteries," says Lord Gambier, "which had been erected by the army in the several positions they had taken round Copenhagen, together with the bomb vessels, which were placed in convenient situations, began the bombardment on the morning of the 2d September, with such power and effect, that in a short time *the town was set on fire, and, by the repeated discharges of our artillery, was kept in flames, in different places*, till the evening of the 5th; when a considerable part of it being consumed, and the conflagration arrived at a great height, threatening *the speedy destruction of the whole city*, the general commanding the garrison sent out a flag of truce." The result of this transaction was, that the conquerors conveyed to England sixteen ships of the line, thirteen frigates, and six brigs.

Such, on the largest calculation, is the amount of our gain by this unprecedented operation;—against which, we have obviously to set off, 1st, the expense attending the expedition itself, which probably amounted to the prime cost of an equal number of new vessels of the same dimensions; 2d, the implacable animosity of the whole Danish nation towards this country,—devoting them, with all the resources of Denmark, to the service of Bonaparte; 3d, the resentment expressed and acted upon ever since by the Emperor of Russia, which has cemented, if it did not dictate, his alliance with the ruler of France. Lastly, and above all, the wreck of that high national character, and consequent influence, which Great Britain had hitherto enjoyed amongst the nations of Europe.

Whoever has had an opportunity of comparing the people of England with those of the Continent, must have remarked that, with a sense of honour equally acute, the former possess far more rigid notions of morality and justice. Honesty and scrupulous fidelity are necessary in extended commerce, and naturally infuse themselves into the general conduct of a commercial people. The noble and dignified sentiments which actuate the mind of the sovereign are universally acknowledged. The eminent persons who direct his councils are all men of strict moral rectitude in

private life. We are bound, therefore, to conclude that the demand of the navy of a neutral power, and the destruction of his capital in order to enforce that demand, is either consonant to political justice and established maxims, or else that it was urged by a danger so vast and imminent as to justify the grossest violation of general principles. We propose to consider the arguments which have been advanced in support of this last and only rational proposition; and we may begin with a short view of the reasoning of the author before us.

It has been the policy of Bonaparte to attack England through the medium of her commerce. For that purpose, the possession of Holstein was of the utmost importance, by enabling him to exclude British manufactures and colonial produce from Toningen, the only considerable depôt then open to them on the Continent. This being obviously his interest, it is manifest that he would not have continued to respect the neutrality of Denmark; but, having possessed himself of Holstein, would have had no difficulty in passing into Zealand; and the possession of the Danish fleet would unavoidably lead to that of Sweden and Russia also. Besides, the Danes did not mean to defend themselves; otherwise, the fortifications of Rendsburgh and Gluckstadt would have been strengthened and augmented. On these arguments — and we really can discover no others in the work — it seems enough to say, that though the Danes did not consider themselves adequate to the defence of Holstein, if attacked by such a force as France could bring against it, they did undoubtedly rely upon being able to defend their islands, until attacked by a naval force equal to their own.

It would be uncandid, however, to judge of this extraordinary measure by the reasonings of this anonymous writer. Let us, therefore, have recourse to the declarations of his Majesty's ministers. In that published on the 25th of September, 1807, the late measures in the Baltic are thus accounted for: — “His Majesty *had received the most positive information* of the determination of the present ruler of France to occupy with a military force the territory of Holstein, for the purpose of excluding Great Britain from her accustomed channels of communication with the Continent; of inducing or compelling the court of Denmark to close the passage of the Sound against the British commerce and navigation; and of availing himself of the aid of the Danish marine, for the invasion of Great Britain and Ireland:” and further, “Holstein once occupied, Zealand would be at the mercy of France, and the navy of Denmark at her disposal.”

Now, though it cannot well be denied that, ever since the occupation of Hanover, Bonaparte might have taken possession of Holstein, it by no means follows that he had the same power over the Danish marine. Yet, of the three objects specified in the declaration, the last only — namely, the invasion of the British Isles — can be pretended to have been prevented by the Danish expedition; since England is now completely excluded from the ports of Denmark, and all the *seamen* and naval means of that country are at the disposal of the enemy.

But in the declaration against Russia, dated 18th December, 1807, in accounting for the expedition against Copenhagen, no allusion whatever is made to the positive information detailed in the first. Here it is said, “His Majesty feels himself under no obligation to offer any atonement or apology to the Emperor of Russia for the expedition against Copenhagen. It is not for those who were parties to the secret arrangements of Tilsit to demand satisfaction for *a measure to which those arrangements gave*

rise, and by which one of the objects has been happily defeated." Again, "His Majesty was prepared to employ, for the advancement of the common objects of the war, those forces *which, after the peace of Tilsit, he was under the necessity of employing, to disconcert a combination directed against his own immediate interests and security.*"

It thus appears that it was *not* in consequence of Bonaparte's determination to occupy Holstein, that the expedition took place; but of secret articles of the Treaty of Tilsit, by which a combination was formed hostile to Great Britain. Be it so. The Ministry wished it, then, at that time to be understood that, previously to the sailing of Lord Gambier on the 26th of July, they were in possession of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, concluded on the 8th; though it has since been distinctly admitted, in both houses of parliament, that information of the signing of the treaty did not reach the British government till the 8th of August. But if they were at any time in possession of such articles, their conduct in not producing them is altogether inexplicable. The simple production of the articles involved no disclosure of the sources of intelligence; and is it possible for a moment to suppose that ministers were in possession of a document which completely justified their measures — would have silenced the clamours of opposition, and effaced a stigma on the national character; and that they yet, without any imaginable motive, preferred to suppress it? Besides, if, previously to the sailing of Lord Gambier, ministers *knew* (for we apprehend there are none who think that a vague surmise or conjecture would justify such a proceeding as this) — if they knew, we say, that the Emperor of Russia was a principal in a combination for placing the naval means of Denmark at the disposal of France, and for excluding us from the Sound, how shall we account for the forbearance that was observed towards Russia herself — for the policy that spared her fleets in the Baltic and the Mediterranean — her merchant ships in our ports, and her commerce in every quarter? How shall we account for the hopes long afterwards held out by Mr. Canning and Lord Leveson Gower, of the adjustment of a commercial treaty with that monarch? Or how shall we account for the manner in which the supposed combination is alluded to in the Right Honourable Secretary's private letter of the 28th of September, in which it is mentioned, not as the result of secret articles actually ratified by his Imperial Majesty, but under the vague designation of "*a plan brought forward at the conferences of Tilsit?*" It is not in this manner that formal stipulations are usually characterised; and, indeed, in point of fact, we believe it is now universally admitted that the secret articles of Tilsit related exclusively to arrangements eventually to take place in *the south of Europe*; and that the hostile combination in the Baltic would never have been more than *a plan of Bonaparte*, if the attack on Copenhagen had not united Russia and Denmark in a zealous and cordial co-operation in his hostile designs.

It has indeed been contended, and from high authority, that ministers never had any occasion to produce proof of their assertions; that the facts which justify the seizure of the Danish fleet were public and notorious: — the power and animosity of France; the weakness and hostile disposition of Denmark; and the importance of her navy towards the success of any plan which the enemy may adopt for the invasion of these realms. These circumstances, it has been said, make out a case of necessity; and the measure adopted was one of self-preservation, the first law of nature. Of all the links in this chain of ratiocination, those which most required support were, the inability of Denmark to resist the seizure



of her fleet by France ; and that, even in such a case, Great Britain was menaced with a danger so imminent, as to justify an attack on a neutral power. On the first of these points, it was contended, that the invasion of Zealand from Holstein might be effected without difficulty, since cruisers cannot always keep their stations in the Belt, nor, consequently, always prevent the passage of troops. The importance of the subject will induce us to examine each proposition separately.

The animosity of Bonaparte we readily admit. But, with respect to his power, the humiliation of Austria and extinction of Prussia had not converted the brave and robust nations of Germany into the willing instruments of his despotism. The unsuccessful campaign of Russia, though it rendered peace expedient, had not alienated the esteem of the Emperor from this country, and still less that of the Russian nation ; nor could it have created in either any attachment to France. However improbable, let it be admitted as not impossible, that Denmark might have been compelled to become a reluctant auxiliary of Bonaparte, and an unwilling instrument in his hands for the subjugation of other nations. But it was reserved for the Danish expedition, to unite with Bonaparte the hearts and resources of all the inhabitants of Denmark and Russia. The conferences of Erfurth furnish an instructive commentary on our Baltic policy. The march of the veteran troops of France from the Oder to the Ebro, proves at once the confidence established between Bonaparte and the northern powers, and the disgust which the violence of our measures was naturally calculated to excite. Thus it is, that one precipitate step has levelled with the dust that fair fabric of moral grandeur, which would probably have rendered England the rallying point of Europe, in the dawn of happier times.

If, by the weakness of Denmark, be meant any thing else than her incapacity to defend the fleet which we seized, we cannot perceive that it furnishes any justification of the measure. Were Lord Wellesley's assertion correct, that ships cannot keep their station in the Belt, nor prevent the transport of troops into Zealand, the question indeed would be materially changed. But the first naval authority in this country, Earl St. Vincent, affirmed, in the presence of Lords Cathcart and Gambier, in the House of Peers, and challenged contradiction, that it was easier to invade Great Britain from Boulogne, than Zealand from Funen, on account of the number of gun-boats that might be collected, and the excellence of the anchorage in the Belt. This proposition was not disputed in that House ; nor did Sir Arthur Wellesley, Sir Samuel Hood, or Sir Home Popham, in the other, attempt to state any observations to detract from its weight. So much, then, for the assertion, that, " Holstein once occupied, Zealand was at the mercy of France, and the navy of Denmark at her disposal."

But, of all the grounds on which the expedition has been defended, the least tenable is, the hostile disposition of the Danes. " It is *impossible* for you to be of that opinion !" exclaimed the Emperor of Russia, in conversation with Lord Hutchinson. To us it certainly appears impossible ; for, even if we could disregard entirely the direct affirmation of his Majesty, of his generals, and of his ministers,—and the regret and reluctance so strongly expressed in resorting to such an extremity,—we need only reflect, that the isle of Zealand was exposed to attack from England only—the province of Holstein exclusively from the French ; and that the former, during three years, had been stripped of every soldier that could be spared from regular garrison duty, and the whole Danish

army, with the prince at their head, collected on the frontiers of the latter province; whilst the fleet of Denmark, with the exception of one ship of the line, was laid up in ordinary. But we would ask any man of common sense and candour, Whether, if Denmark had been conscious of listening to propositions affecting the vital interests of Great Britain, such would have been the distribution of her army, or such the condition of her navy? A distinguished member of the late administration, whose exertions to procure justice for the Danes have been equally able and unavailing, states a fact, which decidedly militates against the supposition of hostile intentions,—that the number of Danish vessels in our ports, on the 2d September, greatly exceeded the average proportion,—the number seized amounting to 320. Yet the College of Commerce at Copenhagen had assured the owners, so late as the 13th of August (only two days before the arrival of the English army), “that any report of a misunderstanding with Great Britain was totally destitute of foundation; nothing having been done on their parts, whereby the good understanding hitherto subsisting betwixt both courts could any ways be considered as lessened or interrupted.”

We proceed to consider the *necessity* of the measure. The most strenuous advocates for the expedition against Copenhagen admit, that it can only be justified by necessity; that it forms a remarkable exception to the generous maxims which Great Britain has adopted, and which foreign nations have admired and applauded; but that the danger resulting from the possession of this fleet by Bonaparte was so great and so imminent, that we were justified in anticipating his designs. Now, we entirely concede the truth of the old maxim, “*Salus populi suprema lex;*” but contend, that the danger apprehended was inconsiderable, remote, and contingent; and, consequently, not such as to warrant so atrocious an act of aggression on a neutral power. Ministers themselves did not imagine the country was menaced by great and imminent peril; for the plan which they then adopted for augmenting the army and militia was avowedly calculated, not for immediate operation, but for a gradual increase of our forces. But will it be seriously stated, that this nation would have been in a state of tremendous and unparalleled peril, although the navy of Bonaparte had been actually augmented by sixteen ships, thirteen frigates, and six brigs? Since when, we would ask, had this force, in the hands of the enemy, appeared so formidable to England? When the war was last renewed, the victories of our naval heroes had not completed the destruction of the French marine. France had still a powerful fleet; and Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark—all the northern powers—were united in a confederacy hostile to this country. Yet did our measures at that time argue pusillanimity, or beget despondency? Did any man then venture to state to the British nation, that the imminent perils which menaced these realms had rendered obsolete the political code of our ancestors,—and that safety could only be found in imitating the violence and atrocity of the enemy?

There is only another point of view in which it may be proper to consider this subject. *Could* Denmark have consented to the sacrifice we demanded? Her Continental possessions were exposed to French invasion; her capital might be laid in ruins by an English fleet; and her foreign possessions were at the mercy of Great Britain. A strict neutrality was therefore a line of conduct imperiously prescribed to the Crown Prince, by the local peculiarities of his territories. We have the authority of the Emperor of Russia, the public and repeated menaces of Bonaparte, and our own experience, to convince us, that neither threats

nor promises would induce him to depart from it. If, however, Bonaparte should cease to respect his neutrality, and seize upon Holstein, what means of defence had the Crown Prince left, excepting his fleet, of which we demanded the surrender? Without it, indeed, his capital, with the rest of his dominions, must have fallen a prey. That fleet was constructed at an immense expense, and constructed for the security of Denmark. Never was that security more imminently endangered; and at that very crisis, it is demanded, in deposit, to add to the security of Great Britain,—although the immediate conquest of Holstein, and, according to his Majesty's declaration of the 25th of September, the seizure of Zealand by the French, must have been the inevitable consequences.

It appears to us, that every transaction nearly or remotely connected with the Danish expedition, partakes of its character. In the declaration promulgated by ministers on the 25th September, his Majesty declares, "that he is not desirous, from any motive but the security of his own dominions, or for any object of advantage or aggrandisement, to carry measures of hostility beyond the limits of the necessity which produced them." This declaration corresponds entirely with the magnanimous disposition of the sovereign; and it certainly was the duty of ministers to have acted in conformity to it. But if that necessity demanded that the Danish fleet should be removed out of the reach of Bonaparte, it would have been at least natural to have declared openly our intention to restore them when the danger was at an end. Instead, however, of being kept in deposit for that purpose, they are added to the British navy. Above all, what plea of state necessity, what law of self-preservation, could call for the seizure and confiscation of three hundred and twenty merchant vessels, which, in the unsuspecting confidence of neutrality, were found in our ports immediately previous to the commencement of hostilities? Of these vessels, many had been wrongfully brought in, and had been decreed by our courts to be restored. Yet, although we might have animadverted on this measure on another occasion, we are sensible of its propriety on the present; and are perfectly ready to admit the harmonious composition of the whole transaction, of which no incidental deviation into magnanimity disturbs the consistency, or injures the general effect.

In the person of Bonaparte, the success of unprincipled power is strongly exemplified. Yet we are far from measuring the amount of that power by the extent of the superficies over which his authority is felt. The minds of men are not bowed to the yoke. The elements of resistance are not extinguished. From the loss of civil occupations, a military spirit is fast spreading itself over the Continent; and, in the very cloud which blackens all our horizon, we may see the bow which is set for a token that the tempest will not be for ever. Whether this generation will live to see the troubled waters subside, and the ancient landmarks of the world re-appear above the flood, is indeed more difficult to conjecture. But, whatever be the destined means of our deliverance, we think we may say with certainty, that it will not be accomplished by a coalition of sovereigns: and that, if England is to have the share she might once have expected in this great redemption, it must be by reverting to her ancient maxims,—by exhibiting a contrast, and not a counterpart, to the violence and selfishness of her enemy,—and by expiating the fatal and degrading error of which we have been speaking, by some signal act of generosity and forbearance.

## TRANSFERENCE OF NORWAY.\*

It would be inconsistent with all the principles maintained in this Journal, were we to remain silent upon one of the most profligate measures in modern times,—we mean the *transference of Norway*. We shall state the nature of the question first historically, for the purpose of bringing the facts fairly together.

In March, 1812, when France was threatening the Russian empire, and had invaded Swedish Pomerania, a convention was entered into by the courts of St. Petersburg and Stockholm, for a mutual co-operation in defence of their respective territories. The object certainly was most momentous and desirable; and all slight considerations would have been properly sacrificed to ensure its attainment. But the most remarkable part of this act is the stipulation, that Sweden shall, before making a diversion in Germany in favour of the common cause, receive *the kingdom of Norway* from Denmark, who is *not* a party to the convention, and is at peace with both the contracting parties. The following is the extraordinary article by which this is stipulated. “As the King of Sweden cannot make this diversion in favour of the common cause, consistently with the security of his dominions, so long *as he can regard* the kingdom of Norway as an enemy, his majesty the Emperor of Russia engages, either by negotiation or by military co-operation, to unite the kingdom of Norway to Sweden. He engages, moreover, to guarantee the peaceable possession of it to his Swedish Majesty.” It is not even pretended that Denmark then menaced Sweden on the side of Norway; much less that Norway, independent of Denmark, threatened any such attack. On the contrary, another article of the same convention admits the friendly relations of Denmark:—“The two contracting parties being unwilling, *if it can be avoided*, to make an enemy of the King of Denmark, will propose to that sovereign to *accede to this alliance*; and will offer to his Danish Majesty to procure for him a complete indemnity for Norway, by a territory more contiguous to his German dominions, provided his Danish Majesty will cede for ever his rights on the kingdom of Norway to his Swedish Majesty. In case his Danish Majesty shall refuse this offer, and shall have decided to remain in alliance with France, the two contracting parties engage to consider Denmark as their enemy.” What is the plain English of this most profligate compact? That Russia having resolved to keep Finland from Sweden, they both agree to fall upon a weak neighbour, and despoil him of an indemnity amounting to half his dominions; offering him, by way of consolation, the power of acceding to a treaty, the main object of which is the partition of his territories! This favour, no doubt, they had the power to bestow:—but they promised also, what at the time they had no prospect of ever procuring, a compensation elsewhere, at some future time, and at the expense of some other neighbour still weaker. It is but just to the *high* parties in this contract, to allow that they do not make any very hypocritical pretences about their motives for the work they are about. They avow its nature pretty roundly; and only attempt to varnish it, by mentioning

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\* Letter from Sir Philip Francis, K. B., to Earl Grey.—Vol. xxiii. page 80. April, 1814.

the remote possibility of an attack from Norway. It is equally fair to say, for the defenders of the measure elsewhere, that they have not very stoutly maintained its honesty, or attempted to distinguish it, either from the former works of the same masters, or from the well-known productions of the French school. In truth, France might just as well have vindicated the seizure of Spain, on pretence of its necessity to secure her flank when she was about to invade Austria, or to defend herself on the Rhine. The language of the treaty is too closely copied from the partitions of Poland, to leave a doubt as to the class of statesmen from which it proceeds. But to show that the Emperor Alexander was not always so inclined, we shall add an extract from his declaration against the atrocious expedition to Copenhagen in 1807. Speaking of Great Britain (*Declaration of St. Petersburg, 31st October, 1807*), he says, "Her fleets and her troops appeared on the coasts of Denmark, to execute there an act of violence, of which history, so fertile in examples, does not furnish a single parallel. A tranquil and moderate power, which, by long and unchanging wisdom, had obtained in the circle of monarchies a moral dignity, sees itself assaulted and treated as if it had been forging plots, and meditating the ruin of England; and all to justify its prompt and total spoliation. The Emperor engages, that there shall be no re-establishment of concord between Russia and England till satisfaction shall have been given to Denmark." And what is the satisfaction to Denmark which now seals the restoration of concord between England and Russia?—a partition of the Danish dominions, for the purpose of repaying to Sweden what Russia has taken from her, and leaving Russia in quiet possession of her spoil!

So much for the original character and design of the undertaking. About a year after this convention was made, (that is, in March, 1813,) a treaty was concluded, by the same parties, with England; and the following article is stated as containing our accession to the convention of 1812. "His Britannic Majesty, being desirous to give an immediate and unequivocal proof of his resolution to join his interests to those of Sweden and Russia, promises and engages, by the present treaty, to accede to the convention already existing between these two powers; *insomuch that* his Britannic Majesty will not only not oppose any obstacle (*en tant que* S. M. B. non seulement, &c.) to the annexation and union in perpetuity of the kingdom of Norway as an integral part of the kingdom of Sweden, but also will assist the views of his Majesty the King of Sweden, to that effect, either by his good offices, or by employing, if it should be necessary, his naval co-operation in concert with the Swedish or Russian forces." If the article stopped here, its construction could admit of no doubt; it binds England to co-operate with Sweden and Russia in obtaining, by foul means or fair (it is a homely, but a very correct expression), the surrender of Norway from Denmark. The stipulation has a plain reference to Denmark as a state or power, because it refers to the convention of 1812, which, as we have already seen, speaks distinctly of obtaining the cession of Norway from his Danish Majesty. But the article concludes with a proviso that leaves not a shadow of ambiguity. "It is, nevertheless, to be understood, that recourse shall *not be had to force* for the effecting the union of Norway to Sweden, *unless* his Majesty the King of Denmark shall have previously refused to join the alliance of the North, upon the conditions stipulated in the engagements subsisting between the courts of Stockholm and St. Petersburg; and (with a prophetic glance at the blockade) his Majesty the King of Sweden engages

that this union shall take place *with every possible regard and consideration for the happiness and liberty of the people of Norway.*"

These extracts will enable us to demonstrate, we venture to say, this proposition — that England is not bound to wage war with the people of Norway.

*First*, we contend that if a profligate compact is entered into, or acceded to, by the rulers of any state, it is not only not binding, but it is their duty to recede from the obligations contracted, at all costs and risks. Analogies from municipal law are too numerous and obvious to require particular notice. Rather let us ask, why a nation should commit so gross an inconsistency as to persist in dishonourable courses from a mere principle of honour? A treaty has been made, and to break it would be dishonour; not so, if the treaty binds to acts of injustice and cruelty. All the powers of the Continent have of late, in their turn, broken the most solemn treaties, upon the ground of their having been forced to make them. This is a doctrine full of danger, and most liable to abuse. But surely no such risk is incurred by the position, that an illegal compact is *ab initio* void.

But we rely upon the strict construction of the articles themselves; and observe, *secondly*, that they only bind England to obtain *a cession from Denmark*. Neither in the Convention of 1812, nor in the Treaty of 1813, is there a single expression which can fairly be interpreted as contemplating any resistance on the part of Norway. Every thing is stated with relation to the crown and the sovereign. England is to assist in obtaining "the annexation and union of Norway to Sweden;" and, if negotiation fails, force is to be used. The words are, "either by good offices, or by employing naval co-operation." With whom were the good offices to be used? Did any treaty ever speak of good offices, except in the sense of negotiation with *a government*? or of military operations, but against the forces of the state? The Convention, to which this article is an accession, says, "by negotiation, or military co-operation;" and expressly mentions the two ways in which Norway can be obtained — "either by cession of the King of Denmark, or in consequence of military operations." Now these can only mean, in the other alternative, of the King of Denmark refusing the voluntary cession, and requiring force to be employed to obtain it. Then the proviso in the Treaty of 1813 speaks the same language, and states, that force shall *not* be used to effect the annexation, "*unless the King of Denmark shall have refused to join the alliance.*" It is said, indeed, that England accedes to the Convention of 1812, which contains a guarantee by Russia to Sweden "*of peaceable possession*" of Norway. To this there are several satisfactory answers. If one power guarantees a possession to another by a treaty containing several stipulations, a general accession to that treaty by a third power cannot be taken to imply a specific accession to the guarantee, unless it be expressed or plainly referred to; because guarantees shall not be raised by implication, nor easily presumed. But the accession of England is in fact a qualified accession. She engages to accede, "*insomuch that she will oppose no obstacle to the annexation, but assist by good offices and naval co-operation;*" and then the proviso, as well as the tenor of the convention acceded to, show how these exertions are to be employed — *viz.* with reference to the Danish crown. Again, a guarantee of peaceable possession is only a guarantee against princes and states; in this case it is a guarantee against the Danish government, and any ally of Denmark. In order to raise a guarantee so extraordinary as that contended for — *viz.* against the internal

movements of the Norwegians — it is surely not going too far to assert, that the most positive and unambiguous expressions would have been requisite.

*Thirdly*, there is an event expressly mentioned, in which the stipulations, whatever they may be, with respect to forcing the annexation of Norway, are to be void—viz. Denmark having acceded to the Northern alliance previous to the force being employed for obtaining Norway. This throws the friends of the treaty into a manifest dilemma; for they must either admit that the only force contemplated by the treaty is a force to be exerted against the Danish crown; or they must allow that the obligation of using force against Norway ceased upon the accession of Denmark to the coalition, this accession having taken place before force was employed against the Norwegians; and, in either case, there is an end of the argument. The Convention of 1812, too, gives rise to the same argument.

*Fourthly*, the treaty of Keil, January 14. 1814, clearly shows in what sense the stipulations of the former acts were understood by England. The 10th article refers to the treaty between Denmark and Sweden, concluded on the same day, for the cession of Norway, and states it to be a satisfaction of the stipulations respecting Norway. “Whereas his Danish Majesty, in virtue of the treaty of peace this day concluded with the King of Sweden, has ceded Norway to his said Majesty, for a certain provided indemnity; his Britannic Majesty, *who has thus seen his engagements contracted with Sweden in this respect fulfilled,*” promises to use his good offices, at the general peace, to obtain an indemnity for Denmark “*for the cession of Norway.*” It is difficult, after signing and sealing this deed, for the English Government to deny either that Norway has been ceded, or that the cession has been of the kind stipulated in the former treaties, or that England has been satisfied with that cession as sufficient to fulfil her obligations.

*Fifthly*, We should be glad to be furnished with some precedents of a war waged against a people in pursuance of stipulations with their rulers. The treaty was made with Sweden, that is, with the Swedish government; it bound us to make war in a certain event, and in a particular manner, with Denmark, that is, with the Danish government. We go to war accordingly. We obtain the cession by the Danish government; and as far as the contemplation of the treaty extends, Norway is ceded to Sweden, and we make peace with Denmark. If Norway is Danish, we are at peace with it; if Swedish, we are in alliance with it. Can it, in contemplation of the treaty, or of the law of nations, be neither Danish nor Swedish? Where are the precedents for considering a province as separate and distinct from the government to which it belongs? Even in the history of Poland no such precedent can be found. The statesmen, whose names are consigned to perpetual infamy in the records of the partition, were too decorous, at least in forms, to leave any such written evidence of their shame, as compacts to enslave or exterminate a people; and those execrable designs were compassed under the colour of engagements with a reference to the constituted authorities. But where is the obligation to end which we are supposed to have incurred? Must we interfere with the internal affairs of the new Swedish province, as long as there may remain any discontent among its inhabitants? Shall we next be called upon to send horse into the towns, as often as an insurrection may break out under the new dynasty?

But, *lastly*, Supposing, for the sake of argument, it were admitted that

these treaties bound England to wage war against the Norwegians as a state separate from Denmark ; we should be glad to know how a general engagement to co-operate by naval force, necessarily means only one species of naval co-operation, viz. blockade. Formerly this was a rare mode of making war ; and for this reason, that its effects fall on the innocent multitude with fully more weight than upon the armed body of the state. Why then must naval co-operation, in this instance of all others, be confined to the most odious species of naval war ? If the Norwegians fit out vessels against the Russians and Swedes ; if they have any naval arsenals or stations ; if they are receiving warlike stores by sea, or conveying them coastwise ; and if the Swedish forces stand in need of maritime assistance ; in all these cases we might, according to the construction contended for, be bound to interfere. But why particularly cut off supplies of provisions ? Even attacking the general commerce of the country, and leaving its supply of necessaries unimpeded, would be a performance of the stipulation quite consistent with the practice of modern warfare. How often have belligerents refrained from attacking fishing vessels ? But still more material is it to observe, that a naval war may be carried on in all its branches, blockade alone excepted, without any suspicion of collusion or insincerity. The whole shipping of the enemy may be exposed to our cruizers,—those carrying innocent merchandise, as well as those carrying warlike stores,—those carrying provisions, as well as those laden with other goods ; and yet neutrals may be allowed to trade freely in all but contraband of war. Nay, this is the ordinary state of things in war ; and, until very lately, scarcely any other kind of war used to be, generally speaking, waged. Can a reason be devised for adopting, in the case of Norway, precisely the one method of naval co-operation most severe upon the body of the people, in preference to all the other modifications of war known in the practice of nations ;—in preference to the species of warfare carried on for so large a portion of the last twenty years against France herself ? We have now been arguing upon the assumption, made merely for the sake of argument, that the treaties bind us to any operations at all against Norway as distinct from Denmark.

It may be thought that we have gone too minutely and technically into the discussion of a question so much better rested upon general grounds and loftier principles. But the conduct of the argument on the opposite side has imposed upon us this necessity ; for it is remarkable, that almost all the advocates of the blockade have admitted how repugnant, both to their feelings and principles, the measure was, but defended it on the ground of an absolute necessity arising from the obligations of treaty. Now, if we have shown that these obligations exist not, we have done away the only defence of the war ; and meet its supporters on the very ground of strict construction chosen by themselves. We must now turn, however, to the more extensive views of the question. It involves the most important considerations, above all others important at the present moment, when the world is waiting in anxious suspense for the final results of the late changes, and justly expects to see the reign of pillage and revolution succeeded by a period of quiet, in which regard will be paid to right rather than power,—and the restorers of order will at any rate not imitate the worst parts of the system they have overthrown.

By the constitution of this country, the power of making wars and treaties is vested absolutely in the executive branch of the government.



It is obvious that if this arrangement secures a greater degree of promptitude and decision in the management of foreign affairs, it also exposes the state to hazards of the most serious nature. If the Crown plunges into a war manifestly against the interests of the nation, hostilities must be persevered in, even although the parliament should seize the earliest opportunity to disapprove of the war; because the power of making peace may depend on the enemy as much as on ourselves. But it is still more probable that the parliament, however ruinous the war may be, and how certainly soever they would have refused to sanction it by a previous vote, will, after it has been entered into, support the Crown in carrying it on, at least for a certain time. The argument, never to be resisted in such a case is, we have got into a scrape, no matter how, and we must do the best we can. In like manner, if a treaty has been made hurtful to the interests, and injurious to the honour, of the state, the very same men who would have refused their previous concurrence, will be disposed to support the convention when it is once entered into. If to these considerations we add the unquestionable truth, that, by our popular form of government, and the publicity which it necessarily gives to all the negotiations of the state, we are, at all events, not extremely well adapted to the skilful conduct of foreign affairs; it may, perhaps, be thought that the unrestrained power of peace and war in the executive is somewhat anomalous, as well as costly; that it entails serious evils upon the country, while its only beneficial tendency is to create a degree of vigour which other parts of our constitution necessarily confine within very narrow limits. But, without entering further into this question, one thing is abundantly evident; those who have, in the exercise of the prerogative, made a pernicious treaty, or, in the application of the superintending power, sanctioned it, come before the public with a very bad grace, to defend a base or impolitic line of conduct, if all they can urge is an appeal to the obligations voluntarily contracted or approved by themselves, which bind them to such conduct. What is the sum of the defence offered by the authors of the blockade? That they had a year before made an agreement with Sweden and Russia to starve the Norwegians into a surrender of their independence. They have no other pretext for the measure than this; they admit, nay contend, that they voluntarily bound the country to use its naval resources in the forcible partition of the Danish dominions; not only in compelling Denmark to cede Norway, but in reducing the Norwegians, by the extremities of famine, to accept a foreign yoke; and that they did so engage, for the purpose of restoring the ancient and legitimate order of things in Europe. This they *must* maintain; for, if they flinch from it but an inch, if they pretend to assert that the blockade was not in contemplation at the conclusion of the treaty, there is an end of their case; the blockade is undefended.

It is, therefore, a matter of great indifference, whether the treaty of 1813 obliges us to hold this line of conduct or not, as far as the case of the government is concerned: the decision of the question either way, only removes the period of blame from one year to the other. The government was either guilty of binding itself in 1813 to the most profligate policy, by a solemn and deliberate act; or it is guilty of pursuing that policy voluntarily in 1814. We apprehend the latter is the case, for the reasons already assigned — but the difference is immaterial to our present purpose. It is more important to consider the features of the policy itself.

The act which we have sanctioned, and are now diligently engaged in

furthering, is the transference, without their own consent — against their declared wishes — of nearly a million of people inhabiting an extensive and independent country, — attached to that country and its independence for ages, — and abhorring all foreign yoke in a singular degree, but more especially the yoke of the nation to whom we are subjecting them. It may here be proper shortly to state the relations between Denmark and Norway, for the purpose of showing that the latter is as completely an independent realm as Denmark or Sweden itself, and can in no respect be considered as a province of the Danish crown.

Like all the other northern countries, Norway was originally divided into a great number of petty kingdoms or principalities; and these were first united by conquest, under one monarch, Harold Harfager\*, about half a century after a similar union had taken place, in England under Egbert, in Scotland under Kenneth II., and in the West under Charlemagne. Harold's numerous family, legitimate and bastard, disturbed the peace and union which he had cemented; and, about a century and a half† afterwards, Norway was united to Denmark by Canute the Great, whose success was prepared by the persecutions of Olaus, or Olaaf the Martyr, and the consequent rebellion of his subjects. But the possessions of sovereigns in those troublous times were as variable as their rights were obscure and uncertain. The period from which we can clearly date the union with Denmark is the year 1380, when Hagen, King of Norway, married the Princess Margaret of Denmark; and since that time the two crowns have continued united. But it is worthy of notice, that the same great queen, whose talents and conquests have procured her the title of the Semiramis of the North, a few years afterwards, by the union of Calmar, extended her dominion over Sweden also; and that this country remained under the same dynasty with the rest of Scandinavia, until its liberation was effected by Gustavus Vasa, in the early part of the sixteenth century. It might, then, with equal, some may even think with greater, propriety be contended, that Denmark was subjected to Norway, as that Norway was subjected to Denmark. The two kingdoms continued, in every respect whatever, separate and independent of each other, although governed by the same sovereign. They had distinct constitutions, though formed on the same model. And when the oppressions of the nobility in 1660 made the crown and the people combine against them, and abolish the states in Denmark, a similar revolution was effected in like manner by the Norwegians, who since that period have, like the Danes, been governed by an unlimited monarchy. But their ancient laws remained; and, as often as any new edict was issued in Denmark, which was meant to be extended over Norway, its publication as a Norwegian law was requisite, exactly in the same form as if the realms had been under separate monarchs. The two countries have, therefore, distinct constitutions, though both under the same absolute sovereign.

In point of population, Norway is nearly equal to all the rest of the Danish dominions — its extent is far greater: and if the courage, hardiness, and virtues of people be taken into the account, and the natural strength of the country be also considered, it is beyond all comparison the most important member of the state. Easily defensible on almost its whole extent of frontier, it has great facilities for attacking Sweden, the

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\* A. D. 875. Busching, i. 181.

† An. Dom. 1028.

second city of which country lies wholly exposed to an inroad, as was seen in 1788, when the interference of the English minister alone, and a threat of bombarding Copenhagen, prevented Gottenburgh from being destroyed by a Norwegian force. The hatred of the Swedes is deeply rooted in the minds of the people; and, as generally happens, this feeling is mutual between the two nations. The triumphs, however, of which they can boast over each other are very unequally divided. The Swedish arms have never attacked Norway but to be foiled. Gustavus Adolphus marched an army into it, with the co-operation of Flemish and Scotch auxiliaries from the coast; but not a man of this force escaped. Charles X. attacked it three several times, in 1658, 1659, and 1660, with large bodies of troops, and his best generals:—and he was signally defeated in each attempt. Charles XII. invaded Norway in 1716, and again in 1718, when he lost his life in the expedition, at the head of above 40,000 men. The attempt completely failed; and, of an army of 10,000 men which he had marched against Drontheim, all but 500 perished in the retreat, from the severity of the climate. Such annals as these, we may well believe, form at this moment the favourite and familiar recollections of the brave people, whom an execrable repetition of the Polish partition is tormenting with the fruitless attempt to deliver them over to foreign bondage. We assert, that no power exists upon earth to transfer a people in possession, like cattle; that every treaty, to effect such a transference, is a nullity; and that every attempt at executing any bargain of this sort is a public crime of the deepest die. We are willing to put this matter upon any ground that the defenders of the Blockade may point out; and though authority and precedent can no more justify the measure than they could the African Slave Trade, or the Partition of Poland, yet we are ready to try the question even by an appeal to the authorities most usually cited in questions touching the Law of Nations.

The authority of Grotius has been much relied upon by the advocates of the Blockade; and, undoubtedly, whatever comes under the sanction of that venerable name is deserving of the greatest attention. But we must premise, that, upon this particular question, the oldest authorities are far from being the most weighty: for it is intimately connected with, and indeed flows from, those principles of liberty and of popular right which were but feebly asserted, and obscurely defined, and most reluctantly admitted before the latter part of the seventeenth century; nay, we might say, which never reached their perfect form, nor were fully recognised, till the period of the American war. However, the opinion of Grotius has been exceedingly misrepresented; and, when rightly understood, it seems substantially to contain a remarkable confirmation of the doctrine for which we are contending, although one or two remarks may appear to have a different tendency. In the chapter where he discusses the lawful grounds of resistance to the sovereign, he enumerates, among others, the *alienation of the kingdom* by the prince, or the rendering it dependent on another. (Lib. I. cap. iv. § 10. *De Jur. Bel. et Pac.*) This proposition, he seems to think, is too “positively laid down by some;” for he adds, “when the right to a kingdom is acquired, either by election or legal succession, such an act of alienation is in itself void;” and he therefore doubts if a mere nullity can give a right to exist, or convey any right at all: “yet,” continues he, “if a king should endeavour actually to deliver up his kingdom, or subject it to another, I doubt not but, in such case, he may be resisted;” for sovereignty is one thing, and the manner of holding it another. The people may hinder any change in the latter; the power of

making such a change not being comprehended in the right of sovereignty." And he adds, after his manner, an application of a maxim of Seneca, importing, that "though our father is to be obeyed in all things, yet not in those whereby he ceases to be our father." \* In another part of the treatise, we find the doctrine still more broadly asserted. He contends, that sovereignty may be alienated by the parties having a just title to it; and he states these to be, the sovereign in *patrimonial* crowns; the sovereign and people together, in crowns *not patrimonial*. It is justly observed by Barbeyrac, that this distinction is untenable; because, when you ask what a patrimonial crown is, the doctors answer, one that is alienable; and when you ask what crowns are alienable, the answer is, those which are patrimonial. However, passing over this objection for the present, we shall only remark, that from the facts already stated, it is plain, that if there be such a thing as a crown not patrimonial, Norway affords the instance; and, therefore, the doctrine laid down respecting such crowns applies strictly to the present question. It is as follows:— After maintaining that a free people, or a king, with the concurrence of his people, may alienate the sovereignty, he adds, "But if indeed any part of the people be transferred, as they have a right to assent, so have they likewise a right to oppose such alienation." And again he says, that if it be denied "that the people themselves can alienate the sovereignty over a part of themselves, much less can this be done by the king, who, though he be invested with the full sovereignty, yet does not possess it with the full rights of property."—Lib. II. cap. vi. § 9. †

The only exception, then, to these principles which Grotius allows is the case of *patrimonial* dominions.\* This distinction is laid down not very consistently, nor very clearly, by him; but his commentators and successors have refused to admit it. Barbeyrac, as we have already seen, denies it; and, after urging other reasons beside the one above cited, he adds, that whatever becomes of the question, one principle is plain, that wherever any doubt arises to which class a kingdom belongs, it ought to be reckoned non-patrimonial. These just and rational principles are to be found in his French notes; but the Latin commentary likewise states the same doctrine. "Re verâ," says he, "nullum omnino regnum est in patrimonio, nisi ex consensû, expresso vel tacito, Populi. (Lib. I. cap. iii. § 11. not. *n. n.*) Gronovius, in a short note to the passage where Grotius is mentioning the position, "Quædam imperia esse in pleno jure proprietatis, id est, in patrimonio imperantis," very flatly denies it in these concise terms, "Ne hoc quidem admiserim." (*Ibid.* § 12. not. 40.) Perhaps it may appear the less extraordinary, that the commentator

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\* "Si tamen rex reipsâ etiam tradere regnum, aut subicere moliatur, quin ei resisti in hoc possit, non dubito. Aliud est enim ut diximus imperium; aliud habendi modus, qui ne mutetur obstare potest populus; id enim sub imperio comprehensum non est." (Lib. I. cap. viii. § 10.) It is to be observed that several sections of this chapter are devoted to the defence of sufficiently high doctrines of prerogative: indeed, almost all the learning upon the subject of non-resistance, and the quotations and anecdotes respecting it, whether in the sacred or profane writings, are to be found assembled here: not that Grotius overlooks the exceptions to his rule: one of these we have now noticed; another, is the gross misrule and hostile conduct of the prince—as large a loophole as any Whig could wish.

† "At imperium in populi partem si alienare populo non licet, multo minus regi, imperium etsi plenum habenti, attamen non plenè, ut supra distinximus;"—referring to the passage cited from Lib. I. c. viii. in our last note.

should so peremptorily contradict his author, when we find the grounds upon which the latter rests his notion of patrimonial kingdoms being transferable. They resolve themselves into a futile distinction taken by Grotius, between alienating men, and alienating the dominion over them. (*Ibid.* § 12. div. 3.) Puffendorff passes over the distinction very lightly in discussing the power of alienation; he merely says, that he is not going to enquire how far that power extends over a kingdom “*quod in patrimonio regis est:*” and if we are to look for the definition of this sovereignty in a former section, where he treats of the rights of princes over the property of their subjects, we find that he intends, by it, the sovereignty vested in a prince who is absolute master of his subjects, and proprietor of their persons and effects;—a limitation which excludes all question as to right of alienating the kingdom. On the other hand, this great lawyer strenuously denies the right of alienation in the general case. The following passages are so remarkable, one of them apparently meant for the present case, that we shall give the original words:—“*Nihil agere regem, qui regnum in alium propriâ auctoritate transferre aggreditur, nec subditos isto actû regis teneri; verum hic, non minus populi quam regis consensum requiri. Nam uti merito regi regnum non recte eripitur, ita nec invito populo alius rex potest obtrudi.*” \* The strong assertion of a high monarchy doctrine in this passage, that kings have rights different from those of trustees, renders the sounder doctrine which follows in favour of the people the more weighty. Few persons, we hope, will be found disposed to follow the author in denying that kings may be resisted and deposed for misgovernment; but it is remarkable, that even he who holds this courtly faith, admits that kings cannot transfer their subjects. In the sequel, he puts the case of Norway as precisely as possible. “*Quod si autem rex, necessitate adactus cum hoste validiâre pacem, hac lege fecerit, ut ipsi certam regionem concedat, quæ tamen isti cessiononi contradixit; arbitramur debere quidem ipsum ex eâdem sua præsidia deducere, et non impedire quominus victor ejus possessionem adprehendat. Haudquicquam tamen eandem cogere poterit, ut omnino sese in alterius ditionem tradat. Neque illa regio ulla obligatione videtur impediri, quominus si viribus suis confidat, se occupare volenti resistat, aut peculiarem deinceps civitatem constituat.*”—*De Jur. Nat. et Gent. Lib. VIII. cap. v. § 9. See also § 1. †*

Vattel lays down the most sound and liberal principles upon this subject. After denying that there can be such a thing as property, strictly so called, in a people or empire, and treating with still more marked reprobation the slavish notion, that men ever part with their natural rights, so far as to retain no voice in the question most interesting to them, who shall rule

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\* “The sovereign who attempts to transfer his kingdom to another, by his sole authority, does an act in itself null and void, and not binding upon his subjects. To make such a conveyance valid, the consent of the people is required, as well as of the prince. For as a king cannot have his dominions taken from him against his will, so neither can another sovereign be imposed upon the people against their will.”

† “But should a king be compelled, by superior force, to make peace, on condition of giving up a particular province, which resists the transference, then, I am of opinion, that he ought to withdraw his troops from it, and not obstruct the conqueror in taking possession. But he can by no manner of means compel it to surrender itself to a foreign yoke. Nor does there exist any obligation to restrain its inhabitants from relying upon their own resources, resisting the power that desires to reduce them, and forming a new and separate state.”

them; and rejecting, with indignation, the idea of treating human beings “like flocks of sheep, who must await in silence the decision that sends them to the butcher, or restores them to the shepherd,” this author comes to the point of patrimonial kingdoms; and, consistently with the foregoing principles, he rejects the expression as inapplicable. He maintains, that the consent of the people, tacit or expressed, their will declared or delegated, must be interposed to make any alienation of the sovereignty over them valid. “There can be no alienation, strictly speaking, of sovereign power,” he says;—“all real sovereignty is in its nature inalienable.” (*Droits des Gens*, Liv. I. ch. v.) He then alludes to the instances of such alienation, given by Grotius; and observes, first, that these are for the most part abuses of power, and not exercises of right; and next, that the people themselves have consented to them willingly, or by having been compelled from without. To prove the right of alienation, he says, an example must be found of a people resisting the transference attempted to be made by its rulers, and universally condemned as rebellious for this opposition.

Such were the sound and enlightened views of national independence and popular rights entertained by the great jurists of former times, though subjects of arbitrary monarchies. They could find no instance of a people stigmatised as rebels for disobeying the Government which sought to barter them away like cattle to foreign masters. Has it been reserved for the nineteenth century to furnish such a specimen of perverted judgment,—and must England lead the way in pronouncing the unjust decree?

Having appealed at once to the fountain-head of all authority upon such questions, the doctrines laid down by the greatest jurisconsults, by the men whose names, at least, are always in the mouths of practical statesmen, whose *dicta* are freely resorted to as often as they conceive them suited to their purposes, we may be excused from the less grateful labour of citing far inferior authorities, the often repeated arguments of those politicians themselves whose conduct we are examining. The ground now occupied by us, is precisely that on which they have so often taken their stand against France and her Allies. It is the substance of all their invectives against the new, or revolutionary, order of things; and when they poured out those invectives, we believe, they always addressed, as far as opinions of the enemy’s conduct went, a nation nearly unanimous. Any doubt of the injustice of French aggression, any hesitation or coolness in desiring to see it checked, was never shown, even in the most factious times, by a single person of consequence in this country. Upon the probability of succeeding against the enemy, and still more, upon the wisdom of the means taken with that view, there might be a difference of opinion. That the Cintra convention, the advance to Talavera, the scanty supply of troops, the march into the heart of the country, followed by the disastrous retreat to Corunna, were the best means of assisting the Spaniards, might well be questioned. Some doubted the policy, to say nothing of the honesty, of bombarding Copenhagen, and quarrelling with Russia. Others ventured to dispute the propriety of going to war with America when all the rest of the world was leagued against our commerce. And persons there were of a sceptical turn of mind, and prone to nice refinements of reasoning, who hesitated about the blessings of our memorable campaigns against the yellow fever in the West Indies, or the ague in Walcheren. But not even one of those visionary speculators ever denied, that the liberation of Spain and Holland, or the repression of French injustice, was our duty as well as our interest; no one ever doubted that all

the condemnation bestowed upon the enemy's proceedings was merited, and that his preponderance was wholly incompatible with the independence of other states. Certainly, the most pointed reprobation of the treaty respecting Norway and the blockade, is to be sought for in the state papers and harangues so often put forth by the authors of those measures; and it is not a little surprising to find them choosing, for their conversion to the very worst principles of France, the moment when these French principles have been arrested by events in which the politicians alluded to have had as great a share as in the abundance of last harvest, — unless indeed we look to the effects produced by their former patronage of those purer doctrines they seem now to have abandoned.

To adduce examples of this marvellous inconsistency would be a work tedious in proportion to its facility and the copiousness of the materials for performing it. We shall only select two instances; the one, being the solitary case of approbation bestowed by the present government upon the policy of their adversaries when in office; the other, being their own language respecting, what they termed, “the universal Spanish nation.”

The rapid succession of changes in events abroad, and in parties at home, may have effaced from the reader's memory the extraordinary degree of applause which the conduct of ministers towards Prussia in April 1806, and, still more, their manner of treating the question both in Parliament and in their manifestoes, called forth from their antagonists, the authors of the forcible transference of Norway. This, it was said, is really dignified and spirited conduct. Who now fears that Mr. Fox will hold too moderate a tone in his department? Such was the chorus raised on that occasion; and many who joined in it took the opportunity, as happens in such matters, of remembering themselves; they avowed their entire conversion to the new ministry, and joined them heart and hand with all their forces, — not at all because they were aware that it was a good concern, and that opposition was hopeless, — but singly because the conduct of government in this instance won them over. We shall look, however, only to the master artist. A more lavish panegyric than Lord Castlereagh pronounced upon the ministers, in the debate of April 23d, cannot be found in the history of party civility. He gave the address moved by Mr. Fox his “entire and unqualified concurrence;” “and expressed” his cordial approbation “of the sentiments with which it was introduced.” He spoke of “the manly conduct of the government,” which made it “impossible for any candid man to refuse them his praise.” He dwelt on “their firmness, judicially\* tempered with conciliation;” their “maintaining the dignity and resolution which became them” — or, as he phrased it, “pressingly became them;” — with other elaborate praise of the same quality: and he said that Mr. Fox “had put the argument upon such broad grounds, and supported his measure by reasoning so irresistible,” that he could add nothing to it. Now let us see what called forth all this eulogium. Truly a most admirable speech, and one well worthy of the illustrious man who made it, — among the last which he delivered, — but a speech stating, in the most unqualified form, the doctrines we are now maintaining. The following are the passages which were the most loudly applauded by the

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\* Not probably with any allusion to the great judicial talents which in that cabinet must be supposed to have concurred in the measure, from the double portion of judges infused in it, but merely by a mistake for *judiciously*.”

present Ministers and their adherents in the country. "Instead of lessening the ignominy of the cession, it was a great increase of dishonour to sell a brave and loyal people for what was call an equivalent ; it was an union of every thing that was contemptible in servility, with every thing that was odious in rapacity." Again, as the climax of reasons in defence of the war with Prussia, he says, — "Above all, we shall avoid giving our sanction to that principle which has been lately adopted, of transferring the subjects of one prince to another, in the way of equivalents, and under the pretext of convenience and mutual accommodation. The wildest schemes that ever were before broached, would not go so far to shake the foundations of all established government as this new practice. If we are to make exchanges, let us exchange those things which are the proper objects of exchange ; let us give a field for a field, — or let us exchange its stock, its oxen and its sheep, — but let us not consider the people of a country, or the subjects of a state, as matter for exchange or barter. There must be in every nation a certain attachment of the people to its form of government, without which no nation can subsist. This principle, then, of transferring the subjects of one prince to another, strikes at the foundation of every government, and the existence of every nation." We are delighted in being able to cite these words, for their intrinsic value, and the high authority belonging to them, as well as for the more immediate purpose of the present argument, — the ample approbation of them bestowed by the authors of the lamentable measure now under consideration. In the House of Lords, a similar concurrence was avowed in the sentiments of Lord Grenville, by his adversaries, one of whom praised the proceedings of government as "becoming a great and *just* nation." Lord Grenville expressed then the same high sentiments which he has, with his accustomed firmness and consistency, declared upon the Norwegian question. He spoke of the cession "as monstrous, unjust, contrary to the law of nations ;" and he said, that in the retaliatory measures proposed, he wished, "above all things, to mark our abhorrence of the abominable principle, that a power may indemnify itself at the expense of its weaker neighbour." \*

It is difficult to find a single speech or state paper touching upon the conduct of France towards Spain, in which the same principles are not clearly recognised. We shall only refer to the Declaration of 1809, upon the rupture of the negotiation that had been commenced under the mediation of Austria. The following passage must for ever shut the mouths of its authors upon the late glorious conduct of the Norwegians ; but their silence will afford them no refuge from the charge of gross inconsistency which it brings against them, acting, as they are now, the selfsame part, so loudly reprobated in the French government : — "The reply returned by France to the proposition of his Majesty casts off at once the thin disguise which had been assumed for a momentary purpose ; and displays, with less than ordinary reserve, the arrogance and injustice of that government. The universal Spanish Nation is degraded by the appellation of the *Spanish Insurgents* ; and the demand for the admission of the government of Spain as a party to any negotiation, is rejected as inadmissible and insulting. With astonishment, as well as with grief, his Majesty has received from the Emperor of Russia a reply similar in effect, though less indecorous in tone and manner. The Emperor of Russia also stigmatises as *Insurrection* the glorious efforts of the Spanish

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\* See Parliamentary Debates, vol. vi. p. 883. 887.



people in behalf of their legitimate Sovereign, and in defence of the independence of their country; thus giving the countenance of his Imperial Majesty's authority to an usurpation which has no parallel in the history of the world."—And these are the men—the authors of this Declaration, who now affect to think a treaty dictated to the King of Denmark by force, is binding upon the whole people of Norway, according to the duty of their allegiance; that a treaty made between Sweden and Russia, can legalise the cession of Norway by the Danish Court, without consulting a single Norwegian; and that England, having acceded to, or sanctioned, such a bargain, is bound *in honour* (this is the happy phrase)—*in honour*—to starve the brave inhabitants of the country into a calamitous surrender of their existence as a nation!

In the midst of the irresistible reasons which surround us on every side against the fatal measures under discussion, we are naturally anxious to find out by what arguments or pretexts they are defended. For these, however, we seem to search in vain. We can get no further than an appeal to the supposed faith of a treaty: and when we shape the question so as to exclude any such consideration, by asking for the justification of the treaty, made as it was by those whose conduct is the subject of dispute, their defence appears to be at an end. In this extremity, they have recourse to a most perilous, we may say a desperate argument. They maintain that the incorporation with Sweden is advantageous to Norway; they have the unparalleled effrontery to speak of liberty, and assert that the Norwegians will become partakers of a free constitution. It is even reported, but we presume most incorrectly, that certain learned persons did not scruple in parliament to compare the union of the two countries to the happy arrangement which consolidated the strength and liberties of this island. There is some difficulty in treating such vile sophisms (if indeed they do proceed from delusion, and not from a wish to deceive) with the gravity which a subject like this ought to impose. The whole statement, however, is unfounded in fact; and if it were as true as it is false, the conclusion sought to be drawn from it would still be ridiculously unfair.

As may easily be supposed, this hypocritical pretence is loudly proclaimed by the Swedish government. His Swedish Majesty (that is to say, the Crown Prince, who owes his own *metamorphosis* from one of Bonaparte's generals, into a *legitimate Sovereign*, solely to the free choice of the Swedish people,) declares, that he has reserved to the Norwegians "all those essential rights which constitute public liberty;"—and particularly, he promises them a constitution "analogous to the wants of the country, and founded on representation and taxation." This constitution they are to form entirely themselves; he will "in no way interfere with it directly;" all he intends is, to have a *veto* upon what they shall adopt, and merely "to trace the first lines of its foundation, leaving the superstructure to them." Perhaps this exquisite morsel of diplomacy might be sufficient with most persons, and spare the necessity of further reasoning upon the matter. But, we may add, that this offer of a constitution from the Swedes to the Norwegians, is a bait precisely of the same kind that a similar offer would be from France to England, coupled with a condition of absolute submission in the first instance. The hatred of the two nations is mutual and strong; a Swede and an enemy are synonymous expressions among the mountains of old Norway;—with this only difference, that enmity, in common cases, may cease, and peace succeed to it; but the hatred of the Norwegians to the Swedes is almost as ancient

as the defiles which forbid their approach. When England shall forget Agincourt and Cressy, and wish that the Channel were filled up which doubles the defences of her independence — then may the men of Norway cease to exult over the disasters of Charles X., and to point with proud delight to Fredericksald, as the altar where his rash descendant was sacrificed to the liberties of their country. A thousand facts prove, that any attempt at giving happiness to a people who detest you, by taking them under your protection whether they will or no, can have no other effect but to crush their spirit, while it extinguishes the very possibility of improvement. This must infallibly be the fate of such a scheme, even where it is conceived in perfect good faith; but, on the part of Sweden, in the present instance, it is the vainest and most insulting of all pretences. The Norwegians feel no grievances under their present government. It is not a free one; — but it is, whether from policy or indolence, or necessity, an inactive and mild administration. Its existence is, in scarcely any shape whatever, felt by the people. — The Danes are not much loved; — they are not strong; — they are distant, — and they let the Norwegians alone. — No oppressive taxes, — no feudal privileges; — no conscription, except to serve in their national militia; — no standing army which can endanger their repose. All they want is, that which Sweden has in reality not much more of than Denmark, — formal securities and checks to the Royal prerogatives. They may obtain these for themselves from their hereditary Danish rulers: — from their Swedish conquerors they never can expect it.

And who is it that says to them, “Let me reduce you to subjection, in order to make you the more free?” General Bernadotte, now heir-apparent to the Swedish crown, undoubtedly; — but a soldier trained in the most arbitrary and most military school of modern times. It is very true, that the personal qualities of a ruler form no solid ground of refusal to treat with him as a foreign prince; and that if a nation chooses to live under the yoke of the worst of men or of governments, no foreign state has a right to object. But, when a personage comes forward with his offers to take us into his keeping for our own good, — we are called upon to examine a little closely his claims to confidence and credit. It is in this point of view that we are disposed to admit into the argument that portion of Sir Philip Francis’s pamphlet which treats of the Crown Prince, — although we are far from agreeing with him in the use which he makes of it, to prove that the Prince Regent should refrain from the usual courtesies towards his royal brother: — for it would be a most dangerous and difficult task to examine the relative claims of royal personages in this light. The qualities of the Crown Prince are, however, most material to the Norwegians, in estimating the value of his professions in their favour; and therefore they will naturally enough examine what is said, chiefly on the authority of officers high in our service, respecting his supposed deficiency in “personal resolution;” and also touching the contents of his Royal Highness’s trunks, when accidentally searched in the Polish campaign. It would be improper to detail particulars, in the present state of our relations with Sweden; but the facts are fully stated in Sir Robert Wilson’s “*Sketch*,” p. 85.; and p. 18. *et seq.* of Sir P. Francis’s tract.

In truth, it signifies very little whether the offers in question are sincere or not; very little whether Sweden can bestow advantages or not upon Norway; very little whether the union is capable or not of *bettering the condition* of the Norwegians in the ordinary sense of the

phrase. That union is compulsory; and therefore it is a subjugation. This is enough. It answers every thing that the wit of man can devise in favour of the Swedish proposition, and our armed support of it. Happiness itself, forced upon a rational being against his will, is a contradiction in terms. But the argument we are now dealing with is not new; and when we find that it has been regularly brought forward to varnish over the worst pages in the annals of public injustice, we may well be excused for turning suddenly away from it, and rather marvelling at the boldness which can once more advance it with any gravity of countenance.

It was under such pretences as these that the most detestable of crimes ever perpetrated by a government, the partition of Poland, was begun and concluded. "The happiness of the Poles" was perpetually in the mouths of the actors during the whole course of that dreadful tragedy; and the public order issued the day after the inhuman massacre of Warsaw, describing the Empress Catherine as "a tender mother, only solicitous for the happiness of her children," directed "the Poles to give thanks to God in all their churches for the blessings conferred upon them."—*See No. XLIV. p. 316.*

When France purchased from Genoa the island of Corsica, in 1768, and sent an army thither to compel the brave inhabitants to submit, the same language was used, and the same hypocritical pretexts held forth to the derision of mankind. The royal declaration of Compeigne sets out with the statement, that the king takes possession of the island "merely for the good of the people." It promises them "all the advantages they can desire, if they submit to our sovereign rights." It does not fail, exactly in the spirit of the manifestoes against Poland and Norway, to point out the "disturbances by which they had been distressed for so many years past." It then proceeds with full and regal solemnity. "We will watch over the prosperity, *the glory*, and happiness of our dear people of Corsica in general, and of every individual in particular, with the sentiments of a paternal heart. We will maintain, upon our royal word, the conditions we have promised in regard to the form of government, to the nation, and to those who shall show themselves most zealous and most ready to submit to our obedience; and we hope that nation, enjoying this advantage and our protection by such precious ties, will not put us upon treating them as rebels, and perpetuate, in the island of Corsica, disturbances which cannot but prove destructive to a people whom we have adopted with complacency among the number of our subjects." Is not this the very language of the present day, except perhaps that less is said about a free government and representation than would doubtless have been inserted, had the proclamation been issued after the French and American revolutions? Yet, next to the partition of Poland, the invasion of Corsica is perhaps the act most generally and loudly reprobated in modern times, previous to the late convulsions; insomuch that a court-poet has lately ventured to assert, with perhaps some exaggeration, "that the foulest murderer who ever perished by the hands of the executioner has infinitely less guilt upon his soul than the statesman who concluded this treaty, and the monarch who sanctioned and confirmed it." \*

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\* *Southey's Life of Lord Nelson*, vol. i. p. 103.—As extravagance is not very favourable to consistency, we should not greatly wonder at the next birth-day ode commemorating Norway and blockade. It will require some ingenuity indeed; for in the same passage we find great indignation expressed at the notion of "any

To take only one other example, the line of argument now under consideration furnished a favourite topic to the slave-traders, for many a long year of successful sophistry and misrepresentation. The negroes were so miserable in their own barbarous country; so comfortable and happy in our polished dominions! — Nay, the slave-trader was held up as the African's friend; as the civiliser of his country. Surely some of the able advocates of the abolition in Parliament could scarcely have forgotten this circumstance, when they so lately gave their support to the blockade, upon the express ground, as it is said, of the union with Sweden being for the good of the Norwegians. But such is the inconsistency of men, in discussions where their zeal is cold, and their feelings thwarted by other views and habits. The eminent and worthy individuals to whom we allude seem to have two minds, each furnished with a complete and several assortment of recollections, reasonings, and feelings, but wholly unconnected with one another, and capable of being used separately, as occasion may require. They have an abolition mind, and an every-day mind. One day in seven, or thereabouts, they use the former; at all other times they wear the latter most ordinary instrument: and, were not the belief of their personal identity preserved by their outward appearance, it would be impossible for their hearers to recognise them. — How they themselves can go on without mistakes upon this cardinal point, and indeed serious differences with themselves, is not so easily understood; unless, indeed, that as there is no end of human delusions, so are there luckily no limits to the charity and forgiveness exercised by a man towards himself.

The evils which must result from the measure under discussion, are so obvious, that we have rather dwelt upon the parts of the question less exposed to the general view. Great and manifold as they are, however, the one which stands forward, and throws the rest into the shade, is the mischief of shaking to its very foundations the wholesome principle hitherto so happily inculcated by England, that she is the protector of national independence, and the enemy of unjust aggression all over the world. Our conduct in India may no doubt have created doubts upon this subject; and the affair of Copenhagen stands on record to confirm them. But no transaction, to which we were parties, ever set public principle so completely at defiance as the present; and we have chosen to stamp ourselves as accessories to a crime equal to any of the enemy's, at the moment when his profligacy had visibly worked his ruin. It is indeed a sad abatement of the general rejoicing, that when men had seen with delight the downfall of injustice, and were anxiously expecting, in the restoration of Europe to its lawful possessors, and in the recognition of ancient principles, the best reward for their past toils, the firmest security for future repose, — their eyes should be fated to behold such acts of apostasy from those principles, on the part of their warmest friends. The war is, generally speaking, at an end; Europe is once more independent: — but hostilities must yet be continued in one quarter for the purpose of showing that England, as well as France, can make war upon freedom; and that she does not hate tyranny, or love liberty, for their own sakes, but only in so far as the tyrant is French, and the freeman is her own ally. The indifference exhibited towards Poland is indeed another melancholy proof of similar inconsistency. But let us

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bargain and sale justifying one country in taking possession of another against the will of the inhabitants.”

hope that the voice of the country may yet be raised with effect on both these kindred subjects; and that the triumph of injustice, and of the real enemies of England, will be but short-lived.

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INVESTIGATION OF THE DISPUTES WHICH LED TO THE  
LAST WAR WITH AMERICA.\*

WE propose on this occasion to offer a few reflections to our readers upon the subject of the disputes with America.† With a view to assist the people in considering the questions relating to this last subject, we purpose at present to treat of them in a plain and intelligible shape. They are indeed such as any one may easily understand; and it would be hard to conceive a point more worthy of exercising the attention of the country, or a moment better calculated to rouse them to a view of their dearest interests. The universal prevalence of distress, and the general tendency towards discontent, are admitted. To a certain degree, says one class of reasoners, the policy of the enemy has succeeded; and the Continent is closed to our trade. The enemy's policy, say their opponents, seconded by our own, has effected what, alone, it never could have done; and, by the concurrence of the two systems, England is excluded from the continental market. Both agree in the fact; each party acknowledges that the result has been, to confine our trade, and reduce the demand for our wares. Then, the next measure of our rulers being an American war, it is for the country to reflect, how vast an addition this would make to its distresses. Or, if the interruption of intercourse with America has already been complete, and if to this cause is to be ascribed a part of the pressure, it is for the country to consider, how great, and how instantaneous a relief the renewal of that intercourse would bring. Why then should we go to war with America? And wherefore do we not suffer that intercourse to be restored? These are questions which every one must desire to see answered, who reflects that the United States buy yearly from Yorkshire and Lancashire, and the neighbouring counties, above twelve millions worth of their manufactures; and that if, to a final shutting up of this vast market, were added an open rupture with the Americans, they have above fifteen thousand sail of vessels ready to become privateers, and to prey on whatever commerce might remain to us—sheltered by almost all the ports in Europe, and by those which stud a coast of 1500 miles in length on the other side of the Atlantic, in the midst of all our colonies. We urge not these matters as reasons for taking fright, and being driven by America into any concessions derogatory to our honour, or inconsistent with our interests: but we mention them as very good reasons for pausing before we determine, that the points demanded are such as we cannot, either in honour, or for our interest, yield; and we think they render it incumbent on those who would hold out at such a price, to satisfy themselves beyond all doubt that the right side of the argument is theirs.

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\* The Crisis of the Dispute with America. By a Merchant of the Old School. Vol. xix. p. 290. February, 1811.

† The introductory remarks on the pamphlet which occasioned this essay to be written, and on the conduct of his late Majesty, when Prince of Wales, relative to the Catholic question, are omitted.

The Americans are, in every respect, the most important, and, in some sort, the only nation which has kept clear of all actual share in the wide-spreading hostilities that have swept over the face of the world during the last twenty years. To maintain this neutrality has, no doubt, been the leading object of many states; but, except America, no one has been able to succeed; and she unquestionably owes her success to the distance of her situation from the scene of hostilities. In every war, neutrals are liable to be viewed with distrust and dislike by the contending parties, whose passions being roused, cannot easily excuse the calm unconcern of such as choose to remain bystanders; and whose losses and privations, the result of the war, fill them with envy towards those who not only escape unhurt by it, but gain a great portion of what the belligerents lose. Thus it always happens, that neutrality becomes odious to the combatants, instead of appearing, as it really is, an alleviation of the evils which their own passions are inflicting on the world, and on each other.

First, it is found out that "*this war*" is unlike all former wars;—that it is a war for national existence;—and that to take no part, which in other cases might be allowable and even laudable, in *this* grand contest, is highly criminal. Nor can any war be found, to which the same description and the same remarks have not been applied;—from contentions about a few acres of snow,—or a fishing or a fur station,—to the Polish partition, and the French and Spanish revolutions. This feeling being at the bottom of the sentiments entertained towards neutrals, an opportunity is speedily found or made, for giving vent to it in a regular and formal manner. The neutral is accused by one belligerent of assisting the other; and this branches into an infinite variety of charges. Sometimes this aid is given by employing the neutral vessel to cover the enemy's property. The belligerents take different views of the point; and the one which is most powerful at sea looks to the real ownerships of the cargo, while the other maintains, that the character of the vessel should be the only criterion whereby to judge of the character of the lading. Hence the question, whether free ships make free goods or not? A question which, in our humble apprehension, in point of right, is clearly with England—however remote her interest may be in asserting it, considering the vast interest she has in the extension of commercial dealings beyond that of any other country.

Then it is found that neutrals trade in articles immediately subservient to the military operations of one of the parties. The neutrals cannot deny that such conduct would be an infraction of neutrality; but they deny the fact, and refuse to be searched on their voyages—the only means whereby the belligerent can ascertain whether the charge be well founded or no. Thus arises the question of right of search, mixed up with some lesser discussions as to what shall be deemed contraband of war. This right of search has been extended to a case of a more delicate nature,—for the reclaiming of deserters from the navy of a belligerent, sheltering themselves on board of neutral vessels,—a right rendered still more delicate in the case of the British navy, where the men are not voluntarily enlisted, but forced into the service. When such deserters have taken refuge in neutral merchantmen, it seems as if it were no very violent extension of the right of search to allow recovery of those men. But an attempt has been made to carry the claim a step farther, and search the vessels of the state:—an attempt so inconsistent with all sound principle, and so utterly repugnant to the law of nations, that it was

abandoned, almost as soon as it was challenged; and forms the solitary instance, we believe, of a dereliction of any maritime pretension on the part of this country during the late, or the present war.

Again, the neutral engages, during war, in trades from which he was excluded during peace; and each belligerent uniformly encourages this interposition of the neutral flag. Thus France opens her colonial trade to the neutral on the commencement of hostilities; and England, as regularly as she passes the Prize act, begins each war with a suspension of the branch of the Navigation act, which excludes foreigners from the carrying trade. But although each belligerent approves this in his own case, he wishes to prevent the other from benefiting by it; and as the party which is weak at sea benefits the most, the party preponderating in this respect most zealously attempts to check it; and hence the principle contended for by England chiefly in the war 1756, and which has from that date received its name. But the most fruitful source of discord arises from the right of blockade; and as no assumed privilege of war more largely affects the neutral, or gives rise to more plausible complaints on his part, so it seems to merit somewhat of a nearer examination. It involves the whole question of Orders in Council, and the present disputes with America.

The right to blockade a strong place, as a fortress, or a city, of the enemy, that is to say, of cutting off all communication with it, for the purpose of compelling it to surrender, is as ancient and undoubted as the right of making war. This interruption of communication may, and in most cases probably will, affect peaceable subjects as well as persons bearing arms; and it may frequently affect the interests of third parties, or neutrals, by depriving them of a beneficial intercourse with the blockaded place. But the right to injure neutrals in this manner has never been denied; because the course of hostile operations absolutely required it, and the exercise of it had a tendency, by severely distressing the enemy, and producing a great change in the relative strength of the belligerents, to shorten the period of hostilities, and attain the great end of all war—the end to which every principle should bear a reference—the restoration of peace. From this clear and admitted right of blockade, it is perhaps a slight, but unquestionably a certain deviation, to allow the blockade of a place, not in its nature and position military—as a large and wealthy manufacturing town, or a convenient place of maritime trade. Here the sufferers are, in the first instance, peaceable citizens—who furnish indeed, by their wealth and their industry, the resources of war, but the protection of whom ought in general to be an object of public law. Yet the impossibility of drawing a line between those cases in which the distress of an enemy's financial resources may contribute to shorten the conflict, and *on the whole* to lessen the evils of war, and those where it can only make the contest more miserable, without abridging its duration,—renders it quite necessary to allow of this extension of the right of blockade; and, accordingly, no one can deny the title of a belligerent to blockade any harbour, or any city, or any moderately large district, without regard to its military character, unless he is also prepared to dispute the right of privateering by sea, and of levying contributions, and quartering troops; and, in a word, marching troops through a territory on shore. War between governments, and peace between nations, is indeed a notion beautiful to contemplate; but it was not made for human affairs; and when pursued ever so short a way, will be found wholly inconsistent with the nature of hostilities. At any rate, it never

was recognised, either by the practice of nations, or by any authority whatever, on matters of public law. It can form no part then of our present consideration.

If from single towns, or harbours, or small districts, we extend our view to large territories—to whole provinces—or large lines of coast—very different considerations must enter to qualify our inferences. Suppose a belligerent powerful enough to surround a whole kingdom by a cordon of troops, in such force as to prevent, by physical superiority, all ingress and egress at any part of the circle; and the question is raised, not whether the entrance or egress of troops and stores may lawfully be stopped by these means; but whether every cart, horse, and foot passenger may thus be stopped, and his goods confiscated, and his person imprisoned, for making the attempt;—we acknowledge that there appears some difficulty in giving this question an affirmative answer. For here is evidently a most grievous injury inflicted upon the neighbouring neutral—so grievous indeed, that the case may well be put, in which the pressure of such a measure of hostility would fall as heavily on the neutral as on the enemy—on the party not intended to be at all affected by it, as on him against whom it was professedly levelled. For if two nations, lying contiguous, as Holland and Brabant, should be, as they naturally will be, each the best customer of the other, the blockade of the one which is at war with us operates exactly as a blockade of the other also, which, so far from being at war, ought, by all the principles of public law, to be encouraged in its neutrality, and favoured, so long as it preserves a real and sincere indifference in its conduct towards the belligerents. To visit a nation of this description so severely, is surely a consummation to be greatly deprecated; unless where some inducement of a very high and paramount kind may seem to dispense with the natural and just feeling of favour, and to authorise, upon more large views of general expediency, such a departure from ordinary principles. But as the prospect of speedily terminating hostilities by some such extraordinary pressure on the enemy may be thought to justify even such a blockade as this—we are not disposed to deny it absolutely as a general principle; and the admission must consequently be extended to such a blockade by sea of a whole coast, as a very powerful fleet, aided by innumerable attendant vessels, may be capable of establishing so strictly, that at each part of the line ingress and egress may be prevented. This is perhaps a large admission; but we know not where else to draw the distinction: and at all events, we should never forget, that it is an admission full of danger, and leading to utter subversion of principle, in the utter disregard of neutral rights, unless it be carefully limited by its appropriate checks.

Now, what are those checks?—If there be no limit to this right but the good pleasure of the belligerents—if each party may bid against the other in mutual animosity, for the overthrow of the rights of third parties—and if those neutral rights may be encroached upon by both belligerents, according to their several desires of hurting each other, and their respective disregard of all other parties, or rather their respective dislike towards all who are not mixed in the contest,—then it is in vain to talk of neutral rights, or of neutrality at all. For each belligerent will begin by going to the utmost extremity,—each will decree that the other shall be cut off from all communication with the rest of mankind,—and the party which is weakest, and whose threat cannot be executed, will be despised by neutrals, while they will be drawn into the quarrel against the stronger power. Such a right, then, can only increase the calamities



of war, in the first instance; and speedily it must enlarge their range, by involving all other nations in the dispute between the belligerents, and putting an end to the very character and condition of neutrality all the world over. *Some* limit then must evidently be fixed; and the one which the nature of things presents to us, seems, on every account, the reasonable and safe one to choose. *The power* of each party to execute his intentions appears to be this natural limit. Each belligerent should be strictly confined to such a blockade only as he has actual means of enforcing. While this is clearly understood, it seems scarcely possible that the general principle can be liable to great abuse; for, whatever may be the wishes of the parties, they cannot go beyond certain bounds; and, as far as they can go, they exercise a real hostility,—to which, as their adversaries must expect they shall be exposed, so neutrals must submit to its indirect consequences, in the hope that it may ultimately shorten the period of war.

That *this* limitation has, in general, and in the best times, been held by jurists, and admitted, by the practice of nations, to constitute an essential part of the right of blockade, we need not take great pains to show from history or from authority. We say, in general; for we are aware of attempts to disregard it having now and then been made in times of peculiar confusion and national animosity, when the voice of reason was little likely to be heard. The Dutch in Philip II.'s time, and the French during the revolution war, both acted, or attempted to act, in contravention of this principle. Thus, the *decree of the 18th January, 1797*, declares, that all vessels found on the high seas, with any English goods whatever on board, to whomsoever belonging, shall be good prize; and it requires *certificates of origin*, under the hands of French consuls, exactly as the more recent decrees of Berlin and Milan do. (See *Robinson's Admiralty Reports*, vol. i. p. 342.) England at different times has declared large lines of coast, and whole colonies, to be in a state of blockade; but she has (*till the present war*) uniformly provided a naval force sufficient to make this blockade real and effectual; and as often as a question arose respecting the rights of neutrals to enter or sail from ports within such blockades, the enquiry essential to the decision has always been, whether such a force was stationed on the coast as was sufficient to blockade it effectually. According as this question was answered in the affirmative or negative, the decree of blockade was held to be good and lawful, or a mere nullity. As nothing can be more instructive than the decisions of our prize courts on this point, so, nothing can give us more gratifying views of the purity with which those tribunals administer the law of nations, and their impartiality in trying the delicate questions which come before them, between their own sovereign or their own countrymen, and the rulers or the people of foreign states. It is with pleasure, therefore, that we pause here, to consider how clearly the principles for which we are contending have been recognised, and indeed how anxiously and rigorously they have been enforced by the High Court of Admiralty under the presidency of Sir William Scott, and the Court of Prize Appeal, composed, practically speaking, of that learned and honourable Judge, the late and the present Masters of the Rolls, and Sir William Wynne. In observing the train of decisions, it will be essential to keep the eye upon *dates* as well as points; the *time* is material in this question.

In the case of the *Frederick Molke, Boysen, December 10th, 1798*, Sir William Scott lays it down, “that nothing further is necessary to con-

stitute blockade, than that there should be a force stationed to prevent communication, and a due notice or prohibition given to the party." (1 *Rob.* 86.) In the *Mercurius Gerdes*, December 7th, 1798, referring to the doctrines maintained by the armed neutrality of 1780, he describes a place to be in a state of blockade, "when it is dangerous to attempt to enter it." (*Id.* p. 84.) In the same case he says, still more precisely, that "a blockade may exist without a public declaration, although a declaration, unsupported by fact, will not be sufficient to establish it." And in support of this doctrine, he refers to the case of the West Indian Blockade of 1794, as decided by the Lords of Appeal. That case merits our attention; and, though there is no report of it in the books, yet it is sufficiently known, from the frequent references made to it in other cases, and from one or two reported cases expressly ruled on the principle of it. Such was the case of the *Betsey, Murphy*, December 18th, 1798, in which the principle in question was the chief point. It was the case of an American taken by the English at the capture of Guadaloupe, April, 1794, and retaken by the French, at the recapture of the island in the following June. The question arose on the legality of the first seizure, which had been made on the ground that the vessel had broken the blockade of Guadaloupe. The captors stated by affidavit "that on the arrival of the British forces in the West Indies, a proclamation issued, inviting the inhabitants of *Martinique, St. Lucie*, and *Guadaloupe*, to put themselves under the protection of the English; that, on a refusal, hostile operations were commenced against them all;" and "that, in January 1794, Guadaloupe was summoned, and was then put into a state of complete investment and blockade." Upon this statement the learned judge observes, "The word *complete* is a word of great energy; and we expect from it to find that a number of vessels were stationed round the entrance of the port, to cut off all communication. But, from the protest, I perceive that the captors entertained but a very loose *notion* of the true nature of a blockade; for it is there stated, that on the 1st of January, after a general proclamation to the French islands, they were put into a state of complete blockade."—"It is a term, therefore, which was applied to all those islands at the same time under the first proclamation. The Lords of Appeal" (he continues) "have pronounced that such a proclamation was not, in itself, sufficient to constitute a legal blockade. *It is clear, indeed, that it could not, in reason, be held to produce the effect* which the captors erroneously ascribed to it. From the misapplication of these phrases in one instance, I learn that we must not give too much weight to the use of them on this occasion; and from the generality of these expressions, I think we must infer, that there was not that *actual blockade which the law is now distinctly understood to require.*" An argument in favour of the blockade having been raised upon a declaration of the municipality, that "*the island was in a state of siege,*" Sir William Scott, with an indignant sneer at the revolutionary politicians of France, whom a dispenser of the public law may, above all other judges, be excused for holding in abhorrence, as the great contemners of the rights of neutrals, and the rash innovators on the ancient code of Europe, observes, that this "is a term of the new jargon of France, which is sometimes applied to domestic disturbances, and certainly is *not so intelligible* as to justify me in concluding, that the island was in *that state of investment* from a foreign enemy *which we require to constitute blockade.*" How rapid the progress of the *jargon* has been — how it has worked its way into the recesses of the Civil law, as well as of the Cabinet, — how a single

hint conveyed in that outlandish tongue has since become sufficient to convey ideas which whole sentences were formerly incapable of rendering intelligible,—and how those who, in the infancy of their studies under French doctors of the law, had not organs of comprehending forms of blockade, which now-a-days they deal with as familiarly as if they had never been out of the University of Paris,—we shall probably have occasion to see more nearly before we close the present discussion. In the mean while, it may suffice to observe, as touching the *Betsey*, that the learned Judge having, for the reasons already mentioned, “*denied that a blockade existed till the operations of the forces were actually directed against Guadaloupe*” (notwithstanding the proclamation of blockade months before), pronounced it, on this ground, to be a case of restitution. (1 *Rob.* 94. *et seq.*)

To seek for confirmations of the same sound and correct principles, would be only to take at random the *dicta* of the same distinguished Judge during any part of the last, and the earlier stages of the present war, in every question that hinged upon the right of blockade, or incidentally connected itself with it. We have the principle in the logical form of a general definition, in the case of the *Vrouw Judith, Valkerts*, Jan. 17. 1799. “A blockade is a sort of circumvallation round a place, by which all foreign connection and correspondence is, *as far as human force can effect it, to be entirely cut off.*” (1 *Rob.* 151.) It meets us again in the exhaustive shape, in a specification of the classes which compose the genus blockade; and from which blockade by mere declaration is carefully excluded. “There are two sorts of blockade;—one by the *simple fact* only, the other by a notification accompanied with the fact. In the former case, when the fact ceases, otherwise than by accident or the shifting of the wind, there is immediately an end of the blockade.” He then says, that where a blockade has been notified, a counter-notice should be given at the same time that the fact ceases. “It is,” he adds, “the duty undoubtedly of a belligerent country, which has made the notification, to notify in the same way, and immediately, the discontinuance of it. To suffer the fact to cease, and to apply the notification again at a distant time, would be a fraud on neutral nations, and a conduct which we are not to suppose that any country would pursue. I do not say that a blockade of this sort may not, in any possible case, expire *de facto*; but, I say, such a conduct is not hastily to be presumed against any nation.” (*Neptunus, Knyp.* 1 *Rob.* 171.) Nor does there appear, in any of the cases argued before the court, as far as the very admirable reports of Sir C. Robinson, the present King’s Advocate, have preserved the history of them, any attempt, in these days, even by the ingenuity of counsel, when labouring under a heavy case, to contend for any blockade other than such as actual force is employed to begin and support.

Such, then, we take to be the law of nations, as expounded by the highest authority on this important point. But suppose that one of the belligerents neglecting or openly violating this law, shall disregard the limits fixed by its own strength, and issue decrees, pretending to order what, in fact, it has no power to execute — *proclaiming* the coasts of its adversary to be blockaded, without providing a force sufficient even to attempt their circumvallation; that the neutral may regard such conduct as wholly illegal we have already seen; but what rights does it bestow, and what duties does it impose, on the other belligerent? Does this proceeding, in short, entitle the enemy *to retaliate*? We shall again seek for a solution in the records of the first Prize tribunal in the world, and

in the words of its ablest sage. In the noted case of the *Flad Oyen, Martenson*, a case, not of the less authority on the present occasion, that it over-ruled a material pretension introduced by the enemy during the last war, and favoured pretty anxiously by neutrals, Sir W. Scott combats the argument, that the practice followed, in some instances by Great Britain, of condemning prizes in neutral ports, could ever justify France in a similar proceeding. "That consequence," he says, "I deny: *the true mode of correcting the irregular practice of a nation is by protesting against it*, and by inducing that country to reform it. It is *monstrous* to suppose, that because one country has been guilty of an irregularity, every other country is let loose from the law of nations, and is at liberty to assume as much as it thinks fit." (1 *Rob.* 142.) This sentence would of itself be sufficient to establish, on an imperishable basis, the fame of the eminent judge who uttered it, and avowed himself ready to act upon its principles. Those principles are truly incontrovertible; and we rejoice to reflect how constantly they have been illustrated in the practice of the more enlightened states of Europe, but especially of England. What but a conviction of their soundness prevented the fatal play of partition from making the round of the Continent in 1774? What other consideration dissuaded the English cabinet during the greater part of the last war from imitating, under the mask of retaliation, the unjust and violent decrees of the French government against this country, and their manifest violation of neutral rights? Why else did the commanders of our army in 1794 meet the abominable edicts of the Jacobins prohibiting quarter to the English, with a reproof to those insane rulers — a protest in the face of the world — and a generous recommendation to our troops to abstain from retaliation? In truth, were the contrary maxims allowed, the smallest breach of the law of nations would insure the immediate and total overthrow of the system, which has done more for the civility and peace of the world than conquerors or mobs have been able to effect against those inestimable blessings.

The doctrine here laid down, was no doubt broached by Sir W. Scott incidentally, in the course of an elaborate argument, of which it did not form the main drift; it was more of an *obiter dictum* than of a point ruled; and, unquestionably, it was not the principal point in the case. But the *dicta* of judges must not be taken like admissions of advocates in the course of argument — concessions of one point in order to justify another. A judge rules more or less solemnly, on every point which he deliberately decides upon; and as he is not arguing to support a particular doctrine, all that he lays down for law in explaining and recommending that doctrine must be taken to be law, as far as his authority can make it so.

What, then, it may be asked, is the one belligerent to do when the one violates the clear law of nations, by establishing a blockade unsupported by actual force? The principle now contended for, and on the great authorities referred to, would justify this answer, — that the utmost extent of retaliation is to assist all neutrals in evading such an order of blockade. But if neutrals should be found willing to obey the order, it may seem fit that the retaliation should proceed a step further; and that England, for example, being declared in a state of blockade by France, should be authorised, in her turn, to declare France in a state of blockade with respect to whatever neutrals may acquiesce in the French declaration. This principle, however, must be taken with some limitations; because, if the French proclamation be a mere empty threat, a mere insult to the neutrals, incapable of really injuring either them or us, we

shall not surely be justified in inflicting such a blockade as may utterly annihilate their intercourse with the enemy. The French decree says to America—Your ships shall not go to and from England;—it is a decree which France cannot execute: and if America refuses to go to war with her on account of it, what does she more, than despise a mere idle threat, or put up with an empty insult? This is no ground for retaliating on America. No one can pretend that England has a right to insist upon America accounting to her for all the insults she may endure; or to make that neutral state receive real injuries at her hands, because she has taken insults at the hands of her enemy. If, indeed, America not only refuses to quarrel with France on this score, but ceases, in consequence of the French decree, to trade with England, it may be thought more reasonable that England should have the same right of preventing her from trading with France. Nevertheless, they who maintain this point must be prepared to admit that neutrals have no longer a right to trade with whomsoever they please; and to give up a certain commercial intercourse at their own pleasure. The support of this doctrine of retaliation would lead to an acknowledgment, that a cessation of commercial intercourse is a just ground of war. However, we are not disposed to raise speculative questions, and argue on a state of facts which has never existed. America never did acquiesce in the French decrees; and she ceased to trade with England, only when England adopted a particular and strange modification of the new French principles of blockade. We shall take for granted the right of retaliating on the enemy at the expense of the neutral, and enquire how this right is limited, and whether it has been exercised under the fit limitations?

If any one were asked, what would be a proper retaliation of the blockade proclaimed against England? he would naturally answer—A similar blockade proclaimed against France. The object of such a measure would be sufficiently intelligible. Whether attainable or not is another question,—and one which belongs to the political view of the case—a view not now before us: but a blockade of France would have an intelligible reference to the blockade of England; and, while it only called upon neutrals to bear from us as much as they chose to bear from our enemy, (the sole, though we fear no very triumphant justification of such a retaliating measure as relating to neutrals,) it would offer some chance of compelling the enemy to alter his conduct—recur to the old established law of nations, and cease violating neutral commerce. England, however, by the first Orders in Council, inflicted no such retaliation upon France. She endeavoured, on the other hand, to monopolise, instead of retaliating. In answer to a decree which said, No one shall trade with England; she said, Every one shall trade with England, or give up all trading whatsoever,—instead of saying, as she ought to have done, No one shall trade with France. The blockade was thus affected to be retaliated; but it was in reality met,—not with a counter blockade, but with a monopoly;—and this conduct was both contrary to the rule which it pretended to follow, and wholly incapable of either making the neutral cease to acquiesce in the enemy's illegal proceedings, or compelling the enemy to abandon those measures. For it neither prevented the neutral from trading as extensively as before, nor distressed the enemy by cutting off his intercourse with neutrals;—it only hampered, and insulted and harassed the trade of the former, and prescribed the way in which the latter should be traded withal. Both neutral and enemy might trade as largely as before, provided they chose to drive that traffic through the medium of British ports, and in such a way as somewhat, though very

little, to assist the trade of those ports. It is therefore quite impossible to defend the Orders in Council of 1807 on the principle of retaliation. Their preamble states that principle—but only to abandon it, and adopt another of a perfectly different kind. The preamble says, We have a right to retaliate; but the Order says, We will not do so useless and unprofitable a thing as to retaliate;—we will endeavour to get a little good trade out of the fire. The substance of the proclamation is—Whereas we have a right to retaliate by blockade; therefore we choose not to do so; but we prefer making a certain profit by monopoly.

In April, 1809, these orders were repealed; and another set substituted in their place. The principle now resorted to was a blockade of a limited extent, comprehending the coasts of France, Holland, part of Germany, and the north of Italy;—and as this blockade was absolute, admitting of no exceptions, and no evasion, by touching at British ports, it wears on the face of it an appearance of more strict retaliation than the measure to which it succeeded. Yet, how has it been followed up in practice? By a series of Orders in Council, adapted to particular cases, authorising thousands of exceptions in a year to the blockade originally imposed, or pretended to be imposed, the breach of the blockade has now become the rule, instead of the exception: and while we affect to prevent France from trading with any other country, in order to starve her into a compliance with the law of nations;—while we tell America that we are reduced by the state of the war, and the conduct of the enemy, to the disagreeable necessity of preventing all commerce with France;—while we express our *unfeigned* regret, that the course of hostilities should fall heavy upon American trade, and protest, that nothing could reconcile us to such an act of apparent harshness towards neutral rights, but the absolute impossibility of permitting the enemy of all order to trade in any degree whatever with any nation in the world (for our case is this, or it is nothing):—we at the same time encourage our own clandestine traffic with that same enemy as much as we can, and allow all neutrals who will submit to certain indignities, and to conditions beneficial to ourselves, as ample a trade with *blockaded* France as they ever before enjoyed: so that the principle of the original orders of 1807 is revived underhand, and in detail; and the blockade of 1809, when interpreted by the licences, is found to mean, like that of 1807, only a monopoly, under the imposing disguise of such a measure as might press hard on the enemy, and oblige neutrals to resist his encroachments, while it forced him to observe the public law of Europe.

In what light such measures are viewed in our Prize courts, we may easily see, by consulting their latest decisions: for, till lately, they would allow of no illegal proceedings, even when strictly retaliatory. But, now that they have relaxed the ancient rules, and allowed one belligerent to break the law, in order to punish another for a breach of it, we shall still find them confining within much narrower bounds than the government is disposed to walk by, this right of retaliation. The case of the *Fox*, recently decided by Sir William Scott, is on many accounts of peculiar authority in the present discussion; but chiefly for this reason, that no former judgment of our Prize tribunals ever showed such deference to the municipal legislation of the country, and such disposition to mix it up with the public law in regulating their decisions. In the outset, Sir William Scott declares our Orders in Council to be purely “*retaliatory*.” They are so declared in their own language, and in the uniform language of the government which has established them. I have no hesitation in

saying, that they would cease to be just if they ceased to be retaliatory; and they would cease to be retaliatory, from the moment the enemy retracts, in a sincere manner, those measures of his, which they were intended to retaliate." P. 4.

It having been objected by Dr. Herbert, one of the counsel for the claimant, that the Orders in Council are not retaliatory, inasmuch as they are accompanied with the Licence trade, the learned Judge thus proceeds to comment on that objection:—"It is incumbent upon me, I think, to take notice of an objection of Dr. *Herbert's*, to the *existence* of the Orders in Council—namely, that *British* subjects are, notwithstanding, permitted to trade with *France*, and that a blockade, which excludes the subjects of all other countries from trading with ports of the enemy, and at the same time permits any access to those ports to the subjects of the state which imposes it, is irregular, illegal, and null. *And I agree to the position, that a blockade, imposed for the purpose of obtaining a commercial monopoly for the private advantage of the state which lays on such blockade, is illegal and void, on the very principle upon which it is founded.*" (P. 10.) He then endeavours to show that the Licence trade is not so extensive as to come, or to bring the measure of which it forms a part, within the scope of this observation. The fact, however, it now appears, is otherwise; a very large trade having been carried on under licence between this country and the coast pretended to be blockaded by our Orders in Council. He further remarks, that the Licence trade is chiefly in the hands of foreigners: but surely it signifies nothing to the principle, whether we, underhand, violate our own blockade by our own or by foreign vessels, so long as we prohibit neutrals from trading with France directly. The last answer which he gives to the objection amounts to this, that the French decrees, conferring on us a right to blockade France rigorously, "it is not for other countries to enquire how far this country may be able to relieve itself further from the aggressions of the enemy." But why is it not? and how does this agree with the large admission, that a blockade, which ends in "commercial monopoly, is illegal and void, on the very principle upon which it is founded?" Is not this relaxation of the blockade, take it in whatever light we may, a relaxation, in our own favour, of the pressure which we pretend must needs be inflicted upon the enemy, and which we vindicate in regard to its effects upon neutrals, only on the ground of its absolute necessity to the subjugation of that enemy? Has not then the neutral a full right to complain of our conduct, in pretending to destroy his trade, for the better management of the war, and the more speedy attainment of peace, when all that we do, in reality, is to transfer it out of his hands into our own, for the more profitable carrying on of business, and the more speedy acquisition of wealth?—Have *we*, who do such things, any right to abuse the Dutch, who blockaded a city, and secretly sold it provisions and stores—determined it should seem, to make the most of their war, and, if they could not take the place, to turn its resistance to a good account?

The principle, then, of the new system—new at least in *our* Prize courts, and repugnant to the rules laid down by our most eminent Judges heretofore, is profit and monopoly, and not retaliation or self-defence. But, more recently, it has been recommended on such grounds, in a manner still more avowed and unblushing. His Majesty's ministers are said to have lately declared, that the defence of their measures rested, not so much on their forcing the enemy to retract—for this ground it

was necessary to abandon in the face of the notorious facts—but on their tendency to protect our trade from injurious competition. (*See Reports of the Debate on Lord Lauderdale's and Mr. Brougham's Motions upon the Orders in Council.*) It was contended, that if the Orders were withdrawn, there would be nothing to prevent the manufactures of the Continent from getting into other markets, as that of South America, possibly at peace freights, under cover of the American flag; and that we should be undersold, or at any rate lose the exclusive possession of those markets. It was inferred, that to the new measures we owed our present trade in a great degree; and that, to protect that trade, those measures must at all events be persevered in. We shall here wave all dispute about the matter of fact, on which this portentous doctrine rests. We shall not enquire, whether our manufactures are really come to such a pitch, that they can only keep their ground by the assistance of main force. Nor shall we ask what the manufacturers themselves say upon this matter, and whether they have any such panic fears? We are at present dealing with a dry question of law—with mere matter of right; and to clear the way for the argument—indeed to raise the question at all—we must admit the facts, on the assumption of which this most strange of doctrines is brought forward; and for the first time in the history of civilised governments, openly and daringly avowed, how often soever it may have been covertly acted upon, at least with a more decent shame.

We say, then, that though all the facts should be admitted—though the greatest gain should be allowed to flow from the Orders in Council, and in general from the newfangled right of blockade;—this affords not only no defence of those measures, if they are otherwise untenable upon principles, but is a topic which cannot even be stated *at all* in the argument;—that it has no more to do with the question, than the great value of the booty has with the defence of the pirate who is on trial for having plundered it. The Americans have a right to trade with our enemy, unless we can show that justice, and the acknowledged rights of belligerents with regard to neutrals, limit or abrogate that right. We say, they shall not trade with our enemy; and when they complain of this infraction of their rights, we answer, that if they were permitted to carry on such a trade, it would interfere with the gains of our own commerce!

They who maintain such a monstrous position—they who throw it out even as a makeweight in the present discussion—must be prepared to contend, that the love of gain is a just cause of hostilities;—and that a nation is at any time entitled to make war upon its neighbours, for the sake of increasing its own trade. Nay, they must be ready to maintain (for it is scarcely going a step further), that we have a just right to quarrel with an unoffending people, for the sake of plundering their ships, and ransacking their warehouses. Now, England has sometimes swerved from the only path which a great nation can ever pursue, consistently with its honour and character. She has carried on the slave-trade, and defended it because it was lucrative. She has seized the property of her neighbours, while they confided in the subsisting relations of peace. She has, on some plea of state-necessity, burnt the capital of a friendly state, in order to obtain possession of its warlike resources: but, to this period of time, she has never laid it down openly as a maxim, that all right, and all public law, is at an end—that interest alone is her guide—and that she has a title to despise all principles—to make a mock of every thing like justice among nations, as often as she can make a profit by such monstrous deeds of perfidy and violence. Let us hope that such principles have been



rashly hazarded, and will be quickly retracted. Surely, if an American war is so dear to our rulers—if they must at all risks have a rupture with the only free people beside ourselves now left in the world—if they are quite resolved upon finally shutting up the best and safest market which yet remains to our industry—they may find some less revolting pretext on which to found their measure; and we fervently trust, that so great a calamity may fall upon the country and the world, unattended by the additional and most needless aggravation of a manifesto, which outrages all the principles that hold either men or nations together, and stand between us and universal anarchy.

We have had occasion to speak of the legality, or illegality, of the Orders in Council, and the instructions connected with them, as a matter capable of being discussed and decided upon in judicatures actually existing. We have been supposing, that there are courts where redress may be obtained by individuals against acts of force, inconsistent with the law of nations; and we are willing to please ourselves with the idea, that the pernicious example of France has not shut up those fountains of justice, and left in their room some impure and uncertain channels, flowing at the command, or by the caprice, of politicians. The Prize Courts are understood to be judicatures, which decide the questions coming before them according to the principles of the general law of nations, recognised all over the civilised world. This law is proverbially the same in every country, like that of nature: *non est alia Romæ, alia Athenis*. Were it otherwise, indeed, there could be no such thing; and to speak of a *law of nations* would be a mockery. Two parties, then, come before such a court; the one demanding condemnation of a vessel or cargo, seized under a certain Order of Council, and the other resisting the demand, and claiming restitution. What questions do they thus raise for adjudication? First, whether the Order in Council was consistent with, or repugnant to, the law of nations? Next, whether the seizure was made within the terms of the Order? The first of these questions is to the full as material as the second; because the court must decide according to the law of nations, and distribute equal justice between the government of the country where it happens to sit, and the governments or subjects of foreign states; and the Order being, in truth, a mere act of one of the two governments, its legality is a question for the court.

Such is the general doctrine, we apprehend, on this subject—but it is laid down so much more clearly and forcibly by the celebrated judge to whose opinions we have so often referred, that we must be excused for calling in his justly revered authority to our support.—We allude to his beautiful judgment in the famous case of the Swedish convoy (the *Maria, Paulsen, June 11. 1799*). This was a question, as our readers will recollect, respecting the right of search for contraband of war. The Swedish convoy had been met by an English cruiser; and, acting under the undisputed orders of their own government, they had refused to be searched. For this refusal of the convoy ship, and for preparing to repel force by force, the merchant ships were seized and brought in for condemnation. Each party acted under the orders of their respective governments, who severally held the opposite opinions touching the right of search;—England maintaining it in proclamations, orders, and manifestoes—Sweden, with the other Baltic powers, denying it, as they had done twenty years before; and embodying their denial in state papers and conventions. To determine this important and much disputed question between the two parties, was the delicate task which now de-

volved upon Sir William Scott—and which is universally admitted, we believe, to have been performed by him with the greatest justice and ability. “In forming my judgment,” says this distinguished judge, “I trust that it has not escaped my anxious recollection for one moment what it is that the duty of my station calls for from me; namely, to consider myself as stationed here, not to deliver occasional and shifting opinions, to *serve present purposes of particular national interest*, but to administer, with indifference, that justice which the law of nations holds out, without distinction, to independent states, some happening to be neutral, and some to be belligerent. The seat of judicial authority is indeed locally here in the belligerent country, according to the known law and practice of nations; but *the law itself HAS no locality*. It is the duty of the person who sits here to determine this question exactly as he would determine the same question if sitting at Stockholm;—to assert no pretensions on the part of Great Britain which he would not allow to Sweden in the same circumstances;—and to impose no duties on Sweden as a neutral country which he would not admit to belong to Great Britain in the same character. If, therefore, I mistake the law in this matter, I mistake that which I consider as the universal law upon the question;—a question regarding one of the most important rights of belligerent nations, relatively to neutrals.” (1 *Rob.* 350.)

He then enquires, whether the claim of England is supported by the principles of the law of nations, as collected from authority and from the general practice of states;—and, determining that it is consistent with those principles, he asks, whether the authority of the neutral sovereign, being interposed, can legally vary the rights of the belligerent—which he answers very clearly in the negative: and, in every part of his argument, where he appeals to the practice of nations, he will be satisfied with nothing short of uniform and constant usage;—where he relies on pretensions, those pretensions must have been acquiesced in by the world generally. Indeed, when he quotes the proclamation, 1672, and the Order of Council, 1664, he says, “I am aware, that in those orders and proclamations are to be found some articles not very consistent with the law of nations, as understood now, or indeed at that time, for they are expressly censured by Lord Clarendon.”—“But,” he adds, “the article I refer to is not of those he reprehends; and it is observable, that Sir Robert Wiseman, then the king’s advocate-general, who reported upon the articles in 1673, and expresses a disapprobation of some of them as harsh and novel, does not mark this article with any observation of censure.” (*Ibid.* 368.)

In the same spirit we find the learned Judge ruling another great question, in the case of the *Flad Oyen, Martenson*, already referred to. Mentioning the pretension of the French government to condemn in neutral ports as “an attempt made for the very first time in the world, in the year 1799,” he adds, “In my opinion, if it could be shown that, regarding mere speculative general principles, such a condemnation ought to be deemed sufficient, that would not be enough;—more must be proved: *it must be shown that it is conformable to the usage and practice of nations*.”—“A great part,” he continues, “of the law of nations, stands on no other foundation. It is introduced, indeed, by general principles, but it travels with those general principles only to a certain extent; and if it stops there, you are not at liberty to go further, and to say that mere general speculations would bear you out in a farther progress. For instance, on mere general principles it is lawful to destroy your enemy; and mere

general principles make no great difference as to the manner by which this is to be effected; but the conventional law of mankind, which is evidenced in their practice, does make a distinction, and allows some, and prohibits other modes of destruction; and a belligerent is bound to confine himself to those modes which the common practice of mankind has employed, and to relinquish those which the same practice has not brought within the ordinary exercise of war, however sanctioned by its principles and purposes." We earnestly recommend this excellent passage to the attention of those who sent a brigade of blood-hounds to track and tear in pieces the Maroon negroes in Jamaica; and more recently endeavoured to deprive the enemy's hospitals of one of the most healing plants which providence has bestowed upon suffering mortals. To the authors of the same measures we would submit the following paragraph:— "It is my duty not to admit, that because one nation has thought proper to depart from the common usage of the world, and to meet the notice of mankind in a new and unprecedented manner, that I am on that account under the necessity of acknowledging the efficacy of such a novel institution, merely because general theory might give it a degree of countenance, independent of all practice from the earliest history of mankind. *The institution must conform to the text law, and likewise to the constant usage upon the matter.*" (1 Rob. 139. et seq.)

When we bear in mind the utter novelty of the new principles of blockade,—their repugnance to constant usage, and to all sound general principle, and apply to them the reasonings now cited, we may feel disposed to conclude this part of the argument in the words of the same high authority, while discussing the doctrines of the armed neutrality. "It is high time that the *legal merit* of such a pretension should be disposed of one way or other:—it has been for some few years past preparing in Europe,—it is extremely fit that it should be brought to the test of *judicial decision*; for a worse state of things cannot exist, than that of an undetermined conflict between the ancient law of nations, as understood and practised for centuries by civilised nations, and a modern project of innovation, utterly inconsistent with it; and, in my apprehension, not more inconsistent with it than with the amity of neighbouring states, and the personal safety of their respective subjects." (1 Rob. 377.)

Such were the sound, enlightened, and consistent doctrines promulgated by the learned Judge, in the years 1798 and 1799—doctrines wholly unconnected with any "*present purpose of particular national interest*;"—uninfluenced by any preference or "*distinction to independent states*;"—delivered from a "*seat of judicial authority locally here*" indeed, but according to a law which "*has no locality*," and by one whose "*duty it is to determine the question exactly as he would determine the same question, if sitting at Stockholm*,"—"*asserting no pretensions, on the part of Great Britain, which he would not allow to Sweden.*" If a question had then arisen on the legality of a seizure under the new law of blockade, we can entertain but little doubt how this eminent Judge would have dealt with it; and, certainly, none whatever as to the authority which he would have allowed to the mere proclamation of the one belligerent, when cited in the manner, and with the force of statute law, to over-rule the claim of a neutral. So, too, must neutral nations have thought; and, satisfied with the sound and impartial principles which were so explicitly laid down in the *cases of the Flad Oyen and Swedish convoy*, they acquiesced in the particular application of them, hard though it happened to bear on their interests in those individual instances.

Twelve years have passed away since the period of those beautiful doctrines—an interval not marked by any general change of character among neutrals, or any new atrocities on the part of the belligerents,—distinguished by no pretensions which had not frequently before been set up by the different parties in the war, except that on both sides the right of unlimited blockade had been asserted. France complaining that England, in 1806, and previously, had exercised this power, declared England and her colonies in a state of blockade; and England, in her turn, proclaimed all France, and her allies, blockaded. There were orders and decrees on both sides; and both parties acted upon them. The neutrals protested; and, recollecting the sound and impartial principles of our Prize courts in 1798 and 1799, they appealed to that “judicial authority which has its seat locally here,” but is bound to enforce “a law that has no locality,” and “to determine in London exactly as it would in Stockholm.” The question arose, whether those orders and decrees of one belligerent justified the capture of a neutral trader; and on this point we find Sir W. Scott delivering himself with his accustomed eloquence,—with a power of language, indeed, which never forsakes him,—and which might have convinced any person, except the suffering parties to whom it was addressed.—*Case of the Fox, 30th May, 1811.*

“It is strictly true, that by the constitution of this country, the King in Council possesses legislative rights over this Court, and has power to issue orders and instructions which it is bound to obey and enforce; and these constitute the written law of this Court. These two propositions, that the Court is bound to administer the Law of Nations, and that it is bound to enforce the King’s Orders in Council, are not at all inconsistent with each other; because these orders and instructions are presumed to conform themselves, under the given circumstances, to the principles of its unwritten law. They are either directory applications of those principles to the cases indicated in them—cases which, with all the facts and circumstances belonging to them, and which constitute their legal character, could be but imperfectly known to the Court itself; or they are positive regulations, consistent with those principles, applying to matters which require more exact and definite rules than those general principles are capable of furnishing.

“The constitution of this Court relatively to the legislative power of the King in Council, is analogous to that of the Courts of Common Law relatively to that of the parliament of this kingdom. Those Courts have their unwritten law, the approved principles of natural reason and justice;—they have likewise the written or statute law in acts of parliament, which are directory applications of the same principles to particular subjects, or positive regulations consistent with them, upon matters which would remain too much at large, if they were left to the imperfect information which the Courts could extract from mere general speculations. What would be the duty of the individuals who preside in those Courts, if required to enforce an act of parliament which contradicted those principles, is a question which I presume they would not entertain *à priori*; because they will not entertain *à priori* the supposition that any such will arise. In like manner, this Court will not let itself loose into speculations as to what would be its duty under such an emergency; because it cannot, without extreme indecency, presume that any such emergency will happen; and it is the less disposed to entertain them, because its own observation and experience attest the general conformity of such orders and instructions to its principles of unwritten law.” P. 2, 3.

Here there are two propositions mentioned, asserting two several duties which the Court has to perform. One of these is very clearly described;—the duty of listening to Orders in Council, and proclamations issued by one of the parties before the Court;—the other, the duty of administering the Law of Nations, seems so little consistent with the former, that we naturally go back to the preceding passage of the judgment where a more particular mention is made of it. “This Court,” says the learned Judge, “is bound to administer the Law of Nations to the subjects of other countries, in the different relations in which they may be placed towards this country and its government. This is what other countries have a right to demand for their subjects, and to complain if they receive it not. This is its unwritten law evidenced in the course of its decisions, and collected from the common usage of civilised states.”

The faultless language of this statement all will readily confess and admire. The more judicial virtues of clearness and consistency may be more doubtful in the eyes of those who have been studying the Law of Nations under the same Judge, when ruling the cases of the *Flad Oyen* and *Swedish Convoy*. It is with great reluctance that we enter upon any observations which may appear to question any thing stated by such accurate reporters as Dr. Edwards and Sir C. Robinson, to have been delivered in the High Court of Admiralty. But we have no choice left;—we must be content to make our election between the doctrines of 1799 and 1811, and to abandon one or the other. The reluctance which we feel is therefore materially diminished; for, if we venture to dispute the law recently laid down by the learned Judge, it is upon his own authority in times but a little removed from the present in point of date, and nowise differing from them in any other respect.

How then can the Court be said to administer the unwritten law of nations between contending states, if it allows that one government, within whose territories it “locally has its seat,” to make alterations on that law at any moment of time? And by what stretch of ingenuity can we reconcile the position, that the Court treats the English government and foreign claimants alike, determining the cause exactly as it would if sitting in the claimant’s country, with the new position, that the English government possesses legislative powers over the Court, and that its orders are in the law of nations what statutes are in the body of municipal law? These are questions which, we believe, the combined skill and address of the whole doctors of either law may safely be defied to answer.

Again:—What analogy is there between the proclamations of one belligerent, as relating to points in the law of nations, and the enactments of statute, as regarding the common law of the land? Were there indeed any general council of civilised states—any congress such as that fancied in Henry IV.’s famous project for a perpetual peace—any amphyctyonic council for modern Europe; its decisions and edicts might bear to the established public law the same relation that statutes have to the municipal code; because they would be the enactments of a common head, binding on and acknowledged by the whole body. But the edicts of one state, in questions between that state and foreign powers—or between that state and the subjects of foreign powers—or between those who stand in the place of that state and foreign governments or individuals,—much more nearly resemble the acts of a party to the cause, than the enactments of the law by which both parties are bound to abide.

Mark the consequences of such loose doctrines—such feeble analo-

gies. They resolve themselves into an immediate denial that any such thing as the law of nations exists, or that contending parties have any common court, to which all may resort for justice. There may be a court for French captors in France, and for English captors in England. To these tribunals such parties may respectively appeal in safety; for they derive their rights from edicts issued by the governments of the two countries severally; and those edicts are good law in the Prize courts of each. But, for the American claimant, there is no law by which he may be redressed — no court to which he may resort. The edicts of *his* government are listened to in neither the French nor the English tribunals; and he is a prey to the orders of each belligerent in succession. Perhaps it may be thought quite a sufficient hardship, without this aggravation, that even under the old and pure system laid down in 1798 and 1799, the neutral was forced to receive his sentence in a foreign court — always in the courts of the captor's country. But this undoubted rule of law, tempered by the just principles with which it was accompanied, appeared safe and harmless. For, though the court sat locally in the belligerent country, it disclaimed all allegiance to its government; and professed to decide exactly as it would have done sitting in the neutral territory. How is it now, when the Court, sitting as before, has made so large a stride in allegiance, as to profess an implicit obedience to the orders of the belligerent government within whose dominions it acts?

That a government should issue edicts repugnant to the Law of Nations, may be a supposition unwillingly admitted; but it is one not contrary to the fact; for all governments have done so — and England among the rest, according to the learned Judge's own statement. Neither will it avail to say, that, to enquire into the probable conduct of the Prize courts in such circumstances, is to favour a supposition, which cannot be entertained "*without extreme indecency*;" or to compare this with an enquiry into the probable conduct of municipal courts, in the event of a statute being passed repugnant to the principles of municipal law. The cases are quite dissimilar. The line of conduct for municipal courts in such an emergency is clear. No one ever doubted that they must obey the law. The old law is abrogated, and they can only look to the new. But the courts of prize are to administer a law which cannot, according to Sir William Scott, (and, if we err, it is under the shelter of a grave authority,) be altered by the practice of one nation, unless it be acquiesced in by the rest for a course of years; for he has laid down that the law, with which they are conversant, is to be gathered from general principles, as exemplified in the constant and common usage of all nations.

Perhaps it may bring the present case somewhat nearer the feelings of the reader, if he figures to himself a war between America and France, in which England is neutral. At first, the English traders engross all the commerce which each belligerent sacrifices to his quarrel with his adversary. Speedily the two belligerents become jealous of England, and endeavour to draw her into their contest. They issue decrees against each other nominally, but, in effect, bearing hard on the English trade; and English vessels are carried by scores into the ports of America and of France. Here they appeal to the law of nations; but are told, at Paris, that this law admits of modifications, and that the French courts must be bound by the decrees of the Tuilleries; at New York, that American courts take the law of nations from Washington; and, in

both tribunals, that it is impossible, “*without extreme indecency,*” to suppose the case of any public act of state being done, which shall be an infringement on the law of nations. The argument may be long, and its windings intricate and subtle; but the result is short, plain, and savouring of matter of fact, rather than matter of law: — all the English vessels carried into either country would be condemned as good and lawful prize to the captors.

Let us not enquire how short a time the spirit of *our* nation would endure such a state of *public law*, and how speedily the supposed case would cease to apply, by our flag ceasing to be neutral. But let us, on this account, learn to have some patience with a free and powerful people, quite independent of us, when we find them somewhat sore under the application of these new doctrines — these recent innovations on Sir William Scott’s sound principles of law; and let us the more steadily bear in mind that great Judge’s remark on another part of the subject: “If it were fit that such a state should be introduced, it is at least necessary that it should be introduced in an avowed and intelligible manner, and not in a way which, professing gravely to adhere to that system which has for centuries prevailed among civilised states, and urging at the same time a pretension utterly inconsistent with all its known principles, delivers over the whole matter at once to eternal controversy and conflict, at the expense of the constant hazard of the harmony of states, and of the lives and safeties of innocent individuals.”

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#### APPEAL OF THE POLES.\*

THE publication of this tract gives us an opportunity, of which we are very anxious to take advantage, of calling the attention of our readers to the important subject of Poland. Were this merely a topic of party politics, involving matters of a transient interest, we should allow it to pass with the other themes of the day, and leave it to the care of those who in their various walks drive a traffic of political discussion. It is precisely because the subject is not at all likely to suit their purposes that we wish to canvass it. We fear it will be found to present no facilities for party attacks, or for mutual recriminations among public men. Those who exhaust the whole force of a very limited talent in abuse of the enemy, in all probability will turn away from an enquiry that leads them to contemplate public crimes committed by persons not connected with France. And they who are only solicitous for peace at all events, without thinking of securities, are likely to disregard a subject which may seem to throw difficulties in the way of negotiation, by calling our attention to the only real principles of national independence. Nevertheless, as we are deeply impressed with the general and permanent importance of the question, and consider its interest to be temporary only in as far as the present time offers peculiar reasons for canvassing it, we shall urge no further apology for the observations upon which we are about to enter.

Whence comes it to pass, that the feelings of the English nation are so easily roused upon some subjects, and upon others precisely similar, are

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\* An Appeal to the Allies, and the English Nation, in behalf of Poland. — Vol. xxii. page 294. January, 1814.

so obstinately torpid? Are we liable to the imputation which foreigners have frequently brought against our national character, of being a strange mixture, full of inconsistency, at once refractory and capricious, and chiefly distinguishable from others by having no marked and general characteristic? Or does the charge alluded to, when well examined, happen to be unfounded in fact, and the inconsistency only apparent? the wrongs of Africa, the oppressions of Spain, the sufferings and subsequent liberation of Holland, occupy every tongue; while not a whisper is heard, in behalf of Poland.—Whence this extraordinary diversity?

It will not be sufficient to say, that in those cases which have excited most interest, our own concerns were involved. There is no doubt that when the slave trade was denounced, a crime was held up to detestation which we ourselves committed,—and this might awaken some feelings of a peculiar nature. But the sensation chiefly excited by a disclosure of the horrid details of that subject, was pure compassion for the Africans; and we may safely assert, to the honour of the nation, that no feeling ever pervaded a country more thoroughly, or with less interested motives. The general anxiety for the success of the Spanish cause, was a sentiment not quite so extensive, nor founded upon so accurate a knowledge of the facts. In truth, however iniquitous the conduct of France may have been, the spirit of resistance shown by the Spaniards was the principal ground of the sympathy excited in this country; for had the people submitted to the usurpation, it would not have made their lot worse, and we should only have felt shocked at a new instance of the enemy's perfidy in his transactions with his neighbours. But the gallant resolution displayed by the Spanish nation, not to be transferred, like herds of cattle, by the craft or violence of one court, operating on the weakness or perfidy of another; their determination to be an independent people, and have a government of their own, without any calculation of the precise value of this object, indeed without reference at all to what is vulgarly termed their interest; gave their cause an importance in the eyes of the English public, which, though ultimately connected with just views of policy, was certainly in the first instance only ascertained by feelings of sympathy. Even the counter-revolution in Holland, though undoubtedly much more nearly related to ideas of gain, was in all probability hailed at first with a joy wholly free from calculation, and only recognised as really advantageous some time after it had ceased to be highly interesting. Whence, then, the almost complete indifference with which we have always regarded the sufferings and the exertions of the Poles?

We shall in vain endeavour to answer this question by attempting to discover any difference in the degree either of those sufferings or of those exertions;—the difference is all in their favour. Poland was first partitioned in a moment of profound peace, without any more pretence of right than Bonaparte had when he attacked Spain, nay, without even that shadow of a title which he pretended to derive from the cession of the Court: for Stanislaus, though the creature of Catherine II., protested solemnly against the dismemberment, in the face of all Europe; and the factious diet suspended its animosities, to join him in his appeal. The subsequent acts of 1793 and 1794 were done without the slender colour of a pretext afforded by the anarchy of 1772; and the struggles made in both cases, but especially in the last, were far greater than any of which our Spanish allies can boast, beside being wholly unassisted, and in circumstances almost desperate. The miseries endured by this brave people almost defy description; while in reality the evils inflicted by France upon



the Spaniards lie within a narrower compass — for these two reasons, among others, because she has never had sufficient possession of their country, to introduce among them her worst plague, the conscription, — and because no man of a calm and unbiassed judgment can suppose that a district overrun by Cossacks fares as well as one conquered by French troops. Is it then that the Spaniards have succeeded, while the Poles were overwhelmed? This would, indeed, be a strange reason for withholding commiseration; but surely the day is past when any one can pretend to believe that the French have been expelled from Spain by any resistance except that of the British armies, backed by the allies in Germany, — although they were seconded, no doubt, in several important particulars by the spirit of the people in the Peninsula, and more especially by the excellent troops drawn from Portugal. Was there something romantic in the captivity and sufferings of the Spanish princes, and in the attachment and the adventures of their subjects? But can any one compare these with the sufferings of Stanislaus, and the gallantry of the confederates of Barr, and the chiefs who led on the last resistance in 1794? It is not by any means intended to lessen the great merits of the Spaniards, or to chide the enthusiasm excited by them in this country; but the difference between their case and that of the Poles is assuredly all in favour of the latter.

If the cause of the apathy in question cannot be found in any quality belonging to the subject, perhaps we must seek it in something relating to ourselves. We are willing to throw it upon the ignorance generally prevailing of every thing regarding Poland; and to contribute, as far as in us lies, toward removing this, is the chief purpose of the present article. Some other ingredients are, however, mixed up along with ignorance, in composing the soporific mixture which has so strangely lulled the feelings of Englishmen. It is to be feared, that we too often refuse our attention to any tale of public distress, in producing which the French have had little or no share; and are averse to hearing the truth spoken, when it arraigns the conduct, not of our enemies but our allies. One part of this feeling we need not be ashamed of — tenderness towards Allies, to whom all Europe owes so great a debt of gratitude. But it is quite absurd, that any such feelings should shut us out from a discussion essential to the interests of every nation. It is a discussion which presses forward upon us from all quarters; and, without an abandonment of all claim to consistency, and to principle, the Allies themselves cannot repudiate it. They are about to negotiate a peace. — What shall be the basis? — Must France keep all that she possesses? No one pretends to believe it. — Shall Austria regain what she has lost? Every one will answer, as far as may be. — Is this only because she has fought so efficiently against France? — Then must Switzerland be excluded from the benefits of the treaty, and Bonaparte continue Mediator of the Cantons; — then, too, must the whole German States, except those of the Allies, be swallowed up in the fund of equivalents and indemnities. Nay, upon this principle, Holland could not have been restored to independence, had she made no movement in her own behalf, let what would have happened on the Upper Rhine; and no successes of the allied arms could have given independence to Spain, unless the fortune of war had made the Peninsula the scene of the victory. But the question is still more urgently forced upon us, by the state of the Duchy of Warsaw. — How is it to be disposed of? It consists of almost all the Prussian, and half the Austrian shares of Poland — and is now in the anomalous state of a vast province, in which the

Côte Napoleon is the law—Prussians and Poles the civil administrators—and Russians the absolute rulers, and military occupants. Is this country to be restored to its former proprietors, or retained by Russia, or subjected to some new scheme of partition? Restored to its former owners, will probably be the answer—because restoration is the grand principle of the good cause; every thing is carried on with the view of reinstating things in their ancient condition; the Bourbons are to be replaced, at least in Spain; the Orange family in Holland; the Austrians in Italy; and Savoy is to be separated from France.—Therefore, it will be said, the Duchy must of course revert, partly to Russia, and partly to Austria. Now, all this at first sight looks mighty plausible, and even has some semblance of consistency; but it is only a thin varnish, which a breath will melt: for we should like to hear any one answer this single question—By what right Prussia and Austria are the *owners* of Poland, and must have their *shares* of it restored as a matter of course, when those two powers are busily engaged in restoring Holland to independence and its former sovereigns? But they have had longer possession of Poland.—Of a small part of it, certainly—but not of the bulk; for it does so happen, that their last partition was effected *the very month* that Holland was overrun by French troops, seconded by a powerful faction in the country.

Here, then, we find ourselves in the very midst of the question, at the outset of any negotiation which can be undertaken for a settlement of Europe;—and we might almost stop here, and be satisfied with the conclusion to which we have already come, that there is but one ground upon which a distinction can be raised in favour of Holland or Spain, and against Poland;—the ground, not of principle, but interest—not of right, but might;—the ground that the Allies have in their hands the power of keeping Poland in subjection, and are resolved to preach up restoration at other people's expense, but to practise none of their doctrine themselves.

If such is the language of the day; if all the professions of the last twelve months are dissipated by the successes to which they contributed so largely, and Europe is once more to be plunged in a chaos of intrigue, profligacy, and violence,—we have nothing more to offer; we at least understand what we are about;—and it is our own fault if we are disappointed, let what will happen either now or hereafter. But let the proper words be used for all this, so that we may not be made grateful for nothing, and be at once deceived in our hopes, and cheated out of our thanks. Let our ears be spared the insulting titles—of *restorer*, *liberator*, *avenger*, lavished upon, or even claimed by those, who, having got the upper hand by means of the people of Europe, use their power in perpetuating slavery and oppression; and, having driven out the French armies, only think of dividing the spoils among themselves, without ever wasting a thought upon the rightful owners, to whose assistance they had affected to come.—But, most of all, let us be spared hearing the ridiculous name of *pacificator*, given to those who are destroying every chance of lasting tranquillity; and employing a moment of unexampled success, never likely to recur, in laying the foundation of new wars;—when they might, by recurring to sound principles, by only keeping the faith which they had vowed, re-establish the system of European independence upon an immovable basis, and give to the world a real and lasting peace.

We cannot, however, for one moment allow such thoughts to cross our minds. After the delightful expectations which have been raised so high by the victories and the dignified moderation of the Allies, it would

be a grievous disappointment indeed to find them resorting to such principles for a proof of their consistency. It may well be permitted us to speculate upon their persevering in the right course which they have so steadily pursued; and, in this belief, we conceive, that the line of policy which shall appear to be most conducive to the general interests and permanent tranquillity of the Continent, will be followed in their arrangements for the distribution of territory. The object of the "*Appeal*" is, to prove that the restoration of Polish independence, in some shape or other, is a most material part of this policy; and we cannot better fulfil the task we have now undertaken, of calling the attention of our readers to this important subject, than by laying before them an outline of the argument, and arranging, under the different heads of it, such further information, respecting Polish affairs, as we are possessed of.

The "*Appeal*" opens with removing some preliminary objections which might startle the bulk of readers, and disincline them to any discussion of the subject at the present moment. Poland is, among the Allies, rather a delicate topic; it resembles some of those personal questions, touching the merits of individuals, the gains of near and dear relations, or the delinquencies of persons highly connected, which are frequently brought forward in the discussions of our domestic politics, and generally create considerable uneasiness among all parties. Upon the subject of Poland there seems pretty much the same shyness among the old established powers of Europe, that we observe among ourselves when any matter is broached on which each party in its turn has had something to regret. No one loves to handle it; the person who mentions it is deemed officious, and intrusive, and indelicate; by common consent the less that is said, and the sooner the subject is dropped, the better. Nay, you shall see the company for a while quite ignorant of what is meant, when the topic is started, staring about, and looking as innocent as possible; and only by a kind of force awakened and made to listen. Perhaps the reader may have chanced to be in a company of persons of character and station, among whom one is *awkwardly* connected with some half-forgotten judicial proceeding; the topic of halts is here proverbially so irksome, that every body is apt to fall into it from our anxiety to avoid it; and when by accident the fatal word is out, the meeting must either disperse (which we recommend in such case) or remain in the fear of encountering one another's looks. But the case of the partitioning powers is by many supposed to resemble that of some companies in America, or other settlements where the delicate subject is much, and almost equally, to be eschewed by every person present. Now, we are fully aware of the delicacy of the topic; and if, by holding our peace, we could keep it at rest, perhaps the best way would be to do a great violence to all natural feeling, and bury it for ever in profound silence. We shall even grant that, if it were possible, it would be advisable to let all principles of justice and humanity sleep, and forget Poland, for fear of hurting the feelings of the Allies upon a point presumed to be so tender. But unhappily this is wholly impossible; depending upon persons and things altogether beyond our control, — upon no less a personage indeed, and one of no greater delicacy than the Emperor Napoleon, — who, whether in peace or war, whether negotiating or intriguing, never fails to bring up the ugly subject, as in truth he must be utterly ignorant of his greatest advantage if he for a moment lost sight of it. The Allies may be as silent as the grave upon it, and may affect not to understand the broad hints of the *Moniteur*, and the

French proclamations ; but the bystanders, and their own subjects, must judge ; and one part of their subjects, the Poles, devour with insatiable avidity every allusion of the sort, and are fully more ready to act than to reason upon it. Is it not far better to remove the weakness to which their cause is subject, than to pretend that they have forgotten it? Would they not do a wiser as well as a better thing, if, instead of avoiding the discussion altogether, till their enemy forced it upon them either in the shape of set-off in a treaty, or rebellion in a campaign, they manfully got rid of the flaw in their title to regenerate Europe and resist French usurpation, and secured to themselves a more tranquil dominion, with an unimpeachable character?

But is there no reason to think that this notion of delicacy is overstated? — Why should the Allies dread the subject? — None of them had any share whatever in the first partition : each of them is removed from that crime by two descents. In the last, which undoubtedly was by far the most important, except that it was not the beginning of the fatal system, neither the Emperor of Russia nor the King of Prussia had any part ; and the Emperor of Austria may fairly be supposed to have been merely passive ; for the treaty was half-finished before his accession, and he was engaged in a most critical war with France at the moment. Why then should we hesitate to discuss the subject from delicacy towards them, any more than we suffer a similar delicacy towards our own Government to hamper us in reprobating the American war, or the enormities committed by our rulers in the East and West Indies? The writers and statesmen on the Continent canvass very freely our conduct in those particulars ; and in reality all the praise which they bestow upon one of the finest passages in our history — the victory gained for humanity in 1807 — is an admission that seven years ago our present rulers and statesmen encouraged the traffic in human flesh — with this additional circumstance, that the very heads of the Royal Family were uniformly strenuous in resisting its abolition. In fact, the present appeal is made, not against any living individuals, but against a system begun by princes long since dead, and entailing lamentable consequences, as well on their descendants whom it was designed to benefit, as on those whose interests were from the beginning meant to be sacrificed. But there is certainly a magnanimity in the whole conduct of the Allied Sovereigns, which would render it a safe duty to speak the truth to them, even if the errors to be pointed out existed in their own individual conduct, and were not the practical effects of the policy handed down to them from their illustrious progenitors.

But, it may be said, this question is no longer open to negotiation ; it is one of domestic, and not of foreign policy ; we have no right to interpose our good offices between the allied Princes and their subjects. The force of this objection had better be tried by the excellent and unerring rule of making the case our own ; — and we have no occasion to do so in fancy ; we need only to tax our memory for an instance wherein the very thing occurred to ourselves, our enemy having exactly made the objection here presumed to be raised by the allies. When we required the evacuation of Spain, then wholly overrun by his troops, as a *sine quâ non* in our negotiation for peace, he said Spain was no business of ours, and added, that he might as well require the emancipation of the Irish Catholics. Now, this must be deemed to have been a perfectly satisfactory answer by every one who can for a moment listen to the present objection against our interfering in behalf of Poland. If the Allies have

a right to say, the Poles are ours, and we may as well ask you to emancipate the Irish Catholics; Bonaparte had the same right to say, Spain is mine, as Ireland is yours. Yet we doubt if any one individual in the whole world was duped by his absurd argument. But then indeed it came from France, and was used against Spain — while the topic in question, though precisely the same, is supposed to come from Russia, and to be used against Poland: — this is the diversity. The difference, in the length of possession, we are immediately to consider.

There remains to be noticed the repugnance felt towards the Poles, because they have been found ranged on the side of the enemy, that is, of our enemy, the French; for, it is quite plain that none of our allies can say a word upon a charge equally applicable to them all. Austria joined Bonaparte in his Russian invasion, and only left him during the armistice last summer. Prussia was wholly devoted to him until his disastrous retreat enabled her to escape. And Russia, having joined him at Tilsit, by a treaty too which gave her two new slices of Poland, one at the expense of Austria, the other at the cost of her Prussian ally, was found backing him two years after in the invasion of Austria. It would be reckoning too much on the powers of princely inconsistency, or the proverbially short memories known at court, to pretend, in the presence of those great potentates, that the mere fact of having taken part with France is a sufficient answer to every thing that may be urged for Poland. Yet, it must be admitted, that some pretty bold attempts at such an excess of flattery have lately been made. We have been told of the three allied monarchs turning away their heads when the King of Saxony saluted them at Leipsic; and have heard much of the dignified contempt with which one of their majesties received a message from that unhappy prince. Did the injudicious parasites who invented such fables forget, or could they fancy that Alexander had forgotten, the unfortunate course of events which so lately made even the sovereign of all the Russias league with the enemy of Europe, and gain by the union an extension of territory at the expense of his own allies? How dared they insult his Imperial Majesty by insinuating that he would maltreat the petty elector for yielding to overwhelming force, a compliance which the apprehension only of a doubtful struggle had extorted from his own immense and almost unbroken power? Such topics, then, as the Polish alliance with France, cannot be used on the Continent. Have they any more weight with ourselves? Let us, says the appeal, make the case our own, and suppose ourselves in the situation of the Poles — Should we not have acted precisely as they have done?

“ Suppose that the incurable folly of the government had alienated a considerable portion of its subjects, and thrown them for a moment of desperation upon the still more insane expedient of calling in foreign assistance; that, availing himself of this pretext, our ancient enemy had poured his forces into a part of the empire; and, establishing his power there, had afterwards extended his dominion over England itself. Let us fancy to ourselves this fair island, which we love instinctively because it is our country, and rationally for the blessings we enjoy in it, seized by the lawless hands of Frenchmen and Italians, its venerable establishments despitefully overthrown, its countless riches pillaged, its citizens massacred or dragged away into foreign slavery, or condemned to the more unbearable suffering of perpetual indignities near the homes of which they had been dispossessed. A few years of such misery would surely not efface from our memories the picture of what England once had been. It may well be questioned, whether any one individual would live long enough to survive the recollection that he formerly had a country to claim his gratitude and affection. It may be

doubted, whether the excess of present misfortune would not make the remembrance of the lost enjoyment more sweet, and concentrate every thought, feeling, desire, passion of the soul, in the single determination to regain it. A French general is rioting in every town, which is not beneath the notice of so considerable an oppressor. Commissions are assembled in each county, to carry on the work of confiscation. The services of the most abandoned of both sexes in Paris are recompensed by grants of land wrested from such of our fellow-citizens as have most stoutly resisted the conqueror. The estates of our great proprietors are become the currency in which every baseness and treachery of our own countrymen is paid. The inhabitants are insulted, tortured, driven away in thousands to serve abroad, or to expiate, by banishment from their country, the generous virtue which made them risk every earthly possession in its defence. Life has become indifferent, or burthensome, upon such terms; the very semblance of English independence is gone; no man cares for himself; all other ideas are absorbed in the wish, not of blind revenge, but of restoring the lost country of our forefathers—when suddenly an occasion presents itself of driving the French away, and once more enjoying independence. Russia, which has always been our ally, which has helped us in our unsuccessful struggle, which has uniformly been hostile to our oppressors, is in open war with France, and has landed an immense army upon our coasts. Now this is the question—shall we acknowledge the French, because they are our rulers *de facto*; shall we remain quietly subject to them; shall we take their part in the contest for our own liberation about to be fought on our own ground; shall we join them against the Russians, who come professedly to destroy their dominion, and to set us free? The Englishman who blames the Poles for being deceived by France into a share in the late wars against Russia, must be prepared to maintain that he would himself, in the case now put, join his French tyrant against the Russians. But the case becomes infinitely stronger for Poland, when we reflect that she was in fact overrun by an immense force, before the option was even given her whether she would arm for her tyrants in possession, or for her conquerors in expectancy, pretending to be her avengers. If any one can affect a doubt about the judgment to be pronounced on such conduct, or pharisaically insinuate that England would have carried herself differently, the following reflections are certainly not addressed to *him*. I appeal to him who is not afraid to avow, that had he been a Pole he would have grasped at any chance, even the forlorn hope of French protection, to save his sinking country. Poland has indeed been undeceived; but it is neither befitting the generosity, nor the justice, nor the wisdom of her sovereigns, to visit her with such a continuance of calamity as must, even after the experience of French perfidy, expose her to be again misled in her hopes of redress. How much more does it become England, who can have no interest except the future independence and happiness of her neighbours, and who can feel no resentments for the past, to exert her powerful intercession in favour of a gallant people, second only to her own children in love of liberty, equal even to them in devoted enthusiastic attachment to their native land—nay, let us acknowledge it, superior to ourselves in patriotism, because far more heavy sacrifices have been demanded by their unhappy country, than it ever entered in the mind of an Englishman that patriotism could require.” — P. 7—10.

Thus much to remove the objections which encumber the question at the threshold, and, if not first of all eradicated from our minds, will disturb the whole discussion. But this appeal is asserted to be made, not on the ground of compassion for the Poles—it is stated on the score simply of the common interests of the European nations; and nothing is demanded for Poland beyond what those interests require us to allow. This general good may be viewed in two senses, the one more enlarged than the other, and comprehending a reference to consistency and principle; the other more limited, and confined to what is vulgarly termed national benefit. A sound and enlightened policy never can separate these two views for any purpose, except to examine the subject-matter by each of them successively, with the greater distinctness.

I. It is impossible to look forward, without some alarm, to the moment which seems fast approaching, when the results of all the late victories and the pending negotiations are to be disclosed, and mankind shall learn the value of the professions with which the war has hitherto been conducted. The following doubts upon this most interesting subject have certainly been partly removed since the appeal was published. Swedish objects having turned the Crown Prince aside from his progress towards the Rhine, we have seen him obtain Norway in exchange for Pomerania (the value of which may be somewhere about one twentieth of the former). But it is not so generally known, that this distinguished personage smoothed the way to his elevation by the most distinct promises to obtain the restoration of Finland; and that, whether well or ill founded, the wish of the Swedish people for such an event, can only be exceeded by their extreme indifference to the acquisition of Norway. Probably the next Diet will have all the papers laid before them, which may chance to contain evidence of the reiterated and earnest efforts made to get back Finland, with the grounds upon which Alexander the Restorer declined it, and the Swedish patriot acquiesced. In the mean time, let us hope, that this may be the only part of the passage which the event may realise:—

“The secret enemies of the coalition; the abettors of French oppression; they who have seen the progress of victory with a malignant eye—who could hardly dissemble their joy were a reverse unhappily to interrupt its course—the evil disposed, of whatever description, throughout Europe, are now awaiting in anxious expectation the moment when every declaration of principle promulgated since the beginning of the contest, will be tried by a searching and unerring scrutiny. Their suspense may last for some time; the war may be prolonged, or the negotiations may proceed slowly: until the mutual offers of the parties are known, until the ultimate result is disclosed, all must continue to be taken upon trust. But the decision of the question, how far the allies act up to their principles, is assuredly pronounced as soon as the world sees the terms of the treaty. It is decided, and for ever, by every rational man in Europe, within an hour after those terms are made known to him. With it, too, is decided finally the fate of every future coalition for the liberation of Europe—of every future attempt which France may hazard to regain her lost usurpations. The enemies of the good cause are full of hope that the Allies will be found wanting to themselves, in this day of trial: and that a scene will be disclosed similar to former negotiations—a combination of craft and violence, a balance of cupidity and fear, a base trucking of principles for territory, a cold-blooded barter of human beings by millions, in which the pattern of French treaties is closely followed; and the victorious parties take all they safely can, or show any moderation they may have in their nature, only towards the conquered enemy—alienating their friends—at once raising up their antagonists, and arming them with confidence by following their worst example—securing the censure of impartial posterity, and laying the deepest groundwork of future discomfiture, by abundantly deserving it.

“I confess that I have no apprehension of seeing these frightful anticipations realised, at least in their most odious form. The state of the war in Spain, let us hope in Holland also, may prevent the possibility of the Peninsula and the United Provinces being given up to French domination. But it is to the full as great an impeachment of the principles of the coalition, to expect that they will only be followed where there is little temptation, and scarcely any opportunity, to swerve from them. The sincerity of the Allies must, I fear, be tried by a higher test. We shall be asked by the enemy and his wellwishers, how have they treated the sovereigns whom force alone drove into Bonaparte’s toils? To abandon Spain, or partition Holland, was next to impossible. Bavaria had the opportunity of joining them—but have they made the conduct of Denmark and of Saxony a pretext for seeking indemnities at their expense? Have they required pay at the end of a service in which we had imagined they were volunteers? Does it turn

out, after all, that the liberation of the Continent means, in the Russian Dictionary, a new slice, being the sixth, of Poland? Does the balance of Europe, in good Swedish, signify a weighing of Finland against Norway; of pledges to Sweden against bargains with Russia; of the affections of the people against the interest or convenience of the crown? Is interminable war with French usurpation, the Prussian, for a war which is to end as soon as the Saxon villages shall be garnished with spread eagles? These questions, let us hope, will receive a satisfactory answer in the result of the present negotiations; we may rest assured that they will be put by every honest and every thinking man in Europe. The true policy of the Allies is contained in a single word, which expresses their bounden duty also—*restoration*. This word implies another, which all parties have an interest, though certainly a very unequal one, in freely using—*forgiveness*. That we should be fated to witness such a spectacle as the Elector of Saxony stripped of his dominions to enrich Russia and Prussia, upon the ground of his having taken a title and a territory by treaty with the former, and joined the enemy in company with the latter, is a consummation earnestly to be deprecated by all those friends of kingly dignity who may not relish seeing it stoop to something very much in the nature of a practical joke.”—P. 11—14.

It is assumed, however, and we sincerely hope with truth, that the Allies will continue true to their principles, and only show themselves anxious to re-establish the independence of Europe upon a lasting foundation. How, then, is this to be accomplished? By recurring to those principles which in former times secured national independence, and made the neighbourhood of the greatest state safe to the most insignificant. These principles have been so often detailed in the pages of this Journal that we shall not enlarge upon them, farther than to observe, that they consist in the universal persuasion among statesmen, constantly in view and acted on, that every aggression by one power affects all; and that not an acre of territory may be taken with impunity from any member of the European commonwealth. If any superficial reasoner, from ignorance, should deride such doctrine as speculative, or as old-fashioned and ill suited to the spirit of the times, we beg him to observe, that the consequences of disregarding it have been sufficiently practical, and that all the security of old times has been banished from the world by this very heresy. But we may stop a little, to put the matter in a light which even a clerk in office, we should think, will admit to be practical and plain.

We shall suppose that success continues to attend the Allies, and that they compel Bonaparte to make a peace upon their own terms. They have told us themselves, that those terms will leave France possessed of more territory than she had before the Revolution: but suppose that she only has her old limits—a result not very probable—however we shall take it so; no man can doubt that the whole attention of her government will be turned towards regaining the ascendant which she has recently lost—that the personal character of her ruler, as well as the national feelings, will direct her whole efforts to this object. We say nothing of the large army of prisoners which must be sent back; but there is already a larger army within France, arising, no doubt, partly from the invasion. In one way or another, then, Bonaparte will have a prodigious force on foot; and it would be singular if peace did not augment his pecuniary resources. Can any man doubt that he will be a most formidable neighbour? Who is there so confident as to view, without apprehension, the probable event of a contest between him and any one of the Allies, single-handed? We speak not merely of the risks of a war between him and Holland, or the German principalities; but of a war between him and any one of the greater powers. We might, perhaps, go farther; but we are aware of the singular inconsistency of those whom we are now addressing; and know



full well, that although they can see nothing but dangers from France when peace is proposed, they ridicule every one who adverts to such a topic for any other purpose. Supposing it, then, only to be stated that Bonaparte is more than a match for the third and fourth-rate powers in his neighbourhood, and for any one of the greater powers, we desire to know wherein the security of the Continent shall consist after a peace has recruited him? What chance is there of his not being desirous once more to cross the Rhine? Then, what reasonable prospect have we of his being restrained within his limits? Assuredly one only.—If the rest of Europe, recollecting the sufferings of late years, shall be wise enough to be perpetually upon the watch, and resolute enough to make common cause with the first prince or state whom he may attack, then there will be no chance of his prevailing as he has heretofore done; for their armies are in every respect improved, his forces no longer fight with superior enthusiasm, and the feeling of the people all over Germany is decidedly against him. The security of the Continent, then, must rest, first, upon the recurrence of the government to ancient principles; and, after that, upon the improvement of its military system, and the diffusion of right popular feelings. Now, it cannot be for a moment contended that the terms upon which a treaty is made are indifferent in respect of the disposition to keep it either on the part of the government or the people. If those terms are consistent with justice and sound principles, it is infinitely easier to unite both governments and their subjects against the infringement of them. If a settlement of Europe is made upon the profligate scheme of each party taking as much as he can get by force or intrigue,—if a few powerful states lay their heads together, and despoil all the rest,—if the interests and the feelings of the people go for nothing in the arrangement, who can expect that either the different cabinets will be ready at a moment's warning to unite against any one which may violate the arrangements thus foully made, or that the popular feelings, which it wholly disregarded, will rise up to defend it? What confidence can the parties to such a scheme have in each other? What answer can they give to the first among them who betrays the common cause, by joining the enemy in breaking the bargain? What answer can they make to the enemy when he proposes some new plot of the same kind, and quotes to the world their own authority in the very last precedent on record? If men were mere machines in the hands of courts, and all governments were carried on upon the Turkish plan, it might signify little what are the grounds of war, or how inconsistent the professions were with the practice of statesmen. There would then be no question of popular opinion; but, even then, it would be impossible for mutual confidence to prevail among allies. A single government might go on—a confederacy of more than one could not exist; and accordingly, among states of this description, no man ever thought of a balance of power. We take it to be very manifest that a treaty founded upon disregard of principle—upon the revolutionary and not the older and sounder doctrines of modern Europe, would speedily share the fate of those other compacts which each successive war, since 1792, has forced upon the vanquished, and each new aggression of the common enemy has broken, without uniting either allied courts or popular feeling in their behalf.

There are many very urgent reasons for exhibiting the return of public principles and honour, more peculiarly in the case of Poland. It is universally agreed that they were here first grossly violated. The partition of 1772, to use the language of Mr. Burke, was “the first very great breach in the modern political system of Europe. It was not sapping by

degrees the constitution of our great western republic — it was laying the axe at once to the root, in such a manner as threatened the overthrow of the whole.” If these were his forebodings at the time, he unhappily lived to see them exceeded by the event: his declining years witnessed the completion of the crime in Poland, and its cruel effects over every part of the Continent. He again foretold, with his accustomed sagacity, that its perpetrators would be the first to repent, and to suffer by it. We have the authority of one well acquainted with foreign politics, more especially those of France, for asserting that the last partitions, in 1793 and 1794, animated the Jacobins with fresh courage and resources. He closes a striking parallel of the conduct pursued by the partitioning powers and the proceedings of the Revolutionary Committee with the remark, that if the republicans failed in establishing freedom and justice at home, they at least secured their independence from a foreign yoke; and that the fate of Poland made all Frenchmen, of all parties, swear to die rather than submit to receive the law from the Allies.\* This was written in 1802. Twelve years have elapsed since then, and twenty since the events it relates to. The same Allies are once more leagued against France, and occupy her frontier provinces. It is observable that Bonaparte has recourse to the very same topic which had so greatly aided his Jacobin predecessors: his state papers are full of Poland. “See there,” he exclaims, “the conduct of your invaders, who now come speaking to you of peace, and freedom, and national independence, while they hold in their hands the sword that reeks with the blood of Polish patriots!” We do not mean to lay much stress on the coincidence; but unquestionably the French people have now, as formerly, turned a deaf ear to all the protestations and promises of the Allies. It is, however, of the people of Europe generally that we are now speaking; and we submit it to even the most practical politician, whether they will not be disposed to obey the next call to rise in their own defence against any aggressor, and to believe that the proposition is made for their own good, the more because the Allies have kept faith with them on the present occasion? Whether it would not be a great advantage, in any future struggle with France, that the Allies could look her in the face, and complain of injustice, without fear of retort; that they could look at Poland, not only without shame, but with the proud recollection of principles carried into practice at the cost of what is commonly termed interest? Whether the general recurrence to those strict, sound, political maxims, which used to form the strength of coalitions, would not be most essentially promoted by undoing the odious act which first relaxed, and then almost entirely extirpated them?

The length of time which has elapsed since the first partition, is the most ready answer to these suggestions. Nor are we disposed to deny that, in matters of public as well as private right, long and fixed possession should have great weight. But we are now speaking rather of the last than of the first dismemberment; and against undoing this no such objection can be offered. The lamentable events of 1772 left Poland a great and powerful state. It still had a population of above ten millions, and the partition had produced a most important change: there was an end of all the former anarchy and faction, insomuch that the diet of 1788 exhibited an unprecedented scene of unanimity. The leaders of the nation seemed anxious only for the firm establishment of a regular and free constitution, which should secure the external independence and promote the

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\* Segur, *Tableau de l'Europe*, III. 180.

domestic improvement of their country. The deliberative wisdom displayed by some of those eminent men was still more striking than the eloquence of their debates. The speech of Count Potocki, upon the sale of the Starosties, has been preserved; and assuredly it exhibits as sober and sagacious a disposition of mind as might be expected in assemblies meeting in the quietest times. He warns his brethren of the Diet against following the example of the French revolution, in its exceptionable parts; for he was aware of these, although it was long before the public opinion in Europe had turned against the revolutionary proceedings. "The faults which France has committed," says he, "originate in a single error; she has only considered men in the mass; she has lost sight of the individual. Eager to do justice towards the whole, she has injured the parts; she has dealt with the members of civil society as if they were ideal beings, or geometrical figures, on which she might reason abstractly and systematically, without ever regarding them as in fact they exist." The labours of these enlightened and temperate reformers terminated in giving to Poland that celebrated Constitution of the 3d of May, which she was fated to possess but for a moment of passing tranquillity and freedom. To say that it has been universally admired, is a general and unavailing praise. But, in the ferment of the French revolution, while the invidious enemies of the Poles were busy in representing them as Jacobins — at a moment when even the abolition of the Slave Trade was held to be a French crime, and Mr. Burke, half giving into the mistake, abandoned that cause — we find Mr. Burke himself proclaiming to the world his highest admiration of the Polish patriots and their new constitution. His eloquent panegyric thus concludes: — "Happy people! if they knew how to proceed as they have begun! Happy prince! worthy to begin with splendour, or to close with glory, a race of patriots and of kings! To finish all — this great good, as in the instant it is, contains in it the seeds of all future improvement, and may be considered as in a regular progress, because founded on similar principles, towards the stable excellence of a British constitution."\* It is not our intention to detail the provisions of this admirable code, remarkable alike for the salutary changes which it boldly introduced where the evil would bear no temporising, and for the moderation and skill with which it paved the way towards more gradual improvement, where a sudden alteration was not required and might have proved hazardous. But a few of its leading features deserve notice in this discussion. It distinctly recognised the principle, "that all power in civil society should be derived from the will of the people, its end and object being the preservation and integrity of the state, the civil liberty and good order of society, on an equal scale and lasting foundation." (Art. V.) — The legislative, executive, and judicial powers, were separated from each other †; the duration of the legislature was limited to two years; but its constant existence was provided for; and the *liberum veto* was wholly abolished. The crown was declared no longer to be elective, except upon the extinction of the family in which it was made hereditary. The person of the king was declared inviolable; but he could do no act whatever without a responsible minister. He was intrusted with the command of the armies, and the disposal of a revenue raised by the legislature; but, fearful of any thing resembling the *veto*, the constitution gave him no other voice in legislation, except as

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\* Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs.

† This was carried perhaps too far, as with us after the Revolution — for no minister could sit in the Diet. — Art. VI.

president of the senate. Various wholesome regulations were established for preserving freedom and order in elections, and for securing the communication between the representative and constituent. Important reforms in the administration of justice were begun, by abolishing private and seignorial jurisdictions, both lay and clerical, in the towns; and appointing a commission to revise the civil and criminal code. In the mean time, an explicit recognition was made of "that cardinal law, *neminem captivabimus nisi jure victum*" (§ 2.); and the maxim was distinctly enacted, "that every man is free the moment he touches Polish ground." (Art. IV.)—The wisdom of this system was equally shown in the modest anticipation of its defects; and provisions were carefully made for a revision of it at stated periods, as well as for partial corrections and improvements. To support this constitution, the army was immediately raised from twenty to a hundred thousand men, by the unanimous voice of the Diet, and with the loudest acclamations of the people; contributions of money were poured in from all quarters; and when the zeal of the contributors outstripped the circulating powers of the currency, the more cumbrous wealth of the nobles might be seen moving towards the treasury, while their domains were alive with armed peasantry, ready to secure its expenditure.

"It may be questioned," says the Appeal, "if the time be even yet come, when the miserable catastrophe can be adequately deplored, that paralysed all those noble efforts, and blighted the fair prospect unfolded by them to the eyes of every friend of liberty. But one part of the calamity, that which pressed the most sorely upon the interests of the European community, will perhaps never be more deeply felt than at the present hour. I speak of the peculiar moment chosen by the confederate courts. The new constitution was enveloped in a cloud of foreign soldiery—the patriots were scattered abroad—the rudiments of the national army were dissipated—the country was overwhelmed, parcelled out, confiscated, jobbed, turned into money—blackened with garrisons, prisons, gibbets, cemeteries, and the desolate abodes of men who had perished for freedom—its separate existence finally destroyed—its name blotted out from the map, and forbidden to be any more uttered, as if it had been guilty of all the crimes whereof it had been the scene and the victim. But why enumerate particulars? Do they not all fall short of the deed itself? The partition of Poland was completed **AFTER** the French revolution had awakened slumbering royalty—had taught the force of France to burst through its ancient bounds—and had made national independence tremble in every corner of Europe. This is the fact upon which, at the present moment, it imports us well to meditate. There is no getting over it. If Poland had been left as she was when those great changes began which the Allies are now occupied in undoing, she would still have been one of the greatest powers on the Continent. She was seized when even the pretences of 1772 no longer existed—when she was a safe, orderly, and peaceable neighbour. But, above all, she was seized in 1793 and 1794, at the very time when France was seizing Savoy, Belgium, and Holland. This is the matter which *now* presses itself upon our attention. We are recurring to sound and ancient principles. We are treading back our steps in order to get out of the slough in which we have been since the French revolution, and to regain the eminence of a pure morality. We are endeavouring to undo as much as possible the recent changes of dominion, and to place the affairs of Europe on their former ground, with all the benefits of past experience. With what pretension of consistency—by what powers of face, marvellous even in this unblushing age,—can we meet either the enemy or the Poland, if the only change on which we are obstinately silent is one of the most momentous and the least justifiable, and which our conscience tells us was effected in the very same month with the conquest of the Netherlands, admitted on every hand to be the fittest subject of restoration?" P. 22, 23.

Perhaps a few details will serve to illustrate the different parts of this

description, which is a mere enumeration of undoubted facts. To feel an interest in the fate of the Polish constitution is natural for Englishmen, and it is not new. Some feelings of this kind were formerly excited among us, and steps were even taken to succour the patriots. Why should not the returning peace and liberty of Europe be marked by a revival of those feelings, at once kindly and salutary, among ourselves?

By a treaty solemnly concluded with Poland in 1790, a few months before the constitution was promulgated, the King of Prussia had bound himself to prevent, by all the means in his power, "any interference in the internal affairs of the republic, or its dependencies, at any time, or in any manner whatsoever, or upon whatever pretence of former transactions or stipulations, or any construction of the same;" — and if other endeavours failed, he bound himself to make common cause with Poland against the aggressor. When Russia marched her armies thither in 1792, Frederick-William declined to interfere, upon the pretence that "the constitution of the 3d of May altered the matter; that he never had approved of it; and had always foreseen its evil consequences."\* The royal memory is short indeed. Only two years before, on receiving the account of the constitution being proclaimed, he had written with his own hand the warmest congratulations to the authors of it — commanding his ambassador to "declare, in the most formal manner, his sincere felicitations to the king, the marshals † of the Diet, and all those who had contributed to so important a work;" praising the change "as essential to the happiness of the nation," and "likely to confirm for ever the harmony and close connection subsisting between them:" — and professing that his ardent desire was "to assist in consolidating the new constitution, and promoting the happiness of the republic." The Empress Catherine, too, had a singular anxiety for the "happiness of the republic;" and accordingly, she no sooner heard of the new constitution, than she pretended to listen to a wretched junto of some five or six factious nobles (only one of whom had any weight), the last remains of party, and the only objectors to the change. She sent an order to Warsaw that the constitution should be abolished, and the old anarchy, "whereof she was guarantee," restored; announcing that her armies were on their march for effecting this purpose. They marched accordingly, and the King of Prussia took the opportunity of "seizing provisionally Thorn, Dantzic, and part of Great Poland, to secure his states against the contagion of French principles, and to protect the well disposed inhabitants." ‡ The Poles in those parts being wholly taken by surprise, as was indeed not unnatural after the treaties and letters so lately signed by the same royal hand, could make little resistance. But when the handful of Russian partisans at Targowitz, beginning to open their eyes, asked the Empress what all this meant? her minister was pleased to reply, that "they should have a blind confidence in the generous protection of her Imperial Majesty, and not imprudently defend themselves against Prussia, without first consulting her." At length, in concert with Frederick-William, she threw off the mask. The principal confederates of Targowitz, finding how they had been duped, joined the rest of their countrymen; and it is difficult to avoid rejoicing that their unparalleled folly was soon punished

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\* Answer of the King of Prussia to the King of Poland, June 8. 1792.

† Letter of the King of Prussia, May, 1791.

‡ Manifesto, March 25. 1793.

in Siberia by the perfidy of the court which had seduced them. The two powers assembled, in a remote town, a diet of such persons as they thought would answer their purposes: but even these, being Polanders, it was necessary to compel them by military force. The place where they met was surrounded by musketry and artillery. The only effect was to produce a dead silence. The creatures of Russia interpreting this into consent, several persons were bold enough to protest aloud, and they instantly found themselves in the hands of the Cossacks. Terror is the appointed punishment of despots; it follows close upon violence, and touches the criminal whom conscience cannot reach. Having thus extorted a new share of Poland, on the shameless pretext "that it was tainted with French principles"—because it had just exchanged the anarchy of an elective for the stability of an hereditary monarchy—the spoilers required that the army should be reduced to 12,000. Many regiments refusing to lay down their arms, reinforcements of Russian troops were poured in. The chief patriots of 1791 had been forced to fly the country; but the whole population furnished materials for insurrection; and one or two individuals in the capital prepared the means of it, although the country was still over-run with the troops of Russia and Prussia.

In every part of the country, this unfortunate people flew to arms; and Kosciusko, and their other leaders, having secretly returned, after proclaiming war and internal emancipation in the same manifesto, led them on against the enemy—in circumstances all but desperate. History will record, to the consolation of freemen in future ages, that the invincible ardour of troops, half armed, and newly raised, and scarcely at all disciplined, beat the veteran forces of Catherine and Frederick, never less than thrice their numbers, in many fierce engagements. Madalinsky, with 800 horse, made his way through the Prussian troops, and traversed the whole of the country occupied by them. At Wraclavicz, Kosciusko, with 4000 men, principally peasants, defeated 12,000, with the loss of 3000, and 12 pieces of cannon: one battery, in this engagement, was actually taken by a corps armed with pitchforks. Jasinski took Wilna with 600 men, and drove away the Russians, with the loss of 1500 prisoners. In Warsaw, the people rose on the garrison; and notwithstanding the dreadful fire which it kept up with artillery, after 48 hours' hard fighting, drove them out with a loss of 6000 killed, 3000 prisoners, and 50 pieces of cannon. Such a discomfiture seemed to require an explanation; and the Russians have accounted for it, in a detailed memorial, which ascribes it chiefly to the pillaging and drunkenness of the troops, of whom it says 60 were killed in a state of intoxication in one cellar.\* Frederick-William marched against the capital with 40,000; and Kosciusko, advancing to meet him with 12,000, repulsed him with loss. The Prussians took Cracow; and the people of Warsaw, as happens in such cases, showed signs of violence against their persons; but, unlike the encouragers of the Parisian Septemberizers, their leader instantly checked this spirit, by making some examples. The united forces of the Allies now bore upon Warsaw, and laid siege to it with all the resources of war and of intrigue. They were kept at bay for two months, and sustained several defeats; and the Prussians raised the siege, in order to check a formidable insurrection of the Poles in Southern Prussia. At length, Kosciusko—after a long and obstinate engagement with Ferzen,

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\* Memoirs, p. 148.

in which an overpowering superiority of numbers would have been of no avail, had not a treacherous coadjutor \* deserted him in a critical moment, covered with wounds — was defeated, and taken. His virtues and misfortunes are said to have melted the rude nature of the Cossacks, who were about to comply with his entreaties, and to kill him, when some one recognised him. He was carried to Petersburg, and flung into a dungeon, where he languished during the remainder of Catherine's iniquitous reign. Even this dreadful reverse, and the defeats that followed, in nowise diminished the enthusiasm of the Poles. They showed neither the listlessness nor the cruelty of despair; — no commander was persecuted for his losses — and no relaxation appeared in their preparations for defence. The whole strength of the Russians was required to take Warsaw, after a gallant resistance, and immense loss on either side. Of the unfortunate Poles, 9000 perished in the fight. After the place was carried, it was in cold blood given up to pillage and massacre; — 30,000 persons, of all ages, and either sex, are supposed to have suffered death, in every horrid form of torture and indignity; — 30,000 more, who still refused to submit, were suffered to leave the place, and afterwards hunted down by the soldiery on every side, so that few reached the frontiers. The *amnesty* (as it was phrased), promised by the commander, was not ratified by his Imperial mistress — and the most distinguished chiefs were sent to distant prisons. The wretched monarch was carried away to Russia, where he soon after died, not without suspicious circumstances; — the remainder of the country was partitioned; and Catherine, as she describes herself in her proclamation, “*with the solicitude of a tender mother, who only wishes for the happiness of her children,*” concluded the scene, by ordering a solemn “*thanksgiving to God in all the churches, for the blessings conferred upon the Poles;*” and commanded, that each of them should “*swear fidelity and loyalty to her, and to shed in her defence the last drop of their blood, as they should answer for it to God, and his terrible judgment, kissing the holy word and cross of their Saviour.*”

All this we admit, however, was performed, not by French but Russian authority, which makes a great difference; moreover, it was done towards Poles, and not Spaniards. We doubt also, if it was not somewhat exceeded by several of the proceedings at the time of the first partition — at any rate, it had its equal among those; so that if the Russians had not positively improved, they had at least a precedent in their own history for their conduct. The afflicting but romantic story of the Confederates of Barr, abounding on the part of the Poles with actions of gallantry and skill scarcely to be equalled, is terribly disfigured by the systematic cruelty with which the Russians sought to supply the want of enthusiasm and of genius. “For the honour of human nature,” says the Appeal, “it is to be hoped, that a monster like Drewitz may never again be born of woman.” But details are avoided, as leading to irritation. This man was the leader against the Confederates; and one of the most interesting and sagacious of modern histories thus relates his proceedings †: — “Persons of rank, who had capitulated as prisoners, were butchered by him in cold blood, with the tortures invented in Russia for the punishment of slaves. Sometimes he bound them to trees, and made them serve as

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\* Poninski — not Poniatouski, as is absurdly stated in some accounts, *e. g.* Annual Register.

† Rulhiere, tom. iii. p. 139.

marks for the soldiers to shoot at; sometimes their heads were dexterously carried off by lancers, as at a tournament." — "Whole companies were turned out, with their hands cut off, and allowed to wander up and down the country; and, with a ferocity wholly inconceivable, joining mockery to unheard of cruelty, he flayed those miserable victims alive; cutting the skin, so as to represent, with the flesh, the national dress of the Poles." \* Such was the precedent of 1772. The details of the massacres of 1794 are not minute enough to show how far it was followed.

If cruelty of this description produces a more acute degree of misery, it is neither so wide-spreading nor so lasting in its consequences as the impoverishment by confiscation. The assertion in the Appeal, that Poland was "parcelled out, confiscated, jobbed, turned into money," is most strictly and literally true. Each time that a Russian army enters Poland, whether for the purpose of partition, or of driving out an enemy, a *commission of confiscation* is assembled as a matter of course. There has been, for instance, one sitting at Wilna since December, 1812, composed of five Russians, pretty well known before in Poland. All offences against the state are punished with confiscation; and there is consequently no lack of such accusations. Every thing becomes a state offence in times of change; and the information of a spy, a private enemy, a turned off lackey, a swindling Jew, a conscious malefactor, aware that he has been detected, is quite sufficient to put the emissaries, whether military or civil, of the extraordinary police in movement. The false accuser, too, runs no risk; for the first step is to send away the accused seven or eight hundred miles on his road to Siberia, at which distance, if at all, the examination of the charge is gone into. In the mean time his whole property is put in sequestration, and handed over to interim managers appointed by the police, — frequently the informers or their friends, — frequently the agents of those who are expecting to have the estates finally given to them. We may easily picture to ourselves the change which such a proceeding must make in the lot of the whole peasantry on the property: they have lost their protector and parent; and, instead of his managers, chosen for their knowledge of the people and their kind dispositions, there are now to be seen and felt a set of harpies selected for their power of plundering, or in consideration of their wants. The commission proceeds against the property, and keeps it in sequestration, or declares it confiscated, according to circumstances. When confiscated, it is granted out to some favourite, and irrevocably lost to the proprietor. The favourite is a Russian; and, in all probability, never intends to come near it, but means to squander as much as can be squeezed out of it, at Petersburg. If the accused proprietor, in spite of every disadvantage, as want of money, distance from his proofs, preju-

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\* The adventures of the Polish chiefs — the two Pulawskis, Zarembo, &c. — form a most interesting contrast to these atrocities. The surprise, and subsequent siege of Czenstokow — the singular march of Kosakowski — the campaigns of the partisans, almost invisible, except at the moment when they fell on their prey — the activity and address of Dumourier — the firm and sustained wisdom of the council of Eperis; — form altogether a history, certainly not to be easily surpassed in point of brilliancy and interest. It would be highly desirable that the most remarkable passages could be collected and published; the whole history of Poland abounds with such, from the most ancient times. A concise series of Polish adventures would furnish a work, equally important and entertaining.



dice of his judge, is lucky enough to escape and return, he may very possibly find his estates confiscated by the commission, which does not always await the event of the examination, knowing probably how rarely any such ceremony is performed; but should he be happy enough to return before decree of confiscation has passed, and obtain a restitution of the property, he finds it damaged to the amount of half its value, in every shape that dilapidation can assume. If the proprietor happen to be absent from the country at the time of partition or invasion, confiscation follows of course; he is presumed to be with the enemy, although (as happened very frequently last summer) he may have gone abroad with regular passports, for health, business, or pleasure. Still more certainly are the estates seized and the families ruined of those who, actually serving with the enemy, have been unable to get away; as was the case with subjects of the Austrian and Prussian parts; whose rulers sent them into Bonaparte's service one year, and who the next were ruined by the Allies for not deserting. We are, however, chiefly considering the effects of such measures on the body of the inhabitants. Many estates have above twenty thousand; some have above a hundred; but it is no very rich lordship which numbers four or five. The wretchedness of these, under such changes, may, perhaps, be estimated by those who are acquainted with the proceedings of middlemen and tithe-proctors in Ireland, or rapacious attorneys, and needy mortgagees in the West Indies. The latter case is the more exact parallel.

It is of no consequence that the prince at the head of the empire is the mirror of justice and goodness; the fault is in the system; and he cannot, all-powerful as he is, make men act right under a vicious order of things, or superintend the execution of his own benevolent intentions: he must trust it to agents, to his Cœrtels, his Rozens, and their inferior harpies, at an immense distance from his residence. It is in vain that he issues his manifestoes, and confirms them by ukases; that upon entering the country he proclaims peace and restoration; promises amnesty, and complete security of person and property; and pledges himself to show the difference between a French and a Russian administration. (*Manifesto, January, 1813.*) Things proceed in their accustomed course; and the Emperor is at Frankfort while his agents are scattered over Poland. The exact history of the present confiscations is not yet known. That they are most numerous, cannot be doubted; the Petersburg Gazette has already published very long lists of them; and it appears that certain refinements have now for the first time been introduced into the scheme. Formerly the debts due upon the property, the sums for which it was mortgaged, the claims of widows and children, were lost as against the estate, which the crown or its grantee took freed from all incumbrance; and if a favourite of the government chanced to be the creditor, and, at some subsequent change, another estate of the same owner came under the dominion of Russia, it was seized to pay the debt due on the confiscated estate. Upon the present occasion, a further advance has been made towards the perfection of public justice, the *beau-ideal* of imperial conveyancing. All debts due *to* the estate, or its owner, are confiscated; and not only debts but expectancies, as reversions and remainders; nay even mere *spes successionis* — as the portion of a parent's effects which the child would have at his decease. But the new creditor, reversioner, or remainderman, is of an impatient disposition, and cannot await the term of payment, or the determination of the particular estate; — accordingly all debts must be immediately paid, and possession must be

forthwith given — and this without regard to the contingent nature of the reversionary interest; for if one of two sons is confiscated, the parent being alive and likely to have a third child, the government takes immediate possession of the half share, as if the parent were dead; and where there is but one son, the parent's whole effects are seized, by a species of visitation the very reverse of divine.

On the other hand, there was one financial arrangement in 1792 to which we believe the recent occupation of Poland has furnished no parallel. We allude to the measure of ruining public credit, by reducing all the banks to a state of insolvency, and then wasting their funds by a special commission. The business of the country used, from time immemorial, to be transacted at two stated meetings in the year; one at Warsaw, the other at Lemberg. At these, all contracts, whether respecting land or money, were made; and all settlements of accounts adjusted. The meetings were thence denominated the "*Contracts.*" They were attended by bankers of good credit, through whom balances were transferred, and who received new deposits, for which they paid interest. Of these great houses there were six or seven known and esteemed over all Poland. The chief was Tepper's; founded by Ferguson, a Scotchman. The Russian court cajoled him with honours, and the promise of a large estate, ("with a nice discrimination," says the Appeal, "of the national character,") until he was persuaded to lend them an enormous sum, which was punctually to be paid at the next "*Contracts.*" Instead of that, before the time, a Russian army was marched into the country; the proprietors brought little money to the meeting; and hearing of the loan, made a run on the house, which, thus disappointed of new deposits, and drained of the old, became bankrupt; and the others all followed. A commission to distribute the effects among the creditors was soon assembled; it consisted of ten agents from Russia, Prussia, and Austria; — the Russian being five in number. After sitting ten years, dividing somewhat more than eighteen-pence in the pound among the creditors; after subsisting, as such functionaries love to do, out of the funds at their disposal, they separated, and returned to their respective homes. Several of them were greatly enriched; and one of them, speaking of his gains, was pleased to observe upon this touching subject — "In this pocket I have got 100,000 ducats\*; and what I have in the other I won't tell you." The unfortunate Tepper, it is needless to observe, never received his promised estate; but a Russian officer had the mercy to assassinate him, after he had been reduced from the highest wealth to the most extreme misery.

The operation of banishment is intimately connected with that of confiscation; and is the constant work of the police and of individuals in authority, during times of change. It affects all ranks, — from the Prince-bishop of Cracow, who was carried away to Siberia, and died deranged in consequence after his return, — down to the peasantry, who are carried off by thousands to serve in the army, or be sold in Russia, or people some district in Asia. Pallas, the celebrated traveller, found in that remote wilderness, a tribe, the remains of a vast number carried thither on a scheme of this description. They were living in wretchedness; and, no longer hoping to see their country, had only one request to make, that their land might not, as heretofore, be seized by the government, as soon as they had brought it into cultivation. In Warsaw,

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\* £50,000.

above a hundred persons of eminent wealth or rank have been carried off in a season. The sex exempts not from this common lot of Poles. Matrons of the highest dignity, and most fascinating accomplishments, are exposed to the same risks with their husbands and sons. Persons in authority have been known to carry off some hundreds of peasants at a sweep, under pretence of recruiting, and then sell them in the Russian provinces.

The general ill treatment experienced by the people wherever Russian troops are stationed, must not be passed over; for it is a perpetual misery, and affects those who have escaped exile and confiscation; nor can any care of the government materially amend it. While the Poles feel the ardent attachment to their country which distinguishes them, they can never be expected to regard the Russian troops as any thing but oppressors. The Russians, on their part, view them as discontented, and almost rebellious subjects;—their principle being, that every Pole is an object of suspicion. No care of the ruler can reconcile such discordant classes of subjects, or make them live in harmony. A Polish village, where troops have been for some days, is said to resemble a place taken by storm. We insert an extract of a letter from a mercantile gentleman of undoubted respectability, who travelled over this country in the months of March and April. It is a literal translation from the German original.

“After having passed through burned and plundered villages, where contagion and injurious treatment have left only a few wretched peasants, who, pale, distracted, cause fear and pity to the traveller, you arrive in a city. The suburbs are usually burned completely; and so sometimes is a part of the city. The streets are empty; many houses are shut up and abandoned as during the plague. If you enter one of those which are inhabited, to ask after persons of your acquaintance, you learn that they are in exile, or have concealed themselves to escape some disaster. People are every where packing up their effects, and preparing to set out. The whole nation is seized with terror. If you ask the reason, the answer is—Ertel is to be here in a few days; or, Rosen has arrived, or has sent secret orders. None are to be seen in the streets, unless when wretches are led to punishment, or prisoners conducted to Siberia. These are often well known characters; gentlemen, persons in holy orders, who are seen chained on a cart, surrounded by Cossacks, or Barchkirs, with sabres in their hands.

“I travelled through Poland in the month of March last, and a second time in returning; each time I grew sick at the continual spectacle of death engraven on every countenance.”

A circumstance remains to be noticed of the greatest importance, especially at the present moment, when changes are again but too probable. Each partition, each change of dominion, has been of necessity accompanied by a change of frontier; and this entails upon the districts in which it takes place, as well as on others more remote, consequences extremely serious. A proprietor's estate is cut in two; one part becomes Russian, the other Prussian; or he has different estates lying in two, or in all the three monarchies. This happens to almost every one of the great landholders. How does this affect them? First, every war between the three powers becomes a civil war to them; and their numerous relatives and connections are fighting in different sides. Next, hold what conduct they may, it is impossible they can escape offending one or other of their masters; and their property and relatives are at hand to answer for the offence. Again, they cannot go from one estate to another, or it may be

from one part of the same farm to another, in time of war; and even in peace, not without a passport, which must be had from the capital in the Russian parts, and may take about eight months to procure. Moreover, though a passport were out of the question, a frontier never fails to create delay and vexations of every kind; planted, as it ever is, with custom-houses and officers of every description, whose duty is to stop and examine, but who make their duty a cover for their trade, which is to annoy and extort. Lastly, frontier provinces are naturally more dissolute, from the facilities of eluding the police. The Appeal thus states the changes of frontier to which Poland has been subjected; and subjoins a notice of the most serious consequence of all—the constant alteration of laws which such revolutions produce.

“ First, the partition of 1772 drew four sets of lines in different directions. Immediately afterwards, Austria was dissatisfied, and mistaking the name of a river, took in a small but convenient territory by a new line. Prussia said (we have it under Frederick’s hand), that if Austria made mistakes, so could other people; and he followed her example in the north. In 1793, new lines were drawn by all the three powers; and in 1795 they completed their work, by describing the last great boundaries that have been drawn. But in 1806, the Prussians were driven out, which was equivalent to another change of boundary; and by the peace of Tilsit, the district of Bialystock was transferred from the new duchy to Russia. In 1809, Austrian Poland was cut in twain, and half given to the duchy; the district of Tarnopol was also handed over to Russia. Is it possible to reflect on the situation of a country thus unceasingly cut in pieces, without feeling the deepest compassion for the vast amount of individual misery which all those violent operations must have occasioned?

“ A most serious calamity resulting from them, is the change of laws which they involve in almost each case. The Russian parts of Poland have indeed preserved their ancient municipal laws; but Austria and Prussia have introduced their own codes, and Bonaparte has followed their example. Hence Galicia has undergone these revolutions within forty years: at first the government was provisional, and in part military; no regular system of jurisprudence was established till 1774, when the Austrian law was introduced; and the provinces added in 1793 and 1794, were subjected to the same system. In 1800 the new code prepared by Martini was proclaimed: in 1809, Western Galicia being incorporated with the duchy, received the Code Napoleon; and Tarnopol, a part of Eastern Galicia, being given to Russia, the old Polish law was restored to it.—Prussian Poland received the Frederician code at each partition: in 1807 the bulk of it was subjected to the Code Napoleon, and Bialystock was restored to the Polish law. Now all those systems of jurisprudence are wholly unlike each other in their principles and forms, both civil and criminal, except that Martini’s code was merely civil, and, by a strange anomaly, left the old form of proceedings, while it overturned the principles. We may imagine how searching the operations are of such changes. To be guaranteed against any future revolutions of this kind, even were they unaccompanied with confiscations and military execution, would be a solid and general benefit to the people; it would be the foundation stone of a tranquillity and security which they have never known. Who can think, without repugnance, on the bare possibility of the present successes all over Europe, ending in a renewal of those afflicting operations in Poland;—that when the rest of the world, awakened to peace, shall be looking back on the last twenty years as a long and frightful dream, the happy change should only be to Poland the beginning of new troubles; and the signal for the ancient principalities and powers taking up the dismal tale of violence which they have been compelling the children of revolution to lay down? Grant that Poland deserves punishment—though I conceive this has been fully disproved—has she not been sufficiently tormented? Or will those who hold seven years’ possession and a compulsory treaty as making unimpeachable title to the fruits of princely rapine, allow, when the people err, no atonement in half a century of misery—no expiatory virtue in patriotism sealed with blood?” P. 59—61.

We have now traced, with a feeble, certainly, but a faithful pencil, the outlines of a picture of national injustice and suffering, not easily matched in modern times. By far the greater part of those evils belong to the period of the French revolution. The question, at present, is how Europe may best be restored to its former state; all statesmen are occupied with this enquiry, which the victories of the Allies have at length made practical one. We profess to be wholly unable to comprehend why a Poland alone should be left out of view, and no man ever think of terminating the sad scenes which we have just been surveying. It will not now do to say, as Mr. Gentz and others have said, The partition has become a matter of history — it is part of the settled state of European affairs. When did they say so? After the peace of Luneville; that is, seven years after the worst of the partitions. Then the same argument now applies more strongly to all the changes effected by the peace of Presburgh in 1805, and of Tilsit in 1807, which the Allies are at this moment engaged in undoing upon the principles of restoration. Nay, the same argument, if urged at present, applies with equal force to the case of Holland, over-run in the same month in which Poland was blotted out of the map. Indeed, there is this material difference to be observed in favour of Poland, that England and France never recognised the partition; whereas all the powers of Europe have by solemn treaties acknowledged the Dutch republic, and the whole changes prior to 1803. But the Dutch freed themselves: — admit it to be so; would the restoration of their independence have been the less a matter of negotiation, if it had either not been effected at all previous to a cessation of hostilities, or if it had been brought about by the progress of the allied arms on the upper Rhine?

We shall, however, now take another view of the question, which may have some weight with those who will not listen to the argument from principle and consistency. The statements already given, coupled with the facts generally known, lead to conclusions quite irresistible with respect to the *advantages*, in the most ordinary and limited sense of the word, which would result to the Allies from restoring the independence of Poland. These are stated in the Appeal under two heads, Economical and Military; of which the former, though less striking than the latter, are, we conceive, equally undeniable. Let any man reflect on the condition of the Polish provinces during the last forty, but especially the last twenty years, and say whether their possessors can have derived the benefits from them, in a commercial point of view, which a peaceable intercourse between their other dominions, and those fertile districts, would have secured. The whole commerce of Poland, by its position, must enrich the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian dominions, which surround it on every side. To keep its inhabitants in the state in which they have so long been held, is in truth sacrificing as much of the benefits of such a neighbourhood, as human impolicy warring with natural riches can destroy. But sovereigns seldom listen to such an argument; they look to extent of territory — increase of revenue — and augmentation of forces. Is it conceivable, that the undisputed mistress of continents scarcely explored, should desire a comparatively trifling addition of land, with a vicious title, and a contested, insecure possession? Does Austria stand in need of territory? Surely such a motive is only intelligible at Berlin. As for the revenue and the recruits derived from Poland, they must suffer a large deduction when we come to set off against them the cost, both in men and money, at which that country

has been half conquered, and uneasily retained. But let us look more particularly to the insecurity of the possession, and the benefits in a defensive view, derivable from a change of system. This consideration will at once, we believe, settle the question.

Except as a matter of curiosity, it is useless to enquire whence arises that singular affection for their country, by which the Poles are distinguished. Some persons may ascribe it perhaps to the natural vivacity of their character, and their imperfect state of refinement; the state of anarchy to which they have so long been accustomed, by calling forth, in one way or another, almost every man's exertions, has undoubtedly contributed much to it; and the dreadful sufferings which, of late, have united them in a wish for restoration, and an antipathy towards their masters, have naturally operated in the same direction. But the fact is certain, whatever be its explanation; and we might safely appeal to any one who has had intercourse with them, to say whether he has ever met a single Pole who appeared to feel like the common run of men, in questions regarding his country. These sentiments are, with this people, not occasional, but constant and habitual; they never cease to prey upon their minds; they are perpetually present with persons of every age, and both sexes; and he who should fancy that the lower orders cannot share in them, "*because they are slaves,*" would commit an egregious blunder. As well might it be alleged, that the Spaniards cannot hate the French, because they have not a representative government, and are subject to the Inquisition; or that the people of Scotland are regardless of the British constitution, because not one in a thousand has any political rights. The Polish peasantry, moreover, have never been in the same condition with the Russian. Long before they were free by law, the progress of manners, and the interests of their lords, had rendered their bondage extremely gentle, and they were not, even by law, liable to be separated from the soil.\* That this body of people have suffered severely by the changes that immediately affected the landholders, as well as by the proceedings of the foreign troops, we have already seen. That they have felt and acted for their country, is equally true; although unquestionably it is among the higher orders that we are to look for the greatest force of national spirit. It is easy to say that these are but a handful, and that the Polish people are a few great lords with some millions of slaves. The answer is, that the fact is otherwise. A distant view of any institution is deceitful;—we should see how they work in practice, before we decide on their effects. We shall give the reader a riddle by way of proving this. What country is that, in which the judges being most grave, virtuous, and learned, they are not allowed to decide on the greater number of judicial questions without the assistance of some ignorant tradesmen, chosen at random, whose characters are wholly unknown,—where there are appeals from a judge to himself,—where the court of ultimate appeal

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\* The Emperor Alexander, with his usual regard for the happiness of his people, published an ukase, about ten years ago, abolishing villenage in gross. But the law is almost inoperative; for the masters sell the peasants as before, only they do it under the name of *hiring*. Thus this beneficent measure has only varied the style in the public advertisements; and instead of announcing so many men or women, with such and such qualifications, for sale, the papers are filled with notices of men fit for such work, or women of such an age and description (sometimes with child), *to be let*. The same price as formerly is paid, and the property substantially changed. In Russian Poland, the peasants are as before the 3d of May.

is composed of hereditary judges, not one in fifty of whom pretend to know any thing of the law,—where a man is not allowed the assistance of professional lawyers when he is accused of the heavier offences, but only in the extreme cases of the lightest and the heaviest of all?—Not only is this our own country, but the description given refers to by far the most perfect of its institutions. When viewed more nearly, the Polish peasantry are not found to be, in point of practical effect, materially different from those of other countries; and the higher classes are not a handful of nobles, but a vast multitude of persons in every state of employment, rank, and fortune, practically speaking. This class comprises all the landholders, amounting to perhaps 100,000 families; all those, far more numerous, who have the name and privileges of nobility, without any property in land, and who may be in any employment; and all those who are nominally peasants, but on different titles possessed of land,—and those settled in towns as tradesmen and artificers. Substantially, then, this is a nation constituted as others are; and the feelings which we have described pervade them as they would others, if they had the same character and sufferings to excite them.

Again look to the fact. The men raised by the Allies in Poland can never be trusted, except perhaps in their wars with each other; for they immediately desert. It is believed that, at the present moment, there are not one hundred Poles in all the combined armies. The ranks of any power at war with the three courts are constantly filled with them. Since 1794, France has never been without multitudes of them. But since 1807, when she held out hopes of restoration, they have been almost equal to the whole of her foreign levies together. In 1812, they are reckoned at 100,000, under the most gallant and unfortunate of men.

“How many thousands of this devoted people have bled in the cause of French ambition in every part of the world! How often have the hearts of impartial men been wrung by the unnatural sight of Poles assisting in the subjugation of nations free and high-spirited like themselves!—Ill-fated Poniatowski! through all his illustrious course, ever most unfortunate when his cause was purest; happy only in closing it when there was no alternative but dishonour, and life must have been alike miserable in victory or defeat! Devoted from his earliest years to his country; seeking her enemies in every field; astonishing the veteran companions of Pulawski and Zaremba, by his romantic valour; the delight of the young, and the gay, whom he outshone in court and camp; the likeness of a king for dignity of presence, of an ancient cavalier for his high-bred gallantry; zealous in friendship, to which he would sacrifice all but honour and love; an enthusiast for liberty, but unmindful that there were other tyrants beside Frederick and Catherine;—how melancholy to find him beguiled by the deceitful promises of one who never spoke of freedom but with the design to enslave! What a lesson to princes, when they view the very flower of their subjects, the men best fitted to adorn and fortify their thrones, driven into exile, and submitting to those they should have fought against, after proving to the conviction of the coldest heart, that wealth, honours, life itself, were indifferent to them without liberty! A superficial thinker only can severely blame such errors. In the antagonists of those whom he thought his country's worst enemies, this gallant chief could only see her friends. But surely it needs no argument to prove that the system, which at any moment gives France the disposal of an army of Poles, under leaders like Poniatowski, is little calculated to secure the tranquillity of those who occupy Poland.”\* P. 45—47.

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\* The death of this illustrious chief is affectingly described in a most interesting tract upon the *Battles of Leipsic*, which we will not cite, because it might prevent our readers from purchasing it, and contributing to the relief of the distressed

How many of these have deserted? Even in unparalleled defeats, how constantly have they clung to France, because she still battled with Russia! Saxons, Bavarians, Dutch, Rhinlanders, Prussians, and Italians — all have by thousands deserted her standards, quivering with fearful disasters; — of the Poles not one! And yet Bonaparte deceived their hopes, and had at best promised but little to gain them over. He was hampered with his alliances each time he went into Poland, and probably not very willing to begin the work of restoration.

But the facts speak still more loudly, when we look at the actual state of the country during these changes. No sooner had Prussia lost the battle of Jena, than the Poles compelled the Prussian troops to evacuate the Prussian provinces, as rapidly as the French left Holland after the battle of Leipsig. The partial prospects of restoration then held out by Bonaparte (who was in alliance with Austria, and perhaps unwilling to break with Russia beyond all chance of reconciliation,) were sufficient to call forth incredible exertions. In a few days, whole regiments were raised by a few individuals — some brought battalions — or only companies — and all poured in their wealth of every kind. Nothing probably contributed more than the ferment in Poland to keep Austria quiet at that moment; and it certainly enabled the enemy to maintain himself during the winter, after severe losses, and in the following campaign to dictate a peace upon the Niemen. In the next war, 1809, the Poles made similar efforts, and their army over-ran Austrian Poland with ease, meeting in these provinces only friends wherever they came. Bonaparte was now in alliance with Russia, and could promise little to the Poles; but they felt grateful for the shadow of independence given to the duchy of Warsaw; and by the peace of Vienna he added half of Galicia to that state. In 1812 new offers were held out; but the Austrian alliance controlled them; nevertheless, the people still hoped, and they surpassed their former exertions. He obtained nearly twelve millions sterling within a few months, including the ordinary revenue, from the duchy alone; and his ranks were filled from all parts of Poland. It is not to be questioned, that if he had fairly offered the restoration of the country, with its own laws, instead of the Code Napoleon, and had waited for six months in order to avail himself of its entire co-operation, a very different result would have attended his advance upon Russia. That Poland was for ever gone from her, no one can doubt.

Now, the question is, whether all this may not be once more tried, with fuller effect, and according to the lessons taught by experience? Is

Leipsigers, for whose benefit it is sold. Suffice it to say, that he fell as he had lived, in the display of prodigious courage, and overwhelmed with affliction. A solemn dirge has been performed for him, with a splendid ceremonial, in the metropolitan church of Warsaw, *though now occupied by the Russians*. In fact the common license of abuse has been spared by all parties, even by the profligate part of the English press, upon this occasion, and not a word has ever been whispered against him by the Allies; a plain indication that, confident as they are, and well may be, in their cause against France, they feel what a weak part it has towards Poland. “*Scelus tu illud vocas, Tubero? cur? isto enim nomine illa adhuc causa caruit. Alii errorem appellant: alii timorem: qui durius spem, cupiditatem, odium, pertinaciam: qui gravissime temeritatem: scelus, præter te, adhuc nemo. De illis loquor, qui occiderunt. Fuerint cupidi, fuerint irati, fuerint pertinaces; sceleris vero crimine, furoris, parricidii, liceat Cn. Pompeio mortuo, liceat multis aliis carere.*” — *Pro Ligario*.



it hazarding too much to assert, that as long as the dreadful state of things continues, which we have above endeavoured to describe, France, or whoever is at war with the three partitioning powers, has a steady ally in the heart of their dominions? Is it wise in them to neglect the lesson which they as well as she have learnt, that no appeal to Poland has ever been made in vain? What inference can be drawn from this lesson, except that they should in wisdom now listen to the appeal in her behalf? If *they* restore her independence, they at once raise an impregnable bulwark against France in all time coming, and get rid of the greatest weakness in their own position; they take a vast weight out of their enemy's scale, and transfer it to their own.

An objection will be started against this expectation, which may immediately be remedied. The Poles, it will be said, have shown a rooted aversion to the Allied powers, particularly the Russians, and a preference to the French. Now this has been entirely owing to the circumstances. There is no natural antipathy between Russians and Poles; on the contrary, they have every thing to unite them; a common origin, a language almost the same, and manners not dissimilar. Accordingly, in ordinary circumstances, they live together; and it is only where Russian soldiers occupy their country, that the mutual hatred begins to show itself. If the Poles are really as ardent in their wish of restoration, as every fact proves them to be, the removal of foreign troops, and the grant of independence, will both remove all cause of hatred, and change the aversion now felt into gratitude; for it will come with all the grace of a free gift. This, too, is the moment, when France, having for the third time deceived them, they will be the more reclaimed from their connection with her, by obtaining from their neighbours the blessing of a separate existence.

There are other arrangements, however, short of absolute independence — all of which would confer the most substantial benefits upon Poland, and contribute in the same proportion to the advantage and security of the Allies. A separate state may be formed, under a constitution as nearly as possible resembling that of the 3d of May, but annexed to Russia, as Hungary is to Austria. The objection to this undoubtedly is, that Prussia and Austria would suffer by it, and Russia alone gain; and this of itself ought to weigh against it, and make Russia, on an enlarged view of her interest, and in order to keep her two neighbours for ever separate from French connections, prefer the entire independence of Poland. It may be remarked, however, that such a plan would not increase the preponderance of Russia, more than she might at any time augment it herself; for if she engages in a war with her neighbours, she may easily, to use the common expression of the continental politicians, "*Leur faire sauter la Pologne.*" Another plan, much less beneficial in every view, but still far preferable to the duration of the present arrangement, would be to incorporate all Poland at once with Russia. The numerous evils arising from the division of the country would be greatly alleviated; and the Poles would be secured against that calamity which they now have most reason to dread — the increase of those sufferings, by new changes and new partitions.

It was not possible for us to avoid noticing these intermediate arrangements; because it is difficult to carry on this discussion, without a reference to the Poles themselves, as well as the interests of their masters; and nothing is more clear, than that there are degrees between the opposite extremes of complete restoration and new partitions — the choice of

which is a matter infinitely important to the happiness of the people. We have too long devoted our humble efforts in this Journal to the best interests of humanity, and are too sincerely happy in the reflection, that they may not have been unavailing, to leave such considerations out of view. We belong not to the number of those, who can feel no indignation at injustice, unless committed by our enemies; nor pity for public misfortunes, unless suffered by Africans, or Spaniards. But the interests of the Polish people are, however important, only a subordinate part of the present question. The restoration of European independence is the object of every statesman's anxious hopes; the revival of sound and consistent principle alone can effect it; and this cannot be thought possible, by any reflecting mind, without the complete re-establishment of Poland as an independent state.

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#### NECESSITY AND EXPEDIENCY OF PEACE WITH AMERICA.\*

WITHOUT entertaining any extravagant ideas of that portion of human wisdom which is employed in governing the world, or making any romantic estimate of the justice and prudence of cabinets and public assemblies, we did think it improbable that a war, which both parties had entered upon with reluctance, should, by any management, be protracted for more than a year after all the objects for which it had been gone into had ceased to exist, and after both parties appeared to be convinced that no beneficial results could be expected from its continuance. Nor can we yet believe that the infatuation which has already cost so much brave blood can be indulged much longer;—and while the uncertainty of the result seems to impose it upon us as a duty to call the attention of the country to the true character and inevitable consequences of the hostilities in which we are so unfortunately engaged, we go to the task with a fond and sanguine expectation, that what we have to say may lose the greater part of its interest even before it comes into the hands of our readers, and be recorded rather as a *memento* against future errors, than a protestation and appeal against an existing enormity. On the strength of this anticipation, we shall confine our remarks to as small a space as possible.

We are no admirers of the Americans—and no advocates for the policy they have pursued in the great crisis of European affairs. We think their government has all along shown a manifest partiality to France, even after France became a great monument of despotism at home, and oppression abroad;—that in wisdom and in justice they ought to have declared war against that power, and not against us, if they found it impossible to maintain the position of neutrality;—and that, at all

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\* Letters from Canada, written during a Residence there in the Years 1806, 1807, and 1808; showing the present State of Canada, its Productions, Trade, Commercial Importance, and Political Relations; exhibiting also the Commercial Importance of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Cape Breton, &c. By Hugh Gray. London, 1814.

The Right and Practice of Impressment, as concerning Great Britain and America considered. London, 1814. Vol. xxiv. p. 243. November, 1814.

events, they should have withdrawn that declaration of war the moment that, by rescinding our Orders in Council, we had redressed the most urgent of their grievances, and given a substantial pledge of our disposition to redress the rest. With these sentiments and settled impressions, however, we are far from thinking that the Americans are a detestable people; or that we ought to pursue hostilities against them to our own injury and disgrace, for the mere gratification of our resentment. There are —we once hoped that by this time we might have used another tense— there are circumstances in the history of the two countries that prevent them from judging fairly of each other —and from which, if we suffer unjustly on the one hand, we may depend on it they suffer at least as much on the other. It is impossible even to lay the foundation for a candid or impartial view of the present unhappy differences, without casting a glance back to their original source of alienation.

The war of the revolution, or of emancipation, as it is called in America,—the violent rupture of the ties which had previously bound the two countries so closely together,—necessarily left a certain degree of soreness upon both sides. At first sight it may appear that this should have been greatest on the part of England, and that we have a better apology than our opponents for the rancorous feelings which have been fostered too long by the less generous part of both nations. The truth, however, is otherwise;—for though those who are worsted in a contest generally retain the bitterest animosity, and the successful can best afford to be generous, yet in this particular instance the general rule was reversed, by two circumstances equally obvious and conclusive. In the *first* place, the war was carried on in America, and not in England,—and was not always carried on, we regret to say, in a spirit of magnanimous hostility; and, in the *second* place, that war which, even while it lasted, was little more than a tale of interest to the greater part of our population, and has since been effaced from our recollection by the still greater and more momentous contentions in which we have been involved, was the first and the last adventure of the insurgent colonies in the great game of battles. The leaders in that war were the founders of their being as a nation; and the events of it the steps by which they rose to independence. With them, therefore, it has always possessed an importance, and been connected with a weight of public feeling to which there was nothing parallel in this country; and while the remembrance of disasters and defeats sustained on the other side of the Atlantic, and never really felt but through the medium of taxes or gazettes, was likely to be speedily obliterated from our unviolated and opulent land, a very different impression might naturally be expected to survive the contest in that country, which had been the theatre of so many sanguinary scenes—whose fields and cities still bore the marks of devastation and rapine—whose whole population had been exposed to the horrors of rancorous hostility—whose national vanity has scarcely any other field of triumph but the story of our discomfiture—and whose *fasti* are consecrated to record our cruelties and defeats. In such a country, the bitterness of the struggle was of necessity far more deeply felt than in this, and therefore was more likely to be remembered; nor can it be reasonably denied, we think, that in spite of their success, the Americans had more apology for allowing hostile feelings to survive the close of the contention, than can be fairly pleaded for us.

Such as they were, however, the course of events seemed for a while to hold forth the promise of their gradual and total extinction. The ties

of blood and of language — the common prerogative of freedom — the substantial identity of laws, literature, and manners — and, above all, the actual and substantial advantages which, by a pacific intercourse, each had discovered experimentally that it would derive from the other, were all tending to obliterate the remembrance of past hostility, and to unite, in a voluntary and equal association, those kindred races which would alike have spurned at the idea of subjugation. But then came the French Revolution, and the wide-spreading and vindictive wars which were scattered from that grand source of discord and of crime.

The war of independence had left behind it in America a feeling of gratitude to France, as well as of hostility to England; and when France became a republic, this feeling of gratitude was naturally exalted into a more ardent sympathy, and extended into visions of a more intimate alliance. The atrocities which stained the infancy of the European democracy, soon checked this sympathy in the illustrious founder of American independence, and the greater part of those who directed the councils of his country; but it had too strong and natural a foundation in the circumstances of the people, to be altogether extinguished; and it unfortunately fell in with the policy of one great party in the nation to foster and inflame it, and to make it the means of reviving the animosity against this country, which had been gradually subsiding, and must otherwise have disappeared entirely with the generation which had witnessed its birth.

The constitution of America was purely democratical from the beginning; — but the evils of this form of government were averted for a while, by the personal influence and authority of those by whose wisdom and valour they had submitted to be guided in the war which had led to its establishment, and by the habits of deference to wealth, talent, and hereditary influence to which they had been trained before the rise of these dissensions. The love of power, however, is the strongest of all human passions; and the circumstances of the country which made the lower orders entirely independent of the patronage or employment of the higher, co-operating with the democratical institutions which had been adopted, enabled this principle to develop itself to an extent previously without example in any age of the world. The whole political power of the country was actually vested in, and exercised by, the numerical majority of its inhabitants; — or, in other words, by the vulgar and uninstructed part of the community. Even in America, however, the people must ultimately act through leaders, — who end by making them their tools. But to win the favour of the vulgar, vulgar passions must be appealed to; — and those aspiring spirits who saw the decline of the natural aristocracy of Washington and his coadjutors, thought that nothing was better calculated to accelerate the extinction of their interest, and ensure their own succession to office and distinction, than to take advantage of the rising enthusiasm for republican France, and to rekindle along with it those embers of hatred to England, which ten years of peaceful intercourse had gone far to extinguish. The device succeeded; and animosity to England, and admiration of France, — even of conquering, insulting, Imperial France, — became the watchwords and the instruments of a party, which the course of events had destined, at all events, to rule for a season in the country.

This alone, however, could scarcely have led to war — but it kept alive the elements from which war might at any time be engendered, and prevented that resentment of the outrageous proceedings of France, which

must otherwise have leagued them with England in open resistance of her pretensions. When two great powers go to war, all the neutrals in their neighbourhood are exposed to occasional injuries, and let into the enjoyment of great and peculiar advantages. America attempted, from the beginning, to avail herself of these advantages, and submitted with occasional grumblings to the rubs and inconveniences she encountered in their pursuit. It was a prudent, at least, if not a magnanimous policy; — and it is infinitely to be lamented, for her own sake as well as for ours, that she did not persevere in it to the end. Could she have foreseen that the end was so near at hand, we are persuaded she would have endured till it came. In the whole course of the struggle, however, we conceive it to be quite manifest and undeniable, that she endured far more from France than from England — infinitely more in the way of direct indignity and insult — and a great deal more in bare-faced depredation, rapine, and injustice. If England had held the language or assumed the tone which France did to America, from the time of Genet to that of Turreau, neither prudence nor fear could have prevented an immediate recourse to hostility; — and if at any time she had seized and condemned the American shipping, with the unprincipled and indiscriminating rapacity which characterised the conduct of France, from 1803 to 1806, the same result would inevitably have followed. We do not blame America for remaining at peace under those provocations; but we refer to the fact of her having done so, as conclusive evidence of the partiality for which we have been endeavouring to account, and in part perhaps to apologise.

Then came the Milan and the Berlin decrees, and our unhappy Orders in Council. In this measure, too, there can be no question that the first and the greatest outrage was on the part of France, and that she set the example of this unprecedented invasion of the freedom of neutral commerce. If America had looked only at the injustice of the pretension, she must have seen that France was by far the most to blame, and that our proceedings were palliated at least, if not rendered necessary in principle, upon the ordinary grounds of belligerent retaliation. She did not look at the question, however, entirely in this light; and though we have no doubt that her habitual partialities continued to operate, we must admit in candour that it was not natural that she should so look at it; and that her conduct in this last and most unfortunate crisis was infinitely more justifiable than in the long period that had preceded. France, to be sure, had denounced intolerable edicts against the trade of America, and had openly proclaimed her resolution to sacrifice its interests, without the slightest scruple, to her own immediate objects; — and we only followed the example she set before us. But then, though France was willing no doubt to have executed her edicts with unrelenting severity, it was notorious that she had but feeble and precarious means for carrying them into execution. She had no navy abroad on the seas; and it was their own fault if they trusted themselves in her ports, or those of her confederates. England, on the contrary, covered the ocean with her cruisers, and was able to carry into terrible effect whatever she might denounce against the unarmed vessels of a neutral. The French decrees, therefore, were only heard — but the English were felt, by America; — and those proceedings which were denominated retaliation, were the only proceedings from which she suffered any serious inconvenience.

For this, as well as for other reasons, we have always considered our Orders in Council as an unjustifiable aggression against America, as well

as a most impolitic contrivance against our own trade;—and, though we cannot help thinking that America had borne even worse things from France, and that it would have been wiser and better for her to have abstained from the declaration of war, upon which she was indisputably driven mainly by the pressure of those Orders, we cannot say that, in adopting that measure, she did any thing that can be called very unjustifiable, or indicated any very rancorous hostility or groundless animosity against this country. The case became far worse for her, however, when we rescinded these obnoxious Orders. Their existence undoubtedly was the immediate cause of the war;—and no man doubts that peace might have been preserved if they had never been enacted, or had been recalled a year earlier than they were recalled. It seems a fair inference, therefore, that peace should have been restored, or at least that pacific overtures should have been made, the moment they were actually withdrawn;—and we are clearly and decidedly of that opinion.

At the same time, there were not wanting serious causes of complaint, and grounds of dissension as considerable as many that have precipitated nations into war. The impressment of their seamen was, undoubtedly, a grievance of very serious and intolerable magnitude;—and though we conceive that no reasonable doubt can be entertained of our right to reclaim the services and secure the persons of such of our sailors as we found in their vessels, we suspect that this right was sometimes asserted without those scrupulous precautions against abuse which were indispensably necessary to justify the practice. We have always been clear, that the right of impressment which is vested in the sovereign by the known principles of our constitution, and which entitles him to annul and disregard all contracts entered into by our own merchants with persons using the sea, entitles him just as clearly to disregard any similar engagement into which such persons may have entered with foreign merchants, and to enforce their immediate service in his navy, in virtue of the paramount and precedent obligation which they contracted by engaging in that profession. We consider all British seamen, in short, as under an incapacity, and a *notorious incapacity*, to contract any absolute engagement to their private employers,—or any engagement that is not substantially conditional with reference to the intermediate assertion of the preferable right of the sovereign. Upon the question of right or of principle, therefore, we conceive that the pretensions of England are liable to no serious dispute:—but, on the other hand, it is no less plain that we have no right, or shadow of right, to touch the person of a native American — and that the impressment of a single citizen of that country is an atrocious and intolerable violation of his most sacred rights, against which his government is bound to protect him, and which it would be deserting its first and most imperious duties if it did not resent and resist. Now, the plea of America is, that the right of search and impressment at sea cannot, in the nature of things, be exercised without occasionally mistaking native Americans for English, even if there was every disposition to avoid such mistakes — and she complains that there is no such disposition, but in many instances an insolent and arbitrary resolution to make up a complement of men, without any regard to the most regular evidence of citizenship and neutrality. There is, therefore, a real difficulty in the adjustment of these conflicting and indisputable rights — not such a difficulty, perhaps, as might not have been got over, if there had been a truly amicable and cordial feeling on both sides — but such as will go far to account for the continuance of a war which was already on foot, and

had of course fomented that ancient spirit of hostility, the origin and progress of which we have hitherto been endeavouring to trace. That this spirit was stronger on the part of America than of England, and that she therefore is justly to be blamed for the continuance of the war at the period of which we are now speaking, is manifest, we think, from this notorious fact, that this very question had been made the subject of an amicable arrangement between Mr. Monroe and Lords Holland and Auckland, but five years before; and that we had just given an unequivocal proof of our being still willing to settle all differences upon moderate principles, by the repeal of our obnoxious Orders.

The war, however, — whoever had the immediate blame of it, found us shamefully unprepared, and ridiculously sanguine and secure. Our navy was to drive the pigmy fleets of America from the ocean, and to levy contributions along all her shores; while the very dread and terror of our hostility was expected to shake their unseasoned government to pieces — to effect a disunion of the states — in all likelihood a civil war, and perhaps the return of some of the revolted colonies to the dominion of the mother country! Such were our expectations. How they have been answered by events, is too painfully and universally known to make it necessary for us to say any thing. We have been worsted in most of our naval encounters, and baffled in most of our enterprises by land. — With a naval force on their coast exceeding that of the enemy in the proportion of ten to one, we have lost two out of three of all the sea-fights in which we have been engaged — and at least three times as many men as our opponent; while their privateers swarm unchecked round all our settlements, and even on the coasts of Europe, and have already made prize of more than seventeen hundred of our merchant vessels. By land we were so shamefully unprovided, that had it not been for the gross mismanagement of the American commanders, they must have got possession of Montreal, and in all probability advanced to the walls of Quebec before the end of the first campaign; and even when reinforced to an extent which could not possibly have been calculated on when the war began, it is but too well known that we have gained no substantial or permanent advantages, but have actually had to witness the incredible spectacle of a regular and well-appointed army of British veterans retiring before little more than an equal force of American militia!

While these things were in progress, and while it was yet extremely doubtful whether Bonaparte was to retain the dominion of the Continent, and whether the whole resources of England might not be required to maintain the cause of Europe on European ground, we again testified our desire, or our need of peace, by making a spontaneous proposal for an immediate negotiation. This proposal was made in December 1813, and was immediately acceded to on the part of the American government; — and the consequence has been the discussions that are still depending at Ghent.

At the time when this proposal was made, it certainly will not be pretended that we had any view to an increase of territory, or to any other thing than the adjustment of those questions as to neutral and maritime rights, which formed the whole original subject of contention; and as little can it be doubted that peace would have been instantly and joyfully accepted, had America been then disposed to withdraw her pretensions upon the points of search and impressment, or to leave those and the other relative questions as to the law of blockade to amicable and deliberate discussion. The great doubt and difficulty was, whether America

would abandon any part of her pretensions ; and whether we would consent to such modifications of our practice, as to lay a ground for immediate pacification. Before the Commissioners met, however, all these difficulties seemed to be providentially removed ; for peace was restored in Europe ; and, with the state of belligerent, vanished all the grievances and all the pretensions of the neutral. As there was no longer to be any impressment at all, it became quite unnecessary to settle under what limitations impressment should take place out of the trading ships of a neutral ; and as all blockade, and prospect of blockade, was abandoned, it was equally idle to define the conditions on which it should be enforced against third parties. It could scarcely be pretended, and it could never for a moment be seriously believed in any quarter, that it could be of any use to settle these general questions, with a prospective view to future cases of war and neutrality, which all the world knew would make rules, or exceptions, suited to their own emergencies ; and, at all events, it was obvious, that such a settlement upon abstract principles, would be gone about with much better hope of success in deliberate consultations to be entered into after the cessation of hostilities, than by the ruder logic of force. It was confidently anticipated, therefore, that America would consent to the *waver* of all her neutral pretensions, and that the war would die a natural death upon the removal of all the objects and causes by which it had been excited. This anticipation, it appears, was fully realised on the part of America, who instructed her Commissioners to allow all these points to lie over, and to let the secondary and relative hostilities which had arisen out of the wars in Europe cease with the wars which had occasioned them ; — and we are now at war, because England will not agree to that proposal, but insists upon gaining certain advantages by the war, which she had not in contemplation when she herself first suggested the negotiation, and which, to all ordinary observers, she seems to have but a feeble prospect of obtaining by force.

What these advantages are, it is not necessary very minutely to explain. They amount, in one word, to a demand for a cession of territory ; and the war which is now going on is neither more nor less than a war for the conquest of that territory. By the treaty of 1783, the boundary line between the United States and Canada was settled with the utmost precision ; and for the greater part it was made to run through the centre of the great chain of lakes, and their connecting waters, with a joint right of navigation to both parties. The territory of certain Indian tribes, who are now dignified with the name of our Allies, is within the country then solemnly ceded to America, in so far as England had any power to cede it, — in the same way as the territory occupied by many other Indian tribes was included in the country then finally ceded to England. We now insist on the exclusive military occupation of all those waters — on a guarantee for the perpetual inviolability and independence of the territory of our Indian Allies — and on the unqualified and absolute cession, without compensation, of a part of the state of Massachusetts, in order to establish a more convenient communication between Halifax and our settlement of New Brunswick — besides some smaller matters : — and we refuse to make peace unless these terms are complied with.

On the *justice* of these pretensions — on the fairness of our *causa belli* — we have scarcely a word to say, after we have again repeated that it is undeniably, and almost professedly, *a war of conquest* upon our part. The territory we now insist upon taking from America was solemnly ceded and secured to her by the treaty of 1783, when we knew, or ought



to have known as well as we do now, what was necessary for the security of the provinces we retained. The obligations of that treaty, we humbly conceive, are by no means annulled by the war which has intervened; because that war did not arise from any infraction of the treaty on the part of America, but from certain collisions of neutral and belligerent pretensions, which have since been settled and entirely taken away by the cessation of European hostilities, and which leave all the other rights and pretensions of both nations precisely on the same footing as before. But it is truly of no consequence whether the treaty of 1783 be supposed to be in force or not. At all events it is indisputable, that when we went to war with America on the subject of neutral commerce and belligerent impressment, the whole territory and subjects which we now insist upon her giving up were confessedly and exclusively hers, and formed a part of her legitimate and unquestioned dominion — no matter whether expressly recognised or guaranteed by treaty with us or not. It is as little to be denied, we think, that when she did go to war about neutral rights, she had, if not a just, at least a natural and colourable cause for so doing. It was not a war of mere depredation or conquest — an unprovoked and wanton aggression upon her part, for the gratification of cupidity or revenge — but an ordinary case of taking up arms for the redress of specific and considerable grievances, which we cannot deny to have existed; though we are of opinion that she was not fully justified, in the circumstances of the case, in taking that way to redress them. After a short period of hostilities, attended with various success, — certainly not with such decided advantage on our side as could have entitled us to dictate terms to the enemy had the original subject of contention remained, — the occasion of dissension is fortunately removed by the restoration of peace in Europe, and the consequent disappearance both of neutrals and belligerents. America, then, agrees to wave all farther discussion of claims which are no longer to be asserted in practice; and England refuses to lay down her arms till she has got large portions of land and water from her antagonist. The war which goes on after this, we conceive, is just as clearly a war of mere conquest and aggression upon our part, as if we had first signed a peace on the accommodation of the only points that had occasioned the war — and next day declared war anew, for the avowed purpose of adding a part of her territory to our possessions.

The matter, indeed, seems scarcely to be disguised in the official statements of our commissioners. It is not in the way of indemnity for the past, or security for the future, that we demand these cessions. It is because the joint possession of the Lakes is apt to excite a contest for naval superiority, and in order that we may have a direct communication between Halifax and New Brunswick. Pretexts like these — pretexts indeed of a much higher nature, have never been wanting to justify that most pernicious and most dangerous of all human crimes, the undertaking of a war of conquest; nor is there any other meaning in the general principle of maintaining the independence of all civilised governments, than that no pretext — nay, no *proof* of increased security and general advantage — shall be admitted as an apology for the invasion of one state by another, or the forcible dismemberment of an atom of her indisputed territory. It is upon this principle that civilised society depends for its very existence. It is by this alone that the strong are restrained, and the weak protected from oppression — by this and by this only, that the substance or the names of public principle or occasional peace have ever been heard of among mankind.

The apology that is held out for our invasion of this principle, however, is not more hollow in itself than it is inconsistent with the very form of the invasion. We are the weakest of the two powers it seems in America; and therefore, what? — why, we will take by force what is necessary to put us on a footing with our neighbour. This way of putting our case certainly lays us open to a very perplexing dilemma. If we are now in a condition to take our neighbour's territory in America by force, we surely cannot justify our taking it on the score that we are now too weak to have any chance in a contest against him; or, if we are too weak to enter into such a contest, we certainly have no great chance of succeeding in depriving him of it by means of a war. The plea, however, is manifestly quite preposterous; and the consequence of admitting it would be, that after we had got what we now ask, we might ask more, till we were on a footing of perfect equality with our neighbour; or, in other words, that mere inequality of force in neighbouring states, is a lawful and sufficient cause for their engaging in a war of conquest.

It is needless, however, to say more of the *justice* of our pretensions, when we have so much to say upon the inexpediency of pursuing them any farther. If we had ever so just a title to the territory we are now fighting to acquire, we conceive it would be insanity to fight for such an object. We think it impossible that we should succeed in acquiring it, — and altogether certain that we shall encounter disgrace and disaster in its pursuit.

The invasion of their territory will necessarily unite all America against us. Nothing but the most complete ignorance of their character can leave the least doubt upon that subject. They are split, no doubt, into hostile factions — very rancorous and very abusive of each other; — but they are all zealous republicans, and all outrageously proud of their constitution, and vain of their country. This indeed is the ruling passion of all democracies; and it exists in America in a degree that is both offensive and ridiculous to strangers. In this point of view, nothing could be so unwise — to say nothing more of them — as our unmeaning marauding expeditions to Washington and Baltimore, which exasperated without weakening, and irritated all the passions of the nation, without even a tendency to diminish its resources; nay, which added directly to their force, both by the indignation and unanimity which they excited, and by teaching them to feel their own strength, and to despise an enemy that, with all his preparation and animosity, could do them so little substantial mischief. The consequences, accordingly, were immediately apparent; and for the paltry and unworthy gratification of obliging the Congress to assemble in a wooden shed, we gave confidence and popularity to the war-party in that assembly, and tied up the tongues of those who might otherwise have thwarted their designs. This was before our projects of conquest were known in the country; and it affords a pretty sure augury of the effect of their promulgation. We have no doubt at all, that every man in America will be for a vigorous prosecution of the war, rather than submit to so great an indignity; and that, though the adverse factions will still revile and accuse each other, sacrifices and efforts will be made for this purpose, of which scarcely any other people would be capable.

In the *next* place, what sort of a nation is it which we have thus united against us, — and from whom, thus united, we propose, by main force, to wrest a part of their territory? It is a nation, in the first place, situated at the distance of three thousand miles from our shores, to which it pro-

bably costs us upwards of 100*l.* to transport every man we are to employ in subduing them ; — a nation now consisting of *between eight and nine millions of souls* \* ; — a nation remarkably hardy, athletic, and brave, in which every individual is armed ; and in which, from the abundance of game and leisure, and the want of all game laws, every individual is an expert marksman before he is sixteen years of age ; — a nation in which not only public feeling but political power has its chief depository in the body of the people, and in which the poor can therefore compel the rich to make any sacrifices, and partake any hardships, which they think necessary for the gratification of their vanity or hatred ; — *the* nation, in short, which, with one third of its present population, without government or resources, and divided far more radically than it can ever be divided again, baffled all our efforts to retain an established authority over it ; and drove us, after a sanguinary struggle, beyond those boundaries which, in the maturity of their strength, we now propose to repass by force.

In the *third* place, what are the circumstances of encouragement and good augury under which we think it reasonable to demand the exclusive possession of their lakes, and the cession of a part of their territory ? Why, it is after being twice utterly routed on these lakes, and in the only considerable battles of which they have been the theatre ; — or, in other words, after being almost entirely driven from the possession of those waters in which, before the war, we had an equal interest with them, and in which we may still regain an equal interest, merely by making peace, and accepting their renunciation of all the pretensions in support of which they originally took up arms. A nation forced into an unjust war has sometimes insisted on retaining a part of her conquests at its termination ; but it is something new, we believe, for one who has lost ground in the quarrel to insist on a cession of territory from her enemy, and to refuse a peace which re-invests her in all her former rights unless this extraordinary pretension be yielded to. On land again, after having received reinforcements infinitely greater than we had any reason to expect could be afforded — after frightening a few defenceless towns, and defeating some regiments of militia — we have been repulsed from Baltimore, and retreated from Plattsburgh ; — and are now retired into winter quarters with the loss of at least four or five thousand men, while the enemy is increasing every hour in skill, confidence, and numbers.

In what *can* such a contest issue, but in the utter discomfiture of a conquering or invading army. All the advantage was with us in the beginning, — our numbers complete — our reputation high — our discipline perfect ; while the enemy was raw and timid, and unwilling to venture in numbers within the hazard of the conflict. With all those advantages, a long campaign has just been closed with a series of disasters, and without any sensible progress towards the triumphs through which alone we can hope to force our hard terms on the adversary. Every hour our numbers are diminishing, while theirs are increasing ; every hour they are improving in discipline, and consequently in enterprise and valour. The attacks at Washington and Baltimore have called out all the militia of the country, and filled the land, from border to border, with armed men ; — while the repulse from the latter place, followed so soon by the disaster at Plattsburgh, have taught them their strength, and made them come forward

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\* By the last *census*, which was completed in 1810, the population was about seven millions. It must be increased near two millions since that time.

with alacrity to share the honours of a contest the result of which is no longer to be dreaded. More than one hundred and fifty thousand men are now in arms within the territories of the United States;—bad soldiers certainly at this moment, and unfit as yet to contend in pitched battles in the field—but quite fit, even now, to do murderous execution from behind a breastwork, and perfectly capable of acquiring that discipline and steadiness which a few campaigns will necessarily give them.

What, then, are our prospects for these approaching campaigns? If we are to carry our objects, we must reckon not only upon being able to drive the enemy from the lakes, and to destroy all their settlements on their borders, and on taking forcible possession of the territory we mean to keep, but, on so ruining the force, and breaking the spirit of the country, as to induce them to sue for peace on condition of our permanently keeping both the lakes and the territory. Is there any man in his senses who looks to the condition of this country, and the condition of America, that expects *this* to be done?—or, if he does think it possible to be done, who can hesitate for a moment in saying, that it could only be done at a cost ten thousand times greater than the value of the object can justify? With an army of forty thousand men, and a suitable equipment of vessels transported in frame from Great Britain, we may, at an expense of twenty or thirty millions—we are convinced it cannot be at less—retrieve, in the course of next campaign, some of the disgraces and disasters which we have sustained in the last. With the loss of a fourth part of our troops, we may succeed in clearing our frontier of the enemy, and driving him back before us beyond the line to which we wish to advance our future boundary; and we may even succeed, after a pitiable carnage, in gaining possession of the lakes. But does any man expect that the Americans will agree, upon this, to let us keep what we have so dearly won; and submit to leave in the hands of an exasperated foe the key to some of the richest provinces of their country? No man can possibly expect it. The enemy knows that we cannot afford to send out twenty thousand men every year, nor to incur an additional expense of twenty millions, to maintain possession of a few barren acres on their borders. They will harass us, therefore, with continual attacks, and exhaust us with interminable marches, in the boundless wastes of their difficult and unfruitful country; till, after distinguishing ourselves by prodigies of useless valour, and disgracing ourselves by acts of vindictive cruelty, the second American war ends, like the first, in the utter discomfiture and signal defeat of the rash and stubborn invaders. “Conquer three millions of free men!” exclaimed Lord Chatham, with contempt and wonder at the infatuation which persisted so long in that first fatal contention; although we had then a settled and original possession of half the country, and the hearts of the other half were believed by many to be with us! And now we expect to conquer nine millions, when we have been driven from one part of the border, and have united the hearts of the whole against us!—Nothing short of conquest, and complete prostration, can possibly gain for us the objects on which we are insisting; and no sane person, we imagine, believes that to be possible.

But suppose that it were possible, and that it were actually accomplished, what should we have gained?—we shall not say to compensate for the waste of blood and treasure which our success must have cost us—but with a view to that security for our Canadian dominions which is held out as the object of the contest. The carnage, the sufferings, the disgrace which our success must necessarily have inflicted on the enemy, must

excite a rancorous and incurable animosity in the breast of every citizen of the land; and if we are able, by main force, to maintain ourselves in possession of our new frontier, it may fairly be assumed that it will only be to force that we shall owe it. The most rooted hostility, the most eager thirst for revenge, will infallibly watch all our proceedings; and a greedy advantage will assuredly be taken of the first moment of negligence or weakness, of external embarrassment or interior dissension, to repair the loss and retrieve the dishonour of so invidious a conquest. After such a conquest, therefore, we can never be secure for a moment, even under the appearance of the most complete pacification,—but must continually maintain such a force as may be sufficient to repress the desperate attempts to which we must be continually liable. In our old frontier we should excite no such jealousy, and require no such costly precautions: and therefore we presume it can scarcely be doubted, that we should be more secure on the whole with that old frontier,—and must lose more in the increased hostility of our neighbours, than we can possibly gain by this slight diminution of their resources.

Such, we think, would be the inevitable result of our success—even if the relative strength of the two countries were destined to remain at its present proportions. But it is impossible here to shut our eyes to a fact most material to the whole question. America has doubled her population in little more than eighteen years; and, from the state of her territory, is likely to go on nearly at the same rate for at least fifty years to come. Long before that time, therefore, she must have a population of from thirty to forty millions; while in Canada, from the inferiority of the soil and climate, we can never reckon upon having more than two or three millions. Against such an enormous preponderance of force, if backed by mortified pride and vindictive resentment, it is evident that no succours that England could spare could enable this colony to make any resistance;—and long, indeed, before the disproportion has attained to this limit, not only our new boundary, but our whole transatlantic possessions must infallibly be swept away. It is not easy, indeed, to see how Canada is ultimately to be protected against this monstrous force, by any frontier or by any policy;—but this at all events we take to be manifest, that she may be longest protected by that policy which most effectually conciliates the friendship and respect of her more powerful neighbour—and by that frontier which is most visibly guarded by the sanctity of justice and the charm of moderation. America, in fact, has no need of any accession to her territory, and will every day feel less and less jealousy of a weak and a peaceable neighbour. But if we now make aggressions upon her soil, we may be assured that, in the fulness of her strength, they will be repaid with interest;—if we wantonly sow the seeds of rancorous and inexorable hostility, we must expect to reap in due season the bitter and abundant harvest.

But truly it is too visionary to dwell thus at large upon the consequences of a success which we are obviously never destined to attain, and from the hope of which so many circumstances conspire at this moment to exclude us. If there are any persons so insane as to dream at any time of conquests in America, is there nothing in the present situation of Europe that should admonish them that this is not the season when such visions can be safely indulged? Is there nothing in the aspect of the blackening horizon before us—of the storms that are brewing in the South—and the East, that should induce us to look anxiously for the return of serenity in the West? Who is there so sanguine as to expect

that Europe is to remain in peace for many years, or that England is not to be embroiled in the first and the last of her quarrels—or, if that tremendous destiny may be avoided, who does not see that the best chance to avoid it is to have a great disposable force ready to throw into the scale of the advocates of order and justice—to have our hands free, and our flanks disencumbered for the vital contest that we may yet have to sustain on our own shores? For the sake of trying to gain a frontier a little more convenient for the insignificant province of Canada—for the sake of making an irreconcilable enemy of America, and pouring out oceans of blood and heaps of treasure in a contest in which success can be attended with no glory, and defeat leads to aggravated disgrace—is it really worth while to desert our own cause, and that of Europe, at a moment so critical as the present, and to send fifty ships and fifty thousand men to waste their strength in that obscure and subordinate contention?

But it is not merely with a view to the greater and nearer occasions of exertion which it threatens to present to this country, that the present situation of Europe should operate as a sedative to our zeal for hostilities in America. If Europe is again embroiled, America will be sure to find allies in these very hostilities; and we have already experienced what it is to contend against American energy, backed by the skill and resources of an European auxiliary. The original cause of war with America, we ought to recollect, is one in which all the continental powers have at one time or another protested against our pretensions,—and may be presumed, indeed, habitually to look upon them with no very favourable eye. To these pretensions America is now willing to submit, and thus to remove all occasion for their farther discussion; but if we insist on going on with the war, her protest against them will of necessity be revived, and in all likelihood will soon find other abettors. How long does any one think we can reckon, in the present situation of Europe, on having to meet the Americans without any allies? And has our success, while they stood single-handed against us, been so very brilliant as to give us much hope of a favourable result when they are thus strengthened and supported? Besides all this, the very existence of our quarrel with America is likely enough to embroil us in Europe, and to disturb, before its day, the nice and ticklish balance on which our tranquillity so visibly hangs. We have declared the whole coast of the United States, with some trifling exceptions, in a state of blockade. Do we imagine that the maritime nations of Europe will quietly submit for any length of time to such an exclusion; and if we capture a French or a Russian vessel trading towards the uninvested ports of that country, can we doubt for an instant that we shall have the question of neutral and belligerent rights, which it is now in our power to settle on terms of infinite advantage, to try under circumstances incalculably more unfavourable than any that ever occurred with America?

But supposing the state of Europe to be as encouraging as it is disheartening to the career of transatlantic conquest upon which we seem to have entered, is there nothing in the state of our *Finances* which should make us pause before we thus plunge into wars of aggression and ambition? We have just obtained a peace, or a breathing-time at least, in Europe,—and we find ourselves burdened with a debt of which it requires the enormous sum of *thirty millions* sterling to pay the annual interest,—and with establishments of various kinds, which require, even upon the supposition of universal peace, an expenditure of at least twenty

millions more. Are we in any condition, then, to embark in a new war—confessedly unnecessary for our security or honour—and comparatively insignificant in its objects, when it is apparent that, from the distance and the nature of the country in which it is to be waged, it will be incomparably more expensive than any other scheme of hostility that could possibly be devised of the same magnitude? Will the country, with all the silly and vulgar animosity it has been taught to feel against its American opponents, be indeed disposed to pay the property tax, and to see it increased to fifteen or twenty per cent., in order to have thousands upon thousands of her brave sons obscurely slain in an attempt, successful or unsuccessful, to get a better frontier for Canada than we solemnly agreed to take in 1783? If it be willing, is it able, to bear this enormous burden? and at the moment when our manufacturers are in danger of being undersold by those of France and Germany, and our farmers by those of Poland,—can it be thought a fit time to enter into such ambitious speculations, with the certainty of such tremendous expense, and so faint a prospect of ultimate success—success almost worthless when attained?

In such a situation of things, and where there is such an overwhelming preponderance of argument in favour of peace, it may be scarcely necessary to suggest, that we wilfully expose Canada itself to an immediate and most serious hazard, by this unjustifiable attempt to provide for its future security. If we make peace upon the advantageous terms that are offered, Canada is safe for the present; and as safe for the future as it has ever been since 1783,—as safe, that is, as it was thought possible to make it, when that treaty was deliberately adjusted with a view to that object. If we go on with the war, however, and any one of the numerous casualties befall us to which we are continually liable,—and some of which, if the war is long protracted, must almost necessarily occur,—Canada is gone from us—and gone irretrievably, and for ever. One half of it is disaffected, and the other nearly indifferent. Upper Canada is peopled almost entirely by settlers from the United States, who in their hearts must wish well to their countrymen and friends. Lower Canada—thanks to our preposterous policy—is still almost entirely French, and dislikes us only less than the Americans. If France should join with America, there could be but little dependence on their fidelity;—as it is, there is notoriously none to be placed in their zeal. They will make no sacrifices, and no desperate efforts for a government, towards which they have never felt any cordiality; and if the country be once lost, they will risk no insurrections to recover it for English masters.

We shall conclude this part of the subject with the mention of one other most painful and most potent dissuasive from the farther prosecution of this disastrous war. Our armies will be thinned by unprecedented desertions in every campaign on the soil of America, and will melt away by inglorious dissolution, adding to the force of the enemy, and detracting at once from our strength and our national character. Do not let it be said that this is an imputation on the loyalty and honour of our army which it cannot possibly have merited. We appeal to facts that are notorious, and to principles of human nature that need no corroboration from particular instances. We think as highly of the valour and the worth of our soldiery as it is possible to think of any soldiery: but, alas! it is not in the private ranks of a regular army,—and least of all, perhaps, in the ranks of war-worn veterans, who have campaigned in foreign lands.

till all domestic recollections are nearly worn out of them, — that we are to look for refined notions of propriety, or the habit of resisting extraordinary temptations. It is to the extraordinary force of the temptation, and not to the previous corruption of its victims, that we ascribe this disaster. There are desertions from all armies — and large desertions from all armies that begin to be unsuccessful; but, in a country where the deserter can hide and domesticate himself with those who resemble his countrymen, who speak his own language, and display his own manners, — in a country, above all, where wages are high and subsistence cheap, and where a common labourer may, in a short time, raise himself to the rank of a landed proprietor — the temptations to desert are such as the ordinary rate of virtue in that rank of life will rarely be able to resist. We know already, from documents that have been laid before the public, that the Americans boast of prodigious desertions having taken place from the British forces; and the fact, when averred in Parliament, met with nothing but an evasive answer from His Majesty's ministers. We know also, that a proposition to encourage desertion, by holding out a large bribe at the public expense, was entertained in Congress; and, although it was rejected as inconsistent with the principles of honourable hostility, we have little doubt that it will be renewed, if we should really proceed to enforce our demands of territory by an actual invasion of their soil: nor do we see very well upon what grounds we should then be entitled to complain of it. Against a lawless invader — an invader for the avowed purposes of conquest — all arms are held to be lawful, and all devices by which he can be resisted, praiseworthy. But, whether this additional seduction be resorted to or not, we greatly fear that many will be found to yield to the existing temptations; and that, after incurring a prodigious and intolerable expense in transporting men to fight our melancholy battles in America, we shall find their ranks reduced by other agents than the sword or the pestilence, and their officers drooping with resentment and agony over their daily returns of those who are missing where there has been no battle; and who are not only lost to their country, but gained by her exulting adversary.

We must now draw to the close of these observations; and, indeed, there is but one other point which we are anxious to bring before our readers. America is destined, at all events, to be a great and a powerful nation. In less than a century she must have a population of at least seventy or eighty millions. War cannot prevent, and, it appears by experience, can scarcely retard this natural multiplication. All these people will speak English; and, according to the most probable conjecture, will live under free governments, whether republican or monarchical, and will be industrious, well educated, and civilised. Within no very great distance of time, therefore, — within a period to which those who are now entering life may easily survive, America will be one of the most powerful and important nations of the earth; and her friendship and commerce will be more valued, and of greater consequence, in all probability, than that of any one European state. England had — we even think that she still has — great and peculiar advantages for securing to herself this friendship and this commerce. A common origin, a common language, a common law, a common enjoyment of freedom, — all seem to point them out to each other as natural friends and allies. What then shall we say of that short sighted and fatal policy, that, for such an object as we have been endeavouring to expose, should sow the seeds of incurable hostility between two such countries, — put rancour in the vessel of their



peace, and fix in the deep foundations and venerable archives of their history, to which for centuries their eyes will be reverted, the monuments of English enmity and American valour, on the same conspicuous tablet,—binding up together the sentiments of hate to England and love to America as counterparts of the same patriotic feeling, and mingling in indissoluble association the memory of all that is odious in our history with all that is glorious in theirs? Even for the insignificant present, we lose more by the enmity of America than can be made up to us by the friendship of all the rest of the world. We lose the largest and most profitable market for our manufactures; and we train up a nation, destined to so vast an increase, to do without those commodities with which we alone can furnish them, and from the use of which nothing but a course of absolute hostility could have weaned them. But these present disadvantages, we confess, are trifling, compared with those which we forego for futurity: and when we consider that, by a tone of genuine magnanimity, moderation, and cordiality, we might, at this very crisis, have laid the foundation of unspeakable wealth, comfort, and greatness to both countries, we own that it requires the recollection of all our prudent resolutions about coolness and conciliation, to restrain us from speaking of the contrast afforded by our actual conduct in such terms as it might be spoken of—as, if the occasion calls for it, we shall not fear to speak of it hereafter.

The Americans are not liked in this country; and we are not now going to recommend them as objects of our love. We must say, however, that they are not fairly judged of by their newspapers; which are written for the most part by expatriated Irishmen or Scotchmen, and other adventurers of a similar description, who take advantage of the unbounded license of the press to indulge their own fiery passions, and aim at exciting that attention by the violence of their abuse which they are conscious they could never command by the force of their reasonings. The greater part of the polished and intelligent Americans appear little on the front of public life, and make no figure in her external history. But there are thousands of true republicans in that country who, till lately, have never felt any thing towards England but the most cordial esteem and admiration; and to whom it has been the bitterest of all mortifications that she has at last disappointed their reliance on the generosity and magnanimity of her councils, belied their predictions of her liberality, and justified the execrations which the factious and malignant formerly levelled at her in vain. This is the party too that is destined ultimately to take the lead in that country, when the increase of the population shall have lessened the demand for labour, and, by restoring the natural influence of wealth and intelligence, converted a nominal democracy into a virtual aristocracy of property, talents, and reputation; and this party, whom we might have so honourably conciliated, we first disgusted, by the humiliating spectacle of a potent British fleet battering down magnificent edifices unconnected with purposes of war, and then packing up some miserable hogsheads of tobacco as the ransom or the plunder, we disdain to remember which, of a defenceless village, and afterwards roused to more serious indignation by an unprincipled demand for an integral part of their territory.

We have said enough however, and more perhaps than enough, on this unpopular subject; for there is, or at least has been, till very lately, a disposition in the country to abet the government in its highest tone of defiance and hostility to America. While it was supposed that our

maritime rights were at issue, this was natural—and it was laudable; nor shall the time ever come when we shall cease to applaud that spirit which is for hazarding all, rather than yielding one atom of the honour and dignity of England to foreign menace or violence. Since this question of our maritime rights, however, has been understood to be waved by America, we think we can perceive a gradual wakening of the public to a sense of the injustice and the danger of our pretensions. There are persons, no doubt—and unfortunately neither few nor inconsiderable—to whom war is always desirable, and who may be expected to do what they can to make it perpetual. The tax-gatherers and contractors, and those who, in still higher stations, depend for power and influence on the appointment and multiplication of such offices, are naturally downcast at the prospect of a durable pacification; and hail with joy, as they foment with industry, every symptom of national infatuation by which new contests, however hopeless and however sanguinary, may be brought upon the country. But the sound and disinterested part of the community—those who have to pay the taxes, and the contractor and the minister—ought, one would think, to have a very opposite feeling;—and it is to them that these observations are addressed—not to influence their passions, but to rouse their understandings, and to make one calm appeal to their judgment and candour from paltry prejudices and vulgar antipathies.

Why the Americans are disliked in this country, we have never been able to understand; for most certainly they resemble us far more than any other nation in the world. They are brave, and boastful, and national, and factious like ourselves;—about as polished as 99 in 100 of our own countrymen in the upper ranks—and at least as moral and well educated in the lower. Their virtues are such as we ought to admire,—for they are those on which we value ourselves most highly; and their very faults seem to have some claim to our indulgence, since they are those with which we also are reproached by third parties. We see nothing then from which we can suppose this prevailing dislike of them to originate, but a secret grudge at them for having asserted, and manfully vindicated, their independence. This, however, is too unworthy a feeling to be avowed; and the very imputation of it should stimulate us to overcome the prejudices by which it is suggested. The example of the sovereign on this occasion is fit for the imitation of his subjects. Though notoriously reluctant to part with this proud ornament of his crown, it is known that His Majesty, when convinced of the necessity of the measure, made up his mind to it with that promptitude and decision which belong to his character, and which indicated themselves, long after, in the observation which we believe he was in the practice of addressing to every ambassador from the United States at their first audience—“I was the last man in my kingdom, Sir, to acknowledge your independence; and I shall be the last to call it in question!”

It would be extremely gratifying to know that the Prince Regent has inherited this manly sentiment; and that he infuses the spirit of it into the instructions under which the present negotiations are conducted. Never any negotiations were of such moment to the interests and the honour of this country—and never any, at the same time, in which her interests and her honour might be so easily secured.

THE DOWNFALL AND CHARACTER OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.  
 —STATE OF EUROPE AT THAT PERIOD.—PROBABLE CON-  
 SEQUENCES OF THE RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS.—  
 ORIGIN, EFFECTS, AND MORAL OF THE FRENCH REVO-  
 LUTION.\*

It would be strange indeed, we think, if pages dedicated like ours to topics of present interest, and the discussions of the passing hour, should be ushered into the world at such a moment as this, without some stamp of that common joy and overwhelming emotion with which the wonderful events of the last three months are still filling all the regions of the earth. In such a situation, it must be difficult for any one who has the means of being heard to refrain from giving utterance to his sentiments: but to us, whom it has assured, for the first time, of the entire sympathy of all our countrymen, the temptation, we own, is irresistible; and the good-natured part of our readers, we are persuaded, will rather smile at our simplicity, than fret at our presumption, when we add, that we have sometimes permitted ourselves to fancy that, if any copy of these our lucubrations should go down to another generation, it may be thought curious to trace in them *the first effects* of events that are probably destined to fix the fortune of succeeding centuries, and to observe the impressions which were made on the minds of contemporaries by those mighty transactions, which will appear of yet greater moment in the eyes of a distant posterity. *We* are still too near that great image of deliverance and reform which the genius of Europe has just set up before us, to discern with certainty its just lineaments, or construe the true character of the aspect with which it looks onward to futurity. We see enough, however, to fill us with innumerable feelings, and the germs of many high and anxious speculations. The feelings, we are sure, are in unison with all that exists around us; and we reckon therefore on more than usual indulgence for the speculations into which they may expand.

The *first* and predominant feeling which rises on contemplating the scenes that have just burst on our view, is that of deepfelt gratitude and unbounded delight,—for the liberation of so many oppressed nations,—for the cessation of bloodshed, and fear, and misery over the fairest portions of the civilised world,—and for the enchanting prospect of long peace and measureless improvement, which seems at last to be opening on the suffering kingdoms of Europe. The very novelty of such a state of things, which could be known only by description to the greater part of the existing generation,—the suddenness of its arrival, and the contrast which it forms with the horrors and alarms to which it has so immediately succeeded, all concur most powerfully to enhance its vast intrinsic advantages. It has come upon the world like the balmy air and flushing verdure of a late spring, after the dreary chills of a long and interminable winter; and the refreshing sweetness with which it has

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\* A Song of Triumph. By W. Sotheby, Esq. 8vo.

L'Acte Constitutionnel, en la Séance du 9 Avril, 1814. 8vo.

Of Bonaparte, the Bourbons, and the Necessity of rallying round our legitimate Princes, for the Happiness of France and of Europe. By F. A. Chateaubriand. 8vo.  
 —Vol. xxiii. page 1. April, 1814.

visited the earth, feels like Elysium to those who have just escaped from the driving tempests it has banished.

We have reason to hope, too, that the riches of the harvest will correspond with the splendour of this early promise. All the periods in which human society and human intellect have ever been known to make great and memorable advances, have followed close upon periods of general agitation and disorder. Men's minds, it would appear, must be deeply and roughly stirred, before they become prolific of great conceptions, or vigorous resolves; and a vast and alarming fermentation must pervade and agitate the whole mass of society, to inform it with that kindly warmth, by which alone the seeds of genius and improvement can be expanded. The fact, at all events, is abundantly certain; and may be accounted for, we conceive, without mystery and without metaphors.

A popular revolution in government or religion—or any thing else that gives rise to general and long-continued contention, naturally produces a prevailing disdain of authority, and boldness of thinking in the leaders of the fray,—together with a kindling of the imagination and developement of intellect in a great multitude of persons, who, in ordinary times, would have vegetated stupidly on the places where fortune had fixed them. Power and distinction, and all the higher prizes in the lottery of life, are brought within the reach of a far larger proportion of the community; and that vivifying spirit of ambition, which is the true source of all improvement, instead of burning at a few detached points on the summit of society, now pervades every portion of its frame. Much extravagance, and, in all probability, much guilt and much misery, result, in the first instance, from this sudden extrication of talent and enterprise, in places where they can have no legitimate issue, or points of application. But the contending elements at last find their spheres, and their balance. The disorder ceases; but the activity remains. The multitudes that had been raised into intellectual existence by dangerous passions and crazy illusions, do not all relapse into their original torpor when their passions are allayed and their illusions dispelled. There is a great permanent addition to the power and the enterprise of the community; and the talent and the activity which at first convulsed the state by their unmeasured and misdirected exertions, ultimately bless and adorn it, under a more enlightened and less intemperate guidance. If we may estimate the amount of this ultimate good by that of the disorder which preceded it, we cannot be too sanguine in our calculations of the happiness that awaits the rising generation. The fermentation, it will readily be admitted, has been long and violent enough to extract all the virtue of all the ingredients that have been submitted to its action; and enough of scum has boiled over, and enough of pestilent vapour been exhaled, to afford a reasonable assurance that the *residuum* will be both ample and pure.

If this delight in the spectacle, and the prospect of boundless good, be *the first* feeling that is excited by the scene before us, the *second*, we do not hesitate to say, is a stern and vindictive joy at the downfall of the tyrant and the tyranny by whom that good has been so long intercepted. We feel no compassion for that man's reverses of fortune, whose heart, in the days of his prosperity, was steeled against that, or any other humanising emotion. He has fallen without the pity, as he rose without the love, of any portion of mankind; and the admiration which was excited by his talents, and activity, and success, having no solid stay in the

magnanimity or generosity of his character, has been turned, perhaps rather too eagerly, into scorn and derision, now that he is deserted by fortune, and appears without extraordinary resources in the day of his calamity. — We do not think that an ambitious despot and sanguinary conqueror can be too much execrated, or too little respected by mankind; but the popular clamour, at this moment, seems to us to be carried too far, even against this very hateful individual. It is now discovered, that he has neither genius nor common sense; and he is accused of cowardice for not killing himself, by the very persons who would infallibly have exclaimed against his suicide, as a clear proof of weakness and folly. History, we think, will not class him quite so low as the English newspapers of the present day. He is a creature to be dreaded and abhorred, but scarcely, we think, to be despised, by men of the ordinary standard. His catastrophe, so far as it is yet visible, seems unsuitable, indeed, and incongruous with the part he has hitherto sustained; but we have perceived nothing in it materially to alter the estimate which we formed long ago of his character. He still seems to us a man of consummate conduct, valour, and decision in war, but without the virtues, or even the generous and social vices of a soldier of fortune; — of matchless activity, indeed, and boundless ambition, but entirely without principle, feeling, or affection; — suspicious, cruel, and overbearing; — selfish and solitary in all his pursuits and gratifications; — proud and overweening to the very borders of insanity; — and considering at last the laws of honour and the principles of morality equally beneath his notice with the interests and feelings of other men. Despising those who submitted to his pretensions, and pursuing with implacable hatred all who presumed to resist them, he seems to have gone on in a growing confidence in his own fortune, and contempt for mankind, — till a serious check from without showed him the error of his calculation, and betrayed the fatal insecurity of a career which reckoned only on prosperity.

Over the downfall of such a man, it is fitting that the world should rejoice; and his downfall, and the circumstances with which it has been attended, seem to us to hold out three several grounds of rejoicing.

In the *first* place, we think it has established for ever the utter impracticability of any scheme of universal dominion; and proved, that Europe possesses sufficient means to maintain and assert the independence of her several states, in despite of any power that can be brought against them. It might formerly have been doubted, — and many minds of no abject cast were depressed with more than doubts on the subject, — whether the undivided sway which Rome exercised of old, by means of superior skill and discipline, might not be revived in modern times by arrangement, activity, and intimidation, — and whether, in spite of the boasted intelligence of Europe at the present day, the ready communication between all its parts, and the supposed weight of its public opinion, the sovereign of one or two great kingdoms might not subdue all the rest, by rapidity of movement, and decision of conduct, and retain them in subjection by a strict system of disarming and *espionnage* — by a constant interchange of armies and stations — and, in short, by a dexterous and alert use of those means of extensive intelligence and communication, which their civilisation seemed at first to hold out as their surest protection. The experiment, however, has now been tried; and the result is, that the nations of Europe can never be brought under the rule of one conquering sovereign. No individual, it may be fairly presumed, will ever try that fatal experiment again, with so many extraor-

dinary advantages, and chances of success, as he in whose hands it has now finally miscarried. The different states, it is to be hoped, will never again be found so shamefully unprovided for defence — so long insensible to their danger — and, let us not scruple at last to speak the truth, so little worthy of being saved — as most of them were at the beginning of that awful period; while there is still less chance of any military sovereign again finding himself invested with the absolute disposal of so vast a population, at once habituated to war and victory by the energies of a popular revolution, and disposed to submit to any hardships and privations for a ruler who would protect them from a recurrence of revolutionary tumults. That ruler, however, and that population, reinforced by immense drafts from the countries he had already over-run, has now been fairly beaten down by the other nations of Europe, at length cordially united by the sense of their common danger. Henceforward, therefore, they know their strength, and the means and occasions of bringing it into action; and the very notoriety of that strength, and of the scenes in which it has been proved, will in all probability prevent the recurrence of any necessity for proving it again.

The *second* ground of rejoicing in the downfall of Bonaparte is on account of the impressive lesson it has read to Ambition, and the striking illustration it has afforded, of the inevitable tendency of that passion to bring to ruin the power and the greatness which it seeks so madly to increase. No human being, perhaps, ever stood on so proud a pinnacle of worldly grandeur, as this insatiable conqueror at the beginning of his Russian campaign. He had done more — he had acquired more — and he possessed more, as to actual power, influence, and authority, than any individual that ever figured on the scene of European story. He had visited, with a victorious army, almost every capital of the Continent; and dictated the terms of peace to their astonished princes. He had consolidated under his immediate dominion a territory and population apparently sufficient to meet the combination of all that it did not include, and interwoven himself with the government of almost all that was left. He had cast down and erected thrones at his pleasure; and surrounded himself with tributary kings and principalities of his own creation. He had connected himself by marriage with the proudest of the ancient sovereigns; and was at the head of the largest and the finest army that was ever assembled to desolate or dispose of the world. Had he known when to stop in his aggressions upon the peace and independence of mankind, it seems as if this terrific sovereignty might have been permanently established in his person. But the demon by whom he was possessed urged him on to his fate. He could not bear that any power should exist which did not confess its dependence on him. Without a pretext for quarrel, he attacked Russia — insulted Austria — trod contemptuously on the fallen fortunes of Prussia — and by new aggressions, and the menace of more intolerable evils, drove them into that league which rolled back the tide of ruin on himself, and ultimately hurled him into the insignificance from which he originally sprung.

It is for this reason; chiefly, that we join in the feeling, which we think universal in this country, of joy and satisfaction at the utter destruction of this victim of Ambition, — and at the failure of those negotiations, which would have left him, though humbled, in possession of a sovereign state, and of great actual power and authority. We say nothing at present of the policy or the necessity, that may have dictated those propositions; but the actual result is far more satisfactory than any condition of

their acceptance. Without this, the lesson to Ambition would have been imperfect, and the retribution of Eternal Justice apparently incomplete. It was fitting that the world should see it again demonstrated by this great example, that the appetite of conquest is in its own nature insatiable;— and that a being, once abandoned to that bloody career, is fated to pursue it to the end; and must persist in the work of desolation and murder, till the accumulated wrongs and resentments of the harassed world sweep him from its face. The knowledge of this may deter some dangerous spirits from entering on a course which will infallibly bear them on to destruction; and at all events should induce the sufferers to cut short the measure of its errors and miseries, by accomplishing their doom at the beginning. Sanguinary conquerors, we do not hesitate to say, should be devoted by a perpetual proscription, in mercy to the rest of the world.

Our *last* cause of rejoicing over this grand catastrophe, arises from the discredit, and even the derision, which it has so opportunely thrown upon the character of conquerors in general. The thinking part of mankind did not perhaps need to be disabused upon this subject; but no illusion was ever so strong, or so pernicious with the multitude, as that which invested heroes of this description with a sort of supernatural grandeur and dignity, and bent the spirits of men before them, as beings intrinsically entitled to the homage and submission of inferior natures. It is above all things fortunate, therefore, when this spell can be broken, by merely reversing the operation by which it had been imposed; when the idols that success had tricked out in the mock attributes of divinity are stripped of their disguise by the rough hand of misfortune, and exhibited before the indignant and wondering eyes of their admirers, in the naked littleness of humbled and helpless men, begging life and subsistence from the pity of their human conquerors, and spared with safety, in consequence of their insignificance. Such an exhibition, we would fain hope, will rescue men for ever from that most humiliating devotion, which has hitherto so often tempted the ambition, and facilitated the progress of conquerors. It is not in our days, at least, that it will be forgotten, that Bonaparte turned out a mere mortal in the end; and neither in our days, nor in those of our children, is it at all likely, that any other adventurer will arise to efface the impressions connected with that recollection by more splendid achievements than distinguished the greater part of his career. The kind of shame, too, that is felt by those who have been the victims and the instruments of a being so mean, will make it difficult for any successor to his ambition so to overawe the minds of the world again; and will consequently diminish the dread, while it exasperates the hatred, with which presumptuous oppression ought always to be regarded.

If the downfall of Bonaparte teach this lesson, and fix this feeling in the minds of men, we should almost be tempted to say that the miseries he has inflicted are atoned for; and that his life, on the whole, will have been useful to mankind. Undoubtedly there is no other single source of wretchedness so prolific as that strange fascination by which atrocious guilt is converted into an object of admiration, and the honours due to the benefactors of the human race lavished most profusely on their destroyers. A sovereign who pursues schemes of conquest for the gratification of his personal ambition is neither more nor less than a being who inflicts violent death upon thousands, and miseries still more agonising on millions of innocent individuals, to relieve his own *ennui*, and divert the

languors of a base and worthless existence ; — and if it be true that the chief excitement to such exploits is found in the false glory with which the madness of mankind has surrounded their successful performance, it will not be easy to calculate how much we are indebted to him whose history has contributed to dispel it.

Next to our delight at the overthrow of Bonaparte, is our exultation at the glory of England. It is a proud and honourable distinction to be able to say, in the end of such a contest, that we belong to the only nation that has never been conquered ; — to the nation that set the first example of successful resistance to the power that was desolating the world, — and who always stood erect, though she sometimes stood alone, before it. From England alone, that power, to which all the rest have successively bowed, has won no trophies, and extorted no submission ; on the contrary, she has been constantly baffled and disgraced whenever she has grappled directly with the might and the energy of England. During the proudest part of her continental career, England drove her ships from the ocean, and annihilated her colonies and her commerce. The first French army that capitulated, capitulated to the English forces in Egypt ; and Lord Wellington is the only commander against whom six French marshals have successively tried in vain to procure any advantage.

The efforts of England have not always been well directed, — nor her endeavours to rouse the other nations of Europe very wisely timed ; — but she has set a magnificent example of unconquerable fortitude and unalterable constancy ; and may claim the proud distinction of having kept alive the sacred flame of liberty and the spirit of national independence, when the chill of general apprehension, and the rushing whirlwind of conquest, had apparently extinguished them for ever, in the other nations of the earth. No course of prosperity, indeed, and no harvest of ultimate success, can ever extinguish the regret of all the true friends of our national glory and happiness, for the many preposterous, and the occasional disreputable, expeditions, in which English blood was more than unprofitably wasted, and English character more than imprudently involved ; nor can the delightful assurance of our actual deliverance from danger efface the remembrance of the tremendous hazard to which we were so long exposed by the obstinate misgovernment of Ireland. These, however, were the sins of the government, — and do not at all detract from the excellent spirit of the people, to which, in its main bearings, it was necessary for the government to conform. That spirit was always, we believe universally, a spirit of strong attachment to the country and of stern resolution to do all things, and to suffer all things in its cause : — mingled with more or less confidence, or more or less anxiety, according to the temper or the information of individuals, — but sound, steady, and erect, we believe, upon the whole, — and equally determined to risk all for independence, whether it was believed to be in great or in little danger.

Of our own sentiments and professions, and of the consistency of our avowed principles from the first to the last of this momentous period, it would be impertinent to speak at large, in discussing so great a theme as the honour of our common country. None of our readers, and none of our censors, can be more persuaded than we are of the extreme insignificance of such a discussion — and not many of them can feel more completely indifferent about the aspersions with which we have been distinguished, or more fully convinced of the ultimate justice of public opinion. We shall make no answer therefore to the sneers and calumnies



of which it has been thought worth while to make us the subject, except just to say, that if any man can read what we have written on public affairs, and entertain any serious doubt of our zeal for the safety, the honour, and the freedom of England, he must attach a different meaning to all these phrases from that which we have most sincerely believed to belong to them; and that, though we do not pretend to have either foreseen or foretold the happy events that have so lately astonished the world, we cannot fail to see in them the most gratifying confirmation of the very doctrines we have been the longest and the most loudly abused for asserting.

The most important of these doctrines was, that France could not now be successfully resisted, unless all the other great powers were united against her, — and that it was playing her game, therefore, and casting away the last hope of the world, to excite one or two of them to the contest, till the co-operation of the rest could be secured. The fate of all former campaigns, and the fate of the last, have equally illustrated this observation. France rose more audaciously triumphant from the result of all these minor coalitions — and she fell before the first impulse of that great one which we had always recommended. Europe sunk into deeper despondency and humiliation from the impotent and premature attempts which we had ventured to deprecate; and she was restored at once by that united effort, from which alone we had always said that her salvation was to be expected.

Our other leading doctrine was, that there was but little hope of an effectual resistance to France till the body of the people in the different nations of Europe could be made to take part heartily with their governments in the cause; — and here, too, the event has corresponded with our prediction. The greater part of the late wars against France were undertaken by the respective courts who were engaged in them, without any regard to the disposition of their people; who were long indifferent, and in many instances disaffected to the cause. Their success accordingly was such as might have been expected. But after repeated shocks of national misfortune had thrown the sovereigns more entirely on the attachment of their people, and especially after these people had successively tasted of the bitterness of French dominion, and learned by experience the miserable fate that awaited the victims of such a foe, the war assumed a different complexion, and was waged with a different spirit; — campaigns became obstinate, and supplies inexhaustible. The ardour of the troops encouraged their leaders to be enterprising; and it soon appeared that thrones might be overturned, while nations remained unconquered.

These, we think, were the chief of our heresies; and we really cannot perceive that the events of the last six months should bring shame to their supporters; and least of all in a country where the war against France has always been successful, precisely because it has been the war of the people, and because the people are free. Of Spain, we think as we have always thought. Of Russia, we are most willing to believe that we have spoken somewhat rashly; — though its condition under Paul must have resembled nothing so little as its condition under Alexander.

The last sentiment in which we think all candid observers of the late great events must cordially agree, is that of admiration and pure and unmingled approbation of the magnanimity, the prudence, the dignity, and forbearance of the Allies. There has been something in the manner of these extraordinary transactions as valuable as the substance of what

has been achieved, — and, if possible, still more meritorious. History records no instance of union so faithful and complete — of councils so firm — of gallantry so generous — of moderation so dignified and wise. In reading the addresses of the allied sovereigns to the people of Europe and of France ; and, above all, in tracing every step of their demeanour after they got possession of the metropolis, we seem to be transported from the vulgar and disgusting realities of actual story, to the beautiful imaginations and exalted fictions of poetry and romance. The proclamation of the Emperor Alexander to the military men who might be in Paris on his arrival — his address to the Senate — the terms in which he has always spoken of his fallen adversary, are all conceived in the very highest strain of nobleness and wisdom. They have all the spirit, the courtesy, the generosity, of the age of chivalry ; and all the liberality and mildness of that of philosophy. The disciple of Fenelon could not have conducted himself with more perfect amiableness and grandeur ; and the fabulous hero of the most sublime and philanthropic of all moralists has been equalled, if not outdone, by a Russian monarch, in the first flush and tumult of his victory. The sublimity of the scene, indeed, and the merit of the actors, will not be fairly appreciated, if we do not recollect that they were arbitrary sovereigns, who had been trained rather to consult their own feelings than the rights of mankind — who had been disturbed on their hereditary thrones by the wanton aggression of the man who now lay at their mercy — and had seen their territories wasted, their people butchered, and their capitals pillaged, by him they had at last chased to his den, and upon whose capital, and whose people, they might now repay the insults that had been offered to theirs. They judged more magnanimously, however ; and they judged more wisely — for their own glory, for the objects they had in view, and for the general interests of humanity. By their generous forbearance, and singular moderation, they not only put their adversary in the wrong in the eyes of all Europe, but they made him appear little and ferocious in comparison ; and, while overbearing all opposition by superior force, and heroic resolution, they paid due honour to the valour by which they had been resisted, and gave no offence to that national pride which might have presented the greatest of all obstacles to their success. From the beginning to the end of their hostile operations, they avoided naming the name of the ancient family ; and not in words merely, but in the whole strain and tenour of their conduct, respected the inherent right of the nation to choose its own government, and stipulated for nothing but what was indispensable for the safety of its neighbours. Born, as they were, to unlimited thrones, and accustomed in their own persons to the exercise of power that admitted but little control, they did not scruple to declare publicly, that France, at least, was entitled to a larger measure of freedom ; and that the intelligence of its population entitled it to a share in its own government. They exerted themselves sincerely to mediate between the different parties that might be supposed to exist in the state ; and treated each with a respect that taught its opponents that they might coalesce without being dishonoured. In this way the seeds of civil discord, which such a crisis could scarcely have failed to quicken, have, we trust, been almost entirely destroyed ; and if France escapes the visitation of internal dissension, it will be chiefly owing to the considerate and magnanimous prudence of those very persons to whom Europe has been indebted for her deliverance.

In this high and unqualified praise, it is a singular satisfaction to us to

be able to say, that our own government seems fully entitled to participate. In the whole of those most important proceedings, the ministry of England appears to have conducted itself with wisdom, moderation, and propriety. In spite of the vehement clamours of their own party, and the repugnance which was said to exist in higher quarters to any negotiation with Bonaparte, they are understood to have adhered with laudable firmness to the clear policy of not disjoining their country from that great confederacy, through which, alone, either peace or victory was rationally to be expected:—and, going heartily along with their allies, both in their unrivalled efforts and in their heroic forbearance, they too refrained from recognising the ancient family, till they were invited to return by the spontaneous voice of their own nation; and thus gave them the glory of being recalled by affection, instead of being replaced by force; while the nation, which force would either have divided, or disgusted entire, did all that was wanted, as the free act of their own patriotism and wisdom. Considering the temper that had long been fostered, and the tone that had been maintained among their warmest supporters at home, we think this conduct of the ministry entitled to the highest credit; and we give it our praise now, with the same freedom and sincerity with which we pledge ourselves to bestow our censure, whenever they do any thing that seems to call for that less grateful exercise of our duty.

Having now indulged ourselves, by expressing a few of the sentiments that are irresistibly suggested by the events that lie before us, we turn to our more laborious and appropriate vocation, of speculating on the nature and consequences of those events. Is the restoration of the Bourbons the best possible issue of the long struggle that has preceded? Will it lead to the establishment of a free government in France? Will it be favourable to the general interests of liberty in England and the rest of the world? These are great and momentous questions, — which we are far from presuming to think we can answer explicitly, without the assistance of that great expositor — Time. Yet we should think the man unworthy of the great felicity of having lived to the present day, who could help asking them of himself; and *we* seem to stand in the particular predicament of being obliged to try at least for an answer.

The first we think is the easiest; and we scarcely scruple to answer it positively in the affirmative. We know, indeed, that there are many who think, that a permanent change of dynasty might have afforded a better guarantee against the return of those ancient prejudices and abuses which first gave rise to the revolution, and may again reproduce all its disasters; and that France, reduced within moderate limits, would, under such a dynasty, both have served better as a permanent warning to other states of the danger of such abuses, and been less likely to unite itself with any of the old corrupt governments, in schemes against the internal liberty or national independence of the great European commonwealth. And we are far from under-rating the value of these suggestions. But there are considerations of more urgent and immediate importance, that seem to leave no room for hesitation in the present position of affairs.

In the first place, the restoration of the Bourbons seems the natural and only certain *end* of that series of revolutionary movements, and that long and disastrous experiment, which have so awfully overshadowed the freedom and happiness of the world. It naturally figures as the final completion of a cycle of convulsions and miseries, and presents itself to the imagination as the point at which the tempest-shaken vessel of the

state again reaches the haven of tranquillity from the stormy ocean of revolution. Nor is it merely to the imagination, or through the mediation of such figures, that this truth presents itself. To the coldest reason it is manifest that, by the restoration of the old line, the whole tremendous evils of a disputed title to the crown are at once obviated; for when the dynasty of Napoleon has once lost *possession*, it has lost *all* upon which its pretensions could ever have been founded, and may fairly be considered as annihilated and extinguished for ever. The novelty of a government is in all cases a prodigious inconvenience; but if it be substantially unpopular, and the remnants of an old government at hand, its insecurity becomes obviously alarming; and nothing but great severity and great success can give it even the appearance of stability. Now, the government of Napoleon was not only new and oppressive, and consequently insecure, but it was absolutely dissolved and at an end, before the period had arrived at which alone the restoration of the Bourbons could be made a subject of deliberation.

The chains of the Continent, in fact, were broken at Leipsic; and the despotic sceptre of the great nation cast down to the earth, as soon as the Allies set foot as conquerors on its ancient territory. If the Bourbons were not then to be restored, there were only three other ways of settling the government — to leave Bonaparte at the head of a limited and reduced monarchy; to vest the sovereignty in his infant son; or to call or permit some new adventurer to preside over an entire new constitution, republican or monarchical, as might be most agreeable to his supporters. The first would have been fraught with measureless evils to France, and dangers to all her neighbours; but, fortunately, though it was tried, it was in its own nature impracticable; and Napoleon knew this well enough when he rejected the propositions made to him at Chatillon. He knew well enough what stuff his Parisians and his senators were made of, and what were the only terms upon which the nation would submit to his dominion. He knew that he had no hold of the affections of the people, and ruled but in their fears and their vanity — that he held his throne only because he had identified his own greatness with the glory of France, and surrounded himself with a vast army, drawn from all the nations of Europe, and so posted and divided as to be secured against any general spirit of revolt. The moment this army was ruined, therefore, and he came back a beaten and humbled sovereign, he felt that his sovereignty was at an end. To rule at all, it was necessary that he should rule with glory, and with full possession of the means of intimidation. As soon as these left him, his throne must have tottered to its fall. Royalist factions and republican factions would have arisen in every part of the nation — discontent and insurrection would have multiplied in the capital and in the provinces; and if not cut off by the arm of some new competitor, he must soon have been overwhelmed in the tempest of civil commotion. The second plan would have been less dangerous to other states, but still more impracticable with a view to France itself. The nerveless arm of an infant could never have wielded the iron sceptre of Napoleon; and his weakness, and the utter want of native power or influence in the members of his family, would have invited all sorts of pretensions, and called forth to open day all the wild and terrific factions which the terror of his father's power had chased for a season to their dens of darkness. Jealousy of the influence of Austria, too, would have facilitated the deposition of the baby despot; and even if his state could have been upheld, it is plain that it could have been only by the faithful energy of his predecessor's ministers of oppres-

sion, and that the dynasty of Napoleon could only have maintained itself by the arts and the crimes of its founder. The third expedient must plainly have been the most inexpedient and unmerciful of all; since, after the experience of the last twenty years, we may venture to say with confidence it could only have led, through a repetition of those monstrous disorders over which reason has blushed and humanity sickened so long, to the dead repose of another military despotism.

The restoration of the Bourbons, therefore, we conceive, was an act, not merely of wisdom, but of necessity; or of that strong and obvious expediency, with a view either to peace or security, which in politics amounts to necessity. It is a separate, however, or at least an ulterior question, whether this restoration is likely to give a free government to France, or to bring it back to the condition of its old arbitrary monarchy? — a question, certainly, of great interest and curiosity, and upon which it does not appear to us that the politicians of this country are by any means agreed.

There are many, we think, who cannot be brought to understand that the restoration of the ancient line can mean any thing else but the restoration of the ancient constitution of the monarchy — who take it for granted that they must return to the substantial exercise of all their former functions, and conceive that all restraints upon the sovereign authority, and all stipulations in favour of public liberty, must be looked upon with contempt and aversion, and be speedily swept away as vestiges of that tremendous revolution, the whole brood and progeny of which must be held in abhorrence at the court of the new monarch; and truly, when we remember what Mr. Fox has said with so much solemnity upon this subject, and call to mind the occasion with reference to which he has declared, that “a restoration is for the most part the most pernicious of all revolutions,” it is not easy to divest ourselves of apprehensions that such may in some degree be the consequence of the events over which we are rejoicing. Yet the circumstances of the present case, we will confess, do not seem to us to warrant such apprehensions in their full extent; and our augury, upon the whole, is favourable upon this branch of the question also.

They who think differently, and who hope, or fear, that things are to go back exactly to the state in which they were in 1788; and that all the sufferings, and all the sacrifices, of the intermediate period, are to be in vain, look only, as it appears to us, to the naked fact, that the old line of kings is restored, and the ancient nobility re-established in their honours. They consider the case, as it would have been, if this restoration had been effected by the triumphant return of the emigrants from Coblenz in 1792 — by the success of the royalist arms in La Vendée — or by the general prevalence of a royalist party, spontaneously regenerated over the kingdom; — forgetting that the ancient family has only been recalled in a crisis brought on by foreign successes, when the actual government was virtually dissolved, and no alternative left to the nation but those which we have just enumerated; — forgetting that it is not restored unconditionally, and as a matter of right, but rather called anew to the throne, upon terms and stipulations, propounded in the name of a nation, free to receive or to reject it; forgetting that an interval of twenty-five long years has separated the subjects from the sovereign; and broken all those ties of habitual loyalty, by which a people is most effectually bound to an hereditary monarch; and that these years, filled with ideas of democratic license, or despotic oppression, cannot have tended to foster associations favourable to royalty, or to propagate kindly conceptions of the connection of subject and king; — forgetting, above

all, that along with her ancient monarchy, a new legislative body is associated in the government of France, — that a constitution has been actually adopted, by which the powers of those monarchs may be effectually controlled; and that the illustrious person who has ascended the throne, has already bound himself to govern according to that constitution, and to assume no power with which it does not expressly invest him.

If Louis XVIII., then, trained in the school of misfortune, and seeing and feeling all the permanent changes that these twenty-five eventful years have wrought in the condition of his people; — if this monarch, mild, honourable, and unambitious as he is understood to be in his character, is but faithful to his oath, grateful to his deliverers, and observant of the counsels of his most prudent and magnanimous Allies, he will feel, that he is *not* the lawful inheritor of the powers that belonged to his predecessor; that his crown is not the crown of Louis XVI.; and that to assert *his* privileges, would be to provoke his fate. By this time, he probably knows enough of the nature of his countrymen, perhaps we should say of mankind in general, not to rely too much on those warm expressions of love and loyalty, with which his accession has been hailed, and which would probably have been lavished with equal profusion on his antagonist, if victory had again attended his arms in this last and decisive contest. We do not doubt, that he is more acceptable to the body of the nation, than the despot he has supplanted; and that some recollections or traditions of a more generous loyalty than the sullen nature of that ungracious ruler either invited or admitted, have mingled themselves with the hopes of peace and of liberty, which must be the chief solid ingredients in his welcome; and acting upon the constitutional vivacity of the people, and the servility of mobs, always ready to lackey the heels of the successful, have taken the form of ardent affection, and the most sincere devotedness and attachment. But we think it is very apparent, that there is no great love or spontaneous zeal for the Bourbons in the body of the French nation; that the joy so tardily manifested for their return is grounded upon the hope of great consequential benefits to themselves, and that there is no personal attachment, which will lead them to submit to any thing that may be supposed to be encroaching, or felt to be oppressive. It will probably require great temper and great management in the new sovereigns to exercise, without offence, the powers with which they are legitimately invested; but their danger will be great, indeed, if they suddenly attempt to go beyond them. With temper and circumspection, they may in time establish the solid foundations of a splendid, though limited, throne; if they aspire again to be absolute, they will soon cease to reign.

The restoration of the old nobility seems, at first sight, a more hazardous operation than that of the ancient monarchs; — but the danger is more apparent than real. The various inclemencies of a twenty-five years' exile have sadly thinned the ranks of those rash and sanguine spirits that assembled at Coblenz in 1792, and may be presumed to have tamed the pride and lowered the pretensions of the few that remain. A great multitude of families have become extinct, — a still greater number had reconciled themselves to the Imperial government, — and the small remnant that have continued faithful to the fortunes of their royal master will probably be satisfied with the conditions of his return. Thus dwindled in number, — decayed in fortune, — and divided by diversities of conduct that will not be speedily forgotten, we do not think that there is any great hazard of their attempting either to assert

those privileges, or to assume that tone, by which they formerly revolted the inferior classes of the state, and would now be considered as invading the just rights and constitutional dignity of the other citizens.

We do not see any thing, therefore, in the restoration itself, either of the Prince or of his nobles, that seems to us very dangerous to the freedom of the people, or very likely to pervert those constitutional provisions by which it is understood that their freedom is to be secured. Yet we did not need the example that France herself has so often afforded, to make us distrustful of constitutions on paper ;—and are not only far from feeling assured of the practical benefits that are to result from this new experiment, but are perfectly convinced that all the benefit that does result must be ascribed, not to the wisdom of the actual institutions, but to the continued operation of those circumstances in point of fact, by which these institutions have been suggested, and by the permanent pressure of which alone their operation can yet be secured. The bases of the new constitution sound well certainly ; and may be advantageously contrasted with the famous declaration of the rights of man, which initiated the labours of the Constituent Assembly. But the truth is, that the bases of most paper constitutions sound well ; and that principles not much less wise and liberal than those which we now hope to see reduced into practice have been laid down in most of the constitutions which have proved utterly ineffectual within the last 25 years, to repress popular disorder or despotic usurpation in this very country. The constitution now adopted by Louis XVIII. is not very unlike that which was imposed on his unfortunate predecessor in the Champ de Mars in 1790 ; and it certainly leaves less power to the crown than was conceded by that first arrangement. Yet the power vested in Louis XVI. was found quite inadequate to protect the regal office against the encroachments of an insane democracy ; and the throne was overthrown by the sudden irruption of the popular part of the government. On the other hand, it is still more remarkable that the constitution now about to be put on its trial is yet more like the constitution adopted by Bonaparte on his accession to the sovereign authority. He, too, had a Senate and a Legislative Body,—and trial by jury,—and universal eligibility,—and what was pretended to be liberty of printing. The freedom of the people, in short, was as well guarded in most respects by the words and the forms of that constitution, as they are by those of this which is now under consideration ; and yet those words and forms were found to be no obstacle at all to the practical exercise and systematic establishment of the most atrocious despotism that Europe has ever witnessed.

What then shall we say ? Since the same institutions, and the same sort of balance of power, give at one time too much weight to the crown, and at another too much indulgence to popular feeling, shall we conclude that all sorts of institutions and balances are indifferent or nugatory ? or only, that their efficacy depends greatly on the circumstances to which they are applied, and on the actual balance and relation in which the different orders of the state previously stood to each other ? The last, we think, is the only sane conclusion ; and it is by attending to the conditions which it involves, that we shall be enabled to conjecture, whether an experiment, that has twice failed already in so signal a manner, is now likely to be attended with success.

When a limited monarchy was proposed for France in 1790, the whole body of the nation had just emancipated itself by force from a state of political vassalage, and had begun to feel the delight and intoxication of that consciousness of power which tempts at first to so many experiments

on its reality and extent. New to the exercise of this power, and jealous of its security so long as any of those institutions remained which had so long repressed or withheld it, they first improvidently subverted all that was left of their ancient establishments; and then, from the same impetuosity of inexperience, they split into factions that began with abuse, and ended in bloodshed; and, setting out with an extreme zeal for reason and humanity, plunged themselves very speedily in the very abyss of atrocity and folly. In such a violent state of the public mind, no institutions had any chance of being permanent. The root of the evil was in the suddenness of the extrication of such a volume of political energy,—or rather, perhaps, in the arrangements by which it had been so long pent up and compressed. The only true policy would have been for those, whose interest or judgment enabled them to see the hazards upon which the new-sprung enthusiasts were rushing—to have thrown themselves into their ranks;—to have united cordially with those who were least insane or intemperate; and, by going along with them at all hazards, to have retarded the impetuosity of their movements, and watched the first opportunity to bring them back to sobriety and reason. Instead of this, they abandoned them, with demonstrations of contempt and hostility, to the career upon which they had entered—they emigrated from the territory—and thus threw the mass of the population at once into the hands of the incendiaries of the capital. Twenty-five years have nearly elapsed since the period of that terrible explosion. A great part of its force has been wasted and finally dissipated in that long interval; and though its natural flow has been again repressed in the latter part of it, there is no hazard of such another eruption, now that those obstructions are again thrown off. That was produced by the accumulation of all the energy, intelligence, and discontent, that had been generated among a people deprived of political rights, during a full century of peaceful pursuits and growing intelligence, without any experience or warning of the perils of its sudden expansion. This can be but the collection of a few years of a very different description, and with all the dreadful consequences of its untempered and undirected energy still glaring in view. We do not think, therefore, that the attempt to establish a limited monarchy is now in very great danger of misgiving in the same way as in 1790; and conceive, that the conduits of an ordinary representative assembly, if instantly prepared and diligently watched, may now be quite sufficient to carry off and direct all the popular energy that is generated in the nation—though the quantity was then so great as to tear all the machinery to pieces, and blow the ancient monarchy into the clouds, with the fragments of the new constitution.

With regard to the late experiment under Bonaparte, it is almost enough to observe, that it seems to us to have been from the beginning a mere piece of mockery and delusion. The government was substantially despotic and military, or, at all events, a government of undisguised force, ever since the time of the triumvirs,—perhaps we might say, since that of Robespierre; and when Bonaparte assumed the supreme power, the nation willingly gave up its liberty for the chance of tranquillity and protection. Wearied out with the perpetual succession of sanguinary factions, each establishing itself by bloody proscriptions, deportations, and confiscations, it gladly threw itself into the arms of a ruler who seemed sufficiently strong to keep all lesser tyrants in subjection, and, despairing of freedom, was thankful for an interval of repose. In such a situation, the constitution was dictated by the master of the state for



his own glory and convenience,—not imposed upon him by the nation for his direction and control; and, with whatever names or pretences of liberty and popular prerogative the members of it might be adorned, it was sufficiently known to all parties that it was intended substantially as an instrument of command,—that the only effective power that was meant to be exercised or recognised in the government was the power of the Emperor, abetted by his army; and that all the other functionaries were in reality to be dependent upon him. That the Senate and Legislative Body, therefore, did not convert the military despotism upon which they were engrafted into a free government is no considerable presumption against the fitness of such institutions to maintain the principles of freedom under a different constitution; nor can the fact be justly regarded as a new example of their inefficiency for that purpose. In this instance they were never intended to minister to the interests of liberty; nor instituted with any expectation that they would have that effect. Here, therefore, there was no failure, and no disappointment. They actually answered all the ends of their establishment, by facilitating the execution of the Imperial will, and disguising, to those who chose to look no farther, the naked oppression of the government. It does not seem to us, therefore, that this instance more than the other, should materially discourage our expectations of now seeing something like a system of regulated freedom in that country. The people of France have lived long enough under the capricious atrocities of a crazy democracy, to be aware of the dangers of that form of government,—to feel the necessity of contriving some retarding machinery to break the impulse of the general will, and providing some apparatus for purifying, concentrating, and cooling the first fiery runnings of popular spirit and enthusiasm; while they have also felt enough of the oppressions and miseries of arbitrary power, to instruct them in the value of some regular and efficient control. In such a situation, therefore, when a scheme of government that has been found to answer both these purposes in other countries is offered by the nation as the accompaniment and condition of the monarchy, and is freely accepted by the sovereign on his accession, there seems to be a reasonable hope that the issue will at length be fortunate; and that a free and stable constitution may succeed to the calamitous experiments which have been suggested by the imperfections of that which was originally established.

All this, however, we readily admit, is but problematical, and affords ground for nothing more than expectation and conjecture. There are grounds certainly for doubting, whether the French are even yet capable of a regulated freedom; and for believing, at all events, that they will for a good while be but awkward in discharging the ordinary offices of citizens of a limited monarchy. They have probably learned by this time, that for a nation to be free, something more is necessary than that it should will it. To be practically and tranquilly free, a great deal more is necessary; and though we do not ascribe much to positive institutions, we ascribe almost every thing to temper and habit. A genuine system of national representation, for example, can neither be devised, nor carried into operation in a day. The practical benefits of such a system depend in a great measure upon the internal arrangements of the society in which it exists, by means of which the sentiments and opinions of the people may be peacefully and safely transmitted from their first small and elementary gatherings, to the great public depositories of national energy and wisdom. The structure, which answers those purposes, however, is,

in all cases, more the work of time than of contrivance; and can never be impressed at once upon a society, which is aiming for the first time at these objects. Without some such previous and internal arrangement, however, and without the familiar existence of a long gradation of virtual and unelected representatives, no pure or fair representation can ever be obtained. Instead of the cream of the society, we shall have the froth only in the legislature; or, it may be, the scum and the fiery spirit, instead of the rich extract of all its strength and its virtues. But even independent of the common hazards and disadvantages of novelty, there are strong grounds of apprehension in the character and habits of the French nation. The very vivacity of that accomplished people, and the raised imagination which they are too apt to carry with them into projects of every description, are all against them in those political adventures. They are too impatient we fear — too ambitious of perfection — too studious of effect, to be satisfied with the attainable excellence or vulgar comforts of an English constitution. If it captivate them in the theory, it will be sure to disappoint them in the working: from endeavouring universally, each in his own department, to top their parts, they will be very apt to go beyond them; and will run the risk, not only of encroaching upon each other, but, generally, of missing the substantial advantages of the plan, through disdain of that sobriety of effort, and calm mediocrity of principle, to which alone it is adapted.

The project of giving them a free constitution, therefore, may certainly miscarry, — and it may miscarry in two ways. If the court can effectually attach to itself the marshals and military senators of Bonaparte, in addition to the old nobility; — and if, through their means, the vanity and ambition of the turbulent and aspiring spirits of the nation should be turned either towards military advancement, or to offices and distinction about the court, the legislative bodies may be gradually made subservient in most things to the will of the government; — and by skilful management may be rendered almost as tractable and insignificant as they have actually been in the previous stages of their existence. On the other hand, if the discordant materials, out of which the higher branch of the legislature is to be composed, should ultimately arrange it into two hostile parties, — of the old noblesse on the one hand, and the active individuals, who have fought their way to distinction through scenes of democratic and of imperial tyranny on the other, it is greatly to be feared, that the body of the nation will soon be divided into the same factions; and that while the court throws all its influence into the scale of the former, the latter will in time unite the far more formidable weight of the military body — the old republicans, and all who are either discontented at their lot, or impatient of peaceful times. By their assistance, and that of the national vehemence and love of change, it will most probably get the command of the legislative body and the capital; — and then, unless the Prince play his part with singular skill, as well as temper, there will be imminent hazard of a revolution, — not less disastrous perhaps than that which has just been completed.

Of these two catastrophes, the first, which would be the least lamentable or hopeless, seems, in the present temper of the times, to be rather the most likely to happen; — and, even though it should occur, the government would most probably be considerably more advanced toward freedom than it has ever yet been in that country — and the organization would remain entire, into which the breath of liberty might be breathed, as soon as the growing spirit of patriotism and intelligence had again removed the

shackles of authority. Against the second and more dreadful catastrophe, and in some considerable degree against both, there seems to exist a reasonable security in the small numbers and general weakness of that part of the old aristocracy which has survived to reclaim its privileges. One of the bases of the new constitution, and perhaps the most important of them all, is, that every subject of the kingdom shall be equally capable of all honours or employments. Had the sovereign, however, who is the fountain of honour and the giver of employment, returned with that great train of nobility which waited in the court of his predecessor, this vital regulation we fear might have proved a mere dead letter; and the same unjust monopoly of power and distinction that originally overthrew the throne might again have sapped its foundations. — As things now are, however, there are far too few of that order to sustain such a monopoly; and the Prince must of necessity employ subjects of all ranks and degrees in situations of the greatest dignity and emolument. A real equality of rights will thus be practically recognised; and a fair and intelligent distribution of power and consideration will go far to satisfy the wishes of every party in the state, or at least to disarm those who would foment discontents and disaffection, of their most plausible topics and pretexts.

On the whole, then, we think France has now a tolerable prospect of obtaining a free government — and, without extraordinary mismanagement, is almost sure of many great improvements on her ancient system. Her great security and *panacea* must be a spirit of general mildness, and mutual indulgence and toleration. All parties have something to forgive, and something to be forgiven; and there is much in the history of the last twenty-five years, which it would be for the general interest, and the general credit of the country, to consign to eternal oblivion. The scene has opened, we think, under the happiest auguries in this respect. The manner of the abdication, and the manner of the restoration, are ominous, we think, of forbearance and conciliation in all the quarters from which intractable feelings were most to be apprehended; and the commanding example of the Emperor Alexander will go farther to diffuse and confirm this spirit than the professions or exhortations of any of the parties concerned. The blood of the Bourbons, too, we believe to be mild and temperate; and the adversity by which their illustrious chief has so long been tried, we are persuaded has not altered its sweetness. He is more anxious, we make no doubt, to relieve the sufferings than to punish the offences of any part of his subjects — and returns, we trust, to the impoverished cities and wasted population of his country with feelings, not of vengeance, but of pity. If to the philanthropy which belongs to his race he could but join the firmness and activity in which they have been supposed to be wanting, he might be the most glorious king of the happiest people that ever escaped from tyranny; and, we fondly hope, that fortune and prudence will combine to render the era of his accession for ever celebrated in the grateful memory of his people. In the mean time, his most dangerous enemies are the royalists; and the only deadly error he can commit, is to rely on his own popularity or personal authority.

If we are at all right in this prognostication, there should be little doubt on the only remaining subject of discussion. It must be favourable to the general interests of freedom, that a free government is established in France; and the principles of liberty, both here and elsewhere, must be strengthened by this large accession to her domains. There are persons among us, however, who think otherwise, — or profess, at least, to see, in the great drama which has just been completed, no other moral than

this — that rebellion against a lawful sovereign is uniformly followed with great disasters, and ends with the complete demolition and exposure of the insurgents, and the triumphal restoration of the rightful Prince. These reasoners find it convenient to take a very compendious and summary view indeed of the great transactions of which they thus extract the essence — and positively refuse to look at any other points in the eventful history before them, but that the line of the Bourbons was expelled, and that great atrocities and great miseries ensued — that the nation then fell under a cruel despotism, and that all things are set to rights again by the restoration of the Bourbons. The comfortable conclusion which they draw, or wish at least to be drawn, from these premises, is, that if the lesson have its proper effect, this restoration will make every king on the Continent more absolute than ever, and confirm every old government in an attachment to its most inveterate abuses.

It is not worth while, perhaps, to combat these extravagances by reasoning; — yet, in their spirit, they come so near certain opinions that seem to have obtained no slight currency in this country, that it is necessary to say a word or two with regard to them. We shall merely observe, therefore, that the Bourbons were expelled, on account of great faults and abuses in the old system of the government; and that they have only been restored upon condition that these abuses shall be abolished. They were expelled, in short, because they were arbitrary monarchs; and they are only restored, upon paction and security that they shall be arbitrary no longer. This is the true summary of the great transaction that has just been completed; and the correct result of the principles that regulated its beginning and its ending. The intermediate proceedings, too, bear the very same character. After the abolition of royalty, the nation fell, no doubt, into great disorders and disasters, — not, however, for want of the old abuses, — or even of the old line of sovereigns, — but in consequence of new abuses, crimes, and usurpations. These they strove to rectify and repress as they best could, by expelling or cutting off the delinquents, and making provision against the recurrence of the tyranny; — at last, they fell under the arbitrary rule of a great military commander, and for some time rejoiced in the subjection which ensured their tranquillity. By and by, however, the evils of this tyranny were found far to outweigh its advantages; and when the destruction of his military force gave them an opportunity of expressing their sentiments, the nation rose against him as one man, and expelled him also, for his tyranny, from that throne, from which, for a much smaller degree of the same fault, they had formerly expelled the Bourbons. — Awakening then to the advantages of an undisputed title to the crown, and recovered from the intoxication of their first burst into political independence, they ask the ancient line of their kings, whether they will renounce the arbitrary powers which had been claimed by their predecessors, and submit to a constitutional control from the representatives of the people; and upon their solemn consent and cordial acquiescence in those conditions, they recall them to the throne, and enrol themselves as their free and loyal subjects.

The lesson, then, which is taught by the whole history is, that oppressive governments must always be insecure; and that, after nations have attained to a certain measure of intelligence, the liberty of the people is necessary to the stability of the throne. We may dispute for ever about the immediate or accidental causes of the French revolution; but no man of reflection can now doubt, that its true and efficient cause, was the undue limitation of the rights and privileges of the great body of the people,

after their wealth and intelligence had virtually entitled them to greater consequence. Embarrassments in finance, or ambition in particular individuals, may have determined the time and the manner of the explosion; but it was the system which withheld all honours and distinctions from the mass of the people, after nature had made them capable of them, which laid the train, and filled the mine that produced it. Had the government of France been free in 1788, the throne of its monarch might have bid a proud defiance to *deficits* in the treasury, or disorderly ambition in a thousand Mirabeaus. Had the people enjoyed their due weight in the administration of the government, and their due share in the distribution of its patronage, there would have been no democratic insurrection, and no materials indeed for such a catastrophe as ensued. That movement, like all great national movements, was produced by a sense of injustice and oppression; and though its immediate consequences were far more disastrous than the evils by which it had been provoked, it should never be forgotten, that those evils were the necessary and lamented causes of the whole. The same principle, indeed, of the necessary connection of oppression and insecurity, may be traced through all the horrors of the revolutionary period. What, after all, was it but their tyranny that supplanted Marat and Robespierre, and overthrew the tremendous power of the wretches for whom they made way? Or, to come to its last and most conspicuous application, does any one imagine, that if Bonaparte had been a just, mild, and equitable sovereign, under whom the people enjoyed equal rights and impartial protection, he would ever have been hurled from his throne, or the Bourbons invited to replace him? He, too, fell ultimately a victim to his tyranny:—and his fall, and their restoration on the terms that have been stated, concur to show, that there is but one condition by which, in an enlightened age, the loyalty of nations can be secured—the condition of their being treated with kindness; and but one bulwark by which thrones can now be protected—the attachment and conscious interest of a free and intelligent people.

*This* is the lesson which the French revolution reads aloud to mankind; and which, in its origin, in its progress, and in its termination, it tends equally to impress. It shows also, no doubt, the dangers of popular insurrection, and the dreadful excesses into which a people will be hurried, who rush at once from a condition of servitude to one of unbounded licentiousness. But the state of servitude leads *necessarily* to resistance and insurrection, when the measure of wrong and of intelligence is full; and though the history before us holds out most awful warnings as to the reluctance and the precautions with which resistance should be attempted, it is so far from showing that it either can or ought to be repressed, that it is the very moral of the whole tragedy, and of each of its separate acts, that resistance is as inevitably the effect, as it is immediately the cure and the punishment, of oppression. The crimes and excesses with which the revolution may be attended, will be more or less violent, in proportion to the severity of the preceding tyranny, and the degree of ignorance and degradation in which it has kept the body of the people. The rebellion of West India slaves is more atrocious than the insurrection of a Parisian populace;—and that again far more fierce and sanguinary than the movements of an English revolution. But in all cases, the radical guilt is in the tyranny which compels the resistance; and they who are the authors of the misery and the degradation, are also responsible for the acts of passion and debasement to which they naturally lead. If the natural course of a stream be obstructed, the pent up waters

will, to a certainty, sooner or later bear down the bulwarks by which they are confined. The devastation which may ensue, however, is not to be ascribed to the weakness of those bulwarks, but to the fundamental folly of their erection. The stronger they had been made, the more dreadful, and not the less certain, would have been the ultimate eruption; and the only practical lesson to be learned from the catastrophe is, that the great agents and elementary energies of nature are never dangerous but when they are repressed; and that the way to guide and disarm them, is to provide a safe and ample channel for their natural operation. The laws of the physical world, however, are not more absolute than those of the moral; nor is the principle of the rebound of elastic bodies more strictly demonstrated, than the reaction of rebellion and tyranny.

If there ever was a time, however, when it might be permitted to doubt of this principle, it certainly is *not* the time when the tyranny of Napoleon has just overthrown the mightiest empire that pride and ambition ever erected on the ruins of justice and freedom. Protected as he was by the vast military system he had drawn up before him, and still more, perhaps, by the dread of that chaotic and devouring gulf of revolution which still yawned behind him, and threatened to swallow up all who might drive him from his place, he was yet unable to maintain a dominion which stood openly arrayed against the rights and liberties of mankind. But if tyranny and oppression, and the abuse of imperial power has cast down the throne of Bonaparte, guarded as it was with force and terror, and all that art could devise to embarrass, or glory furnish to dazzle and overawe, what tyrannical throne can be expected to stand hereafter? or what contrivances can secure an oppressive sovereign from the vengeance of an insurgent people? Looking only to the extent of his resources, and the skill and vigour of his arrangements, no sovereign on the Continent seemed half so firm in his place as Bonaparte did but two years ago. There was the canker of tyranny, however, in the full-blown flower of his greatness. With all the external signs of power and prosperity, he was weak because he was unjust—he was insecure, because he was oppressive—and his state was assailed from without, and deserted from within, for no other reason than that his ambitious and injurious proceedings had alienated the affection of his people, and alarmed the fears of his neighbours.

The moral, then, of the grand drama which has occupied the scene of civilised Europe for upwards of twenty years, is, we think, at last, sufficiently unfolded;—and strange indeed and deplorable it certainly were, if all that labour should have been without fruit, and all that suffering in vain. Something, surely, for our own guidance, and for that of our posterity, we ought at last to learn, from so painful and so costly an experiment. We have lived ages in these twenty years; and have seen condensed, into the period of one short life, the experience of eventful centuries. All the moral and all the political elements that engender or diversify great revolutions, have been set in action, and made to produce their full effect before us; and all the results of misgovernment, in all its forms and in all its extremes, have been exhibited, on the grandest scale, in our view. Whatever quiescent indolence or empiric rashness, individual ambition or popular fury, unrectified enthusiasm or brutal profligacy, could do to disorder the counsels and embroil the affairs of a mighty nation, has been tried, without fear, and without moderation. We have witnessed the full operation of every sort of guilt, and of every sort of energy—the errors of strength and the errors of weakness—and

the mingling or contrasting effects of terror and vanity, and wild speculations and antiquated prejudices, on the whole population of Europe. There has been an excitement and a conflict to which there is nothing parallel in the history of all past generations; and it may be said, perhaps, without any great extravagance, that during the few years that have elapsed since the breaking out of the French revolution, men have thought and acted, and sinned and suffered, more than in all the ages that have passed since their creation. In that short period, every thing has been questioned—every thing has been suggested—and every thing has been tried. There is scarcely any conceivable combination of circumstances under which men have not been obliged to act, and to anticipate and to suffer the consequences of their acting. The most insane imaginations—the most fantastic theories—the most horrible abominations, have all been reduced to practice, and taken seriously upon trial. Nothing is now left, it would appear, to be projected or attempted in government. We have ascertained experimentally the consequences of all extremes; and exhausted, in the real history of twenty-five years, all the problems that can be supplied by the whole science of politics.

Something *must* have been learned from this great condensation of experience;—some leading propositions, either positive or negative, must have been established in the course of it:—and although *we* perhaps are as yet too near the tumult and agitation of the catastrophe, to be able to judge with precision of their positive value and amount, we can hardly be mistaken as to their general tendency and import. The clearest and most indisputable result is, that the prodigious advances made by the body of the people, throughout the better part of Europe, in wealth, consideration, and intelligence, had rendered the ancient institutions and exclusions of the old continental governments altogether unsuitable to their actual condition; that public opinion had tacitly acquired a commanding and uncontrollable power in every enlightened community; and that, to render its operation in any degree safe, or consistent with a regular plan of administration, it was absolutely necessary to contrive some means for letting it act directly on the machine of government, and for bringing it regularly and openly to bear on the public counsels of the country. This was not necessary while the bulk of the people were poor, abject, and brutish,—and the nobles alone had either education, property, or acquaintance with affairs; and it was during that period that the institutions were adopted which were maintained too long for the peace and the credit of the world. Public opinion overthrew those in France; and the shock was felt in every feudal monarchy in Europe. But this sudden extrication of a noble and beneficent principle, produced, at first, far greater evils than those which had proceeded from its repression. “The’ extravagant and erring spirit” was not yet enshrined in any fitting organisation; and, acting without balance or control, threw the whole mass of society into wilder and more terrible disorder than had ever been experienced before its disclosure. It was then tried to compress it again into inactivity by violence and intimidation; but it could not be so over-mastered, nor laid to rest by all the powerful conjurations of the reign of terror; and, after a long and painful struggle under the pressure of a military despotism, it has again broken loose, and pointed at last to the natural and appropriate remedy, of embodying it in a free representative constitution, through the mediation of which it may diffuse life and vigour through every member of society.

The true theory of that great revolution therefore, is that it was pro-

duced by the repression or practical disregard of public opinion and that the evils with which it was attended, were occasioned by the want of any institution to control and regulate the application of that opinion to the actual management of affairs:—and the grand moral that may be gathered from the whole eventful history seems therefore to be, that in an enlightened period of society, no government can be either prosperous or secure, which does not provide for expressing and giving effect to the general sense of the community.

This, it must be owned, is a lesson worth buying at some cost:—and, looking back on the enormous price we have paid for it, it is no slight gratification to perceive, that it seems not only to have been emphatically taught, but effectually learned. In every corner of Europe, principles of moderation and liberality are at last not only professed, but acted upon; and doctrines equally favourable to the liberty of individuals, and the independence of nations, are universally promulgated, in quarters where some little jealousy of their influence might have been both expected and excused. If any one doubts of the progress which the principles of liberty have made since the beginning of the French revolution, and of the efficacy of that lesson which its events have impressed on every court of the Continent, let him compare the conduct of the Allies at this moment, with that which they held in 1790,—let him contrast the treaty of Pilnitz with the declaration of Frankfort, and set on one hand the proclamation of the Duke of Brunswick, upon entering the French territories in 1792, and that of the Emperor of Russia on the same occasion in 1814;—let him think how La Fayette and Dumourier were treated at the former period, and what honours have been lavished on Moreau and Bernadotte in the latter—or, without dwelling on particulars, let him ask himself, whether it would have been tolerated among the loyal Anti-gallicans of that day, to have proposed, in a moment of victory, that a representative assembly should share the powers of legislation with the sovereign—that the noblesse should renounce all their privileges, except such as were purely honorary—that citizens of all ranks should be equally eligible to all employments—that all the officers and dignitaries of the revolutionary government should retain their rank—that the nation should be taxed only by its representatives—that all sorts of national property should be ratified, and that perfect toleration in religion, liberty of the press, and trial by jury should be established. Such, however, are the chief *bases* of that constitution, which was cordially approved of by the allied sovereigns, after they were in possession of Paris; and, with reference to which, their august chief made that remarkable declaration, in the face of Europe, “that France stood in need of strong institutions, and such as were suited to the intelligence of the age.”

Such is the improved creed of modern courts, as to civil liberty and the rights of individuals. With regard to national justice and independence, again,—is there any one so romantic as to believe, that if the allied sovereigns had dissipated the armies of the republic, and entered the metropolis as conquerors in 1792, they would have left to France all her ancient territories, or religiously abstained from interfering in the settlement of her government, or treated her baffled warriors and statesmen with honourable courtesies, and her humbled and guilty chief with magnanimous forbearance and clemency? The conduct we have just witnessed, in all these particulars, is wise and prudent, no doubt, as well as magnanimous; and the splendid successes which have crowned the arms



of the present deliverers of Europe, may be ascribed even more to the temper than to the force with which they have been wielded;—certainly more to the plain justice and rationality of the cause in which they were raised, than to either. Yet those very successes exclude all supposition of this justice and liberality being assumed out of fear or necessity; and establish the sincerity of those professions, which it would, no doubt, have been the best of all policy at any rate to have made. It is equally decisive, however, of the merit of the agents and of the principles, that the most liberal maxims were held out by the most decided victors; and the greatest honours paid to civil and to national freedom, when it was most in their power to have crushed the one and invaded the other. Nothing, in short, can account for the altered tone and altered policy of the great sovereigns of the Continent, but their growing conviction of the necessity of regulated freedom to the peace and prosperity of the world—but their feeling that, in the more enlightened parts of Europe, men could no longer be governed but by their reason, and that justice and moderation were the only true safeguards of a polished throne. By this high testimony, we think, the cause of liberty is at length set up above all hazard of calumny or discountenance; and its interests, we make no doubt, will be more substantially advanced, by being thus freely and deliberately recognised in the face of Europe, by its mightiest and most absolute princes, than they could otherwise have been by all the reasonings of philosophy, and the toils of patriotism, for many successive generations.

While this is the universal feeling among those who have the best opportunity and the strongest interest to form a just opinion on the subject, it is not a little strange and mortifying, that there should still be a party in this country, who consider those great transactions under a very different aspect;—who look with jealousy and grudging upon all that has been done for the advancement of freedom, and think the splendour of the late events considerably tarnished by those stipulations for national liberty, which form to other eyes their most glorious and happy feature. We do not say this invidiously, nor out of any spirit of faction; but the fact is unquestionable;—and it is worth while both to record, and to try to account for it. An arrangement, which satisfies all the arbitrary Sovereigns of Europe, and is cordially adopted by the Monarch who is immediately affected by it,—is objected to us as too democratical, by a party in this free country! The Autocrat of all the Russias—the Imperial Chief of the Germanic principalities—the Military Sovereign of Prussia,—are all agreed, that France should have a free government; nay, the King of France himself is thoroughly persuaded of the same great truth;—and all the world rejoices at its ultimate acknowledgment—except only the Tories of England! *They* cannot conceal their mortification at this final triumph of the popular cause; and while they rejoice at the restoration of the King to the throne of his ancestors, and the recall of his loyal nobility to their ancient honours, are evidently not a little hurt at the advantages which have been at the same time secured to the people. They are very glad, certainly, to see Louis XVIII. on the throne of Napoleon,—but they would have liked him better if he had not spoken so graciously to the Marshals of the revolution,—if he had not so freely accepted the constitution which restrained his prerogative,—nor so cordially held out the hand of conciliation to all descriptions of his subjects;—if he had been less magnanimous in short, less prudent, and less amiable. It would have answered better to their ideas of a glorious restoration, if it could

have been accomplished without any condition; and if the Prince had thrown himself entirely into the hands of those bigoted emigrants, who affect to be displeased with his acceptance of a limited crown. In their eyes, the thing would have been more complete, if the noblesse had been restored at once to all their feudal privileges, and the church to its ancient endowments. And we cannot help suspecting, that they think the loss of those vain and oppressive trappings, but ill compensated by the increased dignity and worth of the whole population, by the equalisation of essential rights, and the provision made for the free enjoyment of life, property, and conscience.

Perhaps we exaggerate a little in our representation of sentiments in which we do not at all concur:—but certainly, in conversation, and in common newspapers—those light straws that best show how the wind sits—one hears and sees, every day, things that approach at least to the spirit we have attempted to delineate,—and afford no slight presumption of the prevalence of such opinions as we lament. In lamenting them, however, we would not indiscriminately blame.—They are not all to be ascribed to a spirit of servility, or a disregard of the happiness of mankind. Here, as in other heresies, there is an intermixture of errors that are to be pardoned, and principles that are to be loved. There are patriotic prejudices, and illusions of the imagination, and misconceptions from ignorance, at the bottom of this unnatural antipathy to freedom in the citizens of a free land, as well as more sordid interests, and more wilful perversions. Some sturdy Englishmen are staunch for our monopoly of liberty; and feel as if it was an insolent invasion of British privileges, for any other nation to set up a free constitution. Others apprehend serious dangers to our greatness, if this mainspring and fountain of our prosperity be communicated to other lands. A still greater proportion, we believe, are influenced by considerations yet more fantastical. They have been so long used to consider the old government of France as the perfect model of a feudal monarchy, softened and adorned by the refinements of modern society, that they are quite sorry to part with so fine a specimen of chivalrous manners and institutions; and look upon it, with all its characteristic and imposing accompaniments of a brilliant and warlike nobility,—a gallant court,—a gorgeous hierarchy,—a gay and familiar vassalage, with the same sort of feelings with which they would be apt to regard the sumptuous pageantry and splendid solemnities of the Romish ritual. They are very good Protestants themselves, and know too well the value of religious truth and liberty, to wish for any less simple or more imposing system at home; but they have no objection that it should exist among their neighbours, that their taste may be gratified by the magnificent spectacles it affords, and their imaginations warmed with the ideas of venerable and pompous antiquity, which it is so well fitted to suggest. The case is nearly the same with their ideas of the old French monarchy. They have read Burke, till their fancies are somewhat heated with the picturesque image of tempered royalty and polished aristocracy, which he has held out in his splendid pictures of France as it was before the revolution; and have been so long accustomed to contrast those comparatively happy and prosperous days with the horrors and vulgar atrocities that ensued, that they forget the many real evils and oppressions of which that brilliant monarchy was productive, and think that the succeeding abominations cannot be completely expiated till it be restored as it originally existed.

All these, and we believe many other illusions of a similar nature,

slight and fanciful as they may appear, contribute largely, we have no doubt, to that pardonable feeling of dislike to the limitation of the old monarchy, which we conceive to be very discernible in a certain part of our population. The great source of that feeling, however, and that which gives root and nourishment to all the rest, is *the ignorance* which prevails in this country, both of the evils of arbitrary government, and of the radical change in the feelings and opinions of the Continent, which has rendered it no longer practicable in its more enlightened quarters. Our insular situation, and the measure of freedom we enjoy, have done us this injury, along with the infinite good of which they have been the occasions. We do not know either the extent of the misery and weakness produced by tyranny, or the force and prevalence of the conviction which has recently arisen, where they are best known, that they are no longer to be tolerated. On the Continent, experience has at last done far more to enlighten public opinion upon these subjects, than reflection and reasoning in this island. There, nations have been found irresistible when the popular feeling was consulted; and absolutely impotent and indefensible where it had been outraged and disregarded: and this necessity of consulting the general opinion, has led, on both sides, to a great relaxation of many of the principles on which they originally went to issue.

Of this change in the terms of the question — and especially of the great abatement which it had been found necessary to make in the pretensions of the old governments, we were generally but little aware in this country. Spectators as we have been of the distant and protracted contest between ancient institutions and authorities on the one hand, and democratical innovation on the other, we still look upon the parties to that contest, as occupying nearly the same positions and maintaining the same principles that they did at the beginning; while those, who are nearer to the scene of action, or themselves partakers of the toil, are aware that, in the course of that long conflict, each party has been obliged to recede from some of its pretensions, and to admit, in some degree, the justice of those that are made against it. Here, where we have been but too apt to consider the mighty game which has been playing in our sight, and partly at our expense, as an occasion for exercising our own party animosities, or seeking illustrations for our peculiar theories of government, we are still as diametrically opposed, and as keen in our hostilities, as ever. The controversy with us being in a great measure speculative, would lose its interest and attraction, if any thing like a compromise were admitted; and we choose, therefore, to shut our eyes to the great and visible approximation into which time, and experience, and necessity, have forced the actual combatants. We verily believe, that, except in the imaginations of English politicians, there no longer exist in the world any such aristocrats and democrats as actually divided all Europe in the early days of the French revolution. In this country, however, we still speak and feel as if they existed; and the champions of aristocracy, in particular, continue, with very few exceptions, both to maintain pretensions that their principals have long ago abandoned, and to impute to their adversaries, absurdities with which they have long ceased to be chargeable. To them, therefore, no other alternative has yet presented itself but the absolute triumph of one or other of two opposite and irreconcilable extremes. Whatever is taken from the sovereign, they consider as being given to crazy republicans; and very naturally dislike all limitations of the royal power, because they are unable to

distinguish them from usurpations by the avowed enemies of all subordination. That the real state of things has long been extremely different, men of reflection might have concluded from the known principles of human nature, and men of information must have learned from sources of undoubted authority: but no small proportion of our zealous politicians belong to neither of those classes; and we ought not, perhaps, to wonder, if they are slow in admitting truths which a predominating party has so long thought it for its interest to misrepresent or disguise. The time, however, seems almost come, when conviction must be forced even upon their reluctant understandings, — and by the sort of evidence best suited to their capacity. They would probably be little moved by the best arguments that could be addressed to them, and might distrust the testimony of ordinary observers; but they cannot well refuse to yield to the opinions of the great Sovereigns of the Continent, and must give faith to their professions when they find them confirmed at all points by their actions. If the establishment of a limited monarchy in France would be dangerous to sovereign authority in all the adjoining regions, it is not easy to conceive that it should have met with the cordial approbation of the Emperors of Austria and Russia, and the King of Prussia, in the day of their most brilliant success; or that that moment of triumph on the part of the old princes of Europe should have been selected as the period when the thrones of France, and Spain, and Holland, were to be surrounded with permanent limitations, — imposed with their cordial assent, and we might almost say, by their hands. Compared with acts so unequivocal, all declarations may justly be regarded as insignificant: but there are declarations also to the same purpose; — made freely and deliberately on occasions of unparalleled importance, — and for no other intelligible purpose but solemnly to announce to mankind the generous principle on which those mighty actions had been performed.

But while these authorities and these considerations may be expected, in due time, to overcome that pardonable dislike to continental liberty which arises from ignorance or natural prejudices, we will confess that we by no means reckon on the total disappearance of this illiberal jealousy. There is, and we fear there will always be, among us, a set of persons who conceive it to be for their interest to decry every thing that is favourable to liberty, and who are guided only by a regard to their interest. In a government constituted like ours, the court must almost always be more or less jealous, and perhaps justly, of the encroachment of popular principles, and disposed to show favour to those who diminish their influence and authority. Without intending or wishing to render the British crown altogether arbitrary, it still seems to them to be in favour of its constitutional privileges that arbitrary monarchies should, to a certain extent, be defended; and an artful apology for tyranny is gratefully received as an argument *à fortiori* in support of a vigorous prerogative. The leaders of the party, therefore, lean that way; and their baser followers rush clamorously along it, to the very brink of servile sedition and treason against the constitution. Such men no arguments will silence, and no authorities convert. It is their *profession* to discredit and oppose all that tends to promote the freedom of mankind; and in that vocation they will infallibly labour, so long as it yields them a profit. At the present moment, too, we have no doubt that their zeal is quickened by their alarm; since, independent of the general damage which the cause of arbitrary government must sustain from the events of which we have been speaking, their immediate consequences in this country are likely to be eminently favourable to the

interests of regulated liberty and temperate reform. Next to the actual cessation of bloodshed and suffering, indeed, we consider *this* to be the greatest domestic benefit that we are likely to reap from the peace; and the circumstance, in our new situation, which calls the loudest for our congratulation. We are perfectly aware that it is a subject of regret to many patriotic individuals, that the brilliant successes at which we all rejoice should have occurred under an administration which has not manifested any extraordinary dislike to abuses, nor any very cordial attachment to the rights and liberties of the people; and we know that it has been an opinion pretty current, both with them and their antagonists, that these successes will fix them so firmly in power, that they will be enabled, if they should be so inclined, to deal more largely in abuses, and to press more closely on our liberties, than any of their predecessors. For our own part, however, we have never been able to see things in this inauspicious light; and having no personal or factious quarrel with our present ministers, are easily comforted for the increased chance of their continuance in office by a consideration of those circumstances that must infallibly, and, under any ministry, operate to facilitate reform, to diminish the power of the crown, and to consolidate the liberties of the nation. If our readers agree with us in our estimate of the importance of these circumstances, we can scarcely doubt that they will concur in our general conclusion.

In the *first* place, then, it is obvious that the direct patronage and indirect influence of the crown must be most seriously and effectually abridged by the reduction of our army and navy, the diminution of our taxes, and, generally speaking, of all our establishments, upon the ratification of peace. We have thought it a great deal gained for the constitution of late years, when we could strike off a few hundred thousand pounds of offices in the gift of the crown that had become useless, or might be consolidated; and now the peace will at one blow strike off probably thirty or forty millions of government expenditure. This alone might restore the balance of the constitution.

In the *next* place, a continuance of peace and prosperity will naturally produce a greater diffusion of wealth, and consequently a greater spirit of independence in the body of the people; which, co-operating with the diminished power of the government to provide for its baser adherents, must speedily thin the ranks of its regular supporters, and expose it far more effectually to the control of a more impartial public opinion.

In the *third* place, the events to which we have alluded, and the situation in which they will leave us, will take away almost all those pretexts for resisting enquiry into abuses, and proposals for reform, by the help of which, rather than of any serious dispute on the principle, these important discussions have been waved for these last twenty years. We shall no longer be stopped with the plea of its being no fit time to quarrel about the little faults of our constitution, when we are struggling with a ferocious enemy for its very existence. It will not now do to tell us, that it is both dangerous and disgraceful to show ourselves disunited in a season of such imminent peril; or that all great and patriotic minds should be entirely engrossed with the care of our safety, and can have neither leisure nor energy to bestow upon concerns less urgent or vital. The restoration of peace, on the contrary, will soon leave us little else to do; and when we have no invasions nor expeditions, nor coalitions nor campaigns, nor even any loans and budgets, to fill the minds of our statesmen, and the ears of our idle politicians, we think it almost certain that questions of reform will rise into paramount importance, and the redress of abuses become

the most interesting of public pursuits. We shall be once more entitled, too, to make a fair and natural appeal to the analogous acts or institutions of other nations, without being met with the cry of revolution and democracy, or the imputation of abetting the proceedings of a sanguinary despot. We shall again see the abuses of old hereditary power, and the evils of maladministration in legitimate hands, and be permitted to argue from them, without the reproach of disaffection to the general cause of mankind. Men and things, in short, we trust, will again receive their true names, on a fair consideration of their merits ; and our notions of political desert be no longer confounded by indiscriminate praise of all who are with us, and intolerant abuse of all who are against us, in a struggle that touches the sources of so many passions. When we plead for the emancipation of the Catholics of Ireland, we shall no longer be told that the Pope is a mere puppet in the hands of an inveterate foe ; nor be deterred from protesting against the conflagration of a friendly capital by the suggestion that no other means were left to prevent that same foe from possessing himself of its fleet. Exceptions and extreme cases, in short, will no longer furnish the ordinary rules of our conduct ; and it will be impossible, by extraneous arguments, to baffle every attempt at a fair estimate of our public principles and proceedings.

These, we think, are among the necessary consequences of a peace concluded in such circumstances as we have now been considering ; and they are but a specimen of the kindred consequences to which it must infallibly lead. If these ensue, however, and are allowed to produce their natural effects, it is a matter of indifference to us whether Lord Castle-reagh and Lord Liverpool, or Lord Grey and Lord Grenville are at the head of the government. The former, indeed, would probably be a little uneasy in so new a posture of affairs ; but they will either conform to it, or abandon their posts in despair. To control or alter it, will assuredly be beyond their power.

With these pleasing anticipations, we would willingly close this long review of the State and Prospects of the European commonwealth, in its present great crisis of restoration, or of new revolutions. But cheering and beautiful as it is, and disposed as we think we have shown ourselves to look hopefully upon it, it is impossible to shut our eyes on two dark stains that appear on the bright horizon, and seem already to tarnish the glories with which they are so sadly contrasted. One is of longer standing, and perhaps of deeper dye. But both are most painful deformities on the face of so fair a prospect ; and may be mentioned with less scruple and greater hope, from the consideration, that those who have the power of effacing them can scarcely be charged with the guilt of their production, and have given strong indications of dispositions that must lead them to wish for their removal. We need scarcely give the key to these observations, by naming the names of *Poland* and of *Norway*. Nor do we propose, on the present occasion, to do much more than to name them. Of the latter, we shall probably contrive to speak fully in a subsequent part of this Number. Of the former, many of our readers may think we said enough in our last. Our zeal in that cause, we know, has been made matter of wonder, and even of derision, among certain persons who value themselves on the character of *practical* politicians and men of the world ; and we have had the satisfaction of listening to various witty sneers on the mixed simplicity and extravagance of supposing, that the kingdom of the Poles was to be re-established by a dissertation in an English journal. It would, perhaps, be enough to state, that, independ-

ent of any view to an immediate or practical result in other regions, it is of some consequence to keep the observation of England alive, and its feeling awake, upon a subject of this importance; but we must beg leave to observe, that such dissertations are humbly conceived to be among the legitimate means by which the English public both instructs and expresses itself; and that the opinion of the English public is still allowed to have weight with its government, which again cannot well be supposed to be altogether without influence in the councils of its allies. Whatever becomes of Poland, it is most material, we think, that the people of this country should judge soundly, and feel rightly, on a matter that touches on principles of such general application. But every thing that has passed since the publication of our former remarks, combines to justify what we then stated; and to encourage us to make louder and more energetic appeals to the justice and prudence and magnanimity of the parties concerned in this transaction. The words and the deeds of Alexander that have, since that period, passed into the page of history — the principles he has solemnly professed, and the acts by which he has sealed that profession — entitle us to expect from him a strain of justice and generosity, which vulgar politicians may call romantic if they please, but which all men of high principles and enlarged understandings will feel to be not more heroic than judicious. While Poland remains oppressed and discontented, the peace of Europe will always be at the mercy of any ambitious or intriguing power that may think fit to rouse its vast and warlike population with the vain promise of independence; while it is perfectly manifest that those, by whom alone that promise could be effectually kept, would gain prodigiously, both in security and in substantial influence, by its faithful performance. It is not however, for the mere name of independence, nor for the lost glories of an ancient and honourable existence, that the people of Poland are thus eager to array themselves in any desperate strife of which this may be proclaimed as the prize. We have shown, in our last Number the substantial and intolerable evils which this extinction of their national dignity — this sore and unmerited wound to their national pride, has necessarily occasioned: and thinking, as we do, that a people, without the feelings of national pride and public duty, must be a people without energy and without enjoyments, we apprehend it to be at any rate indisputable, in the present instance, that the circumstances which have dissolved their political being have struck also at the root of their individual happiness and prosperity; and that it is not merely the unjust destruction of an ancient kingdom that we lament, but the condemnation of fifteen millions of human beings to unprofitable and unparalleled misery. But though these are the considerations by which the feelings of private individuals are most naturally affected, it should never be forgotten, that all the principles on which the great fabric of national independence confessedly rests in Europe, are involved in the decision of this question; and that no one nation can be secure in its separate existence, if all the rest do not concur in disavowing the maxims which were acted upon in the partition of Poland. It is not only mournful to see the scattered and bleeding members of that unhappy state still palpitating and agonising on the spot where it lately stood erect in youthful vigour and beauty; but it is unsafe to breathe the noxious vapours which this melancholy spectacle exhales. The wholesome neighbourhood is poisoned by their diffusion; and every independence within their range sickens, and is endangered by the contagion.

THE RESTORATION OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE TO THE  
THRONE OF FRANCE.—STATE OF PARTIES.\*

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE is once more at Paris.

It is not yet twelve months since the surrender of that capital to an army commanded by the greatest sovereigns of Europe, and composed of dwellers in every country, from the Rhine to the Wall of China. The same Prussians, Bavarians, Wirtembergers, &c. who had marched under Napoleon to the attack of Moscow, shared under Alexander the honours of a triumphal entry into Paris. That prediction of Rousseau, that Tartars should be encamped in that city, which was thought, and probably was in him a misanthropical rant, was literally verified. Bashkirs showed the hideous features of the Mongol race in the west, for the first time since the irruption of Attila and his Huns. Bands of Cossacks protected the property, and restored the liberty of the commercial cities of Hamburgh and Amsterdam; and thousands of them were hutted in the most brilliant promenades of the capital of France.

Under these auspices, the Millennium seemed to dawn upon Europe. "The Lion and the Lamb lay down together." The Emperor of Russia, aided by the counsels of M. Talleyrand, was to restore those hopes of liberty with which the French Revolution had opened, but which had seemed to be for ever blasted by the rage of anarchy, and the oppressions of military despotism. His Imperial Majesty was afflicted, and almost shocked, that the descendant of Hugh Capet should claim the crown of France by hereditary right, or by any title but that which he derived from a constitution framed by Bonaparte's senate, when they were surrounded by Russian bayonets! The most extravagant speculators of Paris employed their authority to repress the enthusiasm of the Imperial Demagogue. The same great monarch became the patron of liberty throughout the world. Indignant at the lukewarmness of Lord Castle-reagh in the great cause of the abolition of the slave trade, he made the most strenuous exertions immediately to abolish all traffic in slaves — within the torrid zone. As a Roman emperor had presented a philosopher with a city of Campania, as the subject of an experiment whether Plato's Republic could be realised, so Alexander presented the Pays de Vaud to his deserving and enlightened preceptor, Colonel La Harpe. He could not endure the idea that any district in Switzerland should again fall under the authority of the Republics under which it had flourished for centuries. The Czar of Muscovy exerted all his authority to check the despotism, and to resist the ambition, of the Senate of Bern.

In the mean time, a sort of treaty was huddled up at Paris. It was signed within a month after the occupation of that capital. As might be expected, it stipulated nothing distinctly but the continental frontier

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\* Tracts; on the Spirit of Conquest, the Liberty of the Press, Constitutions, and Ministerial Responsibility. By Benjamin de Constant.

A Visit to Paris in 1814. By John Scott.

Notes on a Journey through France. By Moses Birkbeck. — Vol. xxiv. page 505. February, 1815.



of France, and the colonial cessions of England. All that could provoke the public temper in France, or disarm the Government of England, was to be immediately performed. Having thus exasperated one of these countries, and duped the other — while both were substantially laid aside, — the military Sovereigns adjourned to a more convenient season the partition of that immense booty which they held in their hands. They took care that the Jubilee should not be disturbed by the unavoidable squabbles about the division of the spoil. They appointed a Congress to be held at Vienna, composed nominally of all the parties to the treaties at Paris, of France and England, and even of Spain and Portugal; — but, as all men of common sense originally saw, influenced only by those Powers whose vast armies occupied the territories which were to be the subject of arrangement, and equivalent, and compensation, and indemnity, and of all the other operations designated by the various terms which the ingenious politeness of modern times has substituted instead of robbery. There, when the fit of enthusiasm had subsided, or the mask of magnanimity was thrown off, — when Statesmen were to act, who had hitherto allowed Emperors to talk, the conquerors of Poland and of Finland would revert to the maxims of solid and practical policy. There, it would not be difficult to re-establish the very ancient good understanding between liberal professions and selfish conduct. In theory it would be allowed — in public with a grave face, in private with a compassionate smile — that all nations, great and small, had equal rights. Justice would be owned to be the most excellent of all things. But — those admirable principles, — sublime and sacred as they are, — enforced by law, — consecrated by religion, are unfortunately not applicable to the present corrupt condition of human affairs! They are eternally true, and eternally inapplicable. It would indeed be childishness and imbecility, in any single state, to beggar and exhaust herself by their adoption, while all others were growing rich and powerful by their violation. This last argument, the refuge of every practical politician in every desperate case, with which every state is sure to supply every other in abundance, had indeed often been urged by Lord Castlereagh in defence of our late valuable commerce on the coast of Africa; though in his last great stand on that subject, against a visionary administration, it had only influenced the seventeen members of the House of Commons, who formed his glorious minority.

It would have been singular, even if it had remained a mere matter of speculation, that during the feasts of the summer, or the cabals of the winter, none of the rulers of the world appear to have thrown away a thought upon that Terrible Personage who had so lately ceased to be the imperious master of most of them, and the most dreaded enemy of the few who escaped his yoke. It cannot be necessary to remind any of our readers, that, in virtue of a convention executed at Paris on the 10th of April, by the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, on the one part, and Marshal Ney and Caulaincourt on the part of Napoleon, it was stipulated that he should retain the imperial title with the sovereignty of the Island of Elba: — That Maria Louisa should retain the same title, with the Duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, to be inherited by her son: — That all his family should retain the titles of Prince: — That about 80,000*l.* per annum should be settled on him, payable by the French treasury, of which one-half was to be settled on his wife in case of her survival; — and that, in consideration of these conditions, “his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon renounced, for himself, his

successors and descendants, as well as for all the members of his family, all right of sovereignty and dominion, as well to the French empire and the kingdom of Italy as over every other country." These Articles the Allied Powers guaranteed, and engaged that they should be guaranteed by France. On the part of Great Britain, Lord Castlereagh acceded to this convention, as far as it conferred the sovereignty of Elba and Parma on Napoleon and Maria. But, probably, because Great Britain had never acknowledged either the imperial dignity of Napoleon, or his sovereignty over France, Lord Castlereagh declined to become a party to the treaty, and seems to have sacrificed to that diplomatic punctilio, the advantage of being one of the parties to whom Napoleon renounced the crown of France and Italy, and consequently the direct right of enforcing that fundamental condition, as far as such right arises out of the convention.

When the secret history of the negotiations which passed from the 20th of March to the 10th of April is disclosed to our posterity, the motives, if not the reasons, of this singular convention may be understood. At the moment of its publication, all its conditions, but especially the place of his residence, excited universal astonishment. This sentiment was expressed by men of all parties and conditions, from the most celebrated statesmen of England to the porters of Vienna; and the former might have expressed them as openly as the latter did, if they had not been silenced by the most obvious considerations of prudence. The island of Elba appears to have been first (at least publicly) suggested by Marshal Ney. It is said that Bonaparte originally demanded *Corfu*, which was refused as too valuable a possession, under the ludicrous pretext that his residence there might disturb the tranquillity of *Turkey!* The island to which he was sent united every property which Bonaparte could have desired for new plans of ambition. Its small size and population disarmed jealousy, and gave it the appearance of a mere retreat. It contained an impregnable fortress, capable of being defended by a handful of faithful soldiers. It was within a few hours' sail of the coast of Italy, even then dreading the yoke of her old masters. Through Italy and Switzerland, communications with the French army might be opened through unsuspected channels; and, in the long line of the Alps and the Jura, it was scarcely possible to intercept them. The distance from the coast of France somewhat diminished the facility of watching the port; and he was near enough to Provence for such a sudden enterprise as his situation allowed. If the globe had been searched for that residence in which Napoleon was most dangerous to France, all sagacious searchers must have pointed to Elba.

The decision of the majority who took a part in that deliberation, will not astonish those who know them: but it is not so easy to comprehend the acquiescence of such men as M. Talleyrand and M. Pozzo de Borgo; men certainly of distinguished talents, and familiarly acquainted with the character of Napoleon. Perhaps indeed it may one day appear, that they were both over-ruled. Perhaps in the noise of triumph, and in the eagerness to carry the main point, every contingent danger was overlooked; and in the insolence of victory, a prostrate enemy might be despised. The parade of cheap magnanimity which distinguishes some sovereigns, — the family connection of others with the deposed Emperor, — the remains of habitual deference from them all to their late master, probably contributed to their acquiescence in the plan which he had suggested, or which he had approved. The anxiety of all to prevent the bloodshed which the prolongation of uncertainty might still produce, was a commendable, and,

within certain limits, a reasonable ground of action. It was thought proper perhaps, to give a decent disguise to the conduct of the Marshal or Marshals who had betrayed him, and a reasonable satisfaction to the scruples of the Marshals, who, though without personal attachment or political connection, were influenced by the military virtue of fidelity to him from whom they had accepted command. Forty thousand soldiers, in the neighbourhood of Fontainebleau, and probably thirty more in the provinces on the Loire, still showed symptoms of attachment to their chief; irregular, indeed, and fluctuating, sometimes appearing to be suspended, but at other times seeming to be capable of being kindled into a terrible flame. The dispositions of Soult were more than suspected; and it is now known that he fought the battle of Toulouse with a full knowledge of the changes at Paris. These military fears might, indeed, justify the purchase of Napoleon's abdication at a liberal price. But they do not account for the choice of his residence.

The sudden and apparently complete change in the opinion of the army as well as of the people, which followed the abdication, is a symptom of the character of Frenchmen and of armies, which deserves much more reflection than we can bestow on it, though we shall presently say a few words on the subject. — He who, ten months before, had seemed the undisputed sovereign of France, who a week before seemed to retain the enthusiastic affection of the flower of the army, was now conducted by four foreign officers to the place of embarkation — unnoticed during the first part of his journey — and, during the latter part of it, protected by a foreign escort from destruction by the populace of Provence. Every opponent yielded to the Bourbons. Carnot, with the garrison of Antwerp, proclaimed their submission, and exemplified it by the surrender of that fortress, — above all other conquests the object of national pride and policy. Davoust acknowledged the authority of a prince, before whom he was sure to be accused by the people of Hamburg. Soult, who had rendered himself so odious to the Royal Family, by his insulting proclamations against the Duc d'Angoulême, evinced, by his tardy adhesion, that the torrent was too strong even for him to resist. The restoration of the House of Bourbon had every character of an unanimous national act. Louis XVIII. might also wonder where his enemies had fled, and where his friends had been so long hidden. All seemed to be allegiance, and jubilee, and triumph.

Zealous royalists considered the example of a restoration, and its tendency to strengthen the inviolable Rights of Kings, as more than sufficient to compensate for the concessions to liberty which circumstances had extorted, and from many of which more fortunate circumstances might gradually release the sovereign. The friends of liberty, full of apprehensions and scruples (as they must ever be till they cease to deserve the name), were still delighted with the hope, that some institutions favourable to freedom were to compensate for the evils of the Revolution. All parties vied with each other in demonstrations of joy at this union of legitimacy and liberty, which promised to perpetuate the benefits of that long struggle, and to close its sufferings.

Napoleon appeared to be universally forgotten — except by some English travellers, whose restless and rambling curiosity led them to his retreat. Some idle societies still discussed the question, whether he ought to have fallen by his own hands? as questions of tyrannicide were formerly agitated in the Schools of Declamation at Rome. That numerous class of persons, who are full of candour to the powerful, and of severe

justice to the fallen, boasted of their previous insight into his character, and declared that they had always despised him as a mean-spirited coward. Others listened with interest to the account of his own summing up of the arguments for and against suicide a few days before he left Fontainebleau, which he concluded with a declaration the most singular, in the degree of inconsistency between the subject and the manner, of any perhaps ascribed by history to extraordinary men at critical moments — “*Et d'ailleurs je ne suis entièrement dépourvu de tout sentiment religieux!*” His conversations at Elba, with persons in every sense of the word distinguished, then amusing, are now become important. He admitted that he had consented to order poison to be given to a few of the patients in the hospital at Jaffa, who could not be removed. He predicted, that the Bourbons must perish if they got nothing for France in the scramble for spoil going on at Vienna. He said that France contained a martial youth, and half a million of men trained to arms; — that a hurricane would rise from the centre of France which would again tear Europe from its foundations. The worst part of his conversation, was his allegation that he had been instigated to the execution of the Duc d'Enghien, and to the destruction of the remaining Bourbons, by Talleyrand — of whose character, defective and faulty as it is, atrocity forms no element. In all these conversations, wandering and unequal as they were, displaying both a strange ignorance and an unaccountable knowledge, there appears a general character of incoherency — ascribed at the time to a mind disordered by reverses — but now, with the commentary of events, more probably imputed to the agitation of daring projects, and perhaps exaggerated to conceal them. If some of his visitors felt any degree of that ascendant which he constantly exercised over those who approached him, it is more honourable to their sensibility than discreditable to their judgment, that adversity, however merited, lent an additional power to his commanding character; and they are certainly the very persons who may be expected to resist him most boldly in the hour of his strength.

Very soon after Bonaparte's arrival at Elba, those who had an opportunity of observing him closely were convinced that he still harboured projects of ambition, and that he even seriously meditated a return to France, of which he often jestingly spoke. We have the best reason for believing, that these accurate observers did not conceal their conviction from the principal governments of Europe, especially from the government of Great Britain. Indeed, from the condition of some of them, it was impossible that their opinion, with its reasons, should not have found its way to the British government. It is not our business to enquire, in what country, or by what ministers (we do not say statesmen) information relating to this subject was received with indifference and neglect, if not with scorn. The large remittances of money made to Joseph Bonaparte in the Pays de Vaud, — the preparations made by him to assemble men, under pretence of the differences between that country and their ancient sovereigns at Bern, — his arrangement of quarters for several hundred French officers in his pay, are said to have been communicated by the Swiss government to the Great Courts, with no other than a most mischievous effect on their policy. In the villages around Paris, as well as on the banks of the Lake of Geneva, *the violet* was the secret symbol by which they denoted their chief, and recognised each other. They wore rings of a violet colour, with the device, “*Elle réparaitra au printems.*” When they asked, “*Aimez-vous la violette?*” if the answer was “*Oui,*” they inferred, that the answer was not a confederate. But if the answer

was, "Eh bien," they recognised a brother, initiated in the secrets of the conspiracy; and they completed his sentence, "*Elle réparaitra au printemps.*" These secret symbols, less important for their professed purposes of secrecy, than as a romantic garniture of conspiracy, calculated to excite the imagination, and peculiarly adapted in that respect to the character of Frenchmen, had been employed a twelvemonth before by the partisans of the house of Bourbon. A royalist then sounded any man, of whom he entertained hopes, by saying, "Déli." If the answer was, "vrance," the recognition of principle was reciprocal and satisfactory.

*M. Ferrand*, an old bigot of despotism, made a minister in France for no apparent merit but the extravagance of his monarchical opinions, who was intrusted with the department of the post-office, has, since the landing of Bonaparte, publicly said, that he had read the whole project in the letters broken open at his office! The seizure of the correspondence on Lord Oxford, though it is said to have produced no discovery more interesting than that letter of Excelman to Joachim, was a proof of the suspicions of the French government; — though it is not improbable that Lord Oxford was chosen as bearer of so many letters to Italy, and information given of their number to the police, as a false scent to divert the attention of that government from the real channels of communication.

The universality of the opinion, that Napoleon was not idle at Elba, cannot perhaps be better proved than by the following passages of a middling book, entitled, "*Essai sur la Révolution Française*," in three volumes, published at Paris in January. "*L'obscur retraite de Napoleon peut devenir célèbre comme lui-même. Dans l'humble Lemnos reposèrent long-tems oisives les flèches auxquelles étoient attachés les destins de Troye. C'est au monarque qui préside aux destinées de la France; c'est aux souverains qui stipulent en ce moment la paix et le repos du monde qu'il appartient de prévoir et de détourner ce danger alarmant, tandis qu'il est possible.*"—Vol. iii. p. 315.

"Qu'il soit désormais dans sa solitude libre des fougueuses passions — S'il étoit vrai qu'il négociait avec elles, *qu'il attendit le retour de la fortune et la faveur des événemens!* . . . . Les hommes justes aiment à croire que ce soupçon est suscité par les haines trop méritées qui le poursuivent." — *Ibid.* p. 316.

The bad rhetoric and puerile mythology of this writer, are a tolerable proof that what *he* saw must have been obvious to most men; and the whole character of his book sufficiently proves that he was let into the secret of no party. Early in January, offers are understood to have been received by M. Blacas, the favourite of Louis XVIII., to disclose a plan for the restoration of Bonaparte. It was treated with contemptuous silence.

In defiance of every public reason for precaution, as well as of all those secret warnings of danger, the Allied Powers proceeded in their most offensive projects of dismemberment. The British government made various arrangements which indicated their expectation of a long peace. The Bourbons seemed to slumber at the Thuilleries, amidst the brilliant gaiety of profound security, which restored Paris to her ancient place as the seat of the amusements and pleasures of Europe. Notwithstanding the atrocious projects ascribed to the Congress of Vienna, the people of all the countries to the north of the Alps and the Pyrenees partook the confidence of their sovereigns, which they very naturally ascribed to a

thorough knowledge that no danger existed; and indulged themselves in the delightful hope of a long tranquillity, during which the manners and opinions of civilisation would insensibly correct much of the evil meditated, and in part consummated, by partitioning princes. Even the voice so loudly raised in the British parliament on behalf of justice, was an indication of that calm in which alone such a voice can be heard.

In a moment the hurricane broke out. Napoleon Bonaparte landed at *Cannes* in Provence, on the 1st of March, a day or two before Lord Castlereagh entered London, considering himself as having completed the new treaty of Westphalia, and about to receive those plaudits of his majority which were to attend his pacific triumph. The journey of Bonaparte (for the military term *march* would be misplaced) from Cannes to Paris was without parallel in history, and much beyond the limits of probable fiction. Every soldier sent against him joined his force. Where resistance seemed for a moment to be threatened, it was disarmed by the sound of his voice. The ascendant of a victorious leader over soldiers; the talent of moving armed multitudes by a word; the inextinguishable attachment of an army to him in whom its glory is concentrated and embodied, were never before so brilliantly and tremendously exemplified. Civilised society was never before so terribly warned of the force of those military virtues, which are the greatest of civil vices. In twenty days he found himself quietly seated on the throne of France, without having spilt a drop of blood. The change had no resemblance to a revolution in an European country, where great bodies of men are interested in the preservation of authority, and where every body takes some interest for or against political mutation. It had nothing of the violence of a popular revolt. It was a bloodless and orderly military sedition. In the levity with which authority was transferred, it bore some resemblance to an Oriental revolution. But the total absence of those great characteristic features, the murder or imprisonment of princes, destroyed the likeness. It is, in short, an event of which the scene could have been laid by a romance writer, bold enough to have imagined it, in no other time and country than France in the year 1815. How it could have occurred in that time and country, is the question respecting which we shall now proceed to offer a few observations. But before we make any attempt towards an answer of a more general and refined sort, it is necessary to say something on the question, "How came Napoleon to be left with the means of leaving Elba?" which requires more immediate consideration, and surely admits, as much as it imperiously requires, a plain and short answer.

Whether the Convention of Fontainebleau was wise or necessary, is not an open question. It was made. The faith of Europe was pledged to its observance; and no consideration could have justified its violation. The breach of it must either have disgraced or disgusted the French marshals, who were substantially its guarantees. It might have produced an explosion in the French army, known to be in a most inflammable state. Perfidy towards so memorable a person must have produced a powerful effect on the moral feelings of mankind: it must either have perverted the conscience or excited the indignation of all Europe; and it would have transmitted the infamy of the actors in such a scene to the latest posterity, in characters as indelible as those which must preserve his name. Whether the contract was foolish or wise, there never was any which it was more necessary to observe. Only one policy could be

conceived;—religiously to observe the treaty, and rigorously to exact, and, if necessary, to enforce the observance of it by Napoleon. The grand stipulation on his part was the renunciation of the crown of France. In this stipulation was contained an engagement, that he would do nothing which could endanger the new government of France, or disturb the tranquillity of that country. He evidently bound himself to consent to every measure absolutely necessary to give effect to his renunciation. Now, it is too obvious to require being stated, that among such measures, the first,—the most important,—that which comprehended every other, consisted in the precautions necessary to prevent his quitting Elba, or at least to afford the most perfect security against his re-appearing in France. The right of the Allied Powers to employ such precautions, so clearly arose from their duty, that he could not with the least shadow of plausibility have complained of its exercise. Such a complaint would have been an avowal of bad faith. No unnecessary restriction, indeed, no act of disrespect or discourtesy, would have been excusable. Every indispensable precaution ought to have been firmly and frankly, though with all possible decorum, communicated to him, after measures had been taken to render it impossible for him to resist or evade it. The residence of avowed diplomatic agents at Elba would have facilitated such measures; and the omission of that establishment must have arisen from a very puerile fear of its being thought humiliating—if not from (what we should rather not believe) a mutual jealousy which made the powers of Europe suspect each other of intriguing with the deposed emperor. In plain English, they ought to have watched him, without attempting to cheat him. They are said to have done precisely the reverse.

The government of France publicly resisted the payment of his stipulated pension, under the miserable pretext that they were not parties to a convention to which they owed the undisputed possession of the kingdom. They sequestered his private property, and that of his family, without any colour of law and justice. Considered as against him, these measures were odious, without being in the least degree effectual. The appearance of a poverty unjustly suffered by him who had yesterday commanded the treasures of Europe, created a feeling in his favour. The success of such enterprises as he could execute depended entirely on his personal qualities, and could not be in the slightest degree affected by having or wanting thirty or forty thousand pounds. Every payment of his pension received by Bonaparte, would have been an oath of allegiance by him to Louis XVIII. The impression of such circumstances on armies and mobs, is much greater than in reason it ought to be. Perhaps few things would have tended more to disenchant his character, and dispel the illusion of his superiority. And, on the other hand, punctual honesty towards a mortal enemy, would have been a great source of credit to, and a considerable mark of conscious strength in, the Bourbon government. Even the ground which it would naturally have afforded for the residence of a faithful agent at Elba, would have been no contemptible advantage.

The secrets of the Congress at Vienna are not yet made known to the world. But there seems to be no doubt that they hesitated about executing the article which related to Parma; and that (however incredible such imbecility may appear) they manifested an expectation of being able to persuade Napoleon to remove voluntarily to a residence more safe for Europe, but fatal to all his own hopes. Instead of taking such measures as

would have made it impossible to resist justifiable restraint, they appear to have apprised him of plans which must have been most alarming to him, without using a single previous measure of common prudence; and in the fullest expectation that this man, of whose pride and ambition and impetuosity they had spoken so justly and so strongly, would patiently and tamely wait their pleasure, and expect the moment when they thought fit to execute their plans. It never seems to have occurred to them, that he might escape as an adventurer, in order to ensure his not being carried away as a prisoner.

It may be thought that the duty of watching the issues of Elba, ought to have been more especially performed by the French marine. But it was a very dangerous service to commit to them. The fidelity of the French navy, and especially of the Toulon fleet, to the Bourbons, was more than suspected. And even if it had been otherwise, it was a measure capable of making a very mischievous impression in France, whether it were considered as an act of tyrannical rigour, or as a symptom of fear. The duty could have been performed easily, effectually, and safely, by England alone. Can it then be true that our naval officers in the Mediterranean had no instructions to detain Bonaparte, even if they met him out at sea, clearly making for the French coast? It has even been said, though that be incredible and unnecessary, that our ships had positive orders not to stop him. Will there be now found a single man in Europe to say, that Porto Ferraiò ought to have been a day without two or three British frigates in the harbour, at the disposal of a constantly resident accredited agent, avowedly with the purpose of ensuring the performance of Napoleon's engagements? \* With this simple, obviously necessary,

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\* The following is an extract of a letter, published in a London newspaper, apparently by the friends of Sir Neil Campbell; and we republish it here, both to illustrate the subject of our reasoning, and from a sense of justice to the high character of that gallant and deserving officer:—

“ From this period, until the assembling of the Congress at Vienna, Bonaparte evinced the greatest predilection for the constant personal presence and society of Sir Neil Campbell; *but the discussions, &c. of the Allied Powers, touching his future situation, and the arrangements of the Italian states, seemed to awaken his slumbering passions, and create rancour in his mind; and he evidently alienated himself from the habits he had before cultivated with the British resident.* Bonaparte's restlessness and dissatisfaction with his situation at Elba daily increased. About this time several of his relations and old friends arrived at Elba from the Continent; and a frequent intercourse commenced between him, Italy, &c. (*via* Leghorn, Florence, &c.); and he evidently showed Sir N. Campbell that his company was not so acceptable as formerly. Under these, *and other circumstances, which cannot at present be disclosed,* Colonel Campbell found it expedient occasionally to visit the Continent, for the purpose of being the better enabled to watch, ascertain, and communicate to his government, and its functionaries on the Continent, such intrigues and ramifications of Bonaparte, as might be carried forward, and which it was impossible to do by a constant residence at Elba; *and there is reason to believe, that he did not fail to report, from time to time, what appeared to him deserving of notice, as well on the Continent as in Elba.*—It is therefore to be presumed, that even this exposition of the footing on which he was at Elba, will evince the injustice of the disgraceful language in which the public prints have indulged, in attributing to him a situation which he would have scorned to hold,—a power which he did not possess,—and a negligence, which the whole tenor of his military life most decidedly contradicts: nor will the judgment of a discerning public ascribe to an insulated individual, so situated, the means of preventing his departure from Elba; the signal for which,



and absolutely inoffensive precaution, the escape of Napoleon, with a sufficient force to cover his landing, would have been literally impossible.

It seems, indeed, that, with this precaution, he could have escaped in no other manner than singly, and in a fishing-boat, even if the vigilance of the British resident had slumbered sufficiently to allow his escape at all. We shall doubtless be told in due time why such precautions were omitted. Till that explanation be given — till we hear what mysterious obstacles prevented the adoption of measures of prudence so very obvious, the world will believe, that all the dangers with which we are threatened, and all the evil which we may suffer — the new desolation which may arise from French victories — the terrible though inferior mischiefs which must result from France being conquered, if that event be possible — the waste of happiness, of civilisation, of morals (to say nothing of blood and treasure), which must attend a protracted struggle, are to be ascribed to the criminal supineness, or the almost frantic security, of the British administration. We must not, therefore, wonder at the absurd reports prevalent in France, which ascribe to us the intention of letting loose Napoleon to excite a civil war. All those who have just fled from France describe this as the universal opinion of the common people. It will contribute somewhat to swell that torrent of prejudice and antipathy against England, which have arisen from the thousand false and absurd rumours that have been propagated during the last twenty years, the particulars of which are mostly forgotten, and would be disclaimed if they were now distinctly renewed, but which have left behind, as their permanent effect, a general hatred of the British name. This rumour, false as it most certainly is, cannot, after all, be said to be the most absurd of popular rumours, or even quite so absurd as that conduct on the part of statesmen for which it professes to account. It is remarkable that the same opinion is maintained, whether it be believed or not, by the higher classes of Frenchmen — by the Royalists, notwithstanding the gratitude of the King to England, and his hopes from her in future — and by Napoleonists, though it may seem strange that they should thus derive, from so impure a source, the event which has completely fulfilled their wishes. But both these parties guard their speculations by the salvo, that the English Government ventured on this Machiavelian expedient, only because they thought the success and restoration of Napoleon to be impossible; and that the only consequence of it would be a civil war, sufficient to exhaust the strength, and to crush the rival industry, of France. In the mean time, it is said that the Netherlands would be secure from an invasion which Louis XVIII. himself must have attempted as soon as he ceased to fear his own army more than foreign states. The union between Belgium and Holland would have had time to consolidate; and the Congress of Vienna would have proceeded in their partitions, undisturbed even by those feeble remonstrances, which a decent regard to the safety, if not to the glory of France, must have extorted from the weakest monarch; —

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had Colonel Campbell been on the spot, would have been his imprisonment, and consequent deprivation of all means of previous report to government. It is necessary to observe, that Colonel Campbell's absence from Elba, at the time of Bonaparte's departure from it, was as short as possible, consistent with the performance of the public duty on which he was then employed."

so extravagant are the opinions to which the apparently incomprehensible negligence of the British administration has given currency.

The causes which produced the restoration of Bonaparte must be chiefly referable to the condition and character of the French people, — to the administration of the French government, — to the example of other restored governments, — and, most of all, though not as many think, exclusively, to the state of the French army; — to say nothing, for the present, of the policy of the Congress at Vienna, which, as it affects the present and future situation of all Europe, requires a separate and a very extensive discussion; though it cannot be doubted, that, except the military spirit, it was the most powerful agent in subverting the throne of the Bourbons.

On each of these subjects we shall throw out a few reflections, which it would be presumptuous to publish if they were not the result of some thought and observation, but which it would, in our estimate of things, be pusillanimous to suppress from any fear of the disadvantages of haste in mere writing. To appreciate the effects of the French Revolution on the people of France, is an undertaking for which no man now alive has sufficient materials, or sufficient impartiality, even if he had sufficient ability. It is a task from which Tacitus and Machiavel would have shrunk; and to which the little pamphleteers who speak on it with dogmatism, prove themselves so unequal by their presumption, that men of sense do not wait for the additional proof which is always amply furnished by their performances.

The French Revolution was a destruction of great abuses, executed with much violence, injustice, and inhumanity. The destruction of abuse is, in itself and for so much, a good. Injustice and inhumanity would cease to be vices if they were not productive of great mischief to society. This is a most perplexing account to balance.

As applied for instance to the cultivators and cultivation of France, there seems no reason to doubt the unanimous testimony of all travellers and observers, that agriculture has advanced, and that the condition of the agricultural population has been sensibly improved. *M. De la Place* calculates agricultural produce to have increased one fifth during the last twenty-five years. *M. Cuvier*, an unprejudiced and dispassionate man, rather friendly than adverse to much of what the Revolution destroyed, and who, in his frequent journeys through France, surveyed the country with the eyes of a naturalist and a politician, bears the most decisive testimony to the same general result. *M. Candolles*, a very able and enlightened Genevese, who is Professor of Botany at Montpellier, is preparing for the press the fruit of several years devoted to the survey of French cultivation, in which we are promised the detailed proofs of its progress. The apprehensions lately entertained by the landed interest of England, and countenanced by no less an authority than that of Mr. Malthus, that France as a permanent exporter of corn would supply our market, and drive our inferior lands out of cultivation, though we consider them as extremely unreasonable, must be allowed to be of some weight in this question. No such dread of the rivalship of French corn growers was ever felt or affected in this country in former times. Lastly, the evidence of Mr. Birkbeck, an independent thinker, a shrewd observer, and an experienced farmer, though his journey was rapid, and though he perhaps wished to find benefits resulting from the Revolution, must be allowed to be of high value.

“*Montpellier, Aug. 18.*—From Dieppe to this place, we have seen scarcely a working animal whose condition was not excellent;—oxen, horses, and now mules and asses, fat and well looking, but not pampered. This looks like prosperity. And when I add, that we have not seen among the labouring people one such famished, worn out, wretched object as may be met with in every parish of England\*,—I had almost said on every farm. This, in a country so populous, so entirely agricultural, denotes real prosperity. Again, from Dieppe to this place, I could not easily point out an acre of waste, a spot of land that is not *industriously* cultivated, though not always *well*, according to our notions. France, so peopled, so cultivated, moderately taxed, without paper money, without tithes, without poor-rates, almost without poor, with excellent roads in every direction, and overflowing with corn, wine, and oil, must be and really is a rich country.

“*Aug. 19.* Waited on M. —, for whom we had letters. He is better informed probably than any other man on the actual state of the kingdom; having been occupied for a series of years, under the direction of government, in visiting the country from department to department, with a view to obtain a precise knowledge of its agriculture and resources. This gentleman confirms our observations in every particular, and enables us with safety to generalise the result of the information we have collected.

“*1st,* The labouring class, formerly the poor, are now rich †, in consequence of the national domains having been sold in small allotments, at very low rates; and with the indulgence of five years for completing the payment. Thus, there are few labourers or domestic servants who are not proprietors of land.

“*2d,* By the revolution, every oppression on agriculture was done away; tithes, game laws, *corvées*, &c. &c.

“*3d,* Since that time, much new land has been brought into cultivation, and none of the old abandoned.

“*4th,* The modes of husbandry have improved in many districts, by the introduction of fallow crops and artificial grasses—‘*prairies artificielles.*’ The general wages of labourers in husbandry, *20d.* per day; which, compared with prices, is equal to *3s. 4d.* with us.”—P. 51—53.

We cannot resist the temptation to copy here, though out of place, the account which this discerning farmer gives of the first impression made upon his mind by the people of France.

“There is more appearance of enjoyment, and less of positive suffering, than I ever beheld before, or had any conception of; but it is not the sort of enjoyment which suits my habits. What a pains-taking, unfortunate race are we,—so busy about living, that we really have not time to live. Our recreations have so much vice in them, that serious folks have imagined it impossible to be both merry and wise. *The people here, though infinitely behind us in the accommodations of life, seem to be as much our superiors in the art of living.*” — P. 5.

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\* The author seems to be aware that he was visited by a propensity to exaggerate, which easily besets careless and animated writers. But, even if it were literally correct, it would not in the least shake the certain truth, that the condition of the people of England is superior to that of all other nations. From our populousness, our liberty, our wealth, and particularly from our mixed character as an agricultural and manufacturing nation, our industry is much more adventurous and ambitious than that of any other people. Greater objects are aimed at—greater failures must necessarily occur. Some examples of greater distress than is elsewhere to be seen may therefore naturally be expected. But the general condition of a people, whose faculties are roused to the highest pitch of enterprise and energy, must be more desirable.

† We must recommend to Mr. B. to soften and limit this alarming proposition in the next edition of his valuable and amusing little book. To change the poor, *i.e.* the majority, into *rich*, is not only impracticable, but inconceivable, and an absolute contradiction in terms, as long as the word *rich* continues to denote what it does at present—*those who are richer than most others.*

We have no time to point out the exaggeration and mistake, mixed with the truth, which this short passage conveys, in so striking a manner. They must be allowed to amount at least to the average sacrifice of accuracy to vivacity, which is required in the manufacture of pointed sentences.

The first impression made on the mind of Mr. Scott, on his landing at the same port of Dieppe, is very curious from its relation to those terrible events, which it was impossible for him to foresee, and is in itself characteristic of the powers and habits of mind which distinguish that eloquent and philosophical traveller. It is less marked than most other passages of the volume, by that enthusiasm for English manners and institutions, at which only the vulgar can wonder in the Editor of what is called an Opposition Journal; and by that severe and indignant invective against the vices, and even the frailties, of the French nation, which sometimes more resembles the language of a moral satirist, than that of an estimator of national character.

“ But the most impressive feature of the crowd before us, and that which most struck us with a sense of novelty and of interest, was its military aspect. Almost every man had some indication of the military profession about his person, sufficient to denote that he had been engaged in war; at the same time, there was a self-willed variety in the dress of each, which had a very unpleasant effect, inasmuch as it prevented us from recognising that *stamped assurance of legitimacy as an armed force*, which is impressed on the aspect of British troops. We could scarcely imagine, that the dark-visaged beings, some in long, loose great coats, some in jackets, some in cocked hats, some in round ones, some in caps, who darted at us keen looks of a very over-clouded cast, had ever belonged to regiments, steady, controlled, and lawful;—they seemed, rather, the fragments of broken-up gangs, brave, dexterous, and fierce, but unprincipled and unrestrained. Much of this irregularity and angriness of appearance was doubtless occasioned by the great disbandment of the army that had just taken place. The disbanded had no call to observe the niceties of military discipline, although they still retained such parts of their military uniform as they found convenient. They had not then either pursuits to occupy their time, or even prospects to keep up their hopes; they still lounged about in idleness, although their pay had been stopped; and disappointment and necessity threw into their faces an expression deeper than that of irritation,—approaching, in fact, to the indications of indiscriminate and inveterate hatred. They carried about with them in their air the branded characteristics of forlorn men, whose interests and habits opposed them to the peace of mankind;—men who would cry with the desperate Constance,—

“ ‘ War! war! no peace! peace is to me a war!’ ” — *King John*.

P. 22—24.

Whatever may have been the benefits conferred by the Revolution on the cultivators, supposing them to have been more questionable than they appear to have been, it is at all events obvious, that the division of confiscated land among the peasantry, must have given that body an interest and a pride in the maintenance of the order or disorder which that Revolution had produced. All confiscation is unjust. The French confiscation, being the most extensive, is the most abominable example of that species of legal robbery. But we speak only of its political effects on the temper of the peasantry. These effects are by no means confined to those who had become proprietors. The promotion of many inspired all with pride. The whole class was raised in self-importance by the proprietary dignity acquired by numerous individuals. Nor must it be supposed that the apprehensions of such a rabble of ignorant owners, who had acquired their ownerships by means of which their own conscience would distrust the fairness, were to be proportioned to the

reasonable probabilities of danger. The alarms of a multitude for objects very valuable to them are always extravagantly beyond the degree of the risk, especially when they are strengthened by any sense, however faint and indistinct, of injustice, which, by the immutable laws of human nature, stamps every possession which suggests it with a mark of insecurity. It is a panic fear;—one of those fears which are so rapidly spread and so violently exaggerated by sympathy, that the lively fancy of the ancients represented them as inflicted by a superior power.

Exemption from manorial rights and feudal services was not merely, nor perhaps principally, considered by the French farmers as a relief from oppression. They were connected with the exulting recollections of deliverance from a yoke, of a triumph over superiors, aided even by the remembrance of licentiousness with which they had exercised their saturnalian privileges in the first moments of their short and ambiguous liberty. They recollected these distinctions as an emancipation of their caste. The interest, the pride, the resentment, and the fear had a great tendency to make the maintenance of these changes a point of honour among the whole peasantry of France. On this subject, perhaps, they were likely to acquire that jealousy and susceptibility which the dispersed population of the country rarely exhibit, unless when their religion, or their national pride, or their ancient usages, are violently attacked. The only security for these objects would appear to them to be, a Government arising, like their own property and privileges, out of the Revolution.

We are far from commending these sentiments, and still farther from confounding them with the spirit of liberty. If the forms of a free constitution could have been preserved under a counter-revolutionary government, perhaps these hostile dispositions of the peasants and new proprietors against such a government, might have been gradually mitigated and subdued into one of the auxiliaries of freedom. But, in the present state of France, there are unhappily no elements of such combinations. There is no such class as landed gentry,—no great proprietors resident on their estates,—consequently no leaders of this dispersed population, to give them permanent influence on the public counsels, to animate their general sluggishness, or to restrain their occasional violence. In such a state they must, in general, be inert;—in particular matters which touch their own prejudices and supposed interest, unreasonable and irresistible. The extreme subdivision of landed property might, under some circumstances, be favourable to a democratical government. Under a limited monarchy it is destructive of liberty, because it annihilates the strongest bulwarks against the power of the crown. Having no body of great proprietors, it delivers the monarch from all regular and constant restraint, and from every apprehension but that of an inconstant and often servile populace. Wherever it is not the companion of democracy, it naturally tends to produce despotism; and, melancholy as the conclusion is, it seems too probable that the present state of property and prejudice among the larger part of the people of France, rather disposes them towards a despotism deriving its sole title from the Revolution, and interested in maintaining the system of society which it has established, and armed with that tyrannical power which may be necessary for its maintenance.

Observations of a somewhat similar nature are applicable to other classes of the French population. Many of the tradesmen and merchants, as well as of the numerous bodies of commissaries and contractors, grown rich by

war, had become landed proprietors. These classes in general had participated in the early movements of the Revolution. They had indeed generally shrunk from its horrors—but they had associated their pride, their quiet, almost their moral character to its success, by the extensive purchases of confiscated land, made by many of their number. These feelings were not to be satisfied by any assurances, however solemn and repeated, or however sincere, that the sales of national property were to be inviolable. The necessity of such assurance continually reminded them of the odiousness of their acquisitions, and of the light in which the acquirers were considered by the Government. Their property was to be spared as an evil, incorrigible from its magnitude. What they must have desired, was a government from whom no such assurances could have been necessary.

The middle classes in cities were precisely those who had been formerly humbled, mortified, and exasperated by the privileges of the nobility—for whom the Revolution was a triumph over those who, in the daily intercourse of life, treated them with constant disdain, and whom that Revolution raised to the vacant place of these deposed chiefs. The vanity of that numerous, intelligent, and active part of the community, merchants, bankers, manufacturers, tradesmen, lawyers, attorneys, physicians, surgeons, artists, actors, men of letters, had been humbled by the monarchy, and had triumphed in the Revolution. They rushed into the stations which the gentry, emigrant, beggared, or proscribed, could no longer fill. The whole government fell into their hands.

Bonaparte's nobility was an institution framed to secure the triumph of all these vanities, and to provide against the possibility of a second humiliation. It was a body composed of the revolutionary aristocracy, with some of the ancient nobility, either rewarded for their services to the Revolution by its highest dignities, or compelled to lend lustre to it by accepting its secondary ranks, with titles inferior to their own, and with many lawyers, men of letters, merchants, physicians, &c. who often receive inferior marks of honour in England, but whom the ancient system of the French monarchy rigorously excluded from such distinctions. The military principle predominated; not only from the nature of the government, but because military distinction was the purest that was earned during the revolution. The Legion of Honour spread the same principle through the whole army, which probably contained six and thirty thousand out of the forty thousand who composed the order. The whole of these institutions was an array of new vanities against old vanities. The vanity of the former roturiers was embodied against the vanity of the former nobility. The new knights and nobles were daily reminded by their badges, or titles, of their interest to resist the re-establishment of a system which would have perpetuated their humiliation. The real operation of these causes was visible during the short reign of Louis XVIII. Military men, indeed, had the courage to display their decorations, and to avow their titles. But all gentlemen renounced them on their own part, and laughed at them in others. Most civilians were ashamed, or afraid to use their new names of dignity. They were conveyed, if at all, in a subdued voice, almost in a whisper. They were considered as extremely unfashionable and vulgar. Talleyrand renounced his title of Prince of Benevente; and Massena's resumption of his dignity of Prince was regarded as an act of audacity, if not of intentional defiance.

From these middle classes were chosen another body, who were neces-

sarily attached to the revolutionary government — the immense body of civil officers who were placed in all the countries, directly or indirectly, subject to France; in Italy, in Germany, in Poland, in Holland, in the Netherlands, for the purposes of administration of finance, and of late to enforce the vain prohibition of commerce with England. These were all thrown back on France by the peace. They had no hope of employment. Their gratitude, their resentment, and their expectations, bound them to the fortune of Napoleon.

The number of persons in France interested directly or indirectly in the sale of confiscated property by original purchase, by some part in the successive transfers by mortgage or by expectancy, has been computed to be ten millions. This must be a great exaggeration: but one half of that number would be more than sufficient to give colour to the general sentiment. Though the lands of the church and the crown were never regarded in the same invidious light with those of private owners, yet the whole mass of confiscation was held together by its revolutionary origin: the possessors of the most odious part were considered as the outposts and advanced guards of the rest. The purchasers of small lots were peasants. Those of considerable estates were the better classes of the inhabitants of cities. Yet, in spite of the powerful causes which attached these last to the Revolution, it is certain that among the class called "*La bonne bourgeoisie*" are to be found the greatest number of those who approved the restoration of the Bourbons as the means of security and quiet. They were weary of revolution, and they dreaded confusion. But they are inert and timid, and almost as little qualified to defend a throne as they are disposed to overthrow it. Unfortunately, their voice, of great weight in the administration of regular governments, is scarcely heard in convulsions. They are destined to stoop to the bold; — too often, though with vain sorrow and indignation, to crouch under the yoke of the guilty and the desperate.

The populace of great towns (a most important constituent part of a free community, when the union of liberal institutions, with a vigorous authority, provides both a vent for their sentiments, and a curb on their violence) have, throughout the French Revolution, showed at once all the varieties and excesses of plebeian passions, and all the peculiarities of the French national character in their most exaggerated state. The love of show, or of change — the rage for liberty or slavery, for war or for peace, soon wearing itself out into disgust and weariness — the idolatrous worship of demagogues, soon abandoned, and at last cruelly persecuted — the envy of wealth, or the servile homage paid to it: — all these, in every age, in every place, from Athens to Paris, have characterised a populace not educated by habits of reverence for the laws, or bound by ties of character and palpable interest to the other classes of a free commonwealth. When the Parisian mobs were restrained by a strong government, and compelled to renounce their democratic orgies, they became proud of conquest — proud of the splendour of their despotism — proud of the magnificence of its exhibitions and its monuments. Men may be so brutalised as to be proud of their chains. That sort of interest in public concerns, which the poor, in their intervals of idleness, and especially when they are met together, feel perhaps more strongly than other classes more constantly occupied with prudential cares, overflowed into new channels. They applauded a general or a tyrant, as they had applauded Robespierre, and worshipped Marat.

They applauded the triumphal entry of a foreign army within their walls as a grand show; and they huzzaed the victorious Sovereigns, as they would have celebrated the triumph of a French general. The return of the Bourbons was a novelty, and a sight which, as such, might amuse them for a day. But the establishment of a pacific and frugal government, with an infirm monarch and a gloomy court, without sights or donatives, and the cessation of the gigantic works constructed to adorn Paris, were sure enough to alienate the Parisian populace. There was neither vigour to overawe them, nor brilliancy to intoxicate them, nor foreign enterprise to divert their attention.

Among the separate parties into which every people is divided, the Protestants are to be regarded as a body of no small importance in France. Their numbers were rated at between two and three millions: but their importance was not to be estimated by their numerical strength. Their identity of interest, their habits of concert, their common wrongs and resentments, gave them far more strength than a much larger number of a secure, lazy, and dispirited majority. It was, generally speaking, impossible that French Protestants should wish well to the family of Louis XIV., peculiarly supported by the Catholic party. The lenity with which they had long been treated, was ascribed more to the liberality of the age than of the Government. Till the year 1788, even their marriages and their inheritances depended more upon the connivance of the tribunals, than upon the sanction of the law. The petty vexations, and ineffectual persecution of systematic exclusion from public offices, and the consequent degradation of their body in public opinion, long survived the detestable but effectual persecution which had been carried on by missionary dragoons, and which benevolently left them the choice to be hypocrites, or exiles, or galley-slaves. The Revolution first gave them a secure and effective equality with the Catholics, and a real admission into civil office. It is to be feared that they may have sometimes exulted over the sufferings of the Catholic Church, and thereby contracted some part of the depravity of their ancient persecutors. But it cannot be doubted that they were generally attached to the Revolution, and to governments founded on it.

The same observations may be applied, without repetition, to other sects of Dissidents. Of all the lessons of history, there is none more evident in itself, and more uniformly neglected by governments, than that persecutions, disabilities, exclusions, all systematic wrong to great bodies of citizens, are sooner or later punished; though the punishment often falls on individuals who are not only innocent, but who may have the merit of labouring to repair the wrong.

The voluntary associations who have led or influenced the people during the Revolution, are a very material object in a review like the present. The very numerous body who, as Jacobins or Terrorists, had participated in the atrocities of 1793 and 1794, had, in the exercise of tyranny, sufficiently unlearned the crude notions of liberty with which they had set out. But they all required a government established on revolutionary foundations. They all took refuge under Bonaparte's authority. The more base accepted clandestine pensions or insignificant place. *Barrere* wrote slavish paragraphs at Paris. *Tallien* was provided for by an obscure or a nominal consulship in Spain. *Fouché*, who conducted this part of the system, thought the removal of an active Jacobin to a province cheaply purchased by five hundred a year. *Fouché* him-



self, one of the most atrocious of the Terrorists, had been gradually formed into a good administrator under a civilised despotism ; regardless indeed of forms, but paying considerable respect to the substance, and especially to the appearance of justice ; never shrinking from what was necessary to crush a formidable enemy, but carefully avoiding wanton cruelty and unnecessary evil. His administration, during the earlier and better part of Napoleon's government, had so much repaired the faults of his former life, that the appointment of Savary to the police was one of the most alarming acts of the internal policy during the violent period which followed the invasion of Spain. At the head of this sort of persons, not indeed in guilt, but in the conspicuous nature of the act in which they had participated, were the Regicides. The execution of Louis XVI., being both unjust and illegal, was unquestionably an atrocious murder. But it would argue great bigotry and ignorance of human nature, not to be aware, that many who took a share in it must have viewed it in a directly opposite light. Mr. Hume himself, with all his passion for monarchy, admits that Cromwell probably considered his share in the death of Charles I. as one of his most distinguished merits. Some of those who voted the death of Louis XVI. have proved that they acted only from erroneous judgment, by the decisive evidence of a virtuous life. One of them perished in Guiana, the victim of an attempt to restore the royal family.

But though among the hundreds who voted for the death of that unfortunate prince, there might be seen every shade of morality, from the blackest depravity to the very confines of purity,—at least in sentiment,—it was impossible that any of them could be contemplated without horror by the brothers and daughter of the murdered monarch : nor would it be less vain to expect that the objects of this hatred should fail to support those revolutionary authorities, which secured them from punishment, which covered them from contempt by station and opulence, and which compelled the monarchs of Europe to receive them into their palaces as ambassadors. They might be—the far greater part of them certainly had become, indifferent to liberty,—perhaps partial to that exercise of unlimited power to which they had been accustomed under what they called a free government. But they could not be indifferent in their dislike of a government, under which their very best condition was that of pardoned criminals, whose criminality was the more odious on account of the sad necessity which made it pardoned. All the terrorists, and almost all the regicides, had accordingly accepted emoluments and honours from Napoleon, and were eager to support his authority as a revolutionary despotism, strong enough to protect them from general unpopularity, and to ensure them against the vengeance or the humiliating mercy of a Bourbon government.

Another party of revolutionists had committed great errors in the beginning, which co-operated with the alternate obstinacy and feebleness of the counter-revolutionists, to produce all the evils which we feel and fear, which can only be excused by their own inexperience in legislation, and by the prevalence of erroneous opinions at that period, throughout the most enlightened part of Europe. These were the best leaders of the Constituent Assembly, who never relinquished the cause of liberty, nor disgraced it by submissions to tyranny, or participation in guilt.

The best representative of this small class is M. de la Fayette, a man of the purest honour in private life, who has devoted himself to the de-

fence of liberty from his earliest youth. He may have committed some mistakes in opinion; but his heart has always been worthy of the friend of Washington and of Fox. In due time the world will see how victoriously he refutes the charges against him of misconduct towards the Royal Family, when the palace of Versailles was attacked by the mob, and when the King escaped to Varennes. Having hazarded his life to preserve Louis XVI., he was imprisoned in various dungeons, by powers who at the same time released regicides. His wife fell a victim to her conjugal heroism. His liberty was obtained by Bonaparte, who paid court to him during the short period of apparent liberality and moderation which opened his political career. M. de la Fayette repaid him by faithful counsel; and when he saw his rapid strides towards arbitrary power, he terminated all correspondence with him, by a letter, which breathes the calm dignity of constant and intrepid virtue. In the choice of evils, he considered the prejudices of the court and the nobility as more capable of being reconciled with liberty, than the power of an army. After a long absence from courts, he appeared at the levee of Monsieur, on his entry into Paris; and was received with a slight,—not justified by his character, nor by his rank—more important than character in the estimate of palaces. He returned to his retirement, far from courts or conspiracies, with a reputation of purity and firmness which, if it had been less rare among French leaders, would have secured the liberty of that great nation, and placed her fame on better foundations than those of mere military genius and success.

This party, whose principles are decisively favourable to a limited monarchy, and indeed to the general outlines of the institutions of Great Britain, had some strength among the reasoners of the capital, but represented no interest and no opinion in the country at large. Whatever popularity they latterly appeared to possess, arose but too probably from the momentary concurrence, in opposition to the court, of those who were really their most irreconcilable enemies,—the discontented Revolutionists and concealed Napoleonists. During the late short pause of restriction on the press, they availed themselves of the half liberty of publication which then existed, to employ the only arms in which they were formidable—those of argument and eloquence. The pamphlets of M. Benjamin Constant were by far the most distinguished of those which they produced; and he may be considered as the literary representative of a party, which their enemies, as well as their friends, called the Liberal; who were hostile to Bonaparte and to military power; friendly to the general principles of the constitution established by Louis XVIII., though disapproving some of its parts, and seriously distrusting the spirit in which it was executed, and the maxims prevalent at Court. M. Constant, who had been expelled from the *Tribunat*, and in effect exiled from France, by Bonaparte, began an attack on him before the Allies had crossed the Rhine, and continued it till after his march from Lyons. He is unquestionably the first political writer of the Continent, and apparently the ablest man in France. His first Essay, that on “Conquest,” is a most ingenious development of the principle, that a system of war and conquest, suitable to the condition of Barbarians, is so much at variance with the habits and pursuits of civilised, commercial, and luxurious nations, that it cannot be long-lived in such an age as ours. If the position be limited to those rapid and extensive conquests which tend towards universal Monarchy,—and if the tendency in human affairs to resist them be stated only as of great force, and almost sure within no

long time of checking their progress, the doctrine of M. Constant will be generally acknowledged to be true. With the comprehensive views and the brilliant poignancy of Montesquieu, he unites some of the defects of that great writer. Like him, his mind is too systematical for the irregular variety of human affairs; and he sacrifices too many of those exceptions and limitations, which political reasonings require, to the pointed sentences which compose his nervous and brilliant style. His answer to the Abbé Montesquieu's foolish plan of restricting the press, is a model of polemical politics, uniting English solidity and strength with French urbanity. His tract on ministerial responsibility, with some errors (though surprisingly few) on English details, is an admirable discussion of one of the most important institutions of a free government; and, though founded on English practice, would convey instruction to most of those who have best studied the English constitution. We have said thus much of these masterly productions, because we consider them as the only specimens of the Parisian press, during its semi-emancipation, which deserve the attention of political philosophers, and of the friends of true liberty in all countries. In times of more calm, we should have thought a fuller account of their contents, and a free discussion of their faults, due to the eminent abilities of the author. At present we mention them, chiefly because they exhibit, pretty fairly, the opinions of the liberal party in that country.

But not to dwell longer on this little fraternity, who are too enlightened and conscientious to be of importance in the shocks of faction, and of whom we have spoken more from esteem for their character, than from an opinion of their political influence, it will be already apparent to our readers, that many of the most numerous and guiding classes in the newly arranged community of France, were bound, by strong ties of interest and pride, to a revolutionary government, however little they might be qualified or sincerely disposed for a free constitution, which they struggled to confound with the former; that these dispositions among the civil classes formed one great source of danger to the administration of the Bourbons, and that they now constitute a material part of the strength of Napoleon. To them he appeals in his proclamations, when he speaks of "a new dynasty founded on the same bases with the new interests and new institutions which owe their rise to the Revolution." To them he appeals, though more covertly, in his professions of zeal for the dignity of the people, and of hostility to feudal nobility, and monarchy by Divine right.

It is natural to enquire how the conscription, and the prodigious expenditure of human life in the campaigns of Spain and Russia, were not of themselves sufficient to make the government of Napoleon detested by the great majority of the French people. But it is a very melancholy truth, that the body of a people may be gradually so habituated to war, that their habits and expectations may be at last so adapted to its demand for men, and its waste of life, that they become almost insensible to its evils, and may require long discipline to re-inspire them with a relish for the blessings of peace, and a capacity for the virtues of industry. The complaint is least when the evil is greatest. It is as difficult to teach such a people the value of peace, as it would be to reclaim a drunkard, or to subject a robber to patient labour.

A conscription is, under pretence of equality, the most unequal of all laws, — because it assumes that military service is equally easy to all classes and ranks of men. Accordingly, it always produces pecuniary

commutation by the sedentary and educated classes. To them in many of the towns of France it was an oppressive and grievous tax. But to the majority of the people, always accustomed to military service, the life of a soldier became perhaps more agreeable than any other. Families even considered it as a means of provision for their children; each parent labouring to persuade himself that his children would be among those who should have the fortune to survive. Long and constant wars created a regular demand for men, to which the principle of population adapted itself. An army which had conquered and plundered Europe, and in which a private soldier might reasonably enough hope to be a marshal or a prince, had more allurements, and not more repulsive qualities, than many of those odious, disgusting, unwholesome, or perilous occupations, which in the common course of society are always amply supplied. The habit of war unfortunately perpetuates itself. And this moral effect is a far greater evil than the mere destruction of life. Whatever may be the justness of these speculations, certain it is, that the travellers who lately visited France neither found the conscription so unpopular, nor the decay of male population so perceptible, as plausible and confident statements had led them to expect.

It is probable, that among the majority of the French (excluding the army), the restored Bourbons gained less popularity by abolishing the conscription, than they lost by the cession of all the conquests of France. This fact affords a most important warning of the tremendous dangers to which civilised nations expose their character by long war. To say that liberty cannot survive it, is saying little. Liberty is one of the luxuries which only a few nations seem destined to enjoy, and they only for a short period. It is not only fatal to the refinements and ornaments of civilised life; its long continuance must inevitably destroy even that degree (moderate as it is) of order and security which prevails even in the pure monarchies of Europe, and distinguishes them above all other societies ancient or modern. It is vain to inveigh against the people of France for delighting in war, for exulting in conquest, and for being exasperated and mortified by renouncing those vast acquisitions. These deplorable consequences arise from an excess of the noblest and most necessary principles in the character of a nation, acted upon by habits of arms, and "cursed with every granted prayer," during years of victory and conquest. No nation could endure such a trial. Doubtless those nations who have the most liberty, the most intelligence, the most virtue, — who possess in the highest degree all the constituents of the most perfect civilisation, — will resist it the longest. But, let us not deceive ourselves: — long war renders all these blessings impossible. It dissolves all the civil and pacific virtues — it leaves no calm for the cultivation of reason — and by substituting attachment to leaders instead of reverence for laws, it destroys liberty, the parent of intelligence and of virtue.

The French revolution has strongly confirmed the lesson taught by the history of all ages, that while political divisions excite the activity of genius, and teach honour in enmity, as well as fidelity in attachment, the excess of civil confusion and convulsion produces diametrically opposite effects, — subjects society to force, instead of mind, — renders its distinctions the prey of boldness and atrocity, instead of being the prize of talent, — and concentrates the thoughts and feelings of every individual upon himself, his own sufferings and fears. Whatever beginnings of such an unhappy state may be observed in France, — whatever tendency it may have had to dispose the people to a light transfer of allegiance,

and an undistinguishing profession of attachment,— it is more useful to consider them as the results of these general causes, than as vices peculiar to that great nation.

To this we must add, before we conclude our cursory survey, that frequent changes of government, however arising, promote a disposition to acquiesce in change. No people can long preserve the enthusiasm which first impels them to take an active part in change. Its frequency at last teaches them patiently to bear it. They become indifferent to governments and sovereigns. They are spectators of revolutions, instead of actors in them. They are a prey to be fought for by the hardy and bold, and are generally disposed of by an army. In this state of things, revolutions become bloodless— not from the humanity, but from the indifference of a people. Perhaps it may be true, though it will appear paradoxical to many, that such revolutions as those of England and America, conducted with such a regard for moderation and humanity, and even with such respect for established authorities and institutions, independent of their necessity for the preservation of liberty, may even have a tendency to strengthen, instead of weakening, the frame of the commonwealth. The example of reverence for justice— of caution in touching ancient institutions— of not innovating, beyond the necessities of the case, even in a season of violence and anger— may impress on the minds of men those conservative principles of society more deeply and strongly than the most uninterrupted observation of them in the ordinary course of quiet and regular government.

We have no time to say much at present on the remaining divisions of this great subject. Wise administration, in the situation of Louis XVIII., was so extremely arduous a task that the consideration of his misfortunes is not necessary to repress all propensity to severe censure. The restoration of the French monarchy was impossible. Its elements were destroyed. No proprietary nobility— no opulent church— no judiciary bodies— no army. Twenty-five years had destroyed and produced more than several centuries usually do. The King of France could not be restored. A Bourbon prince was placed at the head of revolutionised France. It was not merely a loose stone in the edifice—it was a case of repulsion between the government and all the elements of society.

It is difficult to determine whether any prudence could have averted the catastrophe. In justice it ought to be allowed that more civil liberty was enjoyed during these ten months than during any period of French history. There were no arbitrary imprisonments— not above one or two feeble attempts to exile obnoxious men to their country houses. Once, or perhaps twice, during the revolution, there had been more political liberty— more freedom of the press— more real debate in the legislative assemblies. But in those tumultuous times there was no tranquillity— no security of person and property.

The king and the court could not indeed love liberty— few courts do; and they had much more excuse than most others for hating it. It was obvious that his policy consisted in connecting himself with the purest part of the revolutionists—in seeing only in the revolution the abuses which it had destroyed— in keeping out of sight those claims which conveyed too obvious a condemnation of it— in conquering his most natural and justifiable repugnance to individuals, when the display of such a repugnance produced or confirmed the alienation of numerous classes and powerful interests; and, lastly, the hardest but most necessary part of the whole, in the suppression of gratitude, and the delay of justice itself, to those

whose sufferings and fidelity deserved his affection, but who inspired the majority of Frenchmen with angry recollections and dangerous fears. It is needless to say that so arduous a scheme of policy, which would have required a considerable time for a fair experiment, and which, in the hands of an unmilitary prince, was likely enough, after all, to fail, was scarcely tried by this respectable and unfortunate monarch. The silly attack made by his ministers on the press rendered the government odious, without preventing the publication, or limiting the perusal of one libel. It answered no purpose, but that of giving some undeserved credit for its suppression to Bonaparte, who has other means of controlling the press than those which are supplied by laws and tribunals. Macdonald, who spoke against it with most rigour and spirit in the House of Peers, was one of the last marshals who quitted the king (if he has quitted him); and Constant, who wrote against it with such extraordinary talent and eloquence, was the last French writer of celebrity who threw himself into the breach, and defied the vengeance of the conqueror.

The policy of some of the restored governments in other countries of Europe was extremely injurious to the Bourbon administration. Spain, governed by a Bourbon prince, threw discredit, or rather disgrace, upon all ancient governments. The conduct of Ferdinand at Valençay was notorious in France. It was well known that he had importuned Napoleon for a princess of the Imperial family, and that he wrote constant letters of congratulation to Joseph on his victories over the Spanish armies, whom Ferdinand called the rebel subjects of Joseph. It was known, that, besides all those imbecilities of superstition which disgraced his return,—besides the re-establishment of the Inquisition,—besides the exile, on various grounds or pretexts, of several thousand families, he had thrown into prison more than five thousand persons, for no other crime than that of administering or seconding a government which all Europe had recognised,—which had resisted all the offers of Bonaparte, and under whom the resistance was made to which he owed his crown. Many cases of oppression were familiarly known in France, which are hitherto little spoken of in this country. Among them, that of *M. Antillon* deserves to be mentioned. That gentleman, a pre-eminent professor in an university, had distinguished himself both in the Cortes, of which he was a member, and by his writings, especially by several excellent works against the slave trade, of which he was the most determined enemy. The first care of King Ferdinand was to imprison such mischievous men. Early in June, he issued a warrant for the apprehension of *M. Antillon*, whom the officer appointed to execute the warrant found labouring under a severe and dangerous malady at his house in Arragon. Upon the representation of the physicians, the officer hesitated to remove the prisoner, and applied for farther instructions to the Captain General of Arragon. The Captain General suspended the execution of the order till his Majesty's pleasure could be ascertained. The ministers immediately intimated to the viceroy the royal dissatisfaction at the delay. They commanded *M. Antillon* to be instantly conducted to Madrid. The order was executed; and *M. Antillon* died on the road, shortly after he had begun his journey!—Such is the narrative which we have received from persons who appear to us worthy of faith. If it be entirely false, it may easily be confuted. If it be exaggerated, it may with equal ease be reduced within the limits of the exact truth. Until it be confuted, we offer it as a specimen of the administration of the Spanish monarchy.

The Pope and the King of Sardinia seemed to be ambitious of rivalling Ferdinand in puerile superstition, if their limited means forbade them to aspire to rivalship in political oppression. They exerted every effort to give a colour to the opinion, that the restored governments were the enemies of civilisation and of reason, and that the great destroyer was necessary to pave the way for wise institutions, even at the expense of tyranny for a time. Spain was represented at Paris as a mirror, in which all nations might see the destiny prepared for them by restored princes, and the yoke which would be imposed on them if the sovereigns were not restrained by fear of their people. These impressions were not effaced even by the policy which induced Louis XVIII. to suffer the journals of Paris to discuss the administration of his cousin in Spain, as freely as those of London.

THE ARMY!— We have not time to develope all that is suggested by this terrible word. And it is unnecessary. The word conveys more than any commentary could unfold.

Many readers will say, that this word alone might have been substituted for the whole of what we have written. Short and dogmatical explanations of great events are at once agreeable to the pride of intellect, and very suitable to the narrow capacity and indolent minds of ordinary men. To explain a revolution by a maxim, has an imposing appearance of decisive character and practical good sense. But great revolutions are always produced by the action of some causes, and by the absence of others, without the full consideration of which it is impossible to form a true judgment of their origin. In the case before us, we must consider as well what might have prevented, as what actually produced the catastrophe. The spirit of a soldiery inured to victory, and indignant at defeat; the discontent of officers whose victories were gained over the allies of the government whom they now served; the ambition of generals whose companions had obtained principalities and kingdoms; the disrespect of a conquering army for an unwarlike sovereign; the military habits spread over the whole population of France—did certainly constitute a source of danger to the restored monarch, against which no wisdom could devise, or even conceive a perfect security. But to retard is, in such cases, to gain a chance of preventing. Every delay had at least a tendency to unsoldier the army. Time was the ally of tranquillity. Two years of quiet might have given the people of France a superiority over the soldiery, and thus might have insured Europe against military barbarism. It is true, that the frame of society produced by the revolution, which we have attempted to describe, contributed to render perhaps the larger, certainly the more active, part of the civil population not cordially affected to the authority of the Bourbons. Even in this very difficult case much had been accomplished to appease the alarms, and (what was harder) to soothe the wounded pride of that numerous body who derived new wealth or consequence from the revolution. But the wisest policy of this sort required a long time, and an undisturbed operation. The moderate administration of Louis might have accomplished, in a great degree, the work of conciliation. But it was indispensable that it should have been secure against violent interruption for a reasonable period, and that it should not have been brought into a state of continual odium and suspicion by the contemptible folly of some powers in their internal administration, and by the detestable ambition of others in their projects of foreign policy. It was essential that the French people should not be goaded into daily rage at the treaty which confined

them within their own ancient limits, by the spectacle of the great military powers bartering republics, confiscating monarchies, adding provinces and kingdoms to their vast dominions. Notwithstanding the natural sources of internal danger, if even some of these unfavourable causes had been absent, the life of Napoleon Bonaparte (supposing him to have been as vigilantly watched as it would have been just and easy to watch him) might have proved a security to the throne of the Bourbons, by preventing any other military chief from offering himself to the army till they had subsided into a part of the people, and imbibed sentiments compatible with the peace and order of civil life.

As things stand at present, the prospects of the world are sufficiently gloomy, and the course of safety and honour by no means very plain before us. Two things, however, seem clear in the midst of the darkness; one, that a crusade in behalf of the Bourbons and the old monarchy is as palpably hopeless as it is manifestly unjust; and the other, that that course of policy is the wisest and most auspicious, which tends most to reclaim the population of France from its military habits, and to withhold it from those scenes of adventure in which its military spirit has been formed.

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#### THE STATE OF PUBLIC FEELING IN FRANCE AFTER THE FIRST AND SECOND RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS.\*

WE are almost thankful that we have neither time nor space left even for the enumeration of the many mighty themes that are folded up in the little word France, which we have placed at the top of this page. Undoubtedly, there never was a moment when the reasonable settlement of France was so important to itself, to its neighbours, and to posterity — nor one in which it was so little to be looked for; never a moment in which the temptation to admonish and to predict with regard to it was so strong, and at the same time so full of peril. In the whole history of the world, perhaps, there has been no conjuncture in which it was so difficult to determine what was to be wished — so impossible to say what was to be expected. With reference to that unhappy country, all parties are confounded, and all principles set in opposition; and its actual situation presents, not so much a choice of evils and dangers as a variety among which choice itself is bewildered.

With these difficulties, however, it is not our intention to grapple — at least on the present occasion: nor shall we enter into any question as to the wrongs which France may have suffered from her own rulers, or from other nations — or the rights to which she may yet be entitled to lay claim in either quarter. We enquire not, at present, what treatment she has deserved, or of what government she is capable — what evils she may occasion by her example, or of what dangers she may become the source by our mismanagement. These are topics, indeed, of incalculable interest, not only to her, but to us, and to all the world; — but they are by far too large to be entered upon here; and we have not as yet either

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\* *Examen Rapide du Gouvernement des Bourbons en France, depuis le Mois d'Avril 1814, jusqu'au Mois de Mai 1815. Seconde Edition. 8vo.*

*Des Revolutionnaires et du Ministere Actuel. Par M. ——. 8vo. — Vol. xxv. page 501. October, 1815.*



lights or courage to treat of them as they ought to be treated. In the little, therefore, which we propose now to say, we shall merely endeavour to give a short explanation of the immediate hazards to which the peace of that country seems to be actually exposed; and to suggest a few observations on the course of policy which it will be fitting that this country should pursue, in the event of certain emergencies which can no longer be considered as unlikely.

We suppose there are none of our readers so enviably ignorant, or sanguine, as not to know and believe, that notwithstanding the second restoration of their ancient line of princes, opinions are still deeply and dreadfully divided in that distracted country—that the elements of the fiercest dissension are still fermenting in her bosom—and that in the minds both of his friends and his enemies, it is confessedly a matter of doubt and uncertainty, whether the present sovereign will be able to maintain himself many months longer on the throne which he has so recently ascended.

Of the actual extent of the discontents that undoubtedly prevail, it would be presumptuous for any one in this country to pretend to make any thing like a precise estimate — since it is certain that it is not at all known in that where they are actually raging; and it is undoubtedly one of the most alarming symptoms of the present disorders of France, that with a prodigious exasperation and violence in both parties, they seem to be mutually in the most complete and incurable ignorance of their relative strength and organisation. With us the channels by which public opinion is collected and conveyed are every where visible and conspicuous. They have been worn deep and regular by the long continued agency of undisguised communications; and constitute a system by which the amount and direction of the general sentiment may at any time be ascertained with a precision quite sufficient for all practical purposes. In France, however, this sort of communication has never been openly permitted; and, for the last twenty years, the same circumstances which have most powerfully excited and impressed the opinions of the great mass of the nation, have also effectually repressed their expression; while the apparent earnestness with which certain opinions have been expressed on extraordinary occasions, and the levity with which they have been as solemnly disavowed, make it doubly difficult to rely on the few indications which the nature of the government permitted, or the genius of the people supplied. There is no organization, in short, in the structure of their society, for the transmission of political sentiments through the great mass of the community; and the temper and habits of the people are such, as to make us distrust the conclusions which might be drawn from the scanty specimens that occasionally appear. Thus it has happened, that almost all their great internal movements have been ventured upon in the dark; and that, with them, more than with any other people, a few daring spirits have so often succeeded in forcing the bulk of the nation upon courses not more against their interests than their inclinations—because there were no safe or ready means of ascertaining how few they were, or what a great majority was inclined to oppose their usurpation: and from the same circumstances it happens, that, even with the best means of information on the spot, no correct or satisfactory account of the national temper can now be obtained; and that little else can be learned with certainty from the immediate communication of the most intelligent persons in both parties, than that there exist every where the grossest contradictions, and the most monstrous exaggerations; and

that men of all principles are utterly blinded by their strong passions and sanguine imaginations.

In these circumstances, it is evident that no reliance can be placed upon the most confident assertions of either party with regard to the true spirit and disposition of the nation at large, and that our opinion of it must be formed by inference from certain prominent and admitted facts in their history and situation, and from a comparison of the principles and motives which they mutually avow or impute to each other. The slightest glance at their history, at all events, will at once demonstrate the existence, and display the deep sunk and wide spreading roots of that dislike and distrust of the reigning family, which it would require so much management to obviate, or so much power to disregard.

In the first place, it is now near twenty-five years since they were driven from the sovereignty and the country;—during all which time, its affairs have been conducted without reference to them, or their pretensions. But from this great fact alone, it is obvious, that more than five sixths of the active population of France must have come into existence since the name of the Bourbons had ceased to be heard of in that country; and even those who had attained to manhood before their disappearance, can only have heard of them, during that long interval, as objects of contempt or hostility. Some kinder and more respectful remembrances might be secretly cherished, and some more loyal vows breathed for their welfare, in the woods of La Vendée, or the alleys of Bourdeaux;—but the public and general voice of France had unquestionably, during all that time, designated them only as objects of scorn and aversion;—and it is equally undeniable, that the state of things which followed upon their expulsion, however fruitful it might be of crimes and barren of substantial comforts, yet gave rise to a series of events, incalculably flattering to the national vanity, and captivating beyond measure to the selfish ambition of the bold and aspiring part of the society.

It is necessary also to remember, that the princes, by whose removal this great flood of glory seemed to be let in upon the nation, had neither endeared nor distinguished themselves by any great or dazzling exploit, or trait of magnanimity, by which their memory might have been exalted in popular recollection, and they themselves brought to mind, with loyal and penitential regrets, when discontents were occasionally roused by the exactions of a sterner master. They had emigrated ingloriously in pursuit of personal safety; and had never headed, nor animated, by their presence, any of the attempts which their adherents for some time made with so gallant a desperation for their restoration. They had taken refuge, too, and generally resided among the bitter and beaten enemies of the nation; and must have figured to French imaginations as among the most insignificant dependents of those weak and misguided monarchs who had been compelled to kiss the feet of the great republic—and whose kingdoms had been rent and scattered, and given away at the nod of its Imperial master.

From this retirement, they came back at last,—not in consequence of any voluntary or internal movement of reviving loyalty, or impatience of actual oppression,—not in obedience to the spontaneous call or invitation of any part of the people, or under any circumstances which could render their restoration glorious to the nation they were to govern, but in consequence of a series of disasters, by which its power and its triumphs were signally overthrown, and the deepest mortification inflicted on that national pride and vanity which had been their support under oppression,

and their delight in their days of prosperity. This restoration was the obvious and immediate fruit of the victories of foreigners over the armies and provinces of France. It crowned the first triumphs of those who had been for twenty years the inveterate but baffled enemies of the country, and was confessedly brought about by the slaughter of her citizens, the desolation of her fields, and the humiliation of her national greatness. It formed part of the greatest train of calamities that had befallen the country from without in the memory of the existing generation, and must have been connected in the minds of all Frenchmen with ideas of defeat, degradation, and dishonour; ideas which received no softening, in this instance, from any part of the nation having been instrumental in bringing it about, or even from the recollection of any feat of arms or of heroic daring having been performed in their own cause, by those whose exaltation was the end and consummation of all this suffering. It was simply the case of France being invaded and conquered, and its government overthrown by Russian and Prussian armies, and of a prince who had not been heard of for twenty years, coming under their escort, and ascending the vacant throne.

It is plain, that under all these circumstances, there was no reason to suppose that there could be any active attachment to the person of the restored sovereign, or to his family, in the body of the nation; and that though their desire to obtain a settled government, and, above all, to disarm the present hostility of their victorious enemies, might induce them to receive him, and even to maintain him on the throne, he could have no personal claim on their regard or affection, and none of that hold of their habitual feelings, which, in regular monarchies, is so apt to identify the dignity of the sovereign with the honour of the country, and gives to patriotism or national partiality the name and the attributes of loyalty. All their habits, and feelings, and attachments naturally ran in another direction; and, with reference merely to the circumstances we have enumerated, we may safely say that they must have been at least neutral and null in behalf of Louis XVIII., and that he had every thing like loyalty to create in the breasts of a people to which he had been so long a stranger.

But these were not the only circumstances which belonged to his new situation, and that of the people he was to govern. The internal condition of France had been altered during his absence, at least as much as its exterior relations. The original possessors of property and rank, and official and personal eminence, had been all displaced along with the reigning family, and those various titles to power and influence been settled for twenty years upon other individuals. The whole frame and structure of society had been accommodated to this change; and if some few individuals yet survived, to whom "the soil of the achievement" might still be supposed to adhere, by far the greater part were in possession of their honours and emoluments upon legitimate titles. Innumerable multitudes had fairly bought, and diligently improved, the properties that had been originally confiscated in the heat and violence of the revolution; and almost all who had been promoted to office, or attained to distinction, had deserved the places they had reached, by the cultivation and exercise of their talents, or by eminent services rendered to what was universally acknowledged to be the settled government of the country. Still greater numbers, who remembered no other government, had innocently succeeded to the advantages thus acquired by their parents, and could not easily be persuaded that they were not entitled to

retain them. Besides all this, it is never to be forgotten, that, along with many miseries and wrongs, the revolution had been productive of much substantial benefit to the great body of the people. Seigniorial tyranny and ecclesiastical exaction had been entirely destroyed. The right of the nation at large to a voice in the enactment of its laws, and the measures of its government, had been distinctly recognised; and, above all, the capacity of all ranks of people, and of every individual indeed in the country, to be appointed to every situation of power or dignity within it, had not only been allowed, but had been acted upon in the most ample and conspicuous manner. The barrier between the noblesse and the lower orders was entirely thrown down, and the very traces of its existence effaced and trodden smooth: almost every person in eminent station in France, had risen from that class of society to which all eminent station had been formerly interdicted, and whose condition had consequently received an accession of dignity and advantage that scarcely admitted of being over-rated.

All these were the fruits of the revolution — the dear-bought fruits of the dangers and sufferings, the crimes and anxieties, that had occurred in its progress — and now endeared them the more to those by whom they had been purchased at so vast a price. But the return of the Bourbons had always been considered as the triumph of a counter-revolution; — and it was obvious that the brother of Louis XVI., ascending the throne by the exclusive aid of a foreign army, could not be supposed to look with indulgence on any of those changes or institutions which had originated in the massacre and expulsion of his family, or upon any of those individuals whom he found in possession of the properties or offices which had formerly belonged to the faithful companions of his exile. A thousand amiable and a thousand excusable feelings stood in the way of any such indulgence: and whatever forbearance the necessity of his situation, or the dictates of obvious policy might impose upon him, no man in France could doubt that he must wish to restore their estates and dignities to the emigrants, their privileges to the nobility, and *all* its original powers to the crown. To the body of the nation, however, a sovereign with such dispositions could not possibly be acceptable — nor could his accession be contemplated without feelings of general distrust and alarm. Speaking with a very moderate latitude, we might say that all the considerable men in France in March, 1814, — all who by station, or talent, or reputation, could guide its opinions, or determine its conduct, — had interests opposed to such an event, and felt that they would be placed by it either in the condition of offenders to be punished, or delinquents to be forgiven.

This then was the situation in which the present sovereign of France stood at his first accession in April, 1814. There was not only no attachment or liking to him or his family in the bulk of the nation — but there were strong and very general interests and habits which rendered their return undesirable, and laid the foundation of a very wide spread feeling of alarm and jealousy in the body of the people. In these, and in many other respects, there was no resemblance whatever between our restoration in 1661 and that of the Bourbons in 1814. Property had not changed hands at all in England, during the time of the usurpation; and, with a few exceptions, the same individuals who held the chief permanent influence in the country at the breaking out of the war continued to possess it through the whole period that elapsed till the restoration. In

France, every thing was radically altered, and twenty years had done the work of several centuries.

These distressing, but very obvious truths, were felt too by the princes themselves and their adherents; and, conscious that nothing but the total discomfiture of the national force, and the actual invasion and conquest of the country, could have opened their way to the throne, they felt that it was not by the assertion of their hereditary rights that it could now be maintained:—aware that they had been placed there by nothing but the success of the allied arms, and that these arms could not *always* be held out to support them, they were convinced of the necessity of creating a French interest in their behalf, and at all events of disarming the hostilities and suspicions to which they could not be ignorant they were liable. The only three points they had in their favour were, 1st, the support of their victorious allies; 2dly, the ordinary patronage which belongs to all actual governments; and, 3dly, the advantage of being the descendants of a former sovereign, by whose elevation the idea of an open competition, or of setting up the crown as a prize to be fought for, was excluded. Except these three considerations, every thing as we have seen was against them; and these were by no means of such decisive weight as might at first sight be imagined. The first, and by far the strongest, was evidently of a temporary nature; for though an unprecedented alliance of the great powers of Europe might seat a king on the throne of France, it was evidently absurd to suppose, that they should continue to hold him on it for an indefinite period of time, if he was not able to keep his seat by his own exertions. The second was the mere necessary result of actual possession, and sure, of course, to be transferred to any one by whom the possessor might be supplanted. The third did not necessarily point to the individuals actually called to the succession; and, we suspect, has always had much less weight in France than the inhabitants of happier countries can easily believe. The evils of internal dissension and civil broils, which appear so terrible to those who contemplate them at a distance, seem to have little influence on those to whom they have been long familiar. The strong passions which they excite and gratify have a sort of attraction like the habit of intoxication or deep play; and we are persuaded, not only that both parties in France would at this moment risk all the horrors of another popular revolution, if they thought that by means of it they could completely demolish their antagonists; but that nothing else has contributed so much to pervert our judgment as to the affairs of that country, as our exaggerated estimates of the reluctance which those who have once suffered by civil commotions must feel for their renewal. Be this, however, as it may, the King felt in 1814 that the offer of the crown which was then made him originated mainly in a desire to get rid of the existing war with Europe; and that it would never have been made, had the fortune of that contest been different. Accordingly, he did not claim it as his absolute and rightful inheritance, but accepted the offer that was made, and assented in substance to all the conditions with which it was qualified.

By this act, he became at once a constitutional king. He recognised in the body which made the offer the most conspicuous of all the revolutionary institutions, and gave a wise and unequivocal pledge of his willingness to recognise all that was still recognised by his subjects of the revolution itself, and the principles to which it had given birth. His professions, however, were naturally viewed with some degree of distrust; and coming back surrounded with those emigrants who had always treated

the whole revolution as a mere rebellion and successful revolt, and openly declared their wishes for a complete restoration of the ancient monarchy with all its accompaniments, it was of the utmost necessity that his conduct should be in conformity with his professions, and that no single act should betray those dispositions or designs, the existence of which he could not fail to know was so generally and reasonably suspected. Let us see whether his acts were always thus guarded and unexceptionable.

He began by calling himself Louis XVIII., though no sovereign after Louis XVI. had ever been acknowledged by the nation; and the first hour of his accession he said was the twenty-first year of his reign. There were obvious motives and temptations to the use of this style; but it could not fail to startle and alarm the nation, who certainly never meant to acknowledge that they had owed him allegiance for twenty years before his arrival among them, or that he had a right to be king at all, independent of their invitation and consent. He then, without taking any notice of that invitation, which he had, however, accepted, declared that he owed his throne, after God, to the Prince Regent of England. He ordered a monument to be erected to the memory of the emigrants who had fallen at Quiberon fighting against their countrymen, in an attempt to re-establish the whole ancient privileges of the crown and the nobles; and immediately after ennobled, by a special grant, the family of Georges Cadoudal, who had come into the country with the avowed purpose of assassinating its former sovereign. In presenting the constitutional charter to the House of Representatives, his chancellor described it, in his official speech, as "the voluntary limitation of a power in itself unlimited." The liberty of the press, which had been solemnly promised on his arrival, was afterwards retracted; and, what was of far more consequence, under the censure to which it was then subjected all sorts of invectives against the revolution and every thing to which it had given birth, as well as the most direct reclamations of the privileges and properties of the emigrants, were allowed to be printed without challenge, while an unrelenting interdict was put upon all that bore an opposite character. The most indiscreet language upon those subjects was openly held by many persons who were known to be high in the royal favour; and Monsieur, the King's brother, went so far as to say, in a public address to the emigrants of the south, that though little had been done for them as yet, "we hope, in time, to obtain for you a more complete justice." The consequence of all this was, that many individuals spoke confidently of the properties which formerly belonged to their families as being still theirs; and that, in consequence of the fears suggested by those proceedings, very many of the holders of these properties offered them for a third part of their value to these new claimants, who, in several instances, rejected the compromise with disdain. About the same time a royal edict was promulgated for the formation of schools, and the revival of the regulations of 1750, for the education of the young nobility; and subscriptions were opened for their support, in which no name but that of an ancient family could be admitted; while it was observed, that the nomination to foreign embassies, and other situations of dignity, was confined almost exclusively to persons of the same description.

To these most alarming indications of the spirit of the new government, were added some more substantial, though less provoking, infractions of the charter thus ungraciously promulgated. The abolition of the *droits réunis* had been promised with much parade and solemnity;

and, shortly after, the payment was exacted with more than usual rigour. The charter had declared, that no tax or impost of any sort should be levied without the consent of the legislature; and a variety of taxes, in particular those upon newspapers, upon letters of naturalisation, and for defraying the judiciary establishment, were levied by a mere order of the chancellor. In like manner, the charter had declared, that all the courts of justice should remain as they were, until altered by a special law; but the King, after proposing a law to the Chamber of Representatives for new-modelling the Cour de Cassation, by far the most important of them all, and finding that it was not likely to be adopted, adjourned the Chamber, and re-organised the court of his own authority—diminishing the number of judges, and changing several even upon that reduced establishment—besides many other acts of a similar character, which could not be explained without a longer detail.

We say nothing at present as to the justice or injustice of these acts. Some of them may have been thought unavoidable, and some may admit of another justification; but from whatever motive, good or bad, they were performed, it seems impossible to deny, that they were calculated to give very general disgust and alarm to the body of the nation—to offend all those who had become considerable under the former government, and to deaden the hopes of those who had expected more freedom and impartiality from that which was begun. The consequence accordingly was, that the people began to regard their new princes with distrust, anger, and disdain. Many who had at first supported them, became sullen and alienated. Those who had been neutral, were turned into decided enemies; and such as had always been hostile, became clamorous and forward in their opposition.

In this state of the public mind, Bonaparte landed from Elba: and it is in vain to disguise that it was this state of the public mind, and this alone, that made it possible for him to advance triumphantly to Paris. Some concert and preparation there probably was,—but no detailed plan for his march; and the success of the enterprise was evidently trusted, in the main, to the zeal and discontent of the soldiery, and to the general indifference, despondency and alienation which the conduct of the new government had inspired. France had no occasion, certainly, to love or to trust this mighty conqueror\*; and yet, with all the hazard of an un-

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\* We could more easily account, however, for the love of his own subjects whom he had trained to profitable servility or profligate ambition, than for the strange partiality which has lately indicated itself for him among some of those who profess to be lovers of liberty in this country. It is a fine thing, no doubt, to be generous to a fallen foe, and not to insult that which we were lately compelled to fear; and, upon this principle, we cordially approve of all the decencies and external civilities that have been observed in the recent treatment of this imperial captive. It is to our own honour and dignity, however, and not to his merits, that these observances are due; and we are altogether unable to conceive how his mere downfall should convert him into an object of regard or affection, who was generally admitted, in the days of his exaltation, to deserve the execration of all friends to political freedom or national independence. To us, he has always appeared a most pernicious and detestable tyrant, without feeling, principle, or concern for human sufferings or honour—and such he appears to us still. Even they who now seem inclined to relent towards him, can find nothing better to say in his behalf, than that he is not worse than the run of other tyrants and conquerors—and we believe this to be true: but is that a reason why those who hate and oppose *them*, should feel any kindness and indulgence for *him*? For

provided war which his return brought with it, it is certain that she submitted more entirely and implicitly to him than she did to Louis XVIII. in the first days of his apparent popularity. The interests of freedom and of the rights acquired by the revolution seemed once more identified with his; and, miserable as that delusion was, the eagerness with which many persons rushed into it, showed sufficiently how very popular these interests still were in the country, and the mighty influence which might be gained or lost by consulting them. The danger to the restored Emperor, therefore, was wholly from without, — while that to Louis XVIII. had been wholly from within. He made head with his usual alacrity against that danger; dashed himself desperately against the iron lines of the English at Waterloo — and was broken to pieces and totally destroyed in the shock. The victory of foreigners, and the defeat of the French armies, again opened the way for Louis to the French throne.

After the impressive lesson which this second expulsion of the family must have taught, it is interesting to consider what measures they adopted to correct the errors, or supply the omissions, which had contributed to that catastrophe.

In the first place, instead of waiting beyond the frontier till the first shock of rage and humiliation attending the defeat was over, and the odium of the severe measures to which it necessarily led had subsided, and then coming in to share and mitigate the national afflictions, — his Majesty was advised to come back to Paris in the very midst of the allied forces, and thus directly to connect himself with all their obnoxious proceedings, and to exhibit himself, not only as profiting by the national discomfiture, which he unquestionably did, but as exulting and rejoicing in their calamities.

In the second place, before any treaty of peace was concluded with the nation, and while the national army had retired by convention, he set himself down in his capital, surrounded by two or three hundred thousand foreign soldiers, and there agreed to terms more humiliating and disadvantageous for France than ever had been imposed on her in the course of three hundred years of war and negotiation: almost all her border garrisons and places of strength were to be given up to a foreign soldiery, and large payments were to be made to defray their expenses in this triumphant war. It was in this way that the country was to pay for the expense to which Europe had been put in bringing them back their King! — and his popularity must have been great indeed, if his return did not appear dearly bought with the blood of an hundred thousand Frenchmen — the unprecedented mortification of the national vanity — the loss of twenty frontier towns — and the stipulation of forty or fifty millions sterling of tribute to those allies of their sovereign.

In this situation of affairs, and still overawed or protected by the foreign armies, the King immediately removed the whole of the prefects

our part, we know nothing so hateful as a tyrant and a conqueror; and it is quite enough that he is admitted to belong to that fraternity. But it is proper to observe, that, though not worse perhaps in character than other tyrants, he has had far more power, and done far more mischief, than any other in recent times, and therefore deserves to be more hated. The sort of hankering after him, which we can trace among some of our good Whigs, proceeds, we have no doubt, from the circumstance of his being now abused and insulted by the servile tools of tyrants not much better than himself. But it is a gross perversion of a good principle, and does real injury to the cause it is meant to serve.



and provincial officers, and replaced them with men for the most part of violent royalist principles — many of them emigrants, utterly unknown and necessarily suspected in their districts — and almost all of them understood to be adverse to any limitations whatever on the royal authority. The pretext for this change was, that the former prefects had made no efforts to arrest the progress of Bonaparte; and that it was necessary to have officers upon whose fidelity his Majesty might confidently rely. But the charge of non-resistance to Bonaparte was equally applicable to the nation at large; and it must have been not a little alarming to the people to find, that no one was thought deserving of the King's confidence who had not professed hostility to their freedom.

The next step, however, was more decisive. The legislative bodies appointed by the Emperor were necessarily dissolved; and if, in the new nomination of peers, there was a jealous exclusion of almost all who had signalled themselves at any time by attachment to the principles of the revolution, this was no more than could be accounted for, and excused, by the prejudices and alarms of royalty, in a body depending entirely on its pleasure for its existence. In the election of the representatives, however, there was an interference of a more extraordinary and questionable character. These elections, it may not be known to all our readers, had been finally regulated by Bonaparte soon after his assumption of the government, about fifteen years ago. The old aristocracy being entirely destroyed, it was very early thought expedient to do something towards supplying its place; and, in order to reconcile this with the revolutionary right of universal suffrage, it was agreed that the primary electors of every department should nominate a certain number of persons, with considerable qualifications in respect of property, who should elect the representatives for the legislative body. The change introduced by Bonaparte was to make those last electors hold their functions for life — and thus to limit the right of interference in the body of the people, to merely filling up the vacancies which might from time to time arise in their body. That energetic sovereign, however, was not very fond of popular interference in any shape — and it had accordingly happened that, during the whole period of his power, no vacancies ever had been supplied; and, at the period of the King's last restoration, the electoral colleges, as they were called, were deficient of their complement by one third, or in some instances one half of their number. When the king came to issue orders for returning a new Chamber of Deputies, it was suggested that the electoral colleges ought previously to be raised to their proper quota: but, instead of referring for this purpose to the primary electors, it was thought better just to order the prefects of the departments, who by this time were all decided royalists, to make up the complement, by nominating, of their own authority, such a number of trustworthy persons in the neighbourhood as might be required for that purpose.

This was accordingly done; and as those supplementary members were, of course, the most violent royalists which the prefect could find in his district, all the deputies, with a very few exceptions, proved to be of the same character; and, in some instances, the original body of electors refused to concur with these royal nominees, and left the election entirely in their hands. Such, we believe, is the true history and actual constitution of that Chamber of Deputies which now exercises the legislative functions in France, and has already signalled itself by so many marks of devotion to the cause of the Court. So far from fulfilling the appropriate

duty of a representative of the commons of the land, by leaning towards the democratical side of the constitution, and maintaining a constant jealousy of royal encroachment, it is notorious that it is a great deal more royalist than either the king or his ministers; that the minister has been left in a small minority on the popular side in almost every question of a constitutional nature; and that the great difficulty on the part of the Court has been, not to secure its attachment, but to keep it within moderate limits. The Chamber of Peers, nominated at the same time by the King alone, as the bulwark and aristocratical fence of the monarchy, is far less monarchical than this popular assembly, which professes to represent that part of the state which is the most jealous of court influence. Out of 450 members, of whom scarcely so many as 400 have ever assembled, the common calculation is, that there are more than 150 violent royalists, who think that the emigrants should have all their property and privileges restored, and that all who had ever held office of any kind before April, 1814, ought to be exiled from the country; nearly 200 who go along with the ministry in more moderate projects, both of reward and of punishment, about 30 constitutionalists, and 15 or 20 old jacobins.

A body so constituted cannot well be supposed to be a fair representation of the public opinion, or to command much public respect by its proceedings. Accordingly, from the first hour of its convocation, it has been the custom with the great mass of the discontented, to make a mock of its pretensions, and to hold it out as in direct opposition to the general sentiments of the country. It is even understood, that the Court itself has been alarmed at the extravagance and excess of its loyalty; and that it actually was in contemplation to have dissolved it, and assembled another, by a more unexceptionable mode of election.

All that has passed since has been calculated to aggravate, rather than allay, the resentment and distrust occasioned by the course of policy we have been endeavouring to delineate. The removal of Fouché and Talleyrand from the ministry, for no other known offence than that of having belonged to the revolution, and having urged the necessity of conciliating a nation which could not be subdued; a number of arrests by the agents of government without the authority of law; and a law passed suspending all the provisions for personal liberty, with very little precaution; the continued suppression of the liberty of the press, and the continued partiality of the censors; the barbarous persecution of the Protestants, avowedly on the score of their general love of civil liberty; the mission of the princes into the provinces most noted for the violence of their royalist principles; the exclusive favour shown to priests and emigrants; and the general irritation produced by the presence of the armed allies of the King, and the humiliating restitutions upon which they have insisted; have all conspired to foster that spirit of discontent and impatience towards the government, of which the foundations had been laid by so many other causes.

We have hitherto spoken only of the public and overt acts of the government, and of circumstances, the existence and effect of which seem equally undeniable; and if there were nothing more in the case, we should think the causes of a general and very dangerous discontent sufficiently accounted for. But the truth is, that those feelings are more embittered by circumstances of which it is impossible to produce the same evidence, and in the reality of which it is consequently impossible to have the same assurance. It is notorious, however, all over France,

that it is not so much against the King himself, as against those members of his family who are most about his person, that the suspicions and resentment of the nation are directed; and that by far the most formidable exasperation has been produced by the impressions which unhappily prevail as to the principles and deportment of the princes next in succession to the throne. Monsieur, though principally bent upon the restoration of the church to its primitive power and splendour, is said to profess openly his preference of an absolute monarchy, and to speak with undisguised hostility of all representative assemblies, and other checks on the royal authority. The Duc d'Angouleme, bred up in the same principles, has had his zeal for them inflamed by the enthusiastic temper of his wife, who has all the spirit of a martyr for the cause, and many apologies for that spirit which its martyrs could not always claim. At Bourdeaux and Nismes, and in various parts of the south, self-created bands are said to have risen up, breathing vengeance against all who have taken any part in the revolution, and contending for the restoration of the old monarchy. Their royalism is so exalted, that they will not wear the white cockade, which they say has been contaminated by the touch of republicans and regicides; but adorn themselves in the colours of the Duchesse d'Angouleme, whose champions they profess to be. The Duc de Berri is still more unpopular than any of the other three. To their implacable hostility to every thing that owes its birth to the revolution, he is said to add a harshness and arrogance of manner, which has given deep and indelible offence. These illustrious persons, and their immediate confidants and advisers, are positively asserted to hold language of the most unequivocal kind in their own circles, under the very roof of the Tuilleries; and to discourse with considerable openness, of the necessity of putting to death all who had any share in the condemnation of Louis XVI., and of seizing the property and banishing the persons of all who had ever held or accepted any employment whatsoever under any of the revolutionary governments;— to effect all which, they are said to contemplate the formation of a pure royalist army in La Vendée and the South, by means of which, after the factious have been disposed of, they propose to redeem the national honour by taking vengeance on the English and other foreigners who have taken such an ungenerous advantage of their weakness to spoil and disable the country.

For the truth of these imputations, of course, we do not pretend to vouch; nor do we even profess to have grounds sufficient absolutely to settle our own belief with regard to them; but we do vouch for the fact, that such imputations are very generally made and believed at Paris, and that by persons whose means of information and general veracity are held to be equally unquestionable. It is no less certain, that the same impressions are very widely diffused through the body of the nation, and have been greatly strengthened and exasperated by the late mission of the Duc d'Angouleme into the South, and that of the Duc de Berri to La Vendée. Of their effect in promoting the previous animosity and alarm, it is needless to say any thing.

To what practical end this animosity tends, it is not, perhaps, quite so easy to determine. In one point, however, all but the high-flying royalists seem to be agreed, that they never will submit to a government which does not cordially recognise all that is now defended by any body in the revolution, — guarantee without grudging all the popular rights and privileges which have been acquired by the revolution, — and acknowledge as ornaments and benefactors to the nation many of those who distin-

guished themselves in the service of France, while it would have been held both criminal and ridiculous to talk of the rights of the Bourbons. Many seem now persuaded, that it is in vain to hope for such a government under the present monarch, or his immediate successors; and that the first opportunity must be taken again to expel them from the country. Others are of opinion, that if the King, who is by no means personally obnoxious, would emancipate himself from the yoke of the princes, and take into his councils men acquainted with the present situation of France, he might still retrieve his past errors, and maintain himself on the throne for the remainder of his days. The scheme of a republic seems to be universally abandoned — at all events it is universally disavowed. The star of Napoleon, too, seems to be generally considered as set; and though there have been rumours of a design to bring forward his son, under the auspices of Austria, yet this is understood to be, as yet at least, nothing more than an angry and undigested conception of some of the discontented military leaders, and never likely to make any considerable party in the country, which it would naturally throw, during the minority of the young Emperor, into the hated hands of Austria, or subject to the sanguinary competitions of rival generals and armies.

At present we are inclined to think, that the general voice of the discontented would be for THE DUKE OF ORLEANS; and that his appointment to a limited monarchy would satisfy a greater majority of all parties, and appease far more jealousies and alarms, than any other measure that could be suggested. Such a choice would ensure these three great advantages to the nation. In the first place, they would have a king who owed his crown unequivocally to the will of the country, and consequently could claim nothing as his right by birth, nor dispute the legitimacy of any of the conditions under which it was given. In the second place, they would have a king connected with the revolution by his parentage and early education, and therefore not liable to be tempted by family affection, or to be suspected of being tempted to look upon those concerned in the revolution with feelings of hatred or revenge; — and, finally, they would have a king so near in blood to the lineal successor to the throne, and so little entitled to the dignity for his personal services or exertions, as to mark a considerable veneration for the principle of hereditary succession, — to conciliate the moderate royalists on the one hand, and to prevent this limited exercise of choice, in an emergency so new and important, from affording any encouragement to the perilous experiment of an elective monarchy; or, in other words, a crown set up as a prize to be fought for by all the daring and ambitious spirits in the country.

These considerations are so forcible, and, at the same time, so obvious, that we cannot help believing, that if things do not mend greatly before the death of the King, whose health and habits do not promise a long course of existence; — or if, even during his life, discontents should rise so high as to produce another subversion of the government, by far the most likely, and, upon the whole, the most desirable issue, will be the transference of the sceptre to the Duke of Orleans, upon conditions more favourable to general liberty than have yet been admitted by a French Sovereign.

We are far from intending to insinuate, that that illustrious person has actually taken any measures to bring about such a consummation, or that he is even suspected of caballing against the throne of his kinsman.

On the contrary, it is generally understood, that he has carefully kept himself aloof from the hazard of all such imputations;—and that though his partisans may conjecture that he will not refuse the greatness that may be put upon him, they are perfectly aware that he will himself do nothing to bring it to him, nor use any other arts to strengthen his interest, than a scrupulous adherence to the principles of the constitutional charter, which the whole nation is now bound to observe. This character, as far as we can gather, is that of much good sense and moderation.

Hitherto we have been speaking very much in the name of the constitutionalists, or those who think they have room to complain of the existing government, and who say that they comprehend nine tenths of the whole French people;—and in stating the facts on which they mainly rely for the justification of their discontents, we have perhaps unconsciously borrowed a little too much of their tone and temper. It would not be fair, however, to conclude this hasty sketch of the actual state of the country, without taking some notice of the pleas and averments of the Royalists.

Admitting, as they do in substance, most of the facts which we have already stated as notorious, the moderate persons of this party certainly deny that the King looks with any grudging or regret on the rights which the constitutional charter confirms to the people at large, or that the princes profess any hostility to that constitution. They say, we are afraid not quite correctly, that the system of lenity and confidence was fairly tried during the last short reign, when it was shamefully abused, and that greater distrust and severity are now indispensable for their safety;—that those who are discontented now, never would be satisfied while any power was left to the crown, and that it is as well to resist their pretensions at this point as at any other;—that they must at all events have a force for their protection upon which they can rely—and that if the proved faithlessness of so many who made professions of attachment, compels them to choose that force among persons who carry their notions of loyalty somewhat farther than the present constitution admits, that is no fault of theirs; and it will be easy for the government to prevent this excessive devotion of their supporters from producing any practical mischief. They maintain also, that the only violent opposition to their government is to be found among the discontented and ambitious soldiery, who wish again for conquest and pillage, under a military sovereign; and that the great mass of the people, though overawed by this dangerous class of persons, are in their hearts for the King's government—as that under which they will have most peace, and most substantial freedom; and they maintain farther, that the genius of the French nation, and their late habits, lead them to submit much more patiently to the hand of power than the voice of reason;—and that if they could only get such an army as to repress all internal resistance, the country would fall very readily into its old habits of obedience to legitimate force. They confess, that the propensity of the people is to war, and that their leading passion is for military glory;—and upon this, in fact, they now build their chief hope of consolidating their government. The allies, they say, and particularly the English, have behaved ungenerously, and even deceitfully, in coming into their country, with professions of amity to all but Bonaparte and his adherents; and then, taking advantage of their weakness and unprepared condition, to plunder and insult them like a

conquered people; to exact tribute from them; to dictate to them what garrisons they shall have, and where they shall be stationed in their own realm; and to seize upon their whole frontier, and quarter a foreign army upon them for a period of years after all pretexts for hostility have disappeared." By holding out this language, which no doubt falls in exactly with the sentiments of all classes of Frenchmen, they expect very easily to raise an army, which will at once strengthen their hands against all domestic enmity, and enable them, in due time, to drive these treacherous invaders from their soil, and retrieve the military honour of France, at the same time that they restore its independence.

We do not mean to say that this language is held by official persons about the Court on public occasions; but there is not the least doubt that it is held by the great body of Royalists individually, and that with very little reserve or concealment; and that the hatred to England is now, on the whole, more acrimonious, and more openly and offensively expressed, among this class of persons than among their antagonists. It is, or was at least very lately, an ordinary topic of reproach with them, that our Government was actually in league with the partisans of Orleans to bring about the expulsion of the present King: — and some belief in this imputation may, perhaps, have mitigated the hostility of the constitutionalists.

From this state of parties and of facts, our readers may judge for themselves what is likely to be the fortune of this distracted country: — and we have no inclination to disturb their calculations with any predictions of ours. It is impossible, however, with the slightest recollection of the facts, and the general principles of human nature, to doubt that the party of the malcontents is by far the most numerous and daring: but they labour under the disadvantage of having no military head, no sort of pecuniary funds, and no means of safe or easy concert and preparation. The Government, in all these respects, is in a much more favourable situation. It is actually established, and invested with some immediate authority; and, as long it lasts, may take its measures in perfect security and tranquillity. Both parties, in the mean time, are repressed, and nearly alike repressed we take it, by the overawing foreign force with which the theatre and the prize of their contentions is still surrounded, and the extreme uncertainty of the policy that this force may adopt in the event of a renewed civil war. They are also mutually repressed by the impoverished state of the country, and the almost total destruction of the *materiel* of an army which has taken place in the course of their late hostilities. It is owing to these circumstances alone, we think, that the conflict does not take place immediately.

As to the policy of Austria and Russia — though many extraordinary things are confidently asserted with regard to them — we shall not now venture upon any speculation: but it is impossible to look at such an event as the revival of civil contentions in France, even as a remote possibility, without strenuously inculcating upon *this* country the propriety, the justice, the necessity of an absolute, true, and entire neutrality. We have no right to interfere — we have no interest to interfere — and our interference is most likely to defeat the objects for which it is undertaken, and to ruin the peace and the liberties of all Europe, while it brings this nation to speedy bankruptcy, disorder, and dishonour.

Our ministers have already solemnly abjured all right to interfere in the internal government of France, or in the choice which that great nation may make of a government for itself; and, therefore, it is needless

to say any thing more on the general view of the subject, — as it probably will not be contended, that, except for some strong and immediate interest of our own, we can ever be entitled to intermeddle with the private concerns of our neighbours. That there are limits to this principle of non-interference, is indeed undeniable; and we are not disposed to be very rigid in fixing their places. If France should again erect itself into a revolutionary republic, and proclaim hostility to all thrones, we should think this a justifiable case of interference, even antecedent to any actual attack on our own government. Nay, if Bonaparte should escape from St. Helena, and resume the purple for a third time in Paris, we should not much quarrel with those who should hold that also a ground for immediate opposition: but we must peremptorily protest against any interference for the purpose of keeping Louis XVIII. on his throne, in despite of the French nation; — or for opposing the pretensions of the Duke of Orleans, or any other competitor whom the voice of the country may call to supply his place.

We are zealous and most sincere advocates for hereditary monarchy, and our opinions and arguments upon that subject are already before the public at large\*: but hereditary monarchy, without a power and a right in the people to change the line of succession, is the old slavish absurdity of the *jus divinum* of kings; and cannot decently be asserted in any country that has the smallest pretensions to liberty. In England, where we still have a free constitution, and that exactly because we have a sovereign who owes his crown to such a change in the succession, the mere statement of such a doctrine must appear to be the very height of absurdity and baseness. But, even if this were questionable, surely it will not be pretended that the opposite doctrine, upon which it is our great glory and especial distinction among nations to have acted, and to the practical assertion of which we familiarly ascribe all that is excellent in our political institutions, can at the same time be so very pernicious and detestable, that it can be lawful to take up arms to prevent its adoption in a foreign country, and a duty to make war upon our neighbours, if they seem disposed in this respect to follow our example.

The only ground, in short, that can bear to be stated for such an interference, must be, that our interests would be in some way compromised by any internal change in the government of a neighbouring country. But what is it to us, or any interest of ours, that the French people prefer the Duke of Orleans to the Count de Lille for their sovereign? and choose to call one prince of the old family to the throne, instead of another? It certainly is very much to be wished, for their own sakes, that they should adhere upon the whole to the principle of hereditary succession; but, even if they should judge differently, and should set up the crown to sale, or openly proclaim it to be elective, we do not see what right we should have to find fault with them. The mischiefs of such a government are, in common cases, all to the nation that adopts it; and as it is usually rendered weaker and less formidable by the struggles and distractions to which it is consequently exposed, there seems to be no conceivable ground upon which the vicinage can have any right to prevent it. That it is an impolitic and improvident measure in general estimation, can surely give the wise people who think so no right to enlighten the folly of an independent nation by making war upon them till they are convinced of their folly. They must be left

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\* See the Review of Mr. Leckie's work, vol. xx. p. 322, &c.

to the gentler and more effectual schooling of experience and reflection. What should we have thought in England, in 1688, if the great states of Europe had combined, and required us to show cause why we could live no longer under the dominion of our *legitimate* sovereign, and enjoined us to make out such a case of necessity as *they* should find complete and satisfactory, before they would tolerate a measure so irregular, and of such dangerous example? Could any nation that pretended to independence submit to such an interference? Could any government, or any combination of governments, that pretended to justice or liberality, presume to attempt it? The question, however, comes exactly to this issue, —whether the reasons which entitle a nation to make changes in its internal government, must be reasons that are satisfactory to itself, —or to other countries? That there may be reasons to justify such a change, probably will not be disputed; and all that is contended for is, that the nation which is to act upon them should be allowed to judge of their validity. No other tribunal can possibly be aware of their force, or attempt to make their practical application without manifest usurpation.

But even if an independent state could be subjected, in a matter like this, to the jurisdiction of the surrounding governments, and obliged to make out a colourable case before it was allowed to make any such alteration, we conceive that France could have no difficulty in making out such a case, as must, upon every principle of reciprocity, be conclusive and satisfactory, in so far at least as this country is to judge of it. We could not well refuse the authority of the great and glorious precedent afforded by our own history;—indeed there is no other conceivable standard by which any man among us could ever pretend to estimate the reasonableness of any similar attempt. But it would not be difficult, we think, to show, that if there be any truth at all in the view which we have already given of the interests and sentiments of the French nation, and the conduct and dispositions of its present rulers, there are, relatively to French feelings, as strong inducements to change the person of the sovereign in the one case as in the other. The ultimate motive for all such changes is the conscientious conviction of the people, that their lives, properties, or liberties will be in hazard if it be not adopted. But there can be no sort of doubt, we suppose, that there are many more individuals now in France who sincerely entertain such apprehensions from the continuance of the present system, than there were in England in the time of James II. To quiet such general or extensive apprehensions, and to prevent them from breaking out into perpetual and incurable disturbances, the principle of hereditary succession, which is itself only to be valued as generally preventing such disturbances, may be lawfully sacrificed; and the sacrifice will be cheap, if the end can be accomplished, without absolutely departing from the principle altogether, but only deviating a little way from the lineal order of inheritance.

This is truly the bottom of the case; and the basis upon which our Revolution, as well as that of the Dutch provinces and the Swiss Cantons, and indeed every other, must ultimately be rested. But the parallel between our case in 1688, and that of France at the present moment, may perhaps be pushed a little farther. The true cause of the expulsion of James, was the difference of religion. He adhered to the old faith of the country, while its habits and institutions had been permanently moulded to one of later origin; and instead of yielding a part, at least, of his own notions and prejudices to those of his people, and being guided by the counsels of those who knew them and their temper, he gave him-



self up to the guidance of priests and Jesuits, and other zealots, who would admit of no compromise, and were substantially strangers to the character of the nation he was to govern. If we read *Emigrants for Jesuits*, this is nearly the picture of the present government of France. Twenty years of Revolution have made the Court and the emigrants as much aliens to the habits and feelings of France as it now is, as the lapse of a century had estranged Popery and its accompaniments from the habits of our people in 1688; and we believe it will scarcely be doubted, that the political reformation of the former period is at least as much valued by its disciples, as the religious reformation of the latter was by its immediate supporters.

From what we have here said, it may perhaps be inferred, that we wish at all events for the dethronement of the present King, and think that an insurrection for that object would be a laudable and proper measure. This, however, is by no means our opinion. If the crown, indeed, could be brought to the Duke of Orleans, without a struggle or an insurrection, we have no hesitation in saying, that we think France would have a better chance, both for freedom and for tranquillity, than under the present Monarch and his apparent heirs; and we should consider it as a very fortunate and happy event, for her and for the world, if, either by the natural course of mortality, or by any voluntary arrangement in the family, that prince should now be enabled to ascend the throne, without competition or resistance from any quarter. Beyond this, however, our revolutionary spirit proceeds not; — and if all Frenchmen thought as we do, they would rather apply themselves to conciliate each other, and gradually and patiently to ameliorate their constitution under their present King, than commit their country to the dreadful hazard of a new civil war, for an object which may be desirable, but which they cannot be sure of attaining.

Ignorant as the opponents of the Court are of the exact measure of their own strength, or of that which may be arrayed against it, it is quite impossible that they can have any assurance of a speedy or easy victory: — and with a people so combustible, — already so mischievously trained to military habits and principles, — so ill provided with leaders in civil wisdom, — and so apt to be made the prey of atrocious factionaries, or ambitious generals, we confess that we see much more danger, both to liberty and peace, from the issue of a long internal contention, than from any abuse of which the present government is likely to be guilty, if properly watched, admonished, and resisted. The foundations of a representative government are now laid, we think, indestructibly in the French constitution; and we have no idea that the present King has any design to abrogate or defeat the objects of this great institution. However much it may be abused or perverted, therefore, at this moment, it seems certain, that if every thing is not again cast down by the shock of another popular revolution, the monarchy will be substantially limited, and a certain considerable and growing portion of power vested in the people. We are not even sure whether the nation be fit at this moment for more complete liberty; and whether they would not, on the whole, have a better chance of ultimately obtaining a free and happy constitution, by this progressive and gradual extension of the legislative power, than by starting at once into the function of patriots and citizens. At all events, we should prefer this chance to the perilous experiment of an appeal to arms, and the hazards of an exasperated civil war. We should endeavour to enlighten and conciliate the nation, and, if necessary, to control and

even intimidate the Court, if it persisted in a narrow or illiberal policy; but we should not risk an actual insurrection, — on slighter ground than that of actual and intolerable oppression, — and certainly not for the uncertain chance of obtaining a Sovereign who would no doubt be more suitable in many respects to the present condition of the country.

Such are our sentiments of the course that France *ought* to pursue in the present agitating crisis of her affairs; but we greatly fear that they are not the sentiments of any considerable part of the people of that country: and it is with a view to their acting upon their own opposite impressions, and actually plunging into domestic dissensions, that we have endeavoured to show that we will have neither right nor interest to interfere in that quarrel; and are bound, upon every consideration of generosity and prudence, to let them settle their government in any way they please, or are able, provided they do not endanger our peace or independence in the operation.

As to the consequences of our yielding to our lamentable passion for war and interference, on our finances and internal prosperity, we shall say nothing in this place, as we expect to be able to annex a short separate article upon these important subjects; and, indeed, we have left ourselves room to add but a word or two on the effects of such a mischievous system of policy on our honour and influence, and the fortunes of Europe in general.

In the first place, if it really require the whole united force of Europe to prevent the French from dethroning their present King, it must be pretty plain that he has no considerable number of supporters in his own country, and that the great mass of it is decidedly against him. If it be not so, there can scarcely be any necessity for our interference; and if it be so, then that interference must of necessity appear to the mass of the nation to be a monstrous outrage, injustice, and oppression, the existence of which must exasperate them still more against the prince on whose account they are subjected to it. The natural effects of persecution are now pretty well known and admitted — to exalt and rivet the attachment of its victims to the objects for which it is inflicted — to turn mere reluctance or difference of opinion into furious hatred or ungovernable enthusiasm — to raise common men to the devotedness of martyrs, or the frenzy of assassins — and to put all the strong feelings of revenge and honour in the way of easy reconciliation. There is bitterness enough in the ordinary case of a civil war; but if the allies, who are already generally hated in France for their humiliation of the national power and vanity, are to take part in that war, this will not only throw the whole weight of national feeling into the opposite scale, but will infallibly give a character of acrimony and deadly hatred to the contest, of which the world has yet seen no example. But a war waged with such feelings, and against such a nation as France, can have no issue on which reason or humanity can bear to look without horror. Even supposing the allied arms to be as completely successful as possible, it is plain that France can never be permanently subdued, without the absolute extermination of most of its inhabitants. Paris and other great towns may, and probably would be, abandoned to pillage and conflagration; large provinces may be occupied and severed, by decrees of Congress, from the rest of the country; but a warlike and exasperated population of forty millions cannot be absolutely destroyed, or permanently kept under, by mere force; — and these violent and deplorable measures, which can only become possible in the end of the most savage and murderous

hostilities, will merely sow the seeds of after revolts, insurrections, and massacres, — till some view of policy or private ambition disunite the victorious Allies, and afford the vanquished an opportunity of again asserting their independence, and wreaking their revenge.

In short, it appears to us, that if we are to mingle again in the internal dissensions of France, and to take part in the hostilities to which they will but too probably give rise, we shall not only render the prince whom we mean to support more universally odious in that country, but in all likelihood involve the whole of Europe in the most rancorous and desolating hostilities for thirty years to come. In this point of view, it is of the utmost importance to recollect, that the great hazard to which civil liberty, national morality, and general prosperity are now exposed all over the civilised world, arises from the prevalence of military habits, and the conversion of an undue proportion of the people into a professional soldiery. It is to this that we owe the last return of Bonaparte, and all the disgusting scenes of perfidy and atrocity by which it was attended; and it is to this also that we must ascribe that neglect of literature and political philosophy — that contempt in short of civil arts and civil virtues, the beginnings of which, we conceive, have lately been but too visible in other nations. Nothing indeed can be more certain, than that no country can be free, or rich, or moral, or refined, whose leading occupation is that of war, and among whom the military order takes precedency over, and gives the tone to every other. Even if every other reason, therefore, did not concur to deter us from engaging in wars which do not concern us, and in which we must be equally ruined by failure as by success, this consideration, we conceive, ought to inspire us with redoubled caution, and determine us to abstain from a scene not more painful than precarious, and in which our very efforts must strike so deep at the heart of our prosperity.

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#### AGGRESSIONS OF FRANCE AGAINST SPAIN. — ENGLAND BOUND TO RESIST THEM BY FORCE.\*

It is our purpose, on the present occasion, to lay before our readers a short statement of such facts and arguments as may enable them to estimate the justice of the war now threatened by the Ultra Royalists of France against Spain; the consistency of the principles of that faction with the general rules of the law of nations, or even with any exception from those rules which has been acted on without universal reprobation in civilised times; the influence of the success of such a war on the independence of states, and the circumstances which would render that success more formidable to the security of Great Britain than to that of any other European state.

By the abdications extorted at Bayonne in May, 1808, from Charles IV. and Ferdinand VII., the Spaniards who took up arms for the independence of their country, were left without legitimate authority, and indeed without acknowledged leaders. Local and general juntas very irregularly appointed, and often not very well composed, were neither able to give the appearance of legality, nor the advantage of union, to

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\* The Holy Alliance *versus* Spain; or Notes and Declarations of the Allied Powers. — Vol. xxxviii. p. 241.

the heroic efforts of the Spanish people. This defect was the subject of triumph to their enemies, and of deep regret to their friends. In the midst of their enemies, and at the season of their utmost distress, the Emperor of Russia refused to acknowledge their title to be parties to any negotiation, and would call them by no other name than "THE INSURGENTS OF SPAIN."\* But their disunion and want of chiefs were viewed with other eyes by Lord Wellesley; who, though he had wielded with a vigorous hand the force of an absolute monarchy, had too much wisdom not to discover that liberty alone was the source of union and obedience, as well as of energy and valour, to a people struggling for independence. By him, during his embassy to Spain, the calling together of the Cortes appears to have been first proposed †, for the purpose of redressing grievances and reforming abuses, as well as that of providing for the public defence. That assembly, convoked by the Regency, met, after several delays, in September, 1810, at Cadiz, then almost the only spot in the Spanish territory which was not occupied by foreign force. Its composition was very popular; as was natural, in a body whose chief function was to excite popular spirit, and in a country where the only examples of timidity or treachery were to be found among the higher orders. In the eye of every true Spaniard, the Cortes became the only lawful power of the monarchy. As such, their commands were obeyed, and their authority acknowledged. The Regency, whom they superseded, gave up their power without a murmur. The two successive regencies whom they nominated, were obeyed as the executive government of the monarchy by all but the partisans of France. The constitution was promulgated by their authority in March, 1812, and was received as the fundamental law wherever the French arms did not silence the public voice. That it contained some language capable of mischievous misconception, and that it did not provide sufficient means of conciliating those classes who derived a powerful influence from property and opinion; that it did not enough maintain the authority of the deliberate judgment of the people over their hasty and transient passions, may be admitted, without involving censure on the leaders of the Cortes, and certainly without affording any inference that these, or that any constitutional defects, should be remedied under the terror of foreign bayonets. If every error in legislation were to be punished by a perpetual forfeiture of a nation's title to liberty, no free government could be established among men. The most excusable of all errors, is a disposition in the founders of freedom to fly to the greatest distance from the institutions which had formerly been the instruments of oppressions. In the peculiar situation of Spain, the strongest declarations of the rights of the nation were politically necessary to invalidate the acts into which the imprisoned King might have been betrayed. The sovereignty of the people became the only safeguard of the independence of the monarchy.

But whatever may be thought of the wisdom of the constitution, it is impossible to conceive any authority more legitimate than that of those who framed it. They were not a revolutionary assembly. After conquest had destroyed all lawful power in Spain, the Cortes were called together to give their country a regular government. To restore internal

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\* Note of Count Romanzoff to Mr. Secretary Canning. Paris, 28th November, 1808.

† Despatch from Marquis Wellesley to Mr. Secretary Canning. Seville, 15th September, 1809.

order, and to secure national independence, were the objects of their convocation. By preserving a national government for the people, they also preserved a crown for the King. An authority thus originating, and thus sanctioned by the obedience of all true Spaniards, was recognised also by all those foreign states who were not subject to the domination of France. England indeed had very early recognised a government which had far less pretensions to be considered as national than the Cortes. So early as the 4th of July, 1808, an Order of Council was issued, directing all hostilities against Spain to cease, in consequence “of the *glorious efforts of the Spanish nation to the deliverance of their country from the usurpation of France, and of the assurances which H. M. had received from several provinces of Spain of their amicable dispositions towards this kingdom.*” In November and December of the following year, England claimed a place in any congress which should be assembled for the representation of those whom Alexander, in concert with Napoleon, called, “THE INSURGENTS OF SPAIN.” It is now well known that Alexander, in spite of all the tender and enthusiastic attachment for Napoleon, of which he made so extravagant and ridiculous a display at Erfurt, had bargained at that interview for a share in an intended partition of Turkey, as the price of his connivance at the conquest of Spain. On the 14th of January, 1809, the treaty of London was concluded between his Britannic Majesty and the Supreme Junta of Spain, containing the important stipulation, that Great Britain “never would acknowledge any King of Spain but Ferdinand II. and his heirs, *or such lawful successor as the Spanish nation should acknowledge.*”\*

These acts were much more than a recognition of the legitimacy of the Junta; they were continued towards the Regency, and, by necessary consequence, implied a recognition of the Cortes, which the Regency had convoked. The alliance was accordingly maintained and confirmed under that assembly; and an occasion arose in which England made an express declaration of its legitimate and supreme authority. In answer to a proposal for negotiation in April, 1812, by M. Maret, on the part of Napoleon, he was informed that England could not consent to any treaty, in which it was not acknowledged that “the royal authority in Spain was vested in the legitimate sovereign Ferdinand VII. and his heirs, *and in the extraordinary assembly of the Cortes, now invested with the powers of government in that kingdom.*” † Another still more solemn recognition of their government followed, which recent events have rendered very memorable. On the 20th of July, 1812, when Napoleon appeared to be making a triumphant entry into Russia, with all the nations and sovereigns of the Continent in his train,—before he had experienced disaster, and when there was no reasonable prospect of a reverse, a treaty was concluded at Weliki Louki between the Emperor of Russia and the Cortes of Spain, of which the third article deserves to be cited at length. “His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias *acknowledges the LEGITIMACY of the general and extraordinary assembly of the Cortes held at Cadiz, AS WELL AS THE CONSTITUTION WHICH THEY HAVE DECREED AND SANCTIONED.*” ‡ Whether this stipulation amounted to a guarantee, might be a question; but certainly no event in the annals of mankind, not even in the history of the partition of Poland, could have prepared us to expect, that, only ten years after, Russia should represent the existence of this very constitution as a reason for breaking off all

\* Ann. Register, 1809, p. 736.

† Schoell, x. 129.

‡ Id. x. 543.

intercourse with Spain, and almost as a ground of war against that country. The reasons by which this inconsistency has been attempted to be explained are more monstrous than the fact itself. In a supplementary despatch from Verona to M. Balgari at Madrid, Count Nesselrode attempts to vindicate his master from the charge of inconsistency, on three grounds. 1. It was *necessary* for Russia, in 1812, to form an alliance with the Cortes against France, the common enemy of both; which is certainly a most extraordinary reason for breaking the alliance; and to which it may be answered, that the recognition of a Constitution is no necessary or ordinary part of an alliance with a Government, and must therefore be regarded as a spontaneous act on the part of Russia, strongly binding her conduct, and irrevocably pledging her approbation of the Constitution recognised. 2. The Russian minister alleges, that the Constitution being only provisional, and dependent on the assent of Ferdinand, the guarantee was provisional also, and was annulled by his dissent. But the fact assumed in this argument is notoriously false. The Constitution of the Cortes was, and purported to be, independent of the King's assent, insomuch that his acceptance of it was made a condition of the exercise of his authority.\* The assumption is not only at variance with truth, but with the context of the despatch, in which the sovereignty of the people is declared to be one of the intolerable faults of the Constitution;—a principle which formed a part of it in 1812, which necessarily rendered it independent of the King's assent, and which, after being solemnly recognised as legitimate at Weliki Louki, is represented by the same Government at Verona as a ground for sentence of outlawry against Spain. As an aggravation of this reasoning, Count Nesselrode is not ashamed to lay down the abominable principle, that the positive and absolute words of the treaty of 1812 contained “an implied reservation which it was unnecessary to express!” 3. Sensible of the vanity of these pretexts, the Russian minister concludes his despatch, by avowing a doctrine of which the adoption would tear up by the roots all faith between nations. “Even supposing,” says he, “that the nullity did not exist, his Imperial Majesty cannot recognise any law *but that of the welfare of Spain; and this is the only one which he is resolved to follow!*” It is certain that this principle, if admissible, must extend to all treaties; and that it would render all treaties nugatory. The guarantee of a Constitution, at least against foreign attack, is universally acknowledged to be a legitimate object of treaty. But according to the new jurists of Russia, their Sovereign, after having made a treaty to that effect, may, as soon as he changes his opinion or his language,

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\* “The sovereignty resides essentially in the nation; and for the same reason, *the right of establishing the fundamental laws belongs EXCLUSIVELY to the NATION.*” —*Spanish Constitut.* title i. c. 1. art. 3.

“The king, on his accession, and if he be a minor when he comes to exercise his government, shall take an oath before the Cortes to observe, and cause to be observed, the constitution and laws of the Spanish monarchy.” —*Id.* tit. iv. c. 5. art. 172.

“The Cortes may exclude from the succession to the Crown such individuals as have done acts for which they deserve to lose the Crown.” —*Id.* art. 181.

“The Prince of Asturias must take the same oath at the age of fourteen.” —*Id.* art. 212.

These, and many other articles, which equally disprove the allegation of Count Nesselrode, are to be found in the constitution promulgated at Cadiz on the 19th March, 1812, four months before the treaty of Weliki Louki.

send an army for the destruction of the Constitution which he guaranteed, on the principle, or under the pretence, that he no longer thinks it conducive to the welfare of the nation which has established it!

On the circumstances which attended the subversion of the constitution in 1814, we forbear to remark, for reasons which the present situation of Spain will suggest to the mind of every reader. The necessity of the argument, however, requires it to be stated, that it was destroyed by military force, without even the pretext of legal or civil forms; and that the absolute monarchy, which conquest and national opinion had eradicated, was planted with open violence in its stead. It was a transaction which had every character of manifest usurpation; and it must be deemed to be so by all who do not hold, that usurpation can be committed only against a King; a doctrine which, however it may be professed by those who have the fear of Siberia before their eyes, must be reprobated, not only in all free states, but in all those civilised monarchies which observe fixed laws. In such countries, the best security of hereditary royalty is, to place it on the same footing with the other establishments and institutions which are created by the fundamental laws.

The Spanish army, who appeared to have caught the spirit of liberty in their struggle for independence, early repented their fatal and criminal participation in the destruction of the constitution, and the dispersion of the Cortes. Between 1814 and 1820, several partial revolts of the soldiery showed that the remedy was likely to arise in the same quarter with the disease. In the beginning of the year 1820, the constitution was *restored* by the army assembled at Cadiz to be embarked against America. Their example was followed by the people, as well as the soldiers, throughout Spain; and the constitution was soon after adopted by the King, with as much appearance of sincerity as usually attends the consent of an absolute monarch to limitations on his power. The friends of liberty might no doubt lament, that even the *restoration* of a constitution should have *originated* with the army, though they listened with the utmost indignation to the same objection when it came from the mouths of those who prompted, or vindicated, or abetted the employment of military force for the subversion of the same constitution. The advantage of a regular and legal system was so great and obvious, that all discussion of the faults of the constitution, and all attempts to reform them, would have been imprudent and unreasonable at the moment of the restoration. Even the United States of America, for several years after the peace, preserved that rude scheme of association which they had hastily formed at the beginning of the war, and at a proper season found no difficulty in strengthening their executive government, and fastening the bands of their union. Men of all opinions must agree with Lord Liverpool, that there never was an extensive political change attended with less violence or bloodshed than the Spanish revolution, during the last three years. Whoever recurs to the unsuspected testimony of Mr. Southey, will find, that the popular excesses committed by the Spaniards on occasion of the French usurpation in 1808, were at least tenfold more than those which have occurred since March, 1820.

The example of Spain was naturally followed by Portugal, where nearly the same system of misgovernment had formerly existed, and where a great part of the people had learned to love, if not yet to understand liberty, in that glorious war of independence which raised so high the character of the Portuguese army and nation. In the unfortunate attempt of Italy to recover her liberties, Naples and Piedmont took the

Spanish constitution as their bond of union, for want of any other fixed system or popular name. Assuredly their choice was not influenced by Spanish intrigues or correspondence with Spain; since, if we may believe their enemies, it was scarcely possible, at the moment of the revolution, to find a copy of the Spanish constitution at Naples. The French constitution could have no popularity; for the restoration, which might have freed France, had enslaved Italy. The name and constitution of England, once the object of enthusiastic admiration, were discredited by the faults of its administration. The Italians could not hope for liberty from a country which was a party to the Congress of Vienna,—which had betrayed the people of Genoa,—and which had sacrificed even Sicily herself, after her adoption of a form of government as near as she could make it to the English constitution. In the numerous prosecutions for treason which occurred in France, where we find perpetual allusion to Italy, and great importance ascribed to the Association of the *Carbonari*, not a vestige is discoverable of any connection with Spain.\* But there is a still more decisive proof that no Spanish intrigues were carried on in France. Louis XVIII., in his speech at the close of the Session in June 1822, declared that “malevolence alone has been able to find, in the measures which I have adopted against contagion, a pretext for misconstruing my intentions.”—“Intentions so pure,” he continued, “could not be misconstrued by any but *the malevolent, who seek, on all occasions, means to set fire again to the still smoking brands of DISCORD and WAR.*” Presuming, as we are bound to do, that this declaration is true, we must conclude, that in June no practices had been attempted by Spaniards against the quiet of France; and that no danger was then apprehended by the French monarch from the Spanish revolution; for, in either of these cases, there was no need of so indignant a disavowal of political motives for keeping up an army on the Spanish frontier.

On the whole, it may be safely affirmed that Spain gave as little disturbance, or cause of just alarm, to her neighbours, as any country engaged in political reformation ever did.

The powers of the north, however, who arrogate to themselves the guardianship of Europe, early treated the Spanish revolution as a criminal enterprise, which called for the exertion of their paramount jurisdiction. In May 1820, Count Nesselrode declared, in notes which were immediately made public, that “the Spanish nation now owes the example of an expiatory act to the people of the two hemispheres.” Be it observed, in passing, that this atonement was required for no greater crime than the *restoration* of a constitution which the Emperor of Russia had, by a solemn treaty, recognised as legitimate. When these sovereigns assembled at Troppau, they expressly included the Spanish revolution among the objects of their condemnation.† They declared their right to interfere in every case where a government had been changed by violence, or where new institutions were established not consistent with “*the MONARCHICAL PRINCIPLE,*” which *recognises no institution as legitimate that*

\* Plaidoyer de M. de Marchanzy, avocat général à la cour royale de Paris — 29 Août et 7 Septembre, 1822. That this attorney general was not withheld, by extreme scruples, from adverting to Spain, we may judge pretty certainly from some of his opinions. He lays it down positively, that the confession of a person accused, even though it should be retracted, is evidence against other men; and that the accused have no right to require the attendance of officers in high command at a distance, as witnesses to prove their defence.

† Circular from Troppau, 8th December, 1820.



*does not flow spontaneously from the monarch.* Naples they selected as the object of attack, because “no other can be so immediately and certainly opposed.” To leave no doubt of their opinion of the extent of their right, they disavowed any intention, at that time, “to invade the western territory of Europe.” After the conquest of Naples and the dissolution of the Congress of Laybach, a circular despatch of the Prussian government, dated on the 5th June, 1821, stated, with a distinctness unusual in such compositions, the perseverance of the allies in their claims of universal jurisdiction in all changes of government. “They will always mark rebellion, under whatever form or name it may appear, with the stamp of their disapproval. *Wherever it appears, and they can reach it, they will repress, condemn, and combat its work.*” It seemed still too early to proceed against Spain and Portugal. France was then governed by ministers of some prudence and moderation. England, in 1820, had resisted the attempt to suppress the Spanish revolution, and was at length so alarmed by the language held at Troppau and Laybach, as to publish the circular despatch of January, 1821, which, tardy, feeble, and ambiguous as it was, must be owned to be, in substance, a protest against the pretensions of the allied powers.

In the mean time, France fell into the hands of a fanatical faction, who, like the republican enthusiasts of 1793, aimed at the universal establishment of governments suitable to their own narrow opinions. An attempt of the King of Spain’s guards to re-establish the absolute monarchy, undoubtedly instigated by foreign intrigues, was defeated in July, 1822. A few bands of peasants were easily excited to revolt, prepared to listen to foreign missionaries, by some impolitic as well as unjust decrees of the Cortes on ecclesiastical property, and by those physical, as well as political circumstances, which have always rendered the authority of the law very loose and unequal in some provinces of the kingdom. The French administration availed themselves of these pretexts, of which they had in a great measure contrived the very slight foundation. They exulted in discovering, in a Spanish party in arms against the government, the same advantage which Catharine had obtained, in 1792, from those infamous Poles who formed the Confederacy of *Bar*. They changed their sanitary cordon into an army of observation; they suffered the chiefs of the Spanish insurgents to assemble, with forms of public authority, on the French territory; they countenanced loans for these insurgents; they not only received them as fugitives after defeat, which was a common office of humanity, but they allowed them to march back into Spain for the purpose of new hostility; and, in the midst of all this instigation, support, and countenance, they had the meanness and bad faith to complain of the Spanish troops for having pursued their enemies twice or thrice into valleys, which, in the intermingled territory and uncertainty of a doubtful frontier, are asserted by France to be part of her dominions.

Such was the state of things, when the Sovereigns, who call themselves, by way of eminence, “The Powers,” assembled at Verona, according to their declarations, in the preceding year, at Laybach.\* We say nothing of the intrigues and divisions which followed, both at Verona and at Paris. Our present business is only to discuss and avow the reasons alleged for and against the war. On the 25th December, 1822, M. de Villèle sent a very ambiguous note to the French ambassador at Madrid,

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\* Circular of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, 12th May, 1821.

which contained the important intimation, that “the CONTINENTAL POWERS had adopted the resolution of uniting with France (if there ever should be occasion), in maintaining her dignity and tranquillity!” or, in plain English, of supporting the French ministers against all opposition, either in France or Spain. On the 28th of January, the King of France announced, in his speech to the legislature, that he had ordered the recall of his minister from Madrid, and that he had directed an army to advance, but that hostilities should cease as soon as “Ferdinand VII. was free to give his people INSTITUTIONS WHICH THEY CANNOT HOLD BUT FROM HIM;” thus adopting, in its fullest extent, “the monarchical principle” of the confederates or conspirators of Laybach. On the 25th of February, the violent Chateaubriand read a speech, which may be considered as the manifesto of the French government, and with a short examination of which we shall conclude this statement.

It is somewhat remarkable, that the argument of M. de Chateaubriand should set out from “the right of one government to interfere in the internal affairs of another;”—as if that were a first principle of the law of nations, which would, in truth, be destructive of all its principles, and which has never before been represented by its most zealous advocates otherwise than as an exception from all other principles, admissible only in those extremely rare cases, of stern and dire necessity which suspend all the ordinary rules of human action. It is very plain, that this intervention is directly at variance with international law; that no community, which is not independent, can be called a nation; and that the very definition of independence excludes such intervention. The justice of the French aggression, therefore, must solely depend on the answer to the question, Whether it can be brought within the case of exception? Now, what is that case? Has it hitherto ever been carried farther, in any example that even divides the opinion of mankind, than this position, that if a state avows the intention of propagating its own institutions in neighbouring countries, and actually attempts so to propagate them by intrigue or by force, the powers who are insulted and assailed in this manner have a right to destroy the government which had attempted to destroy them? Perhaps this case is improperly termed an exception. A war made on such a ground is not so much an interference in the internal affairs of a foreign country, as a resistance to such an interference. The state which first attempts to excite revolt in its neighbourhood is the real offender against the principle of national independence. Now, the King of France’s speech in June, 1822, demonstrates that, before that period, Spain was guilty of no such offence. His speech in January, 1823, seems, by its silence on matters which, if they were real, would have been so important, to be an admission that Spain had then violated no duty of good neighbourhood towards France. The silence of M. de Chateaubriand on this important particular carries the admission down to the very eve of hostilities. The violation of French territory, and the capture of French ships by pirates under the Spanish flag, are not honestly urged; and it is not even alleged that reparation for these casual or frivolous wrongs has been demanded and refused. The reduced sale of French mules in Spain has much the appearance of being inserted by an opponent in M. de C.’s MSS. to bring ridicule on the speaker and speech. He is reduced, therefore, to the bare and naked allegation, that *the example of the Spanish revolution*, though unattended by any words or acts of the Spanish government or people of Spain hostile to the tranquillity of other countries, is dan-

gerous to the quiet of France, and therefore a just cause of war against Spain!

It cannot be too often repeated, that no overt act, no incendiary decree, no encouragement to revolt, no correspondence with the disaffected, is laid to the charge of Spain. She has no need of disavowing them. She is so innocent as not even to be accused by enemies who plot her destruction. Nothing, therefore, remains but the doctrine, that whenever a state thinks or says that her quiet is endangered by the mere example of the form of government of another nation, she may make war to destroy that government! Such a doctrine would leave no independence; for every weaker nation would in that case be bound to change its government at the pleasure of a stronger neighbour. As it would leave no independence, it could leave no international law, of which the sole object is the protection of independence. It would establish universal and eternal war; for such a right of intervention must belong to all nations or to none; and if to all, it is evident that there could be no peace till one had established its favourite government, and secured it over all countries. The worst governments would possess this right more clearly than the best; for it is surely to bad governments that the example of good is most dangerous. Morocco might make a war against England for setting the example of a pure administration of justice at Gibraltar, which would excite the Africans to revolt against their masters. As despotism prevails over a far greater number of men than liberty, and barbarism than civilisation, the practical effect of this doctrine, if universally adopted, would be to reduce all mankind to be at once barbarians and slaves.

It is difficult to conjecture what part of Lord Bacon's writings could have been so misunderstood, as to tempt M. de C. to an unfortunate appeal to the authority of that great lawyer, as well as philosopher. Nothing can be more decisive than the condemnation pronounced by Lord Bacon against such wars as the present. In his "Essay on the Greatness of Kingdoms" we find the following passage, which is the more remarkable, because the doctrine of the Essay is, that a nation which would be great must be well armed with pretexts for wars:—

"As for the wars which we anciently waged on behalf of a sort of parity or conformity of estate, I do not see how they can be justified; as when the Lacedæmonians or Athenians MADE WAR TO SET UP OR PULL DOWN DEMOCRACIES AND OLIGARCHIES."—*Bacon's Essay on the Greatness of Kingdoms.*

If such wars can be justified, we must no longer condemn religious wars. A pious monarch might well think that the orthodoxy of his own subjects, a still higher object of his care than their security or quiet, could be effectually secured only by the destruction of heresy in all surrounding countries. As long as this principle prevailed in Europe, irreconcilable and perpetual war was the inevitable consequence of it. Peace was unknown till nations learned to tolerate each other's religion. Wars of political opinion will produce the same fatal effect; and permanent peace will again be a stranger to Europe, till nations learn to tolerate each other's governments, however various and unlike. If mere danger from the form of a government be a justification of war, it is obvious that we must at once acknowledge the justice of all the Revolutionary and Imperial wars of France. The National Convention knew that the monarchies of Europe were, from the very necessity of their nature, adverse to the French Revolution. Napoleon knew that the Bourbons

of Spain were the irreconcilable, though secret, enemies of his family, and would embrace the first opportunity of subverting it. The reasoning, in short, of M. de Chateaubriand, would legitimate all those acts which the voice of Europe has most loudly condemned.

The most celebrated exception to the general principle of national independence is the war of the Coalesced Powers against France in 1793. It excited a division of opinion at the moment, which will probably long continue. Without now enquiring which of the English parties who differed from each other so widely on that occasion were right, it is of some importance to show, that on the principles of the party who approved and conducted the war, it affords no precedent for the aggression of France against Spain. It is now well known that, in the summer of 1792, Mr. Pitt, far from intending to take a part in war, founded his whole system of policy on the continuance of peace. Lord Gower was recalled from Paris after the tenth of August, as a measure "*conformable to the principles of neutrality.*" On the 19th of November, 1792, the National Convention decreed "Fraternity and Assistance TO ALL PEOPLE who wish to recover their liberty." That this decree was an encouragement to all subjects to revolt against all governments cannot be, and, in fact, never has been, denied. It was said, indeed, that all the continental monarchs had at that time in substance, if not in form, declared war against France. But, at all events, the decree should have been limited to those powers with whom France was at war; in which case, it would have been a legitimate exercise of the rights of war. But it was not so limited. On the contrary, a motion made in the Convention on the 24th December, to amend the decree by the addition after the word "*people,*" of the words "against all tyrants with whom France may be at war," was laid aside by a previous question. But even if it were admitted that the decree might have been justly applicable to all the continental kings, it is certain that Holland, at least, ought to have been expressly exempted from its operation. On the contrary, an act of hostility was done against Holland at the very moment of issuing the decree.

The treaty of Westphalia, which established the independence of the Dutch republic, had forbidden the passage of vessels from the Austrian Netherlands to the sea by the Scheldt, because that river runs through the heart of Holland, and a free navigation of it would have laid open the interior of that country to attack. On the 21st of November, 1792, after the conquest of the Austrian Netherlands, the National Convention sanctioned a decree of the Executive Council for opening the Scheldt. This was certainly an act of hostility against Holland, and involved the assumption of a right to annul treaties.\* It was not, however, treated as a cause of war by England. The correspondence between both countries continued with increasing symptoms of an unfriendly temper. M. Chauvelin was ordered to quit England after the death of Louis XVI. — a war was declared against England and Holland by France, on the 1st of February, 1793. The party in opposition to

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\* See *Brissot à ses Commettans*, London edition, p. 77., one of the most curious pamphlets of that time, in which the war with England is distinctly attributed to the decree of the 19th November; strengthened as that decree was by another decree of the 17th December, the second article of which began as follows: "The French nation will treat as enemies any people who, refusing or renouncing liberty and equality, are desirous of preserving their prince, or privileged castes, or of entering into any accommodation with them."

the English ministers did not contend that the complaints against France were groundless, or that the decrees of the Convention, if unexplained or unretracted, might not be a cause of war. But they maintained, that there was a possibility of their being settled by a negotiation, and that we, who, by dismissing M. Chauvelin, had shut up the channels of negotiation, became, by that act, the authors of the war. Mr. Fox did not vindicate the decree of the 19th of November, or the opening of the Scheldt. He merely contended, that, to shut the door on amicable discussion, rendered that war inevitable, which such discussion afforded, at least, a possibility of avoiding. *Still less* did he so far depart from the principles of his whole life, as to censure resistance to French conquest and French aggrandizement, and not strenuously to support the principle of the balance of power. The publications which purport to be the speeches of Mr. Fox, are perfectly well known by all who were accustomed to hear him, to be utterly void of that accuracy and precision of language, especially in the statement of principles, which were among his chief excellences. These publications are, therefore, altogether unfit to be quoted as records of his opinions and reasonings, at least on questions which cannot be satisfactorily, nor even intelligibly, handled without considerable exactness and discrimination in the choice of expression. Instead of quoting such reports, we shall select two short passages from an Address moved by Mr. (now Earl) Grey, on the 21st of February, 1793, both to justify the above observations, and to show that the opinions of Mr. Fox's friends, respecting the duty of England towards the nations of the Continent, have not varied during a long agitated period of thirty years. "We will not dissemble our opinion," says that Address, "that the decree of the 19th November was, in a great measure, liable to the objections urged against it. But we cannot think that it would have justified war, unless explanation and security had been demanded and refused.

"We admit that it is the interest and duty of every member of the commonwealth of Europe to support the established system and distribution of power among the independent sovereignties which actually subsist, and to prevent the aggrandizement of any state, especially the most powerful, at the expense of any other."

It is therefore indisputable, that the part taken by England in the war of 1793 affords no precedent for the attack on Spain. Whatever the final determination of mankind may be on the question at issue between the supporters and opponents of that war, the conclusion will be the same, as far as relates to the present case.

There is probably no example in political reasoning of so gross a confusion of ideas as that of M. de Chateaubriand, between interference considered as an object of war, and interference practised as a measure of hostility. If the minister of a great nation had not been deliberately and repeatedly guilty of this confusion, it might seem needless to make any express distinction between things so extremely and so apparently different. It is one thing to make war for the purpose of interference, and another to interfere in the course of war. Whenever a just war is begun from any cause, each belligerent has a right to employ against his opponent all the means of hostility not forbidden by the usages of civilised nations. Among other means, he may, undoubtedly, form connections with the disaffected subjects of the enemy, as much as with any other auxiliaries. He may afford them aid — he may assist them in resisting and subverting the adverse government. These are *belligerent*.

rights which exist in all wars, and as much in those which have no original connection with the internal affairs of the hostile state, as in others. In all wars, however originating, interference of the most extensive and violent sort in the internal affairs of an enemy's country is a part of the common course of hostility. The greater right comprehends the less. As an enemy's country may be over-run, and his power utterly overthrown, so, every smaller degree of interference may be lawfully practised towards him. The war of the Austrian succession had no relation to the internal government of Great Britain. But Louis XV., in the course of that war, sent assistance to Charles Edward, and the Scotch insurgents under his command. In doing so, he only exercised his legitimate right, against a government with whom he was previously at war. It never was hitherto supposed that he might have appealed to his acts on that occasion as a *precedent for making war* against England, in order to compel her to restore the Stuarts.

In truth, however, it seems utterly inconceivable that any human understanding should confound lawful means of hostility with just objects of war. Conquest, as well as interference, may be a legitimate means in war. But neither, unless in the most extreme cases, can be a justifiable end of war. Acts of hostility are of a nature so totally different from grounds of war, that it is one of the greatest of all absurdities to represent the one as affording any foundation for the other. The remarks of M. de Chateaubriand, and of his friends in this country, on the Declaration of October, 1793, must appear altogether futile to those who are capable of perceiving the distinction between interference in war, and war for interference. That Declaration describes the war as defensive, as undertaken to repel aggression, and to defend allies. It would, therefore, have been inconsistent with itself, if it had stated the internal state of France as being the ground of the war. The tyranny under which France then suffered is treated by the Declaration only as an obstacle to negotiation, as an aggravation of the evils of conquest, by armies which would spread the like tyranny over other countries, and as a reason why states, involved in just war with France *on other grounds*, should employ their success to compel her to establish a government which might afford some prospect of secure peace to her neighbours. All that part of the Declaration, in short, which has been appealed to on the present occasion, relates not to the cause of war, but to the principles which are to regulate the exercise of the rights of war. It was addressed to the French royalists, immediately after the occupation of Toulon, and was intended to excite their feelings as royalists, without alarming that sensibility to the honour and independence of France, which they were then supposed to entertain. Observations of a similar nature are applicable to all the acts of the English government having reference to the interior of France, which occurred before the peace of Amiens, or during the second French war. In themselves, they might be wise or unwise. They might be breaches of the duty which the government owed to the British people. But they were done in the exercise of undisputed rights. France could not complain of them as a breach of public law; and they have no relation to any question about the object and end of a war.

The short campaign which terminated in the battle of Waterloo may at first seem to be distinguishable from the preceding events. But, according to the theory of public law, and to the avowed principles of the Allies, the supposed distinction disappears. The abdication of Napoleon being one of the conditions of the treaty of Paris, which expressly

professes to grant more favourable terms to France on account of the deposition of her formidable ruler, the resumption of the crown of France by him was a breach of that treaty, in consequence of which the Allies re-entered into their belligerent rights, and were, in the eye of public law, again in a state of war with the French nation. The interference of the Allies in the internal affairs of France in 1815 was not therefore held forth as the object of war, but as an exercise of the rights of conquest.

Whether all, or any of these *interferences*, in the course of the last thirty years, were in other respects wise and justifiable, it is no part of our present purpose to examine. It is sufficient to have shown, that the threatened aggression of France against Spain is so far from justified by the general principles of the law of nations, that it is not even in the slightest degree warranted by the most recent, violent, and ambiguous cases of exception from these principles, which have been specious enough to cause any general and lasting difference of opinion among mankind. It is indeed wonderful, that, in the convulsions of the last thirty years, no such cases can be found. The principles of rapine, on which Spain is now attacked, were discovered by the spoilers of Poland. They were revived by their successors at Troppau and Laybach. They are now justified in France by a pious, moral, and sentimental minister, full of professions of zeal for free constitutions and of respect for the independence of nations.\*

But it has been said, that these principles have been recognised by the British government as applicable to the case of Naples, in the circular despatch of January, 1821. There is such merit in the negative part of that paper, which disclaims the principles of Troppau, that its faults are entitled to some indulgence. But it must be owned, that no state paper ever required more impartiality, caution, precision, and perspicuity; and that few are more wanting in these important qualities. The paragraph which relates to Naples is not dictated by the spirit of impartial neutrality; but the only reasonable sense in which it can be understood, is, that if the Neapolitan revolutionists sought to propagate their principles by force or by intrigue throughout the neighbouring territories, Austria, and the other Italian states, might repel such an aggression by arms. Two words, probably flowing from the wordiness of official language, throw some ambiguity over the most important part of the paper. It declares for “the right of states to interfere where their own immediate security *or essential interests* are seriously endangered by the internal transactions of another state.” Had the words printed in italics been omitted, this declaration would have been nearly unexceptionable. But the words “essential interests” are either needless, or of very dangerous latitude. If we ask, “essential” to what object? the only reasonable

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\* M. de Chateaubriand, in his last speech on the House of Peers, has attempted to limit “the monarchical principle.” He now allows two principles of all social order, “the sovereignty of the monarch in monarchies, and the sovereignty of the people in republics.” Now, if by “the sovereignty of the monarch” be meant, the sole, exclusive, and unlimited authority of the king, it is clear, that he excludes all limited monarchies from his enumeration, and indeed allows the existence of no government but despotism and democracy, and no means of amending civil institutions, but such as depend on the caprice of a single tyrant, or the passions of a tyrannical multitude. What is most pertinent to our purpose is, that, in spite of all his vain distinctions, he in truth displays the monarchical principle in all its horrors; for he still maintains, that no absolute monarchy can be reformed, otherwise than by the spontaneous act of the monarch.

answer is, to security; which renders the words altogether useless. If they mean more, they open a field for interference which has no bounds, and within which M. de Chateaubriand has found means to comprehend even the abatement of the sale of French mules in Spain.

It is said, that there is no difference between the case of Spain and that of Naples. To which we answer, that though there should be no difference in justice, there may be a great difference in the necessity of the interposition of England. "The avowal of a deliberate purpose of violating the law of nations is a cause of alarm to every state in Europe. All commonwealths have a concern in that law, and are its natural avengers." \* As the safety of all states depends on the observance of the laws of nations, all acts done in avowed and systematical defiance of its principles, give a right of war to all states against the wrongdoers. The spoilers of Poland placed themselves in a state of war with every European nation. The propriety of hostilities against them was a mere question of prudence which each government had a right to determine in the way most suitable to its own interest and safety. The invaders of Naples were guilty of the same offence even on the avowed principles of the English government; for the invasion of that country was begun and completed, not on the narrow ground of danger to a neighbouring state, which our Circular allowed, but on those monstrous doctrines of the right of universal interference, which we, in that very paper, had strongly and solemnly condemned. The principle on which the invasion of Naples was carried on, is of more importance than the act itself. The seizure of a single village on such a principle, *authorises* all Europe to treat the offenders as enemies. But it does not *compel* them to take up arms; for the question of prudence still remains to be determined. In the decision of that question, England had a right to consider the very different degrees in which the unjust conquest of Naples and that of Spain endangered her own immediate safety. Poland, though great, is remote; Naples is not near. Injustice towards both is dangerous, in its example and tendency, to us and to all states: but the possession of neither afforded powerful means of direct hostility against Great Britain. The same observations apply to an attack on the balance of power. The disturbance of that balance in any part of Europe, doubtless, in some degree, impairs the security of every European state. Its effect in this respect, however, is very unequal. It deeply affects neighbouring states; its influence is diminished by distance; and in very remote countries the danger may be almost evanescent. That England should go to war to prevent Russia from conquering *Oczakow*, was certainly an extravagant extension of the principle. But there are two countries, neither of which can be reduced to dependence on France, without immediate danger to the safety of Great Britain. These are the Netherlands, and the Spanish Peninsula. The former has indeed been more frequently the object of our solicitude, partly because it is more near, but chiefly because it has been more frequently endangered. But the greatness of the Peninsula compensates for its distance. Even its position, in the unhappy situation of Ireland, renders the possession of the Peninsula, by a powerful antagonist, more dangerous to us than the dependence of the Netherlands. The dependence of either of these countries on France would furnish our most formidable neighbour with such increased means of attack on the British islands, that all considerations of principle, of example, of general

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\* Protest, House of Lords, 7th December, 1779.



tendency, of regard to the law of nations, and to the independence of states, are almost lost in the urgent and immediate necessity of defence. Those who think that we can allow Spain to be over-run by a French army, must be of opinion, either that no measures of precaution and prevention are ever wise, or that we are now in too weak a condition to hazard such measures. The first of these opinions must be adopted in its utmost extent and extravagance, by those who rely on it in the present case; for if we are not to prevent the military occupation of Spain by France, it is evident that there never can be a case which will call for our interposition in continental affairs: and whether the first or the last be adopted, the result will equally be, that we cannot, or ought not, to take any measures to *prevent* any attack from the Continent; that we are to wait till our antagonists choose their own moment for aggression, against a people dispirited by long acquiescence in the unjust aggrandizement of other nations, without allies (for those who succour none can expect aid from none), and contending barely for existence, on the seas or shores of Great Britain.

It is unnecessary perhaps to add, that our relations, both commercial and political, with Portugal, give us, if possible, a stronger, and, at all events, a more direct and immediate interest in preventing the conquest of that country by France; and that it is plainly impossible to suppose, that her case, on the present occasion, can be divided from that of Spain. She has given the same provocation to the invaders, and must share the same fate. Even, therefore, if France should, in the first instance, resort to the hollow pretence of abstaining from all interference with Portugal, Portugal cannot abstain from concurring with Spain in opposing her invading forces. The attack is on the whole Peninsula, in point of principle and in point of fact; and Portugal must unite in the defence of Spain, if she wishes herself to be defended. In the present situation of her government, Portugal is not only threatened, but in substance and reality invaded, as soon as the French army passes the Bidassoa, and we are already called upon to interfere for the protection of our oldest and most constant ally.

These, it humbly appears to us, are grounds of decision that admit of no hesitation, whatever the pretexts might have been on which France proposed to take possession of those two great countries. But we can never shut our eyes to the fact, that this is not an insulated act of ambition or jealousy on the part of France alone, but an open and avowed attempt by that government to reduce to practice the principles laid down by her, in concert with the three great partitioning powers of the Continent;—an experiment conducted, indeed, in the first instance, by France, but with the express sanction and approbation of those other states, and in furtherance and execution of the system which they have jointly announced as the rule of their conduct. It is the first step, in short, of a crusade against liberty and national independence, and in support of despotism in its most revolting and offensive form; and is therefore an inchoate attack, of the most formidable and unequivocal nature, on those principles which this country has, above all others, the strongest and most direct interest to maintain. Considering the enormous power of those with whom they originated, and the use they have formerly made of their power, we have no hesitation in saying, that the declarations made at Laybach and Verona were, even before they were carried into active execution, more justifiable grounds of war to all free and independent states, than those decrees of the French Convention in 1793

which, we have already seen, were universally admitted to justify such hostilities, if not explained or retracted. The offer of assistance to all people who were dissatisfied with their governments was only an encouragement to rebellion, where discontent already existed, and did not infer the employment of foreign force, except where civil war had previously begun; but the doctrine that no institutions are to be tolerated which do not proceed from the free gift of the sovereign, and are at all events to be put down by invading armies, though universally pleasing to the people among whom they prevail, is a far more flagrant interference with national peace and independence; and is, beyond all question, a manifest impeachment not only of the revolution of 1688, but of the fundamental principles and daily practice of the British constitution; and if England sit quietly by, and see a friendly kingdom invaded, because its constitution and practice are also impeached by this doctrine, it is obvious that she acquiesces in a proceeding which affords a direct precedent for the invasion of her soil, and the forcible subversion of her constitution also; and must thus strengthen the hands and confirm the courage of that association, which, in order to be consistent, must turn upon her as soon as they have strength and courage for the enterprise. With the great power and influence which England possesses, it is obvious that *her* freedom and her free institutions must be infinitely more offensive and alarming to the confederated monarchs, than those of Spain or any other country. The debates in her Parliaments—the discussions in her journals—the language held by her proud travellers in every corner of the world, are a nuisance and abomination a thousand times more vexatious and prejudicial to their interests, than any thing that has appeared in the proceedings of the Cortes, or any thing that has yet been written or spoken in the Castalian tongue. It is impossible to doubt, therefore, that they must be still more desirous to put down our anti-monarchical institutions than theirs; and, with the immense military power they possess, we see no reason to doubt, that, if the result of the present experiment is encouraging, they will not hesitate to make the attempt, as soon as they think they can do so with any prospect of success.

The question then is, Whether it is not better for us to make head against a policy so manifestly and outrageously hostile to our best interests, while it is yet awkward and unconfirmed, and while we have still allies with whom we can make common cause in our resistance, than to wait patiently till it has gained confidence by success, and skill and consistency by practice, and till we have lost the affections of others, and our own respect, by looking on as cold or panic-stricken spectators of an outrage, the first victims of which can never by possibility be allowed to be the last?

After what has already taken place, we need never expect to be admitted to the friendship of those who combined at Laybach and Verona. Our protestations and our late parliamentary proceedings have completely destroyed, and we thank God for it, any hopes of that kind that may have been conceived on former occasions; and they now hate us as cordially for our rejection of their doctrines, as they must despise us for our indecision when they are about to be reduced to practice. If they should now succeed in subduing Spain and Portugal, they will only turn upon us with greater force and spirit and undiminished rancour. They will easily find against us a better pretext for hostility than they have yet found against either of these countries; and if we should even stoop to urge the pitiful plea of our neutrality during these aggressions, they will

tell us that we were neutral only because we did not *dare* to be hostile ; that they succeeded in spite of our ill wishes and underhand ill offices ; and that they owe us no obligation for not interfering in defence of one system of unholy resistance to legitimate authority, while we maintain and cherish among ourselves another of far worse and more pernicious example. If we should now interfere, therefore, in behalf of our common freedom, its enemies will not hate us more,—and they will despise us less ; while our chance of successful resistance will, for this very reason, among others, be greatly increased.

But war, it is said, is an evil—and we are not now in a condition to encounter its hazards and expenses. War is an evil undoubtedly. It leads to taxation, to jobbing, to the increase of the influence of the Crown, to waste of the national capital, to the depreciation of all the arts and virtues of peaceful life—and to such a derangement of all useful industry that its very *cessation* gives rise to sufferings inferior only to those occasioned by its continuance. Yet there are causes which make war not only necessary but just—and turn this work of desolation and slaughter into the first and noblest of our duties. The present appears to us to be of that description. Principles are avowed that threaten the extirpation of all liberal institutions from the consecrated soil of Europe—and an aggression is actually begun in furtherance of this scheme of outrage. Is this an occasion on which the great mistress and exemplar of freedom can possibly stand neutral, and allow the battles of liberty to be fought, against such fearful odds, by the weakest and least skilful of her votaries ?—and are there any ordinary sacrifices to which an Englishman would not submit, to see his country once more resume the lofty character of the assertor of national independence—to see her fairly arrayed in her strength against the principles and practices of the Holy Alliance ? It is difficult, indeed, to set bounds to the duration or expenses of war once begun ; but according to all human probability, the great end of our interference may be accomplished with far less waste of our resources than has often been hazarded for far inferior objects. A maritime armament—with the supply of stores and some small advance of money, would be invaluable to Spain in the outset of this momentous contest. The name of England alone would be a tower of strength to their cause ; and would tend more both to unite the Spaniards, to repress their possible excesses, and to confound and appal their assailants, than any imaginable increase of their numbers, or improvement of their discipline. It would be a pledge to the moderate that they were proceeding upon no wild or extravagant speculations of impracticable improvement, and would at once put down the malignant insinuations of the invaders as to the dangers and guilt of their new scheme of government. It would rally all within the country round the standard which was supported by so noble an ally—and would compel all without to respect a cause which was maintained not merely by the young enthusiasm of those who were new to the service of liberty, but was owned by the most ancient and august—the most experienced and commanding of her disciples.

The true question however is, whether our neutrality *can* be preserved for any length of time ; and whether, if we do not now *prevent* the maturing of plans, and the approach of dangers which have already unequivocally disclosed themselves, we shall not shortly be called upon to fight in our own defence, with far worse hopes, and under infinitely greater disadvantages ? Whatever may be the state of our finances, we suppose we *must* fight when the Holy Alliance expressly denounces the

English Constitution as a nuisance which it is called upon to abate—or even when France and Russia shall agree to take permanent possession, the one of Spain and the Netherlands—the other of Turkey and Norway. We suppose it will also be admitted, that when that time comes, we shall fight with greater disadvantage, for our own freedom and the wreck of European independence, than we may do now, when both are comparatively entire; and we shall not repeat the obvious considerations which lead us to think, that we are no longer at liberty to look upon these dangers as either chimerical or remote. But without recurring to these, we would put it to any one who has attended to the history of Europe for the last hundred and fifty years, whether it is to be imagined that its great powers can be at war for any length of time, especially for objects that directly touch on the balance of power and the rights of independence, without England being compelled, sooner or later, to take part in the affray? Neutrals, even when they do not mediate for, and substantially side with, one of the parties, are always exposed to such rude treatment from belligerents—such pushing and jostling while within “the wind and whiff of their fell swords,” that they are almost always driven to engage in the struggle—and, with its proud temper and ancient habits, and its vast and vulnerable commerce, England is not peculiarly qualified to resist those temptations, or bear meekly with those insults by which its pacific purposes must be tried.

We have neither space nor time left for further observations. In such a crisis of European liberty, and indeed of human fortune, we could not think of letting another number of our work appear, without saying one word on the topic that fills all bosoms and engages all tongues—and yet, what have we to say that has not been said and felt already in every corner of the land?—what, that shall not appear but a feeble echo and a formal response, to that deep voice of English justice and generosity, which has spoken aloud in the high places of our government, and resounded in the humblest of our abodes? Never certainly, in our remembrance, has any public cause been met by a feeling so profound and unanimous;—and if we are indeed to abandon the high and holy office, which we held of old, of championing the independence of Europe and the cause of national freedom, it will not be the fault of our people, but of their rulers—or rather of their necessities. Our poverty, it seems, and not our will, is to consent to the humiliating desertion of such a right and a duty. If it indeed be so, we shall have more cause than ever to curse that profligate waste of our resources,—that lavish and guilty throwing away of our means, which has reduced us to such pitiable weakness. But we firmly believe it to be otherwise; and with a rigid economy, and a wise administration, we have no doubt at all that we may not only do with effect, all that our own interest, and that of mankind, so loudly call on us to do, but retire from our ended and honourable task with increased vigour, and renovated honour, and improved means of prosperity.

PRESENT POLICY AND FUTURE FATE OF ARBITRARY  
GOVERNMENTS. \*

IT is curious, for middle-aged persons like us, to look back on the public history of the last thirty or thirty-five years — on the hopes and disappointments, the fears and deliverances, the revolutions and restorations, which have filled that eventful period — and on the strange concatenation and dependency of events by which these results have, in so many instances, been effected — the fatal triumphs, the glorious disgraces, the disasters that have proved the means of unexampled prosperity! We suppose it is the close of another year which has led us into this vein of meditation; and, though it is to the present condition and immediate prospects of the world, rather than to its recent history, that we now wish to call the attention of our readers, we cannot well enter on the subject without indulging ourselves in a brief retrospect of the causes which have brought us into this condition, and set these prospects before us.

The drama opened, it must be confessed, with a brilliant and startling flourish — the new series of the world's annals was ushered in with a most captivating prospectus — all old prejudices to be dispelled, and all old tyrannies overthrown — the whole race of man to be emancipated and regenerated — all formal distinctions and fantastic privileges to be abolished, and every one made free to enter on the open career of honour, on the strength of his virtues and talents alone! The work began, too, with intrepidity and vigour enough, and there was as little want of energy in the execution as there had been of boldness in the design. But the scene was soon overcast. Rash and extravagant experiments were made in all the branches of legislation — a passionate and presumptuous spirit of innovation took place of the sober spirit of reform — old principles were brought into question, as well as old prejudices, and the best established maxims of morality and religion were treated with the same irreverence as the mere arbitrary institutions of less instructed men. Where all standards of opinion were thus destroyed, and all authority exploded, there could, of course, be no umpire in the disputes which ensued, but force. Men's doubts, accordingly, were first solved by their passions or their interest, and then their dogmas were imposed on others by violence and terror. The most atrocious crimes were committed with the most revolting effrontery, and the effects of mutual distrust and apprehension were to render all alike cruel and perfidious. They proscribed that they might be safe from proscription, and set the example of treachery as their only chance of not being betrayed. Obscure men were thus raised, one after another, and at least as much by their fears as their ambition, to precarious and lawless power, from which they were successively swept down, unlamented, by the turning of the bloody tide; till at last a more vigorous system of military rule overawed the sanguinary factions, and imposed silence on their crude and turbulent speculations.

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\* 1. Remarks on the Declarations of the Allied Powers from Verona. By an Englishman. 8vo.

2. Britannia's Letters to a British Prince, on the Holy Alliance. 8vo.

3. The Domestic Policy of the British Empire, viewed in Connexion with its Foreign Interests. 8vo — Vol. xxxix. page 281. January, 1824.

Still there remained the force and the talent that had been sublimed from the heated multitude in the course of the great experiment; and the scene, though it had lost much of its attraction, had certainly lost nothing of its terror. The revolutionary armies over-ran the world, and her diplomatic agents over-reached it. The old tyrannies, nearly as hateful, and far less strong, crumbled before their blows, or melted in their lightnings. Some truckled, and were insulted — others bullied, and were trampled out of existence, — and the greater part ended with courting the alliance, and receiving the contemptuous mercy of that more potent and enlightened tyranny, which either swallowed up all the rest, or spared them at its pleasure. The whole Continent of Europe then presented a spectacle at once humiliating and frightful — unbounded insolence on the one hand, and unmeasured servility on the other; — while all the talents and energies which had been conjured up by the revolutionary crisis, and fostered by its incredible successes, were turned entirely to the purposes of a cold-hearted and remorseless ambition. An immense power, intellectual and physical, had been generated in the course of these contentions; in the first place undoubtedly by the sudden liberation and expansion of plebeian talent and ambition in the revolutionary countries, and afterwards by the audacity which was inspired by the spirit of the times, leading men every where to cast off the trammels of old opinions, and to venture on new and bolder methods, with an assurance that nothing was impossible to the daring. But this mighty power was from the beginning more terrible than majestic; and, it is miserable to think, was never once employed in any noble or generous cause. Its aspect from first to last was rapacious, insolent, vindictive; and, with the means of regenerating the world, contemplated no higher end than that of subduing it. Nothing was safe from its violence, nothing sacred from its injustice. The wrongs it did were aggravated by insult, and the complaints they provoked answered by mockery and derision; national independence was trampled on, and national honour profaned.

At last “ vaulting ambition overleaped itself,” and the scorner of mankind found, that intimidation had not extinguished the thirst for revenge. The giant who brooded over the centre of Europe could not grasp both the south and the north with the utmost stretch of his hands. The obstinate valour of England, with Spain, yet unspoiled of her spirit by legitimacy, baffled him in the one — the elements, with the stars in their courses, fought against him in the other. The love of national independence, the sense of national honour, revived in the intermediate regions. The downcast sovereigns took advantage of the season — and, recollecting how their subjects had been beguiled by the fair promises of the first revolutionists, and how bitterly they had resented the breach of them, addressed themselves at once to their pride and their hopes, — protested against *the despotism* of the prevailing system, and held out its continuance as the only bar to the universal adoption of liberal institutions. The appeal was not made in vain. There was no longer disaffection in their armies, or deficiencies in their contingents. One spirit of zeal animated all parties. For the first time there was an honest concert among the sovereigns themselves, who had at last discovered, that it was their first interest to put down the common foe, and that by nothing but a sincere union could this be effected. They banded, therefore, against him from the East and from the West; and at length succeeded in bear-

ing to the earth that enormous fabric of military power by which they had so long been oppressed.

Then, for a brief season, there was exultation, and good humour, and symptoms of cordiality between subjects and rulers,—charters were granted, and constitutions promised; and professions zealously made of a design to separate the gold that had been brought to light, and tried in the fires of the revolution, from the dross with which it had been de-based. But this was a transient and deceitful gleam; and a deeper darkness soon settled on the world. The restored governments, forgetting how much of what they deplored had been owing to their own vices and misconduct, manifested a vindictive jealousy of all that had been done against them; and seemed inclined to provoke a repetition of the insurrections by which they had suffered, by returning to the very follies and abuses by which they had been mainly produced. The dread, however, of the past, the ultimate bad success of the former experiment, and their own continued concert, enabled them to do this with safety; and they used the power which they had thus regained neither with moderation nor mercy. Their charters were revoked—their promises broken—their amnesties violated—the most offensive pretensions were openly put forward—the most revolting prejudices countenanced—the smaller states were relentlessly sacrificed—and the greater ones, made more formidable by their union, assumed a tone of dictation unknown in the history of the world—and used it to proclaim the most slavish doctrines, and to announce their purpose to maintain them at the point of the sword.

Upon this system they have since acted—and so far as they have gone, they have been successful. Arbitrary government is now maintained all over the continent of Europe, more openly in theory, and more rigorously in practice, than it was before the French Revolution was heard of;—and political freedom is more jealously proscribed, and liberal opinions more vindictively repressed, than in any period of modern history. “The wheel has come full circle:”—and after the speculations and experience of thirty-five years, we seem at least as far from political improvement as we were at the beginning!

And is this indeed so? Has the troubled and bloody scene passed before us but as a pageant, to excite our wonder and be forgotten? Has this great and agitating drama no moral? Have the errors, and crimes, and sufferings of thirty years taught no lessons?—have the costly experiments in which they have been consumed ascertained no truths? Have the statesmen and philosophers who directed the stormy scene, or the heroes who gave it movement and glory, lived and died in vain? Is political truth a chimera, and political science a dream? Are the civilised nations of Europe in reality unteachable?—or has the progress by which they have advanced beyond the condition of barbarians already attained its limits—and is what remains of their destiny to be fulfilled in painful attempts at improvements that are never to be attained, and impotent struggles with abuses that must for ever recur?

We will not believe it. The affairs of mankind do not revolve in a circle, but advance in a spiral; and though they have their periods of obscuration, as well as of brightness, tend steadily, in spite of these alternations, and by means of them, to a sure consummation of glory. There is, we are firmly persuaded, a never-ceasing progress to amelioration; and though each considerable movement is followed by a sensible re-action, the system moves irresistibly onward; and no advance that is made is

ever utterly lost. The years on which we have been looking back have left indelible traces behind them, and both truths and errors have been demonstrated, by experiments a great deal too impressive to be speedily forgotten. The losers and the winners have both been taught by events of the utmost moment and authority. The governments that have been restored to their old forms have *not* been restored by any means to their old condition; and though the dispositions of the rulers may be the same, the circumstances in which they are placed are essentially different. They feel this, too, in spite of themselves; and begin already to accommodate themselves to the new necessity. A great lesson, in short, has been taught to all nations. They who receive it most willingly will profit the most by it; but its first lines, at least, are impressed on the most reluctant, and must produce a corresponding change on the conduct of all. It is to the nature of this change, and of the other changes to which it must ultimately lead, that we wish now to direct the attention of our readers.

It would be shutting our eyes to the objects that press most importunately upon them, not to admit, that the first and immediate effect of the change to which we have alluded is unfavourable to political freedom. It is a fact no less certain than lamentable, that the governments of continental Europe are at this moment more truly arbitrary in principle and practice than they ever were before; and that it is most likely that they will continue for some time to be administered on these principles. That part of the world is now in its *aphelion* from the Star of Liberty, and has not yet, perhaps, reached the point of greatest obscurity: but we still believe, not only that it will in due time emerge into greater brightness than ever, but that its orbit is even now converging rapidly to the centre from which its illumination proceeds. To explain this, it is necessary to consider, very briefly, what the circumstances are which have thus recently strengthened the hands of absolute monarchy.

The first, undoubtedly, is the intimate union they have formed among themselves for the purpose of supporting these principles, the discovery they have made, that it is better for them to fight together against the liberties of their people, than to fight with each other for the mere enlargement of their dominions. The detestable conspiracy into which they have entered, under the blasphemous name of the Holy Alliance, is the great cause and support of the tyrannical maxims upon which each now thinks he may safely proceed to administer his government; and so long as they look upon increase of personal power, and security in practical tyranny, as of more value than mere increase of territory, or of foreign influence, so long, it is not impossible, that this impious confederacy may continue.

Another great source of the strength and present safety of these governments is, the general diffusion of improvements in the art of war, and the maintenance and equipment of armies; by means of which a much smaller force is capable of keeping in awe a larger population, and at the same time a limited revenue enabled to maintain more numerous forces.

These, we think, are the immediate and occasional causes of the confidence and apparent security with which arbitrary power has been recently proclaimed as the only legitimate spring of European government. But there is another and a more ominous cause, which is only beginning to operate, and threatens to exercise a more durable influence in



support of the same system, though still more likely in the end to counterwork the purposes for which it has been called into action, — and this is, the improved knowledge and policy of the absolute governments themselves, and their gradual correction of all abuses which do not tend to maintain their despotism, — a topic which both deserves and requires a little more development.

Tyrannical governments have hitherto been singularly ignorant and prejudiced; and more than one half of the abuses which make them odious in the eyes of their subjects have had no immediate connection with political rights or institutions, and might have been safely redressed, without at all improving the constitution, or increasing the political consequence of the people. Their great danger has always been in the superior intelligence of the people, with whom the policy of their rulers has usually been a subject of contempt, as well as of resentment, and who, in their plans of reform or resistance, have uniformly had a most mortifying advantage, in point of contrivance, combination, address, and prudence. A new era, however, we think, is now begun as to all these particulars; — and though it is impossible that either the oppressors or the oppressed can ever prove a match for freemen in the virtues and talents which are the offspring of liberty alone, it is nevertheless true, that the eyes of the rulers have at last been opened on their own nakedness and weakness, and that great efforts are making, and will be made, to secure to the cause of tyranny some part of those advantages, which the spread of intelligence and general multiplication of talents have lately conferred on all other institutions. The effects of this will soon become apparent in every department of their proceedings. They will employ better casuists and more ingenious sophists to defend their proceedings — they will have spies of more activity and intelligence, and agents of corruption more crafty and acute, than they have hitherto thought it necessary to retain in their service. But principally, and above all, they will endeavour to rectify those gross errors in their interior administration, which are a source at once of weakness and discontent; and by the correction of which, they will infallibly extend and multiply their resources, while they cut off one fruitful spring of disaffection. They will not only seek therefore to improve the economical part of their government, and to amend the laws and usages by which the wealth and industry of the people are affected, but they will seek to conciliate their good will, by mitigating all those grievances from which they themselves derive no advantage, and which may be redressed without at all advancing the people in their pretensions to the character of freemen. They will construct roads and canals therefore — and encourage agriculture and manufactures, and reform the laws of trade — and abolish local and subordinate oppressions — and endow seminaries of education, and inculcate a reverence for religion, and patronise academies of art; — and all this good they will do, at the instigation of that more enlightened but more determined hostility to popular rights, by which they are now professedly actuated, and with a view merely to these two plain consequences. In the *first* place, that, by increasing the wealth and population of their subjects, they may be enabled to draw from them larger taxes and supplies, and to recruit greater armies to uphold their tyrannical pretensions; — and in the *second* place, that by keeping the body of the people in other respects in a comfortable condition, they may have a better chance of reconciling them to the privation of political rights, and not have the discontent which arises from distress to combat

at the same time with that which arises from injustice. The roads and canals too are of excellent use for the easy and rapid transportation of armies and their appointments — and religion and education, in the paternal hands of such governments, are known to be the best of all engines for the dissemination of universal servility.

On the strength then of these improvements, and taking advantage at last of that civilisation and intelligence which had formerly been their surest corrective, the arbitrary governments of the present day proposed to become more arbitrary, and more adverse to popular institutions than ever — and to wage a fiercer and more acrimonious war on the principles of liberty, with weapons which liberty could alone have furnished, and which have scarcely ever yet been employed but in her cause. The great strength and hope of freedom was formerly the progressive information and improvement of the body of the people, — obtained chiefly by the influence of the measure of freedom they had gained, and acting alternately as the cause and the effect of its increase: but the new policy of despotism has taught it to avail itself of these very circumstances, for the advancement of its own sinister interests — to enlist those arts which are the children of liberty, in unnatural hostility against her — and to pervert what has hitherto been regarded as her best aliment and protection, into the main instrument of her destruction. Economical improvements, therefore, with political intolerance — more protection to private rights, with more restrictions on public ones — melioration in municipal laws, and corruption in the constitution — less discontent among the lower people, and more tyranny in the government — more luxury in short, and less freedom — are what we must expect to see more and more conspicuously for some years to come, as the first fruits of that more refined and insidious system on which the circumstances of the times have visibly driven the governments of which we have been speaking.

No man can look, indeed, to their recent proceedings, without seeing that such is their plan of policy. France, heading a crusade against national independence, and announcing a creed of unqualified despotism, is full of schools, and engineers and financiers — and gives up the proudest of her palaces to dignify the display of her most homely manufactures. In Germany, new towns and villages and cotton-spinning establishments rise every where by the side of new barracks and prisons; and other trades are encouraged, to give more effectual encouragement to the great engrossing trade of war. In Russia, Alexander is establishing schools for his peasantry, and mitigating the severity of their feudal servitude, while he is digesting better plans for the regular recruiting of his enormous armies; and making factories for his merchants, while he is proscribing the works and the persons of all who, by word or deed, would encourage, however indirectly, the slightest encroachment on the hallowed purity of his despotism. Even Austria, the most vindictive and low-minded of the confederates — Austria, who has her Italian dungeons full of men of virtue and talent, for suspicions of liberal opinions — who proscribes all political discussion, in speech or by writing, by the most brutal severities\* — who pursues the victims of her unmanly tyranny into their

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\* The punishment of political libel, or verbal sedition, in Austrian Italy, is, for the first offence, the *carcere duro* for an indefinite period, — which signifies solitary confinement in a dungeon, without light, except for half an hour in the day, when the bread and water are supplied, with the indulgence of irons of moderate weight, and straw to sleep on. For the second offence, the *carcere durissimo*, in which light and food are supplied but once in two days, and the patient is loaded with

foreign asylums \* — who recalls her travelling nobility by threats of confiscation, and rewards them, on their return, by arbitrary arrests: — even this Austria is making efforts to conciliate and multiply the lower classes from whom her armies are recruited, by regulations for the improvement of agriculture and manufactures, and large and judicious expenditure, even in Italy, upon works of public utility, roads, canals, and all the enginery of irrigation. The policy, in short, is manifest, and is beginning to take effect. There is now less risk of insurrection in those countries than there has been for the last thirty years; and their governments are likely enough, if they can only act up to the principles on which they have begun, to go on for some time in a tolerably safe course of defiance to all claims of right, and all sorts of popular interference.

But in what way is the experiment to end — and what is the compensation that is ultimately to be made for the present security and imposing attitude of arbitrary power?

We would answer, in the *first* place, that the improvements which are actually making, though for sinister ends, are a great good in themselves, and add manifestly to the mass of human comfort and happiness. We must not quarrel with actions that have such results, by enquiring too anxiously into their motives. Knaves, who are honest only because they think it the best policy, are better, at all events, than knaves who have not yet learned that lesson; and selfish men, who are beneficent from vanity, are very nearly as useful in society as those who are so from kindness. But the true answer is, that the men who are now treated with justice in some things, must by and by be so treated in all things; and that, whether those who so treat them shall be trained along with them or not, to such an extension of their principles, the result is equally inevitable, and the present preparatory discipline can ultimately forward no other end.

The present absolute governments must either persist in their new policy of partial and subordinate reformations, or abandon it, and recur to the old ruinous abuses. The most bigoted and ignorant will probably try the latter experiment, in some moment of passion or supposed necessity — and this will be the first practical exposition of the true and genuine effects of the experiment which they had begun. Nor can any one doubt for an instant what these effects will be. Men accustomed to the

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irons as heavy as can be used without immediate danger to life, and fastened in such a position as to be totally precluded from lying down, and only allowed to seek repose by sitting or leaning on a pillar of stone. These punishments, we have been assured, have been rigorously inflicted for the last two years — their strict execution ascertained by ocular inspection of persons of the very highest rank — and magistrates censured and degraded for yielding to the smallest relaxation.

\* A great number of meritorious and accomplished individuals have been lately obliged to fly from Geneva upon the imperative requisition of Austria, who did not hesitate, it is said, distinctly to intimate to that insulted republic, that if the proscribed persons were not ordered out of her territory, a military force should march into it, and make them prisoners in the heart of her city. Not contented, too, with interdicting all works that treated of political matters within her own dominions, this usurping power has also insisted on the literary and discursive republic of Geneva adopting the same regulation; and, by open and undisguised menace of lawless force, has actually compelled that small and unfortunate state to pass a temporary law, prohibiting all publications, and all public discourse, in which the merits or demerits of any of the actual governments of Europe are in any way brought into question!

enjoyment of certain rights and comforts, will be far more discontented and clamorous when they are withdrawn, than if they had never been allowed to possess them. If the system is to be discontinued, therefore, so much the worse for the rulers. Its effect will be to make their subjects far more inclined to rebellion than if it had never been tried; and its apparently lulling operation will turn in the end to a most formidable cause of excitement. But the true way of testing its character is to suppose, as indeed is most likely, that it will, to a certain extent, and with occasional deviations, be persevered in long enough to be incorporated in the habits both of the people and their governors; and let us then consider what must be its ultimate operation on both.

And *first* as to the people — it is quite true, that men at their ease will be less apt to rise in wild insurrections, than men in distress; and that habits of industry and tolerable employment are the great cures for a certain kind of disaffection. But it is not less true, that men to whom their rights have been conceded in one department, are the most formidable petitioners for their concession in others — that it is more difficult to do justice by halves, than to withhold it altogether — and that, where right and reason are with the people, any partial sacrifices made to them are so far from allaying their appetite, that they serve only to excite and inflame it. They form but the leaven which sets the whole mass in more active fermentation — conquests that add to their means of farther conquest — interests that are accumulated to their capital — votes gained or neutralised that are of value chiefly for contests that are yet to come.

But the matter does not stand upon metaphors — but upon plain fact and experience. Men first desire subsistence — property — and some sort of security for both. Till they have attained these for themselves, they have no leisure to think of the rights of others, or of their own rights, to think, to speak, or to act in matters of less immediate concernment. Till then, they can scarcely be said to have attained the qualifications of political agents; — and though they may be easily stirred to tumultuary movements, have generally neither interest nor intelligence to conceive or to assert their rights as members of a community. With property, however, and the means of acquiring it, comes the feeling of these rights, and the capacity and habit of reasoning which leads irresistibly, and by a very short process, to their full developement. When a man has once come to a full sense of his right to retain his property against any *private* claimant, till a sufficient reason is shown for parting with it, he comes almost instinctively to feel the same right to question the title of the government to interfere with his possessions; and when called on for contributions for what he is told is the *public benefit*, is apt to require evidence of the public having any interest in the exaction; and to conclude, that the public alone can legally determine what is for public utility. These feelings are still more strongly raised, if, in addition to pecuniary contributions, personal services and sufferings are required of him in behalf of the government; — and more strongly yet, if distinctions are made among those who are liable to such exactions — if one class of persons is exempted in whole or in part — and if those same persons have the exclusive enjoyment of certain honours and emoluments which government is in the habit of bestowing.

It requires no study or systematic instruction to bring men to those feelings and opinions. They arise naturally and universally among all persons who have property and intelligence enough to extend their

thoughts beyond the care of their daily subsistence—and plainly lead at once to the assertion of *political rights* in their broadest and most comprehensive sense—a right, on the part of the public, to control, in some shape or other, the exaction and application of the funds which the public supplies—and, on the part of individuals, to share *equally* in the protection and benefits which the government has the power of dispensing. It is the refusal or privation of those rights which properly constitutes an arbitrary government;—and therefore, when such governments take measures for promoting the wealth and instruction of their people, they are plainly laying the foundation of claims by which their own absolute power must be subverted. When they have attained to this condition, they will be less liable indeed to break out into riot and violent insurrection—but they will be more sure to insist on rights to which they feel their claim to be irresistible. They will show more judgment both in the ends at which they aim, and the means they take to compass them;—and, above all, will be more resolute in their prosecution of them, precisely as they are more temperate in their views, and more assured of ultimate success. So certain indeed is the connection between wealth and intelligence in the body of the people, and freedom in the constitution of the government, that the one may safely be taken at any time as a practical measure or exponent of the other—and that the surest as well as the safest way of inspiring any people with a love of liberty, is to direct our first attention to the general cultivation of their understandings, and the establishment of those habits of industry which lead to wealth and independence. If these can ever be introduced, the love of liberty will spontaneously arise—and with it the power, and the consciousness of power, to give effect to its dictates.

The history of the world shows, that whenever men attain any such degree of comfort and security, as exempts them from the daily necessity of servile drudgery, and gives them the means of acting in concert and society, they immediately form the rudiments of a political constitution, and provide for the exercise of their most material rights. The first establishment of Burghs, and their scheme of internal government, all over Europe, affords a striking example of this—and the reformation, which the growing lights and intelligence of the people afterwards introduced universally in their religious establishments (for the Catholic churches were *reformed* as well as the Protestant), may be cited as another. The economical reforms now introduced by the absolute monarchs, are also to be referred in substance to the same general intelligence. For they were called for and required by the people, long before their rulers were convinced of their necessity. They are to be reckoned, therefore, among the triumphs of reason and justice over prejudice and sinister or mistaken interests,—and nothing is so certain as that one such triumph always paves the way for another, and that the general reason which has overthrown one set of errors and prejudices, becomes more able and more eager to cope with those that may remain. It is impossible to give a nation the use of the faculty of reason, and to prevent them from employing it on the subjects that interest and concern them most nearly. It is impossible to make them feel and understand their rights as to one class of persons, and yet keep them in ignorance or indifference as to others. If they once have the principle, they cannot be prevented from making its full and true application. You cannot couch their cataracts, and unseal their eyes, and yet tell them that they must not see the most conspicuous and interesting parts of creation. You cannot

acknowledge their claim to their baser rights, and yet think of strengthening your resistance to their demands for the higher. You cannot teach them to expect and compel justice from each other, and yet to submit to injustice from you. You cannot, in short, give them good laws, and yet insist on their living under a vile constitution. It is certain, therefore, that all those partial reforms, which are intended to bribe the people into acquiescence in tyranny, and render usurpation popular, can ultimately have no other effect than to make them more desirous of that general reform which implies the downfall of tyranny,—and to increase, in the same proportion, their power to execute their desires.

So much with regard to the people: as for the rulers, the speculation may not be so certain. But we do not think it absolutely romantic to hope, that the habit of doing justice in part may reconcile them to doing it entirely;—that having experienced the advantages of yielding in so far to the spirit and intelligence of the times, they may come by degrees to yield to it altogether. Having found it both safe and pleasant to sacrifice certain prejudices, they may be encouraged to venture on the sacrifice of others; and having already discovered that they can live in wealth and dignity, although they have abandoned the prerogative of purveyance or arbitrary confiscation, they may come in time to discover, that their best power is not inconsistent with the liberties of their people, and that the dignity and safety and popularity of a constitutional King is better than the barbaric pomp and danger and solitude of a Despot.

We do not rest much, however, on these considerations. Unaccountable as it may seem to the rest of the world, there certainly must be a strange sort of pleasure or fascination in the possession of absolute power; so that its possessors can scarcely ever be expected to resign it but on compulsion; and those who have any chance of acquiring it may always be suspected of a disposition to hazard a good deal for its attainment. There is one consideration, however, which we think may be supposed, without extravagance, to have ultimately some weight in reconciling arbitrary monarchs to constitutional control,—and that is, that in civilised countries and important affairs, they know well enough that they really must submit to the control of somebody,—and may learn, at last, that it is both more dignified and more comfortable to submit to that of the general sense and wisdom of the nation, by conforming to which they must acquire popularity and personal influence, than to that of a junto of ignorant favourites and presumptuous councillors, who must always run a great risk of exposing them to odium, disaster, and contempt. We do not know how it may be in Dahomy or Ashantee, where the personal will of the sovereign is said to be literally the law; but even in Turkey and Russia, the Emperor is not independent of control; and in the civilised parts of Europe, and under governments where the interference of the people is most jealously excluded, the monarch is daily obliged to submit his own wishes and opinions to those of his courtiers and advisers. Now, these worthy persons, when they do venture thus to cross the royal pleasure, do it most commonly upon some vague and imperfect apprehension of the necessity of not running too violently against the current of public opinion, of which, however, they generally know almost as little as their master,—and consequently, nine times out of ten, thwart and offend him, only to bring him into new perplexities. In such circumstances, we really do not think it too much to surmise, that these unconstitutional rulers, finding that they cannot be absolute in reality, should come to prefer the safe and honourable contro-

of a national representation to the secret and ignoble domination of a few interested and incapable individuals, who use them as disrespectfully, and lead them into far more embarrassing situations than the most popular councillors.

But even if this should not happen, there is one view in which we conceive the general adoption of more enlightened, though selfish principles of government, must have a beneficial effect on the character of the rulers. To carry through such principles, the administration must, in most of its branches, be intrusted to men of ability and liberal information. Mere favouritism or old nobility will no longer be sufficient qualifications for high office; and the monopoly of the aristocracy or courtiers must either come to an end, or they must acquire the talents and information that may enable them to discharge their duties sufficiently. Symptoms of this, we think, are already apparent in most of the courts of Europe. The ambitious part of the noblesse are already putting themselves to school, with a degree of labour and industry from which their fathers would have revolted with disdain; and even Princes of the blood are beginning to think it necessary to know something beyond the fashionable games of hazard and address, or the arts of personal intrigue. This of itself will be a great gain to the country; but its chief benefit is in its tendency still farther and unconsciously to enlighten and liberalise that whole *caste* of persons by whom the absolute governments must for some time be administered; and not only to prepare them to acquiesce peaceably in inevitable changes, but to enable them so to read the manifest signs of the times as to avoid fatal struggles by prudent concessions, and substantially to co-operate with the opposite interests in the state in a wise adjustment of differences, which obstinacy might render irreconcilable.

We must not venture, we fear, to pursue these speculations any farther; and enough, probably, has been said to explain the views we entertain of the new policy of the arbitrary governments, and of the results which we think it is preparing. There is one objection, however, which suggests itself too obviously to the whole scheme of our observations, to admit of our passing it over without notice; and to which we refer the more willingly, because it leads to some material illustrations of our doctrine, which we could not so well have introduced in any other connection. If despotism is growing so wise, it may be asked, How is it really worse than constitutional government? If nations are secured in their civil rights, of what substantial value are political ones? and why predict and provoke revolutions, with all their risks and horrors, for the sake of a name and chimera?

Now, to this we answer, in the *first* place, that the possession of political rights, the consciousness of freedom, independence, and a share of self-government, is in itself a great pleasure; and leads to many other enjoyments and exertions, which are at once delightful to the individual and profitable to the community. We have not time at present fully to develop and illustrate this truth; nor can we suppose it necessary, at least for our English readers. We may observe, however, that if the best practical laws were enacted by a despotic government, they would infallibly appear much less perfect, and be more murmured at and complained of, than if the very same code had been adopted by a representative legislature, after consultation with those whose interests they were to affect, and substantially by their authority. There would necessarily be less discontent and disorder, therefore, under the one system than under the

other; and though the law were actually the same, men would submit much more cheerfully and happily to rules of their own making, than to the mandates of an absolute master, however enlightened and benevolent.

But the true answer is, that there can never be such good laws, and such good execution of them, under an absolute as under a free government; that without political rights there can be no security for civil ones; and that it is the feeling and experience of this, more even than the instinctive love of independence, and impatience of subjection to an equal, that has, in all ages, impelled men to contend, amidst the applauses of their kind, and against the most fearful odds, for the vindication of their political liberties. The education of absolute monarchs is not likely to make them very wise, or industrious, or benevolent; and the chance plainly is, that the greater number will be distinguished for the opposite qualities. But if we could ensure to all the thrones of the Continent a succession of Tituses and Antonines, we should not be at all nearer any security for a wise administration. A popular government, however, *does* ensure at all times a mass of wisdom and information for the management of its affairs, in comparison with which any possible attainments of the most highly-gifted individual must always be insignificant; and not only brings to bear upon every department of its business the talents and experience of those who are most conversant with it, but affords to all an assurance that such information has been obtained. It must always be the interest of any country, that all the knowledge and energy it contains should be employed in the enactment of its laws and the administration of its government; and that the measures adopted by its rulers should be conformable to the general opinion of its inhabitants. Now, it is the great virtue of a representative legislature that it ensures this object; while the universal responsibility of its functionaries, and the favour with which all colourable accusations against them are always received, seems to secure as much purity in their actual conduct, as the infirmities of human nature will ever allow us to expect.

No patriotism and no wisdom in an absolute ruler can attain these objects. But, in truth, it is absurd to suppose, that absolute rulers will ever be either wise or patriotic. The very genius of their place necessarily inspires other sentiments. The very fact, that they cling fondly to their arbitrary power, proves that they are conscious of abusing it. If they never proposed to do any thing but what was conformable to the wishes and opinions of their subjects, why not give them an opportunity at least of making these opinions authentically known?—why not bind themselves to comply with them?—why not legalise and divide their power, in short, with the representatives of the nation, who might assist them with their advice, and share with them the responsibility of the execution? The truth is, they neither contemplate nor wish for any such conformity; and though, in a season of alarm, and upon a narrow view of the consequences, they now propose, in some respects, to better the condition of their subjects, they are neither likely to pursue this policy steadily and consistently, nor to hesitate about abandoning it entirely, as soon as they discover that it threatens ultimately to impair any of their darling prerogatives. The time probably never will come, when it will be safe for them to trace back their steps, and entirely to undo what they are now doing; but they will infallibly tamper with the system which they dare not openly abandon, and interfere so often, for the gratification of their own passions, or the vanity and cupidity of their favourites,



even with the economical projects they now profess to favour, as to prevent, in a great degree, the practical good they might have effected, and thoroughly to convince their subjects, that, until they have their rights settled by law, and made independent of the will of the government, there is no reasonable security, either for their continuance, or for their being fairly and equally awarded while they remain. The system, in short, will be most imperfectly and inconsistently administered; and, though we trust it will have operation enough to raise up a spirit of liberty, which nothing but reform can lay again, we have not the least apprehension that it will so exemplify the possible excellence of tyranny, as to make men enamoured of its bounty, or convinced that, for the substantial purposes of life, political freedom is but a troublesome superfluity.

We have but one other observation to make before we conclude. It has often been remarked, that genius and energy of character, nay, even that the nobler and more intellectual kinds of industry, are never found to thrive in any but a free country, or to form in any other circumstances the basis of a national character. The observation is as old as Aristotle, and all subsequent experience has confirmed it. The fact, indeed, is quite certain, and the reason of it sufficiently obvious. Where the most animating subjects are interdicted, genius feels in perpetual dread of rebuke, and disdains to display itself even on those that are permitted; and, while an insulting and impassable barrier shuts up the career of plebeian ambition, all the heroic energies of the character are repressed and extinguished. Even in mechanics, in trade and manufactures, the higher spirit of enterprise will not be exerted if the higher rewards of distinction and political importance be withheld. The successful merchant in this country, the inventive engineer, the ingenious chemist, the founders of sovereign companies, the discoverers of steam engines and safety lamps, are stimulated in their meritorious labours by the personal honours as well as the solid wealth to which they aspire; and look forward, not only to a station of equality in the very highest society, but to a seat in the legislature of their country, and to titular dignities that rank them with the aristocracy of the land. It is only, in short, in a free country that there is either encouragement for useful enterprise, or security for the reward of perseverance. But we will not be tempted to enlarge further on these topics. The time has been, even since the commencement of our labours, when we should have been ashamed to have insisted so anxiously on truths so elementary; and now we shall not be surprised to find that they are considered as paradoxes.

In all that we have now said, we have referred only to the absolute governments of the Continent, and to those chiefly who have associated themselves under the title of the Holy Alliance. To England, we confidently trust, the letter of our observations never will be applicable; but even there, there is much to which the spirit of them may be applied. We, too, are beginning a new era of economical reform, under the patronage of the most jealous opponents of popular rights; and it is not to be doubted that the credit and popularity which they expect to derive from their new and compulsory liberality in matters of trade and internal regulation, will be employed to strengthen their hands in resisting all proposals for political reform, and in weakening and undermining the democratical parts of the constitution. We are far from insinuating that they have adopted these improvements merely for the purpose of gaining this support to their Tory principles. They have been forced upon them,

we do not doubt, by a sincere though somewhat tardy conviction of their expediency; and if any thing could add to the honest satisfaction with which we look forward to their actual adoption, it would be the recollection that they were first suggested by that party in the state to which we have always professed our attachment, and had long to encounter the bigoted opposition of many of their present supporters. We hope we may be permitted to regard this as an augury of their future conversion on points still more important; and, at all events, we trust that the recollection of it will co-operate with the cautions and warnings we have now presumed to offer, in inducing the public to look with some distrust on arguments against the principle of reform, from persons who are now practical reformers, and to judge somewhat favourably of the merits of a cause to which the most enlightened and powerful of its original enemies have been compelled to proclaim their conversion.

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#### DESIGNS OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE. — STABILITY OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT UNDER THE BOURBON DYNASTY.\*

WHAT are truly the views of the Holy Alliance, and what the means by which they expect to obtain them? The answer, if given in detail, might assume something of a complicated appearance, because each government has interests and means in some measure peculiar to itself; but it may safely be stated in general, that each member of the Holy Alliance wishes to establish and to preserve, within its own territory, absolute power by means of military force, though each state may not act on its neighbours under the influence of the same immediate interests.

Nations, it should always be remembered, exercise on each other a very important influence, without intending, and almost without knowing, that they do so. It is impossible that one nation should see another happier, freer, and better governed than itself, without envying its condition, and aspiring after the same advantages. The mere existence, therefore, of a state enjoying prosperity and good government in the neighbourhood of others who do not enjoy them, must operate as a perpetual incentive to reform, and, if necessary, to revolution. Either the happiness of the former must be destroyed, therefore, or the latter must in some way or other rise to its level; and this, in one word, is the reason that liberty finds it so difficult to gain a footing on the European continent, and despotism in America.

This tendency, however, which every government more or less despotic has to surround itself with others more degraded than itself, and thus to secure itself from the influence of what it terms *bad example*, must at last meet with obstacles which are insurmountable. It is very true, that since the suppression of the constitutional government of Naples, the Austrian states of Italy have little reason to envy the Neapolitans; and the French have still less to envy the fortune of Spain, since France has undertaken the task of introducing *good order* into that unhappy country. But if the members of the Holy Alliance wish really to destroy the influence of bad example, they must go a little farther. The same principle which led

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\* L'Europe et l'Amérique en 1822 et 1823. Par M. de Pradt. — Vol. xl. page 514. July, 1824.

France to carry its arms into Spain should lead Russia and Austria to adopt the same system with Germany and France; for there is still enough of liberty, even in these countries, to set a bad example to Austria and Russia, and it is still worse with England. The influence of the press is also a strong bond of union among nations; and until the despotic sovereigns of the Continent succeed in unteaching their subjects to read, they never can believe themselves secure from its operation, while England and America preserve their liberty.

The ultimate consequences of the Holy Alliance are likely, we think, to be very different from those which are contemplated either by its enemies or by its members; although, at first sight, we admit that they are big with alarm and danger. In despotic states, the fear of insurrection is, in truth, the only check upon the monarch and his deputies; and were this check once withdrawn, there is no excess to which they might not abandon themselves with impunity. Now, the Holy Alliance does seem, for the time, to secure its members from any apprehension of popular commotions. Each state requires only to have at hand a force sufficient to prevent surprise, and she may then bid defiance to insurrection; for she knows she is surrounded by an immense foreign army, ready to pour in upon her on the first signal. It is thus that Spain is kept in check by the armies of France; Italy by those of the house of Austria; Germany by the troops of Russia and Austria; while France herself is surrounded by all the armies of Europe, and the experience she has acquired must have taught her not rashly to provoke their hostility. Thus each government, conscious of its security against the consequences of public discontent, subject to no law, consulting no opinion, and checked by no vain scruples of morality, may indulge its wishes without restraint. The King of Spain, restored to his power, may execute those whom he caressed the evening before — the King of Portugal may banish his friends, and load with favours the men whom he denounced as public enemies — the King of France may proscribe those whom he has pardoned, and swear eternal fidelity to the charter, and trample it under foot, once at least in every year — the King of Prussia, after exciting his subjects to resist a foreign yoke by the promise of a constitution, may shut up in his state prisons any one who happens to have a more retentive memory than himself — and the Emperor of Austria may imprison or put to death, at his pleasure, those who have been convicted of attachment to their country; — all of them, in short, may, with apparent impunity, violate their engagements, and, at the same time, accuse their subjects of treachery!

The new relations which the Holy Alliance has established among the continental governments have not only changed the ancient order of things, but altered the old meaning of words. A king who obeys the general laws of society, and respects, either through choice or necessity, the rules of justice, is *un roi esclave*; but a king who comes in the train of a foreign army, or mingles with a faction which owes its triumph to military force, is *un roi libre* — as if the liberty of a king consisted only in his power of doing wrong! To break an oath which has been extorted by despotism, is *treason*; but to violate the oath which binds the monarch to govern according to the laws, is a noble assertion of *liberty*, even though the violator should be also the author of the laws!

The operations of the Holy Alliance are not confined to the suppression of popular movements. It is its object also to counteract every attempt on the part of any of its members to ameliorate the national institutions. The King of Naples, when surrounded by his brethren at the

Congress, declares that the promises he had made to his subjects were intentionally false ; that he had sworn fidelity to the constitution, only to secure to himself the means of subverting it—that he had promised to the Neapolitans to attend the Congress, to avert the storm with which their liberties were threatened, but that, in fact, he came there only to invoke the assistance of an Austrian army to stifle them in blood. The King of Spain, who styled himself free in the midst of the Cortes, called himself equally free when placed by the French in the hands of his confessor and the army of the Faith—and retracted at once every thing he had asserted before. We do not pretend to determine which of these declarations—or whether any of them—was true : but we must be allowed to say, that had the constitution of Spain, of Portugal, and of Naples, been framed spontaneously by the sovereigns of these countries—had they really emanated, in the language of the Holy Allies, from the free grace of their monarchs,—they would not, on that account, have been less certainly overthrown by that apostolical brotherhood. We are quite willing to believe, that the Emperor of Austria has a great affection for the King of Naples ; that he feels a personal gratification in seeing him exercising an unlimited power over his subjects, and disposing at his pleasure of their persons and property. But we must be permitted to doubt whether he is influenced *merely* by fraternal regard when he marches his armies into the Neapolitan territory. These royal *penchants* are unknown, even in romance. The case is the same with regard to the invasion of Spain by the French. We have no doubt that there exists a strong personal sympathy between Louis and his cousin of Spain, and that the French ministry are strongly attached to the government of Spain and the soldiers of the Faith. But we cannot quite believe that Louis XVIII. and his ministers would have wasted men and money merely to restore to Ferdinand and his monkish associates the pleasures of arbitrary power?—to enable him, for example, to proscribe the Constitutionals, and to hang Riego on a gallows sixty feet high?—No. The real object of Austria and the Holy Alliance in overturning the constitutional government of Naples, and restoring arbitrary power, was to destroy what they term “*moral contagion* ;”—to withdraw from the other Italian states the dangerous spectacle of a more just and protecting government. Had the constitution of Naples continued to exist, they felt that the rest of Italy must either have shaken off the yoke of Austria, or obtained from it a similar constitution. In the same way, the object of the French ministry, and of the Holy Alliance, in making war on Spain, was to put a stop to another of these sources of *moral contagion*, and to save France from the *demoralising* influence of a National Assembly, which ventured to think for itself, and to consult the interests of its country.

It was of no consequence, in this question, whether the kings of Spain and of Naples had acted freely and voluntarily, or not. Had the constitutions of these countries emanated from their sovereigns and their ministers alone, would this have in any way affected the existence of the *moral contagion* which was dreaded by the Holy Alliance? Could it have prevented the unreformed governments from becoming unpopular by the contrast, or lessened the disposition of their subjects to amend them? On the contrary, its effects must have been to increase these tendencies, by increasing their confidence in the sincerity of the new governments. The wars against Spain and Naples then would have equally taken place, had the constitutions of these states been framed by their kings. The Holy Alliance would still have declared, without hesitation, that these monarchs

had not been *free*; and, in order to restore them to liberty, would have placed them in the hands of military keepers of their own. The consequence to be drawn from this is indeed a fearful one,—that every member of the Holy Alliance is perfectly at liberty to destroy the laws of his country, if they are good; but that no one can venture to ameliorate them, however wretched they may be. The Prussian government, for instance, may destroy the few good laws that are still to be found in that kingdom; but the first attempt to grant to its subjects the long-promised constitution would be the signal for the immediate advance of the armies of the Holy Alliance to break the fetters which government had voluntarily agreed to wear. And thus the progress of civilisation on the Continent must ultimately be determined by the condition of the rudest and most barbarous of its communities, and every thing brought at last to the level of Russia, of Austria, of Hungary, and of conquered and corrupted Poland!

The Holy Alliance, while it thus links governments more closely together, does all it can to separate and keep asunder their subjects, and to keep every nation in the dark as to the true sentiments and condition of every other. By the help of alien bills and passports, no person can travel or remain in any state without the express permission of its rulers. The subjects of every monarch are marked, like cattle, with their master's mark; and these masters have agreed to stop and deliver up any runaways that may be found on their premises. More than one Englishman has already been prevented from visiting France, because his political opinions happened to differ from those of the Viscomte de Chateaubriand. We have lately seen an exquisite specimen of the style in which political excommunications are now issued by the head of the holy brotherhood; and the truth is, that there are states in Europe where a traveller is even less secure than among savages; unless he be protected by that happy ignorance or apathy to which the pious confederates are labouring to reduce their subjects, and which the Emperor of Austria so warmly recommends to his academicians.

But it is in their commercial relations that this national separation begins chiefly to be felt, and threatens daily to become more sensible. The Holy Alliance has not been entered into for mere vanity; nor is the possession of absolute power coveted for purposes of ostentation. It professes, indeed, to act in the name of the *Holy Trinity*; and every step it takes is in obedience to the *decrees of Providence*;—but when we look beyond this mystical jargon, we perceive that its object is of a less spiritual nature. The budget is still the chief consideration. Money is still the master-spirit that puts in motion the diplomatists of the Congress—the generals that march to the destruction of Spain, the disinterested Champions of the Faith, and the ministers who mount the *tribune* to deliver Homilies in the style of Atala. To make the revenue as large as possible, and to pocket as much of it as possible, is the universal principle of action. The French Ultras triumphed over Spain; and the first speech they made to their master was simply this, “Sire, le clergé demande de l'argent; et la fidélité vous prie de ne pas oublier que vous lui en avez promi.”\*

The Holy Alliance, then, must have money—and they must have much money. For this purpose taxes are necessary; and these taxes have, all over the Continent, at least, had the effect of diminishing the

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\* Address of the Chamber of Deputies.

commercial intercourse with other nations. Since taxes have multiplied in France, for instance, the French Government has been obliged to impose importation duties on foreign articles, so heavy, as almost to amount to a prohibition. And thus, while the progress of political economy should convince nations that they are mutually interested in exchanging their commodities, and that all prohibitory laws must sooner or later be fatal to commerce; the wasteful expenditure of governments, and their ignorant exactions, place a barrier between the nations of Europe, and tend to render every kind of commercial intercourse impossible.

The most alarming consideration, however, of all, is, that the force which the Holy Alliance is enabled to wield, would seem to render its operation irresistible and eternal. According to the calculation of M. de Pradt, the governments of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, have at least *fifteen hundred thousand* troops at their disposal; and if we add to this number about 300,000 which France can command, together with the supplies from the smaller States, which follow in the rear of the great — if we consider, that in none of the Continental States do there exist any institutions by which the action of this power can be controlled — that in all of them the governments direct arbitrarily the course of general education — and that the clergy uniformly co-operate with the government, and give the sanctions of religion to the maxims of despotism — we shall indeed be struck with terror at the colossal power which is thus arrayed on the side of tyranny, and the absolute helplessness of those who are its victims; and can hardly help fearing that Europe is destined to follow the example of Asia, and to become the prey of a few despots and their satellites.

We state these things, however, rather to show that we are aware of the dangers to which liberty is exposed, than to inspire any doubt of her ultimate triumph. The grounds of our confidence in her cause we have recently explained at some length, in our observations on the present policy and future fate of arbitrary governments\*; and we shall not now resume them. The sum is, that knowledge is indestructible, and that liberty is inseparable from knowledge; and that all the interests which support the cause of tyranny must gradually wear away, while those which point to freedom must increase in the progress of civilisation. The Holy Allies themselves have an instinctive and painful sense of this great truth; and have banded together accordingly, much more from a sense of their weakness than from the pride of their strength. What, indeed, is their alliance, but *a contract of mutual assurance* against great and imminent perils? what else the true meaning of their atrocious engagements, when reduced to plain language? It is worth while to look a little at this, that we may the better feel both the enormity of their pretensions, and the impossibility of their permanent success. Had this celebrated contract, instead of being framed by a Jesuit, been drawn up in explicit terms by a notary, it must have run pretty much as follows:—“ We, the parties hereto subscribing, legitimate sovereigns and absolute masters of our respective kingdoms, considering that the people of all countries have a diseased appetite for freedom, and are sometimes bold enough to revolt against the commands of their masters,—and that in consequence of this evil propensity, it has happened more than once that certain kings have lost their crowns, and been deprived of their legitimate possessions; that the house of Tarquin, for example, was driven from Rome on certain

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\* Vol. xxxix. p. 285, &c.

frivolous pretences, thereby occasioning an anarchy of several centuries ; and that, even after the restoration of legitimate order by the Cæsars, this spirit of insubordination still continued to manifest itself, to the great injury and damage of Nero, Otho, Vitellius, and sundry other lawful sovereigns. Considering also, that, in modern times, examples no less fatal have occurred ; that the English have banished the house of Stuart, for no better reason, than that a prince of that family, in the exercise of his undoubted rights, proposed to compel his people to think as he did, and to give up to his disposal their persons and property ; which treasonable conduct, on the part of the English, was aggravated by the circumstance, that the said prince, in the plenitude of his goodness, did admit that he was responsible to God for the exercise of his said legitimate power ; that the house of Bourbon in the same manner fell a victim, more lately, to the spirit of rebellion, and might have forfeited for ever its legitimate authority, had it not been twice replaced on the throne by the bayonets of the allied armies. Considering, farther, that it has for some time past been treasonably published and proclaimed, that the people are not the absolute property of their sovereigns, but are masters of their property, their persons, their consciences, and their industry, with other false and sophistical maxims of the same nature, dangerous to the security of all good government ; and that the subjects of certain states have carried their audacious pretensions so far, as to demand certain deeds, called Constitutions, with the view of circumscribing the power of their august sovereigns :—We, the high contracting parties, have entered into a contract of mutual assurance against the insubordination of our subjects, to the effect, and of the tenour following ; viz.

“ *Primo*, We hereby guarantee to each other the full and entire exercise of absolute power over our respective subjects ; and if any of the parties shall not, at present, be in the possession of such power, the others hereby bind themselves to assist him in obtaining it.

“ *Secundo*, If it shall at any time happen that the people should show symptoms of revolt, either on account of their inability to pay taxes, or their refusal to conform to a religion which they believe to be false, or upon alleged invasion of their persons or property, or any other vain and frivolous pretext of the same kind, we, the high contracting parties, mutually engage to employ the whole of our joint forces to reduce and bring back the said subjects to their obedience, and to re-establish their sovereign in the full exercise of his absolute and legitimate rights.

“ *Tertio*, If, for any of the reasons above mentioned, or any other reasons whatever, any people shall demand from their sovereign, under the name of Constitution, any political organisation capable of limiting the powers of the king or his ministers, the high contracting parties engage to assist the prince so situated, to deliver him from all compulsion, and to furnish him with such a force as shall enable him to proscribe all malecontents, to confiscate their property, and to put to death all those with whom he may be dissatisfied, especially if they pretend to have assisted him in his distress, or to have received from him oaths and assurances of gratitude and friendship.

“ *Quarto*, Each of the high contracting parties binds himself to the rest to maintain absolute power in its full vigour within his own dominions : and should any one or more of the said parties be prevailed on to limit his power by laws or constitutions, the others hereby engage, instantly to declare him enslaved ; and, with or without his consent, to deliver him from bondage as soon as possible.

“ *Quinto*, Each of the high contracting parties engages to support a sufficient army for the assistance of all kings in distress, who feel themselves trammelled in the exercise of their legitimate power, by the fetters of a Constitution.”

Such in substance is the deed, which has received the name of the *Holy Alliance*, and which its authors have placed under the protection of *the Holy Trinity!* It amounts plainly to an unconditional engagement, on the part of the Continental Sovereigns, to assist each other against their subjects in every event, and whatever may have been the cause of revolt, since there is no tribunal to judge between the prince and the people. But is it possible that such a compact should be lasting? or that the result of a contest between NATIONS and rulers should long be doubtful? In their first exultation over the completed scheme, and, while still profiting by the reasonable union into which they were driven by their fears of Napoleon, their designs may appear practicable, and may even be attended with some success. But in the nature of things this combination cannot be permanent; and is even likely, we think, to precipitate those very changes which it was devised to prevent.

In addition to the discontents that spring naturally from oppression and misgovernment, it is plain that, by this system, there will be added in every country the still fiercer and more ungovernable discontent which arises from the impatience of foreign interference, and the intolerable indignity of being dragooned into slavery on their own soil, by strangers whom they detest and despise. Even the sovereigns who retain, along with their love of power, the least spark of that pride and national partiality which often attends it, must share in this feeling, and come at last to disdain being indebted for their authority to the arms and the insolence of strangers. It is obvious too, that though there is a fine appearance of cordiality among those new allies, in this their honey-moon of endearment, causes of disunion and quarrel will inevitably arise in no long time, from those very principles of unjust aggression and uncontrolled self-will, in which they now abet each other. And what then will be the condition of those unhappy princes, who, from an undue love of power, have thrown away the only safe or natural means of maintaining it? How many base compliances and painful sacrifices must they submit to, at the hands of those who can plausibly reproach them with having saved them from the merited resentment of their subjects? or with what hopes can they at last appeal to that injured people, whom they had not only of themselves oppressed, but subjected to that last humiliation, of binding them in foreign shackles? Even while there is peace between the governments, there must be hostility between the nations,—and even between the native and the foreign troops, whose *joint* efforts are necessary to repress their discontent. This is already apparent in Spain, the first and the easiest experiment on which the Allies have ventured. If these things are done in the green leaf, what shall it be in the dry? Or, is it not obvious that tyrannical thrones, instead of being made more secure by this contrivance, will ultimately be exposed to a double measure of insecurity? In their natural state, the threat of foreign aggression tends to unite the rulers and the subjects, by their common feelings of national pride and antipathy. But now, the ruler is himself identified with the foreigners, and hated as their unnatural instigator against the honour and the rights of his people. Whenever their extraneous support is withdrawn, therefore, the government *must fall*; and, while the provocation



to revolt is thus immeasurably increased, the sovereign is made absolutely dependent on the caprice and folly of an unprincipled ally.

It should never be forgotten either, that those armies, on which the whole system continually depends, are not — except perhaps in Russia — mere tools or machines, that must necessarily obey the hand that moves them. They too are men, and in some measure citizens; and must share in the lights that are growing all over the world. Their very interchange must hasten this illumination. The soldiers of Russia must become less apt instruments of *pure* despotism for their services in France and Germany; and the more enlightened troops of these nations can scarcely return from a mission into more degraded regions, without being deeply impressed with the miseries and dangers of tyranny.

Accordingly, the Holy Allies themselves are plainly distrustful of the sufficiency of that force, by the magnitude of which the friends of liberty are so much disconcerted. This proceeds no doubt from their consciousness, both of the terrible force their proceedings are necessarily raising up to oppose it, and of the unsoundness of a great part of that which looks so formidable at a distance. Nothing indeed, we apprehend, is so fallacious as that appearance of stability by which those governments are now surrounded, or that air of contented submission which seems to hang over their subjects. They are all in truth rotten at the heart; and not to be relied on, even in those quarters in which their apparent strength is most imposing. They know this, too, well enough — and this is the key to their confederations and corruptions — their pitiful severities and contemptible alarms. M. de Pradt has disclosed something of this as to some of those powers — but he has said nothing of France — hitherto the most active and enterprising of the whole, and undoubtedly the most formidable for wealth, talent, and military genius. It is worth while, therefore, to consider a little in detail the true state of its present government, and the actual strength and security of that system, which seems, for the moment, to have triumphed over all opposition. In the course of this examination, we shall probably be able to explain the grounds on which we hold the Holy Alliance to be big with danger to its authors, more satisfactorily than by following out any farther the general observations in which we have hitherto been engaged.

Were we to judge of the inconstancy of the French nation from the variety of governments to which it has been subjected since the Revolution, it would be difficult to speak of it in terms of sufficient reprobation. At one time, the enthusiastic admirers and defenders of American liberty, — at another, the partisans of a constitutional monarchy; — sometimes idolising the brilliancy of a military despotism, — sometimes recalling the dreams of chivalry, and regretting its ancient aristocracy, — it seemed to receive, with equal delight, the Monarchical constitution of 1791, — the Directorial constitution of 1795, — the Military constitution of 1800 — and the Charter of 1814. On the return of Bonaparte from Elba, in the month of May, 1815, the Chamber of Representatives were *Liberals* to a man. When the Bourbons re-entered Paris, three months afterwards, they were all *Aristocrats!* At the elections of 1818 and 1819, none but *Liberals* were returned. In 1824 the deputies were all *Ultras*.

After this, it may appear a little extravagant to say, that we believe that there has always existed, and does now exist, in the great body of the French nation, a pretty firm and unalterable adherence to those principles and opinions which the growing intelligence of the last century

had been long maturing; and which broke out, perhaps, under unfavourable circumstances, at the era of the Revolution. Yet such we believe to be the fact; and those who are best acquainted with the country, will be the readiest to agree with us. It is to be sure impossible, that in any nation there can exist an absolute unity of opinion. Every where there must be differences in fortune, in rank, in education, in religion, and, above all, in political opinion. If these differences exist even in the smallest societies, they must be peculiarly visible in a nation containing thirty millions of inhabitants, where the very languages of the different provinces are distinct, and the inhabitants of one can scarcely understand that of another. Every feeling, and every opinion which has been manifested during the last thirty-five years, continues, we believe, to exist pretty much to the same extent as ever in France; though the course of events has, at different times, brought different parties more prominently into view. The nation has always appeared to take a colour from the ruling party; but, under the name of the nation, these were, in reality, merely the adherents of the conquering party — the rest were compelled to be silent. Bonaparte, on his return from Elba, saw his palace surrounded by 10,000 or 12,000 men, who came there to join in his triumph, or to satisfy their curiosity. Three months afterwards the Bourbons were attended by a crowd of the same kind, ready to applaud their success, or anxious to see what sort of figure they made among the Allies who had brought them back from Ghent. But does this prove any inconsistency or fluctuation in national opinions? Not in the least. It shows only, that in a city containing 600,000 or 700,000 inhabitants, there are some who are adherents of Bonaparte, some who are attached to the Bourbons, some who are amused by any spectacle, and some who are ready to sell their applauses to the highest bidder. But no one of these, we conceive, are entitled to stand for *the nation*.

In France, we should never forget that the state of the community has always been very different from that of England. When their Revolution took place, all popular institutions had long been swept away by the usurpations of the Crown. There were no municipal administrations — no popular elections — no kind of deliberative assembly — nothing but a few corporations, without unity or connection, fit only to impose additional fetters on industry, and which the people were ready to abolish as soon as they had the power. This total want of political institutions produced a corresponding absence of all constitutional habits. The first assembly was therefore obliged to organise every thing — from the municipality of the smallest village to the powers of the sovereign and his ministers; and it is true enough, that they were disposed to use this power so as to insure the triumph of the particular opinions they entertained; and their example has been followed by every government which has succeeded it for the space of thirty years. Each has made its arrangements according to its own peculiar views, and brought into power the men who appeared most favourable to its designs. But the popularity, and consequently the stability, of government, is never to be judged of by the sentiments of those who conduct it, either in the executive departments, or in the legislative assemblies; but by one or other of those criteria: — 1st, by the degree of influence which *the people* are allowed to possess in elections — which may be called the theoretical test; and, 2dly, the usual or uniform result of political dissensions, when the aid of foreign troops has not been called in to settle the dispute — which is the test of practice. Circumstances may concur to throw doubt upon the indica-

tions of either of these tests, taken separately — but where they coincide, and especially for any considerable period of time, the conclusion may be taken as infallible.

Were we to estimate the strength of the ruling party in France, from the number of its adherents who hold office, or sit in the legislative bodies, we should suppose it to be immense. If, on the contrary, we judge of it by past events, by the numbers of its avowed opponents, and by the efforts which it is compelled to make to preserve its ascendancy, we should soon be convinced that its weakness is really extreme, and that the fabric of government is liable to be overthrown by the slightest accident. Many people are inclined to believe, that it is to the Revolution that the overthrow of the aristocracy, and the minute division of landed property, are to be ascribed; but nothing can be more erroneous. It was not the philosophers nor the Jacobins that destroyed the power of the nobility; it was legitimate kings and their ministers, Louis XIII. and XIV., Cardinal Richelieu and their successors. In 1789, the true aristocratic influence was already extinct; the Constituent Assembly merely proclaimed its fall; and abolished the name, when the thing itself had ceased to exist. The slender remnant of aristocracy, the possessors of names once potent, were so sensible of their helplessness, that they made no attempt to resist the torrent. Some, whose talents and virtues gave them an influence independent of their rank, at once declared for the new order of things; others submitted in silence, or sought refuge in the ranks of foreign armies—but none attempted opposition. France had afterwards to sustain a war of twenty-five years; but in all her vicissitudes of victory and defeat, the party which is now the ruling one remained unnoticed,—or was known only as the tool of foreigners, and following in the wake of their armies.

A deputy of the opposition has said, that the Bourbons were received with distrust by the French nation in 1814; but this, we think, is a mistake. The members of the old National Assemblies—the possessors of national property, who remembered the old *régime*, might perhaps feel some distrust; but the bulk of the nation, those who had taken no leading part in the early events of the Revolution, and those whose recollections did not extend forty years back, were certainly influenced by no such feelings. The former had forgotten the Bourbons entirely; the latter had never known them. It was a singular spectacle to see, on the first restoration, some of the old partisans of the family labouring to excite the enthusiasm of the people for their ancient masters; and to mark the *naïveté* and indifference with which men of thirty and thirty-five years of age asked them—“Who is Louis XVIII.? Who is the Count d’Artois.? Are they near relations of Louis XVI.? Are they married.? Have they children.? Whence do they come.? What did they do during the Revolution?”—and similar questions, which showed at once how completely they had forgotten the old dynasty, and with what indifference they witnessed its restoration. But this forgetfulness had one good effect—it induced many to give credit to the first promises made by government. This credulity, which is inherent in every people among whom principle is respected, and the oppression which the nation had experienced during the last years of the Imperial government, even gave the Bourbons a temporary popularity.

But the Holy Alliance was not then in existence; and the Northern Monarchs, on their entry into Paris, had declared themselves favourable to the liberty of the people. The faction which now engrosses power,

and appears so formidable, was still unnoticed. In the Chamber of Deputies it had no influence; and its existence was indicated only by private intrigues — by secret menaces against the members of the first Legislative Assembly, and the possessors of the national property — and by the declamatory invectives of a contemptible journal. The Court, however, was secretly promoting the views of this party — weeding out by degrees from the army the old generals who possessed the confidence of the soldiers, and replacing them by emigrants who had fought in the ranks of the enemy, or the leaders of those bands which, during the Revolution, were known by the name of *Chouans*. It was in these circumstances that Bonaparte re-appeared on the coast of France, and rallied around him the peasants who trembled for their property under the Bourbon government — the workmen whose industry had been stimulated by the effect of restrictive commercial laws — and the soldiers who were sent to oppose him.

Where were the partisans of the old *régime* at this critical moment? — the men who conceive that they form an aristocracy, because they advance magnificent pretensions, and look with contempt on knowledge? Did they fly to arms? Did they rally round them their dependents and vassals — the cultivators of their estates — or even their servants? No, they all sought safety in flight; and yet on this occasion they had no reason to dread the fury of a popular insurrection. The great body of the nation, the merchants, the men of property and intelligence, witnessed the return of Bonaparte, not with joy but terror. Even the peasants, while they rose in some departments, threatened no one with outrage. Why then did these devoted adherents of legitimate monarchy, who are now said to form the mass of the nation, surrender the cause without striking a blow in its defence? How was it possible that a government, which had at its disposal a revenue of nearly a thousand millions of francs, which possessed the exclusive appointment to offices, and the unlimited direction of the Journals, and every means by which public opinion is influenced, should be overturned without a drop of bloodshed? It was, as it could be, only because its supporters were utterly contemptible, and incapable of resistance. The greater part of this pretended aristocracy had done nothing but talk of their wretchedness since the return of the Bourbons. They were represented by their organ, the Vicomte de Chateaubriand, “*se rechauffant aux rayons du soleil de leur patrie, comme des mendiants Espagnols, — seul bien que leur eut procuré la restauration de la dynastie légitime.*” But misery is seldom a strong principle of devotion in any country, particularly when it is coupled with insolent pretension.

Finding the support of their nobility hopeless, and deserted by the army, the Bourbons looked elsewhere for assistance. The twelve legions of the National Guard of Paris, amounting to about 30,000 men, were assembled in their quarters; and the Count d'Artois was deputed to make a last appeal to their feelings in favour of the legitimate monarchy. He traversed their ranks accordingly, followed by his aides-de-camp, and loudly invoked the assistance of the men who had long been devoted to his family. His efforts were unavailing. The Guards preserved a mournful silence, and continued immovable. Only four or five individuals stepped forward from the ranks — and instantly stepped back again, as if ashamed of the insignificance of their number! At Lyons a similar experiment was made, with no better success. The Count d'Artois, on that occasion, was deserted even by his suite, and would have

returned alone to Paris, but for the devotion of a single gendarme, who disdained to leave him in that situation—and who soon afterwards received from Bonaparte the star of the Legion of Honour for this piece of courageous fidelity. All were not equally indifferent, it is true. Some pupils of the Ecole de Droit took arms—the Deputies and opposition writers did what they could to prop the falling cause: but all was unavailing. The grandees, who had been created by the Abbé de Montesquieu, some months before, to form a Chamber of Peers, quietly retired from their seats; and one of them, who had been an uniform supporter of the measures of Government, remarked, on his retreat—“*Il était évident que cela devait arriver; depuis leur retour, ces gens là n'ont fait que de sottises.*”

At last the battle of Waterloo brought into Paris the English, Belgian, Dutch, and Prussian troops;—the armies of Austria came up, though tardily, from the East—that of Spain from the South; all the troops of Europe, in a word (not even excepting those of Switzerland), poured in upon France. In the rear of these armies came again the monarchy-men, eager for vengeance and for plunder—and ready to throw themselves on France as on a prey which Europe had given them to devour. Those who had not fled, then peeped from their hiding-places. Their wives and daughters were seen mingling with the invading armies; affectionately pressing hands still red with the blood of their countrymen, and blending their cries of joy with the thunder of the mines, which announced the destruction of the public monuments.\*

The Chamber of Deputies, which existed at the flight of the Bourbons, was now dissolved, as too moderate; and the ruling faction, which had already made itself master of all public employments, formed a Chamber which has acquired a disgraceful celebrity in France, under the title of the Chamber of 1815. This assembly, in which the whole force of the opposition was reduced to three or four members who were not allowed to speak, distinguished itself only by its proscriptions,—which it was pleased to term *amnesties*—by some absurd and atrocious laws, which government was afterwards obliged to repeal, and by the formation of projects which it never found time to execute. The faction, so lately unheard of, now appeared omnipotent. It encountered no opposition within the walls of the Chamber, nor without. But, to show on how unsubstantial a foundation its power actually rested, it is only necessary to add, that as soon as it threatened the life of a favourite, who had recently been elevated to the ministry, it sunk at once, and was annihilated by the dissolution of the Chamber. This terrible aristocracy, that seemed to rule with a rod of iron one of the greatest of the continental nations, and to overturn at its pleasure any party that professed principles different from its own, was dissipated like smoke by the breath of M. Decazes! Another and a more complaisant Chamber succeeded it; for it was, in substance, chosen by the minister himself,—the prefects having been authorised by an ordonnance to choose the electoral bodies as they should see proper.

The fall of the Imperial dynasty had left France still unprovided with any political institutions. Every thing had been organised to suit the action of a military despotism. In 1817, the more intelligent friends of

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\* One of the handsomest bridges in Paris was mined by the Prussians and only saved, it is said, by the interference of the Duke of Wellington.

the Bourbon family, convinced that this dynasty could not subsist without the support of some mixture of popular and aristocratical establishments, framed an election law, conferring the right of voting on every citizen above thirty years of age, who paid taxes to the amount of 300 francs. This law was certainly not democratical; but, on the contrary, decidedly aristocratical in its principle; since it limited the elective franchise to about 90,000 individuals, out of a population of about thirty millions. Thus, only one individual out of every 350 had the right of voting; and even that was fettered by certain qualifications. The vote could be given only in favour of a person at least forty years of age, and paying 1000 francs of direct taxes. This system excluded from all influence and participation in public affairs the great body of the nation, and many even of the more enlightened classes of society, men of small landed property, capitalists, annuitants, physicians, lawyers, and men of letters. But still it called into action a fair proportion of the intelligence and independence of the nation. In the large commercial towns, it led to the choice of men of extensive influence, from their industry or their capital; in the agricultural departments, to that of great landed proprietors; and in towns possessing universities and literary institutions, of distinguished advocates and men of letters. To speak correctly, the members elected formed generally the true aristocracy of the class to which they belonged. A Chamber thus elected might naturally be supposed to be equally free from democratic extravagance and ministerial servility.

But while France was thus approximating towards a legal government, and while order was gradually re-establishing itself within its bosom, the Holy Alliance was proscribing all popular institutions, and watching with jealousy the progress the nations were making towards liberty. The favourite minister, who, in order to save himself, had obtained the dissolution of the Chamber of 1815, began to find that the law of 1817 did not furnish him with deputies sufficiently complaisant. He was annoyed also by the liberty of the press: for it laughed at his inefficiency, and exposed his little intrigues; so that he was perfectly disposed to revive the old system of arbitrary government whenever the opportunity should occur. And the opportunity soon presented itself. A congress was summoned: the Holy Alliance levelled its whole force against the institutions of Germany, and particularly those connected with the liberty of the press and the Universities. As to France, the task of restoring arbitrary power was intrusted to the government itself, and to the faction which had been dispersed by the ordonnance of the 5th of September, 1816; and, under the auspices of the modern Amphictyons, they proceeded boldly with the work. Three laws were proposed at once; the first destroyed the liberty of the press, the second the liberty of the subject, and the third secured the two others, by repealing the election law of 1817.

Public opinion was violently agitated by the discussions which took place relative to these laws; but it was the debate on the system of election which peculiarly displayed the character of the faction which had re-possessed itself of power, and the nature of the force which was opposed to it. Meetings, at first in small numbers, took place in different parts of Paris; these increased, as the discussion became more animated, till their numbers at last amounted to 25,000 or 30,000 men. But in all this immense multitude scarcely a single individual belonging to the labouring classes was to be found. The whole of those who took a part in the discussions belonged to the upper and middle ranks of society; and con-

sisted of men above thirty years of age. It may be fairly said, indeed, that they embraced all the intelligent and independent inhabitants of that great city. Beyond the walls of the Chamber not a single voice was found to support the laws projected by the Holy Alliance. These assemblies were not dispersed by means of the National Guard; the troops, which had shown symptoms of attachment to popular principles were all marched out at night. The gendarmes and the dragoons were put in requisition. Artillery was placed in the principal squares of Paris — the opposition Deputies were publicly insulted by the royal body guard — some were even threatened with assassination; and by the employment of means like these, and a liberal allowance of bribery, the election laws were at length overturned, by a majority of *five* voices! And even this trifling majority would not have been obtained, had not two fifths of the Chamber consisted of Deputies elected by the Colleges formed in virtue of a royal ordonnance in 1816.

We shall not here mention the conspiracies, civil and military, and the partial insurrections which took place during this period; these, we admit, might have existed under a good government, and afford no fair index of the sentiments of the nation. We shall merely state one circumstance, which shows very plainly the idea which the ruling faction entertained of its own weakness. When the Italian Revolution took place, and had spread into Piedmont, the Chamber of Deputies in France was assembled. The news of the Revolution having reached Paris, M. Dudon, one of the most violent members of the *côté droit*, mounted the tribune, and declared in his own name and that of his honourable friends, that as, in all probability, they had now the honour of sitting *for the last time* among the Deputies of the nation, they thought themselves bound to state to the public the views by which they had been actuated. The solemnity of this *last speech* excited considerable amusement among the Deputies of the *côté gauche*; but the defeat of the Neapolitans by the Austrian armies restored life to the expiring faction.

In order to form an idea of the existing state of France, and to appreciate the extent of the force which the Holy Alliance can really calculate on in that country, it was necessary to recapitulate thus shortly the circumstances which have brought France into her present situation, and placed power in the hands of the ruling party of the day. We have seen that this party has been a mere nothing whenever it has been brought into contact with the popular party, unsupported by the presence of foreign armies; that in fact there never was any thing *in France itself* that deserved the name of a struggle; that the civil war, as it was called, consisted merely in the efforts of a few poor peasants in La Vendée; and that on every occasion where the right of election has been even partially free, the adherents of this party have been excluded almost entirely from the Chamber of Representatives. It is evident, therefore, that it is only by the assistance of a foreign force — by means, in short, of the armies of the Holy Alliance, that this party has acquired, and is still enabled to maintain, its ascendancy. And it is equally evident, that the Holy Alliance, in turn, may dispose of the whole strength of the ultra party in France.

The powers of Europe, united for their own security, overturned the Imperial government in France — for the fall of its chief involved that of the men who were devoted to him. But while *men* were removed, *institutions* were left as they were; so that France, at the present day, is organised exactly as it was on the evening before the allied armies

entered Paris for the first time. Bonaparte had suited his administration to a state of things purely military; he had left to the people at large no kind of influence or real power; he nominated, by himself or his deputies, the candidates for every public employment; he possessed the unlimited control of the instruction of youth, and the entire management of many trades and professions. The Bourbons received, and religiously preserved, this inheritance of the *usurper*; and the men who rule in their name enjoy all the influence which this immense patronage can procure. They have also at their disposal the finances of the kingdom, — that is, the unlimited disposal of a revenue of about 1000 millions francs (about 40 millions sterling). They possess also the power of borrowing, which places at their disposal a large proportion of the capital of the richest states in Europe, not excepting England. Taxes or loans procure them soldiers even in foreign countries, and it is thus they keep in pay the Swiss regiments. They possess, besides, all the influence which the preaching of a large proportion of the Catholic clergy can still exert over the people, and that which arises from the instruction of youth, and the zeal of those who are attached to their party through conviction. These means, it must be admitted, are formidable; and the Holy Alliance may no doubt find in France important resources for the execution of its projects: but let us now see what is the strength of the opposing force by which they are counterbalanced.

According to the latest returns, the population of France amounts to about 30 millions. The number of *families* possessing landed property, or connected with agriculture, is about *four millions*, forming nearly *three fourths of the whole population*, the other fourth being composed of workmen, or persons connected with commerce. Government looks on all the *petites proprietaires*, that is to say, the proprietors who are not in the class of electors, as its enemies; and out of four millions of families, 3,920,000 are in this situation. Even of the remaining 80,000 proprietors who do possess the elective power, a large majority are considered as opposed to the government; and in order to overcome the resistance which the ministry met with from this part of the population, two plans have been resorted to. The first was to grant the power of nominating about one half of the deputies to a mere fraction of the people, amounting only to about 10,000 citizens. The nomination of the other half was intrusted, *apparently*, to the 80,000 electors created by the law of 1817; but in reality the ministry had reserved the whole substantial power to itself, by the privilege which it continued to exert over the formation of the electoral colleges. And after all — after granting the elective power to that class of the population which was believed to be most devoted to its interests — after making up the lists of electors in an arbitrary manner, government has been continually obliged to employ threats, violence, and every kind of fraud, to insure the triumph of men, of whom it is alternately the tool and the protector. If the ruling party considers the great body of proprietors as its enemies, it is equally disposed to distrust the mercantile and manufacturing classes. The cities of Lyons, of Rouen, of Strasbourg, and of Paris, fill it with constant alarm; and it is only by the assistance of its Swiss regiments that it believes it possible to keep them in check.

This progress of opinion is owing to several causes, which we shall endeavour to state, because they show the mistakes of the ruling party, and the difficulty which it experiences in producing on the mind of the people an influence favourable to its views. It is a settled point with the



adherents of this party, that the decline of the influence of the nobility and the Catholic clergy, and the Revolution itself, were all occasioned by the philosophical writers of the eighteenth century. Consequently, they banish, as much as possible, from the hands of youth, all these dangerous productions; and recommend to their perusal those of the preceding century, which they honour with the appellation of *classics*. This is now considered as a fine stroke of policy. They seem to imagine, that if an author has lived and written under a despotic government and a bigoted court, the perusal of his works is the likeliest thing in the world to inspire a taste for despotism and bigotry! Nothing, however, can be more ignorant or absurd than such an opinion. Does the ruling party really believe that the tragedies of Corneille, and the portraits he exhibits of Roman grandeur and independence, are likely to inspire the spectators with a love of despotism?—Or that the perusal of Pascal, and of the *Tartuffe*, will make the Jesuits more popular?—Or that the *Marquises* and *Comptes* of Molière will tend materially to raise the character of the ancient nobility? Among those who read nothing, we can understand such opinions; but how is it that the oracles of the party—the Chateaubriands, the Bonalds, and Ferrands, can be insensible to the danger of their friends? Do they not perceive that every work of thought and genius, down to the *Fables* of La Fontaine, is pregnant with dangerous opinions? Can they forget that the courtly Boileau has turned the monks into ridicule, and laughed at a nobility, which even then had fallen from its high estate? Do they not, in short, perceive that a government, anxious to restore to its original grandeur a fallen nobility, should be more cautious in claiming the admiration of the public for that monarch who himself laboured most effectually to degrade them? The writers of the eighteenth century may perhaps be dangerous to the party which calls itself aristocratic, but those of the seventeenth are in many respects still more so.

The monarchy men then would have gained little by this studious exclusion of the writers of the eighteenth century from the hands of youth, even if their efforts had been successful: but they have been far otherwise. Scarcely had the denunciations of the bishops against Voltaire and Rousseau appeared, ere the curiosity of the public and the interests of the booksellers were awakened. Men who knew little of the literature of the eighteenth century immediately became anxious to know more of it, when a party, which it disliked, was incautious enough to proclaim that it considered it as dangerous. Those who were acquainted with it, but had for a long time paid no attention to it, became desirous of renewing their acquaintance. The demand for books of this sort increased so much, that from 1817 to 1823 the press produced more philosophical works than it had done for sixty years before. Not only were the philosophical essays of the writers of the last century republished separately, and at the lowest possible prices, but complete editions of their whole works appeared. Within these six years nine or ten complete editions of the works of Voltaire have been published, each extending to at least 2000 copies, without reckoning the partial editions of his historical, dramatic, and philosophic works. The monarchy men became convinced that the study of French history was dangerous to them; and, accordingly, it was forbidden to be taught, or even mentioned, in any summary of education. But the only effect of the prohibition was to stimulate the interest of the public and the booksellers—and immediately writers of eminence began to present, in a new point of view, the history of their country. They even went farther; for after republishing the writings of

Mably, they published the original works from which their materials had been obtained. The government, perceiving that, in spite of all their efforts, intelligence was gaining ground among men of mature age, then endeavoured to prevent as much as possible its operation on youth; and the notable plan they took was worthy of its object. They decided, that children placed in schools, and who were in the practice of spending Sundays with their relatives, should only be allowed to visit them once a fortnight, in order to save them from the contagion of such dangerous society.

The influence, then, which the ruling party possesses by its monopoly of education, is really less extensive than it appears to be: and, by the help of the booksellers, may be said to have recoiled on itself. The same remark is applicable to the influence of the Catholic clergy. During those ages when industry had no existence, when the people were still in a semi-barbarous state, when every one was either an oppressor or oppressed, and when the property devolved on the eldest son to the exclusion of the rest, the church was an admirable resource for a large part of the population. It offered to the weak a refuge from oppression; a subsistence to the younger sons of good families; and, to those who possessed the slender stock of information then current, the means of pursuing their favourite studies. In the same manner, when the church had acquired great influence and riches, ecclesiastical offices might hold out inducements to men of rank or talents. But the Revolution has produced a remarkable and a permanent change in France;—the clergy no longer form a peculiar body in the state. The individuals that compose it are now merely the pensioners of government, and their allowances are not large enough to tempt their cupidity. The personal security of every other subject is now placed on the same footing with that of an ecclesiastic. The advancement of industry, the progress of the arts and sciences, hold out to men of good education and slender fortune many means of living. The motives, therefore, which formerly induced men to adopt the ecclesiastical profession no longer exist; while the condition of celibacy, which is still attached to it, prevents many from doing so who would otherwise have been inclined to it.

The consequence of these extensive changes has been, that at present the ecclesiastical profession is embraced by few but peasants and small farmers; and it is even a matter of some difficulty to find *curés* and *vicaires* for all the parishes. The Imperial administration, in order to fill its seminaries, was obliged to declare, that every one destined for the church should be exempt from conscriptions. This was at that time a privilege of some consequence, for it was granted to no other profession; and the young men who chose to procure exemption from military service by providing substitutes, were obliged to sacrifice ten or twelve thousand francs, and sometimes more. But the privilege cannot now be attended with the same effects, because the military profession is no longer attended with the same danger. The clergymen of the Catholic persuasion belong, therefore, in general, to the lower ranks of society. Their education is but indifferent, and they have no immediate connection with persons of weight or authority. Their influence, therefore, is now in a great measure confined to the lower classes of society;—and there it is, no doubt, still sufficiently strong, in those departments where the want of occupation, and the misery which accompanies it, dispose the mind to receive and to retain any impression which is communicated to it. But in those countries where employment affords certain means of living, the inhabitants have

no leisure for fanaticism. It may excite, perhaps, a momentary enthusiasm among a few, but the impression soon loses its force; the people resume their labours, and come speedily to think only of their own affairs.

The army appears, no doubt, a more dangerous instrument; and the privileged bodies are really so. The army, however, even supposing it at this moment inclined to oppose every popular movement, is itself no inconsiderable source of danger to any one who wishes to enslave the population. In France there are no taxes for the support of the poor; and consequently there are scarcely any poor to be supported. In the large towns, beggars are, no doubt, to be found; but these are mostly infirm old people, and quite unfit for military service. Great armies, however, can never be raised with ease among a people who have other means of subsistence: and in the present state of its finances, it may be fairly considered as impossible for the French government to support such an army by voluntary enlistment. The Bourbons, on their arrival in France, promised to abolish the conscription; believing, no doubt, that they would find the people as they had left them, and that the beggars, whom the charity of the monks had created, would be still numerous enough to recruit their armies. Experience, however, has undeceived them,—and in order to obtain soldiers, they have been obliged to have recourse to a forced levy of 40,000 men every year. But to balance this, an equal number must have left the army at the expiration of their four years' service, to mingle again with their fellow-citizens. It is not difficult to perceive the natural result of all this: at the end of a few years, there would be many more soldiers in the body of the nation than in the ranks of government; and were a popular movement to take place, the smaller number would not probably be the strongest. The ruling party has of late become sensible of this danger; but has hitherto been unable to counteract it.

It follows, then, that the influence which they now exercise over the people is entirely of a *material* kind: it is a physical force employed to separate and to hold in check the citizens. The party has been more than once overturned. And is there any reason to believe that its influence and real power are now more firmly rooted than at these different periods of the Revolution? Has any master-spirit since appeared on its side to turn the tide of public feeling in its favour? Vanity may perhaps induce some ultra-orator, or some government writer, to ascribe such effects to his own labours; but he will be found, we believe, to monopolise the opinion. What has the government done during the ten years of its existence, which is likely to conciliate the favour of the people? Let us examine briefly the amount of its favours. 1. It has nearly doubled the amount of contributions which existed under the Imperial government. 2. It has increased the public debt three fourths. 3. It has allowed the ministers of the Catholic religion to perform their ceremonies out of church, even in those towns where a great part of the population consists of Protestants. 4. It has annulled the divorce laws, because the Catholic clergy chose to have it so. 5. It has increased the revenues of the clergy, and multiplied the number of bishoprics. 6. It has restored to the clergy the power of receiving gifts by testament, a privilege of which they had been deprived, to prevent families from being injured by the weakness of dying persons, and the influence of their confessors. 7. It has multiplied prohibitory laws, or raised the duties on importation so much that they amount to a prohibition. 8. Lastly, It has made war on Spain. If we add to these the individual hardships which have resulted from par-

ticular measures,—the trials for supposed conspiracies which have taken place for five or six years,—the system of persecution which is still directed against the opposition deputies,—the imprisonments, banishments, and capital punishments,—we shall see no reason to think that its popularity is on the increase.

It is indeed obviously impossible that a party, which has no hold on public opinion, which has been defeated in every struggle in which it has been engaged, and has never been able to regain its power but by the aid of foreign force, should, on its present principles of government, continue long to govern. Should no peculiar accident happen to shake its power, the operation of time alone would be sufficient to destroy it. The men who suffered by the Revolution may naturally feel inclined to persecute those to whom they attribute their misfortunes, and to revenge themselves for the humiliation they experienced at their hands. But these vindictive feelings and these prejudices will not readily descend to the next generation. The Holy Alliance may calculate perhaps on the services of those whom it has restored to the throne; but it would be a great mistake to reckon on those of their descendants. The yoke which weighs so heavily on France and on Europe may be of long duration, if its length be estimated by the life of an individual; and the men who have fought in the cause of liberty might be thought to have laboured in vain, had their toils and their blood been expended with a view merely to their own personal advantage. But if the importance of events is to be estimated by the influence they are calculated to exert over the destinies of mankind—if the blood which has been shed, and the toils which have been endured, have been given to liberty, and not to interest,—even while we lament the evils which are inseparable from such a struggle, we feel the triumphant conviction that the interests of freedom have been advanced.

We have endeavoured particularly to show the state of France, because it is on the condition of this country that the existence of the Holy Alliance, and, consequently, the fate of neighbouring nations, seems mainly to depend. England may have assisted Russia, Austria, and Prussia, in shaking off the yoke of Bonaparte; but should events place it in the power of Europe to break the fetters of the Holy Alliance, the armies and subsidies of England would never be employed in re-uniting them.

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#### THE FRENCH REVOLUTION OF 1830.\*

SINCE the breaking out of the French Revolution, excepting, perhaps, the failure of Napoleon in Russia and the downfall of his enormous power, no event has occurred on the continent of Europe that will stand in any kind of comparison with the late proceedings in Paris. The influence which they are calculated to exert, both upon the condition of the great people over whose name they have shed the lustre of an imperishable renown, and the more wide spreading consequences that must speedily flow from them in every other country, forcibly arrest our attention at the present moment, and demand a calm discussion. If all man-

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\* *Réflexions sur la France; Vices de son Gouvernement; Causes du Mécontentement des Français sous le Ministère de Polignac, &c.* Par M. St. Maurice. 8vo. — Vol. lii. page 1. October, 1830.

kind are interested in this glorious achievement, Englishmen surely have of all others the deepest concern in its effects, not merely as well-wishers to the liberties of other nations, but as feeling watchful of every encroachment upon their own; for with the fullest disposition charitably to construe the feelings and principles of our own rulers, we take it to be abundantly manifest, that the battle of English liberty has really been fought and won at Paris. Under the influence of these impressions, we advance to the contemplation of this mighty theme; and we deem it a sacred duty to view it, deliberately and candidly indeed, but with entire freedom, and without even the least respect of persons, or the most remote care to whom our remarks may prove offensive. Our purpose is certainly to speak the truth, and not to give offence; but if the truth prove unpalatable to any, be theirs the blame, not ours.

As soon as the Prince Polignac was called to the head of the French king's councils, the disposition to favour the Jesuits, to undo the effects of the Revolution, and to counteract the current of liberal opinions, long enough apparent in the conduct of Charles X. and his bigoted daughter-in-law, broke forth without any restraint, and kept no terms with any antagonist. The Dauphin, if indeed he really differed from his family in point of sense, and thus perceived the precipice towards which they were hurrying, was silenced, and borne along by the imperious passions of his fanatical consort. Among the old nobility who surrounded the throne, none had the wisdom to discern, or the virtue to point out, the perils which beset it. The priests ruled supreme over the monarch, or divided their dominion with the Dauphiness. Nor had they the sense to see, in their thirst for revenge, that the impetuosity of the pursuit might frustrate the attainment of their object. One or two military men, of Napoleon's school, were in some credit with the court; but their habitual disregard of the people, and confidence in the steadiness of the army, made them the worst of all advisers, while they gave encouragement to those who looked for their services, as tools at once unprincipled and submissive.

The description of the colleagues to whom the Prince was associated further betrayed alike the dispositions and the blindness of the court. Labourdonnaye was a man of honour and principle; but, from the sustained violence of his political opinions, all avowedly in favour of arbitrary power, and against every vestige of the revolutionary improvements, his name was regarded as the synonyme of the ancient *régime*, in church and in state — old parliaments — old feudal privileges — an insolent nobility — and a bloated priesthood. His extreme violence in debate had marked him out still more for general dislike; and he was the object of unceasing animosity to one party, without securing the good will of the other, whose distrust was excited by his intolerant presumption, and unheeding temerity. A few unknown and insignificant men, such as Ranville, were the make-weights of the junto; but one there was, besides Labourdonnaye, for whom it would have been well could he have been unknown. General Bourmont was hated, if not despised, by the army; but his treachery to it was sufficient to win the confidence of the Bourbons; and, whether from the disposition, too common with kings, to trust those who are thrown as it were into their arms, by being left at their mercy, in the universal distrust and hatred of the rest of mankind, or because such an arrangement would insult and degrade the French army, this person was selected from among its gallant captains, and placed at the head of the war department. He had, moreover,

served with the Dauphin in the shameful war against the liberties of Spain ; and having enabled one branch of the Bourbons to trample upon freedom abroad, he might be employed in helping another to crush it at home.

The announcement of such names completed the impression which the elevation of Polignac was calculated to excite, and it spread consternation through all France. Reflecting men saw on the throne a prince of weak understanding, but furious bigotry, the declared enemy of all liberty, civil and religious, and blindly bent, under the dictation of his confessor, upon working out his own salvation, by rooting up every vestige of the blessings which his people had gained, at the price of so much suffering for a quarter of a century. Around him they perceived a younger brood of the self-same character, who shut out all hope of better times, because the fanaticism of the old king's successors was quite as furious as his own. The chief minister was a weak and reckless bigot ; a man of no pretensions to capacity, or knowledge, or experience ; whose dulness and frivolity made his mind impervious to reason ; whose fanaticism made it proof against fear. His colleagues were one or two obscure and desperate adventurers, the Coryphæus of the ultra royalists, and the deserter of his post on the eve of the battle which had inflicted on the French the unmitigated evils of the Restoration. Among the tools with which this portentous cabinet had to work, were some of the most unprincipled of Napoleon's generals, men grown grey in the career of cruelty, profligacy, and oppression ; practising in the court of the Bourbons all the suppleness which they had learnt in their riper age under the despotism of the Usurper ; and ready to rehearse once more, in the streets of the capital, the early lessons of butchery which had been familiar to their more tender years, under the Convention and the Directory. So prodigious a combination of evil designs, blind violence, and unprincipled instruments, had seldom been arrayed against the happiness of any people. The firmest beholder could not contemplate it without alarm, nor could the most sanguine descry any ground of hope, save in the chance of fatal errors being committed by such adversaries. These errors we will not say rescued, but enabled the people to rescue, their country.

For a while there were no grounds of discontent or of opposition afforded by the proceedings of the new ministry ; and, accordingly, the slavish doctrine, so full of mischief, and so calculated to gain the favour of feeble, thoughtless, and spiritless natures, was every day echoed in our ears, " Measures, not Men." We were told not to condemn the ministry without a trial ; we were bid to wait until they should do some act deserving of reprobation ; we were asked what harm they had done, or attempted, that justified such an universal clamour as was raised against them ? " Only be quiet for a little while," it was said significantly, " and you may find their measures exactly such as you would yourself approve." But the more reflecting and sagacious did not choose to wait until it should be too late to resist with effect—too late for any thing, except to be laughed at by the deceiver. They knew full well, that if you suffer men unworthy of confidence to rule, they can always choose their own time for undermining your defences ; that they may, by slow degrees, by carrying little encroachments at a time, gain a power no longer to be resisted ; that, if opposition is delayed until their time comes—until they shall do some act deserving of reprobation—they may be enabled to do the act, and may leave you, its victims, nothing for your consolation except to reprobate. The French had the sense to prefer

effectual prevention while it was yet time, to unavailing blame when the time was past; they rejected the kind, and judicious, and, as it was termed, temperate counsel of their worst enemies on both sides of the Channel; and they raised all over the country one loud cry for the removal of a ministry at once odious and contemptible. The firmness of the court was not shaken by this universal expression of public opinion; the vain feeble creature who had become prime minister held his ground; the Chambers were dissolved, that a new election might improve their subserviency; and the friends of despotic power, in both France and England, fondly and foolishly hoped that the day was their own. Every engine of influence was set in motion; praise to whom praise was due, honours to whom honours, threats to whom threats, and bribes to whom bribes. The existence, at least the peaceful existence, of the dynasty was staked upon the issue of the contest; and no pains were spared, and no scruples were allowed to intervene, and no means were either neglected, or despised, or rejected, which might further the return of a more complying legislature. The constant cry of "Measures, not Men," was repeated—that cry which so often bewilders honest, weak men in England, and leads to such remediless mischief, and stands in the way of so much solid improvement, enabling the enemies of all amendment in every branch of our system to maintain their ground, and resist every good measure:—that cry which, beyond every other, is in its operation self-contradictory, and in its effects self-destructive, inasmuch as, under the vain and flimsy pretext of making measures every thing, the means are afforded of frustrating all measures, and making all good intentions nothing. This cry, so plausible, so perilous among the ignorant, so well adapted to mislead the unwary and inexperienced, was echoed wherever two or three were gathered together to vote for deputies, or electors, or presidents. It was every where attempted;—thanks to the good sense and the firmness of the people, it every where signally failed;—and they wisely chose the *men* who were most sure to promote the *measures* which the public safety demanded, by wresting the power of putting that safety in jeopardy from the *men* who were bent upon the worst of *measures*, and those *measures* would inevitably carry, if power were left in their hands. This hypocritical, this canting pretext, sustained a defeat every where, from which it has not yet recovered; and a representative body was elected, resolutely bent upon doing its duty in the only manly, rational, and effectual manner by which France could be rescued, and her liberties saved.

The new Chambers met, with the eyes of the whole civilised world anxiously bent towards them. The first step showed how much the government had gained by the dissolution. In England, had the most weak and despised ministry that ever ruled the state dissolved the Parliament, and a new House of Commons been returned, the most adverse to their continuance in office, we much fear that a thousand follies—squeamishness in some—alarm in others—politeness towards individuals in one—indolence and idleness in another—the wish not to offend the court or the minister before it was necessary—the love, or the pretence, or the cant of candour—the desire of being, or appearing, moderate—the influence of wives and daughters loving courts and parties—the slowness to commit themselves unnecessarily—fox-hunting, if the weather was mild—Newmarket the alternate weeks—customary residence till Christmas in the country—a condescending visit and shooting performed by some duke—a gracious one accorded by

some prince — letters, half-chiding, half-tender, from some lady of influence and activity — would, altogether, have made the attempt quite hopeless to bring forward, in the very beginning of the session, all the force gained by the opposition during the elections. A new speaker might be proposed; the man least popular with the House, least suited for the station. But in vain would the leaders of the Opposition expect their followers to muster on so fitting an occasion, and display their strength, so as at one blow to crush the common adversary. “The question is too personal” — “It is beginning too early to oppose the government” — “Wait till some measure is brought forward” — “Why take the field before even the King’s speech” — “Wait till after the holidays” — “Any measure of economical reform I will support” — “I am against Negro Slavery, in a temperate way” — “I would even give Manchester members” — “This looks too like a party measure;” — such would have been the answers of the stout and independent members of an English opposition, to the proposition not to let an incapable minister dictate to a strong and a discontented parliament. Such are the causes of misrule in England, by ministers with neither influence in or out of doors — such are the glaring, rather let us say, such have hitherto been the glaring, the inexpiable breaches of all public duty, committed by men chosen to protect the interest of the people, and professing themselves to be the independent friends of right government. From the tools of the ministry, of course, nothing is expected, and no blame is imputed to them. On the contrary, they are steady to their purpose, and ever at their post. Their employer finds them worthy of their hire; the government has no right to complain of them. It is the people that have a right to complain; it is the pretended friends of the people that are wanting to their employers; it is the loud pretender to patriotism and independence that slumbers at his post, or is never found near it, and wilfully suffers the men to domineer whom he was sent to oppose, and the measures to languish and to fail, which on the hustings he vowed to support. Hence it is, that the weakest of cabinets has ceased to dread even the most powerful opposition; and that the least popular of monarchs has found it an easy matter to choose his ministers, almost with as little regard to the public voice, as if he were choosing his household servants.

Not such was the manly, and ever to be respected, demeanour of the French opposition. No silly, effeminate fear of being thought hasty, or rash, or factious — no preference of personal to public considerations — no listening to the voice either of sloth, or flattery, or cant — could turn these sagacious and firm-minded men from their honest and avowed purpose. They were as mild in their converse as our weak patriots — as civil, as refined in the drawing-rooms — as well-disposed to set a just value upon the intercourse of social life, as the most subservient of our emasculated or superannuated frequenters of “fashionable circles” can be for the little lives of them. But in the Chambers they knew they had a duty to perform, and a country to watch them; and they threw off the fribble when they entered those halls, whither they had been sent under a pledge to rid the nation of a government which oppressed and disgraced it. The Chambers met — the Presidents were proposed — the Opposition mustered on the first vote — the Ministry were signally and shamefully beaten — and all men saw that either the fate of the ministry, or of the dynasty which supported it, was irrecoverably sealed. We ourselves predicted this result of the dissolution. “The elections,” we said in our



last number, (p. 565.) “are closed; the result has disappointed none but the purblind minions of power; and nothing seems to await the ill-advised monarch, but the choice of abandoning his throne, or retracing the steps by which he has lost the confidence of his people, hazarded the existence of his dynasty, and endangered the tranquillity of France, and the peace of Europe.”

It was now that the character of both the royal family and its ministers broke out in all its force, and in all its frailty. They were persons manifestly beyond the reach of those motives and instincts, which provide for the safety of ordinary mortals. They were inaccessible to rational apprehensions of approaching danger, because they were impenetrable to reason; they were incapable of instinctive fear, because their minds and their feelings, and almost their senses, were hardened and perverted by fanaticism. Among the rest, the Prince Polignac stood conspicuous,—towering over all in folly and presumption; calmer than any in the midst of perils from which no genius could escape, and difficulties from which all the art of man could not extricate itself; and yet shining in the full vigour of an incapacity, wholly without example in any European minister or potentate from the days of the Idiot Kings—presenting to the astonished gaze of the world a union almost preternatural of serene, self-complacent confidence, in the negation of every human qualification for his place, and the absence of all chance of unravelling the toils wherein he had entangled himself.

All men were aware of the desperate situation of the government; all saw, too, that it was utterly incapable of grappling with even the most ordinary difficulties. But no one could have divined the remedy which was actually applied for its relief. A majority against the ministry had occasioned the dissolution: when that majority, in consequence of one general election, had been nearly doubled, who could have fancied that the remedy would be another dissolution and another general election? Who could have fathomed the depths of that moon-stricken folly, which should dream of lessening the disadvantage accruing from one appeal to the people by a second appeal, in contempt of the first—the senseless stupidity of expecting that the people would be gained over to the government, and choose obsequious representatives, in return for the insult of rejecting those first selected, and rendering void and of none effect the whole elections which the people had deliberately made? Yet such was the expedient to which the government had recourse. Nor is the din yet out of our ears of the applause bestowed upon this act of insanity, by the clamorous advocates of despotism both in England and in France. “The firmness of purpose displayed by the Bourbons”—“That unshaken resolution, not to be moved by threats, exhibited by Prince Polignac”—“The extraordinary vigour of this distinguished minister, fitting him for the troublous times he lives in”—“The statesmanlike capacity shown by the French Premier, who, had Louis XVI. been fortunate enough to possess such a minister, would speedily have put down the Revolution:”—such was the language of the ministerial advocates in both courts, for in both they made common cause. Never did they consider the second dissolution as any thing other than as a mark of transcendent genius, and an augury most favourable to the grand struggle now making in France for legitimate rights, against the insolence of popular pretensions. It was, however, more than insinuated by those wise adherents of government on both sides of the Channel, that the Bourbon ministers had other resources to support them besides their

prospect of overawing the country by their undaunted front. "They were resolute in their purpose of not yielding; and determined not to be defeated without a struggle."

The dissolution having been proclaimed, men anxiously waited for the next step of those infatuated creatures. Nor was the interval long—so short, indeed, that to this day it is an inexplicable mystery what could be the meaning of the second dissolution—for it had not been made known above a week, when the memorable Ordinances were issued, which at once brought on a crisis never to be forgotten till time shall be no more. The insensate mortals who ruled thirty millions of freemen, by one stroke of the pen abolished the constitution, changed the law of election, and destroyed the liberty of the press. The troops which filled and surrounded Paris were charged with the execution of this Decree.

Attempts have since been made by the friends of the French ministers, to shift from them to their master the frightful responsibility of this measure. In vain! For did not those ministers draw up that prolix and elaborate statement, submitted by them, and signed with their names, detailing all the arguments upon which they thought fit to ground their earnest recommendation of the measure they were calling down from the throne upon the nation? That document surely is not so swiftly forgotten, which was hailed with so much rapture by the sycophants of despotism all over Europe—and which, even in England, gladdened a few of the most noisy, but most despicable creatures that are suffered by Providence to crawl upon the face of the earth. They have not, assuredly, forgotten that "firm and manly document"—that "highly statesmanlike paper"—"that vigorous and decisive instrument, so well worthy of the great occasion which called it forth." But if they have, others have not; and its authors may not find it so easy to wriggle out of it, as its admirers now do to cast it into the shade.

The shameless and profligate measure thus entirely acceptable to the lovers of despotism produced an immediate resistance on the part of the people. All men saw that the worst of designs menaced them, and felt that there was not a moment to lose in resisting the audacious attacks upon their liberty. They stopped not to argue on the niceties of the case; they waited not the effects of discussions and publicity; they rejected, with a just and a memorable indignation, the vile proposition which some slaves dared to make, of having the question between them and their oppressors tried in the courts of law. Exercising the sacred and imprescriptible rights of freemen, they instantly flew to arms, well aware that they who stop to parley with tyranny, above all with military tyranny, are already subdued and enslaved. They acted at once upon the sure principle, that the only way of meeting a tyrant is in the field and the fight. They were tried, and were not found wanting. The wretches who had framed the Ordinance backed it with armed men. The slaves of Napoleon, now of the Bourbon despot, headed the mercenaries, which Switzerland infamously hires out to shed the blood of freemen for the lucre of gain—an enormity which well deserves that those sordid states should be annihilated as an independent power. The Swiss fought against the people; but few indeed of the French soldiers could be induced to join in the fray. Now was seen that glorious sight which has filled all Europe with ceaseless admiration, and will hand down the name of Parisian to the gratitude of the latest posterity. The peaceable citizens of the capital closed their shops; left their daily vocations; barricaded the streets; tore up the pavements; armed and unarmed confronted the enemy, and poured on

every side the swift destruction that awaits troops acting in a town thickly peopled by men determined to be free. The awful lesson now taught to all soldiers — the bright example now held up to all freemen — is the more worthy of being had in perpetual remembrance, because there was no discipline, no concert, no skill of any kind displayed, or required. All men had one common object, to slay the troops that dared oppose them — to embrace those soldiers that still remembered they were citizens. Several regiments of the line at once refused to act; but few joined the people. The refusal, however, was of the last importance, for it spread among the ranks of the whole army, filling the tyrants with despair, and animating the people to new feats of valour. The courage of these gallant men surpassed all belief. Many rushed upon the loaded guns that were pointed with savage barbarity by the bloodthirsty tyrants down streets crowded to excess. The old and the young vied with men of mature years, and women bore their share in the strife. From behind the barricades, the boys of the Polytechnic School, braving the cannon, and only seeking shelter from the musketry and the bayonets, maintained a constant fire. The multitude loaded and handed them their guns; and so steady was their aim, that of one regiment, they killed five hundred men, and all the officers save three. The slaughter of the people, indeed, was great; three or four thousand fell; but as many of the mercenaries were made to bite the dust. The victory declared every where for the citizens; the soldiers retreated; the National Guard was formed as in 1789, and under the command of the same gallant and venerable chief, the patriarch of the revolution in both the old world and the new; — and the Bourbons ceased to reign.

But where were the vile authors of this atrocity, while slaughter reigned on every side? Where were the men who had let loose the soldiery upon the multitude, to maintain their own power? Where were they, those “firm and vigorous statesmen,” whose courage had been extolled in all the haunts of despotism? Where were they, when the danger was near, and there was a possibility of their lives being made the forfeit of their unheard-of crimes? This question no man can answer. No man knows where the person of the wretched Polignac was, while the battle raged which he had ordered to begin. This only is known, that he was no where seen in the battle, and that he and his colleagues all fled to a distance from the scene of action, in various directions. Some of them have since been taken; and if they are suffered to escape condign punishment, a premium is held out to treason against the liberties of the people, while all men know that unsuccessful efforts on behalf of those liberties lead to an inevitable fate.

The conduct of the French people on this occasion was truly above all human praise. Their moderation in victory even exceeded the bravery that gained it. No one act of cruelty stained the glorious laurels which they had won. Even plunder was unknown among the poorest classes of the multitude. A most affecting circumstance, which cannot be told without emotion, is related of those who opened the bankers' and goldsmiths' shops. The lowest of the mob were for hours among untold treasure, and unwitnessed; not a farthing — not a trinket was touched. The same persons were seen, after the fatigues and perils of the day, begging charity, that they might have wherewithal to purchase the meal of the evening; and when the purses of the admiring bystanders were pressed upon them, a few pence was all they would accept? No Greek, no Roman virtue ever surpassed, ever equalled, this.

In casting our eye over the magnificent picture of which we have only been able to sketch a faint outline, we must again, as in reviewing the contests of the senate which preceded the battle in the field, acknowledge the superiority of our neighbours over ourselves. It can hardly be doubted that, were any marked attempts made against the liberties of this country, the English people would in some way resist; and would, sooner or later, make an effectual stand against oppression. But it is, to us, equally clear, that despotism would have far too good a chance of being successful in the first instance. So many would go about preaching up prudence, moderation, peaceable measures — so prodigious an effusion of cant would be made in favour of our “immaculate tribunals,” that the tendency would, we fear, be pretty general to have the question between the government and the people brought to issue in a court of law. Yet who can pretend to doubt that almost all courts of law lean habitually towards the existing government? Who can doubt that the judges are in their nature wellwishers to what they term a firm or strong government, and regard with a jealous eye all popular feeling and popular rights? Who is so ignorant of judicial proceedings as not to know that a little new law is always forthcoming for any pressing occasion — sometimes raked up from old authorities or long-forgotten cases — sometimes derived from vague and common-law principles — sometimes boldly, and even impudently, made to suit the purpose of the hour? Who does not know that the learned judges have a way of just grinding a little law for present use; so that, though you may not always be able to tell beforehand by what route they will arrive at their conclusion, you have a pretty good guess of the side they will decide for, — namely, the crown, or its officers, against the people and their friends? Verily, we do fear greatly, that an appeal made to such guardians of the constitution in this country would have led to a decision in the oppressor’s favour; and that, at all events, the House of Lords, in the last resort, would have determined in favour of the “noble duke,” or the “noble lord in the blue riband,” at the head of his Majesty’s government. We are far from believing that this would have ended the dispute: new encroachments would have begotten fresh remonstrances, till in the end the resistance would have been effectual — the tyrant would have been overthrown, and the successors of Judge Jefferies would have justly shared his fate. But a very long time would have been required for all this, and much would in the meanwhile have been endured. Nay, had the government only been content with a considerable encroachment on the rights of the people, and not pushed matters to the utmost extremity, no resistance at all would have been offered; and aided by the courts of law, the rulers would have triumphed in security, so they were only moderate in their oppressions. If no such thing can now so happen, let us be well assured, that it is because of the glorious example set to us, and the fatal warning held out to our rulers, by the French people. But we deem it a duty to state these matters, painful and mortifying though they be to national pride. We are not the first of nations, perhaps, in all qualities; but in that of self-praise, self-complacency, self-exaltation, we surely far excel every people that ever existed. It is but right that, where a case occurs to mortify this pride, to set before our eyes the reality — we should meditate upon it, in justice to the merits of other nations, and in order to learn a lesson of humility and wisdom ourselves.

It is fit that we should now pause upon the extraordinary crisis, over the history of which we have thrown a rapid glance; and we are to con-

sider what reflections are principally suggested by it, in two respects, — first, as regards France herself; and, secondly, as regards other countries, and especially our own.

I. Nothing can be more important to the interests of France, to her liberties, and to her tranquillity, than the exemplary good conduct of the people, in both the trying predicaments in which they were placed — at the beginning, namely, and at the close of the revolution. The great promptitude with which they met the aggression upon their freedom, and the marvellous temperance with which they used their victory, almost cast into the shade the brilliant courage that secured it. Both the one and the other will be productive of inestimable benefits to France. The swiftness with which punishment followed crime will, for ages to come, operate as a salutary warning to all tyrants, that they can no longer hope with impunity to encroach upon the liberties of their subjects. Men who are touched by no feelings of compassion for their fellow-creatures, influenced by no principles of public virtue, are found accessible to fear; but when a prince once permits himself to plot against his subjects, he is armed with some resolution, and he can face remote dangers, of slow approach and uncertain arrival, in the pursuit of a favourite object. His advisers, too, may be disposed to run some such risks, or at any rate to let their master encounter them. “Things will last my time, at all events,” say they; and thus mischief is hatched or counselled. But such persons have now learnt that they have no breathing time, no respite, no opportunity of escape; they must lay their account with an instant crisis; they must make up their minds to the combat, at a moment not chosen by themselves; and the combat in question is the real, actual operation of being bodily attacked, and either slaughtered, or banished, or imprisoned, and speedily hanged. It follows, that responsibility in France has become real, from being nominal; and the people of that country will not be long in finding the important advantages of the change.

But the moderation of their late proceedings is almost equally beneficial in its tendency. Had any needless violence, any blood-thirsty excesses, been committed, the natural aversion to cruelty would have produced a re-action like that of the first revolution, and made it almost impossible again to excite resistance against unjust rulers. What gave the oppressions and extortions of the Directory their unchecked course? — nay, what enthroned Napoleon on the ruins of the republic, and then sustained his despotic authority at the cost of so much suffering to the whole of the people — what but the awful recollections of the far more hideous reign of terror, and the resolution to suffer any thing rather than plunge again into such dismal scenes? The tyranny of Napoleon and his conscription gained in like manner a much longer respite for the crimes and follies of the Bourbons, than they otherwise would have had. But now the people know, that treason against the constitution may be resisted without any criminal excess; that the sacred duty of self-defence can be performed without needless violence; that the people can exact condign punishment from evil rulers with as much deliberation as the government can from rebellious subjects. The lesson upon resistance which Mr. Fox wisely inculcated, is now taught in a way too striking to be erased from the memory of the French rulers. He said, that resistance was a right which the people should as seldom as possible remember, but which the government ought never to forget.

The stability of the new government will be mainly secured by the same moderation. It has thence happened that a revolution of great

extent, and carried by much bloodshed, has left behind it no angry feelings, no boisterous triumph, on the one hand — no needless humiliation on the other. A people so demeaning themselves are worthy of their rulers; and armed with the strength thus conferred on them, those rulers will do their duty by the people, trusting them liberally, but governing them so as to secure the tranquillity of the state.

It now becomes a most important question, how this tranquillity, and the permanence of a good constitutional arrangement, may best be provided for? We throw out a few reflections upon this point with freedom, but with sincere respect for the illustrious patriots from whom we may in some particulars be thought to dissent.

It seems to us of supreme importance, that the elective franchise should be placed upon a more extended basis. So very few persons have the right of voting at present, that an occasion might arise when intrigues, either of turbulent demagogues prone to change, or of courtiers desirous to extend the royal prerogative, would, in favourable circumstances, obtain a majority in the Chambers, against the sense of the community at large. Both the stability of the throne, and the liberties of the country, would be best secured by such a reform as we are now alluding to.

A serious danger appears to impend over the state from an opposite quarter. There is an absolute necessity for arming the executive with sufficient power to render it capable of administering firmly the great functions which belong to it; — the conservation of the peace at home, and the proper representation of the nation in its intercourse with foreign powers. On this depends the security of the two greatest blessings which any state can enjoy, domestic tranquillity, and peace abroad. But after suffering so much from the grasping propensity of their princes, and experiencing so largely what their false nature is capable of, it is not unnatural for the French people to be over-jealous of the prerogative, and to close their eyes entirely upon the dangers of too weak a sovereign power, while intent upon counteracting the hazards of one too strong. Some crude, and exceedingly alarming opinions that have been ventilated in Paris, and partially repeated in this country, suggest to us the apprehensions under which we are now writing. The best and shortest way of pursuing the subject will be at once to state these.

Much discussion took place previous to the act of settlement in favour of the Orleans branch, upon the important subject of the nobility. It was proposed to restrain the rights of that order, in a manner unprecedented in any state where aristocracy is at all recognised; and the abolition of hereditary rank, or confining the peerage to the lives of the persons first ennobled, was very openly proposed, and the farther consideration of the matter only postponed. It is impossible to contemplate such a change without the greatest alarm; but we even view the entertainment of the subject with apprehension; because it seems to betoken a very superficial acquaintance with the question, and a very light way of treating so weighty a concern. If nobility is to expire with each peer that is created, what an enormous influence is given to the crown, over the families of the aristocracy! All men love to transmit their honours in their own blood. What peer, then, will dare to oppose the court, especially towards his latter years, if he can only hope to leave his son noble, by gaining the favour of the sovereign, or his servants? Then, how few sons of peers will dare do their duty, when it may cost them the fall from their father's estate and privileges? A more certain method,

as it seems to us, could not be devised, of rendering all the peers subservient to the ministry for the time being; and also of enlisting, on the same side, whatever of weight and influence the families of the peers possess out of the Upper House. Yet, it is in vain to deny that this proposition was grounded upon an over-jealousy of the crown, and a dissatisfaction with the peers for leaning too much against the people, and in favour of the court.

We shall not detail the various ways in which it is manifest that such an arrangement would be wholly repugnant to the very nature of a nobility. It would, in fact, convert all the aristocracy into so many place-holders for life, without salary; it would be abolishing nobility, and extending the number of orders of knighthood, but with this difference, that the knights would have legislative privileges. Who in England seeks among the bishops for the stout opposers of the court? Yet such a measure would make the whole Upper House bishops or peers for life. We must really take leave to say, that as long as the restrictions upon the rights of primogeniture are so opposed to the accumulation of large estates in the aristocracy, there is no ground for alarm, lest that order should be too powerful: but this plan would not merely annihilate their power — which would be one evil — it would produce a far greater mischief, by annihilating their independence. The order would remain, with much direct legislative power, and some little influence of station; but all this power and influence would be habitually devoted to the service of the court.

Another subject of great alarm to us is the constitution of the National Guard. This is a most important body — for good or for evil, most powerful. It sprung into existence almost in an instant, during the early stages of the first revolution: 100,000 men took up arms in Paris alone, to perform the office relinquished by the distracted government of Louis XVI., of protecting the public peace. They have of late, with the like celerity, been revived; and 60,000 men in arms were lately reviewed by the King and his generals. There are, certainly, not less than a million of these conservators of the peace, and checks upon the executive government, in all the extent of the country. It is because we desire to see them conserve the peace, and, by the awe of their power, operate as a counter-balance to the army under the sovereign's command, that we are most anxious for the purity of the establishment. The proposal of giving them the choice of their own officers fills us with alarm. Are thousands of armed men a fit and safe deliberative body? Is it wise to make the contest for popular favour a canvass for the command of troops? Would it be well for public men, if to gain popularity, and to have an army under their control, were the same thing? Surely these are questions to which but one answer can be given by any reflecting person. Can there be any cause of alarm if the crown shall appoint the officers, while the men are all citizens? We clearly think not; and we fervently pray that this view of so important a point may be taken in France. Far better at once say, "We can trust no kingly government;" better resolve to have a republic in name and form, as well as in substance; because then it would be utterly impossible to have it on the principle of military election. The republican who honestly desires to see an end of all kingly rule, is grievously deceived if he dreams that the proposed scheme is the path to this consummation. It is the high road, no doubt, to the overthrow of any given government, — regal, or aristocratic, or oligarchical, or democratic; but it takes to a point a good deal farther on — it leads direct to a military despotism.

Some things have been thrown out by way of recommending large re-

straints upon the royal authority. It has been proposed to limit the power of making peace and war; to restrain the number of troops by a fundamental law; to take away some of the patronage usually vested in the crown. On these and similar topics we say nothing; being quite satisfied that a little reflection, independent of the instruction afforded by our experience in this country, will convince any one how impracticable such restraints are, if the government is to be really monarchical. A free press, a reformed representation, a standing army only large enough to defend the country against foreign enemies, and its internal police in the hands of armed citizens,—these form the best and safest checks upon prerogative, the most ample security for the liberties of the people. We are all along assuming, that a limited monarchy is the kind of government best suited to the wishes and habits of the French people, and to their love of military glory—a position which, in our humble judgment, it would be wild to question. A republic would inevitably, as before, begin in anarchy, and end, as before, in the despotism of some fortunate soldier.

It is certain that, in framing a constitution, no regard is to be had to the personal qualities of the individuals who may first be called to administer its powers. But there is one circumstance not to be left out of the account, in providing for the powers of, and restraints on, the crown—we allude to the certainty, that for some generations the King of the French will have a competitor. The ex-King of France will be a *pretender*; and more than the word is unnecessary to remind those who are acquainted with English history, how materially this circumstance tends to keep the reigning family in check, or, in the ordinary phrase, to set them upon their good behaviour.

II. The first consideration that meets us in bringing our regards homewards, and surveying the bearing of the late revolution upon our own concerns, relates to the kind of part which the English government has sustained throughout those events of which we have been sketching the history. That it labours under very grievous suspicions of having befriended the infatuated tyrant and his ministers, unfortunately admits of no doubt; and that these suspicions extend to the French nation as well as our own countrymen, is unhappily equally true. Are they, can they be, likely to rest upon any foundation? Or do they merely proceed from the known sentiments of our ministers regarding every thing free, all popular rights, all royal immunities upon the Continent? Certain it is, that, however much they may have yielded to the people at home, or rather whatever concessions the people may have extorted from them—abroad, where they have neither parliamentary opposition, a free press, nor associations, nor public meetings, to wring from them an assent to improvements, they are found the steady and unflinching patrons of all the forms of antiquated superstition and hateful despotism. Theirs is the preference of the Turk over the Greek,—over those whom they would rather restrain in their efforts for independence than gain the benefit of a counterbalance to Russia, where she is likely to domineer the most perilously for our own interests; and yet they hate the Calmuck, in spite of his despotic accomplishments, because, in fighting his kindred Turcoman, he must, whether he will or no, in some measure, wage the war of freedom. For them it is to back the savage tyranny by which Austria has been justly said to renew, in fair Italy, the inroads of the Goths.\* The

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\* Monti's celebrated Sonnet on the Peace:—“Che ci ha dato Iddio.”

“Gli Austriaci in Italia Gottizzando vanno.”



faithless and detested Ferdinand, the vile, bloodthirsty Miguel, receive from them,—from the ministers of a mild monarchy and a constitutional king, countenance and support; nay, the navy of England is prostituted by her rulers to break the known laws of nations, for the odious purpose of comforting and abetting the worsers of the two most flagitious tyrants of modern times. That men, to whom despotism the most barbarous and atrocious never looked in vain for sympathy, and as far as they dared lend it, for succour, should be deemed the natural allies of oppression in the milder form, which it put on under the Charleses and the Polignacs, can hardly be deemed very wonderful; and accordingly, we find the belief deeply rooted in every man's mind, first of all, that the English ministry favoured the formation of the late French cabinet, and next, that they approved of its misdeeds.

To these charges very inadequate contradictions, it must be confessed, have been given. One minister, and only one, in one House, and in one only, of Parliament, positively denied that the English cabinet had interfered to make Prince Polignac premier of France. We verily believe this denial. Who ever supposed that such interpositions were the acts of cabinets? Possibly, if a like denial had been given by another minister in another House of Parliament—a minister of somewhat more weight, and who could with something more of authority take upon himself to say what had not been done, the country might have been better satisfied. He, however, held his peace; and yet, if even he (though he sometimes acts like a whole cabinet, and seems to forget what in truth the public can hardly ever bear in mind, that he has any colleagues at all,) had only denied “the interference of the cabinet,” so plain an outlet for escape would have been left, that Lord Eldon would doubtless have excepted to the answer, and men far less astute in detecting evasions must have desiderated a far more searching denial. The phrase, *interference*, is so vague, and the phrase, *interference to make a man premier*, so much more uncertain, that no one can well say what he may not have done, who solemnly denies having done this. The English ministers were friends of Prince Polignac; they wished well to his promotion. No one denies, no one affects to deny this, even after they all see the disastrous consequences it has led to. It is possible that no direct communication may have subsisted between the English ministry and the Prince upon the subject. It is barely possible that nothing may have passed in conference between the English ambassador and the Prince. It is conceivable that nothing had ever been said by the ambassador, nor any hints thrown out to Charles X. It is a thing which a man may imagine to be true—it is not mathematically impossible, that the late King of England, who cherished in his latter years a hatred of those principles of liberty in which he was educated;—who detested the Spanish Revolution in 1823 to such a pitch, as to pour forth vows for the success of the French arms, and whose minions at Paris encouraged that detestable crusade against liberty by assurances that it was favoured by their king, and would not be opposed effectually in Parliament;—it is a thing which a man may bring himself to suppose, who yet could not believe that two and two made ten, that neither such a king, nor any of his personal favourites, furthered the suit of Prince Polignac to be premier of France. All this we will, for argument's sake, admit; and still it remains undenied, that both the court and the cabinet did mightily rejoice in that infatuated creature's accession to office; regarding, and

through all their accustomed organs proclaiming, that event most auspicious to "the cause of regular government," as it is most hypocritically termed; in other words, to the interests of arbitrary power, and the enemies of freedom. Even one or two of the papers once liberal, but of late permitted, or permitting themselves, for wise but inscrutable purposes, to be ranged under the ministerial banners, sedulously defended the appointment, and hailed it as one auspicious to the best interests of England.

As these men and their organs began, so they went on. The opposition in the Chambers was derided by them; the resolution of all France, as well as her representatives, to reject the ministers, was stigmatised as unreasonable and factious; the necessity of the Polignac ministry to internal peace, and the security of the throne, was plainly maintained; and, when the majorities were decidedly against the government, the most sanguine hopes were held out of the results of a dissolution, by the same politicians, who had notoriously (and we now speak of the Earl of Aberdeen's department in an especial manner) conceived the most lively expectations of Old Spain reconquering her emancipated colonies, partly by the prowess of the imbecile Barradas, and chiefly by the Mexicans flocking to join his standard. The new elections having greatly increased the force of the patriotic party, and actual violence being manifestly threatened by the wretched junto in power, we will admit that, for the first time, there was some pause, some hesitation, on the part of their English friends. At any rate, no minister thought it quite safe *now* to avow himself the patron of the Bourbons. They deemed it more expedient to await the event. But if any man will say, he believes the success of their measures would have given pain to our ministry, we will tell that man, that a greater dupe does not breathe the air than he! Nay, we cannot avoid feeling a perfect conviction, that the English cabinet (there may be one or two exceptions, but speaking of the body,) hoped to see the *vigour* of the Polignacs rewarded by success, and a *firm* government, upon *true monarchical principles*, established in France. Let but the conduct of their supporters, if not their organs, be examined. The detestable doctrines of a writer, who has escaped from the country he would so fain have given a dictator to, were openly adopted by the chief ministerial Journal. The necessity of silencing the French press, and changing the law of election, was there proclaimed in round terms. It is even said that Cottu's book was originally written in English and in England, and translated into French; and the Anglicisms of the style, and the apparent originality of the passages given as translations, are cited in support of this assertion. Be that as it may, the respectable Journal to which we refer, and which is known to be under the immediate patronage of men high in office, and occasionally assisted by their pens, led the way in recommending that writer's doctrines to the people of this country, and to the French, as adapted to the state of France. The periodical works of less importance, the weekly and daily papers, with a single exception, which espouse the ministerial side of the question, adopted the same line; and weekly and daily laboured in their vocation to vilify all that the French patriots did, to defend the Polignac ministry, and to exhibit the bitterness of their disappointment at the signal failure of its late measures.

In answer to all this, how ridiculous is it to cite the recognition by the English government of the Duke of Orleans as King of the French? Had they any choice? Could they have refused to acknowledge the

King whom all France had with one voice set upon the throne? Were they prepared to summon the new Parliament, and such a Parliament as had just been returned, and to meet it with an announcement of a new war of five-and-twenty years for the restoration of the Bourbons? The idea is ridiculous; but we verily believe that the recognition of Louis-Philip I. was hastened by the loud expression of public opinion at the elections, and by the gratifying fact that no persons held more decided language against the dethroned tyrant and his ministers than the staunch Tory supporters of the government, and of all governments. In the face of such appalling warnings, to have refused the recognition was at once to have signed their own expulsion from office. The recognition, therefore, proves absolutely nothing. The English ministers may have made Polignac minister by direct interference — they may have prescribed his whole conduct — they may have dictated through their ambassador every Ordinance he issued — they may have sent over the draft from Downing Street of every state paper he signed — and yet when the whole plot failed — when their tools were driven with ignominy out of France, or detected in the plot, and shut up in the dungeons of Vincennes, — they were compelled to submit, exactly as Charles X. was. It would be precisely the same argument as is urged for our ministers, if that sovereign were to deny that he had any concern in the events which brought about the Revolution, because he at once yielded to it, abdicated the throne he had polluted, and quitted the country he had vainly attempted to enslave.

The mention of that personage brings to mind another passage in the conduct of our ministers, and one not immaterial to the present enquiry. When a criminal is detected in plotting some foul enterprise, or, having attempted to carry it into execution, fails, and flies from the scene of his iniquity, does the government of this country make it a practice to receive him with open arms, — to direct that the revenue laws shall be suspended in his favour, and to give him shelter and comfort, with much deference and respect, on our shores? No such thing — and why? Because our government never avows a patronage of rapine or murder, and regards with just abhorrence the perpetrators of such crimes. Then why, we ask, has Charles and his family been received, not only with courtesy, but with a degree of favour, which no man living believes would have been shown to the most illustrious patriot that ever bled for freedom — the most venerable philosopher that ever enlarged the powers of man, or bettered the lot of humanity? Had Washington sought our shores, after resigning the sceptre which he might have held for life, possibly transmitted to his kindred, but that he loved his country better than all power — would *his* baggage have been suffered to pass without search at any custom-house quay in all England? No man dreams of such a thing. Suppose Polignac had succeeded, if any of the unoffending Parisians whom the tyrant ordered his artillery to mow down by thousands, had escaped from the slaughter he was destined to, who believes that the wreck of his fortunes would have been allowed to pass duty-free, and unexamined? Indeed, had the alien bill still armed our ministers with the power, such a refugee would have been sent back to certain execution by the next tide. Then why was the oppressor so differently treated? This is the question which we ask now; the question which the people of England are asking, and which it is the bounden duty of their representatives to ask. Charles X., by the very act of our government recognising Louis-Philip, is admitted by that government to be no longer a king — is ranked by that govern-

ment among private persons. What right, then, had that government to treat him as a king? What possible motive could they have for thus flying in the English people's face, and insulting the French people also, except to show ostentatiously their sorrow for his failure, and their fellow-feeling for his fate—a fate brought on by his crimes—a failure in the attempt to perpetrate the most atrocious wickedness of which a monarch can be guilty? But it was not a mere attempt. The abdicated king came among us stained with the blood of his unoffending subjects. He had ordered his soldiers to the charge; the onslaught had been tremendous; the artillery had been, with a cold-blooded cruelty unknown to the most atrocious tyrants, brought to bear upon crowded streets, and to sweep down thousands of all ages, and of either sex. From the miserable slaughter which he had commanded, the wretched despot had withdrawn his own person to a place of safety; and, providentially discomfited, he had fled from the scene of his crimes. This is he for whom the sympathies of our ministers are speedily unlocked; for whose accommodation the laws are suspended; who is received with distinctions which would have been denied to the greatest benefactor of his kind who had never been a king, and a tyrant! What right, then, have those ministers to complain, if they are suspected of a leaning towards his designs? Do they not become accessaries after the fact, by this their conduct? If any man is seen submitting to a criminal's fellowship, whom all others detest, the conclusion is immediate, that he was a partner in his guilt, and that he has put himself in the offender's power. Are we to infer that our ministers dare not turn their backs upon their French allies for fear of disclosures? Certain it is, that a strange alacrity to get into suspicion by their conduct has been succeeded by as strange a reluctance to disavow the charge by words. The more respectable of the treasury journals announced that the Duke of Wellington would deny the odious charge at the late Manchester meeting. His Grace made no sign. He listened to some of his adherents expressing their alarms at the progress of public opinion, and their sagacious apprehensions that the people were becoming so well educated, "as to overwhelm the higher orders." Without stopping longer than to observe, that if by *overwhelm* be meant *out-shine*, a scanty portion indeed of knowledge might cause such wiseacres to be overwhelmed by any class of the community, at least on the supposition that a man's sense is in proportion to his information.\* No other remark of a political cast was made. Yet, was it beneath the Duke of Wellington's dignity to defend himself by a single sentence of disclaimer? At least, let the ministers keep some appearance of consistency. Sir Robert Peel, in Parliament, distinctly announces, at a time when he feels how extremely insecure the hold over that assembly is, that the ministry will throw themselves upon the country, looking only to the people for support. Well, then; their chief goes to a meeting of the better classes of the people, assembled to do him a civility; and he thinks it beneath him to open his mouth in refutation of the worst charge which could be brought against a public man. He prefers labouring under it for a season, to denying it at the earliest opportunity. Is this the conduct of men who appeal to the people, and throw themselves on the country?

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\* The newspapers are supposed to have greatly misrepresented one noble person's words on this occasion.

If, however, such be the predicament of the present ministers in respect of French affairs, such is not that of the people. With an unanimity wholly unexampled, they have suffered their delight at the late glorious Revolution to burst forth, and to reach all the ends of the earth, in accents of applause, of exultation, of heartfelt thankfulness to the French people. The reason why gratitude is felt as well as admiration may easily be discovered. The cause of the French is that of all freemen. If Polignac had succeeded, there would not have been wanting imitators of his conduct elsewhere. We should ourselves have had our Polignacs. No man of common sense can doubt this. But such a consummation is now, God be thanked, rendered utterly impossible. Several lessons have been taught in the *university of Paris*, which will not soon be forgotten. The soldiers of other countries have taken a degree there; it will be an honour to them, for it will make them remember they are citizens; it will be an advantage to them, for it will keep them from being exemplarily punished, and without any delay, by their fellow-citizens. The lesson which all armies have learnt is, first, that their duty is not to butcher their fellow-subjects at a tyrant's commands, in order to save a priest's favour, or a minister's place; next, that if in breach of their duty they lend themselves to such treasonable plots of courtiers, they are rushing upon their own certain destruction. For a lesson has also been taught to the citizens of all great towns, that the soldiery cannot succeed in enslaving them by force of arms. A well-inhabited street is a fortress which no troops can take, if the inhabitants be true to themselves; provided there be other streets near requiring a like attack from the military. Far be it from us to suspect the gallant soldiery of other countries of showing less patriotism, less humanity, than those of France lately displayed; but the example is encouraging to the virtuous portion of the army; the lesson, the warning, is wholesome to the profligate and unprincipled, who alone make a standing army dangerous.

Furthermore, the emancipation of France is the hope and strength of freemen all over Europe. Had she succumbed, the chance of liberty in Italy, in Spain, in Portugal, was indefinitely postponed; in England herself, a sight of much evil omen was held out to both rulers and people. The most imbecile of ministers, and the least trusted by their country, are ever ready to retreat behind the ranks of the army; ever prepared to support their power by force. But no reflecting man can now entertain a doubt, that if our rulers, untaught by the recent lessons, should ever attempt to enforce arbitrary acts by arms, the people of this country would be ashamed of being outdone by those of France in defending their most sacred liberties.

Finally, we take it to be clear, that the honest and generous emulation, which has ever made the two greatest nations of modern Europe run the same race of rivalry in improvement, will now help us in the amendment of whatever defects exist in our institutions. The people of England will not long brook any marked inferiority to their neighbours; and especially will such an eclipse be galling, if it lie in the freedom upon which they have so long prided themselves as their distinguishing and exclusive excellence. France has now a freer government than England. This truth must be told. Shall we not make such improvements as may restore us to our pristine station, and regain for us what Milton called "our prerogative of teaching the nations how to live?" The people have but to will it, and the thing is done. Such ministers as the present, have at

least the recommendation of utter inability to resist the tide of popular opinion. They are, it is true, wholly unfit to lead the public sentiment; altogether impotent to carry through great measures of themselves; but if the country decrees a thing to be done, be it right or be it wrong, they have no power to resist. Reform within certain limits is the right thing which they must now do, or rather suffer to be done. What though all the present cabinet be deeply pledged against it? What though Sir Robert Peel has of late come forward, somewhat ostentatiously and very needlessly, to deny representatives to the great towns? So did he, for many a long day, refuse the Catholics and the Dissenters their rights; and in a few weeks, continuing quite unconvinced\*, as he declared, he, and his principal, himself as stout an enemy to the repeal, came round—right round about, and carried the grand measure through Parliament, as it was said, “*triumphantly*,” to the no small benefit of the empire, if not to the immortal renown of the senate or its leaders. So will such men yield again if the people desire it; perhaps they will even volunteer the measure of reform, in order to keep their places a little longer; and they are surely well worth having at such a price. Religious liberty, received as a *fine* upon renewing the lease of office one year; law reform for the next year; reform of Parliament for a year longer—never sure did landlord make a better bargain, or poor tenant pay more handsomely! It will not

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\* This declaration of Sir Robert Peel is certainly by far the most strange that any public man ever made. He had surely opposed the Catholic question from a conviction that there was more mischief in granting than in withholding it. Then, if his opinion remained, as he solemnly and repeatedly asserted, unchanged, he was, for some reason or other, induced to grant what it was more mischievous to give than to refuse. What could *induce* any man to do it? What *right* had any man to act so? It won't do to say that circumstances were altered—for that is saying that the question is safer given than refused; and he declares his opinion to be unaltered, and that the mischiefs preponderate. What then *can* Sir Robert Peel have meant? We know very well that his enemies say, he means only that he preferred giving up his opinion to giving up his place. We believe no such thing, and we mean no such thing; but we cannot comprehend what he means, and we believe he had no distinct meaning when he made the very incomprehensible statement. At all events, he must *now* allow, and he ought in a manly way to say, that he was wrong from the first. For his argument was that the emancipation was full of danger and risk; these are prospective words, and they mean that the measure would lead to mischief if carried. Carried it has been; what was the future is now the past; no mischief whatever has ensued. Five or six members in England, and as many in Ireland, are Catholics; there's the whole evil we have encountered to pacify Ireland! Does Sir Robert Peel say that the evil may yet arrive? Then he should tell us at least how, if not when; or he is like the Jew who waits for the Messiah, (and, ought, therefore, says this statesmanlike reasoner, to be excluded from parliament and from office,) or the Portuguese who is looking for the return of King Sebastian from Africa. Had he not far better admit, what most men now see, and all men of candour believe he sees, that he was in error from the first? He put himself at the head of a party in church and state which wanted a leader, and had in those days much more power than they now have. And he took their creed with the command. He afterwards found he had paid too dear for the station, and abandoned both, to the great benefit of the country, and his own great and lasting honour. His way of doing so is another matter; so is his wholly inexplicable opposition to Mr. Canning in 1827. These are the dark parts of his conduct; and these, we take it, never can be cleared up, although further services and new sacrifices of prejudice may tend to efface them from our memory.

be hard to find some fourth fine fit to be exacted when this third year shall be out.\*

\* The articles on Foreign Politics occupy a very considerable portion of the Edinburgh Review. Without encroaching upon other departments, it was impossible to transfer to this work more than a few of the most interesting, either for the importance of the topics, or the ability displayed in their discussion. For obvious reasons, I have preferred selecting those only which are likely to be perused with satisfaction at the present eventful period. Many of the Essays in the early Numbers, on the Foreign Policy of England during the memorable struggle with France and America, are written with distinguished talent, though, in some instances, the predictions of the writers have not been verified. As the subjects to which they refer have, in the progress of other events, lost much of their interest, I shall be the more readily excused for rejecting them, and retaining only a limited number of those dissertations that are connected with political transactions of a more recent date. I do not conceive it necessary to direct the attention of the reader to all the articles, under the head of Foreign Politics, for which I had not space. The following may be considered the most valuable:— Inquiry into the State of the Nation in 1806, with regard to its Foreign Policy, Vol. viii. page 190. — Reasons for making Peace with Bonaparte in 1807, Vol. x. page 1. — Don Pedro Cevallos on the French Usurpation of Spain, Vol. xiii. page 215. — Review of Leckie on the Foreign Policy of Great Britain, Vol. xiii. page 186. — Examination of the State of the Foreign Affairs of Great Britain down to 1809, Vol. xiv. page 442. — The Expediency of making Peace with France in 1812, Vol. xx. page 213. — Conduct of the War, Vol. xv. page 197. — Foreign Policy of England in 1806 and 1807, Vol. xi. page 219. — The War with America, Vol. xix. page 290. Vol. xx. page 451. Vol. xxiv. page 243. — Conduct of the English Government towards Genoa, Vol. xxviii. page 106. — Disgraceful Policy of the Allies towards Saxony and Naples, Vol. xxxii. page 399.; and Vol. xxxv. page 72. — Exposure of the Flagitious Proceedings of the Holy Alliance, Vol. xxxix. page 467. — Dethronement, Detention, and Treatment of Bonaparte, Vol. xxx. page 452. — Aggressions of France against Spain, Vol. xxxviii. page 241.

## PART THIRD.

## MISCELLANEOUS POLITICS.

## ON THE UTILITY OF THE BALANCE OF POWER.\*

THE balance of power, and the general system of international relations which has grown up in modern Europe, have afforded to one class of politicians perpetual subject of ridicule and invective, and to another class the constant opportunity of defending or attacking every measure, of discussing or affecting to discuss, every political subject, by a reference to certain terms of art and abstract ideas, of which it is fair to suspect that they little understood the meaning and the force.

Of these reasoners or declaimers, the former sect are undoubtedly the most dangerous. The refinements of modern policy which have sprung from the progressive improvement of the human species, and have, in their turn, secured that progress, and accelerated its pace, are in no danger of being either corrupted, or brought into disrepute, by the petulance of pretended statesmen. But the sophistries and cavils which political sceptics and innovators have founded, partly on a misconception of the theory, and partly on a mis-statement of the facts, tend directly to a degradation of the system in the eyes of superficial reasoners, and may ultimately renew a state of things, from which the unassisted efforts of national heroism would be altogether unable to redeem any one community.

The attacks of those men have, moreover, been extremely inconsistent and contradictory. While, at one time, they maintain, that the idea of a political equilibrium is pregnant with every species of absurdity, and would produce, if carried into the actual affairs of nations, those very evils which the system is extolled for preventing: at another time we are told that the notion is simple and obvious; that it arises naturally out of the passions of men; that it is no refinement of modern statesmen, but has influenced the councils of princes and commonwealths in all ages of the world. Now — the balance of power is an unintelligible jargon, invented to cover every scheme; to furnish pretexts for every act of national injustice; to lull the jealousy of the people in any emergency; or to excite their alarms upon any occasion. Now — it is useless and superfluous; an interference with the natural order of things; or an attempt to effect that which would happen at any rate. Now — it is pernicious in the extreme; the parent of wars and offensive alliances;

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\* *Politique de tous les Cabinets de l'Europe, pendant les Règnes de Louis XV. et de Louis XVI., &c.* MSS. trouvés dans le Cabinet de Louis XVI. Seconde Edition. Considerablement augmentée, par L. P. Segur l'Ainé, Ex-ambassadeur. 3 tom. 8vo. — Vol. i. page 345. January, 1803.



the exciting cause of national violence; the watchword of ambitious princes and destroying commonwealths; a refinement only of injustice; and a system of nothing but treachery or caprice. It is very manifest, without any argument, that the system of modern policy cannot be liable to all those accusations at once, and that the declaimers, who have used such language with respect to it, must have been talking of very different things at different times. But as the foreign policy of nations was never, at any period of modern story, so interesting as at present, we shall proceed to offer a few observations upon that system which has been so little understood, and which is the foundation of the important work now under review.

The national jealousy, by which at all times the European states are animated, and which ranges them on different sides in each public crisis, has been denominated, not a principle of policy, but a national emotion. Nations, it is said, like the individuals which compose them, are moved by caprice, and actuated by passions; excited to contention by envy and hatred; soothed to reconciliation when exhausted by the efforts of their enmity; leagued in friendship by the dictates of an interested prudence; united together by the thirst of plunder; or combined for the gratification of some common revenge. The principle (we are told) which has been pompously called the great spring of civilised policy, is perhaps nothing more than a systematic indulgence of those natural feelings that impel the savage to attack his more wealthy neighbour, or unite rival hordes in a temporary friendship, when invaded by a powerful and common enemy. The policy (it is added) which we have heard extolled as the grand arcanum of modern statesmen, and dignified with the title of a system, is nothing more than the natural result of a conflict between desire of conquest and of security, refined on by ingenious men, and spun into a regular theory.

These remarks are partly true, and partly unfounded. It is true, that nations are guided by human councils, and subject, of course, to the passions and caprices of men; but it is no less certain, that the more regularly any system of government is established, the more will men of sober minds acquire a weight in the management of affairs; and that the longer the art of administering the concerns of empires is practised, prudence will gain the greater ascendancy over passion. It is true, that the dictates of feelings not always amiable, and often outrageous, are frequently, more than any impulse of reason, the springs which actuate the operations of states; but it is equally true, that in all animals the passions themselves are implanted for the wisest of purposes; that instinct is the principle to which, more than reason, the preservation of life, and the maintenance of order in the universe, must be ascribed; and that national councils may be operating what no foresight could combine, while they appear to be swayed only by prejudice and passion. The existence of rude states is indeed frequently preserved, and their civilisation insured, by the operation of principles, to assist the developement of which is the great pride of the most learned and skilful statesmen; yet, the want of this assistance in those rude times, and the want of a constant superintendence and control, which renders the popular feelings useful in one case, and harmless in another, is certainly the cause of that instability of national power, and those perpetual changes in dominion—those constant broils, and that state of unceasing insecurity, to which we may attribute the many revolutions in the situation of savage communities, and the long continuance of their barbarism.

That the system which we are now considering has oftentimes been abused, no one can deny. What human institution can defend itself from this charge? But many of the evils which are ascribed to the principle in question have been owing only to an erroneous conception of its nature. Many of them have arisen, from failing to carry the line of policy recommended by it to the lengths which it enjoins; and, in not a few instances, those events which have been deemed pernicious, would have proved altogether fatal, had not its influence modified and controlled them. We are desired, with no small appearance of triumph, to view the history of the last century; and to mark the manifold wars which the balancing system produced; the various intrigues to which it gave rise; the destructive conquests of which it furnishes the pretext; and the national catastrophes which it could not avert. But had it not been for that wholesome jealousy of rival neighbours, which modern politicians have learned to cherish, how many conquests and changes of dominion would have taken place, instead of wars, in which a few useless lives were lost, and some superfluous millions were squandered? How many fair portions of the globe might have been deluged in blood, instead of some hundreds of sailors fighting harmlessly on the barren plains of the ocean, and some thousands of soldiers carrying on a scientific, and regular, and quiet system of warfare, in countries set apart for the purpose, and resorted to as the arena where the disputes of nations may be determined? We may indeed look to the history of the last century as the proudest era in the annals of the species; the period most distinguished for learning, and skill, and industry; for the milder virtues, and for common sense; for refinement in government, and an equal diffusion of liberty; above all, for that perfect knowledge of the arts of administration, which has established certain general rules of conduct among nations; has prevented the overthrow of empires, and the absorption of weak states into the bodies of devouring neighbours; has set bounds to the march of conquest, and rendered the unsheathing of the sword a measure of the last adoption; whereas, in other times, it was always resorted to in the first instance.

In the beginning of that century, we saw the gigantic power of France humbled by a coalition of princes, each resolved to undergo immediate loss, and run a great present risk, in order to prevent the greater chance of ruin at the distance of a few years. In ancient times the Stadtholder would have been more jealous of Britain or Austria, than of France. The great Monarch, like Cæsar, would have found a Divitiacus in the heart of the empire. By splitting the neighbouring potentates into adverse factions, and fighting one against the other, he would, in a few years, have subjugated the whole. No power would then have conceived that common prudence required an immediate sacrifice of peace, in order to ward off a distant peril. All would have waited quietly till the invasion came on; then, fighting with a desperate, but an insulated valour, all would have been conquered in detail by the ambitious enemy of Europe; and the story of the Roman empire would have been renewed, when submission to foreign power, and loss of liberty, and interruption of peaceful pursuits, were no longer the phantoms of vulgar terror, or the themes of idle declamation, but real, and imminent, and inevitable calamities.

In the middle of the century, we indeed saw an ancient crown despoiled of its hereditary provinces; and the neighbouring states in vain attempting to crush the new-born energies of the Prussian power. It is, how-

ever, extremely doubtful whether the principles of an enlightened policy would not have favoured the rise of a power, whose professed and natural object was the balancing of the Imperial House, and the protection of the smaller princes of the empire, against the preponderating, and formerly absolute, sway of the Austrian monarchs. And, at any rate, admitting the other powers to have been actuated by no such views, it is clear that the success of the Silesian usurpation must be attributed to the actual dereliction of the balancing system, and not to its inefficacy; for, both in the Silesian and in the Seven-years' War\*, the part of Prussia was openly espoused by some of the great powers; in the former, by France and Bavaria; in the latter, first by England, and then by Russia herself. The preservation and accurate adjustment of the balance might perhaps have required some such event as the acquisition which Prussia actually made; but if the immediate object of the system, the maintenance of the established division of power, was held to be a more important consideration, it is clear that the part of Prussia ought not to have been taken by France and Bavaria, in the one case, or by England and Russia in the other, until the usurped dominions of Austria had been restored; and then the allies of that power ought instantly to have deserted her, if she did not remain satisfied with the fruits of their interference.

Soon after the Seven-years' War was terminated, the dismemberment of an ancient European kingdom was projected by the powers who had been most exhausted in the Silesian contest, and who wished to indemnify themselves for their losses at the expense of the Poles. The success of this iniquitous transaction, although it only demonstrates that the modern system has not been carried to its proper length — that it is incapable of changing the nature of men, or disarming the ambition and rapacity of princes — has been always quoted by a certain set of politicians, as an irrefragable proof of the futility and inefficacy of the great principle of modern politics. That calamitous event is indeed a sufficient proof, that the statesmen of Europe had for a while forgotten their most sacred principles, and that the princes who did not interfere to prevent it were blind to their best interests. It serves, therefore, to show us what would be the situation of the world, were the maxims of ancient times to be revived, and the salutary system of modern Europe to lose its influence over the councils of states; but, for this very reason, the partition of Poland cannot, with any truth, be said to prove the inefficacy of those principles, by acting in direct opposition to which, the great powers of Europe permitted it to happen. If, however, the policy of the neighbouring states provided no check to the injustice of the partitioning powers, the influence of the balancing system upon the conduct of those parties themselves was productive of the most important and beneficial effects. Had the ancient maxims of national indifference and insulation prevailed in the cabinets of princes at the crisis of Polish affairs in 1772, the distracted state of that unhappy country would indeed have called in the interference of foreign force. But this interference would have proceeded from one quarter alone. Poland would have been overwhelmed, and its vast resources appropriated, by one only of the conterminous powers, probably by the Russian empire, which would thus have suddenly acquired a preponderance fatal to the rest of Europe; and, without

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\* It is well known that the peace of Dresden was only a truce; that the war of 1756 owed its origin to the cause of the former contest; and that the possession of Silesia was only secured by the peace of Hubertsburgh.

receiving any check in the proportional aggrandisement of the neighbouring states, would have been enabled to stretch its resistless arm into the very heart of the great western commonwealth. But the prevalence of that national jealousy, and anxious attention to the affairs of other states, which is the master principle of the modern system, prevented the usurpation of Russia, even at the moment when she was actually mistress of the kingdom, garrisoned the capital with her troops, and ruled the national councils by a viceroy, under the name of ambassador. With all these circumstances in her favour, she was not even the first proposer of the partition. Her natural enemies, Austria and Prussia, actually gained a greater share of the spoil; and instead of being the first victims of her extended empire, as they infallibly would have been in ancient times, they have themselves acquired, at the same moment, an increase of resources, which enables them effectually to withstand the augmented force of her power.

Although, then, it is extremely absurd to adduce the partition of Poland as an instance of the balancing system (after the manner of the Prussian statesmen \*), it is equally ridiculous to assert that it proves the inefficacy of that system, or to deny that the rest of Europe has been saved by the influence of those principles upon the parties in the usurpation, which should have led the other great powers of Europe to prevent it. It is scarcely necessary to remark, that we by no means intend to assert any thing further than the injustice and impolicy of the transaction upon a great scale: at present, we only look to the effects of the balancing system in maintaining the independence of the weaker states. The case of Poland, as it appears to us, is one of the very few instances which have ever occurred, of a nation being placed in such unnatural circumstances of embarrassment, turbulence, and degradation of every sort, that no change of affairs could possibly render it worse, and scarce any revolution, by domestic violence or foreign invasion, could fail to alter it for the better. Setting apart the high-sounding phrases of patriotism and national spirit, and the feelings of admiration which the very natural emotions of pity have taught us to couple with the name of Poland, it is impossible for a sober-minded observer not to perceive, that ages of the most debasing servitude had utterly disqualified the Polish boors for enjoying the privileges of free subjects; that a lifetime divided between unceasing tumult in public, and the revellings of a boisterous, barbarous hospitality, had utterly unfitted the rest of the state from co-operating in the formation of a constitution which should possess either energy or regularity; and that the happiest event which has ever befallen the fine country of Poland, has been a dismemberment, wept over and declaimed upon by those who had no experience of its necessity, or need of its benefits. Those benefits have most undoubtedly been the pacification of that unhappy kingdom, by the only means which human fancy could have devised for accomplishing this end, without endangering the security of the other powers; namely, a fair division of the country among the neighbouring and rival powers, and a consequent communication of the inestimable blessings which their ancient subjects enjoyed under a system of peaceful government and regular police.

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\* Count Hertzberg (the King's first minister in 1772), in a speculative essay on this subject, gives the partition as an apposite case of the balancing system. It was made, he says, "Selon les principes d'une balance dont les trois puissances partageantes étoient convenues entre elles." — *Mém.* tom. i. p. 296.

The memorable events which took place at the close of the eighteenth century, it is almost needless to observe, were the immediate consequence of an adherence to the principles of the modern system of international policy. The internal state of France would never have alarmed the neighbouring nations in ancient times. Without anxiety, they would have seen the overthrow of all regular government, the progress of Jacobin contagion, and the development of those popular energies which armed a people, devoted exclusively to war, with resistless power to accomplish the grand object of their demagogues — the overthrow of altars and thrones, and the establishment of universal empire. Far from combining to resist the progress of the new horde, they would have split into factions, and assisted its destructive course. No efforts to check it would have been thought of, until all resistance was too late; nor would those modern Gauls have found resistance effectual to oppose them from the Manlius of any capitol in Europe. That this has not been the fate of every thing refined and valuable in Europe, is owing to the degree in which the maxims of the balancing system began to operate their usual effects at the very moment when the first changes took place in France. But that much injury has been done; that many independent states have been humbled; that some powers have been overwhelmed; and that melancholy changes have been effected in the distribution of dominion, has been owing to the unprincipled ambition of certain princes; the taint of disaffection in the people of some countries, which have, together, prevented the modern system of external policy from being followed out, and have given to the common enemy of national independence an advantage proportioned to the neglect of those sound and necessary principles.

Let us hear no more, then, of the last century, as affording arguments against the balance of power. That eventful period in the history of mankind has been marked by the formation of vast schemes, which either by their success may allure, or by their failure may warn, future statesmen to cling still closer by those maxims of conduct which are necessary to the preservation of liberty and peace.

The remarks which have been frequently made on the knowledge of the ancients, in this branch of policy, are for the most part just. Mr. Hume, so far as we know, is the first who stated this point, in an essay replete with accurate reference, and distinguished acuteness of classical illustration, but mingled also with some injurious perversions of facts in more recent history; and with the mistatement, in one or two points, of the great system itself, which he appears to treat with disrespect.\* The celebrated passage in Polybius, which has so often been quoted †, is indeed a distinct statement of one general principle in that system; and the orations of Demosthenes contain some discussions of the most delicate parts of the theory — discussions which, from the events of his time, we may be assured were but imperfectly comprehended in those early ages. ‡ But the number of discoveries or inventions which have been suddenly made in any branch of knowledge, is small indeed. All the more important steps in the progress of the human mind may rather be termed improvements than inventions; they are refinements upon methods formerly known — generalisations of ideas previously conceived. By how many small and slowly following steps

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\* Essay on the Balance of Power.

† Polyb. lib. i. cap. 83. “Nunquam,” &c.

‡ Particularly the famous speech “*pro Megalopolitanis*” — *passim*.

was the true nature of the planetary motions brought to light! By how many insensible gradations did that theory receive its explanation from the great law of gravitation, which, constantly and universally acting, keeps each body in its place, and preserves the arrangement of the whole system. In like manner has that theory of political expediency been gradually unfolded, and its parts refined, which regulates the mutual actions of the contiguous nations of Europe, — subjects each to the influence of others, however remote, — connects all together by a common principle, — regulates the motions of the whole, — and maintains the order of the great complicated system. As the newly discovered planets are found to obey the same law that keeps the rest in their orbits; so the powers, which frequently arise in the European world, immediately fall into their places, and conform to the same principles that fix the positions and direct the movements of the ancient states. And as, even in this enlightened age, we have not yet succeeded in discovering the whole extent of the planetary law, or in reducing certain apparent irregularities of the system to the common principles; so, in these days of political improvement, we have not attained the utmost refinements of international policy, and have still to lament the many irregularities which continue to disturb the arrangement of the European commonwealth.

It is not, then, in the mere plan of forming offensive or defensive alliances; or in the principle of attacking a neighbour, in order to weaken his power before he has betrayed hostile views; or in the policy of defending a rival, in order to stay, in proper time, the progress of a common enemy; — it is not in these simple maxims that the modern system consists. These are indeed the elements, the great and leading parts, of the theory; they are its most prominent features; they are maxims dictated by the plainest and coarsest views of political expediency: but they do not form the whole system; nor does the knowledge of them (for it cannot be pretended that ancient states were in possession of any thing beyond the speculative knowledge of them) comprehend an acquaintance with the profounder and more subtle parts of modern policy. The grand and distinguishing feature of the balancing theory is the systematic form to which it reduces those plain and obvious principles of national conduct; the perpetual attention to foreign affairs which it inculcates; the constant watchfulness over every motion in all parts of the system which it prescribes; the subjection in which it tends to place all national passions and antipathies to the views of remote expediency; the unceasing care which it dictates of nations most remotely situated, and apparently unconnected with ourselves; the general union, which it has effected, of all the European powers in one connected system — obeying certain laws, and actuated, in general, by a common principle; in fine, as a consequence of the whole, the right of mutual inspection, now universally recognised among civilised states, in the rights of public envoys and residents. This is the balancing theory. It was as much unknown to Athens and Rome as the Keplerian or Newtonian laws were concealed from Plato and Cicero, who certainly knew the effect of gravitation upon terrestrial bodies. It has arisen, in the progress of science, out of the circumstances of modern Europe — the greater extent and nearer equality of the contiguous states — the more constant intercourse of the different nations with each other. We have been told by historians\* that the principle of the balance of

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\* Robertson's Charles V., vol. i.

power was a discovery of the fifteenth century, made by the Italian politicians, in consequence of the invasion of Charles VIII. Against such statements as this it is perfectly fair to adduce the arguments of Mr. Hume and others, who have traced, in ancient times, vastly more refined notions of policy than any that dictated the Italian defensive league. It was, in truth, not to any such single event that the balancing system owed either its origin or its refinement; but to the progress of society, which placed the whole states of Europe in the same relative situation in which the states of Italy were at that period, and taught them not to wait for an actual invasion, but to see a Charles at all times in every prince or commonwealth that should manifest the least desire of change.

The circumstances of the European states, by promoting national intercourse, have been singularly favourable to the development of those principles of easy and constant union. Consolidated into one system of provincial government under the empire of Rome, they were separated by the same causes, and nearly at the same time. Reduced by a people whose character and manners were never effaced by the most rapid conquests, or most remote emigrations, they were formed into divisions, under constitutions of the same nature, peculiarly calculated to preserve the uniformity of customs which originally marked the whole. The progress of political government has been similar in all, from the dominion of the nobles to the tyranny of the prince; and, in these latter times, to the freedom of the people. That spirit of commercial intercourse, which produces a perpetual connection, little known in the ancient world, has conspired, with the similarity of situation and the resemblance of manners, to render Europe a united whole within itself, almost separated from the rest of the world; a great federacy, acknowledging indeed no common chief, but united by certain common principles, and obeying one system of international law.

It is from these natural sources, through this gradual progress, and not suddenly from any accidental occurrences in the fifteenth century, or from the cabinets of particular statesmen, that we must deduce the refined system of interference which has regulated, for so long a time, the councils of Europe in foreign affairs; and we are to consider the union of the Italian states against the invasion of Charles merely as a symptom of the same progressive improvement which has since taken place in the other parts of Europe.

The question, of the propriety of a nation interfering with those concerns of its neighbours which have only a remote connection with its own interests, may be stated in two different forms; either as a general question applicable to any state, or in its particular reference to the situation of a nation placed in certain circumstances. Thus, many politicians, who have no hesitation in recommending the balancing system to such powers as Austria and Prussia, placed in the heart of Europe, and surrounded by many other states of various complexions and magnitudes, are yet of opinion that the situation of Britain is very different; that she is, by nature, insulated from the rest of Europe; that she can defend herself against any invasion, by means of her natural barrier and internal resources; and that she ought not to sacrifice the improvement of those resources, and the means of maintaining peace, to the vain wish of holding the European balance, and embroiling herself in the stormy politics of foreign states. To enter fully into the discussion of this great national question, would carry us much beyond our necessary limits; but we cannot avoid remarking, that, so long as Great Britain is engaged in a

commercial intercourse with other nations ; so long as her insular situation only serves to promote and extend those commercial relations ; so long as other states possess a large portion of sea-coast, engage in a wide commercial circle, and are acquiring a navy of formidable power ; so long as Britain interferes with them in other quarters of the globe, where her dominions are the most valuable and extensive,—it is an abuse of language to talk of her being separated from the continent of Europe by the straits of Dover. The transport of an army by sea is often more easy than the march over a considerable tract of land. The fate of a naval engagement is generally more quick, decisive, and dependent upon fortune, than the siege of barrier towns, or the forcing of mountainous passes ; and the elements may, by retaining the British fleets in Plymouth or Portsmouth, while they waft the enemy's squadrons from Brest or the Texel, destroy in a moment that bulwark to which we vainly intrusted the national defence, and render utterly useless the whole *natural force* of the country, which, after a change of weather, may display, triumphantly, its flags over every sea in Europe, while the Consular legions are revelling in the plunder of the Bank, or burning all the dock-yards in the kingdom. To say that England may trust to her fleets, then, is to recommend a full reliance upon the chance of a single battle, or the event of a sea chase ; to inculcate a silly confidence in good fortune, and to advise that the fate of Great Britain should be committed to the changes of the elements, the shifting of a wind, or the settling of a fog. It is to her armies that every nation, insular or continental, must look for her sure and *natural defence*. But although it would be absurd to recommend that the internal resources of a country should be neglected, either in order to favour its naval force, or in order to commit its defence to the movements of intrigue, and the efforts of foreign policy ; yet he would be an equally dangerous counsellor who should advise us to neglect those means of preventing war, and of rendering it harmless when it does occur, which are only to be found in a compliance with the principles of the balancing system.

When the different nations of Europe placed their whole glory in the splendour of their warlike renown, and attended only to the improvement of their military resources, every person of free rank was a soldier, and devoted his life to the profession of arms. But as soon as the arts of peace acquired an ascendancy, and other fame besides that of martial deeds was sought after, war became an object of dread, as deranging the main operations of society, and exposing the national independence to unforeseen casualties and dangers. Instead of being followed for its own sake, it was now only resorted to as a necessary evil, to avoid a greater risk. The first great consequence of this change in the occupations and character of men, was the separation of the military from the civil professions ; the intrusting a small class in each community with the defence of the rest ; the adoption of standing armies, by far the most important improvement in the art of government with which history has made us acquainted. As this great change has disarmed war of almost all its dangers, so another change, equally important, has arisen out of it—rendered wars much less frequent, and confined their influence to a small portion in the centre of the Continent. The European powers have formed a species of general law, which supersedes, in most instances, an appeal to the sword, by rendering such an appeal fatal to any power that may infringe upon the code ; by uniting the forces of the rest inevitably against each delinquent ; by agreeing, that any project of violating a



neighbour's integrity shall be prevented or avenged, not according to the resources of this neighbour, but according to the full resources of every other member of the European community; and by constantly watching over the state of public affairs, even in profound peace. Such, at least, would be the balancing system, carried to its full extent; and such is the state of refinement towards which it is constantly tending. The division of labour, too, and the separation of the military profession, has been carried, by some of the richer nations, to a still greater extent than the mere embodying of standing armies. Those states, which are the most injured by the operations of war, are also the richest in superfluous stock. They have contrived a species of pecuniary commutation of war, similar to the commutation of military service, which paved the way for the introduction of standing armies: they have managed to turn off the battle from their gates, by paying less wealthy allies for fighting in their cause at a safe distance. The operations of war are in this manner rendered very harmless, and a foundation is laid for their gradual disuse. A few useless millions, and a few still more useless lives, are sacrificed; the arts of peace continue to flourish, sometimes with increased prosperity; and the policy of preferring to purchase defeat at a distance, rather than victory at home—of paying allies for being vanquished, rather than gain the most splendid triumphs on their own ground—has been amply rewarded by the safety, increased resources, and real addition of power, which result from an enjoyment of all the substantial blessings of peace, with the only real advantages of necessary warfare.

Such are the general outlines of the modern system, founded upon the preservation of a balance of power. The science which professes to discuss the general principles of this system, and their particular application in detail to the actual situation of the European powers, is, of consequence, next to jurisprudence and police, the most important that can occupy the attention of the statesman. It has, however, been alleged that this is an enquiry reducible to no general or fixed principles; that it does not deserve the name of science; that it depends on the caprices of a few individuals, and the variations in their views or measures occasioned by accidental occurrences. Mr. Hume, in particular, at the very time when he recommends the drawing of our conclusions on subjects of domestic policy as fine as it is possible, adds, "that, in these affairs, the inferences rest on the concurrence of a multitude of causes—not, as in foreign politics, upon accidents, and chances, and the caprices of a few persons."\* It may, however, be observed, that the very same general arguments, so irresistibly stated by that acute and profound writer, to prove that politics may be reduced to a science †, apply as well to the foreign as to the domestic policy of a state. A few more particular remarks on this point may serve to set it in a light sufficiently striking.

1. All the governments of Europe have tended uniformly, and not very slowly, towards greater freedom and mildness, since the rise of the commercial policy of modern times, and the general diffusion of knowledge by the art of printing. Instead of a collection of despots, actuated in all their plans of internal and external arrangement by caprice or accident, the system of European princes is now an assemblage of deputies from the different nations, which have intrusted them with certain powers and commissions for the public good. In the execution of their trust, indeed,

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\* Political Essays.

† Essay III.

they are not directly accountable to any human authority ; but, even in the states where no constitutional control is appointed to the power of the crown, the indirect influence of a numerous and enlightened people is uniformly strong upon the councils of the monarch. It is always his interest to rule by gentle and agreeable means, and to further, by every measure in his power, the prosperity of his state. This interest, though for a while it may be concealed from his eyes, or overruled by opposite passions, can never be long hidden from him ; but must always, in the long run, force itself upon his attention, and be, for the most part, the guide of his conduct. The government of the most despotic princes offers constant examples of a submission to that opinion, which can scarcely there make itself heard ; and not a few instances of obedience to the voice, which, from its resistless power over divans themselves, has been emphatically called the voice of God. A check is thus provided for the violence of royal passions, and a guide or regulator for the movements of even a despot's caprice. In the free governments of modern Europe, however, the influence of public opinion is direct ; the voice of the nation is acknowledged ; and the will of the people is in general obeyed,—the only doubt being as to the particular line of conduct which that voice and will direct.

2. As almost all princes rule by the advice of ministers, and must execute their decrees by the assistance of a great number of deputies ; the connection of those men with the people at large — their responsibility to their country — the odium and personal danger which attach to a failure of any plan executed by their intervention, whether suggested by their councils or not — must quicken their perception of every national danger, and embolden them to withstand, in the cabinet, any pernicious measure dictated by the ignorance or caprice of their master. Where so many must thus, in some degree, concur in every act of the sovereign power, and so many are responsible, in the eyes of the country, for every abuse in the government, it is manifest that the chances of wilful misrule, through the unprincipled caprice, or rashness, or levity, or passions of a single monarch, are considerably diminished ; and that the true interests of the country, in its relations to foreign states, can only be lost sight of or thwarted during casual intervals, when the ministers are utterly careless of popular opinion in comparison of their master's will, and the tyrant is so short-sighted, and so corrupted by his unfortunate situation, as to despise his best interests, and disregard his chief danger. The actual responsibility of every minister to the country, even in governments the most unprincipled and despotic, and the submission of the sovereign to the will of the people, however debased, is proved by so many striking facts of common notoriety, that it is scarcely necessary to state them in illustration of the foregoing remarks. “ The Soldan of Egypt,” says Mr. Hume\*, “ or the Emperor of Rome, might drive his harmless subjects, like brute beasts, against their sentiments and inclinations ; but he must at least have led his Mamelukes or prætorian bands, like men, by their opinion.” There is evidently somewhat of inconsistency between the two parts of this proposition ; for, unless those Mamelukes and prætorian guards were so numerous as to command the whole state, and so separated from the rest of the commonwealth as to participate in no degree in their feelings, and to be altogether unconnected with their wrongs, it is clear that in the long run they must have been influenced by the national opinion. At any rate, although, in the *domestic* concerns of Egypt or Rome, the interests

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\* Essay IV. on the Principles of Government.

of the two orders might be frequently opposed to each other, and those of the people be neglected, there can be no doubt that, in the *external* relations of the state, the two classes formed but one body, and the best interests of the whole were the same. The caprice of the soldan, or emperor, then, could never, for any length of time, stifle or disobey the voice of those bands whom he had to guide by their good-will, and rule by their opinion; that is, by partly yielding to, and partly directing, their wishes.

In the most despotic governments of the East, the fury of a mob frequently obtains a change of ministers, which is always a change of measures. The vizier who commands a vanquished army, who advises an unprosperous war, or concludes a disadvantageous peace, is generally bowstringed at the first murmurs of the mob, and his body thrown to appease them. This is a sacrifice made by the most absolute of monarchs to the will of the most enslaved people in the world. The power of the Grand Signior, which lays every Mussulman prostrate at his feet, does not extend to the enacting of any law which might add to the taxes of the empire. He may crush the proudest of his bashaws, and squeeze from the richest of his officers every particle of their accumulated wealth: he may bowstring thousands, whom ancient opinion and religious prejudice has taught to believe that their lives were made for his sport: but he dares not issue any regular ordinance for a single general impost; or the same people, who, in the strange contradictions of this unnatural state of society, had kissed the axe that was lifted against their lives, would now raise their united voice with a force powerful to shake the innermost recesses of the seraglio.

When Peter the Great of Russia wished to invert the order of succession to the Imperial throne, from an unnatural antipathy to the Tzarowitch, whose rights had formerly been in some degree acknowledged, he did not think it sufficient to issue an express edict, declaring the power of the Emperor to fix upon any successor that he chose. He began, by accustoming the minds of men to such an unsettled and arbitrary mode of inheritance in cases of private property. He published a previous ordinance, obliging each father to bequeath his whole real property to one of his children, leaving him the choice of his heir. This singular barbarian, notwithstanding the many vices that stained his character, and the constant cruelties in which his reign was spent, had the merit of beginning the civilisation of his boundless empire. He wished to raise his savage and enslaved people to the rank of men; and the ordinance which we have mentioned, is an instance of submission to their will, from a real or supposed necessity, and from a wish to bring about a change in their opinions. The succeeding Tzars have adopted a regular mode of receiving the opinions of the most respectable and enlightened part of their subjects, and of imposing a check on their own authority. Upon a new and general law being drawn up, the *ukase* containing it is transmitted to each of the *governments*; and the viceroys may assemble the different *courts* to consider it. If they unanimously disapprove, they may present a *representation* against it to the senate. The law is reconsidered, and is not obligatory on the realm, until another ordinance has been issued, confirming the former.\* The silly passion for legislation which distinguished the Emperor Joseph II., produced many laws disagreeable to the people: and although the whole tenor of that weak

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† Tooke's Russian Empire, vol. ii. p. 395.

monarch's reign demonstrates how little he was disposed to recognise the rights of his subjects, yet those obnoxious regulations were generally abrogated almost as soon as passed. While he was dragooning the provinces of the Netherlands into a surrender of their most sacred privileges, and purposely acting in direct opposition to the wishes of his constituents in the Imperial diet, he could not obtain the acquiescence of Austria (where his power is absolute by law) in a trifling and absurd regulation prescribing the interment of dead bodies in lime-pits: and the discontent of that part of his empire obliged him to abandon this idle measure.\*

3. It must be evident to every one, that the only reason why the theory of international relations has been supposed incapable of being reduced to fixed principles, is, the apparently small number of men concerned in regulating the external policy of states. Where a great body of people are nearly interested, and take a part in each measure; where their consent, advice, or acquiescence, is necessary to the execution of every plan, it is clear that there is always a much smaller chance of capricious and irregular operations being carried through, than where one or two individuals only are concerned. It is a remark of Machiavel, distinguished by his usual acuteness and profundity, that although, in matters of general discussion, the people are often mistaken, yet, in matters reduced to particulars, they are most sensible and judicious; that the prince is much more apt to be ungrateful, both through avarice and suspicion, than the people; that the multitude is generally both wiser and more constant than the prince; and that those leagues or confederacies are more to be trusted, which are made with free states, than those which are made with princes. For the demonstration of these important and curious propositions, both by reasoning and illustration, we refer our readers to the discourses of the Florentine Secretary †, more particularly the fifty-ninth chapter of the first book, which is most in consonance with our present reasonings, and contains as strict a demonstration of the principle, as any that we meet with in geometry, making allowance for the different nature of the evidence. ‡ . As we have shown that in all states, whether free or enslaved, the regulation of public affairs is, in some degree, influenced by public opinion, and that the most despotic princes are not free from its influence, either directly, or through their subordinate agents; it may be inferred, that the principles of the Italian statesman are applicable, in some measure, to the movements of all independent communities; and that the external as well as internal affairs of states are the more steady, the more reducible to certain laws, the greater the number of men is to whose management those affairs are intrusted, and the more extensive the circle is whose opinion or will affects that management.

4. The relative interests of different nations are affected by various circumstances, either unalterable, or only slowly alterable, in their relative situation and domestic state. The knowledge and comparison of those circumstances forms the foundation of the science, the principles of which we are now considering; and it is very evident that this knowledge must be of as difficult acquisition as it is important and practically useful. For,

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\* Mirabeau, *Monarchie Prussienne*, tom. iv. p. 472. 4to. edit.

† *Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di T. Livio*, lib. i. cap. 29. 47. 58, and 59.

‡ Cap. lix. *Di quali confederazioni è lega altri si può più fidare, è quella fatta con una Repubblica, è di quella fatta con un Principe.*

in order to have a clear view of the foreign relations of any power, it is necessary to be acquainted with the circumstances, not only of that nation, but of all the rest which compose the European commonwealth; to learn accurately their political state; to investigate their national characters and habits; to consult minutely their statistical situation;—so intimately is the federal power (the *puissance fédérative* of the foreign politicians) blended with the internal force, and the relative position with the insulated state of any country. The temporary circumstances of the different powers deserve also to be considered in a practical point of view;—the court intrigues; leading characters of the military or political departments; and the distinguished men in the literary world. These make up, in the great book of politics, what may be called the chapter of accidents; and it is a chapter which perpetually sets all the inferences and calculations of the other parts at defiance. Except this last head—and it is obvious that every other branch of the subject is general, and reducible to fixed principles—the circumstances which we have enumerated are of a general and invariable nature, or they vary slowly and regularly, or according to certain laws, which it is the business of the political philosopher to ascertain. The last kind of circumstances which we mentioned are, indeed, more irregular, and their disturbing force is not denied. But, in considering the effects of the former, we must lay out of view those deranging causes, as we demonstrate (in Dynamics) the properties of the mechanical powers, without taking into view the effects of friction, or the resistance of the medium in which the powers operate. In a practical point of view, those disturbing causes must be carefully weighed; and to investigate them is the business of the lawgiver, the prince himself, his ministers of state, with his agents in diplomatic affairs: in a word, of the practical politician or statesman; a character of distinguished rank in every country—filling at once the most dignified and difficult place which man can occupy, and very little deserving of those ill-tempered invectives which Dr. Smith has been pleased to heap upon it, in a fit of peevishness, not unnatural to one who had seen how very seldom this great and important character has been adequately supported.\*

That such disturbing causes do exist, to affect the foreign relations of every state, is no more an argument against the science of which we are treating, than the undoubted existence and effects of causes exactly similar in the domestic policy of states is a reason for denying (what no one now thinks of doubting) that the principles of government are reducible to a general and certain science. The degree of vigour inherent in any form of government, the freedom enjoyed by the people, the influence of the privileged orders upon the great engine of the state,—all these are liable to be affected every moment, and are actually affected, by the characters of the leaders in the different departments of the constitution; yet no one, since the days of Aristotle, has denied that the doctrines of a monarchical, aristocratical, and democratical government are reducible to certain general principles, and that the nature of government in general is a subject of scientific enquiry.

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\* Our readers will be amused with the little piece of ill-humour which this truly great man vents upon the statesman or politician, in the passage here alluded to. He calls him “*an insidious and crafty animal* ;” forgetting, surely, that Cæsar, Cato, Demosthenes, Richelieu, and many others, who have made the world tremble at their names, or revere their memory, must be ranged in this very class.—*Wealth of Nations*, book iv. chap. 2.

In fact, the foreign affairs of nations are much less apt to be influenced by accidental events than is generally imagined. The death of a civil or military chief, who had supported the greatness of a state by the vigour and wisdom of his councils, or the glory of his arms, is seldom, if ever, a cause of great change in the relative importance of that country. Great men rise in certain circumstances; they are disciplined in particular schools; they train up successors for themselves; they are called forth by certain emergencies in public affairs. This is more particularly the case in great systems, either civil or military — in the extensive governments, or vast regular armies of modern times, all the operations of which are combined, and mutually dependent one upon another. As these can only be carried on by the united exertions of many persons of the same habits and cast of talents, their success must always depend on the union of men whose abilities and experience in their arts are extensive. If the general or the statesman fall, his place will be filled by some of those whose talents have assisted him in subordinate branches of employment; and the constant demand for merit in a certain department will generally excite men to apply their attention to the acquisition of the excellence so much wanted, and so splendidly rewarded. Great occasions draw into public life such men as have long been labouring to fit themselves for their station; and new talents, new powers, frequently spring up in a man's mind, when he is placed in a situation of pre-eminent difficulty and splendour sufficient to call them forth. The great object of every nation should be, to remove every impediment or check which may prevent such men from rising into the stations for which their natural or acquired faculties render them fit. Under a free government, the restrictions upon the rise of real merit are much fewer than under a despotism; and the chance of preferment is extended to a much wider circle. In those countries, then, much less consequence may be attached to the existence or to the loss of a particular man. It is seldom that we meet with Fleurys, or Turgots, or Bernstorffs, or Hassans; but a Walpole, or a Pitt, is, happily for mankind, frequently reproduced in the course of an age. Thus the appearance of those illustrious characters in whose hands the fate of nations are placed, is much less regulated by accident than is generally supposed, more especially in modern times and in free states. It follows that, even in that branch of foreign policy which we have denominated the chapter of accidents, some principles may be traced; and less is to be imputed to blind hazard than most men are at first apt to imagine. May we be allowed to hope that the time is approaching (not rapidly, or by violent changes, but slowly and quietly, like all those arrangements of nature which tend to the substantial improvement of the species), when the establishment of equal rights, and rational systems of regular government over the whole of Europe, shall diminish yet farther the consequences attached to the caprices and accidental fates of individuals, and shall reduce to complete order all the circumstances that affect the intercourse of nations, so as to subject their whole movements to certain general and invariable laws, to reduce every eccentricity of course, and to correct all accidental inequalities or alterations in the system.\*

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\* The foregoing general conclusions are sanctioned by the high authority of our countryman Professor Stewart. Had he added the demonstration of a proposition, simply enunciated in his celebrated work on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (chap. iv. sect. 8.), the above enquiry would have been rendered unnecessary.

We have now finished the general observations which we purposed to premise upon the nature and first principles of the science — a practical treatise or application of which is now before us.\* Before offering our particular remarks upon this work, we have yet to call our readers' attention to some of the propositions in which the doctrine of the balance of power is contained: we shall arrange them so as to exhibit a sketch of the nature of the work before us, though in a more general way, and upon a more comprehensive plan, than can be found in that treatise itself, which is principally deficient in fundamental principles and extensive views. We have, in the foregoing statements, insisted the more at large on the possibility of reducing the external policy of nations to certain general principles; because, besides the direct negation of this proposition by Mr. Hume and others, it has been very much the custom of inferior politicians, and of the common run of mankind, more particularly in Great Britain, to decry such speculations as vain and illusive; to hold them up as objects fit only for the pedantic statist of Germany and Holland; and to describe them as points which should be settled by the finical, and too often contemptible characters, who are generally the representatives of the greatest nations, and who have brought a sort of ridicule upon the very name of diplomacy. The gravest subject that can occupy the human mind (intimately connected indeed with our present enquiry, though not altogether of the same kind with it), the *law of nations*, has been exposed to a similar contempt. Montesquieu himself, lawyer and historian as he was, has, with his usual passion for an epigram, grossly misrepresented a subject as important and refined as any in his own department of municipal jurisprudence. He seriously explains "the foundation of international law," by telling us, "that the whole system is a set of obvious corollaries to a maxim in ethics — that, in war, nations should do as little injury, and in peace as much good, to each other, as is consistent with their individual safety." Without asking whether it is possible that the author of this witticism should ever have heard of the insults of flags, the precedence of states, nay, the whole admitted causes of justifiable war, and admitting that all the parts of the system may be strained so as to come under the general proposition, we may be allowed to remark, with great deference to so high a name, that such observations are extremely useless and unsatisfactory; that we learn from this remark nothing which can give the slightest hint of the nature of public law; that it is as instructive as if one ignorant of mathematics were to say, "the whole of this troublesome science consists of obvious corollaries from a very easy axiom — whatever is, is." In this manner might all science be simplified; and learners, who knew what "*corollary*" was, might be charmed to hear that they had but one proposition to learn and remember, and that all the rest was "*corollary*" from it.

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\* The foregoing remarks may appear to our readers unconnected with the particular works of *Segur* and *Favier*. But we must observe, that the notes of *Segur* (the only new part of the publication) are, from beginning to end, a statement of the principles above refuted, viz. that, in this branch of politics, all must be ascribed to the particular characters and fortunes of individuals. In fully examining this, we have therefore completely examined the leading doctrines of this work. It may be proper to add, that the work, of which *Segur's* edition is now before us, has excited more attention on the Continent than any political publication of the present day; and that it is studied by all statesmen, as a manual of one very important branch of their science.

We trust that the remarks already stated will suffice to evince how mistaken are all such views of foreign policy or international law; that those sciences will appear strictly reducible to certain general principles, and leading to important applications; that those subjects will be found highly refined and delicate, and as fully deserving of minute investigation as any within the range of the human intellect. As we proceed, further illustrations of these remarks will occur to set their truth in a still stronger point of view.

1. *Treaties* or *public pactions* are the solemn and authentic expressions of certain agreements, which the governments of friendly or neutral powers have entered into for their mutual advantage. In so far as refers to our present subject, they are chiefly of three kinds — *amicable*, *defensive*, *offensive and defensive*. The first are simple cessations of hostilities; the next are agreements of mutual assistance in case of attack from a third power; and the last are more strict unions of interest, for the accomplishment of certain objects mutually beneficial. The second are seldom pure and unmingled. Many treaties bear the name of defensive, which, by secret articles, or more commonly by mutual understanding, and not unfrequently by the express tenor of the stipulations, are strictly of the latter kind; and, in general, a paction *bonâ fide* defensive has a tendency to bring about one of the more intimate and effectual kind.

The monopolising and jealous spirit of mercantile policy, in modern times, has added to the kinds of treaties just now mentioned a fourth, known by the name of *commercial*; of which the object is, to settle a certain rate of trade between the high contracting parties; or (what comes to the same thing) to grant each other certain privileges of buying and selling, refused to other states. These treaties are in every case absurd; they are meant to restrain that which ought in its nature to be free, and to be regulated only by the unrestricted operations of private traders: they relate to subjects in which no government ought ever to concern itself: they are only tolerable, when their object is the abolition of restrictions formerly imposed by foolish rulers, or gradually arising from the prejudices of the people.

All treaties have been exposed to the invectives and sarcasms of those who do not duly appreciate the nature of the institution. They are bits of parchment, and may be torn; they are made by men of peace in their closets, and may be violated by soldiers in the field; they are deeds by which states affect to bind themselves, while no court of public law exists in which the party failing may be compelled to perform his part; they are intended to check the ambition of princes or commonwealths, but they are to be observed by those who feel the checks, and may in a moment throw them off. “Give me,” said Prince Eugene, in the true spirit of these reasons — “Give me, said the General, when he saw that his allies were slow to fulfil conventions made against their obvious interests, and refusing to gratify his ambition, against their own safety and beyond their means — “Give me a battalion of soldiers; they will do more than a thousand treaties.” If all states were ruled by general officers, this sentiment would indeed be accurately true. In that case, a corporal would be a much more important personage than a publicist or an ambassador; but he would also be more interesting than a municipal judge or jurisconsult; for all municipal law, as well as all public law, would yield to the truncheon and the bayonet. The same sentiment would hold good, also, of all such treaties as those entered into about the time of Eugene, and those to which he evidently alludes —



treaties evidently disadvantageous to one of the contracting parties, and wholly beneficial to the others. But it happens that, in the present state of society, generals receive their commission to act, and their orders to desist, from men strongly interested in the preservation of pacific relations — in the maintenance of the national faith — in the existence of a public code, to which all parties may at all times appeal.

If, by such declamatory arguments, it is meant to demonstrate that treaties will not of themselves be sufficient to maintain peace or alliances — to preserve the independence of states — to ensure success in war — we must admit the position; for we certainly never imagined that an ambassador's seal and subscription communicated to the skin of a dead sheep the faculty of tranquillising or rousing the public mind, levying armies, gaining battles, and taking towns. We would trust more to its powers in the hands of a drummer, than of a statesman, to produce those effects. But that such solemn conventions as lead to treaties, and such discussions as attend them in the nations contracting — such ratifications as finish them — such ideas of pledge and form as they are uniformly supposed to convey, — that all those circumstances have a most powerful influence, we cannot conceive questionable by any one acquainted with the history of man, or the nature of the human mind. Independent of the spirit, indeed, with which those conventions were made, the mere paction is but a bit of parchment. Independent of the spirit which extorted the Magna Charta and Habeas Corpus, those records of the freedom and spirit of our ancestors would be most unavailing to the liberties of the present generation. Both the one and the other are conventional signs — legal modes of expressing a bargain — certain solemn acts, the performance of which intimates to the world that certain intentions were perfected in the minds of the parties at the time — certain deeds, leaving a record which may refresh the memory of the parties, and to which the party fulfilling may appeal. Neither the treaties of Westphalia (now, unhappily, a matter of history), nor the Magna Charta, can be enforced directly by the mandate of any human Court, superior to both parties. If the circumstances which gave rise to them were materially altered, they would both become obsolete; as, indeed, the former has already become. While no material change takes place, they stand on record before the whole world, to animate the parties contracting — to check them in their conduct on their honour and good faith — to show the surrounding nations what compacts have been made — and to hold up to execration those that break them.

The foundation of the stability of every treaty is, the mutual advantage of the parties. It is a just remark of the Florentine Secretary, that, even after the most unequal contest, no peace between nations can ever be solid by which one nation gains much more than the other. If the one gains much real good, and the other only obtains safety from total ruin, the peace will be broken, either by the former, as soon as her power is recruited enough to complete the work of conquest, or by the latter, as soon as she has breathed a little, and can hope to regain her lost ground. All such foolish treaties are rather conventions of truce than of peace. They were one great means of conquest used by the Romans: they are rendered less frequent in modern times, by the principles of the balancing system.

The observation of Machiavel may be extended to alliances in general between nations. The leagues, particularly those of a nature both offensive and defensive, have generally owed their instability to a necessary

disunion of parties, arising from each possessing views radically incompatible with those of the others; views, properly speaking, secondary to the main object of the convention, but more interesting and more binding to the individual party than any views of the common cause.

The remarks made above apply to those subsidiary obligations entered into by nations not strictly concerned in the stipulations, in which the acceding powers guarantee the treaty or bargain to support the party implementing against all infractions by the other. These are generally modified by the disposition of all parties at the time of the requisition to fulfil being made to the parties guarantees. They are the refinement of the modern system of interference.

2. The circumstances in the relative situation of the European powers — their proximity, their constant intercourse, their rivalry, and the uniform desire that all princes have to extend their dominions — render it absolutely necessary that no one power should view with indifference the domestic affairs of the rest, more particularly those affairs which have a reference to the increase or consolidation of national resources.

For the purpose of acquiring such information, the institution of ambassadors has been adopted, or of *privileged spies*, as they have been called by witty men, with much the same propriety of speech as would mark the personage who should be pleased to call Generals master-butchers, or Judges hangmen. From the institution of ambassadors, an essential and peculiar part of the modern system, have resulted the important consequences — a constant intercourse between the two governments; frequent opportunities of detecting and preventing hostile measures or artifices; and still more frequent occasions of avoiding ruptures by timely complaint, and explanation or redress. The natural effects of the system to which this matter has been reduced, are certainly the prevention of wars, and the systematising of the grand art of pacification.

The relative influence of the national changes that happen in one part of Europe, upon the proceedings of the other parts, might be illustrated by a variety of facts from modern history. That influence seems to be founded on natural circumstances, and wholly independent of all theory or system. Thus, to take an obvious instance: — As soon as the grand improvement of standing armies had been introduced into Europe, it was extended, in France, by the ambition of the King, to the keeping of large forces always in pay; and this example was followed by the neighbouring states, not as a useful invention of policy, for securing the prince's power, but as a measure necessary for the safety of nations exposed to the new power with which this change armed the French King. A circumstance not so obvious, in the history of the formation of most of the European states, presents an illustration, equally striking, of the principle which we have stated. There can be no doubt that the consolidation of the smaller dynasties into which the different empires were once divided, took place, in all, about the same period. The united empire of the Franks under Charlemagne was too formidable a neighbour to the heterogeneous masses of divided power which were then presented on all sides — by Britain, Spain, Italy, and the Northern kingdoms. Accordingly we find, that in the space of little more than half a century, all the great unions took place of which the present nations of Europe are composed. The empire of Charlemagne was completed at the end of the eighth century; the Saxon Heptarchy was united under Egbert, first King of England, in 827; the Picts and Scots, by Kenneth II., first King

of Scotland, in 838; the Norwegian petty lordships into one kingdom, by Harold Harfager, in 875; and the crowns of Castile and Leon, under one King of Spain, nearly about the same period. The more contiguous of those states were consolidated at the very same time; the rest within a few years afterwards.

The right of national interference (a late refinement of this right of proportional improvement) has, like all other valuable and sacred principles, been called in question. It has been denied, that the total overthrow of all regular government in the greatest nation of Europe; the abolition of every salutary restraint upon the operations of the multitude; the erection of a standard to which every thing rebellious and unprincipled might repair; the open avowal of anarchy, atheism, and oppression, as a public creed; — it has been denied, that the existence of this grand nuisance gave the vicinage (to use Mr. Burke's apposite illustration) a right to interfere. Yet it is difficult to conceive what national changes, except the introduction of the pestilence, could give a better right to the neighbourhood to reject all intercourse with so infected a mass as France then was. And, if such defensive measures were absolutely necessary, it is evident that the slightest aggression on the part of this neighbour justified that open war, which was so loudly prescribed by the slightest chance of its leading to a restoration of order. The immense acquisition of power which the French government acquired by the revolution — the general levy and arming that immediately took place — would have justified all neighbours in extending their resources upon the common principles of the modern system. Now, if this increase of French power had taken place on the Spanish, instead of the North side of the Pyrenees; if it had been, not a sudden augmentation of internal resources, but an increase of territory and power by conquest; — no one doubts the propriety of an immediate interference: nay, if this increase had only been in contemplation, no one would hesitate to consider the formation of the plan as sufficient cause for war: so thought our forefathers at least, when they attacked Lewis XIV. a hundred years ago. But what difference is there, as to foreign states, whether such an augmentation of power takes place at the expense of the Spanish, the Bourbons, or at the cost of the other branch of that illustrious house? whether this sudden change in the aspect of one powerful rival neighbour is the consequence of her foreign conquests, or of her rapid internal changes? whether the addition is drawn from the pillaged provinces of Spain, or the overthrow of the peaceful institutions, and the plunder of all the wealthy orders at home? When such a sudden and prodigious increase of resources takes place in one country, as can only be matched by a similar revolution developing equal powers in the neighbouring nations, those neighbours are exactly in this dilemma; — either they must wade through all manner of turbulence and danger, to the sudden possession of resources sufficient to balance this new power; or they must submit to this new power. One mode of escape only remains from alternatives equally cruel: they may unite against this common nuisance — they may interfere and abate it. If France had conquered the kingdoms of Leon and Castile, who doubts that Britain and Austria might have attacked her, though neither of them were friends of Spain? But this was not absolutely necessary: for, first, they might have perhaps saved themselves by defensive alliance, and the peaceable improvement of their internal resources; or, secondly, they might certainly have acquired in Holland, or Denmark, or Spain itself, an extent of territory equal to that gained by France. But the former measure would

have been dangerous; the latter both dangerous and unjust. In like manner, Britain and Austria might have met the crisis of their affairs, arising from the new and sudden acquisition of resources which France made at the revolution. First, they might have united defensively as ancient allies, and worked all the while to improve their internal resources; or, secondly, they might have revolutionised, and followed the French example. The first, however, of those plans would have been dangerous; the latter, both dangerous and unprincipled. One alternative remained; — a union against the unheard of nuisance.

We hesitate not, then, to lay it down as a principle, applicable to this extreme case, that whenever a sudden and great change takes place in the internal structure of a state, dangerous in a high degree to all neighbours, they have a right to attempt, by hostile interference, the restoration of an order of things safe to themselves; or, at least, to counterbalance, by active aggression, the new force suddenly acquired. If a highwayman pulls out a pistol from his bosom, shall we wait till he loads and presents it before we kill or disarm him? shall we not attack him with like arms if he displays such weapons, whether he takes them from his own stores, or seizes them from some other person in our sight.\* We do not attack a neighbouring nation for plundering or conquering a third power, because we wish to avenge or redress the injury; but because we shall be ourselves affected by its consequences. Shall we be less injured by the same consequences, because the dangerous power of doing us mischief is developed from its recesses within, and not forcibly snatched from without?

That such a principle as we have now been considering is liable to limitations, we do not deny: it is, indeed, only applicable to extreme cases. No one would think of asserting the right of interference to be applicable in the case of gradual improvement, however great, in any nation; nor in the case of that more sudden amelioration which national resources may receive from the operation of a salutary reform — or a useful law — or a beneficial change of rulers. We only think the right competent in cases of sudden and great aggrandisement, such as that of France in 1790; and then, we maintain, that, if it endangers the safety of the neighbouring powers, no manner of importance should be attached to the nature of those circumstances from whence the danger has originated. Indeed we suspect that the essential, though not always avowed, principles of modern policy would bear us out in a wider interpretation of the proposition. We conceive, that many of the alliances of states, formed with a view to check the growing power of a common rival, and always ending in offensive measures, have been formed without any pretext of violence having actually been committed by the dreaded power, or being apprehended from that quarter; and without any consideration whatever of the source from whence this dangerous strength has been derived, whether from external acquisitions (the most common case), or from the sudden development of internal resources, or from the gradual increase of national strength, while neighbouring states were more slowly increasing or were losing force. This increase it is — this comparative strength, which excites the salutary jealousy of modern councils towards neighbouring powers. The pretexts, indeed, for war have been various; but the cause

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\* The doctrine of the balance of power is deduced, by Vattel, from similar grounds. *Vide Droit des Gens*, liv. iii. ch. iii. § 44. et seq.

of such wars has generally been the same: the pretext has been adopted in conformity to ancient usage or prejudices, or to humour the feelings of the multitude, and cause them to take part, by working on their passions much more powerfully than if the real cause were stated. The great maxim has generally been, "*Obsta principiis*"—"*Venienti occurrere morbo.*" We recommend it as a general watchword to all nations placed in the European community—to those, more especially, who are neighbours of Prussia and France; above all we recommend it to the greater powers of Europe, the natural guardians of the great commonwealth; and to our country in particular, whose pre-eminent rank among them gives her a title to interfere for others, as well as for her own immediate safety. To her we would address a language not unknown to her children in former times—the language of the balancing system.

" *Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento :  
Hæ tibi erunt artes ; pacisque imponere morem,  
Parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos.*" — Virgil. *Æn.*

3. It has been urged as a glaring inconsistency in a system which has for its professed object the preservation of peace, that, according to its principles and technical language, certain nations are denominated *natural enemies*, and others *natural allies*. A little attention to the meaning of this proposition will at once demonstrate the futility of the allegation, and lead us to one of the most general and fundamental doctrines of modern international policy. It is not meant by this phraseology to assert, that some nations ought always to view each other with suspicion and enmity. The intention of such a form of expression is merely to state a very general and, unfortunately, an unquestionable fact in the history of the human species—that nations placed in certain circumstances are uniformly found to entertain towards each other sentiments of rivalry and animosity. The balancing system prescribes the means of disarming this bad principle in our nature of its destructive tendency, by teaching us to consider other nations as our natural friends, and by making the members of each class unite, so as to act systematically, with a view to the preservation of national peace. A few obvious considerations will show what those principles are, and will lead us, by an easy transition, to the particular subject of the work now before us.

The circumstances which are uniformly found to constitute natural enmity between nations are threefold; *proximity* of situation, *similarity* of pursuits, and near *equality* of power. From the opposite causes arise the natural indifference or relative neutrality of states; a reasonable *distance*, *diversity* of objects, and considerable *inequality* of resources; while natural alliance results from the common enmity produced by a concurrence of the three causes, first mentioned in the relations of two or more powers towards the same third power.

But it may often happen that a state is involved in hostile relations with another of which it is not the natural enemy, either from being the accidental ally of a third power, primarily the enemy of this second; or from being the natural ally to this third power, in consequence of their common relations of enmity towards some fourth or fifth power. Hence indeed arises the intricacy, if it has any, of the balancing system; and hence the multiplied relations of every one power with all the rest, so as to permit no one to remain for a moment an indifferent spectator of what is passing in the most remote parts of the European commonwealth. A few examples will illustrate the foregoing proposition. These illustrations

contain the theory of what is called in practice the European balance. The work before us consists, almost entirely, of a treatise drawn up by the Sieur Favier, a confidential servant of Louis XV. and Louis XVI., upon the actual relations of the different powers at the commencement of the last unfortunate reign. The principles upon which all such treatises proceed, we purpose at present briefly to sketch. The utility and application of such speculations may, like their object, be temporary and local; the principles are of all times and places—they are regular, fixed, and general.

In conformity to the proposition above enunciated, France is said to be the natural enemy of Great Britain. These states, separated by a narrow channel, are of sufficient relative strength to be mutually formidable; the one, by the extent and compactness of her territory, and by her large and useful population; the other, by her immense wealth, the defence afforded by her insular situation, and the myriads of her fleets which cover the ocean. They are both engaged in similar pursuits; because the circumstances of their situation are similar. The island, however, is more adapted to commercial occupations, by the genius of her inhabitants, the nature of her produce, and the extent of her sea-coast; from whence has resulted a habit of application to manufactures, navigation, and trade, and, in consequence, superior skill in the arts, and greater extent of trading capital. The other country, eminent also in those points of view, is however so far inferior to the island, that her attention has, for above a century, been constantly directed to emulate so valuable a superiority; while Britain, finding herself deficient in direct power to sway the continental states of Europe, otherwise than by intrigue and gold, has returned France the compliment of attempting to beat, on her own element, the natural mistress of the European continent. From this reciprocal inferiority, and consequent emulation, has arisen that spirit of rivalry, which will, it is to be feared, permanently alienate from each other the two nations most formed to love and esteem each other; best adapted to entertain close and profitable relations of commerce; and formed, by their union, to secure the lasting peace, and sway uncontrolled the sceptre of the civilised world. Unhappily the natural passions of the people, and the ambition of their rulers, have taught both to “bear no brother near the throne;” to suffer no equal in trade, in arts, or in learning; and to divide, by their irreconcilable enmity, the other powers in the system, of which that enmity has become the corner stone.

Holland, from her proximity to Britain, her extensive commerce, and her splendid resources of national wealth, would have been our natural enemy, had France been out of the question. But as Holland lay still nearer to that ambitious power, with whose pursuits she interfered at least as much, besides the jealousy of her democratic government and Calvinistic religion, it became her interest to league with the enemies of her formidable neighbour. Accordingly, in all the wars of the two last centuries, Holland has been found on the side of England, with only two exceptions:—the impolitic contest of Charles II. when he was in the pay of France, and the jealous enmity of Holland in the end of the American war, as anomalous in Dutch politics as the war of Charles had been in the history of Great Britain. After the peace of 1782, the breach was kept open, chiefly by the successes of the Republican power, until the year 1787; when, by one of the most skilful and successful interferences in continental affairs which the balancing system has ever accomplished, the Stadtholder’s power was restored, French influence destroyed, and the Dutch restored to their natural alliance with England.

The present alliance of the French and Batavian Republics is obviously no anomalous case: it is in every respect a subjection retained, as it was made, by the force of arms, and the influence of factious intrigue. The day is perhaps not distant when even the slight appearances of national independence will be thrown off, and the absorption of the United Provinces into the modern empire of the Franks, be (shall we say?) the last great sacrifice to the sweeping principle of "*arrondissement*," one of the most signal inventions of the 18th century.

Next to France, the greatest power on the continent of Europe resides in the house of Austria, from the union of its hereditary dominions in Hungary, Bohemia, Austria, the frontier provinces, and the late acquisitions in Poland and the Venetian territories, with the Imperial crown, which confers an authority, chiefly of indirect influence, over the princes of the empire. The hereditary losses of this power in the late war have, on the whole, been trifling; but she has lost much in the power of swaying the affairs of Italy, much of her influence in the Germanic affairs, and still more of relative force, by the astonishing increase of France and the augmentation also of Prussia (her natural rival in Germany), to one or other of whom, or their dependents, have accrued all that Austria has lost. After all, the Austrian power is great and formidable. It would be the greatest and most formidable in Europe, were its extensive territories somewhat more compact, so as to derive full advantage from their central position; were it to acquire a small addition of sea-coast in the Adriatic, so as to have easier vent for its numerous and costly products in the foreign markets; were its vast resources called forth and wielded by a better formed government, or a wiser race of statesmen, so as to take every advantage of the finest climates, richest mountains, most fertile valleys, and greatest variety of hardy subjects; and more especially, were its armies, the first in the world, organised upon a better plan, so as to place at their head younger leaders: were these advantages (the most of which may be acquired) added to its immense natural resources, Austria might be deemed the first power in Europe, and dreaded by all her neighbours as resistless in the scale.

The circumstances which render Austria the natural enemy and counterpoise of France, render her also the natural ally of Britain, — the great continental support of British influence. In proportion to the enmity between those leading powers, this natural union between Britain and Austria has always been more or less close, since the separation of the Spanish from the Austrian branch of the house. It has experienced only one remarkable intermission, and that a slight one, during the peace-loving administrations of Fleuri and Walpole. In the war which succeeded the fall of Walpole's ministry, France siding with the Bavarian Emperor, England naturally took the part of the Empress-Queen, at that time almost crushed by the union of her enemies. The singular alliance of 1756, the *chef-d'œuvre* of Kaunitz, and, according to the French politicians, the greatest error France ever committed, deranged, for a while, the natural relations of the continental powers. Britain was not thrown out of amity with Austria; but Austria, ceasing to be the enemy of France, ceased also to be the ally of Britain. Yet still it is worthy of remark, that the assistance given by us to Prussia, during the Seven years' war, in consequence of France siding against Frederick II.\*, was pointed, not

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\* *Vide* Hist. de la Guerre de Sept Ans, vol. i. cap. 1., where that Prince himself details the reasons that induced him to undertake the war. One was, the

against Austria or Russia, his two most formidable enemies, by checking whom we could at once have saved him; but against our own natural enemy alone, to our desire of opposing whom Prussia owed the aid she received from us.

The chief part of the "*Politique de tous les Cabinets*," is occupied with a treatise of the Sieur Favier on the Foreign Relations of France, evidently drawn up with a view to decry the policy of 1756, which dictated the Austrian alliance, and to show the necessity under which France laboured of increasing her military as well as federal power (*sa puissance tant militaire que fédérative*), in order to regain the rank of a primary power, said to have been lost through the consequences of the Austrian alliance, and the seven years' war. This treatise (with a few others, chiefly short excerpts from the memorials of Vergennes, Broglio, Turgot, and other French ministers) was first published in 1793, by authority of the legislature; and, after attracting so great attention over all Europe, as to be deemed the best popular manual of young diplomatists and politicians, it is now republished with a few additions, and with large notes, of considerable value, by the editor, M. Segur, formerly an eminent diplomatic character in the service of the French court. The theory of M. Segur is precisely the reverse of Favier's. He approves of the Austrian alliance, and condemns only the misconduct that marked the management of both the civil and military administration of France, after the treaty of Vienna had sealed and perfected the new federal system.

Favier, adopting the opinion since universally received, attributes to the treaty of 1756, and the consequent military operations of France during the seven years' war, not only the immediate loss of men and money at that crisis, (all for the benefit of Austria, without any good to the concerns of France,) but also the subsequent aggrandisement of the Austrian house, already too powerful by the exhaustion of Prussia, and the valuable acquisition of Poland, the natural ally of France, and scene of French influence, whose destruction he hesitates not to impute to the Austrian system. Segur, on the other hand, without denying the losses experienced by France during the war, and the still greater evils arising to her from the Polish catastrophe, ascribes those consequences to the maladministration of French affairs in the seven years' war, and in the whole interval between the peace of Hubertsburg and the Revolution. He maintains, that the wisest policy which France could possibly have adopted, was, the securing of a long peace by an alliance with her natural enemy. He argues this point upon much the same grounds as those chosen by the defenders of Walpole and Fleuri; and he contends that no danger whatever could have arisen to France from the alliance of 1756, if the administration of her domestic affairs had been as wise and energetic as the management of her foreign relations at that era. As Favier perpetually recurs to the same text, endeavouring, like all theorists, to reduce every thing under one head, and twisting all facts to humour his main position; so the new editor follows him through his whole course, and, under the head of each power whose relations to France are discussed by Favier in the text, we meet with a separate argument in Segur's notes, tending either to modify or overthrow the favourite conclusions of the former politician.

It appears to us (although we cannot afford room for the discussion)

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certainty of both England and France *not* taking the same side; whence, he could count on the assistance of one of those powers.



that the doctrine of Favier, with a few limitations, is by far the soundest. All the benefits of repose would have been gained by France, although she had never entered into the defensive treaty of 1755, or the subsequent conventions of 1756 and 1757. The chance of France being attacked was chimerical. By whom, but Austria or England, could she possibly be annoyed? If by the former, of course the defensive treaty was absurd: if by the latter, clearly, Austria could never assist her; since the British forces would only attack by sea, or by a littoral warfare, or in the American and East Indian colonies. But Austria was liable to attack from that power which had despoiled her of her finest provinces a few years before. Besides, the object of the treaty turned out to be (according to the remarks on conventions which we formerly made) not defensive, but offensive. France was, in fact, to assist Austria with 24,000 men to recover Silesia and humble the house of Brandenburg, or dismember its dominions. After the war broke out, the stipulation was forgotten; that is, the terms were changed, as is very commonly the case; and, instead of 24,000, France sent 100,000 men, to be defeated by the British and Prussian armies. How could she possibly gain by such an object, though completely successful in attaining it? She was fighting for Austria, conquering for her profit, and, if defeated, sharing her losses. We object also to the general spirit of Segur's reasonings. He always denies the possibility of drawing certain conclusions upon such matters; and, in the true spirit of an old diplomatist and courtier, he advises us to look more to the peculiarities of human character, and personal or accidental considerations, than to the *criteria* more philosophically appealed to by Favier. We have formerly treated at large of this matter, and have endeavoured to refute doctrines proceeding from so partial and erroneous a view of the subject. We ought to remark, however, that Segur is by no means so ignorant of political philosophy as we might expect from this specimen, and from the nature of his former pursuits. We find him decidedly rejecting, as absurd, the narrow notions of mercantile policy which dictate commercial treaties, although he was himself successful in the negotiation of a very celebrated one, the foundation of his fame in the diplomatic world. We return to our general sketch.

The vicinity of Spain to France, their distance from the rest of Europe, and the compactness of their territories, which renders them, as it were, parts of one great peninsula, might have rendered them natural enemies, had not Holland and Britain been situated in much the same predicament, with respect to France, on the north. Besides, the insulated position of Spain, joined to her great inferiority of strength, from political and moral causes, makes her naturally dependent on her powerful neighbour. But, above all, the separation of the Spanish from the Imperial crown and the Austrian dominions, and the consequent disputes between the Courts of Vienna and Madrid, about the dominion of Italy, have thrown Spain into the arms of the natural enemy of the house of Austria. We do not enumerate, among these causes, the family compact which so closely united the two branches of the house of Bourbon, or the blood relationship which was the cause of that convention. Those circumstances may have drawn closer the natural ties of alliance between France and Spain; but still they are to be viewed as accidental and subordinate. If it was the evident interest of Spain to depend on France, and of France to rule over Spain, the death or marriage of one of the reigning branches could never for a moment have prevented the union of

the nations. The last will of Charles II., indeed, set all Europe in arms to fight down this formidable union. But does any one imagine that, had Alberoni succeeded in stealing this document, the other powers would have shut their eyes on the strides which Louis was making to obtain dominion over Europe, by playing off Spain against Austria? Or, had the combined enemies of that ambitious prince been prudent enough to accept of the terms extorted by his humiliation, and terminated the grand alliance-war at Gertruydenberg, can any one suppose that the union of the two natural allies, thus apparently broken (for Louis's offers went to this length), would have subsisted less close and compact at the next crisis of European affairs?

To such as believe that all great events depend more on chance than principle, and despise all general reasonings on the train of human affairs, we would recommend two obvious considerations: did the alliance of 1756 maintain indissoluble the unnatural union of the two powers? Or, has the dissolution, with every cruel aggravation, of the marriage which had been intended to cement that temporary alliance, prevented peace and seeming amity from subsisting between the murderers and the nearest blood relations of the ill-fated Antoinette? Has not one of the various means tried by Spain to regain that power over her feeble neighbour, which the Bragança revolution (1640) overthrew, consisted in always endeavouring to have a Spanish princess on the Portuguese throne? and yet, has that prevented her from seconding her policy by open force, and attacking the throne which she had immediately before filled with her royal offspring? Or, to come still nearer the present discussion, was not the family compact dissolved in 1793, under circumstances of complicated insult and violence to every branch of the house of Bourbon, as well as of imminent danger to the most despotic and bigoted government in the west of Europe? And have the ancient politics of the Spanish cabinet varied one jot, in consequence of all those personal considerations and grand occurrences? No. After a few months of languid co-operation with the combined powers (from the expectation of crushing the infant Republic), as soon as Spain saw that the new State could stand alone against foreign attacks, and had some chance of surviving the revolutionary storms, she instantly returned to her natural policy, and resumed her alliance with France; that is to say, she resigned all her family regards, the consequences of which had once alarmed all Europe; sacrificed much of her trade; exposed her sea-coast to the troops and fleets of England; risked and lost her fleets by fighting the battles of France; and put the very existence of her weak-handed government to the severest trial, by a free intercourse with republicans and regicides — by acknowledging and receiving into her capital a Jacobin emissary with his crew. In a word, the Spanish branch of the Bourbon line is as closely united, or rather as submissively dependent on the usurper of that throne, which the sister branch once filled, as ever it was during the proudest days of the French monarchy — during the reign of the Bourbons, the Virtues, and the Elegant Arts. In return for his homage, the haughty sovereign of the two Indies is pleased to receive for his son, from the Corsican adventurer, a crown patched up of the Italian spoils taken from the natural enemy of Spain. The service performed, and the boon granted, are equally illustrative of our general principles.

We might now proceed to trace the relations between Portugal and Britain on the one hand, or its connection with France and Spain on the other; between the Italian States and the Transalpine Powers to the right

and left of the Rhine; between the Porte and Russia; or the Porte and Britain, or France; the connections between the three powers surrounding the ancient and dismembered kingdom of Poland; the relations of the northern Crowns; the relations of the different powers possessed of colonies in the East or West Indies, both with the native states, and with each other, in consequence of their colonial possessions. All these juntos of states form separate assemblages of particular interests; smaller systems, influenced internally by the same principles, and connected by the same law with the general mass of the European community. We have, however, said enough to show, that, in practice, as well as from theoretical considerations, this important subject is capable of being reduced to systematic arrangement, and to fixed general principles. And we have only to conclude with repeating, in a form somewhat different, the proposition which at the outset we proposed to demonstrate.

It appears that, by the modern system of Foreign policy, the fate of nations has been rendered more certain; and the influence of chance, of the fortune of war, of the caprices of individuals upon the general affairs of men, has been infinitely diminished. Nations are no longer of transient or durable existence in proportion to their internal resources, but in proportion to the place which they occupy in a vast and regular system; where the most powerful states are, for their own sakes, constantly watching over the safety of the most insignificant. A flourishing commonwealth is not liable to lose its independence or its prosperity by the fate of one battle. Many battles must be lost; many changes must concur: the whole system must be deranged, before such a catastrophe can happen. The appearance of an Epaminondas can no longer raise a petty state to power and influence over its neighbour, suddenly to be lost, with the great man's life, by some unforeseen victory at Leuctra. In the progress of freedom, knowledge, and national intercourse, this great change has been happily effected by slow degrees; it is a change which immediately realises the advantages that every former change has gained to mankind; a step in his progress, which secures the advancement made during all his previous career; and contributes, perhaps more than any other revolution that has happened since the invention of written language, to the improvement and magnificence of the species.

Let statesmen, then, reflect on these things; and, in the present awful crisis of affairs, let them often ponder upon the principles which should direct their public conduct. Without neglecting the increase of their internal resources, by wise regulations, and gradual improvements of the civil and military constitution of the countries intrusted to their care, let them constantly look *from* home; and remember, that each state forms a part of the general system, liable to be affected by every derangement which it may experience; and, of necessity, obliged to trust for its safety to a concurrence of other causes besides those which domestic policy can control. "*Non arma neque thesauri regni præsidia sunt, verum amici: quos neque armis cogere, neque auro parare queas; officio et fide pariuntur.*" — Sal. Jugurth.\*

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\* In Brougham's Colonial Policy, vol. ii. p. 544., there is the following note in reference to this article: — "The substance of the general reasonings and views detailed in this section was published in the second number of a periodical work, conducted by a society of literary gentlemen in Edinburgh, entitled the *Edinburgh Review*."

THE NATURE AND USES OF MONARCHY, AND THE RIGHTS  
AND POWERS OF A SOVEREIGN.\*

THE most important and radical error in Mr. Leckie's theory of Government, is that which relates to the nature and uses of Monarchy, and the rights and powers of a sovereign; upon which, therefore, we beg leave to begin with a very few observations. And here we shall take leave to consider royalty as being, on the whole, but a human institution,—originating in a view to the general good, and not to the gratification of the individual upon whom it is conferred; or, at least, only capable of being justified, or deserving to be retained, on account of its being actually beneficial to the whole society. The benefits which it is calculated to confer in this point of view are obvious. From the first moment that men began to associate together, and to act in concert, it would be found that all of them could not take a share in consulting and regulating their operations, and that the greater part must submit to the direction of certain managers and leaders. Among these again, some one would naturally assume a pre-eminence; and, in time of war especially, would be allowed to exercise an authority. Struggles would as necessarily ensue for retaining this post of distinction, and for supplanting its actual possessor; and whether there was a general acquiescence in the principle of having one acknowledged chief, or a desire to be guided and advised by a plurality of those who seemed best qualified for the task, there would be equal hazard, or rather certainty, of perpetual strife, tumult, and dissension, from the attempts of ambitious individuals, either to usurp an ascendancy over all their competitors, or to dispute with him who had already obtained it his right to continue its possession. Every one possessed of any considerable means of influence would thus be tempted to aspire to a precarious sovereignty; and while the inferior persons of the community would be opposed to each other as the adherents of the respective pretenders, not only would all care of the general good be omitted, but the society would become a prey to perpetual feuds, cabals, and hostilities, subversive of the first principles of its institution. Among the remedies which would naturally present themselves for this great evil, the most efficacious, though not perhaps at first sight the most obvious, would be to provide some regular and authentic form for the election of one acknowledged chief, by a fair but pacific competition;—the term of whose authority would gradually be prolonged to that of his natural life, and afterwards extended to the lives of his remotest descendants. The advantages which seem to us to be peculiar to this arrangement are, first, to disarm the ambition of dangerous and turbulent individuals, by removing the great prize of supreme authority, at all times, and entirely, from competition; and, secondly, to render this authority more manageable and less hazardous, by delivering it over peaceably, and upon understood conditions, to an hereditary prince, instead of letting it be seized upon by a fortunate conqueror, who would think himself entitled to use it—as conquerors commonly use their booty—for his own exclusive gratification.

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\* Leckie's Essay on the Practice of the British Government. — Vol. xx. p. 322. November, 1812.

The steps, then, by which we are conducted to the justification of hereditary monarchy, are shortly as follows. Admitting all men to be equal in rights, they can never be equal in natural endowments,—nor long equal in wealth and other acquisitions:—absolute liberty therefore is altogether out of the question; and a kind of aristocracy, or disorderly supremacy of the richest and most accomplished, may be considered as the primeval state of society. Now this, even if it could be supposed to be peaceable and permanent, is by no means a desirable state for the persons subjected to this multifarious and irregular authority. But it is plain that it could not be peaceable—that even among the rich, and the accomplished, and the daring, some would be more rich, more daring, and more accomplished than the rest; and that those who were most nearly on an equality would be armed against each other by mutual jealousy and ambition, while those who were a little lower would combine, out of envy and resentment, to defeat the pretensions of the few who had thus outstripped their original associates. Thus, there would not only be no liberty or security for the body of the people, but the whole would be exposed to the horror and distraction of perpetual intestine contentions. The creation of one sovereign, therefore, whom the whole society would acknowledge as supreme, was a great point gained for tranquillity as well as individual independence; and in order to avoid the certain evils of perpetual struggles for dominion, and the imminent hazard of falling at last under the absolute will of an exasperated conqueror, nothing could be so wisely devised as to agree upon the nomination of a king; and thus to get rid of a multitude of petty tyrants, and the risk of military despotism, by the establishment of a legitimate monarchy. The first king would probably be the most popular and powerful individual in the community; and the first idea would, in all likelihood, be to appoint his successor on account of the same qualifications: but it would speedily be discovered, that this would give rise at the death of every sovereign—and indeed, prospectively, long before it—to the same fatal competitions and dissension, which had formerly been perpetual; and not only hazard a civil war on every accession, but bring the successful competitor to the throne with feelings of extreme hostility towards one half of his subjects, and of extreme partiality to the other. The chance of not finding eminent talents for command in the person of the sovereign, therefore, would soon be seen to be a far less evil than the sanguinary competitions that would ensue, if merit were made a ground of pretension; and a very little reflection, or experience, would also serve to show, that the sort of merit which was most likely to succeed in such a competition, did not promise a more amiable sovereign than might be reckoned on in the common course of hereditary succession. The only safe course, therefore, was, to take this great prize altogether out of the lottery of human life—to make the supreme dignity in the state professedly and altogether independent of merit or popularity, and to fix it immutably in a place quite out of the career of ambition.

This great point then was gained by the mere institution of monarchy, and by rendering it hereditary: the chief cause of internal discord was removed, and the most dangerous incentive to ambition placed in a great measure beyond the sphere of its operation;—and this we have always considered to be the peculiar and characteristic advantage of that form of government. A pretty important chapter, however, remains, as to the extent of the powers that ought to be vested in the monarch, and the nature of the checks by which the limitation of those powers should

be rendered effectual. And here it will be readily understood, that considering, as we do, the chief advantage of monarchy to consist in its taking away the occasions of contention for the first place in the State, and in a manner neutralising that place by separating it entirely from any notion of merit or popularity in the possessor — we cannot consistently be for allotting more actual power to it than is absolutely necessary for answering this purpose. Our notions of this measure, however, are by no means of a very jealous or contracted nature. We must give enough of real power, and distinction, and prerogative, to make it truly and substantially the first place in the State, and to make it impossible for the occupiers of inferior places to endanger the general peace by their contentions; — for, otherwise, the whole evils which its institution was meant to obviate would recur with accumulated force, and the same fatal competitions be renewed among persons of disorderly ambition, for those situations, by whatever name they might be called, in which, though nominally subordinate to the throne, the actual powers of sovereignty were embodied. But, on the other hand, we would give no powers to the Sovereign, or to any other officer in the community, beyond what were evidently required for the public good; — and no powers at all, on the exercise of which there was not an efficient control, and for the use of which there was not a substantial responsibility. It is in the reconciling of these two conditions that the whole difficulty of the theory of a perfect monarchy consists: If you do not control your sovereign, he will be in danger of becoming a despot; and if you do control him, there is danger, unless you choose the depository of this control with singular caution, that you create a power that is uncontrolled and uncontrollable — to be the prey of audacious leaders and outrageous factions, in spite of the hereditary settlement of the nominal sovereignty. Though there is some difficulty, however, in this problem, and though we learn from history that various errors have been committed in an attempt at its practical solution, yet we do not conceive it as by any means insoluble; and think indeed, that, with the lights which we may derive from the experience of our own constitution, its demonstration may be effected by a very moderate exertion of sagacity. It will be best understood, however, by a short view of the nature of the powers to be controlled, and of the system of checks which have been actually resorted to.

In the first place, then, we must beg leave to remind our readers, however superfluous it may appear, that as kings are now generally allowed to be mere mortals, they cannot of themselves have any greater powers, either of body or mind, than other individuals, and must in fact be inferior in both respects to very many of their subjects. Whatever powers they have, therefore, must be powers conferred upon them by *the consent* of the stronger part of their subjects, and are in fact really and truly the powers of those persons. The most absolute despot accordingly, of whom history furnishes any record, must have governed merely by the free will of those who *chose* to obey him in compelling the rest of his subjects to obedience. The Sultan, as Mr. Hume remarks, may indeed drive the bulk of his unarmed subjects like brutes by mere force, but he must lead his Janissaries like men, by their reason and free will. And so it is in all other governments: the power of the sovereign is nothing else than the power — the actual force of muscle or of mind — which a certain part of his subjects *choose* to lend, for carrying his orders into effect; and the check or limit to this power is, in all cases, ultimately and in effect, nothing else than their refusal to act any longer as the instruments of his pleasure. The

check, therefore, is substantially the same in kind, in all cases whatever ; and must necessarily exist in full vigour in every country in the world ; though the likelihood of its beneficial application depends greatly on the structure of society in each particular nation ; and the possibility of applying it with safety must result wholly from the contrivances that have been adopted to make it bear at once gradually and steadily on the power it is destined to regulate. It is here accordingly, and here only, that there is any material difference between a good and a bad constitution of monarchical government.

The ultimate and only real limit to what is called the power of the sovereign is, the refusal of the consent or co-operation of those who possess the substantial power of the community, and who, during their voluntary concert with the sovereign, allow this power of theirs to pass under his name. In considering whether this refusal is likely to be wisely and beneficially interposed, it is material therefore to enquire in whom the power of interposing it is vested ; or, in other words, in what individuals the actual power of coercing and compelling the submission of the bulk of the community is vested. If every individual were equally gifted, and equally situated, the answer would be, in the numerical majority ; but as this never can be the case, this power will frequently be found to reside in a very small proportion of the whole society.

In rude times, when there is little intelligence or means of concert and communication, a very moderate number of armed and disciplined forces will be able, so long as they stick together, to overawe, and actually overpower the whole unarmed inhabitants, even of an extensive region ; and accordingly, in such times, the necessity of procuring the good will and consent of the soldiery is the only check upon the power of the Sovereign ; or, in other words, the soldiers may do what they choose, and their nominal commander can do nothing which they do not choose. Such is the state of the worst despotisms. The check upon the royal authority is the same in substance as in the best administered monarchies, viz. the refusal of the consent or co-operation of those who have the natural power of the community ; but from the unfortunate structure of society, which vests this substantial power in a few bands of disciplined ruffians, the check will scarcely ever be interposed for the benefit of the nation, and will merely operate to prevent the king from doing any thing to the prejudice or oppression of the soldiery.

When civilisation has made a little farther progress, a number of the leaders of the army, or their descendants, acquire landed property, and associate together, not merely in their military capacity, but as guardians of their new acquisitions and hereditary dignity. Their soldiers become their vassals in time of peace ; and the real power of the State is gradually transferred from the hands of detached and mercenary battalions, to those of a feudal Nobility. The check on the royal authority comes then to lie in the refusal of *this* body to co-operate in such of his measures as do not meet with their approbation ; and the king can now do nothing to the prejudice of the order of nobility. The body of the people fare a little better under the operation of this check ;—because their interest is much more identified with that of their feudal lords, than with that of a standing army of regular forces.

As society advances in refinement, and the arts of peace are developed, men of the lower orders assemble, and fortify themselves in towns and cities, and thus come to acquire a power independent of their patrons. *Their* consent also accordingly becomes necessary to the developement of

the public authority; and hence another check to what is called the power of the sovereign. And, finally, to pass over some intermediate stages, when society has attained its full measure of civility and intelligence, and is filled from top to bottom with wealth, and industry, and reflection; when every thing that is done or felt by any one class, is communicated in the instant to all the rest, — and a vast proportion of the whole population takes an interest in the fortunes of the country, and possesses a certain intelligence as to the public conduct of its rulers, — then the substantial power of the nation may be said to be vested in the nation at large; or at least in those individuals who can habitually command the good will and support of the greater part of them; — and the ultimate check to the power of the sovereign comes to consist in the general unwillingness of the people to comply with those orders which, if at all united in their resolution, they may securely disobey and resist. *This* check, when applied at all, is likely, of course, to be applied for the general good; and though the same in substance with those which have been already considered, — namely, the refusal of those in whom the real power is vested to lend it to the monarch for purposes which they do not approve, — is yet infinitely more beneficial in its operation, in consequence of the more fortunate character of those to whom that power belongs.

Thus we see that kings have no power of their own; and that, even in the purest despotisms, they are the mere organs or directors of that power which they who truly possess the physical and intellectual force of the nation may choose to put in their disposal, and are at all times, and under every form of monarchy, entirely under the control of that only virtual and effective power. There is at bottom, therefore, no such thing as an unlimited monarchy, or indeed as a monarchy that is potentially either more or less limited than every other. All kings *must* act by the consent of that order or portion of the nation which can really command all the rest, and may do whatever these substantial masters are pleased to approve of: but as it is their power which is truly exerted in the name of the sovereign, so, it is not so much a necessary consequence as an identical proposition to say, that if they do not choose to exert that power, the king has no means whatever of exercising the slightest authority. This is the universal law, indeed, of all governments; and though the different constitution of society, in the various stages of its progress, may give a different character to the controlling power, the principles which regulate its operation are substantially the same in all. There is no room, therefore, for the question, whether there should be any control on the power of a king, or what that control should be; because, as the power really is not the king's, but belongs to the stronger part of the nation itself, whether it derive that strength from talents, numbers, or situation, it is impossible that it should be exercised at his instigation without the concurrence of those in whom it is substantially vested.

Such, then, is the abstract and fundamental doctrine as to the true nature of monarchical, and indeed of every other species of political power; and, abstract as it is, we cannot help thinking that it goes far to settle all controversies as to *the rights* of sovereigns, and ought to be kept clearly in mind in proceeding to the more practical views of the subject. For, though what we have now said as to all actual power belonging to the predominant mass of physical and intellectual force in every community, and the certainty of its ultimately impelling the public authority in the direction of its interests and inclinations, be unquestionably true



in itself; it is still of infinite importance to consider what provisions are made by the form of the government for the ready operation of those interests and inclinations upon the immediate agents of the public authority. That they will operate with full effect in the long run, whether those provisions be good or bad, or whether there be any such provision recognised in the government or not, we take to be altogether indisputable; but, in the one case, they will operate only after long intervals of suffering, — and by means of much suffering; while, on the other, they will be constantly and almost insensibly in action, and will correct the first declination of the visible index of public authority from the inclinations of the radical power of which it should be the exponent, or rather will prevent any sensible variation in their movements. The whole difference, indeed, between a good and a bad government appears to us to consist in this particular, viz. in the greater or the less facility which it affords for the early, the gradual, and steady operation of the substantial power of the community upon its constituted authorities; while the freedom, again, and ultimate happiness of the nation depend on the degree in which this substantial power is possessed by a greater or a smaller proportion of the whole society — a matter almost independent of the government, and determined in a great degree by the progress which the society has made in civilisation and refinement.

Thus, to take the most abominable of all governments — a ferocious despotism such as that of Morocco — where an emperor, in concert with a banditti of armed ruffians, butchers, plunders, and oppresses the whole unarmed population, — the check to the monarchical power is complete, in the disobedience or dissatisfaction of the banditti; although, from the character of that body, it affords but little protection to the community; and, from the want of any contrivance for its early or systematic operation, can scarcely ever be applied but with irreparable injury to both the parties concerned. As there is no arrangement by which the general sense of this lawless soldiery can be collected upon the proposed measures of their leader, or the moment ascertained when the degree of his oppression exceeds that of their patience, they never begin to act till his outrages have gone far beyond what was necessary to decide their resistance; and, accordingly, he on the one hand goes on decapitating and torturing for months, after all the individuals, by whose consent alone he was enabled to take this amusement, are of opinion that it ought to be discontinued; and, on the other, receives the intimation at last, not in the form of a remonstrance, upon which he might amend, but in the shape of a bowstring, a dose of poison, or a stroke of the dagger. Thus, from the mere want of any provision for ascertaining the sentiments of the individuals possessing the actual power of the state, or for communicating them to the individual appointed to administer it, infinite evils result to both parties. The first suffer intolerable oppressions before they feel such confidence in their unanimity as to interfere at all; and then they do it at last in the form of brutal violence and vindictive punishment. Every admonition given to their elected leader is preceded by their suffering, and followed by his death; and every application of the check which nature itself has provided for the abuse of delegated power, is accompanied by a total dissolution of the government, and the hazard of a long series of revolutionary tumults.

This is the history of all military despotisms in barbarous and uninstructed communities. When they get on to feudal aristocracies, matters are a little mended; both by the transference of the actual power

to a larger and worthier body, and by the introduction of some sort of machinery or contrivance, however rude, for the operation of this power upon the ostensible agents of the government. The person of the Sovereign is now surrounded by some kind of council or parliament; and threats and remonstrances are addressed to him with considerable energy by such of its members as take offence at the measures he proposes. Such, however, is the imperfection of the means devised for these communications, and such the difficulty of collecting the sentiments of those who are to make them, that this necessary operation is still performed in a very clumsy and hazardous manner. These are the times when Barons enter their protests, by openly waging war on their Sovereign, or each other; and even when they are tolerably agreed among themselves, can think of no better way of controlling the monarch, than by marching down in arms to Runnymede, and compelling him, by main force, and in sight of all his people, to sign a charter of their liberties. The evils, in short, are the same in substance as in the sanguinary revolutions of Morocco. The mischief goes to a dangerous length before any remedy is applied; and the remedy itself is a great mischief;—although, from the improved state of intelligence and civilisation, the outrages are not on either side so horrible.

The next stage brings us to commercial and enlightened times, in which the real strength and power of the nation is scattered pretty widely through the whole of its population, and in which, accordingly, the check upon the misapplication of that power must arise from the dissatisfaction of that great body. The check must always exist,—and is sure, sooner or later, to operate with sufficient efficacy; but the safety and the promptitude of its operation depend, in this case, as in all the others, upon the nature of the contrivances which the Constitution has provided; first, for collecting and ascertaining the sentiments of that great and miscellaneous aggregate in whom the actual power is vested; and, secondly, for communicating this in an authentic manner to the executive officers of the government. The most effectual and complete way of effecting this is undoubtedly by a parliament, so elected as to represent pretty fairly the views of all the considerable classes of the people, and so constituted as to have at all times the means, both of suggesting these views to the executive, and of effectually controlling its malversations. Where no such institution exists, the tranquillity of the state will always be exposed to considerable hazard; and the danger of great convulsions will unfortunately become greater, in proportion as the body of the people become more wealthy and intelligent.

Under the form of society, however, of which we are now speaking, there must always be some channel, however narrow and circuitous, by which the sense of the people may be let in to act upon the administrators of their government. The channel of the press, for example, and of general literature—provincial magistracies and assemblies, such as the states and parliaments of old France—even the ordinary courts of law—the stage—the pulpit—and all the innumerable occasions of considerable assemblage for deliberation on local interests, election to local offices, or for mere solemnity and usage of festivity—which must exist in all large, ancient, and civilised communities, may afford indications of the general sentiment, which must ultimately have full operation; and may serve to admonish kings and courtiers how far the true possessors of the national power are likely to sanction any of its proposed applications. Where those indications, however, are neglected or misconstrued, or

where, from other circumstances, institutions that may seem better contrived fail either to represent the true sense of the ruling part of the community, or to convince the executive magistrate that they do represent it, there, even in the most civilised and intelligent countries, the most hazardous and tremendous distractions may ensue;—such distractions as broke the peace and endangered the liberties of this country in the time of Charles the First—or such as have recently torn in pieces the frame of society in France; and in their consequences still threaten the destiny of the world. Both those convulsions, it appears to us, arose from nothing else than the want of some proper contrivance for ascertaining the sentiments of the actual strength of the nation,—and for conveying those sentiments, with the full evidence of their authenticity, to the actual administrators of their affairs. And the two cases, we take it, were more nearly alike than has generally been imagined; for though the House of Commons had an existence long before the time of King Charles, it had not previously been recognised as the vehicle of commanding opinions, nor the organ of that great body to whom the actual power of the State had been recently and insensibly transferred. The Court still considered the effectual power to reside in the feudal aristocracy, by the greater part of which it was supported; and, when the parliament spoke in the name of the people of England, thought it might safely disregard the admonitions of a body which had not hitherto possessed any considerable claims to attention. It refused, therefore, to acknowledge this body as the organ of the supreme power of the State; and was only undeceived when it fell before its actual exertion. In France again, the error, though more radical, was of the very same nature. The administration of the government was conducted, up to the very eve of the Revolution, upon the same principles as when the nobles were every thing, and the people nothing;—and the people, in the mean time, had become far more than a match for the nobility, in wealth, in intelligence, and in the knowledge of their own importance. The Constitution, however, provided no means for the peaceable but authoritative intimation of this change to the official rulers, or for the gradual development of the new power which had thus been generated in the community; and the consequence was, that its more indirect indications were overlooked, and nothing yielded to its accumulating pressure till it overturned the throne,—and overwhelmed with its wasteful flood the whole ancient institutions of the country. If there had been any provision in the structure of the government, by which the increasing power of the lower orders had been enabled to make itself distinctly felt, and to bear upon the constituted authorities as gradually as it was generated, the great calamity which has befallen that nation might have been entirely avoided,—the condition of the monarchy would have insensibly accommodated itself to the change in the condition of the people,—and a most beneficial alteration would have taken place in its administration, without any shock or convulsion in any part of the community. For want of some such provision, however, the Court was held in ignorance of the actual power of the people, till it burst in thunder on their heads. The pent-up vapours dislodged with the force of an earthquake; and those very elements that would have increased the beauty and strength of the constitution by their harmonious combination, crumbled its whole fabric into ruin by their sudden and untempered collision. The bloody revolutions of the Seraglio were acted over again in the heart of the most polished and enlightened nation of Europe;—and from the very same

cause — the want of a channel for conveying constantly, and temperately, and effectually, the sense of those who possess power, to those who should direct its application;—and the outrage was only the greater and more extensive, that the body among whom this power was diffused was larger, and the period of its unsuspected accumulation had been of longer duration.

The great point, then, is to ensure a free, an authoritative, and an uninterrupted communication between the ostensible administrators of the national power and its actual constituents and depositories; and the chief distinction between a good and a bad government consists in the degree in which it affords the means of such a communication. The main end of government, to be sure, is, that wise laws should be enacted and enforced; but such is the condition of human infirmity, that the hazards of sanguinary contentions about the exercise of power is a much greater and more imminent evil than a considerable obstruction in the making or execution of the laws; and the best government therefore is, not that which promises to make the best laws, and to enforce them most vigorously, but that which guards best against the tremendous conflicts to which all administrations of government, and all exercise of political power, is apt to give rise. It happens, fortunately indeed, that the same arrangements which most effectually ensure the peace of society against those disorders, are also, on the whole, the best calculated for the purposes of wise and efficient legislation. But we do not hesitate to look upon their negative or preventive virtues as of a far higher cast than their positive and active ones; and to consider a representative legislature to be incomparably of more value when it truly represents the efficient force of the nation in controlling and directing the executive, than when it merely enacts wholesome statutes in its legislative capacity.

The result of the whole then is, that in a civilised and enlightened country, the actual power of the State resides in the great body of the people, and especially among the more wealthy and intelligent in all the different ranks of which it consists; and consequently, that the administration of the government can never be either safe or happy, unless it be conformable to the wishes and sentiments of that great body; while there is little chance of its answering either of these conditions, unless the forms of the constitution provide some means for the regular, constant, and authentic expression of their sentiments,—to which, when so expressed, it is the undoubted duty and obvious interest of the executive to conform. A parliament, therefore, which really and truly represents the sense and opinions — we mean the general and mature sense, not the occasional prejudices and fleeting passions — of the efficient body of the people, and which watches over and effectually controls every important act of the executive magistrate, is necessary, in a country like this, for the tranquillity of the government, and the ultimate safety of the monarchy itself,—much more even than for the enactment of laws; and in proportion as it varies from this description, or relaxes in this control, will the peace of the country and the security of the government be endangered.

But then comes Mr. Leckie, and a number of loyal gentlemen from Sicily, or other places, exclaiming that this is mere treason and republicanism,—and asking whether the king is to have no will or voice of his own?—what is to become of the balance of the constitution, if he is to be reduced to a mere cipher added to the end of every ministerial majority?—and how, if the office is thus divested of all real power, it can

serve the purposes for which we ourselves have preferred Monarchy to all other constitutions? We shall endeavour to answer these questions; — and, after the preceding full exposition of our premises, we think they may be answered very briefly.

In the *first* place, then, it does not appear to us that it can be seriously maintained that any national or salutary purpose can ever be served by recognising the private will or voice of the King as an individual, as an element in the political government, especially in an hereditary monarchy. The person upon whom that splendid lot may fall, not having been selected for the office on account of any proof or presumption of his fitness for it, but being called to it as it were by mere accident, may be fairly presumed to have less talent or capacity than any one of the individuals who have made their own way to a place of influence or authority in his councils; and his voice or opinion, therefore, considered naturally and in itself, must be presumed to be of less value or intrinsic authority than that of any other person in office under him: and when it is farther considered that this Sovereign may be very young or very old — almost an idiot — almost a madman — and altogether a dotard, while he is still in the full possession and the lawful exercise of the whole authority of his station, it must seem perfectly extravagant to maintain that it can be of advantage to the nation, that his individual wishes or opinions should be the measure or the condition of any one act of legislation or national policy. Assuredly it is not for his wisdom or his patriotism, and much less for his own delight and gratification, that an hereditary monarch is placed upon the throne of a free people; and this obvious consideration alone might lead us at once to the true end and purpose of royalty.

But the letter and theory of the English Constitution recognise the individual will of the Sovereign, just as little as reason and common sense can require it as an integral element in that constitution. It declares that the King as an individual can do no wrong, and can be made accountable for nothing — but that his ministers and advisers shall be responsible for all his acts without any exception — or at least with the single exception of the act of naming those advisers. In every one act of his peculiar and official prerogative, in which, if in any thing, his individual and private will must be understood to have been exerted, the Constitution sees only the will and the act of his ministers. The King's speech — the speech pronounced by his own lips, and as his voluntary act in the face of the whole nation — is the speech of the minister; and as such, is openly canvassed, and condemned if need be, by the Houses of Parliament, in the ordinary course of their duty. The King's answers to addresses — his declarations of peace or war — the honours he confers — the bills he passes or rejects — are all considered by the Constitution as the acts of his counsellors. It is not only the undoubted right, but the unquestionable duty, of the Houses of Parliament, to consider of their propriety — to complain of them if they think them inexpedient — to get them rescinded if they admit of such a correction; and at all events to prosecute, impeach, and punish, those advisers — to whom, and not to the Sovereign in whose name they run, they are exclusively attributed. This great doctrine of responsibility, then, answers the first question of Mr. Leckie and his adherents, as to the enormity of subjecting the personal will and opinion of the Sovereign at all times to the control of those who represent the efficient power of the community. Mr. Leckie himself, it is to be observed, is for leaving this grand feature of ministerial responsibility, even when he is for dispensing with the attendance of Par-

liaments;— though, to be sure, among his other omissions, he has forgotten to tell us by whom, and in what manner, it could be enforced, after the abolition of those troublesome assemblies.

The next question relates to the theoretical balance of the constitution, which they say implies that the will and the power of the Monarch is to be a separate and independent element in the government. We have not left ourselves room now to answer this at large; nor indeed do we think it necessary; as we have ventured, upon at least two\* former occasions, to submit to our readers, at considerable length, the scope and outline of our views upon that question. Those who feel any doubt, or any anxiety with regard to it, we beg leave to refer to the passages indicated below. At present, we can only make two remarks, and that in the most summary manner. The first is, that the powers ascribed to the Sovereign, in the theory of the constitution, are not supposed to be vested in him as an insulated and independent individual—but in him as guided and consubstantiated with his responsible counsellors—that *the King*, in that balance, means not the person of the reigning prince, but the department of the Executive government—the whole body of ministers and their dependants—to whom for the sake of convenience and despatch, the initiative of many important measures is entrusted; and who are only entitled or enabled to carry on business, under burden of their responsibility to Parliament, and in reliance on its ultimate support. The second remark is, that the balance of the constitution, in so far as it has any real existence, will be found to subsist almost entirely in the House of Commons, which possesses exclusively both the power of impeachment, and the power of granting supplies; and has, besides, the most natural and immediate communication with that great body of the nation in whom the power of control over all the branches of the Legislature is ultimately vested. The Executive, therefore, has its chief Ministers in that House, and exerts in that place all the influence which is attached to its situation. If it is successfully opposed there, it would for the most part be infinitely dangerous for it to think of resisting in any other quarter. If it were to exercise its legal prerogative, by refusing a favourite bill, or disregarding an unanimous address of the Commons, the natural consequence would be, that the Commons would retort by exercising their legal privilege of withholding the supplies; and as things could not go on for a moment on such a footing, the King must either submit at discretion, or again bethink himself of raising his royal standard against that of a parliamentary army. The general view, indeed, which we have taken above of the true nature of that which is called the power of the Monarch, is enough to show, that it can only be upon the very unlikely, but not impossible supposition, that the nominal representatives of the people are really more estranged from their true sentiments than the ministers of the Crown, that it can ever be safe or allowable for the latter to refuse immediate compliance with the will of those representatives.

There remains, then, but one other question, viz. whether we are really for reducing the King to the condition of a mere tool in the hands of a ministerial majority, without any real power or influence whatsoever; and whether, upon this supposition, there can be any use in the institution of monarchy—as the minister, on this view of things, is the real sovereign, and *his* office is open to competition, as the reward of dangerous and dis-

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\* Vol. x. p. 412.; Vol. xiv. p. 292.; and Vol. xvii. p. 277.

orderly ambition? Now, the answer to this is a denial of the fact upon which the question is raised. The King, upon our view of his office — which it has been seen is exactly that taken by the Constitution — would still hold, indisputably, the first place in the State, and possess a substantial power, not only superior to that which any minister could obtain, but sufficient to repress the pretensions of any one who, under another government, might be tempted to aspire to the sovereignty. The King of England, it will be remembered, is a perpetual member of the cabinet — and perpetually the first member of it. No disapprobation of its measures, whether expressed by votes of the Houses, or addresses from the people, can turn *him* out of his situation; and he has also the power of nominating its other members; — not indeed the power of maintaining them in their offices against the sense of the nation — but the power of trying the experiment, and putting it on the country to take the painful and difficult step of insisting on their removal. If he have any portion of ministerial talents, therefore, he must have, in the first place, all the power that could attach to a *perpetual minister* — with all the peculiar influence that is inseparable from the splendour of his official character; and, in the second place, he has the actual power, if not absolutely to make or unmake all the other members of his cabinet at his pleasure, at least to choose, at his own discretion, among all who are not upon very strong grounds exceptionable to the country at large.

Holding it to be quite clear, then, that the private and individual will of the sovereign is not to be recognised as a separate element of the constitution, and that it must in all cases give way to the mature sense of the nation, we shall still find, that his place is conspicuously and beyond all question the first in the State, and that it is invested with quite as much substantial power as is necessary to maintain all other offices in a condition of subordination. To see this clearly, indeed, it is only necessary to consider, a little in detail, what is the ordinary operation of the regal power, and on what occasions the necessary checks to which we have alluded come in to control it. The King, then, as the presiding member of the cabinet, can suggest, or propose, or recommend any thing which he pleases for the adoption of that executive council; — and his suggestions must at all times be more attended to than those of any other person of the same knowledge or capacity. Such, indeed, are the indestructible sources of influence belonging to his situation, that, if he be only *compos mentis*, he may be assured that he will have more authority than any two of the gravest and most experienced individuals with whom he can communicate; and that there will be a far greater disposition to adopt his recommendations than those of the wisest and most popular minister that the country has ever seen. He may, indeed, be outvoted even in the cabinet; — the absurdity of his suggestions may be so palpable, or their danger so great, that no habitual deference, or feeling of personal dependence, may be sufficient to induce his advisers to venture on their adoption. *This*, however, we imagine, will scarcely be looked upon as a source of national weakness or hazard; and is indeed an accident that may befall any sovereign, however absolute — since the veriest despot cannot work without tools — and even a military sovereign at the head of his army must submit to abandon any scheme which his generals positively refuse to execute. If he is baffled in one cabinet, however, the King of England may in general repeat the experiment in another; and change his counsellors over and over, till he find some who are more courageous or more complying.

But, suppose that the Cabinet acquiesces—the Parliament may no doubt oppose, and defeat the execution of the project. The Cabinet may be outvoted in the House of Commons, as the Sovereign may be outvoted in the Cabinet; and all its subordinate members may be displaced by votes of that House. The minister who had escaped being dismissed by the King through his compliance with the Royal pleasure, may be dismissed for that compliance by the voice of the Legislature. But the Sovereign, which whom, upon this supposition, the objectionable measure originated, remains; and may not only call another minister to his councils to try this same measure a second time, but may himself dismiss the parliament by which it has been censured, and submit its proceedings to the consideration of another assembly. We really cannot see any want of effective power in such an order of things; nor comprehend how the royal authority is rendered nugatory and subordinate, merely by requiring it to have *ultimately* the concurrence of the Cabinet and of the Legislature. The last stage of this hypothesis, however, will clear all the rest.

The King's measure may triumph in parliament as well as in the council—and yet it may be resisted by the nation. The parliament may be outvoted in the country, as well as the cabinet in the parliament; and if the measure, even in this last stage, and after all these tests of its safety, be not abandoned, the most dreadful consequences may ensue. If addresses and clamours are disregarded, recourse may be had to arms; and an open civil war be left to determine, whether the sense of the people at large be resolutely against its adoption. This last species of check on the power of the Sovereign, no political arrangement, and no change in the constitution, can obviate or prevent; and as all the other checks of which we have spoken refer ultimately to this, so the defence of their necessity and justice is complete, when we merely say, that their use is to prevent a recurrence to this last extremity—and, by enabling the sense of the nation to repress pernicious counsels in the outset, through the safe and pacific channels of the cabinet and the parliament, to remove the necessity of resisting them at last, by the dreadful expedient of actual force and compulsion.

If a king, under any form of monarchy, attempt to act against the sense of the commanding part of the population, he will inevitably be resisted and overthrown. This is not a matter of institution or policy; but a necessary result from the nature of his office, and of the power of which he is the administrator. But that form of monarchy is the worst, both for the monarch and for the people, which exposes him the most to the shock of such ultimate resistance; and that is the best, which interposes the greatest number of intermediate bodies between *the purpose* of the king and his actual attempt to carry it into execution,—which tries the projected measure upon the greatest number of selected samples of the public sense, before it comes into collision with the general mass, and affords the most opportunities for retreat, and the best cautions for advance, before the battle is actually joined. The cabinet is presumed to know more of the sentiments of the nation than the king; and the parliament to know more than the cabinet. Both these bodies, too, are presumed to be rather more under the personal influence of the king than the great body of the nation; and therefore, whatever suggestions of his are ultimately rejected in those deliberative assemblies, must be held to be such as would have been still less acceptable to the bulk of the community. By rejecting them there, however, by silent votes or



clamorous harangues, the nation is saved from the necessity of rejecting them by actual resistance and insurrection in the field. The person and the office of the monarch remain untouched and untainted for all purposes of good; and the peace of the country is maintained, and its rights asserted, without any turbulent exertion of its power. The whole frame and machinery of the constitution, in short, is contrived for the express purpose of preventing the kingly power from dashing itself to pieces against the more radical power of the people: and those institutions that are absurdly supposed to restrain the authority of the sovereign within too narrow limits, are in fact its great safeguards and protectors, by providing for the timely and peaceful operation of that great controlling power, which it could only elude for a season, at the expense of much certain misery to the people, and the hazard of final destruction to itself.

Mr. Leckie, however, and his adherents, can see nothing of all this. The facility of casting down a single tyrant, we have already seen, is one of the prime advantages which he ascribes to the institution of simple monarchy;—and so much is this advocate of kingly power enamoured of the uncourtly doctrine of resistance, that he not only recognises it as a familiar element in the constitution, but lays it down in express terms, that it affords *the only remedy* for all political corruption. “History,” he observes, “has furnished us with no example of the reform of a corrupt and tyrannical government, but either from intestine war, or conquest from without. Thus, the objection against a simple monarchy, because there is no remedy for its abuse, holds the same, but in a greater degree, against any other form. Each is borne with, as long as possible; and when the evil is at its greatest height, the nation either rises against it, or, not having the means of so doing, sinks into abject degradation and misery.”

Such, however, are not our principles of policy; on the contrary, we hold that the chief use of a free constitution is to prevent the recurrence of these dreadful extremities; and that the excellence of a limited monarchy consists less in the good laws, and the good administration of law, to which it naturally gives birth, than in the security it affords against such a melancholy alternative. To some, we know, who have been accustomed to the spectacle of established despotism, the hazards of such a terrific regeneration appear distant and inconsiderable; and if they could only prolong the intervals of patient submission, and polish away some of the harsher features of oppression, they imagine a state of things would result more tranquil and desirable than the sounding and salutary contentions of a free government. To such persons we shall address but two observations. The first, that though the body of the people may indeed be kept in brutish subjection for ages, where the state of society, as to intelligence and property, is such that the actual power and command of the nation is vested in a few bands of disciplined troops, this could never be done in a nation abounding in independent wealth, very generally given to reading and reflection, and knit together in all its parts by a thousand means of communication and ties of mutual interest and sympathy; and least of all could it be done in a nation already accustomed to the duties and enjoyments of freedom, and regarding the safe and honourable struggles it is constantly obliged to maintain in its defence, as the most ennobling and delightful of its exercises. The other remark is, that, even if it were possible, as it is not, to rivet and shackle down an enlightened nation in such a way as to make

it submit for some time, in apparent quietness, to the abuses of arbitrary power, it is never to be forgotten that this submission is itself an evil—and an evil only inferior to those through which it must ultimately seek its relief. If any form of tyranny, therefore, were as secure from terrible convulsions as a regulated freedom, it would not cease for that to be a far less desirable condition of existence; and as the mature sense of a whole nation may be fairly presumed to point more certainly to the true means of their happiness than the single opinion even of a patriotic king, so it must be right and reasonable, in all cases, that his opinion should give way to theirs; and that a power should be generated, if it did not naturally and necessarily exist, to ensure its predominance.

We have still a word or two to say on the alleged inconsistency and fluctuation of all public councils that are subjected to the control of popular assemblies, and on the unprincipled violence of the factions to which they are said to give rise. The first of these topics, however, need not detain us long. If it be meant, that errors in public measures are more speedily detected, and more certainly repaired, when they are maturely and freely discussed by all the wisdom and all the talent of a nation, than when they are left to the blind guidance of the passions or conceit of an individual;—if it be meant, that, under a simple monarchy, we should have persevered steadily in the principles of the Slave Trade, of Catholic Proscription, and of the Orders in Council:—then we cheerfully admit the justice of the charge—we readily yield to those governments the praise of such consistency and such perseverance—and offer no apology for that change from folly to wisdom, and from cruelty to mercy, which is produced by the variableness of a free constitution. But if it be meant that an absolute monarch keeps the faith which he pledges more religiously than a free people, or that he is less liable to sudden and capricious variations in his policy, we positively deny the truth of the imputation, and boldly appeal to the whole course of history for its confutation. What nation, we should like to know, ever stood half so high as our own, for the reputation of good faith and inviolable fidelity to its allies? Or in what instance has the national honour been impeached, by the refusal of one set of ministers to abide by the engagements entered into by their predecessors? With regard to mere caprice and inconsistency, again, will it be seriously maintained, that councils, depending upon the individual will of an absolute sovereign—who may be a boy, or a girl, or a dotard, or a driveller—are more likely to be steadily and wisely pursued, than those that are taken up by a set of experienced statesmen, under the control of a vigilant and intelligent public? It is not by mere popular clamour—by the shouts or hisses of an ignorant and disorderly mob—but by the deep, the slow, and the collected voice of the intelligent and enlightened part of the community, that the councils of a free nation are ultimately guided. But if they were at the disposal of a rabble—what rabble, we would ask, is so ignorant, so contemptible, so fickle, false, and empty of all energy of purpose or principle, as the rabble that infests the palaces of arbitrary kings—the favourites, the mistresses, the pandars, the flatterers and intriguers, who succeed or supplant each other in the crumbling soil of his favour, and so frequently dispose of all that ought to be at the command of wisdom and honour?

Looking only to the eventful history of our own day, will any one presume to say, that the conduct of the simple monarchies of Europe has afforded us, for the last twenty years, any such lessons of steady and unwavering policy as to make us blush for our democratical inconstancy?

What, during that period, has been the conduct of Prussia—of Russia—of Austria herself—of every state, in short, that has not been terrified into constancy by the constant dread of French violence? And where, during all that time, are we to look for any traces of manly firmness, but in the conduct and councils of the only nation whose measures were at all controlled by the influence of popular sentiments? If that nation, too, was not exempt from the common charge of vacillation—if she did fluctuate between designs to restore the Bourbons, and to enrich herself by a share of their spoils—if she did contract one deep stain on her faith and her humanity, by encouraging and deserting the party of the Royalists in La Vendée—if she did waver and wander from expeditions into Flanders to the seizure of West Indian islands, and from menaces to extirpate Jacobinism to missions courting its alliance—will any man pretend to say, that these signs of infirmity of purpose were produced by yielding to the varying impulses of popular opinions, or the alternate preponderance of hostile factions in the state? Is it not notorious, on the contrary, that they all occurred during that lamentable but memorable period, when the alarm excited by the aspect of new dangers had in a manner extinguished the constitutional spirit of party, and composed the salutary conflicts of the nation—that they occurred in the first ten years of Mr. Pitt's war administration, when opposition was almost extinct, and when the government was not only more entirely in the hands of one man, than it had been at any time since the days of Cardinal Wolsey, but when the temper and tone of its administration approached very nearly to that of an arbitrary monarchy?

On the doctrine of parties and party dissensions, it is now too late for us to enter at large; and indeed, when we recollect what Mr. Burke has written upon that subject\*, we do not know why we should wish for an opportunity of expressing our feeble sentiments. Parties are necessary in all free governments—and are indeed the characteristics by which such governments may be known. One party, that of the Rulers or the Court, is necessarily formed and disciplined from the permanence of its chief, and the uniformity of the interests it has to maintain;—the party in Opposition, therefore, must be marshalled in the same way. When bad men combine, good men must unite;—and it would not be less hopeless for a crowd of worthy citizens to take the field, without leaders or discipline, against a regular army, than for individual patriots to think of opposing the influence of the Sovereign by their separate and uncombined exertions. As to the lengths which they should be permitted to go in support of the common cause, or the extent to which each ought to submit his private opinion to the general sense of his associates, it does not appear to us—though casuists may mask dishonour, and purists startle at shadows—either that any man of upright feelings can be at a loss for a rule of conduct, or that, in point of fact, there has ever been any blameable excess in the maxims upon which our parties in this country have been generally conducted. The leading principle is, that a man should satisfy himself that the party to which he attaches himself means well to the country, and that more substantial good will accrue to the nation from its coming into power, than from the success of any other body of men whose success is at all within the limits of probability. Upon this principle, therefore, he will support that party in all things which he approves

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\* See his "Thoughts on the Cause of the present Discontents," *sub initio, et passim*.

—in all things that are indifferent—and even in some things which he partly disapproves, provided they neither touch the honour and vital interests of the country, nor imply any breach of the ordinary rules of morality.—Upon the same principle he will attack not only all that he individually disapproves in the conduct of the adversary, but all that might appear indifferent and tolerable enough to a neutral spectator, if it afford an opportunity to weaken him in the public opinion, and to increase the chance of bringing that party into power from which alone he sincerely believes that any sure or systematic good is to be expected. Farther than this we do not believe that the leaders or respectable followers of any considerable party intentionally allow themselves to go. Their zeal, indeed, and the heats and passions engendered in the course of the conflict, may sometimes hurry them into measures for which an impartial spectator cannot find this apology;—but to their own consciences and honour we are persuaded that they generally stand acquitted;—and, on the score of duty or morality, that is all that can be required of human beings. For the baser retainers of the party, indeed—those marauders who follow in the rear of every army, not for battle but for booty—who concern themselves in no way about the justness of the quarrel, or the fairness of the field—who plunder the dead, and butcher the wounded, and desert the unprosperous, and betray the daring;—for those wretches who belong to no party, and are a disgrace and a drawback upon all, we shall assuredly make no apology, nor propose any measures of toleration. The spirit by which they are actuated is the very opposite of that spirit which is generated by the parties of a free people; and accordingly it is among the advocates of arbitrary power that such persons, after they have served their purpose by a pretence of patriotic zeal, are ultimately found to range themselves.

We positively deny, then, that the interests of the country have ever been sacrificed to a vindictive desire to mortify or humble a rival party; though we freely admit that a great deal of the time and the talent that might be devoted more directly to her service, is wasted in such an endeavour. This, however, is unavoidable—nor is it possible to separate those discussions, which are really necessary to expose the dangers or absurdity of the practical measures proposed by a party, from those which have really no other end but to expose it to general ridicule or *odium*. This too, however, it should be remembered, is a point in which the country has a still deeper, though a more indirect, interest than in the former; since it is only by such means that a system that is radically vicious can be exploded, or a set of men fundamentally corrupt and incapable removed. If the time be well spent, therefore, which is occupied in preventing or palliating some particular act of impolicy or oppression, it is impossible to grudge that by which the spring and the fountain of all such acts may be cut off.

With regard to the tumult—the disorder—the danger to public peace—the vexation and discomfort, which certain sensitive persons and lovers of tranquillity represent as the fruits of our political dissensions, we cannot help saying that we have no sympathy with their delicacy or their timidity. What they look upon as a frightful commotion of the elements, we consider as no more than a wholesome agitation; and cannot help regarding the contentions in which freemen are engaged by a conscientious zeal for their opinions, as an invigorating and not ungenerous exercise. What breach of the public peace has it occasioned?—to what insurrections or conspiracies or proscriptions has it ever given rise?—what mob

even, or tumult, has been excited by the contention of the two great parties of the state, since their contention has been open, and their weapons appointed, and their career marked out in the free lists of the constitution? Suppress these contentions, indeed — forbid these weapons, and shut up these lists, and you will have conspiracies and insurrections enough. These are the short-sighted fears of tyrants. The dissensions of a free people are the preventives and not the indications of radical disorder — and the noises which make the weak-hearted tremble, are but the natural murmurs of those mighty and mingling currents of public opinion, which are destined to fertilise and unite the country, and can never become dangerous till an attempt is made to dam them up, or to disturb their level.

Mr. Leckie has favoured his readers with an enumeration of the advantages of absolute monarchy;—and we are tempted to follow his example, by concluding with a dry catalogue of the advantages of free government—each of which would require a chapter at least as long as that which we have now bestowed upon one of them. Next, then, to that of its superior security from great reverses and atrocities, of which we have already spoken at sufficient length, we should be disposed to rank that pretty decisive feature, of the superior happiness which it confers upon all the individuals who live under it. The consciousness of liberty is a great blessing and enjoyment in itself.—The occupation it affords—the importance it confers—the excitement of intellect, and the elevation of spirit which it implies—are all elements of happiness peculiar to this condition of society, and quite separate and independent of the external advantages with which it may be attended. In the second place, however, liberty makes men more industrious, and consequently more generally prosperous and wealthy; the result of which is, both that they have among them more of the good things that wealth can procure, and that the resources of the State are greater for all public purposes. In the third place, it renders men more valiant and high-minded, and also promotes the developement of genius and talents, both by the unbounded career it opens up to the emulation of every individual in the land, and by the natural effect of all sorts of intellectual or moral excitement to awaken all sorts of intellectual and moral capabilities. In the fourth place, it renders men more patient, and docile, and resolute in the pursuit of any public object; and, consequently, both makes their chance of success greater, and enables them to make much greater efforts in every way, in proportion to the extent of their population. No slaves could ever have undergone the toils to which the Spartans or the Romans tasked themselves for the good or the glory of their country;—and no tyrant could ever have extorted the sums in which the Commons of England have voluntarily assessed themselves for the exigencies of the state. These are among the positive advantages of freedom; and, in our opinion, are its chief advantages. But we must not forget, in the fifth and last place, that there is nothing else but a free government by which men can be secured from those arbitrary invasions of their persons and properties—those cruel persecutions, oppressive imprisonments, and lawless executions—which no laws can prevent an absolute monarch from regarding as a part of his prerogative; and, above all, from those provincial exactions and oppressions, and those universal insults, and contumelies, and indignities, by which the inferior minions of power spread misery and degradation among the whole mass of every people which has no political independence.

## RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE PEOPLE.\*

IN comparing the structure of society among the free states of antiquity, with that which is presented in the few which bear the same character in the modern world, we shall probably find that they differ chiefly in two great features. The military profession has become a separate employment, instead of forming part of the duty of every citizen; and the system of representation has in like manner confined to a few hands the important cares of government. In Athens and Rome, every man was a soldier and a statesman. He was liable, at a moment's warning, to march against the enemy; and his habits of life had qualified him to take the field. He was also called upon perpetually to deliberate upon the most weighty public measures; and, however little qualified he might be for so grave a task, his voice was required to sanction the scheme, or enact the law. With the various improvements of modern times, this most important change has been introduced—far more important than all the rest put together,—that we confide the task of defence and government—the province at least of *immediate* military and political operations, to classes of the community more or less completely set apart for performing those eminent functions.

It is not our present intention to trace the various consequences which may be deduced from this change, or even to enumerate the effects which it has produced upon the manners and habits, the situation, the liberties, of the people. Our attention shall be confined to one part of the remark which has just been made; and we shall stop for a moment to observe, that unquestionably there is no greater improvement in the arts of government than the substitution of representation—or a delegation of the right of managing their own affairs, inherent in the people—for the actual exercise of this undoubted right by themselves. Such an arrangement gives stability and dignity to public deliberations; it removes all chance of turbulence and discord; it commits the management of the general affairs to some of the wisest men. Even were the choice less happy, it is likely to secure more wisdom in the national councils than the deliberations of a whole people can possibly attain: it leaves the bulk of the community more worthily and more appropriately occupied than they could be were their time spent in political assemblies; and lastly, it is an invention absolutely necessary in a free state of any considerable extent—for it furnishes the only conceivable means of giving the people any voice at all in the government, when the seat of administration is removed at any distance from their own doors. For these reasons, this change in the structure of political society has justly been regarded as among the happiest inventions of human sagacity or experience.

With all these blessings, however—and they are as undeniable as they are important—the plan of delegated authority is liable to several objections; not, indeed, such as greatly to detract from its merits, but such as are well adapted to keep our jealousy awake to its abuses. It may be enough to mention one; into which, indeed, almost all the others resolve themselves. The delegation of the greatest of all trusts—that of government—necessarily implies a surrender of the function itself, and with the

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\* Inquiry into the Origin and Functions of the Popular Branch of the Constitution. — Vol. xx. page 405. 1812.

function much of the power; and leaves the people, in some degree, at the mercy of those whom they choose for their trustees, during the whole term of the appointment. Hence the danger of those trustees abusing their delegated authority in such a manner as to weaken the control of the people over them; and, by rendering themselves more powerful and less accountable, to make the resumption of the trust more difficult. It is quite manifest, therefore, that there is nothing of which the constitution, in a state like England, ought to be more jealous, than any step towards independence on the part of the representatives — any attempt of theirs to acquire a substantive and separate authority — either an existence not created, or attributes not bestowed by the people. From so self-evident a maxim we may deduce all the arguments in favour of parliamentary reform — all the observations which place in the strongest light the abuses in our representative system — the principles which render the Septennial Act by far the greatest mockery of popular rights, and breach of common good faith, that ever was committed by the governors to the governed — the grounds upon which the exclusion of so many of the community from all share in the government, and the usurpation of the elective franchise by the few, are demonstrably shown to be a mere subversion of the very purpose and meaning of representation. But we choose rather to view the subject in another light, because it is of great practical importance, though not, perhaps, altogether so familiar, in our political reasonings; and, above all, because it leads to the prospect of a palliative, if not a remedy, for the evils at present justly complained of.

The people, having in this country parted with the powers of government, have become much more estranged to the interests of their order, and, indeed, to the general interests of the community, than is wholesome for the common weal. It is by no means desirable, indeed, that appeals should be made to them upon the merits of individual measures — if by such appeals we mean real references of the fate of those measures to their decision; and yet, how the courtiers of the present day can maintain this doctrine, we marvel exceedingly — for they have never scrupled to make precisely such appeals when it seemed to suit their purpose. A great and most complicated question divided the wisest men in parliament — no less than the merits of two detailed plans for governing our vast dominions on the other side of the globe. Mr. Pitt conceived it right to refer the decision of this question — one of the most nice and complex nature, involving every speculative difficulty, every refined principle of policy, and encumbered with an incredible mass of details — to the people at large. He raised a cry about *chartered rights* — dissolved the parliament — and, having thrown many of his adversaries out of their seats, he had the *gravity* to pronounce, that the question was decided by the *sense* of the country in favour of his plan, and against Mr. Fox's! Twenty years after this notable experiment, the successors of Mr. Pitt — still professing the highest Tory doctrines, still abhorring all popular topics — thought proper to raise another cry against religious liberty, and forthwith to ask the opinion of the country upon the merits of the Catholic question. The late dissolution of parliament is said to have originated in a wish to consult the people on men as well as measures — to give them an opportunity both of testifying their approbation of the conduct of the war, and of pronouncing that mature and flattering judgment respecting the Prince Regent's demeanour in public and private (if, indeed, princes have any privacy) which it is quite well known every man in the kingdom *must* have formed. It would be difficult, then, with such instances staring us

in the face, to accuse the Court of a consistent aversion to popular practices, or to comprehend how they can object to giving the people a larger share in the government than they now enjoy. They surely can never have the countenance to maintain that proposition which we would lay down as the corner-stone of the representative system,—that the people ought not to decide directly and finally on any public measures, except the choice of their representatives. This proposition does not, as the lawyers say, lie in their mouths; and it is none of the lightest charges which we have to urge against them and their system, that they have never scrupled to invade the constitution, when it suited the purposes of the moment — sometimes on one quarter, sometimes on another — now in the regal part, now in the popular — with the weapons of tyranny or of anarchy — in the capacity of Tories or of Levellers — exactly as the view of their present interest directed; thus evincing themselves apt scholars in the great school of expedients, whereof Mr. Pitt was for so many years the master. But be this as it may, the principle is an undoubted one; and *we* take leave to maintain it, who can do so with perfect consistency.

There are, however, certain explanations necessary to prevent this principle from leading to very fatal mistakes. It is quite true, that the adoption or rejection of specific measures ought in no case to be left with the bulk of the people. But it is equally true, that the people have a right to deliberate on specific measures; to discuss them individually and in bodies; to express the result of those deliberations; and to tender to the legislature and the executive government their opinion, their advice, nay, the free expression of their wishes, upon all matters of public import. This is the sacred inalienable right of the English people: it is theirs, as they are free men; it is theirs, as they are both the fountain and the object of all government; it is a right, the invasion of which we conscientiously hold to form an extreme case — a case, perhaps, more easy than safe to discuss — and one which all lovers of their country, and friends to the peace and good order of society, must fervently pray against ever living to see practically moved. This right, however, was actually violated by Mr. Pitt — by the very man who did not scruple to invade the first principles of the representative system on the opposite quarter, by taking the sense of the country on a particular measure. He was the first minister who ever dared abridge the rights of Englishmen to discuss their own affairs.

We are perfectly ready to admit, that very many well-meaning persons, — friends of liberty, generally speaking, and lovers of the Constitution, — submitted to this violent, and, in the worst sense of the word, revolutionary proceeding, through the alarms artfully excited in those bad times. Nor should we be disposed to make any allusion to that most dismal period in the history of the Constitution, but for the sake of warning all our countrymen against ever again submitting to such gross impostures. To these delusions, and to the suspension of popular rights effected through them, we assuredly owe the continuance of that system which has brought the country into its present condition — overwhelmed with debt, groaning under tribute, and surrounded by the ruins of allied dynasties and the monuments of hostile triumphs.

When the laws against popular meetings (commonly and justly named the *Gagging Bills*) were introduced, an universal disposition had begun to manifest itself for peace. The war had utterly failed in attaining any one of the many objects which its slippery authors had proposed as the



ground of it. France was not conquered — the Bourbons were not restored — Holland was not defended — Belgium was not reclaimed — the balance of power was not re-established — and the gulf of bankruptcy, which used to yawn in France through the costly orations of the ministers, seemed shifting its positions a few points nearer the orators themselves. Meanwhile, tax after tax was imposed and submitted to — our trade was shackled — the prices of all articles were on the rise — a perpetual borrowing promised a long duration to the burthens successively thrown upon the country — and with the money the best blood of the nation was lavished in unprofitable expeditions, which only served to signalise some illustrious branch of the royal family, or, at the most, to add a useless sugar island to our unwieldy empire: all these things were very sensibly felt by the people, and they were beginning to evince the impression which was produced: meetings for peace were in agitation every where; and, before the session closed, one universal cry would have been raised for it, from north to south. Even in Scotland, where there is much less popular feeling than elsewhere, because there is no popular representation at all, it was quite plain that the sense of the people was strong, and would speedily have been expressed. How else can we explain the petitions against the gagging bills sent from this part of the kingdom, which was so little affected by them in ordinary times? We believe the one from Edinburgh had 20,000 signatures, and comprehended a prayer for peace also.

The courtiers saw these signs of the times, and knew the probable fate which awaited their favourite war. They proceeded, therefore, at once to remove the very corner-stone of the Constitution, and made it no longer possible for the people to meet and deliberate on public measures, as it is their unquestionable right at all times, and oftentimes their bounden duty to do. The expression of popular feeling was checked — the mock embassy of Lord Malmsbury was despatched — the negotiations were broken off — the war was renewed: and there being no longer any fear of control from the voice of those whose lives and properties were exhausted to feed it, onwards it went for year after year — as fruitless, as expensive as before — until another set of courtiers, having quarrelled with its authors, thought they could turn a little popularity by making a peace, when there was nothing left to fight about, and scarce any thing to fight with. Now, we take the liberty of holding, that a clear and general expression of the popular opinion in favour of peace, by unrestrained, frequent, numerous meetings in all parts of the country, must necessarily have influenced the conduct of the government, and would have put a stop to the war some years before, or at all events would have put the sincerity of the enemy to a real test. Does any one doubt that, at the least, such an expression of public opinion would have procured us peace on Bonaparte's return from Egypt? — Yet the war lasted long enough after that, to produce the overthrow of the fortunes of Austria in Italy, and its invasion in Germany — to augment the glories of France by Hohenlinden and Marengo.

We have taken the question of war as an example only — though it is doubtless the most important one — of the benefits which result to the country from an unrestrained expression of popular opinion; and a proof how incumbent on the people the duty is — as imperious, indeed, as their right is indisputable — of freely canvassing and reporting to the government, their judgment on all important matters of state. It is essential to the freedom and stability of our happy constitution, as well as to the

right administration of our affairs, that the people should have the practice of frequent public meetings, at which the discussion of their great interests may be undertaken, their voice raised boldly, yet peacefully, to the parliament and the prince; and their sentiments made known without reserve. — This practice, so far from being inimical to the representative system, or in the least degree inconsistent with it, flows naturally from it, and gives it life and vigour.

For surely it cannot be pretended, that the people of England are, only once in seven years (or in three years, supposing the constitution were restored), to exercise the right of interfering with the management of their affairs; and that this interference is to be confined rigorously to one function — the choice of their delegates. Were this the case, only see with what powers those delegates are invested, and consider both how impossible it would be to find persons worthy of so dreadful a trust, and how ridiculous to elect them for more than a few months. Then, indeed, the foolish sarcasm of Rousseau would have some meaning, — that once in seven years the people of England are free — at all other times slaves. But if any further reasoning were required on this head, it might be sufficient to state, that a people limited to the exercise of this one function of election, must necessarily lose the capacity of making a fit choice; and, if it even retained the capacity, would very speedily be either cajoled or forced out of the exercise of it. The elective franchise — the whole system of representation — may safely be pronounced at an end, from the moment that the people confine themselves to the exercise of this one political function.

Again: — Though we do not maintain that the representatives of the people are strictly the agents of their constituents, and bound, on each individual question, to follow their specific instructions, — a doctrine wholly untenable, in our apprehension, — yet he would err just as far on the other side, and in a far more dangerous kind, who should hold the representatives to be quite independent of the people, except at the moment of election. For this would be to maintain, that the government of England is a mere oligarchy; and that the people, exercising no voice in the administration of their affairs, limit themselves, in their politic capacity, to the bare performance of an empty triennial or septennial ceremony. This must strike every one who reflects how certainly a member's conduct would pass unnoticed, and be forgotten, at each succeeding election, if the mass of his constituents stood by, idle and listless, during the whole currency of the Parliament. But if this were not the consequence, and if the people retained their regard for public questions, and were resolved, as far as in them lay, to be consulted; and if we still suppose them only to interfere in the act of election; then an evil of an opposite kind, and scarcely less hurtful to the representative system, must infallibly arise; — the electors, unable to trust him whom they can neither watch nor control, will take care to choose such a man as may be tied down, regarding each vote he is to give, by previous stipulations. And we ask the pretended friends to our Constitution, whether so niggardly and jealous a delegation of this important trust could ever answer the true ends of representation? One of these evils, however, is quite sure to happen. In the present state of the country, we rather dread the first; and we think it not only more imminent, but of a worse description — for it involves the loss of the elective system altogether.

We shall only stop to mention one other point of view in which the subject may be considered. Even if the duration of parliaments were

reduced to the constitutional period of three years—or if, as some learned and virtuous persons think, of one year—still, in the changeful scene of political affairs, unforeseen events arise, upon which the representative could not possibly have had a previous understanding with his constituents, and must be left wholly in the dark as to their feelings and opinions, and oftentimes as to their interests, if he has no opportunity of learning those by their own free and united deliberations. Some unexpected rupture with foreign powers—some novel measure affecting trade—some new invention in the art of taxing—some extraordinary stretch of prerogative,—all these incidents may demand a communication between the parliament and the people, which popular meetings alone can fully and safely maintain.

Hitherto we have been arguing, upon strict and admitted constitutional principles, to show the connection between frequent popular meetings and the representative system. But, in our minds, there is a far more important view of the question, arising out of the indirect effects of such meetings, both in giving strength to the hands of the representative, and in setting bounds directly to the encroachments of tyranny and misgovernment. This involves considerations so much more momentous than any we have been reviewing, that we must stop to dwell a little at large upon them. We are still, it may be premised, proceeding on the supposition, that the representation of the people is quite pure—and that, by a salutary reform, the practice of the constitution is restored to a correspondence with its principles; and we are showing that, in such a state of things, the frequent interference of the people is necessary to our liberties. We shall afterwards advert to the vast additional strength which the argument derives from the actual state of the parliamentary representation.

Let us cast our eyes upon the real foundations of liberty in this country, as these are laid in the powers and privileges of Parliament. The question is, to what cause must we ascribe the control which Parliament has over the power of the Crown? What makes the sovereign a limited monarch? He is a master of a vast army, and a treasure scarcely calculable, if he pleases to divert it from the purposes for which it was granted. He has an influence, dangerous to liberty we must admit it to be, from patronage almost unbounded. Why is this influence not absolutely fatal? Why is military force, generally speaking, harmless? Why does the weight of this enormous treasure press so lightly upon our rights and privileges? It cannot be maintained, that there is any thing very formidable to a tyrant in the physical force of six or seven hundred gentlemen, even if we add to the corps all their families and immediate dependants. Their influence, the power which their wealth gives them, may be somewhat greater; but, divided and unorganised as they necessarily are, this can be nothing worth estimating in the scale. Their debates and resolutions may have weight—the weight of reason—the force of eloquence—the power of worth and character. But a file of grenadiers dispersed them once;—and if such coarse instruments were again to enter the house, we suspect they would again prove as deaf to the debate as irresistible to the debaters. But the members of the Parliament sit not in their individual capacity—they are the delegates of the whole people, and represent the people. An attack upon them is therefore an attack, not on six or seven hundred individuals, but on the nation at large. All this is very true; but unfortunately it is only theory; and, practically considered, it sinks into a mere figure of speech, to which

the armed affecter of despotism would be found extremely insensible. Then what stops his course—a course which in fact almost every prince has more or less desire to pursue—which on every sacred principle of the constitution we are bound to presume all princes may be prone to follow? The answer is perfectly obvious. He knows that the constituent will make common cause with the representative—that *the people* will side with the Parliament\*—that the nation at large will resist—that the army will waver, perhaps suddenly desert him and cleave to the country. He knows that a project, so senseless on his part, would inevitably produce a state of things frightful to contemplate,—a necessity most hateful to all good men, but far more terrible to tyrants;—a necessity so very terrible that it is quite sure never to occur. The doctrine of resistance, as was well observed by the first nobleman in the empire, standing in his place as premier peer of England—the doctrine of resistance placed the present royal family on the throne of these kingdoms—it is interwoven in the constitution; but it is a doctrine more fit to be inculcated on princes, than rashly instilled into the people.—It is a principle, said Mr. Fox, which we should wish kings never to forget, and their subjects seldom to remember.

Now, in every view which can be taken of this principle, whether we would prevent the necessity of recurring to it in practice, or derive all the advantages which the knowledge of its existence is fitted to bestow,—we must be satisfied, that the constant exertion of the popular voice is the surest means of avoiding the one, and attaining the other.

Let us only consider in what way the voice of the representative body may be made most effectual against the errors or the faults of the Executive. If that voice comes backed by the opinion of the country, supported not merely by the act of election, constituting the members, but by frequent expressions of popular opinion, evincing that the delegate really represents his constituent, surely no man can doubt that it must speak with tenfold force. It has often happened, that the resolutions of Parliament have been disregarded by the Crown: but when was it ever attempted by the boldest or the blindest rulers, to disregard the voice of Parliament, when the sense of the people was also loud in backing it?—Of late years we have had instances of ministers retained in office after the Parliament had declared their incompetence. But then the people were silent, the tricks of their enemies had succeeded in beguiling them of their voice; for if that voice had been raised, it must have triumphed. This delusion, indeed, is one of the most notable ever practised. As long as it lasts, the existing minister is safe. He has the chance of procuring majorities; but, if he fails, he need not care:—until the people awaken from their apathy, he is secure, and the Parliament will speedily follow him. This is the very nature of such a body as our legislature. They may come to a resolution after many conflicts; but if the Crown stands out against that resolution, the concurrence of the country alone

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\* Some of the reasonings in this, and other parts of this article, may probably strike our readers as bearing a very near resemblance to those which have been already submitted to them, in the review of Mr. Leckie's publication. That article, however, was printed off before the present was received; and while the general coincidence of sentiment may perhaps appear to afford some additional presumption of its justness, it may be proper to remark, that the former paper was devoted merely to clear *the genuine theory*, and legitimate practice of the Constitution, while this is intended to point out its existing hazards and natural securities.

can prevent that which has always happened in such cases from happening again—the ultimate compliance of the Parliament and the final victory of the Crown.

But, above all, those ought to patronise popular meetings, regular and free discussion of public affairs by the people themselves, who are apprehensive of violence; and dread—as all well disposed men must dread—the extremity of a conflict between the Crown and the country. To hasten such a deplorable issue, no better means could be devised by the mischief of man, than to retain the bulk of the community in thralldom by prohibitory laws, or by gross delusions to lull them into apathy—until, having kept them quiet and unthinking through a course of misrule, they are at length compelled to open their eyes by the extremity of their sufferings. To prevent or discourage popular meetings might well answer the purposes of bad governors—if the taxing machine were not going on all the while, grinding the nation down. It might be extremely safe, in the long run, as well as comfortable for the present, to those whose interest it is that all should be kept silent, if there was the smallest chance that the storm of war could blow over the heads of the people without ever rousing them. But let it be remembered, that this is simply impossible—and that, sooner or later, the people must be awakened to their real condition. Now, we would put one plain consideration to any real friend of domestic peace and good order:—we are satisfied with this one view of the many that might be taken of the subject. While the war is only beginning, and news of victories come in from time to time, the cost is not thought of; or, if thought of, is soon lost in the glory. For some years all wars are but too popular. Then come a few reverses, and the people cease to like the business:—but their rulers as much as possible seek to withdraw their attention from the subject; and the game goes on in the hands of the Government for some years longer—the people remaining indifferent. It is part of the plan to impose the new burdens very gradually, and in minute portions, for each article; so that each item, taken separately, almost escapes observation. Straw after straw the load is laid on; yet the Eastern proverb says, that the last straw breaks the back of the camel. While this process is pursued, there is no one point of time at which the patient creature, the People, can pause, more than at any other, and complain of being bent to the ground. Yet the process of loading goes on unceasingly, and must go on while the war continues. Does any one doubt that, in the end, endurance will cease? Can it be questioned, that they who have not been permitted to discuss the measures themselves, will at length quarrel with the price to be paid for them? Nothing can indeed be less reasonable than for those who have shown no objection to the war, to refuse paying the expenses of it;—and this is a very common observation against the people, when they begin to grumble at taxes. But the truth is, that for some years the people have been silent upon the war, only because the bad habit of never meeting to discuss public measures has become inveterate since its renewal. If popular assemblies had been frequent, the people, instead of quarrelling with the taxes, would have quarrelled with the war itself, and must have obtained such a change of measures as would have rendered those taxes unnecessary. But, admitting that the result of their discussions might have been favourable to the continuance of the war—is it not clear that, in this case, we should have obtained a guarantee against their ever showing violent opposition afterwards to the burdens rendered necessary by that war? And, even if they had shown decided indispo-

sition to the war, but been disregarded by the government, would not the constant discussion of the subject at least have saved the peace and stability of the community from the great jeopardy in which they must be put, when suddenly, and for the first time, the sense of burdensome oppression rouses the nation, and unites it in opposition to a system, now for the first time, and too late, submitted to its full consideration? Far be it from us to be parties to such a delusion as recommending popular meetings as a means merely of carrying off the ill humours that prevail among the people. We wish to see those assemblies frequent and free, for their own sakes,—and because we know they will always produce the most salutary effects on the conduct of the government. But it is also allowable to state, as an indirect good resulting from them, that they prepare the public mind for necessary sacrifices, and, by preventing surprises, are highly favourable to public tranquillity, in the only sound and enlarged sense of the word.

We have all along been reasoning upon the supposition that the Parliament is really, and not in name only, a representation of the people—that its members are chosen by the nation at large—that its deliberations are the result of discussions among delegates appointed by those whose business they are to manage—that the choice of them is free, and the trust so often renewed, as to give the elector, by the mere act of election or rejection, some control over the deputy—that the representative body consists of persons sent, on the part of the nation, to resist the encroachments of the Crown and the aristocracy, and not in any considerable number, of persons chosen by the Crown and aristocracy to play into their hands, and betray the people under the disguise of their trustees. But how greatly is the force of the argument increased by the actual state of the representation? Who shall say that a Parliament, chosen as ours really is, requires no looking after? Who shall tell us that the Crown requires no watching from the people themselves, when their regular watchmen are some of them named, and more of them paid, by the Crown itself? Who shall be permitted to question the necessity of the people deliberating about their own affairs in their own persons, when such vast masses of them are wholly deprived of the elective franchise, and destitute of any semblance of representatives to speak their wishes, or transact their business?

The history of last session, fruitful as it is in lessons of political wisdom, offers none more striking than the one which it reads to us upon this important subject. The most weighty interests discussed in Parliament were those of the manufacturing districts. The bread of hundreds of thousands was in question; and the two Houses were occupied for many weeks in discussing their grievances. Those persons composed the population of Birmingham, Leeds, Manchester, Sheffield, Wakefield, Halifax, Boulton, Bury, Glasgow, and other places. Not one of those towns, some of them containing 100,000 inhabitants, has a single representative in Parliament, except Glasgow; and Glasgow is *represented* (if the abuse of language may be tolerated) by its corporation uniting with three other corporations, and the whole four sets of magistrates choosing one member; but so that the other three at all times (and two of them every other Parliament) may return the member, and leave Glasgow wholly out of the question. Now, in what manner could those great and most important bodies of men have made themselves heard but through the public meetings, which they wisely and constitutionally held to discuss their grievances? In no other way could they have each obtained a

hearing, or established a correspondence with a temporary representative. But surely in no other way could they have gained the point which they did so nobly carry with the Legislature and the Executive Government. In specifying these towns, we have enumerated the greater part, by far, of the manufacturing interests of England;—and they are all without local representatives in Parliament. Is it asking too much, to demand that they may use freely the only means left them of sharing in the public councils—of influencing the measures for which they pay so dearly in all ways—and assemble from time to time, in order to communicate with each other, and with the Government, upon the matters so imminently affecting them? In truth, while so many vast branches of the community are wholly deprived of all share in the representation—while so many members of Parliament owe their existence to private nomination—while the electors, who exercise their franchise the most amply, have only an opportunity once in six or seven years of changing their delegate—and while the enormous patronage vested in the Crown strews with tempting baits the whole floor of the House, and besets every avenue to it with promises and threats—he must be a stubborn lover of despotism indeed, who can deny that the people betray their own cause, and have themselves to blame for the mismanagement of their affairs, if they cease to discuss and speak out their own minds upon all fit occasions. Such a Parliament *must* be *aided* by the watchful eyes of the country. If the people slumber themselves, let them not vainly hope that their *representatives* will be very vigilant, or very successful in the public cause, whatever they may be in their own.

Whence, then, it may be asked, arises the dislike of popular meetings, too prevalent not merely among the natural enemies of the people, or among persons honestly, yet most groundlessly, alarmed at the apprehensions of violent proceedings, but among many real friends to popular rights, and to the best interests of the constitution? Careless as we should be of opposition from hostile quarters, we are extremely anxious to reason a little with persons of this cast; because the utmost respect is due to their scruples,—and we are confident they may be removed.

Their apprehensions arise, we suspect, in a great degree from fastidiousness of taste. They dislike the kind of oratory which is, we presume to say, most absurdly believed to be necessary in popular meetings; and they are still more averse to the unworthy arts which men too often practise for the sake of popular favour. Now, let it once for all be understood distinctly, that with respect to any such arts—and generally with respect to any tricks or deceptions which men of honour would shrink from in any other circumstances—we hold them all in equal abhorrence when used for compassing objects with the people. Of these, then, there is no question here; but indeed we fancy their usefulness is much over-rated, especially with a well informed and rational people; and of this there can be little doubt, that the more the people were accustomed to assemble and deliberate on their concerns, the less easy would it become to entrap their understandings by such base means. Nor is this remark altogether inapplicable to the species of eloquence with which popular assemblies may be addressed. Why a man of sense should not speak to two or three thousand persons of ordinary understandings the same things which he would say to two or three hundred, in the same plain and rational manner, seems difficult to conceive. But they are, many of them, perhaps most of them, vulgar and illiterate. He who urges this, must forgive us for reminding him, that some of the finest

orations of modern times have been addressed to twelve common jurors ; and spoken before an audience, the bulk of which was of no higher description. The people are grievously under-rated in all these remarks. We shall not go back to the assemblies of Greece and Rome — nor ask for whose taste — for whose ear — the divine orations of the ancients were composed ; nor remind the reader of the proverbial fickleness and volatility of the Athenian\* multitude, that is, the audience of Demosthenes,—or the gross ignorance and barbarism of the *Quirites* — we might say, of the *Patres Conscripti* also. But we would ask, if the diffusion of knowledge—the constant habit of reading, and of reading on political subjects—the greater morality and decorum of modern manners—the peaceful demeanour of men who bear the part of citizens and not soldiers—if these circumstances are not well calculated to prepare an English public meeting for behaving with dignity, and for listening with satisfaction and intelligence to the discourses of well informed and rational men, who may treat them, not as children, but as judges ; and give them credit for preferring sense to nonsense ? It is common to speak of the *balderdash* which men *must* talk at popular meetings. If the auxiliary verb were changed, and we were asked to laugh at what they *do* talk there, there might be more reason in the thing : though, even then, that matter would be exaggerated by a good deal. But the necessity of either speaking nonsense, or declaiming in bad taste at such assemblies, we profess ourselves unable to discover. The truth seems to be, that our patriots think they must speak one language in Parliament, and another to the people : whereas, if there were no such thing as a Parliament, and they yet attended popular meetings, they would deliver to those the same speeches, or very nearly so, which they now reserve for the precincts of Westminster. There is no surer way to debase any person in reality, than treating him as if he were base already ; and a more effectual method of lowering the taste of the people cannot be devised, than to compound such articles for their use as offend against every rule of correctness, and outrage every feeling of refinement. But when did the experiment ever fail, when, treating the people like a large body of sensitive and yet intelligent beings, you addressed to them, in the language of delicacy, the arguments and statements which illustrated an important topic ? When were they either found inattentive, or benighted, or disposed to laugh at your refinements ? We will venture to assert, that the most brilliant speeches of either Mr. Fox, Mr. Pitt, or Lord Erskine, might with perfect safety have been committed to any popular assembly in the city of Westminster.

This topic is by no means one of mere curiosity ; it is intimately connected with our present discussion. As long as popular meetings are shunned by the more enlightened members of society, they must want much of the respectability and effect which they ought to have ; and the fear of either failing to gratify and instruct such an audience, or of descending too low to gain this end, is apt to scare those whose patriotism would otherwise lead them thither, and whose talents might there be exerted to the lasting benefit of their country. We are endeavouring to show, that no such lowering of a man's faculties is required, and that success is attainable without any sacrifice at all.

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\* When Alcibiades was making his first speech before them, it is well known, that a bird happened to escape from his bosom, where he had confined it ; and straightway the whole audience got up and ran after it.



Public meetings, such as we are now alluding to, have of late years, we suspect, fallen into a degree of contempt, in which they were never before held. Some of the causes of this, we have already glanced at. The alarms purposely excited against such meetings during last war, and propagated among numbers of honest believers, have in a good measure subsided. The laws which virtually prevented them have expired. Let us hope then that the fastidiousness we have been speaking of will no longer prevent the most upright and enlightened men in the community from coming forward and performing a duty sacred and paramount to the people, and only, from misconception, disagreeable to themselves. We ask for no compromise of principles — no unworthy concessions — no violations of feeling or even of taste. — But we live in England, and we dislike the sickly, foreign squeamishness, as much as we despise the slavish fears, which estrange popular men from an honest intercourse with the people, and prevent true patriots from leading on the strength of the country against its oppressors.

Are examples wanting of such popular courses taken by approved and regular statesmen? We will not refer to such men as Wilkes and Horne Tooke; though, we believe, if their principles had only been as pure as their manners were refined, and their habits, both of thought and speech, classical, the most severe moralist and correct politician must have been satisfied. Neither will we say any thing of living examples; because so odious a topic may well be avoided. But we have now lying before us a volume of Mr. Burke's works, one half of which is made up of speeches delivered by him to the people at Bristol, and afterwards corrected, or rather written and published by himself, and of letters written to them. One of those speeches, among the first he ever made, occupies about a hundred pages of the volume. To be sure, it was connected with his election there; but will the greatest enemy of popular measures pretend to say, that the people are fit to be spoken to only once in seven years — only when some favour is to be asked at their hands? Mr. Burke was incapable of such meanness and ingratitude. This, most assuredly, is an argument *he* never would have urged; and indeed he has expressed his sentiments upon the general subject so strongly and clearly in a letter to the chairman of the Buckinghamshire county meeting of 1780, printed in the last volume of his works, that we cannot resist the temptation of extracting the passage. It is on occasion of no less a subject than a proposal for shortening the duration of parliament.

“I most heartily wish,” says Mr. Burke, “that the deliberate sense of the kingdom on this great subject should be known. When it is known, it *must* be prevalent. It would be dreadful, indeed, if there was any power in the nation capable of resisting its unanimous desire, or *even the desire of any very great and decided majority of the people*. The people may be deceived in their choice of an object. But I can scarcely conceive any choice they can make to be so very mischievous as the existence of any human force capable of resisting it. It will certainly be the duty of every man in the situation to which God has called him, to give his best opinion and advice upon the matter; it will *not* be his duty, let him think what he will, to use any violent or any fraudulent means of counteracting the general wish, or even of employing the legal and constructive organ of expressing *the people's sense* against the sense which they do actually entertain.

“In order that *the real sense of the people* should be known upon so great an affair as this, it is of absolute necessity that timely notice should be given; — that the matter should be prepared *in open committees*, — from a choice into which *no class or description of men is to be excluded* — and the subsequent county meetings should be as full and as well attended as possible. Without these precautions,

*the true sense of the people will ever be uncertain.* Sure I am, that no precipitate resolution, on a great change in the fundamental constitution of any country, can ever be called *the real sense of the people.*" Vol. v. p. 229.

We believe few men can be named of more fastidious taste — more averse to spreading delusions — to vain courting of popularity — whose nature was more abhorrent to every species of mummery and empiricism — than Mr. Fox. His conduct however towards the people, even the populace of the country, is well known; and for his frequent and hearty participation in their assemblies, all our readers may recollect how his enemies attempted to attack and traduce him. In the debates on the Gagging Bills, we have repeated examples of this. Mr. Dundas (afterwards Lord Melville), a very natural hater of such proceedings\*, and aware, it would seem, of what he had to dread from them, inveighed bitterly against that illustrious man for his "*appeals to the people.*" — "He displayed," said Mr. Dundas, "the most extraordinary willingness to resort to them; so that it frequently happened that he was, without the doors of the House, attacking ministers with invective and asperity, one half of the day, where they had no means of defending themselves, and during the other half combating them with the utmost inveteracy within these walls." — "At one time," added this facetious courtier, "in order to excite the indignation of the people against ministers for their prosecution of the American war, Mr. Fox had displayed his oratorical talents on a stage, erected for that purpose, in Westminster Hall." — To this, and many other *matters* of the like kind, how did the man of the people make answer? — By denying the charges? — by explaining away the facts? — by attempting to show that he only addressed his constituents as such — or that his speeches to the electors of Westminster were delivered to them in that capacity? — Nothing of all this. He boldly and manfully met the charge with an admission of the facts, and a broad, anxious avowal of his conduct. He said, that "it was the duty of every man, and particularly of every member of parliament, when the conduct of the executive government was called in question, to represent the characters and conduct of ministers in their true colours." And he plainly reminded the House of Mr. Pitt's eloquent speeches, in which he had formerly described *harangues to the people* as "*the best and most useful duty which representatives in Parliament could discharge to their constituents.*" — In truth, Mr. Pitt did not disdain to court the people, at the beginning of his life, by speeches, as well as by professions; and his successors in the present day are strictly justified by his example — at least his early example — in promulgating their opinions during the season of civic conviviality; — but we have said enough on the subject of precedents. We are willing to fling away the authority of Mr. Burke and Mr. Pitt — and to rest on that of Mr. Fox alone: and, with his great example before our eyes, who amongst us shall be so timid, or so delicate, as to refuse lending our aid to the popular cause in the manner most consistent with the spirit of the constitution, and the character of the English nation?

We have reserved for the last place, a remark arising out of the objections urged to popular meetings; because we conceive that it conducts

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\* The last time the writer of this article had the fortune to see Mr. Fox at a Westminster meeting, he was in the act of addressing the people, in Palace Yard, on the subject of Lord Melville's misadventure.

us to the most commanding view of the subject which has yet been taken. The objects of such proceedings, it is said, are nugatory; for, after discussing the matters in hand, either before hearers who are already convinced, or whom no arguments can be expected to move, whether the measure is carried or lost, nothing substantial is gained; the best that can happen being, that some address should be carried which the Crown or the Parliament may never read; or some resolutions come to which will neither bind those who pass them, nor gain converts among the rest of the community.

Now, having stated this objection as fully and strongly as we are able, we must proceed to observe, that we partly deny the matter of fact on which it is founded. We contend, that the debates carried on in popular meetings may, and frequently do, sway the voices of those present. But we are willing to pass from this, and to grant that full and free discussion is the grand object of such proceedings; and then we say, that he who maintains the objections to them which we are now handling must be prepared to make another step, and to grant that all the debates in parliament might be safely—and if safely, sure we are, most advantageously—omitted, for the purpose of coming at the vote; unless, indeed, some yet severer critic, some more sturdy Pythagorean, should also be for dispensing with the vote, as a ceremony in general wholly superfluous. For, in truth, who is so romantic as to fancy that all the speaking in any one parliamentary debate ever influenced half a dozen of votes? Who is ignorant that each time a member brings forward a measure, and asks the ear of the House, he knows full well how the House, after hearing, will decide? Yet it is generally thought that those debates are of some use to the country, and in some degree beneficial in the conduct of public affairs. In what way, then, are they so? They affect the government indirectly. If they have no influence on the business immediately in hand, they appeal to the country,—that is, to the sense of the people; they confound by that appeal many a bad minister, and prevent many a bad measure from being persisted in, and even propounded, which would, if pressed on the consideration of parliament alone, be secure of its willing support. The speeches which men make in Parliament decide their character in that body, and in the country; their weight with both is settled by the general conduct which they maintain, and the talents they on the whole display. But their weight *in* the legislature would be of no earthly moment,—it would not be worth the trouble of computing, if the Houses deliberated with close doors, and the country was at once deaf to their proceedings, and dumb in its own behalf. Practically considered, the debates in parliament are a regular series of appeals to the people,—of discussions for the benefit of the country, in the conduct of which no man of sense or honour will indeed ever lower himself to catch at a false and fleeting popularity, by making either his taste or his opinions bend to the gusts of public applause, but which produce in reality all the effect whereof they are capable, through the voice and influence of the people—that people which, how often soever it may err upon particular occasions, or be misled by temporary delusions, is never very long blind to political truth; because it cannot be long deceived regarding its own interests—the primary object of all political discussion. Now, if these views of the uses and ends of parliamentary discussion are just,—and we believe they are universally admitted by persons of all descriptions,—we challenge any man to show the distinction between the benefits of those debates, and the benefits which we expect to see result from the free communication of public opi-

nion, and the influence of the public voice, through the medium of popular meetings.

We have written upon this subject with earnestness, because we deeply feel its importance. In conclusion, we shall only observe, that if there is a ray of hope at present in any part of the political horizon, it assuredly breaks in from the quarter to which we have been addressing ourselves — the good sense and increased information of the people. We believe them to be sound and incorruptible; we would fain hope that the reign of delusion is over; and all our fear is, lest it should be succeeded by that of apathy and despair.

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#### DANGERS OF THE CONSTITUTION.\*

IT is a very constant practice with the advocates of existing abuses, to accuse those who would correct them of political fanaticism; — and to this charge he is in an especial manner liable, who shows any jealousy of encroachments upon the constitution. To what danger, it is asked, are the liberties of the people exposed? Who thinks of attacking them? Is it to be supposed that any minister will ever be bold enough to raise taxes by the army, or suffer a year to pass without calling Parliament together? or that he will rely upon a military force to obtain the sanction of the two Houses to his measures? Are there not, besides, (the argument proceeds, in the nature of a composition or set-off,) the courts of justice always open, where the subject may be secure of protection for his liberty, where royal influence is effectually excluded, and open violence never was used, even in the worst of times, by the most audacious ministers of tyranny or of usurpation? Besides, it is added, let the whole constituted authorities be ever so much inclined towards submission, through corruption or through fear, the public opinion will always keep them right: — the press is free; the people speak their minds openly; the Parliament is virtually under their control: and, finally, the members of that body, as well as of the army, being taken from among the classes of the community which have the principal interest in preserving the purity of the system, the people never can be enslaved, till they choose to engage in a plot against their own liberties. Upon these grounds, the alarms excited by any particular measure in the minds of constitutional men, are treated with infinite contempt; they are termed vain, imaginary, or affected panics. Whoever mentions them, is set down at once as either factious or foolish, that is, an impostor or an enthusiast. All men of sound practical sense, we are told, know better than to regard such bugbears; and, whatever may be attempted or effected against any one branch of the constitution, those sound men bid us look at all that is left untouched, and say whether he must not be a furious lover of freedom, who does not admit that we have still liberty enough.

We regard the prevalence of this kind of reasoning (if the word may be so applied) as beyond all comparison the worst symptom of the times,

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\* Schultes' Reflections on the Progressive Decline of the British Empire, and on the Necessity of Public Reform. — Vol. xxvii. p. 245. September, 1816.

and of the most fatal augury for the rights and the prosperity of the country. It evinces a degeneracy of political virtue and courage truly humiliating; it arises from the most sordid views, or the most effeminate habits; and as its existence a century, or even half a century, ago, would have brought England to the state of slavery in which the rest of Europe is now hardly struggling, so its continuance for any length of time bids fair to naturalise amongst us, even now, the worst abuses of foreign despotisms. The topics to which those weak or corrupt declaimers against the true spirit of the constitution appeal, are the more dangerous, because they wear the guise of plain matter of fact as opposed to theory; of moderation as contrasted with exaggeration; of something rational and solid instead of something fantastic and even ridiculous. Thus they easily enlist on their side that class whose influence is always so much beyond their numerical strength, the dealers in ridicule, — the lovers of satire and merriment, rather than truth, — a class composed of lazy, squeamish, effeminate spirits, — peculiarly formidable in a soft and luxurious age, — exercising an unbounded dominion over the frivolous and the timid, and almost ruling over what is termed “SOCIETY,” by the same fear of a laugh, to which, for their punishment, they are themselves absolutely enslaved. We consider it as a most sacred duty, to stand forward at the present moment, in defiance of all this noise — this declamation and derision — and to show how rational and solid the fears are, which the friends of their country entertain for its liberties in these times. It is the more necessary for us to do something of this sort, since views of foreign policy, and the recent dangers from that quarter, have lulled some of the stoutest advocates of the people, and set those against us “that should be ours.” They have leagued themselves, though we trust but for a season, with the enemies of liberty, or the cold-blooded sycophants of a court, who have not even feeling enough to hate, but are only indifferent to the rights of their fellow-subjects — the true foundation of the glory of their country.

It is an unfortunate thing, that the alarms excited by the French revolution should for a while have silenced Mr. Burke, and those who agreed with him, upon all other constitutional questions except those immediately springing out of that great event. Their minds were filled with the contemplation of what they regarded as the paramount danger; and they could not stop to look at any other. Hence they were sometimes led to use expressions, casually indeed, and hastily, which were greedily caught up by the herd of vulgar politicians, whose interests, as well as what they call their principles, bind them to the defence of every abuse, and the ridicule and reprobation of all who plant themselves in the outworks of the constitution, and defend, inch by inch, all its approaches. This servile tribe have thus contrived to borrow the authority of Mr. Burke for their bad cause, and to persuade the unthinking mass of mankind, that they act in concert with that great man, in their warfare against the rights of the people, and their mockery of the champions of the constitution. Because he overlooked lesser points, in preventing what he deemed for the time the pre-eminent evil, he is to be cited as careless of all attacks upon popular rights. Because he thought anarchy the most pressing danger in his latter days, he is to be invoked as the patron saint of those who love despotism as convenient to their purposes, or congenial to their habits; and the man who was, of all others perhaps that ever spoke or wrote upon political subjects, the most feelingly alive to every thing like a constitutional point — whose life was spent in

struggles against encroachments hardly visible to the naked eye—in endeavouring to dissipate political disorders in their first stages, and while their symptoms were not discernible to the vulgar; he whose fault it was to magnify, if it be a fault, the importance of every movement, which, in any quarter, and with how little force soever, touches the fabric of the government, is now held up as covering, with the authority of his great example, those whose doctrine it is, that nothing the government can do is dangerous—short of turning the parliament out of doors by grenadiers, and levying the taxes by the armed force of the Crown! If Mr. Burke were an authority for the revilers of constitutional jealousy, it would only destroy the weight of his name in all other matters, without affording the least support to such a course. But it is fit to have remarked, how unfairly he is called in by those impostors to their assistance.

There is, perhaps, no way of arriving more speedily at a view of the intimate connection between the different parts of the English constitution, and of the imminent danger to which the safety of the whole fabric is exposed, by the injury of any part, than a plain consideration of what it is that forms the real security of our liberties—the principle that keeps the system in order. After all that we have seen of Parliaments, it would be a vain fancy to imagine that the representation of the people is of itself a sufficient security for their rights. Even if that representation were much more perfect than it is, it would be liable to the influence of the Crown, and might be intimidated by violence. In fact, to what baseness has not the Parliament at one time or another made itself a party? The administration of justice, again, is, no doubt, singularly pure; and the Judges, from their habits of seclusion, are generally speaking, little under the evil influence which a contact with the court is apt to engender. Nevertheless, their leanings are almost always towards power; and if the Crown could safely tamper with them—if it could fully exercise the discretion vested in it by law, of choosing them from among tools fit for wicked purposes—the distribution of justice might soon become as corrupt as the accomplishment of those purposes required.

Observe, then, the kind of defence for our liberties, which, by the letter of the law, we have in those great bulwarks of the constitution, Parliament and the courts of law; see how the lawful authority of the Crown encroaches often upon them—how its indirect influence tends to sap them; and then say if it is by them that we keep our rights, or if they have not as great need of being maintained against attack, as the privileges which they are meant to protect. That the majority of Parliament is steadily with the Crown, supporting all its ordinary measures, is admitted. That when a minister has been thus supported by it in all his measures, and happens to lose his place for pursuing those measures, he speedily loses the support of the very men who, the day before, backed him, is a matter of fact. That no proposition can be named much more absurd than many which the Parliament has voted by a great plurality of voices, is equally the result of experience. Yet still we trust to this body with a very firm, and, we think, a reasonable reliance, that were the Crown to propose certain measures of an extremely violent, or an highly impolitic, nature, it would reject them; nay, that even if the Crown could obtain its concurrence, the measures would remain unexecuted. Again, every one knows, that the Judges are chosen, generally speaking, from among barristers educated in long habits of connection with the

ruling powers; men accustomed to Crown-employment, and whose opinions are those of the Government. But the Crown might also, by law, choose the basest of sycophants to fill this important station. They have their places, it is true, for life; but they have still promotion to expect for themselves, and favours to ask for their families,—if gratitude to their patrons were out of the question, and the servile habits or slavish opinions that recommended them to notice were forgotten with their elevation.

In the hands of parliamentary majorities so constituted, and of Judges so appointed, are our whole liberties placed by law. Thus, for the protection of personal security, there is the Habeas Corpus Act: but those Judges must execute it; and if they expose themselves to its penalties, by refusing to give it effect, they themselves (that is, some of their body) have to interfere for the infliction of the punishment. If they refuse to inflict it, what remedy is there but a petition to, or a motion in, Parliament? But the majority may reject the petition, and negative the motion; and thus the constitution is virtually at an end, without any struggle or convulsion, or the least degree of apparent injury. All its outward parts and features remain untouched, and yet the whole life and virtue has departed out of it. The letter has been preserved entire, the spirit is gone. Now we are enquiring in what this spirit and this life consists:—*Wherefore* the sort of events now supposed strike us when mentioned, as in the highest degree improbable: *What* it is, in short, that secures the system against such attacks as we have alluded to, and in like manner against more direct and open invasions of power? It is unquestionably the influence of public opinion, and the apprehension of resistance, intimately connected with it. As long as the proceedings of Parliament occupy the attention of the people, an effectual control is exerted over them; and the discussions in the two Houses, how little soever they may seem to influence the votes, are engines of the highest power in controlling the executive through the public. As long as Judges sit in the face of the country, and, above all, in the face of an enlightened and jealous Bar, the most scrutinising and unsparing of all auditories,—the Crown can neither fill the Bench with its tools, nor can better instruments degenerate into that occupation. As long as all the proceedings of Government are public, canvassed freely by the press, and made known through that and other channels of information; and as long as there is reason to believe that gross misrule will engender resistance, a corrupt judicature and a venal Parliament may in vain combine with a despotic court, in defiance of public opinion. Tyranny will dread going beyond a certain length, and this fear will supersede the necessity of applying the ultimate check.

The sacred principle of resistance is the very foundation of all our liberties; it is the cause to which we owe them:—let it only be destroyed, and they are gone. Mr. Fox is represented to have said, that it should always be held up to the Government, as possible; to the people, as impossible. We suspect there must be some mistake in this statement of his opinion; or that if he used such an expression, it was only an epigrammatic manner of hinting, what had better have been at once plainly told, that the people should not be reminded of resistance, as long as their rulers kept the possibility of it before their eyes. In no other sense is the proposition at all correct. By rulers, however, in this remark, are to be understood not merely the executive government but all the constituted authorities through whose means the despotic designs

of the Crown may be carried into effect. As long as Parliament and the Courts of Law are retained in the line of their duty by the force of public opinion, no necessity ever can arise for bringing the Crown and the people into immediate conflict. This, indeed, is the great use of such institutions; and it is thus only that they may be called bulwarks to our liberties. They enable us to make head against oppression; not merely with advantage, but at a distance from the danger, and without coming to close quarters; they form the grand distinction between regular and despotic forms of government, precisely because they perform this function. By means of them it is that public opinion operates by its preventive influence, and renders it unnecessary to employ force; by their means the Crown with us is either deterred from attempting an oppressive measure, or is foiled in the attempt, peaceably and harmlessly; while, in an absolute monarchy, it would probably have persisted in the same course, until a rebellion overthrew the dynasty; or the immediate dread of it in the courtiers worked the destruction of the reigning prince.

The great security of the constitution, then, being the vigilance of public opinion, and the possibility of resistance, every encroachment upon the rights of the people, how trifling soever in itself,—every act of power in any the least degree contrary to the constitution, is to be regarded not merely as injurious in itself, but as undermining the stability of the whole system: for it is manifest that every such act, if acquiesced in by the community, accustoms the public mind to submission; destroys that integrity of feeling which alone can render the people capable of defending their privileges; and lulls that spirit of independence, which, to be effectual for resistance in a time of need, must be jealous and watchful at all times. The success of the attempt in an equal proportion increases the confidence of the opposite party, and prepares him for new aggressions. Thus we have to consider, each time that an unconstitutional measure is proposed, the four points of view in which it is dangerous. It is injurious in itself, more or less, to the happiness or well-being of the people;—it arms the Government with a certain portion of new power, positively and directly;—it encourages it to make further attempts against liberty, by the experience of impunity and success;—and it breaks the independent feeling of the people habituating them to defeat, and preparing them for new submissions. Let us consider these particular heads a little more closely, in their order.

Nothing can be more false, or more dangerous, than the idea, that any one act of violence, or even of misgovernment, is unimportant in itself. Although no indirect consequences were ever to ensue, each proceeding of this description is most material;—it is a serious evil. Indeed, if it were merely indifferent, that would only be a sufficient argument against it; a conclusive reason for making no change. But can any act of misgovernment be indifferent? Connected as all the parts of every political system are together, who shall say that an injury to one of them may not reach all the rest? The notion, that because an abuse or oppression of any kind is not as great as might be imagined, therefore it is inconsiderable—is founded upon the supposition that the people have no right to complain, unless they are governed extremely ill; whereas they have a right to be governed as well as possible: they are entitled to complain of every deviation from this straight line; and they are only blamable when they attempt to correct errors, or repress encroachments, by acts of violence which might lead to greater evils than those they wish to



redress. Let it only be considered, that the well-being of a people is made up of various parts; and that to make them completely miserable, it is only necessary to injure each part in detail. Let it also be remembered, that the evils arising from any even of the less important abuses, cannot be equally distributed over the community, but will necessarily press most heavily upon some parts, and upon some with a weight wholly destructive — while many may altogether escape. Now the severe pressure of any evil upon a very small number of persons is a very great mischief, although the rest of the people may go free; for no principle can be conceived more absurd in itself, and in its consequences more dangerous, than that of balancing the enjoyment of one class against the sufferings of another; and disregarding the amount of a calamity, by attending to the numbers who escape.

Again: it is difficult to imagine any encroachment upon the constitution, which does not arm the government with new powers; and consequently render the next step more easy than the last. An objection, we shall suppose, is made to an increase of the army; the answer is, only a few thousand men are to be added. The reply is easy: this addition makes the executive more strong; increases its influence sensibly, as well as its force; and renders a new aggression upon our rights, by steps regularly and formally taken, or by open violence, more easy, by means of this new influence and this new force. Has an individual been overwhelmed by oppression? Besides the fear which the example holds out to others, a zealous adversary has at least been removed.

The accession of spirit and audacity which such steps, how small soever, successively give to those who are plotting against liberty, is equally obvious. There is no greater danger than letting the enemies of freedom know their own strength. It is a lesson, however, which nothing but experience ever teaches. They are naturally timid, and see a very little way before them. To understand that they can advance safely, they must feel it; and, in civilised countries especially, and in modern times, they proceed slowly and systematically. Despotism is now grown old and wary. It has learnt how alone the people may safely be overcome: and its maxims, the result of long observation, are well worth our attention. One is, to change things without changing names — that something may be gained by surprise, and the vigilance of the enemy be evaded: another is, to be perpetually moving forwards, however slowly and silently; a third, to choose the time when the attempt is the least expected. But the grand and ruling principle is to risk nothing — to go by steps — and never to move one foot until the other is safely planted. In the nature of things an encroaching government can never know its own strength before hand; for that depends exactly upon what the people will submit to. If, then, the attempt at gaining a small accession succeeds, it knows that so far the people are ready to yield; and this knowledge, by encouraging it to aim at somewhat more, frequently enables it to obtain it.

But the most fatal effect of the encroachment is, its injury to the public spirit. When a man has once suffered himself to bear dishonour in any thing, it is in vain to expect any resistance afterwards. He is no longer the same being, and his sense of honour is gone entirely. Therefore, we never talk of any thing as a *slight insult*. It is an insult, and that is enough. Thus, too, an army once beaten and disgraced, is destroyed; nothing but some violent change, which alters its whole composition, can ever restore its feeling of confidence, and the courage which, if it does not command success, at least deserves it. The people is to the full as

much changed by the act of submission : they are not the same being the day after they have submitted to an encroachment of power. Their pride is gone — their honour tarnished. They are prepared for new encroachments by the recollection of the past. “ They will not make a stand now, because it is not worth the struggle, after having given up the first point. Had the matter been new, indeed, it might have been otherwise ; but it is a trifle, after the ice is once broken, and the first step has been made.” Such are the feelings implanted in the minds of the community by the beginning of submission ; and so, while the government is encouraged to proceed, the people is disheartened, and acquires the habit of yielding. It may truly be said, that they alone can make their own chains ; and every new lesson of submission learnt, is a new link forged — be the subject-matter of the lesson ever so inconsiderable in itself.

To illustrate these different effects of an encroachment upon the constitution ;—let us suppose the question to be raised, by the government acquiring an accession of force or revenue without the consent of Parliament. This is not a vain or imaginary case. As far as money at least goes, the Crown has, by the course of hostilities, come frequently into possession of large sums never voted nor appropriated by the House of Commons. We may therefore take the actual case of the Droits of Admiralty, and mark the progress of this question. It was first objected, that the Crown, according to the spirit of the constitution, should owe every part of its resources to the grants of the Commons, and that this was a sacred and inviolable principle ; that the deviations from it in former times were no authority against its force, inasmuch as the ordinary revenue was then comparatively small, and the perquisites of war were understood to go in defraying its expenses, the system of parliamentary appropriation being irregularly established. It was therefore contended, that the Droits should go into the public treasury, with the other branches of revenue, and be under parliamentary control. The influence of the Crown, however, prevailed against these arguments ; and those funds were retained as a separate and independent patrimony, — it being, however, distinctly admitted, that some regulation should be made respecting them when a new arrangement of the civil list became necessary.

This happened in 1812. We regard it as an encroachment upon the constitution — and we are now to observe how it operated. *First*, it was in itself so much money taken from the people : for, whatever part of it did not go to the expenses of the war, might have set free an equal amount of taxes ; and such part of it as was spent in war, was, of course, much more extravagantly and carelessly spent, than if it had been voted by Parliament. The taxes rendered necessary by this diversion or misapplication of the fund, would not perhaps have been a very great burden on each individual, if distributed over the whole community equally ; that is, according to the means of each person called upon to contribute. But they must have fallen unequally ; perhaps most heavily upon the poorer classes. If they fell on articles only consumed by those classes, they alone bore the burden : — at all events, they produced, it is almost certain, great misery to some individuals in particular branches of employment, and in all probability ruined entirely several persons. *Secondly*, the expenditure of this fund by the Crown directly increased its power, by gratifying many persons of considerable weight in the community, who, with their connections, became the more dependent upon the court. Many voices were thus gained at elections ; many advocates for bad measures, in private society ; perhaps some votes in Parliament upon delicate ques-

tions. If the captain of a vessel who had been favoured to the amount of several thousand pounds, either as a compensation for the loss of prize money, or to repay him for a loss that might have ruined him, were asked to support government at an election, or to make his relative abstain from voting in Parliament on an important occasion, where he was likely to decide the question against the court, it is highly probable that the application would prove successful; and the question might very likely affect the rights of the people in a tender point. *Thirdly*, the government having gained the point respecting the Droits, saw that there was an end of the extreme delicacy about such irregular and peculiar sources of revenue, and felt that the people would yield, upon this, as upon less ticklish questions: it therefore was encouraged to try a further encroachment. And as the people, in the *fourth* and *last* place, no longer felt that it was a new attempt, or that they were for the first time called upon to make a struggle upon the matter, they were disposed to yield, as they had done before, only with much less unwillingness and alarm.

Accordingly, the event has already happened; and two several encroachments have grown out of the first, within four years, besides a kind of abuse which may well be reckoned a third encroachment. In the last campaign, the Crown has, besides the usual perquisites of Admiralty, used the military resources of the country, in war, and in negotiations, to obtain terms advantageous to itself, in a pecuniary point of view. We speak not merely of the accessions gained for Hanover, which are clearly owing to the military exertions of England, and not at all in proportion to those of Hanover itself; but we speak of the large sums secured to the Crown by the treaty, out of the booty taken from France, and over which, it has since been contended, and successfully contended, that Parliament has no control. And thus, from having the right to appropriate all captures made before proclamation of war, and some others of a similar kind, the Crown has advanced to a new position; and been suffered to assert a right (and to maintain it successfully, in the face of Parliament) to use the military power of the country for its private aggrandisement, calling upon Parliament to support the expenses of the war, and withdrawing from Parliamentary control, and from all participation, the whole profits of the victory.

Again, a new arrangement of the civil list became necessary last session; and the promise of Mr. Perceval was expected to be fulfilled, viz. that those irregular funds should at length be placed under the control of the legislature. But various pretexts were found to evade the fulfilment; and, the country having allowed the question to be put off in 1812, in expectation of this arrangement, in 1816 it was not thought going much farther to let it lie over until a demise of the Crown—when, in all human probability, it will be again put off, or, in other words, the separate rights of the Crown will be admitted in their utmost extent.

Lastly, the knowledge that money so obtained could be applied without Parliamentary control encouraged the court to deal freely with the fund. Largesses were made to some branches of the royal family, for entertaining foreign princes; and large sums were applied to aid the deficiency in the civil list;—that is, an immense expenditure was undertaken, beyond what Parliament had sanctioned as fit for the maintenance of the royal dignity; and this extravagance was owing entirely to the knowledge, that those peculiar funds could support it.

We have already remarked, that the enemies of liberty generally choose their time well; availing themselves of some peculiarly favourable com-

bination of circumstances, to give it a blow. Unexpectedly they make an encroachment, greater in reality than in name, while the alarm of foreign danger, or internal confusion, secures them an extraordinary degree of support. A consequence then follows, deserving of all our attention. Soon after this point is gained, another occasion presents itself, when some new, but less considerable, inroad is to be made upon the constitution. The argument for it is at hand — “This is nothing, compared with what was done before without objection ;” — and unhappily it is a consideration which reconciles too many thoughtless persons to the fresh invasion of their rights. How many things have been submitted to of late years without a murmur, almost without a remark, only because, during the times of terror, so many more shameful violations of the constitution were committed ! It is exactly in the same manner that our system of expenditure has become so extravagant. For years, we have talked of tens and almost of hundreds of millions, until thousands excite no attention. After spending above one hundred and twenty millions in a year, we cannot stop to consider whether a particular branch of service shall cost five hundred thousand pounds, or six. Nor shall we ever be awakened to a just sense of the value of money, until a deficit in the ways and means shall force it upon us.

This topic leads us to observe, that although we regard constitutional questions, questions touching only the rights of the people, as much more important than any others, yet there are few of them which have not a very direct connection with the class of questions at all times interesting, even to the most common herd of political reasoners — questions of money. The increased power of the Crown has led, by a straight and short road, to increased burdens upon the people. We are asked, who it is that can be supposed an enemy of liberty in the abstract ? We answer, There are probably none such : but there are very many who hate it because it stands in their way, and obstructs the attainment of objects which they vehemently desire. The expenditure of a large revenue is at once the favourite object of all absolute governments, and the most effectual engine of their power. Let us only observe, to be convinced of this, how profitable, in point of money, all the encroachments on the rights of the subject have proved ; that is, how fertile in taxes and expenditure. When Mr. Pitt sent a subsidy to Germany, during the sitting of Parliament, without its authority, and the body whom he had thus trampled upon almost thanked him for the insult, it was in vain to expect any resistance to any expenditure in further loans and gifts, which he might propose in the regular way. Parliament and the people were too well pleased that the violence was not repeated, to think of criticising the prodigality. The system of alarm in general, by means of which he carried on a war against the people, enabled him to consume hundreds of millions in the war against the enemy. Blind confidence in the government became the prevailing maxim ; and, contrary to every principle of the constitution, Parliament, from year to year, intrusted the minister with a discretionary power of spending vast sums during the recess, in services never once mentioned during the session. At length, the *yearly vote of credit* became, as the name implies, a matter of course, until it actually reached the sum of six millions. To oppose such dangerous grants would have been deemed hardly loyal ; in fact, no real opposition was ever offered to them : and thus it became a part of the ordinary administration of affairs, to intrust the ministry for half the year with the absolute disposal of sums equal to any purpose which despotism or extrava-

gance might desire to accomplish. The government was of course satisfied with the latter; and only indirectly obtained, by the expenditure, an extension of its authority. But no man can entertain a doubt, that to this practice was owing much of the boundless expense for which we are now so sorely smarting, and of those confirmed habits of squandering, which not even the total want of means appears capable of reforming.

Other deviations from the constitution, leading again to new waste of money, have sprung occasionally out of these habits. A treaty was made with Russia to maintain her fleet during the time it took refuge in our ports; and this arrangement never was communicated to Parliament. When, however, the money was wanted, a slight mention of the bargain was made in the estimates; and thus it was brought to light. Half a million was thus promised in secret, when there was no earthly reason for concealment, except the chance of Parliament disapproving the agreement, and preventing its fulfilment. The same secrecy was therefore preserved until after the money had been actually spent in this service; and then Parliament was asked to replace it. Can any man entertain a doubt, that the removal, or weakening of every check upon expenditure, must always augment its amount? Can any man deny, that all such deviations from the constitution are paid for by the people, first in loss of liberty, afterwards in taxes?

But it is not only by encroachments of a nature immediately connected with the revenue, that the property of the subject suffers along with his privileges. Other infringements of the constitution are, somewhat less directly, but very certainly, attended with similar consequences. It is no small objection to a great military establishment, that the expense of it is extremely burdensome. All patronage is, by the nature of the thing, costly to the people; and the more the Crown is enabled to abuse it, by the uncontrolled power of bestowing it, the more likely is the country to be ill served, that is, to pay for services not rendered. Every interference of the government with the commerce of the country is directly prejudicial to its riches; and all powers giving undue preference to one class of men over another, are substantially powers to drain or to stop up the sources of public wealth. The remembrance is still fresh of the evils produced by those unconstitutional measures pursued some years ago with respect to trade. Not only by the illegal interruption of commerce with neutrals, but by the equally illegal use of belligerent rights to the profit of some individuals, and the loss of many more, the trade of the country suffered a shock unparalleled in its history. In short, it would be difficult to point out a single deviation from constitutional principles which has not been followed by a serious loss of property to the people.

In another light, however, this connection between the two classes of oppression appears still more plainly. Whatever multiplies the chances of misgovernment increases the risk of prodigality, and of errors — of great burdens upon the people, and great injury to their private affairs. Every step, therefore, which the Crown makes towards independence, inasmuch as it removes the only effectual check upon maladministration, is a step made towards increased public expense and individual loss. It is a step made or suffered by the people towards the surrender of all control over their own affairs, and consequently over their money matters. How little soever, then, the particular question may seem to be connected with finance, if it relates to the power of the Crown and the rights of the subject, it must be viewed as ultimately resolving itself into a question of

taxes. Money is not more certainly the sinew of war, than it is at once the sinew and the food of absolute power. To domineer, and not to tax, is impossible. As often as our rights are invaded in any quarter, let us only ask if the power of the Crown will not, upon the whole, be something the greater for the change? If so, then, we know that, sooner or later, we shall have to pay for it in money; and those who are only to be moved by such considerations should therefore defend their liberty for the sake of their purse. A frugal man never undervalues small savings. His maxim, on the contrary, is, to take care of the pence, and leave the pounds to take care of themselves. To undertake any thing needless because it costs only a trifle, or even to indulge in what is pleasant because it is only a little beyond what he can afford, he considers as the road to ruin. In like manner, if we are a frugal nation, and would avoid paying our all in taxes, we must estimate every loss of liberty in money, and never reckon any the smallest accession to the influence of the Crown as of little cost. We may be well assured that it can make no progress but at our great expense. Each step brings it nearer our pockets. They whom no higher feelings can touch, may thus learn to dread absolute power for its rapacity. Let them remember, that the rod of iron picks all locks; and they may begin to think their rights worth defending.

It is a very common thing to say, for the purpose, no doubt, of lulling that watchful jealousy in the people upon which every thing dear to them depends, that the lawful guardians of their rights is the Parliament, and that every struggle in their defence must be made there. "To leave things to our representatives," is therefore held out as at once the most safe and the most efficacious method that can be pursued, for the protection of the constitution. We have already shown the absurdity of such a doctrine: but let us also observe, that it is inculcated without the least good faith; for the very persons who profess it, are those most ready, upon all occasions, *in Parliament*, to cry down the efforts made against the encroachments of the executive; and to treat every one as a wild enthusiast or a factious alarmist, who would guard against the dangers of absolute power. Thus, while they bid the people trust to Parliament, they do their best to prevent Parliament from proving itself trustworthy. But when they come to argue upon the safety of the constitution, and attempt to prove the fears of its real friends chimerical, they show a degree of perverseness and self-contradiction, which would be pleasant, were its consequences not so pregnant with mischief, and its success often too melancholy, even with persons of fair understanding.

First, they urge that it is vain to talk of the constitution being in jeopardy, as long as the people are enlightened, and the press free; and they cite the progress of popular information and discussion, as an ample security against any little increase to the power of the Crown. It is incredible, they assert, that, in such a state of things, any considerable invasion of our liberties should be attempted; and impossible that it should succeed. Once more, let the extreme bad faith of this kind of argument be observed, when compared with the language held to the people out of doors. To the people these men say, "Be quiet; the constitution is safe in the hands of the Parliament." In the Parliament they hold all idea of danger to the constitution infinitely cheap, "because it is safe in the keeping of the people!" When the advocates of the slave trade denied the right of Parliament to abolish it, and said that this measure might safely be left to the colonial legislatures, professing all the

while that they were most friendly to it, and only wished to see it undertaken in the right place; some simple persons were extremely surprised to find the same individuals in their places, as colonial representatives, oppose the abolition upon its own merits; and this conduct used to be reckoned the height of bad faith. But it is not quite so intolerable as the mode of proceeding which we are at present considering; for, at any rate, the slave traders did not first tell the mother-country that the question should be left to the islands, and then bid the islands leave it to the mother-country. This sort of argument, this *alibi* sophism (as Mr. Bentham would term it), is peculiar to the advocates of abuse and corruption; and it is the weapon they most constantly and most successfully employ. Thus, they tell us perpetually, that the press is free; and therefore any given constitutional question signifies little; that is, we are desired to tolerate an encroachment upon our rights, because we possess, in some other quarter, a means of defending them against encroachment; and, of course, against the one proposed, as well as others. This would be but a sorry argument taken by itself. But how do the same persons treat any encroachment on the liberty of the press? Exactly in the way now described; — they laugh, or affect to laugh, at such fears; and assure us, that while we have trial by jury, all is safe. Then, if we complain that there are abuses in the management of special juries — that the same pannel is constantly recurred to from the small number of names in the freeholders' books — that persons in office, and intimately connected with government, even in the collection of the revenue, are often called upon to try questions respecting the government — that the advantage of being summoned on Exchequer trials operates as a *douceur* to special juries in their other duties — that the whole system of special juries in criminal, but especially in state trials, is vicious and dangerous to liberty; — we are again treated as enthusiasts and alarmists, and are asked, if we really think there can be any danger, as long as the Judges are pure, and the Bar jealous? If a political jobber happens to be made a judge, from court favour or ministerial services — if he is seen assiduous at the levee, and observed to treat that very bar according to the cast of its political principles, still there is no danger, Parliament may impeach him.\* And, as soon as a remark upon his conduct is offered in Parliament, we are once more bandied back to the bulwarks of liberty — the inestimable privileges of a free press, and public discussion, and trial by jury.

But the grand topic of the quietists, of whom we are speaking, is Parliament. To think of danger to our liberties, while the business of government is regularly carried on in that great public body, and no minister ever dreams of dispensing with its services, is represented as the extreme of folly. Now, we admit that we have no fear of seeing parliaments disused, and still less of seeing them put down by violent means. He must be a clumsy tyrant who should think, at the present day, of employing his influence or his troops in this way. If, indeed, inroads should be made time after time upon the constitution, and acquiesced in under the vain idea that the stand might be made when it became a matter of the last necessity; if, at length, the Parliament were found steadily to support the

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\* It is necessary, from the course of the argument, to state, that the case put here (and in other places) is merely one of supposition; and that, so far from having any application to recent proceedings in Parliament, we deem the attempts there made to rescind a judicial determination to have been hurtful to the cause of the constitution.

privileges of the subject, and its repeated dissolution only identified it the more with the people; it would probably be found, that some violence might safely be attempted against its privileges, by means of those weapons which its long habits of criminal compliance had put into the hands of the Crown. But, for the present, the danger arises from the Parliament itself, identified, as it is too apt to be, with the executive, rather than its constituents. The court party of this country have long since discovered, that by far the easiest and safest means of stretching their power is through the medium of a compliant parliament. To gain this body to their interests, and to prevent every reform which may more closely connect it with the people, is, accordingly, the great secret of acquiring a power dangerous to the constitution. They may, perchance, be now and then thwarted by the House of Commons; but they forget and forgive readily — trusting to an early mark of favour from the representative body, and unwilling to quarrel with it while so much may still be effected by its assistance. Nor will they ever break so useful a correspondence, and quarrel with such an ally, until its services are no longer worth having, and until they may safely be dispensed with. But it is for the people always to bear in mind that the government — that is, the executive — acting in concert with the other branches of the legislature, may attempt measures hostile to their rights; and that it is therefore necessary to keep in their own hands the security for the Parliament always proving a real check upon the Crown.

The uses of parliamentary government — of ruling in concert with the House of Commons — are indeed prodigious to the sovereign. We have noticed the ease and safety of this method of stretching the executive power; but, besides these advantages, it confers a kind of authority, and obtains resources from the country, wholly unknown in any other system of polity. No absolute monarch can call forth the means of a nation as our parliament has done. To say nothing of the men raised, and the sums borrowed, we have paid between sixty and seventy millions in twelve months, and this for a length of years together. The utmost feats of finance in despotic countries are a jest, compared with this; and this is only practicable by means of a parliament. The people feel a sort of connection with that body, how unequally soever the elective franchise is distributed. They are allowed to see from day to day all the details of its proceedings. They follow every tax proposed, from the first mention to the ultimate decision upon its merits. They petition, and “the door is opened wide” to their representations; their prayers are civilly, even respectfully, treated; many highly palatable things are said on all sides; there is a hope of final success held out; the petition is meanwhile solemnly conveyed to its long home, accompanied by a flattering attendance of friends; the affecting service is performed over it by the proper officers; and it is decently laid upon the table, to repose among its distinguished predecessors, who were equally useful in their generation. Were the House of Commons emptied, or — which would exactly amount to the same thing — were it shut up, so that the people knew nothing of what passed within its walls, and only saw a long ugly building, with many doors and windows, where a manufactory of taxes was carried on, there would very speedily be an end of the vast contributions hitherto paid to the services of the state. It may further be observed, that even parliament, with all its means of taxing, has only been able to raise the revenue now paid by adopting the principle of gradual increase; laying on straw by straw upon the people’s backs, until at length they find them breaking, without



knowing when the burden began to be unbearable: a new illustration, to show the necessity of making an early stand, and never suffering ourselves to be lulled with the phrases, "It is a mere trifle"—"What can it signify?"—"We have borne worse, and survived it"—"It is not worth the trouble of resisting."

The struggles which have been recently made, and with signal success, have been almost all against public burdens. The people, by a resolute determination to obtain justice, shook off a load of above seventeen millions a year of war taxes, which the Crown would fain have made perpetual. The successful issue of this great contest ought for ever to teach them a lesson of their strength. But it would be well if the same vigour were shown in resisting the smaller impositions. Great attempts to pillage the country are not very likely to succeed; but when the government goes on by its favourite rule of gradual and insensible progression it only takes longer time, and gains ultimately the same end. Had we been awake to our true interests while the burdens were accumulating, we never should have had to fight that arduous battle, and our means would not have been left in their present state of exhaustion. It should be steadily kept in view, that a financier never is so dangerous as when he proposes a tax which seems not to touch any one sensibly— which raises some commodity by a sum almost lower than any known currency; and therefore such taxes ought, if objectionable in themselves, or if not absolutely necessary (which is indeed the greatest of all objections), to be as strenuously resisted as if they at once cut off a tenth of our income, or subjected our heads to a tribute.

But, independent of pecuniary considerations, we would fain hope that the love of our constitution, the attachment to those inestimable privileges which so nobly distinguish us among all the nations of Europe, and to which the enjoyment of every baser possession is also owing, would be a sufficient motive to keep alive the jealousy of royal encroachment, so absolutely essential to the conservation of liberty. Confidence in our rulers, whether arising from supineness or timidity, or personal predilection, is as foolish as it is unworthy of a free people. The task, indeed, which a sovereign is called to execute is the noblest which the mind can imagine,— the security of a people's happiness by one man's pains, and, it may be, at the expense of his own. But it is also the most difficult of all offices to perform; and we may rest assured that he will be but too apt to exchange it for another, which, as it is the very easiest, is also the basest of employments—the sacrifice of all a nation's interests to his own. The mechanism, even of our excellent government, furnishes him with but too many engines for the accomplishment of this object; nor can any thing effectually check his operations but the perpetual jealousy of the people, within and without parliament, in discerning and repressing even the smallest of his encroachments.

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#### ON THE USES OF PARTY UNION.\*

WHEN a number of men associate themselves from a general agreement in political opinion, and pursue in one body a certain course of measures,

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\* A Bill of Rights and Liberties. By Major Cartwright. — Vol. xxx. p. 181. June, 1818.

it is extremely common to hear them accused of various crimes. If they attack the government of the day, they are by its friends stigmatised as disloyal, by aid of the established sophism which confounds the sovereign with his councillors, — the constitution with the ministry of the day. By the people, they are apt to be regarded as prosecuting their own interests; and only desirous of changing the present servants of the crown, to take their places. Even the more thinking classes of the community, unconnected with government, are apt to see something factious in a systematic opposition; it seems as if men, and not measures, were the criterion of praise or blame; as if the same persons would approve the same propositions, which they now most loudly condemn, were they but made by their own chiefs. The common question is, Are the ministers always in the wrong? And an inference is thus drawn by those who say they retain the unbiassed exercise of their own judgment, that there is almost as great a sacrifice of conscience in always agreeing with an opposition, as in constantly supporting a minister. It is the interest, and the never-failing practice of the government, to encourage such notions; — the minister has no better friends than those who rail at all party as an interested and factious league of place-hunters or zealots — nor any more useful resources than in the number of well-meaning and not very clear-sighted persons, who, from tender consciences, or perhaps from the vanity of always thinking for themselves, keep aloof from party connection as unprincipled and degrading.

Another charge against party, arises out of the coalitions which, from time to time, are framed between men of different political connections, who have once been opposed to each other. No more fruitful source can be assigned of the prejudices which have been conceived against various parties, and of the general disposition, which for a long while has existed, to question the purity of public men generally. As superficial observers cannot comprehend the principle which unites individuals together in political co-operation, or conceive how a man may, to promote a just cause, overlook slighter differences of opinion, and act with those of whom he does not in every particular approve — so the same reasoners find it still more difficult to understand on what grounds persons, long inveterately hostile, can unite when circumstances are changed: and as party union is termed a combination for power or place, and party hostility a factious scramble — so a coalition of parties is deemed a profligate abandonment of public principle for private advantage. The two most celebrated measures of this kind, in more modern times, have given rise to an infinity of such feelings in the public mind.

The last cause we shall here state, of the odium that has lately fallen upon party, is the conduct almost inevitably pursued by every opposition, upon its accession to power, and the disappointment arising from thence, both to the public and to individuals. How sparing soever an opposition may be of their promises to the country, far more will always be expected of them than any man can perform. Whatever has been done amiss by the former ministry, they are called upon to rectify, and instantly — for delay is held equal to non-performance. At all events, they are not suffered to continue for one moment in the steps which they had blamed their predecessors for pursuing; although it may be perfectly consistent in those who inveighed against a measure, to persevere in it, when once adopted, as the lesser evil; or, if resolved upon abandoning it, to do this cautiously and slowly. The heedless multitude however cry out, that the new men are just as bad as the old, and would always have acted like them,

had they been in their place. And hence a new topic for those whose clamour is, that all public men are alike. In the mean time, the impossibility of satisfying the private claims of those who follow the party for the sake of its patronage, fills the ranks of the discontented; and the loss of power having disarmed the popular indignation against the fallen ministry, public censure is almost exclusively reserved for their successors. These, too, are for a long time regarded rather as an opposition, inexpertly converted into ministers, than as regular placemen; and the dislike excited by whatever they do, or leave undone, tinge the public opinion respecting opposition parties in general. These appear to us the principal sources of the unpopularity into which regular party has fallen.

We are very far indeed from denying, that there have been, in all times, abuses of the principle which justifies party union—or that most parties, in their turn, have had errors and crimes to answer for, which afford some colour to the charges indiscriminately made against them all. We may even admit, that, unless strictly watched, and controlled by the great check of public opinion, party association is apt to degenerate and produce serious evils, by its perversion to purposes of a private nature. Nevertheless, we conceive, that the plan of acting in parties has its foundation in the necessity of the case, and that it affords the only safe and practical means of carrying on the business of a free country—not, as ignorant men imagine, by a collusion between different jundos of men, but by a mode at once peaceful and effectual, of giving their full influence to different principles. Let us then attend to the ground upon which alone such associations are to be defended.

As long as men are ambitious, corrupt and servile, every sovereign will attempt to extend his power; he will easily find instruments wherewithal to carry on this bad work; if unresisted, his encroachments upon public liberty will go on with an accelerated swiftness, each step affording new facilities for making another stride, and furnishing additional confidence to attempt it. It requires no argument, then, to show the absolute necessity of strictly watching every administration at all times. But if any given set of ministers has adopted a system of government grossly erroneous, or corrupt, or unconstitutional, a necessity arises for taking every lawful means to displace them, and prevent further mischief. The question is, how can they be most effectually watched in the one case, and opposed in the other? Now, we must consider the means of supporting themselves, which all ministers have, and the power which is thus afforded them of eluding the vigilance and overcoming the resistance of insulated individuals. Every ministry is necessarily a league—a party—a party, too, regularly marshalled, and kept together in one solid body,—as much more compact than the best organised opposition, as a standing army is better disciplined than a corps of volunteers. The ministers have all the force and all the influence of the government at their disposal. The fears of some, the hopes of others, range around them a vast host of persons whom they can dispose of at pleasure, without ever consulting their wishes. It is enough for those multitudes that the government wills any thing; and straightway they feel themselves bound strenuously to promote it. Add to this, the strength derived from the good will, and often the co-operation, of a great and even respectable class, who give themselves little trouble to enquire into the merits of measures, but are resolved to believe, that whatever the minister for the time being says or does is right. When persons of little reflection or no candour cry out against an opposition as factious; inveigh against party spirit; and ask how any

honest man can give up the guidance of his conscience, and follow implicitly the steps of his political leaders, — how comes it that they forget the far more implicit obedience rendered to the minister of the day, by the whole host of government dependents? *They* are indeed knit together by an inseparable bond — their common interest; theirs is an unscrupulous, an unenquiring, an unthinking compliance with all that their chief prescribes. If the charges of unconscientious agreement in opinion, or blind submission to other men, applies to any class, it clearly is to those whom the power of the government commands, or its patronage influences. If the opposers of the government must be accused of violence and rancour, its supporters are equally open to the charge of tyranny and persecution. Nor will it avail the enemies of all party, to say that they blame both sides, and would have no regular discipline in either. By the nature of the case, there *must* be a party, regularly disciplined and paid, for the minister of the day. As long as self-interest has any influence over men's minds at least, this party must, of necessity, exist at all times. The question therefore is not, whether we shall do without any such unions; but whether we shall suffer them all to be on one side, and shall not have recourse to something of the same system and combination for watching and for opposing the ministerial party, which that party always uses for retaining its power, and almost always for augmenting the power of the Crown, and increasing the burdens of the people.

Now, it seems very manifest, that, without some systematic co-operation, no ministry can be either watched or opposed effectually. The argument applies, in different degrees, both to the vigilance which all administrations require, and the opposition which should be given to councils radically vicious; and as it is of course strongest in the latter case, we shall principally direct our attention to that. Compare, then, the chance of success which a ministry and an opposition, composed of insulated individuals, would have. All the adherents of the minister act in concert, and each sacrifices his own opinions and views, where they clash with the common object of defending their leader's place. If he proposes a measure which many of them disapprove, still they support him; because the loss of it would endanger his official existence. But if his opponents only attack him when they are all agreed upon the measure, they must, for the same reason, make the attack in the manner which all approve; that is to say, only those who agree in disapproving of the measure can join the attack; and of those, only such as concur in the way of expressing their dissent. It is not merely that one man may be influenced by one reason, and another by another, to join in the same vote: — this would lead to no material defalcation of strength. But there will be found very few votes in which all are precisely agreed; and if each man must follow his own judgment for conscience-sake, even a small difference of sentiment must prevent a concurrence in the vote. Thus it will happen, that the whole body who disapprove of the measures of government as a system, and conscientiously deem a change necessary, are prevented from ever expressing that opinion at all. There might even be a clear majority against the government, and yet no change could be effected.

Let the nature of the co-operation which party requires be only considered fairly, and it will appear in no respect to involve sacrifices beyond what the most scrupulous ought to make. A number of individuals agree in holding many strong opinions upon the most important subjects. Unless there exists this general communion of sentiments, the party

ought not to be formed. They all agree in holding a change of system necessary for the salvation of the country : — for if they only unite to bring about a change of men, we admit the conflict to be a mere scramble for power. Agreeing generally, and on important points, each man has differences of opinion as to the details ; but the corner-stone of the whole fabric being the unanimous concurrence in thinking that a change of system is necessary, and the adoption of some one line of opposition being essentially to accomplish this end, it is no sacrifice of individual opinions, but only acting in conformity with the most important opinion to sacrifice the less important ; and, to act otherwise, would in reality be a much greater sacrifice of individual opinion. In truth, this is the way in which every man carries on his private affairs ; and it is precisely the principle on which all communities depend for their existence. The power of the majority to bind the whole rests upon no other foundation. Does any man deem it unconscientious to submit to a bad law after it is passed, though he resisted its introduction ? Unless, in extreme cases, when all government is at an end, it is the duty of every man to yield obedience, and to co-operate in carrying into effect measures which, while under discussion, he had opposed, because a still greater evil would ensue from his continued opposition, namely, the dissolution of society. So, in a party, it is a man's duty to co-operate with the whole body after his peculiar views have been over-ruled, because otherwise a still greater evil would result, namely, the establishment for ever of the bad system which all agree ought to be changed. Extreme cases may arise here, as in the community at large ; questions of paramount importance may interfere, upon which the differences of opinion are too great to be overcome ; and a total or partial destruction of the union may be the result. But, in ordinary cases, the yielding in small matters for the sake of greater ones, is not only no abandonment of private opinion, but is the only way in which that opinion can be effectually pronounced and pursued.

It is thus essentially necessary to regard every measure, whether proposed by the government or their opponents, not merely on its own merits, but in connection with the men who bring it forward, and the system of which it forms a part. Some questions, indeed, are of such paramount importance, and rest upon grounds so plain, that no compromise can be admitted in respect to them. But by far the greater number of those which come into discussion must be viewed in the relations just now mentioned. Suppose a measure, in itself good, is propounded by a set of ministers whose whole conduct is at variance with its principles, whose good faith in executing it cannot be trusted, and who may, independent of bad intentions, have no power to do its merits full justice — a man may most conscientiously resist the proposition ; and he is liable to no charge of factious conduct, or of inconsistency, if he object to it in the hands of one class of statesmen, and afterwards approve of it in those of another and better description. It is rational and just to distinguish between different classes of ministers, and approve or disapprove of their systems ; to grant the one our confidence, while we distrust the other. Let us only take a few instances, in order to demonstrate how senseless the clamour is which we see raised against party, upon the ground that measures only, and not men, should be the subject of deliberation and of choice.

There are some powers so hostile to liberty, and some resources so tempting to human weakness, that no ministers whatever ought to be intrusted with them. Thus, a large standing army, an income tax, or the suspension of the constitution even for a short time, though far more

dangerous under rulers of arbitrary principles, lovers of war, and despisers of economy, can never be safely resorted to, whoever may be intrusted with the management of public affairs. But many lesser resources may be conceived which a politician might reasonably and honestly be afraid of confiding to men whose avowed principles would lead to the abuse of the grant, and yet might not be prepared to refuse to a more constitutional and economical government. In like manner, a measure for completing the abolition of the slave trade must be supported by men of all parties who agree in disapproving of that traffic, without regard to the quarter from whence the proposition comes; but an honest and rational abolitionist must feel very suspicious of whatever is done in this cause by men who were always the great patrons of the trade, and who clung to its last remains with the eagerness of African merchants, at the moment when the voice of the whole people was raised to put it down. The same law becomes a very different thing, if its execution is left in the hands of an enemy to its principles and spirit; and almost every branch of public policy is connected with proceedings which must of necessity be intrusted to the servants of the executive government, and with events for which no legislative arrangement can provide. Thus, some very worthy, but mistaken abolitionists, who had flattered themselves that the law being once made, no ministers would dare to show any slackness in executing it, have been somewhat staggered always to find in the colony department an avowed advocate of the West Indian body, and frequently to see in the colonies most exposed to slave trading official men not very hostile to the traffic; nor were they much edified to find the interests of the abolition wholly overlooked in the first peace with France, though the loud and unanimous reprobation of the country soon forced the subject upon the attention of ministers, once the avowed patrons, and now the zealous enemies of the traffic. The state of Ireland affords another illustration. The injudicious supporters of the Catholic claims often rank themselves with the promoters of the outcry against party connection. Yet who can deny that the Catholic question itself, if carried, would confer fewer advantages on Ireland, nay fewer immunities or benefits on the Catholic body, than the establishment of a ministry honestly and anxiously disposed to allay all sectarian animosities, and to give the Catholics the whole advantage of the law as it at present stands? While the professed enemies of that sect bear sway, and while one of the grounds of the preference shown to them by the Crown is their inveterate hostility to the Catholic claims, it is manifest that emancipation itself, if carried, would amend the situation of the sister kingdom in little more than the name. A wise ministry, friendly to that body, was endeavouring in 1806 and 1807 to improve their condition by all practical favours which, under the existing laws, could be shown to them, and to pave the way by gradual relaxations, for the complete repeal of the penal code. Like the abolitionists the violent Catholics cried out, "*Measures, not men;*" and, joining in the attack which their worst enemies made upon their best friends, they have had eleven or twelve years of oppression to warn them how they suffer themselves again to be blindly leagued against their own interests. The great subject of economical reform affords another illustration of the same doctrine. The extreme necessities of the country, and the loud cry which has gone forth from the whole people for retrenchment, has compelled the ministry to make some show of reformation in this particular. But as they are the known enemies of every such change; as their principle is to extend rather than diminish the royal patronage; as

their practice has been the indulgence of unexampled profusion in every branch of the public expenditure, no man of common sense could expect to see the cause of economy thrive in their hands; and none but an idiot can have been disappointed at seeing how little has been effected by them in producing a saving of expense. Whatever relief the people have obtained from their burdens is due to their own vehement determination to shake them off; and has been wrung from the gripe of their rulers in spite of the strongest efforts which could be made to retain the load upon the people's back. Generally speaking, a ministry favourable to the country, friendly to rational reforms, and despising patronage, would have carried through a variety of improvements which none but ministers can accomplish; and would have seized every practicable opportunity of retrenchment which the circumstances of the times afforded, independent of legislative enactments.

We trust that enough has been said to show, how honestly, and how rationally, a public man may withhold his support systematically from one class of statesmen, and co-operate generally with another. Hitherto we have only spoken of the principle of party union, as liable to be questioned by persons of tender consciences, or guided by original views of policy. But two other classes also take a part in such associations, whose co-operation is not to be rejected, although the motives of the one, and the faculties of the other, may be less respectable. Self-interest, which leagues so many with the government, may rank some too with its opponents; and a number of persons, who have sense and information enough to see which side they should, upon the whole, prefer, may be very far from possessing the power to form an enlightened opinion upon each measure that is discussed. There is no reason whatever, why the aid of both these classes should not be received; nor is it the slightest imputation, either upon the chiefs or their cause, to seek such co-operation. The ministry can only be effectually resisted by such means; the ministry, round whom such hosts are rallied by all the basest propensities of our nature, and whose cause is supported too by the ignorance, the weakness, and the servility of multitudes. One of the great advantages of party union is, that it arrays in strength against bad rulers numberless individuals who, if left alone, are too weak to produce any effect; and that it brings good out of evil, by turning the weaknesses, and even the vices, of mankind, to the account of the country's cause. When we see by what means, and by what persons, the worst of ministers is always sure to be backed, can there be a more deplorable infatuation than theirs, who would fain see him displaced for the salvation of the state, and yet scruple to obtain assistance in the just warfare waged against him, from every feeling, and motive, and principle, that can induce any one to join in the struggle? Always reflecting on the fearful odds against the people, who can seriously maintain, that we ought nicely to investigate the grounds of each man's support who is willing to take our part? Who so silly as to ask whether one person is encouraged by his hopes — another by his vanity — a third by his love of action — or to criticise this movement of the public mind, as tinged with enthusiasm, and that as somewhat extravagant? While men are men, these frailties must show themselves in all they do: and the wiseacres or puritans, who object to a party for availing itself of every support without asking to what it may be owing, only contend in reality that the whole of those frailties should be marshalled on one side. This is, in truth, the perpetual error into which the enemies of party fall. The interested declaimers against its principles know it full well; and the well-meaning

purist unintentionally lends himself to the artifice. In a word, as every ministry is sure of all the benefits of party union at all times, he who cries out against faction only means that there shall be one faction unopposed. He commits the same error with the very amicable but not very practical sect, who deny the right of self-defence; and forget, that unless all men were converted into friends, their doctrine would end in the extirpation of half the human race.

We have said enough, and perhaps more than enough, on this subject. Yet we cannot resist the temptation of transcribing a few lines from an author, whose genius entitles him to the highest regard from readers of every description, and whose political partialities may probably recommend him still more strongly to those who might be disposed to distrust our ratiocinations. Mr. Burke, in the most temperate, elaborate, and deeply weighed of all his political publications, has the following admirable remarks on the subject of which we are now treating:—

“ That connection and faction are equivalent terms, is an opinion which has been carefully inculcated at all times by unconstitutional statesmen. The reason is evident. Whilst men are linked together, they easily and speedily communicate the alarm of any evil design. They are enabled to fathom it with common counsel, and to oppose it with united strength. Whereas, when they lie dispersed, without concert, order, or discipline, communication is uncertain, counsel difficult, and resistance impracticable. Where men are not acquainted with each other’s principles, nor experienced in each other’s talents, nor at all practised in their mutual habitudes and dispositions by joint efforts in business — no personal confidence, no friendship, no common interest subsisting among them; it is evidently impossible that they can act a public part with uniformity, perseverance, or efficacy. In a connection, the most inconsiderable man, by adding to the weight of the whole, has his value, and his use; out of it, the greatest talents are wholly unserviceable to the public. No man, who is not inflamed by vain-glory into enthusiasm, can flatter himself that his single, unsupported, desultory, unsystematic endeavours are of power to defeat the subtle designs and united cabals of ambitious citizens. When bad men combine, the good must associate; else they will fall, one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible struggle. When the public man omits to put himself in a situation of doing his duty with effect, it is an omission that frustrates the purposes of his trust almost as much as if he had formally betrayed it. It is surely no very rational account of a man’s life, that he has always acted right; but has taken special care to act in such a manner that his endeavours could not possibly be productive of any consequence.

“ Every profession, not excepting the glorious one of a soldier, or the sacred one of a priest, is liable to its own particular vices; which, however, form no argument against those ways of life; nor are the vices themselves inevitable to every individual in those professions. Of such a nature are connections in politics; essentially necessary for the full performance of our public duty, accidentally liable to degenerate into faction. Commonwealths are made of families, free commonwealths of parties also; and we may as well affirm, that our natural regards and ties of blood tend inevitably to make men bad citizens, as that the bonds of our party weaken those by which we are held to our country. Some legislators went so far as to make neutrality in party a crime against the state. I do not know whether this might not have been rather to overstrain the principle. Certain it is, the best patriots in the greatest commonwealths have always commended and promoted such connections. *Idem sentire de republica*, was with them a principal ground of friendship and attachment; nor do I know any other capable of forming firmer, dearer, more pleasing, more honourable, and more virtuous habitudes.”

Near akin to the last topic on which we have touched, is the benefit derived to the cause of sound and liberal principles by aristocratical influ-



ence being enlisted in the ranks of party. The power of great families is indeed a most necessary part of the array to which the people must look for their security against misgovernment. It is in vain to stigmatise this co-operation as the influence of a domineering aristocracy; to assert that the whole is a contention of grandees; and to pretend that the power of one is better than that of an oligarchy. Such are the clamours cunningly raised by the minions of arbitrary power; scarcely with less wickedness echoed by the wild fury of demagogues, and senselessly listened to by the unthinking rabble. But this description of persons is daily lessening in number, as the education of the poor advances; the delusion is therefore losing its influence, and the undue power of the Crown must soon be deprived of its best allies — the mob and their leaders. Every man of sense has long been convinced, that no two things can be more widely different than the wholesome and natural influence of the aristocracy in a political party, and the vicious form of national government which is known by the same name. That influence can only be exerted by the free will of the party, and the people whose leaders and advocates those great families are. As soon as the common operations of the party have raised them to power, they are subject to all the checks and controls which the frame of our constitution has provided, and which renders all danger from aristocratic influence wholly chimerical. But, in connection with the party whose principles they share, and whose confidence they enjoy, those families exercise a large and a salutary influence. They afford a counterpoise, from their wealth, rank, and station, to the resources of force and corruption at the Crown's disposal: they are a rallying point to the scattered strength of the inferior partisans, and a more permanent mass in which the common principles may be embodied and preserved among the vicissitudes of fortune; and, in the lapse of time, so apt to have a fatal effect among the more fickle and more numerous orders of society, they are eminently useful in tempering the zeal, as well as in fixing the unsteadiness, of popular opinion; and thus give regulation and direction, as well as efficacy, to the voice and the strength of the people.

We are very far from wishing to deny that the principle of party association has ever been abused; and the perversion of it has most frequently been, in the combinations of great families, united by no distinguishing opinions, and opposing the government upon no very intelligible grounds. The object, in these cases, seems rather to have been the distribution of patronage; and the point of difference with the ministry was sometimes nothing more important to the community than the particular channels in which royal favour should flow. In such times as those Swift might well be allowed to rail and to laugh at party, and to term it the "madness of many for the gain of a few." But, in the present times, such a perversion of the principle is quite impossible. The powerful families are aware that they can only retain their influence in the country by acting upon high public grounds. The charge, indeed, to which they have been most exposed, is that of standing on too lofty ground, and refusing office when it was within their reach, because they could not obtain it with a recognition of their own opinions upon certain important questions of state. Certain it is, that a hankering after place never was so little the failing of an opposition as in our times.

As aristocratical influence has sometimes been abused, so it is impossible to deny that coalitions of parties have been formed repugnant to the universal feelings of the country; and, however justifiable upon principle, yet reprehensible in point of prudence — for this reason, that the general

sense of the people could not be reconciled to them. The union of Mr. Fox and Lord North, at the close of the American war, was a measure of this description; and its effects in alienating the public mind from these political leaders were very unfortunate. Yet, that coalitions may be formed most honestly, and that the public good may frequently require them, is abundantly manifest. They are recommended by the same views which prescribe the formation of any one party; namely, the necessity of uniting together all who agree on certain highly important questions, and of sacrificing minor differences in order to secure some grand point for the country. If two parties have been long opposed, and the grounds of their difference were removed by the course of events, there can be no reason whatever for their not forming a junction in order to oppose effectually some third party, the success of which is deemed by them both to be pernicious to the common weal. The coalition, in such a case, is only a sacrifice of private animosities to the public good. No doubt, unions of this description may very probably lead to a great embarrassment, when their primary object is gained; for it is possible that the two parties may agree in little more than in the necessity of a change; so that when they come to act together in office, the views of each may hamper the other, and a feeble government of concessions, and compromises, and half measures may be established. But this is only a reason for carefully examining the grounds of the coalition, and coming, in the first instance, to a full understanding upon all other views of policy; it is no argument against coalitions generally, and most certainly it affords no ground of invective against party in the abstract.

There is just as little reason for such invectives, furnished by the inevitable consequences of a successful opposition; namely, the accession to power of those engaged in it. This event was the avowed object of their operations; not for the sake of the emoluments and patronage connected with office, but for the sake of the principles which they professed, and which could only be carried into effect by the change of ministry. To rescue the country from the hands of men who were misgoverning and ruining it, and to place its affairs in the hands of men whose integrity was greater, and whose views of policy were sounder — this was the avowed object of the party. In pursuing this object, much good service may indeed have been rendered to the state incidentally — many useful measures forced upon the ministers — many pernicious attempts defeated — many bad schemes prevented from being even tried: all these successes would have been of great and lasting benefit to the country, even if the main object had failed, and the change of government had never been effected; and all these advantages to the state would have been the legitimate fruits of party in the strictest sense of the word. But a more extensive and permanent corrective to misrule was wanting: the country was to be saved from men whose principles were hurtful to its best interests, in order to be ruled by those who could safely be trusted with them. Can any clamour, then, be more vulgar or senseless than theirs who abuse, as place-hunters, the men who have been raised to power by the triumph of their own principles? Can any thing be more absurd than to oppose a ministry, and seek its downfall, for the mere sake of destroying it, without putting any other in its place? The formation of a ministry on purer principles, composed of more trustworthy men, is the only legitimate object of all constitutional opposition. Whoever takes office on this ground acts a truly patriotic part. He only can be charged with hunting after place, who assumes, for factious purposes, principles that do not belong

to him ; or abandons those which he had professed, when the avenues to office are within his view. Here, again, we must avail ourselves of the just and dignified expressions of Burke.

“ Party,” he observes, “ is a body of men united, for promoting, by their joint endeavours, the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed. For my part, I find it impossible to conceive, that any one believes in his own politics, or thinks them to be of any weight, who refuses to adopt the means of having them reduced into practice. It is the business of the speculative philosopher to mark the proper ends of government. It is the business of the politician, who is the philosopher in action, to find out proper means towards those ends, and to employ them with effect. Therefore every honourable connection will avow it is their first purpose to pursue every just method to put the men who hold their opinions into such a condition as may enable them to carry their common plans into execution, with all the power and authority of the state. As this power is attached to certain situations, it is their duty to contend for these situations. Without a proscription of others, they are bound to give to their own party the preference in all things ; and by no means, for private considerations, to accept any offers of power in which the whole body is not included ; nor to suffer themselves to be led, or to be controlled, or to be over-balanced, in office or in council, by those who contradict the very fundamental principles on which their party is formed, and even those upon which every fair connection must stand. Such a generous contention for power, on such manly and honourable maxims, will easily be distinguished from the mean and interested struggle for place and emolument. The very style of such persons will serve to discriminate them from those numberless impostors, who have deluded the ignorant with professions incompatible with human practice, and have afterwards incensed them by practices below the level of vulgar rectitude.”

Of the imputations cast upon party men for deserting their followers or their principles when they take office, it is the less necessary to speak at large ; because, as soon as they have the government in their hands, they ought to be closely watched, and are pretty sure to be so, by those whom they have displaced. Nor would there fail, in these times, to arise a third party for the interests of the people, if their present defenders were to forget themselves when in office, and to league with the advocates of unconstitutional measures. The risk would be considerable of the new opposition rather encouraging than checking such a dereliction of duty. They followed this course during the year 1806, when the country had not the benefit of a constitutional opposition. But the immediate formation of a third party, out of doors, would, in this case, be irresistible, and it would speedily find itself represented in parliament, or would push its representatives into that assembly. The more imminent hazard is of an opposite description. Too much, and in too short a time, is expected to be performed by the new and popular ministers. Sufficient time is not allowed them to redeem their pledges. If they do not at once attempt all they promised, they are apt to be deserted by many well meaning, but weak adherents ; and they are thus disarmed of the power to do much of the good service they might render the public, by its impatience for objects unattainable, or only to be achieved in the course of time. Nothing is so true as Adam Smith’s remark, that one of the worst consequences of the mercantile system in political economy is, its creating an unnatural state of things, which makes it impossible to correct the errors committed, without, for a while, occasioning greater evil than that which you seek to remedy. The same observation is equally applicable to every other species of mal-administration ; and it points out the unreasonableness of those who will give no time to a new

government to retrace the false steps of their predecessors ; but, mistaking a prudent and necessary caution for reluctance, launch at them the charge of deserting their principles, and accuse them of intending to do nothing, because they cannot perform miracles, and wish not to work mischief.

The short administration of 1806 was most unjustly treated in this respect. They were about a year in office, with the king, and the whole court strongly against them ; sometimes openly opposing their measures ; always secretly undermining them in the very unequal warfare of stratagem and intrigue. From the motley composition of that cabinet, several errors were committed, and some opportunities of doing good may have been thrown away. But where is the ministry that ever did so much for the country in so short a space of time ? They introduced, upon sound and enlightened principles, a new military system ; they raised the revenue to meet the extravagant demands occasioned by the improvident schemes of their predecessors, until they could retrace their steps, and relieve the people by economy and by peace ; they began those enquiries into public expenditure, which have since, in spite of their successors, produced a material saving to the country, and which, had they continued in power, would, ere now, have effectually relieved its burdens ; they laid the foundation of peace with America, and of tranquillity in Ireland ; finally, they abolished the slave trade, which had grown up to a horrible maturity under the force of all Mr. Pitt's eloquent invectives, and which he, in the plenitude of his authority, had never ventured even to abridge. Can any thing be more unjust than to account all this as nothing, when we reflect that it was crowded into the short space of one year, and that the first year of a change, when the blunders of the former ministry were still producing their most noxious effects in new wars abroad, and failures at home, and when the men recently advanced to power had to contend with a hostile court, a suspicious and unfriendly parliament, and a jealous, discontented, and burdened people ? The history of that short period, while it may prove in many particulars useful as a lesson of errors to be in future avoided, ought also to console the country by the evidence it affords of how much real service might be rendered to its best interests by honest and able ministers enjoying the confidence of the people.

There is one ground of invective against party, to which we have not yet adverted, because we believe it to be the least solid of any. Some timid persons are wont to apprehend violence and turbulence from what they term factious proceedings. There seems to be a great mistake in this view of the matter. The fuel of popular discontent exists independent of all party, in the ignorance of the multitude, the distresses of the times, and the misconduct of the government. The formation of a regular and respectable party to maintain the cause of the people, instead of blowing up the flame, and causing an explosion, is rather likely to moderate its violence, and give it a safe vent. Besides, there exists, at all events, a regular party for the government ; and if it is not opposed by a similar force, it will either destroy public liberty, or go on encroaching on the people's rights, until a popular commotion, under no regulation or control, disturbs the public peace, and perhaps subverts the government.

## DISPOSITIONS OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA.\*

ONE great staple of this book is a vehement, and, we really think, an unjust attack on the principles of this Journal. Yet we take part, on the whole, with the author; and heartily wish him success in the great object of vindicating his country from unmerited aspersions, and trying to make us, in England, ashamed of the vices and defects which he has taken the trouble to point out in our national character and institutions. In this part of his design we cordially concur — and shall at all times be glad to co-operate. But there is another part of it, and we are sorry to say a principal and avowed part, of which we cannot speak in terms of too strong regret and reprobation — and that is, a design to excite and propagate among his countrymen, a general animosity to the British name, by way of counteracting, or rather revenging, the animosity which he very erroneously supposes to be generally entertained by the English against them.

That this is, in itself, and under any circumstances, an unworthy, an unwise, and even a criminal object, we think we could demonstrate to the satisfaction of Mr. W. himself, and all his reasonable adherents; but it is better, perhaps, to endeavour, in the first place, to "correct the misapprehensions, and dispel the delusions in which this disposition has its foundation, and, at all events, to set them the example of perfect good humour and fairness, in a discussion where the parties perhaps will never be entirely agreed; and where those who are now to be heard have the strongest conviction of being injuriously misrepresented. If we felt any soreness, indeed, on the score of this author's imputations, or had any desire to lessen the just effect of his representations, it would have been enough for us, we believe, to have let them alone. For, without some such help as ours, the work really does not seem calculated to make any great impression in this quarter of the world. It is not only, as the author has candidly observed of it, a very "clumsy book," heavily written and abominably printed,—but the only material part of it—the only part about which any body can now be supposed to care very much, either here or in America—is overlaid and buried under a huge mass of historical compilation, which would have little chance of attracting readers at the present moment, even if much better digested than it is in the volume before us.

The substantial question is, what has been the true character and condition of the United States since they became an independent nation,—and what is likely to be their condition in future? And to elucidate this question, the learned author has thought fit to premise about 200 very close-printed pages, upon their merits as colonies, and the harsh treatment they then received from the mother-country! Of this large historical sketch, we cannot say either that it is very correctly drawn, or very faithfully coloured. It presents us with no connected narrative, or

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\* An Appeal from the Judgments of Great Britain respecting the United States of America. Part First. Containing an Historical Outline of their Merits and Wrongs as Colonies, and Strictures on the Calumnies of British Writers. By Robert Walsh, Esq. — Vol. xxxiii. p. 395. May, 1820.

interesting deduction of events — but is, in truth, a mere heap of indigested quotations from common books, of good and of bad authority — inartificially cemented together by a loose and angry commentary. We are not aware, indeed, that there are in this part of the work either any new statements, or any new views or opinions; the facts being mostly taken from Chalmers's Annals, and Burke's European Settlements; and the authorities for the good conduct and ill treatment of the colonies, being chiefly the Parliamentary Debates and Brougham's Colonial Policy. But, in good truth, these historical recollections will go but a little way in determining that great practical and most important question, which it is Mr. W.'s intention, as well as ours, to discuss — what are, and what ought to be, the dispositions of England and America towards each other? And the general facts as to the origin and colonial history of the latter, in so far as they bear upon this question, really do not admit of much dispute. The most important of their settlements were unquestionably founded by the friends of civil and religious liberty — who, though somewhat precise and puritanical, were, in the main, a sturdy and sagacious race of people, not readily to be cajoled out of the blessings they had sought through so many sacrifices, and ready at all times manfully and resolutely to assert them against all invaders. As to the mother-country, again, without claiming for her any romantic tenderness or generosity towards those hardy offsets, we think we may say, that she oppressed and domineered over them much less than any other modern nation has done over such settlements — that she allowed them, for the most part, liberal charters and constitutions, and was kind enough to leave them very much to themselves; — and although she did manifest, now and then, a disposition to encroach on their privileges, their rights were, on the whole, very tolerably respected: so that they grew up to a state of prosperity, and a familiarity with freedom, in all its divisions, which was not only without parallel in any similar establishment, but probably could not have been attained had they been earlier left to their own guidance and protection. This is all that we ask for England, on a review of her colonial policy, and her conduct before the war; and this we think, no candid and well-informed person can reasonably refuse her.

As to the war itself, the motives in which it originated, and the spirit in which it was carried on, it cannot now be necessary to say any thing — or, at least, when we say that having once been begun, we think that it terminated as the friends of justice and liberty must have wished it to terminate, we conceive that Mr. W. can require no other explanation. That this result, however, should have left a soreness upon both sides, and especially on that which had not been soothed by success, is what all men must have expected. But, upon the whole, we firmly believe, that this was far slighter and less durable than has generally been imagined; and was likely very speedily to have been entirely effaced by those ancient recollections of kindness and kindred which could not fail to recur, and by that still more powerful feeling, to which every day was likely to add strength, of their common interests as *free* and as *commercial* countries, and of the substantial conformity of their national character, and of their sentiments, upon most topics of public and of private right. The healing operation, however, of these causes was unfortunately thwarted and retarded by the heats that rose out of the French revolution, and the new interests and new relations which it appeared for a time to create: and the hostilities in which we were at last involved with America herself — though the opinions of her people, as well as our own, were deeply

divided upon both questions — served still further to embitter the general feeling, and to keep alive the memory of animosities that should not have been so long remembered. At last came peace — and the spirit, but not the prosperity of peace ; and the distresses and commercial embarrassments of both countries threw both into bad humour, and unfortunately hurried both into a system of jealous and illiberal policy, by which that bad humour was aggravated, and received an unfortunate direction.

In this exasperated state of the national temper, and, we do think, too much under its influence, Mr. Walsh has thought himself called upon to vindicate his country from the aspersions of English writers ; and after arraigning them, generally, of the most incredible ignorance, and atrocious malignity, he proceeds to state, that the EDINBURGH and QUARTERLY Reviews, in particular, have been incessantly labouring to traduce the character of America, and have lately broken out into such “excesses of obloquy,” as can no longer be endured ; and, in particular, that the prospect of a large emigration to the United States has thrown us all into such “paroxysms of spite and jealousy,” that we have engaged in a scheme of systematic defamation that sets truth and consistency alike at defiance. To counteract this nefarious scheme, Mr. W. has taken the field — not so much to refute or to retort — not for the purpose of pointing out our errors, or exposing our unfairness, but rather, if we understand him aright, of retaliating on us the abuse we have been so long pouring on others. In his preface, accordingly, he fairly avows it to be his intention to act on the offensive — to carry the war into the enemy’s quarters, and to make reprisals upon the honour and character of England, in revenge for the insults which, he will have it, her writers have heaped on his country. He therefore proposes to point out “the sores and blotches of the British nation” to the scorn and detestation of his countrymen ; and having assumed, that it is “the intention of Great Britain to educate her youth in sentiments of the most rancorous hostility to America,” he assures us, that this design “will and must be met with *corresponding sentiments* on his side of the water.”

Now, though we cannot applaud the generosity, or even the humanity of these sentiments — though we think that the American government and people, if at all deserving of the eulogy which Mr. W. has here bestowed upon them, might, like Cromwell, have felt themselves too strong to care about paper shot — and though we cannot but feel, that a more temperate and candid tone would have carried more weight, as well as more magnanimity with it, we must yet begin by admitting, that America has cause of complaint ; — and that nothing can be more despicable and disgusting, than the scurrility with which she has been assailed, by a portion of the press of this country — and that, disgraceful as these publications are, they speak the sense of a powerful and active party in the nation. All this, and more than this, we have no wish, and no intention, to deny. But we do wish most anxiously to impress upon Mr. W. and his adherents, to beware how they believe that this party speaks the sense of the British nation — or that their sentiments on this, or on many other occasions, are in any degree in accordance with those of the body of the people. On the contrary, we are firmly persuaded, that a great majority of the nation, numerically considered, and a still greater majority of the intelligent and enlightened persons whose influence and authority cannot fail in the long run to govern her councils, would disclaim all sympathy with any part of these opinions ; and actually look on the miserable libels in question, not only with the scorn and disgust to which Mr. W. would consign them, but

with a sense of shame from which his situation fortunately exempts him and a sorrow and regret of which unfortunately he seems too little susceptible.

It is a fact which can require no proof, even in America, that there is a party in this country not friendly to political liberty, and decidedly hostile to all extension of popular rights, — which, if it does not grudge to its own people the powers and privileges which are bestowed on them by the Constitution, is at least for confining their exercise within the narrowest limits — which thinks the peace and well-being of society in no danger from any thing but popular encroachments, and holds the only safe or desirable government to be that of a pretty pure and unincumbered monarchy, supported by a vast revenue and a powerful army, and obeyed by a people just enlightened enough to be orderly and industrious, but noway curious as to questions of right — and never presuming to judge of the conduct of their superiors.

Now it is quite true that *this party* dislikes America, and is apt enough to decry and insult her. Its adherents never have forgiven the success of her war of independence — the loss of a nominal sovereignty, or perhaps of a real power of vexing and oppressing — her supposed rivalry in trade — and, above all, the happiness and tranquillity which she enjoys under a republican form of government. Such a spectacle of democratical prosperity is unspeakably mortifying to their high monarchical principles, and is easily imagined to be dangerous to their security. Their first wish, and, for a time, their darling hope, was, that the infant States would quarrel among themselves, and be thankful to be again received under our protection, as a refuge from military despotism. Since that hope was lost, it would have satisfied them to find that their republican institutions had made them poor, and turbulent, and depraved — incapable of civil wisdom, regardless of national honour, and as intractable to their own elected rulers as they had been to their hereditary sovereign. To those who were capable of such wishes and such expectations, it is easy to conceive, that the happiness and good order of the United States — the wisdom and authority of their government — and the unparalleled rapidity of their progress in wealth, population, and refinement, must have been but an ungrateful spectacle; and most especially, that the splendid and steady success of the freest and most popular form of government that ever was established in the world, must have struck the most lively alarm into the hearts of all those who were anxious to have it believed that the people could never interfere in politics but to their ruin, and that the smallest addition to the democratical influence, recognised in the theory at least of the British Constitution, must lead to the immediate destruction of peace and property, morality and religion.

That there are journals in this country, and journals, too, of great and deserved reputation in other respects, who have spoken the language of the party we have now described, and that in a tone of singular intemperance and offence, we most readily admit. But need we tell Mr. W., or any ordinarily well informed individual of his countrymen, that neither this party, nor their journalists, can be allowed to stand for the people of England? — that it is notorious that there is among that people another and a far more numerous party, whose sentiments are at all points opposed to those of the former, and who are, by necessary consequence, friends to America, and to all that Americans most value in their character and institutions? — who, as Englishmen, are more proud to have great and



glorious nations descended from them, than to have discontented colonies uselessly subjected to their caprice—who, as freemen, rejoice to see freedom spreading itself, with giant footsteps, over the fairest regions of the earth, and nations flourishing exactly in proportion as they are free—and to know that when the drivelling advocates of hierarchy and legitimacy vent their paltry sophistries with some shadow of plausibility on the history of the Old World, they can turn with decisive triumph to the unequivocal example of the New—and demonstrate the unspeakable advantages of free government, by the unprecedented prosperity of America? Such persons, too, can be as little suspected of entertaining any jealousy of the commercial prosperity of the Americans as of their political freedom; since it requires but a very moderate share of understanding to see, that the advantages of trade must always be mutual and reciprocal—that one great trading country is of necessity the best customer to another—and that the trade of America, consisting chiefly in the exportation of raw produce and the importation of manufactured commodities, is, of all others, the most beneficial to a country like England.

That such sentiments were naturally to be expected in a country circumstanced like England, no thinking man will deny. But Mr. Walsh has been himself among us, and was, we have reason to believe, no idle or incurious observer of our men and cities; and we appeal with confidence to him, whether these were not the prevailing sentiments among the intelligent and well educated of every degree! If he thinks as we do, as to their soundness and importance, he must also believe that they will sooner or later influence the conduct even of our court and cabinet. But, in the mean time, the fact is certain, that the opposite sentiments are confined to a very small portion of the people of Great Britain—though now placed unfortunately in a situation to exercise a great influence in her councils—and that the course of events, as well as the force of reason, is every day bringing them more and more into discredit. Where then, we would ask, is the justice or the policy of seeking to render a quarrel national, when the cause of quarrel is only with an inconsiderable and declining party of its members?—and why labour to excite animosity against a whole people, the majority of whom *must* be your sincere friends, merely because some prejudiced or interested persons among them have disgusted the great body of their own countrymen, by the senselessness and scurrility of their attacks upon yours?

The Americans are extremely mistaken, if they suppose that they are the only persons who are abused by the party that does abuse them. They have merely their share, along with all the friends and the advocates of liberty in every part of the world. The constitutionalists of France, including the king and many of his ministers, meet with no better treatment;—and those who hold liberal opinions in this country are assailed with still greater acrimony and fierceness. Let Mr. Walsh only look to the language held by our ministerial journals, for the last twelvemonth, on the subjects of Reform and Alarm—and observe in what way not only the whole class of reformers and conciliators, but the names and persons of such men as Lords Landsdowne, Grey, Fitzwilliam, and Erskine, Sir James Mackintosh, and Messrs. Brougham, Lambton, Tierney, and others, are dealt with by these national oracles,—and he will be satisfied that his countrymen neither stand alone in the misfortune of which he complains so bitterly, nor are subjected to it in very bad company. We, too, he may probably be aware, have had our por-

tion of the abuse which he seems to think reserved for America — and, what is a little remarkable, for being too much her advocate. For what we have said of her present power and future greatness — her wisdom in peace and her valour in war — and of all the invaluable advantages of her representative system — her freedom from taxes, sinecures, and standing armies — we have been subjected to far more virulent attacks than any of which he now complains for his country — and that from the same party scribblers, with whom we are here, somewhat absurdly, confounded and supposed to be leagued. It is really, we think, some little presumption of our fairness, that the accusations against us should be thus contradictory — and that for one and the same set of writings, we should be denounced by the ultra-royalists of England as little better than American republicans, and by the ultra-patriots of America, as the jealous defamers of her freedom.

This, however, is of very little consequence. What we wish to impress on Mr. W. is, that they who traduce the largest and ablest part of the English nation, cannot well speak the sense of that nation — and that *their* offences ought not, in reason, to be imputed to her. If there be any reliance on the principles of human nature, the friends of liberty in England must rejoice in the prosperity of America. Every selfish, concurs with every generous, motive, to add strength to this sympathy; and if any thing is certain in our late internal history, it is, that the friends of liberty are rapidly increasing among us; — partly from increased intelligence — partly from increased suffering and impatience — partly from conviction, prudence, and fear.

There is another consideration, also arising from the aspect of the times before us, which should go far, we think, at the present moment, to strengthen these bonds of affinity. It is impossible to look to the state of the Old World without seeing, or rather feeling, that there is a greater and more momentous contest impending, than ever before agitated human society. In Germany, in Spain, in France, in Italy, the principles of reform and liberty are visibly arraying themselves for a final struggle with the principles of established abuse — legitimacy, or tyranny, or whatever else it is called by its friends or enemies. Even in England, the more modified elements of the same principles are stirring and heaving, around, above, and beneath us, with unprecedented agitation and terror; and every thing betokens an approaching crisis in the great European commonwealth, by the result of which the future character of its governments, and the structure and condition of its society, will in all probability be determined. The ultimate result, or the course of events that are to lead to it, we have not the presumption to predict. The struggle may be long or transitory — sanguinary or bloodless; and it may end in a great and signal amelioration of all existing institutions, or in the establishment of one vast federation of military despots, domineering as usual in the midst of sensuality, barbarism, and gloom. The issues of all these things are in the hand of Providence and the womb of time; and no human eye can yet foresee the fashion of their accomplishment. But great changes are evidently preparing; and in fifty years — most probably in a far shorter time — some material alterations must have taken place in most of the established governments of Europe, and the rights of the European nations been established on a surer and more durable basis. Half a century cannot pass away in growing discontents on the part of the people, and growing fears and precautions on that of their rulers. Their preten-

sions *must* at last be put in issue, and abide the settlement of force, or fear, or reason.

Looking back to what has already happened in the world, both recently and in ancient times, we can scarcely doubt that the cause of liberty will be ultimately triumphant. But through what trials and sufferings—what martyrdoms and persecutions—it is doomed to work out its triumph, we profess ourselves totally unable to conjecture. The disunion of the lower and the higher classes, which was gradually disappearing with the increasing intelligence of the former, but has lately been renewed by circumstances which we cannot now stop to examine, leads, we must confess, to gloomy auguries as to the character of this contest; and fills us with apprehensions, that it may neither be peaceful nor brief. But in this, and in every other respect, we conceive that much will depend on the part that is taken by America; and on the dispositions which she may have cultivated towards the different parties concerned. Her great and growing wealth and population—her universal commercial relations—her own impregnable security—and her remoteness from the scene of dissension—must give her prodigious power and influence in such a crisis, either as a mediator or umpire; or, if she take a part, as an auxiliary and ally. That she must wish well to the cause of freedom, it would be indecent to doubt; and that she should take an active part against it, is a thing not even to be imagined. But she may stand aloof, a cold and disdainful spectator; and, counterfeiting a prudent indifference to scenes that neither can nor ought to be indifferent to her, may see, unmoved, the prolongation of a lamentable contest, which her interference might either have prevented, or brought to a speedy termination. And this course she will most probably follow, if she allows herself to conceive antipathies to nations for the faults of a few calumnious individuals; and especially if, upon grounds so trivial, she should nourish such an animosity towards England as to feel a repugnance to make common cause with her, even in behalf of their common inheritance of freedom.

Assuredly, there is yet no other country in Europe where the principles of liberty, and the rights and duties of nations, are so well understood as with us; or in which so great a number of men, qualified to write, speak, and act with authority, are at all times ready to take a reasonable, liberal, and practical view of those principles and duties. The government, indeed, has not always been either wise or generous, to its own or to other countries; but it has partaken, or at least has been controlled by the general spirit of freedom; and we have no hesitation in saying, that the free constitution of England has been a blessing and protection to the remotest nations of Europe for the last hundred years. Had England not been free, the worst despotism in Europe must have been far worse than it is at this moment. If the world had been parcelled out among arbitrary monarchs, they would have run a race of oppression, and encouraged each other in all sorts of abuses. But the existence of one powerful and flourishing state, where juster maxims were admitted, has shamed them out of their worst enormities, given countenance and encouragement to the claims of their oppressed subjects, and gradually taught their rulers to understand, that a certain measure of liberty was not only compatible with national greatness and splendour, but essential to its support. In the days of Queen Elizabeth, England was the champion and asylum of religious freedom—in those of King William, of national independence. If a less generous spirit has prevailed in her cabinet since the

settled predominance of Tory principles in her councils, still the effects of her parliamentary opposition — the artillery of her free press — the voice, in short, of her people, which Mr. W. has so strangely mistaken — have not been without their effects; and, though some flagrant acts of injustice have stained her recent annals, we still venture to hope, that the dread of the British public is felt as far as Petersburg and Vienna; and would fain indulge ourselves with the belief that it may yet scare some Imperial spoiler from a part of his prey, and lighten, if not break, the chains of many distant captives.

It is in aid of this decaying, perhaps expiring influence — it is as an associate or successor in the noble office of patronising and protecting general liberty, that we now call upon America to throw from her the memory of all petty differences and nice offences, and to unite herself cordially with the liberal and enlightened part of the English nation, at a season when their joint efforts will in all probability be little enough to crown the good cause with success, and when their disunion will give dreadful advantages to the enemies of all improvement and reform. The *example* of America has already done much for that cause; and the very existence of such a country, under such a government, is a tower of strength, and a standard of encouragement, for all who may hereafter have to struggle for the restoration or the extension of their rights. It shows within what limits popular institutions are safe and practicable; and what a large infusion of democracy is consistent with the authority of government, and the good order of society. But her *influence*, as well as her example, will be wanted in the crisis which seems to be approaching: — and that influence must be paralysed and inoperative, if she shall think it a duty to divide herself from England, to look with jealousy upon her proceedings, and to judge unfavourably of all the parties she contains. We do not ask her to think well of *that* party, whether in power or out of it, which has always insulted and reviled her, because she is free and independent, and democratic and prosperous: — but we do confidently lay claim to her favourable opinion for that great majority of the nation that have always been opposed to this party — which has divided with her the honour of its reproaches, and is bound, by every consideration of interest and duty, consistency and common sense, to maintain her rights and her reputation, and to promote and proclaim her prosperity.

To which of these parties *we* belong, and to which our pen has been devoted, we suppose it is unnecessary for us to announce, even in America; — and therefore, without recapitulating any part of what has just been said, we think we may assume, in the outset, that the charge exhibited against us by Mr. W. is, at least, and on its face, a very unlikely and improbable one — that we are actuated by jealousy and spite towards America, and have joined in a scheme of systematic defamation, in order to diffuse among our countrymen a general sentiment of hostility and dislike to her! Grievous as this charge is, we should scarcely have thought it necessary to reply to it, had not the question appeared to us to relate to something of far higher importance than the character of our Journal, or the justice or injustice of an imputation on the principles of a few anonymous writers. In that case, we should have left the matter, as all the world knows we have uniformly left it in other cases, to be determined by our readers upon the evidence before them. But Mr. W. has been pleased to do us the honour of identifying us with the great Whig party of this country, or, rather, of considering us as the exponents of

those who support the principles of liberty—and to think his case sufficiently made out against the nation at large, if he can prove that both the EDINBURGH and the QUARTERLY Review had given proof of deliberate malice and shameful unfairness on the subject of America. Now *this*, it must be admitted, gives the question a magnitude that would not otherwise belong to it; and makes what might in itself be a mere personal or literary altercation a matter of national moment and concernment. If a sweeping conviction of mean jealousy and rancorous hostility is to be entered up against the whole British nation, and a corresponding spirit to be conjured up in the breast of America, because it is alleged that the Edinburgh Review, as well as the Quarterly, has given proof of such dispositions,—then it becomes a question of no mean or ordinary concernment, to determine whether this charge has been justly brought against that unfortunate Journal, and whether its accuser has made out enough to entitle him to a verdict leading to such consequences.

It will be understood, that we deny altogether the justice of the charge:—but we wish distinctly to say in the beginning, that if it should appear to any one that, in the course of a great deal of hasty writing, by a variety of hands, in the course of twenty long years, some rash or petulant expressions had been admitted, at which the national pride of our trans-Atlantic brethren might be justly offended, we shall most certainly feel no anxiety to justify these expressions,—nor any fear that, with the liberal and reasonable part of the nation to which they relate, our avowal of regret for having employed them, would not be received as a sufficient atonement. Even in private life, and without the provocation of public controversy, there are not many men who, in half the time we have mentioned, do not say some things to the slight or disparagement of their best friends; which, if all “set in a note-book, conned and got by rote,” it might be hard to answer:—and yet, among people of any sense or temper, such things never break any squares—and the dispositions are judged of by the general tenor of one’s life and conduct, and not by a set of peevish phrases, curiously culled and selected out of his whole conversation. But we really do not think that we shall very much need the benefit of this plain consideration, and shall proceed straightway to our answer.

The sum of it is this—that, in point of fact, we have spoken far more good of America than ill—that in nine instances out of ten, where we have mentioned her, it has been for praise—and that in almost all that is essential or of serious importance, we have spoken *nothing but good*;—while our censures have been wholly confined to matters of inferior note, and generally accompanied with an apology for their existence, and a prediction of their speedy disappearance.

Whatever we have written seriously and with earnestness of America, has been with a view to conciliate towards her the respect and esteem of our own country; and we have scarcely named her, in any deliberate manner, except for the purpose of impressing upon our readers the signal prosperity she has enjoyed—the magical rapidity of her advances in wealth and population—and the extraordinary power and greatness to which she is evidently destined. On these subjects we have held but one language, and one tenor of sentiment; and have never missed an opportunity of enforcing our views on our readers—and that not feebly, coldly, or reluctantly, but with all the earnestness and energy that we could command; and we do accordingly take upon us to say, that in no European publication have those views been urged with the same force or frequency,

or resumed at every season, and under every change of circumstances, with such steadiness and uniformity. We have been equally consistent and equally explicit in pointing out the advantages which that country has derived from the extent of her elective system—the lightness of her public burdens—the freedom of her press—and the independent spirit of her people. The praise of the government is implied in the praise of these institutions; but we have not omitted upon every occasion to testify, in express terms, to its general wisdom, equity, and prudence. Of the character of the people too, in all its more serious aspects, we have spoken with the same undeviating favour; and have always represented them as brave, enterprising, acute, industrious, and patriotic. We need not load our pages with quotations to prove the accuracy of this representation—our whole work is full of them; and Mr. W. himself has quoted enough, both in the outset of his book and in the body of it, to satisfy even such as may take their information from him, that such have always been our opinions. Mr. W. indeed seems to imagine, that other passages, which he has cited, import a contradiction or retractation of these; and that we are thus involved, not only in the guilt of malice, but the awkwardness of inconsistency. Now this, as we take it, is one of the radical and almost unaccountable errors with which the work before us is chargeable. There is no such retractation, and no contradiction. We can of course do no more, on a point like this, than make a distinct asseveration; but, after having perused Mr. W.'s book, and with a pretty correct knowledge of the review, we do say distinctly, that there is not to be found in either, a single passage inconsistent, or at all at variance with the sentiments to which we have just alluded. We have never spoken but in one way of the prosperity and future greatness of America, and of the importance of cultivating amicable relations with her—never but in one way of the freedom, cheapness, and general wisdom of her government—never but in one way of the bravery, intelligence, activity, and patriotism of her people. The points on which Mr. W. accuses us of malice and unfairness, all relate, as we shall see immediately, to other and far less considerable matters.

Assuming, then, as we must now do, that upon the subjects that have been specified, our testimony has been eminently and exclusively favourable to America, and that we have never ceased earnestly to recommend the most cordial and friendly relations with her; how, it may be asked, is it *possible* that we should have deserved to be classed among the chief and most malignant of her calumniators, or accused of a design to excite hostility to her in the body of our nation? and even represented as making reciprocal hostility a point of duty in her, by the excesses of our obloquy? For ourselves, we profess to be as little able to answer this question, as the most ignorant of our readers;—but we shall lay before them some account of the proofs on which Mr. W. relies for our condemnation; and cheerfully submit to any sentence they may seem to justify. There are a variety of counts in our indictment; but, in so far as we have been able to collect, the heads of our offending are as follows:—1st, That we have noticed, with uncharitable and undue severity, the admitted want of indigenious literature in America, and the scarcity of men of genius; 2dly, as an illustration of that charge, that we have laughed too ill-naturedly at the affectations of Joel Barlow's Columbiad, made an unfair estimate of the merits of Marshall's History, and Adams's Letters, and spoken illiberally of the insignificance of certain American Philosophical Transactions; 3dly, that we have represented the manners of

the fashionable society of America as less polished and agreeable than those of Europe,—the lower orders as impertinently inquisitive, and the whole as too vain of their country; 4thly, and finally, that we have reproached them bitterly with their negro slavery.

These, we think, are the whole, and certainly they are the chief, of the charges against us; and, before saying any thing as to the particulars, we should just like to ask, whether, if they were all admitted to be true, they would afford any sufficient grounds, especially when set by the side of the favourable representations we have made with so much more earnestness on points of much more importance, for imputing to their authors, and to the whole body of their countrymen, a systematic design to make America odious and despicable in the eyes of the rest of the world? This charge, we will confess, appears to us most extravagant—and, when the facts already stated are taken into view, altogether ridiculous. Though we are the friends and well-wishers of the Americans,—though we think favourably, and even highly, of many things in their institutions, government, and character,—we are not their stipendiary laureates or blind adulators; and must insist on our right to take notice of what we conceive to be their errors and defects, with the same freedom which we use to our own, and all other nations. It has already been shown, that we have by no means confined ourselves to this privilege of censure; and the complaint seems to be, that we should have used it at all. We really do not understand this. We have spoken much more favourably of their government and institutions than we have done of our own. We have criticised their authors with at least as much indulgence, and spoken of their national character in terms of equal respect: but because we have pointed out certain *undeniable* defects, and laughed at some *indefensible* absurdities, we are accused of the most partial and unfair nationality, and represented as engaged in a conspiracy to bring the whole nation into disrepute! Even if we had the misfortune to differ in opinion with Mr. W., or the majority of his countrymen, on most of the points to which our censure has been directed, instead of having his substantial admission of their justice in most instances, this, it humbly appears to us, would neither be a good ground for questioning our good faith, nor a reasonable occasion for denouncing a general hostility against the country to which we belong. Men may differ conscientiously in their taste in literature and manners, and in their opinions as to the injustice or sinfulness of domestic slavery; and may express their opinions in public, without being actuated by spite or malignity. But a very slight examination of each of the articles of charge, will show still more clearly upon what slight grounds they have been hazarded, and how much more of spleen than of reason there is in the accusation.

1. Upon the *first* head, Mr. W. neither does, nor can deny, that our statements are perfectly correct. The Americans have scarcely any literature of their own growth—and scarcely any authors of celebrity. The fact is too remarkable, not to have been noticed by all who have had occasion to speak of them;—and we have only to add, that, so far from bringing it forward in an insulting or invidious manner, we have never, we believe, alluded to it without adding such explanations as in candour we thought due, and as were calculated to take from it all shadow of offence. So early as in our third number, we observed that “literature was one of those *finer manufactures* which a new country will always find it easier to import than to raise;”—and, after showing that the want of leisure and hereditary wealth naturally led to this arrangement, we added,

that “the Americans had shown abundance of talent, wherever inducements had been held out for its exertion; that their party pamphlets were written with great keenness and spirit; and that their orators frequently displayed a vehemence, correctness, and animation, that would command the admiration of any European audience.” Mr. W. has himself quoted the warm testimony we bore, in our 12th volume, to the merits of the papers published under the title of “The Federalist;” and in our 16th, we observe, that when America once turned her attention to letters, “we had no doubt that her authors would improve and multiply, to a degree that would make all our exertions necessary to keep the start we have of them.” In a subsequent number, we add the important remark, that “among them, the men who *write* bear no proportion to those who *read*,” and that, though they have but few native authors, “the individuals are innumerable who make use of literature to improve their understandings, and add to their happiness.” The very same ideas are expressed in a late article, which seems to have given Mr. W. very great offence—though we can discover nothing in the passage in question, except the liveliness of the style, that can afford room for misconstruction. “Native literature,” says the reviewer, “the Americans have none: it is all imported. And why should they write books? when a six weeks’ passage brings them, in their own tongue, our sense, science, and genius, in bales and hogsheads?”—Now, what is the true meaning of this, but the following:—“The Americans do not write books; but it must not be inferred, from this, that they are ignorant or indifferent about literature. The true reason is, that they get books enough from us in their own language; and are, in this respect, just in the condition of any of our great trading or manufacturing districts at home, where there is no encouragement for *authors* to settle, though there is as much reading and thinking as in other places.” This has all along been our meaning—and we think it has been clearly enough expressed. The Americans, in fact, are at least as great readers as the English, and take off immense editions of all our popular works;—and while we have repeatedly stated the causes that have probably withheld them from becoming authors in great numbers themselves, we confidently deny that we have ever represented them as illiterate, or negligent of learning.

2. As to our particular criticisms on American works, we cannot help feeling that our justification will be altogether as easy as in the case of our general remarks on their rarity. Nothing, indeed, can more strikingly illustrate the unfortunate prejudice or irritation under which Mr. W. has composed this part of his work, than the morose and angry remarks he has made on our very innocent and good-natured critique of Barlow’s *Columbiad*. It is very true that we have laughed at its strange neologisms, and pointed out some of its other manifold faults. But is it possible for any one seriously to believe, that this gentle castigation was dictated by national animosity?—or does Mr. W. really believe, that, if the same work had been published in England, it would have met with a milder treatment? If the book was so bad, however, he insinuates, why take any notice of it, if not to indulge your malignity? To this we answer, *first*, That a handsome quarto of verse, from a country which produces so few, necessarily attracted our attention more strongly than if it had appeared among ourselves; *secondly*, That its faults were of so peculiar and amusing a kind, as to call for animadversion rather than neglect; and, *thirdly*, what no reader of Mr. W.’s remarks would indeed anticipate, That in spite of these faults, the book actually had merits that entitled it to



notice, and that a considerable part of our article is accordingly employed in bringing these merits into view. In common candour, we must say, Mr. W. should have acknowledged this fact, when complaining of the illiberal severity with which Mr. Barlow's work had been treated. For, the truth is, that we have given it fully as much praise as he, or any other intelligent American, can say it deserves; and have been at some pains in vindicating the author's sentiments from misconstruction, as well as rescuing his beauties from neglect. Yet Mr. W. is pleased to inform his reader, that the work "seems to have been committed to the Momus of the fraternity for especial diversion;" and is very surly and austere at "the exquisite jokes" of which he says it consists. We certainly do not mean to dispute with him about the quality of our jokes:—though we take leave to appeal to a gayer critic—or to himself in better humour—from his present sentence of reprobation. But he should have recollected, that, besides stating, in distinct terms, that "his versification was generally both soft and sonorous, and that there were many passages of rich and vigorous description, and some that might lay claim even to the praise of magnificence," the critics had summed up their observations by saying, "that the author's talents were evidently respectable; and that, severely as they had been obliged to speak of his taste and his diction, in a great part of the volume, they considered him as a giant in comparison with many of the paltry and puling rhymsters who disgraced our English literature by their occasional success; and that, if he would pay some attention to purity of style and simplicity of composition, they had no doubt that he might produce something which English poets would envy, and English critics applaud."

Are there any traces here, we would ask, of national spite and hostility?—or is it not true, that our account of the poem is, on the whole, not only fair but favourable, and the tone of our remarks as good-humoured and friendly as if the author had been a whiggish Scotchman? As to "Marshall's Life of Washington," we do not think that Mr. W. differs very much from the Reviewers. He says, "he does not mean to affirm that the story of their revolution has been told *absolutely well* by this author;" and we, after complaining of its being cold, heavy and tedious, have distinctly testified, that "it displayed industry, good sense, and, in so far as we could judge, laudable impartiality; and that the style, though neither elegant nor impressive, was yet, upon the whole, clear and manly." Mr. W. however thinks, that nothing but national spite and illiberality can account for our saying, "that Mr. M. must not promise himself a reputation commensurate with the *dimensions* of his work;" and "that what passes with him for dignity, will, by his readers, be pronounced dulness and frigidity:" and then he endeavours to show, that a passage in which we say that "Mr. Marshall's narrative is *deficient* in *almost* every thing that constitutes historical excellence," is glaringly inconsistent with the favourable sentence we have transcribed in the beginning; not seeing, or not choosing to see, that in the one place we are speaking of the *literary* merits of the work as an historical *composition*, and in the other of the information it affords. But the question is not, whether our criticism is just and able, or otherwise; but whether it indicates any little spirit of detraction and national rancour—and this, it would seem not very difficult to answer. If we had taken the occasion of this publication to gather together all the foolish and awkward and disreputable things that occurred in the conduct of the revolutionary councils and campaigns, and to make the history of this memorable struggle a vehicle for insinu-

ations against the courage or integrity of many who took part in it, we might, with reason, have been subjected to the censure we now confidently repel. But there is not a word in the article that looks that way; and the only ground for the imputation is, that we have called Mr. Marshall's book dull and honest, accurate and heavy, valuable and tedious, while neither Mr. W., nor any body else, ever thought or said any thing else of it. It is his style only that we object to. — Of his general sentiments — of the conduct and character of his hero — and of the prospects of his country, we speak as the warmest friends of America, and the warmest admirers of American virtue could wish us to speak. We shall add but one short passage as a specimen of the tone of this insolent and illiberal production.

“ History has no other example of so happy an issue to a revolution, consummated by a long civil war. Indeed it seems to be very near a maxim in political philosophy, that a free government cannot be obtained where a long employment of military force has been necessary to establish it. In the case of America, however, the military power was, by a rare felicity, disarmed by that very influence which makes a revolutionary army so formidable to liberty: for the images of grandeur and power — those meteor lights that are exhaled in the stormy atmosphere of a revolution, to allure the ambitious and dazzle the weak — made no impression on the firm and virtuous soul of the American commander.”

As to Adams's Letters on Silesia, the case is nearly the same. We certainly do not run into extravagant compliments to the author because he happens to be the son of the American President: but he is treated with sufficient courtesy and respect; and Mr. W. cannot well deny that the book is very fairly rated, according to its intrinsic merits. There is no ridicule, nor any attempt at sneering, throughout the article. The work is described as “ easy, and pleasant, and entertaining;” as containing some excellent remarks on education, and indicating throughout “ that settled attachment to freedom which is worked into the constitution of every man of virtue who has the fortune to belong to a free and prosperous community.” As to the style, we remark, certainly in a very good-natured and inoffensive manner, that “ though it is remarkably free from those affectations and corruptions of phrase that over-run the compositions of his country, a few national, perhaps we might still venture to call them provincial, peculiarities might be detected;” and then we add, in a style which we do not think can appear impolite, even to a minister plenipotentiary, “ that if men of birth and education in that other England which they are building up in the West, will not diligently study the great authors who fixed and purified the language of our common forefathers, we must soon lose the only badge that is still worn of our consanguinity.” Unless the Americans are really to set up a new standard of speech, we conceive that these remarks are perfectly just and unanswerable; and we are sure, at all events, that nothing can be farther from a spirit of insult or malevolence.

Our critique on the volume of American Transactions is perhaps more liable to objection; and, on looking back to it, we at once admit that it contains some petulant and rash expressions which had better have been omitted, and that its general tone is less liberal and courteous than might have been desired. It is remarkable, however, that this, which is by far the most offensive of our discussions on American literature, is one of the earliest; and that the sarcasms with which it is seasoned have never been repeated — a fact which, with many others, may serve to expose the sin-

gular inaccuracy with which Mr. W. has been led, throughout his work, to assert that we began our labours with civility and kindness towards his country, and have only lately changed our tone, and joined its inveterate enemies in all the extravagance of abuse. The substance of our criticism, it does not seem to be disputed, was just — the volume containing very little that was at all interesting, and a good part of it being composed in a style very ill suited for such a publication.

Such are the perversions of our critical office, which Mr. W. can only explain on the supposition of national jealousy and malice. As proofs of an opposite disposition, we beg leave just to refer to our lavish and reiterated praise of the writings of Franklin — to our high and distinguished testimony to the merits of “The Federalist” — to the terms of commendation in which we have spoken of the Journal of Messrs. Lewis and Clarke; and, in an especial manner, to the great kindness with which we have treated a certain American pamphlet, published at Philadelphia and London in 1810, and of which we shall have a word to say hereafter, — though each and all of these performances touched much more nearly on subjects of national contention, and were far more apt to provoke feelings of rivalry than any thing in the Philosophical Transactions, or the tuneful pages of the Columbiad.

3. We come now to the ticklish chapter of Manners; on which, though we have said less than on any other, we suspect we have given more offence, — and, if possible, with less reason. We may despatch the lower orders first, before we come to the people of fashion. The charge here is, that we have unjustly libelled those persons, by saying, in one place, that they were too much given to spirituous liquors; in another, that they were rudely inquisitive; and in a third, that they were absurdly vain of their constitution, and offensive in boasting of it. Now, we may have been mistaken in making these imputations; but we find them stated in the narrative of *every* traveller who has visited their country, and most of them noticed by the better writers among themselves. We have noticed them, too, without bitterness or insult, and generally in the words of the authors upon whose authority they are stated. Neither are the imputations themselves very grievous, or as can be thought to bespeak any great malignity in their authors. Their inquisitiveness, and the boast of their freedom, are but excesses of laudable qualities; and intemperance, though it is apt to lead further, is, in itself, a sin rather against prudence than morality. Mr. W. is infinitely offended, too, because we have said, that “the people of the Western States are very hospitable to strangers — *because* they are seldom troubled with them, and because they have always plenty of maize and hams;” as if this were not the *rationale* of *all* hospitality among the lower orders throughout the world, and familiarly applied, among ourselves, to the case of our Highlanders and remote Irish. But, slight as these charges are, we may admit that Mr. W. would have had some reason to complain if they had included all that we have ever said of the great bulk of his nation. But the truth is, that we have all along been much more careful to notice their virtues than their faults, and have lost no fair opportunity of speaking well of them. In our 23d number, we have said, “The great body of the American people is *better educated*, and more comfortably situated, than the bulk of *any* European community; and possesses all the accomplishments that are any where to be found in persons of the same occupation and condition.” And, more recently, “The Americans are about as polished as ninety-nine out of one hundred of our own countrymen, in the upper ranks; and *quite as moral*

*and well educated, in the lower.* Their virtues are such as we ought to admire; for they are those on which we value ourselves most highly." We have never said any thing inconsistent with this; and if this be to libel a whole nation, and to vilify and degrade them in comparison of ourselves, we have certainly been guilty of that enormity.

As for the manners of the upper classes, we have really said very little about them, and can scarcely recollect having given any positive opinion on the subject. We have lately quoted, with warm approbation, Captain Hall's strong and very respectable testimony to their agreeableness; and certainly have never contradicted it on our own authority. We have made, however, certain hypothetical and conjectural observations, which, we gather from Mr. W., have given some offence—we must say, we think, very unreasonably. We have said, for example, that "the Americans are about as polished as ninety-nine in one hundred of our own countrymen, in the upper ranks." Is it the reservation of this inconsiderable fraction in our own favour that is resented? Why, our very *seniority*, we think, might have entitled us to this precedence; and we must say that our monarchy—our nobility—our greater proportion of hereditary wealth, and our closer connection with the old civilised world, might have justified a higher per-centage. But we will not dispute with Mr. W. even upon this point. Let him set down the fraction, if he pleases, to the score merely of our national partiality; and he must estimate that element very far indeed below its ordinary standard, if he does not find it sufficient to account for it without the supposition of intended insult or malignity. Was there ever any great nation that did not prefer its own manners to those of any of its neighbours? or can Mr. W. produce another instance in which it allowed that a rival came so near as to be within one hundredth of its own excellence?

But there is still something worse than this. Understanding that the most considerable persons in the chief cities of America were their opulent merchants, we conjectured that their society was probably much of the same description with that of Liverpool, Manchester, and Glasgow. And does Mr. W. really think there is any disparagement in this? Does he not know that these places have been graced, for generations, by some of the most deserving and enlightened citizens, and some of the most learned and accomplished men that have ever adorned our nation? Does he not know that Adam Smith, and Reid, and Miller, spent their happiest days in Glasgow; that Roscoe and Currie illustrated the society of Liverpool; and Priestley, and Ferriar, and Darwin, that of Manchester? The wealth, and skill, and enterprise of all the places, are equally indisputable; and we confess we are yet to learn in which of the elements of respectability they can be imagined to be inferior to New York, or Baltimore, or Philadelphia.

But there is yet another passage in the Review which Mr. W. has quoted as insulting and vituperative—for such a construction of which we confess ourselves still less able to divine a reason. It is part of an honest and very earnest attempt to overcome the high monarchical prejudices of a part of our own country against the Americans, and notices this objection to their manners only collaterally and hypothetically. Mr. W. needs not be told that all courtiers and zealots of monarchy impute rudeness and vulgarity to republicans. The French used to describe an inelegant person as having "*Les manières d'un Suisse, en Hollande civilisé*;"—and the court faction among ourselves did not omit this reproach

when we went to war with the Americans. To expose the absurdity of such an attack, we expressed ourselves in 1814 as follows :—

“ The complaint respecting America is, that there are no people of fashion, — that their column still wants its Corinthian capital, or, in other words, that those who are rich and idle, have not yet existed so long, or in such numbers, as to have brought to full perfection that system of ingenious trifling and elegant dissipation, by means of which it has been discovered that wealth and leisure may be most agreeably disposed of. Admitting the fact to be so, and in a country where there is no court, no nobility, and no monument or tradition of chivalrous usages, — and where, moreover, the greatest number of those who are rich and powerful have raised themselves to that eminence by mercantile industry, we really do not see how it could well be otherwise ; we could still submit, that this is no lawful cause either for national contempt or for national hostility. It is a peculiarity in the structure of society among that people, which, we take it, can only give offence to their visiting acquaintance ; and, while it does us no sort of harm, while it subsists, promises, we think, very soon to disappear altogether, and no longer to afflict even our imagination. The number of individuals born to the enjoyment of hereditary wealth is, or at least was, daily increasing in that country ; and it is impossible that their multiplication (with all the models of European refinement before them, and all the advantages resulting from a free government and a general system of good education) should fail, within a very short period, to give birth to a *better tone of conversation and society*, and to *manners more dignified and refined*. Unless we are very much misinformed, indeed, *the symptoms* of such a change may already be traced in their cities. Their youths of fortune already travel over all the countries of Europe for their improvement ; and specimens are occasionally met with, even in these islands, which, with all our prejudices, we must admit, would do no discredit to the best blood of the land from which they originally sprung.”

Now, is there really any matter of offence in this ? — In the first place, is it not substantially true ? — in the next place, is it not mildly and respectfully stated ? Is it not true, that the greater part of those who compose the higher society of the American cities have raised themselves to opulence by commercial pursuits ? — and is it to be imagined that, in America alone, this is not to produce its usual effects upon the style and tone of society ? As families become old, and hereditary wealth comes to be the portion of many, it cannot but happen that a change of manners will take place ; — and is it an insult to suppose that this change will be an improvement ? Surely they cannot be *perfect*, both as they are, and as they are to be ; and, while it seems impossible to doubt that a considerable change is inevitable, the offence seems to be, that it is expected to be for the better ! It is impossible, we think, that Mr. W. can seriously imagine that the manners of any country upon earth can be so dignified and refined — or their tone of conversation and society so good, when the most figuring persons come into company from the desk and the counting-house, as when they pass only from one assembly to another, and have had no other study or employment from their youth up, than to render society agreeable, and to cultivate all those talents and manners which give its charm to polite conversation. If there are any persons in America who seriously dispute the accuracy of these opinions, we are pretty confident that they will turn out to be those whom the rest of the country would refer to in illustration of their truth. The truly polite, we are persuaded, will admit the case to be pretty much as we have stated it. The upstarts alone will contend for their present perfection. If we have really been so unfortunate as to give any offence by our observations, we sus-

pect that offence will be greater at New Orleans than at New York, — and not quite so slight at New York as at Philadelphia.

But we have no desire to pursue this topic any further — nor any interest indeed to convince those who may not be already satisfied. If Mr. W. really thinks us wrong in the opinions we have now expressed, we are willing for the present to be thought so : but surely we have said enough to show that we had plausible grounds for those opinions ; and surely, if we did entertain them, it was impossible to express them in a manner less offensive. We did not even recur to the topic spontaneously — but occasionally took it up in a controversy on behalf of America, with a party of our own countrymen. What we said was not addressed *to* America — but said *of* her ; and, most indisputably, with friendly intentions to the people of both countries.

But we have dwelt too long on this subject. The manners of fashionable life, and the rivalry of *bon ton* between one country and another is, after all, but a poor affair to occupy the attention of philosophers, or affect the peace of nations. Of what real consequence is it to the happiness or glory of a country, how a few thousand idle people — probably neither very virtuous nor very useful — pass their time, or divert the ennui of their inactivity ? And men must really have a great propensity to hate each other, when it is thought a reasonable ground of quarrel, that the rich *descœuvrés* of one country are accused of not knowing how to get through their day so cleverly as those of another. Manners alter from age to age, and from country to country ; and much is at all times arbitrary and conventional in that which is esteemed the best. What pleases and amuses each people the most, is the best for that people : and, where states are tolerably equal in power and wealth, a great and irreconcilable diversity is often maintained with suitable arrogance and inflexibility, and no common standard recognised or dreamed of. The *bon ton* of Pekin has no sort of affinity, we suppose, with the *bon ton* of Paris ; and that of Constantinople but little resemblance to either. The difference, to be sure, is not so complete within the limits of Europe ; but it is sufficiently great, to show the folly of being dogmatical or intolerant upon a subject so incapable of being reduced to principle. The French accuse us of coldness and formality, and we accuse them of monkey tricks and impertinence. The good company of Rome would be much at a loss for amusement at Amsterdam ; and that of Brussels at Madrid. The manners of America, then, are probably the best for America ; but, for that very reason, they are not the best for us. And when we hinted that they probably might be improved, we spoke with reference to the European standard, and to the feelings and judgment of strangers, to whom that standard alone was familiar. When their circumstances, and the structure of their society, come to be more like those of Europe, their manners will be more like — and they will suit better with those altered circumstances. When the fabric has reached its utmost elevation, the Corinthian capital may be added : for the present, the Doric is perhaps more suitable ; and, if the style be kept pure, we are certain it will be equally graceful.

4. It only remains to notice what is said with regard to negro slavery ; and on this we shall be very short. We have no doubt spoken very warmly on the subject in one of our late numbers ; — but Mr. W. must have read what we there said, with a jaundiced eye indeed, if he did not see that our warmth proceeded, not from any animosity against the people among whom this miserable institution existed, but against the institution

itself—and was mainly excited by the contrast that it presented to the freedom and prosperity upon which it was so strangely engrafted ;— thus appearing

—— “ Like a stain upon a vestal’s robe,  
The worse for what it soils.” ——

Accordingly, we do not call upon other nations to hate and despise America for this practice ; but upon *the Americans themselves* to wipe away this foul blot from their character. We have a hundred times used the same language to our own countrymen — and repeatedly on the subject of the slave trade ;— and Mr. W. cannot be ignorant, that many pious and excellent citizens of his own country have expressed themselves in similar terms with regard to this very institution. As to his recriminations on England, we shall explain to Mr. W. immediately, that they have no bearing on the question between us ; and, though nobody can regret more than we do the domestic slavery of our West India islands, it is quite absurd to represent the difficulties of the abolition as at all parallel in the case of America. It seems to be pretty clearly made out, that, without slaves, those islands could not be maintained ; and, independent of private interests, the trade of England cannot afford to part with them. But will any body pretend to say, that the great and comparatively temperate regions over which the American slavery extends, would be deserted, if all their inhabitants were free — or even that they would be permanently less populous or less productive ? We are perfectly aware, that a sudden or immediate emancipation of all those who are now in slavery might be attended with frightful disorders, as well as intolerable losses ; and, accordingly, we have nowhere recommended any such measure : but we must repeat, that it is a crime and a shame, that the freest nation on the earth should keep a million and a half of fellow-creatures in chains, within the very territory and sanctuary of their freedom ; and should see them multiplying from day to day, without thinking of any provision for their ultimate liberation. When we say this, we are far from doubting that there are many amiable and excellent individuals among the slave proprietors. There were many such among the importers of slaves in our West Indies ; yet it is not the less true, that that accursed traffic was a crime — and it was so called in the most emphatic language, and with general assent, year after year, in Parliament, without any one ever imagining that this imported a personal attack on those individuals, far less a blot upon the nation which tolerated and legalised their proceedings.

Before leaving this topic, we have to thank Mr. W. for a great deal of curious, and, to us, original information, as to the history of the American slave trade, and the measures pursued by the different states with regard to the institution of slavery. From which we learn, among other things, that so early as 1767, the legislature of Massachusetts brought in a bill for prohibiting the importation of negroes into that province, which was rejected by the British governor, in consequence of express instructions ; — and another in 1774 shared the same fate. We learn also, that in 1770, two years *before* the decision in the case of Somerset in England, the courts of the same distinguished province decided, upon solemn argument, that no person could be held in slavery within their jurisdiction ; and awarded not only their freedom, but wages for their past services, to a variety of negro suitors. These, indeed, are fair subjects of pride and exultation ; and we hail them, without grudging, as bright

trophies in the annals of the States to which they relate. But do not *their* glories cast a deeper shade on those who have refused to follow the example — and may we not now be allowed to speak of the guilt and unlawfulness of slavery, as their own countrymen are praised and boasted of for having spoken, so many years ago?

We learn also from Mr. W., that Virginia abolished the foreign slave trade so early as 1778 — Pennsylvania in 1780 — Massachusetts in 1787 — and Connecticut and Rhode Island in 1788. It was finally interdicted by the General Congress in 1794; and made punishable as a crime, seven years before that measure was adopted in England. We have great pleasure in stating these facts. But they all appear to us not only incongruous with the permanent existence of slavery, but as indicating those very feelings with regard to it which we have been so severely blamed for expressing.

We here close our answer to Mr. W.'s charges. Our readers, we fear, have been for some time tired of it: and, indeed, we have felt all along, that there was something absurd in answering gravely to such an accusation. If any regular reader of our Review could be of opinion that we were hostile to America, and desirous of fomenting hostility between her and this country, we could scarcely hope that he would change that opinion for any thing we have now been saying. But Mr. W.'s book may fall into the hands of many, in his own country at least, to whom our writings are but little known; and the imputations it contains may become known to many who never enquire into their grounds. On such persons, the statements we have now made may produce some impression — and the spirit in which they are made perhaps still more. Our labour will not have been in vain, if there are any that rise up from the perusal of these pages with a better opinion of their trans-Atlantic brethren, and an increased desire to live with them in friendship and peace.

There still remains behind a fair moiety of Mr. W.'s book; containing his recriminations on England — his exposition of “her sores and blotches” — and his retort courteous for all the abuse which her writers have been pouring on his country for the last hundred years. The task, we should think, must have been rather an afflicting one to a man of much moral sensibility: — but it is gone through very resolutely, and with marvellous industry. The learned author has not only ransacked forgotten histories and files of old newspapers in search of disreputable transactions and degrading crimes — but has groped for the materials of our dishonour among the filth of Dr. Colquhoun's Collections, and the Reports of our Prison and Police Committees — culled vituperative exaggerations from the record of angry debates — and produced, as incontrovertible evidence of the excess of our guilt and misery, the fervid declamations of moralists exhorting to amendment, or of satirists endeavouring to deter from vice. Provincial misgovernment from Ireland to Hindostan — cruel amusements — increasing pauperism — disgusting brutality — shameful ignorance — perversion of law — grinding taxation — brutal debauchery, and many other traits equally attractive, are all heaped together, as the characteristics of English society; and unsparingly illustrated by “loose extracts from English Journals,” — quotations from Espriella's Letters — and selections from the Parliamentary Debates. Accustomed, as we have long been, to mark the vices and miseries of our countrymen, we really cannot say that we recognise any likeness in this distorted representation; which exhibits our fair England as one great Lazar-house of moral and intellectual disease — one hideous and bloated mass of sin and suffering



— one festering heap of corruption, infecting the wholesome air which breathes upon it, and diffusing all around the contagion and the terror of its example.

We have no desire whatever to *argue* against the truth or the justice of this picture of our country; which we can assure Mr. W. we contemplate with perfect calmness and equanimity: but we are tempted to set against it the judgment of another foreigner, with whom he cannot complain of being confronted, and whose authority at this moment stands higher, perhaps with the whole civilised world, than that of any other individual. We allude to Madame de Staël — and to the splendid testimony she has borne to the character and happiness of the English nation, in her last admirable book on the revolution of her own country. But we have spoken of this work so lately, in our number for September, 1818, that we shall not now recall the attention of our readers to it, further than by this general reference. We rather wish to lay before them an *American* authority.

In a work of great merit, entitled “A Letter on the Genius and Dispositions of the French Government,” published at Philadelphia in 1810, and which attracted much notice, both there and in this country, the author, in a strain of great eloquence and powerful reasoning, exhorts his country to make common cause with England in the great struggle in which she was then engaged with the giant power of Bonaparte, and points out the many circumstances in the character and condition of the two countries that invited them to a cordial alliance. He was well aware, too, of the distinction we have endeavoured to point out between the court, or the Tory rulers of the state, and the body of our people: and, after observing that the American government, by following his councils, might retrieve the character of their country, he adds, “They will, I am quite sure, be seconded by an entire correspondence of feeling, not only on our part, but on that of the PEOPLE of England — whatever may be the narrow policy, or illiberal prejudices, of the British MINISTRY;” — and, in the body of his work, he gives an ample and glowing description of the character and condition of that England of which we have just seen so lamentable a representation. The whole passage is too long for insertion; but the following extracts will afford a sufficient specimen of its tone and tenor: —

“A peculiarly masculine character, and the utmost energy of feeling, are communicated to all orders of men, — by the abundance which prevails so universally, — the consciousness of equal rights, — the fulness of power and fame to which the nation has attained, — and the beauty and robustness of the species under a climate highly favourable to the animal economy. The dignity of the rich is without insolence, — the subordination of the poor without servility. Their freedom is well guarded both from the dangers of popular licentiousness, and from the encroachments of authority. Their national pride leads to national sympathy, and is built upon the most legitimate of all foundations — a sense of pre-eminent merit and a body of illustrious annals.

“Whatever may be the representations of those who, with little knowledge of facts, and still less soundness or impartiality of judgment, affect to deplore the condition of England, — it is nevertheless true, that there does not exist, and never has existed elsewhere, — so beautiful and perfect a model of public and private prosperity, — so magnificent, and at the same time, so solid a fabric of social happiness and national grandeur. *I pay this just tribute of admiration with the more pleasure, as it is to me in the light of an atonement for the errors and prejudices, under which I laboured, on this subject, before I enjoyed the advantage of a personal experience.* A residence of nearly two years in that country, — during

which period, I visited and studied almost every part of it, — with no other view or pursuit than that of obtaining correct information, and, I may add, with previous studies well fitted to promote my object, — convinced me that I had been egregiously deceived. I saw no instances of individual oppression, and scarcely any individual misery but that which belongs, under any circumstances of our being, to the infirmity of all human institutions.” —

“The agriculture of England is confessedly superior to that of any other part of the world, and the condition of those who are engaged in the cultivation of the soil incontestably preferable to that of the same class in any other section of Europe. An inexhaustible source of admiration and delight is found in the unrivalled beauty, as well as richness and fruitfulness of their husbandry; the effects of which are heightened by the magnificent parks and noble mansions of the opulent proprietors: by picturesque gardens upon the largest scale, and disposed with the most exquisite taste; and by Gothic remains no less admirable in their structure than venerable for their antiquity. The neat cottage, the substantial farm-house, the splendid villa, are constantly rising to the sight, surrounded by the most choice and poetical attributes of the landscape. The vision is not more delightfully recreated by the rural scenery, than the moral sense is gratified, and the understanding elevated by the institutions of this great country. The first and continued exclamation of an American who contemplates them with unbiassed judgment, is —

Salve, magna Parens frugum, Saturnia tellus,  
Magna virum.

“It appears something *not less than impious to desire the ruin of this people*, when you view the height to which they have carried the comforts, the knowledge, and the virtue of our species: the extent and number of their foundations of charity; their skill in the mechanic arts, by the improvement of which alone, they have conferred inestimable benefits on mankind; the masculine morality, the lofty sense of independence, the sober and rational piety which are found in all classes; their impartial, decorous and able administration of a code of laws, than which none more just and perfect has ever been in operation; their seminaries of education yielding more solid and profitable instruction than any other whatever; their eminence in literature and science — the urbanity and learning of their privileged orders — their deliberative assemblies, illustrated by so many profound statesmen, and brilliant orators. *It is worse than ingratitude in us not to sympathise with them in their present struggle, when we recollect that it is from them we derive the principal merit of our own CHARACTER — the best of our own institutions — the sources of our highest enjoyments — and the light of Freedom itself, which, if they should be destroyed, will not long shed its radiance over this country.*”

What will Mr. Walsh say to this picture of the country he has so laboured to degrade? — and what will our readers say, when they are told that MR. WALSH HIMSELF is the author of this picture!

So, however, the fact unquestionably stands. — The book from which we have made the preceding extracts was written and published in 1810, by the very same individual who has now recriminated upon England in the volume which lies before us, — and in which he is pleased to speak with extreme severity of the *inconsistencies* he has detected in our Review! — That some discordant or irreconcilable opinions should be found in the miscellaneous writings of twenty years, and thirty or forty individuals under no effective control, may easily be imagined, and pardoned, we should think, without any great stretch of liberality. But such a transmutation of sentiments on the same identical subject — such a reversal of the poles of the same identical head, we confess has never before come under our observation; and is parallel to nothing that we can recollect, but the memorable transformation of *Bottom*, in the *Midsummer Night's Dream*. Nine years, to be sure, had intervened between

the first and the second publication. But all the guilt and all the misery which is so diligently developed in the last had been contracted before the first was thought of; and all the injuries, and provocations too, by which the exposition of them has lately become a duty. Mr. W. knew perfectly, in 1810, how England had behaved to her American colonies before the war of independence, and in what spirit she had begun and carried on that war:—our poor-rates and taxes, our bull-baitings and swindlings, were then nearly as visible as now. Mr. Colquhoun had, before that time, put forth his Political Estimate of our prostitutes and pickpockets; and the worthy laureate his authentic Letters on the bad state of our parliaments and manufactures. Nay, the EDINBURGH REVIEW had committed the worst of those offences which now make hatred to England the duty of all true Americans, and had expressed little of that zeal for her friendship which appears in its subsequent numbers. The Reviews of the American Transactions, and Mr. Barlow's Epic, of Adams's Letters, and Marshall's History, had all appeared before this time—and but very few of the articles in which the future greatness of that country is predicted, and her singular prosperity extolled.

How then is it to be accounted for that Mr. W. should have taken such a favourable view of our state and merits in 1810, and so very different a one in 1819? There is but one explanation that occurs to us.—Mr. W., as appears from the passages just quoted, had been originally very much of the opinion to which he has now returned; for he tells us, that he considers the tribute of admiration which he there offers to our excellence, as an *atonement* for the errors and prejudices under which he laboured till he came among us,—and hints pretty plainly, that he had formerly been *ungrateful* enough to disown all obligation to our race, and *impious* enough even to wish for our ruin. Now, from the tenor of the work before us, compared with these passages, it is pretty plain, we think, that Mr. W. has just *relapsed* into those damnable heresies which we fear are epidemic in his part of the country—and from which nothing is so likely to deliver him, as a repetition of the same remedy by which they were formerly removed. Let him come again then to England, and try the effect of a second course of “personal experience and observation”—let him make another pilgrimage to Mecca, and observe whether his faith is not restored and confirmed—let him, like the Indians of his own world, visit the tombs of his fathers in the old land, and see whether he can *there* abjure the friendship of their other children? If he will venture himself among us for another two years' residence, we can promise him that he will find in substance the same England that he left:—our laws and our landscapes—our industry and urbanity;—our charities, our learning, and our personal beauty, he will find unaltered and unimpaired;—and we think we can even engage, that he shall find also a still greater “correspondence of feeling in the body of our people,” and not a less disposition to welcome an accomplished stranger who comes to get rid of errors and prejudices, and to learn—or, if he pleases, to teach—the great lessons of a generous and indulgent philanthropy.

We have done, however, with this topic. We have a considerable contempt for the *argumentum ad hominem* in any case—and have no desire to urge it any further at present. The truth is, that neither of Mr. W.'s portraits of us appears to be very accurate. We are painted *en beau* in the one, and *en laid* in the other. The particular traits in each may be given with tolerable truth—but *the whole truth* is to be found in neither; and it will not even do to take them together—any

more than it would do to make a correct likeness, by patching or compounding together a flattering portrait and a monstrous caricature. — We have but a word or two, indeed, to add on the general subject, before we take a final farewell of this discussion.

We admit that many of the charges which Mr. W. has here made against our country are justly made, and that for many of the things with which he has reproached us there is just cause of reproach. It would be strange, indeed, if we were to do otherwise, considering that it is from our pages that he has on many occasions borrowed the charge and the reproach. If he had stated them, therefore, with any degree of fairness or temper, and had not announced that they were brought forward as incentives to hostility and national alienation, we should have been so far from complaining of him, that we should have been heartily thankful for the services of such an auxiliary in our holy war against vice and corruption, and rejoiced to obtain the testimony of an impartial observer in corroboration of our own earnest admonitions. Even as it is, we are inclined to think that this exposition of our infirmities will rather do good than harm, so far as it produces any effect at all in this country. Among our national vices, we have long reckoned an insolent and overweening opinion of our own universal superiority; and though it really does not belong to America to reproach us with *this* fault, and though the ludicrous exaggeration of Mr. W.'s charge is sure very greatly to weaken his authority, still such an alarming catalogue of our faults and follies may have some effect as a wholesome mortification of our vanity. It is with a view to its probable effect in his own country, and to his avowal of the effect he wishes it to produce there, that we consider it as deserving of all reprobation; and therefore beg leave to make one or two very short remarks on its manifest injustice, and indeed absurdity, in so far as relates to ourselves, and that great majority of the country whom we believe to concur in our sentiments. The object of this violent invective on England is twofold; and we really do not know under which aspect it is most reprehensible. It is, *first*, to repress, if possible, the invectives which we, it seems, have been making on America; and, *secondly*, to excite *there* a spirit of animosity, to meet and revenge that which those invectives are said to indicate here. And this is the shape of the argument: — What right have you to abuse us for keeping and whipping slaves, when you yourselves whip your soldiers, and were so slow to give up your slave trade, and use your subjects so ill in India and Ireland? or, What right have you to call our Marshall a dull historian, when you have a Belsham and a Gifford, who are still duller? Now, though this argument would never show that whipping slaves was a right thing, or that Mr. Marshall was not a dull writer, it might be a very smart and embarrassing retort to those among us who had defended our slave trade, or our military floggings, or our treatment of Ireland and India; or who had held out Messrs. Belsham and Gifford as pattern historians, and ornaments of our national literature. But what meaning or effect can it have, when addressed to those who have always testified against the wickedness and the folly of the practices complained of, and who have treated the Ultra-Whig and the Ultra-Tory historian with equal scorn and reproach? *We have* a right to censure cruelty and dulness abroad, *because* we have censured them with more and more frequent severity at home; and their home existence, though it may prove indeed that our censures have not yet been effectual in producing amendment, can afford no sort of reason for not extending them where they might be more attended to.

We have generally blamed what we thought worthy of blame in America, without any express reference to parallel cases in England, or any invidious comparison. Their books we have criticised just as we should have done those of any other country; and in speaking more generally of their literature and manners, we have rather brought them into competition with those of Europe in general, than those of our country in particular. When we have made any comparative estimate of our own advantages and theirs, we can say with confidence that it has been far oftener in their favour than against them; and, after repeatedly noticing their preferable condition as to taxes, elections, sufficiency of employment, public economy, freedom of publication, and many other points of paramount importance, it surely was but fair that we should notice, in their turn, those merits or advantages which might reasonably be claimed for ourselves, and bring into view our superiority in eminent authors, and the extinction and annihilation of slavery in every part of our realm.

We would also remark, that while we have thus praised America far more than we have blamed her, and reproached ourselves far more bitterly than we have ever reproached her, Mr. W., while he affects to be merely following our example, has heaped abuse on us without one grain of commendation, and praised his own country extravagantly, without admitting one fault or imperfection. Now, this is not a fair way of retorting the proceedings even of the "Quarterly;" for they have occasionally given some praise to America, and have constantly spoken ill enough of the paupers, and radicals, and reformers of England. But as to *us*, and the great body of the nation which thinks with us, it is a proceeding without the colour of justice, or the shadow of apology; and is not a less flagrant indication of impatience or bad humour, than the marvellous assumption which runs through the whole argument, that it is an unpardonable insult and an injury to find *any fault* with *any thing* in America, must necessarily proceed from national spite and animosity, and affords, whether true or false, sufficient reason for endeavouring to excite a corresponding animosity against our nation. Such, however, is the scope and plan of Mr. W.'s whole work. Whenever he thinks that his country has been erroneously accused, he points out the error with sufficient keenness and asperity; but when he is aware that the imputation is just and unanswerable, instead of joining his rebuke or regret to those of her foreign censors, he turns fiercely and vindictively on the parallel infirmities of this country, as if those also had not been marked with reprobation; and without admitting that the censure was merited, or hoping that it might work amendment, complains in the bitterest terms of malignity, and rouses his country to revenge!

Which, then, we would ask, is the most fair and reasonable, or which the most truly patriotic?—We, who, admitting our own manifold faults and corruptions, testifying loudly against them, and feeling grateful to any foreign auxiliary who will help us to *reason*, to *rail*, or to *shame*, our countrymen out of them, are willing occasionally to lend a similar assistance to others, and speak freely and fairly of what appear to us to be the faults and errors, as well as the virtues and merits, of all who may be in any way affected by our observations;—or Mr. Walsh, who will admit *no* faults in his own country, and *no* good qualities in ours—sets down the more extensive of our domestic crimes to their corresponding objects abroad, to the score of national rancour and partiality; and can find no better use for their mutual admonitions, which should lead to mutual

amendment or generous emulation, than to improve them into occasions of mutual animosity and deliberate hatred?

This extreme impatience, even of merited blame from the mouth of a stranger — this still more extraordinary abstinence from any hint or acknowledgment of error on the part of her intelligent defender, is a trait too remarkable not to call for some observation;—and we think we can see in it one of the worst and most unfortunate consequences of a republican government. It is the misfortune of sovereigns in general, that they are fed with flattery till they loathe the wholesome truth, and come to resent, as the bitterest of all offences, any insinuation of their errors, or intimation of their dangers. But of all sovereigns, *the sovereign people* is most obnoxious to this corruption, and most fatally injured by its prevalence. In America, every thing depends on their suffrages and their favour and support; and accordingly it would appear, that they are pampered with constant adulation, from the rival suitors for their favour — so that no one will venture to tell them of their faults; and moralists, even of the austere character of Mr. W., dare not venture to whisper a syllable to their prejudice. It is thus, and thus only, that we can account for the strange sensitiveness which seems to prevail among them on the lightest sound of disapprobation, and for the acrimony with which, what would pass any where else for very mild admonitions are repelled and resented. It is obvious, however, that nothing can be so injurious to the character either of an individual or a nation, as this constant cockering of praise; and that the want of any native censor makes it more a duty for the moralists of other countries to take them under their charge, and let them know now and then what other people say of them.

We are anxious to part with Mr. W. in good humour;—but we must say that we rather wish he would not go on with the work he has begun — at least if it is to be pursued in the spirit which breathes in this. Nor is it so much to his polemic and vindictive tone that we object, as this tendency to adulation, this passionate vapouring rhetorical style of amplifying and exaggerating the felicities of his country. In point of talent and knowledge and industry, we have no doubt that he is eminently qualified for the task — (though we must tell him that he does not write so well now as when he left England) — but no man will ever write a book of authority on the institutions and resources of his country who does not add some of the virtues of a censor to those of a patriot — or rather, who does not feel, that the noblest, as well as the most difficult part of patriotism, is that which prefers his country's *good* to its *favour*, and is more directed to reform its vices, than to cherish the pride of its virtues. With foreign nations, too, this tone of fondness and self-admiration is always suspected, and most commonly ridiculous — while the calm and steady claims of merit that are interspersed with acknowledgments of faults, are sure to obtain credit, and to raise the estimation both of the writer and of his country.

And now we must at length close this very long article — the very length and earnestness of which, we hope, will go some way to satisfy our American brethren of the importance we attach to their good opinion, and the anxiety we feel to prevent any national repulsion from being aggravated by a misapprehension of our sentiments, or rather of those of that great body of the English nation of which we are here the organ. In what we have now written, there may be much that requires explanation — and much we fear that is liable to misconstruction. *The spirit in*

which it is written, however, cannot, we think, be misunderstood. We cannot descend to little cavils and altercations; and have no leisure to maintain a controversy about words and phrases. We have an unfeigned respect and affection for the free people of America; and we mean honestly to pledge ourselves for that of the better part of our own country. We are very proud of the extensive circulation of our Journal in that great country, and the importance that is there attached to it. But we should be undeserving of this favour, if we could submit to seek it by any mean practices, either of flattery or of dissimulation; and feel persuaded that we shall not only best deserve, but most surely obtain, the confidence and respect of Mr. W. and his countrymen, by speaking freely what we sincerely think of them,—and treating them exactly as we treat that nation to which we are here accused of being too favourable.

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#### CAUSES OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.\*

M. MOUNIER, “a man of talents and of virtue,” according to the great anti-revolutionary writer of this country, the antagonist of Mirabeau, and the popular president of the first National Assembly, is well entitled to be heard upon the causes of the French revolution. He was not only a witness, but an actor, in those scenes, of the origin of which he is treating; and must therefore have felt in himself, or observed in others, the influence of every principle that really contributed to their production. His testimony, it may also be observed, is now given, after ten years of exile may be presumed to have detached him from the factions of his country, and made him independent of the gratitude or resentment of its rulers.

With all these claims to our attention, M. Mounier cannot, however, expect that his authority should be taken for decisive upon so vast and complicated a question. In an affair of this nature, it is not enough to have had a good opportunity for observation. Where so many interests are concerned, and so many motives put in action, a man cannot always give an account of every thing he sees, or even of every thing he has contributed to do. His associates may have acted upon principles very different from his; and he may have been the dupe of his opponents, even while he was most zealous in his resistance. It will be remembered, too, that M. Mounier, after co-operating in a revolution that was to consummate the felicity of his country, was obliged to leave it to the mercy of an unprincipled faction; and it may perhaps be conjectured, that he who was disappointed in the issue of these transactions has also been mistaken as to their cause. M. Mounier, finally, is a man of letters, and is entitled to feel for philosophers some of the partialities of a brother. In denying that they had any share in the French revolution, he vindicates them from a charge that sounds heavy in the ears of mankind; and judges wisely that it is safer to plead not guilty to the fact, than to the intention.

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\* Mounier *De l'Influence des Philosophes sur la Revolution de France.*—Vol. i. p. 1. October, 1802.

M. Mounier, however, is not one of those, whom the horrors of the revolution have terrified into an abjuration of the principles of liberty. He classes the bigots of despotism with the apostles of insurrection, and adheres steadily to those notions of regulated freedom which could not satisfy the revolutionary ardour of his countrymen. His book is written, upon the whole, in a style of great candour and moderation; and though it will not probably convert those who have faith in an antisocial conspiracy, must be allowed, upon all hands, to contain much acute reasoning, and many judicious remarks.

The work, as is indicated in the titlepage, is divided into three parts, in which the charge of revolutionary agency is separately considered, as it applies to the philosophers, to the freemasons, and to the illuminati of Germany. The first of these is by much the largest, and contains nearly the whole of the author's reasonings and opinions upon the real causes of the revolution. We shall endeavour to lay before our readers a concise view of his doctrines upon this subject.

It is the clear and decided opinion of M. Mounier, that the revolution in France was brought about, neither directly, by the combination and conspiracy of its philosophers, nor indirectly, by the influence of their writings. It was brought about, he is persuaded, by the ordinary causes of political change; by the insubordination of the parliaments, and the disorders of the finance; and by the new and extraordinary remedies that the sovereign and his ministers thought fit to apply to these disorders.

The refractory and ambitious spirit of the parliaments had been a source of vexation to the court of France for more than half a century before the name of democracy was heard of in that kingdom. The members of these tribunals were always among the privileged orders; and the rights of the people formed no part of their subjects of contention with the crown. They were suppressed under Lewis XV., and restored by his successor, before there was a man in France who had imagined the possibility of a popular revolution. The finances, on the other hand, had been in disorder for little less than a century. Since the time of Cardinal Fleuri, there had been a regular deficiency in the produce of the taxes, and a debt that was constantly increasing. From the year 1778 to the year 1784, the exigencies of the war with England had increased this debt by a sum of 1250 millions of livres; and when M. Neckar went out of office, the produce of the taxes was incapable of defraying the interest. The parliaments, in the mean time, refused to register the edicts for new imposts; and it became evident, that the government must become bankrupt, if the privileged orders were not subjected to a more effectual contribution. As they constituted all the parliaments, however, it was in vain to hope for the co-operation of these bodies; and with a view to over-rule them, or at least to dispense with their authority, the *Notables* were assembled in 1787. In spite of all the pains that had been taken to ensure the success of this experiment, it failed. M. de Calonne was dismissed; and M. de Brienne, who succeeded him, undertook to compel the parliaments to register the royal edicts in spite of their resistance. The contest had now become a matter of popular interest and attention; and as the taxes, and the pretensions of the noblesse to immunity, were extremely disagreeable to the body of the people, the demand that was suddenly made by the parliament of Paris for the convocation of the States-General was seconded by the voice of the whole nation. The States-General had not been assembled



since the year 1614. The *Tiers Etat* was at that time in the completest subjection to the crown and the nobility; and as the produce of the royal domain was at any rate sufficient for the ordinary expenses of government, their temper and disposition was but of little national importance. In the year 1788 every thing was different; and the ministry were sufficiently aware, that if the States were once assembled, there was an end to the ancient administration of government in the country. They resisted the demands of the people, therefore, as long as they possibly could. The convocation of the States-General, in the mean time, was the demand and the petition of every order of men in France. The clergy, the nobility, the capital, the parliaments, and even a considerable proportion of those who were about the person of the sovereign, concurred in thinking it indispensable to their salvation. The army followed their example; resistance became impossible; the ministry was dismissed; and orders were given for assembling the ancient representatives of the nation.

A revolution was thus brought about, says M. Mounier, in which philosophy had not the slightest operation, and by which the ancient monarchy and aristocracy must necessarily have received some limitation. It was not yet apparent that they were both to be entirely overthrown. Perhaps there was not an individual in the country that looked forward to the establishment of a republic. The events that followed were not necessary consequences of those that had gone before; but they were produced by causes of the same description, and owed their origin, alike, to circumstances that had no connection with the speculations of philosophers.

The chief cause of the failure of this grand experiment, and of the first disorders that accompanied the revolution, was, according to M. Mounier, the dissension that naturally arose among the different orders that had thus been called to deliberate, and the fluctuating and unsteady policy of the court in its endeavours to overawe or to reconcile them. As the principal object of this convocation, on the part of the government, was to relieve the finances, by diminishing the exemptions of the privileged orders, it would have rendered the whole scheme vain, to have given such a form to the Assembly as would have secured to these orders the absolute command of its deliberations. M. Neckar, therefore, and a great part of the king's council, were disposed to listen to the applications that were made from all parts of the kingdom for a *double representation* of the commons. The parliaments, and most of the nobility, were against it. Their opposition, however, was disregarded; the double representation was granted; and another question, of still greater importance, presented itself for the consideration of the government.

By the ancient constitution of the States-General, the three different orders of clergy, nobility, and commons, assembled in separate chambers, and took each of them their resolutions apart. The Third Estate was sure to be outvoted, therefore, in every question where the interest of the privileged orders was concerned; and the additional number of their representatives would not have secured them from insignificance, if this plan of deliberation had been adhered to. The same circumstances, therefore, that, by raising their consideration, and increasing their importance in the community, had entitled them to obtain a double representation, seemed obviously to require, that the ancient form of convocation should be abandoned, and that their voice should not be entirely without effect in the great assembly of the nation. Notwithstanding the

incalculable importance of adjusting this matter by some vigorous and immediate resolution, M. Mounier assures us, that the deputies were allowed to repair to Versailles, and the assembly of the States to be opened, before the king's ministers had come to any determination on the subject. It was known, at the same time, that one part of the deputies had been positively instructed by their constituents to contend for the ancient constitution of the States; while others had been directed to agree to nothing but the re-union of the Three Orders in one deliberative assembly.

The Chancellor de Barentin, in opening the session, congratulated the Third Estate upon the double representation they had so happily obtained, expressed his wishes for the agreement of the Three Orders to a joint deliberation, and ended by recommending it to them to begin by deliberating apart! M. Neckar held the same irresolute and inconsistent language; and each party conceived that the administration would decide ultimately in its favour.—This state of uncertainty only exasperated their prejudices, and fomented their mutual animosity. The ministry wavered and temporised. M. Neckar at last proposed that they should deliberate together, at least upon the question of their future organisation. The expedient was probably futile; but it was not put to the test of experiment. After it had been approved of in council, it was suddenly retracted by the influence of a party immediately about the person of the king; and a peremptory order issued for the separation and independence of the three orders of representatives. To prepare for the promulgation of this edict, a guard was appointed to exclude the representatives of the Third Estate from the usual place of their meeting. They believed that the council had determined on their dissolution: they adjourned to a tennis-court in the neighbourhood; and, in the enthusiasm of alarm, took the celebrated oath, never to separate till a legal constitution had been established. M. Mounier acknowledges that this oath was fraught with danger to the prerogatives of royalty; but he denies that it was taken in an assembly of republicans; and justifies it, upon the ground of the emergency and alarm by which it was dictated. The councils of the king wanted that firmness that had been shown by the representatives of the people; the re-union of the orders was decreed; and the king commanded the privileged deputies to deliberate along with those of the Tiers Etat.

In all these transactions (says M. Mounier), the philosophers had no participation; they were the result of contending interests, and the consequences of a political conjuncture, to which no parallel could be found in the history of the world; they were the fruits, in a particular manner, of that improvidence and presumption, that neglected the signs of the times, and disdained to provide for events which it chose to consider as impossible. A revolution, however, was already accomplished; and it might have terminated happily at this point, had it not been for fresh imprudences of which the government was guilty.

In spite of the dissensions by which they had been preceded, the first meetings of the National Assembly gave the greatest indications of returning harmony and order. The friends of monarchy, and the advocates for moderation, constituted the great majority, both in that assembly and in the nation. The aristocratical counsellors, however, by whom the king was surrounded in secret, destroyed this fair prospect of tranquillity: they persuaded him to try the effects of terror; they surrounded the metropolis with armies; they dismissed the popular ministers with

insult, and replaced them by the avowed advocates of the prerogative. The populace, full of indignation and apprehension at the military array with which they were surrounded, rose in a tumultuous manner, and demolished the Bastille; a great part of the troops declared for the popular side of the question; the people flew to arms in every part of the country; and the king was once more obliged to submit. The triumph which the lower orders had now obtained, and the dangers they had escaped, inflamed their presumption and their prejudices: the nobility and the higher clergy became the objects of their jealousy and aversion. Men were found in the Assembly, who were capable of employing those terrible passions as the instruments of their own elevation, and of purchasing a dangerous popularity, by the indiscriminate persecution of the aristocracy. Though these incendiaries did not at first exceed the number of 80, in an assembly of 800, their audacity, their activity, the terror of their associates among the rabble, and the disunion of those by whose co-operation they should have been opposed, gave them a fatal ascendancy in the capital, and enabled them, at length, to subject every part of the government to their will. Then followed the outrages of the 5th and 6th of October; the king's flight to Varennes; and the establishment of the republic in bloodshed and injustice.

Such, according to this author, was the true course and progress of the revolution, and such the causes to which it ought to be ascribed. The speculative writings of philosophers had as little to do with it as the lodges of Freemasonry. The first steps were taken by men who detested the philosophers as infidels, or despised them as visionaries; the last, by men to whom all philosophy was unknown, and who pretended to use no finer instruments of persuasion than the purse and the dagger.

This account is certainly entitled to the praise of great clearness and simplicity, and cannot be denied to have a foundation in truth; but it appears to us to be deficient in profundity and extent, and to leave the revolution, in a great measure, to be accounted for, after all these causes have been enumerated and recognised. The finances of a nation may be disordered, we conceive, or its representatives assembled, without subverting its constitution. The different orders of the State may disagree, and grow angry in support of their respective pretensions, without tearing the frame of society to pieces, and obliterating every vestige of ancient regulation. The circumstances enumerated by M. Mounier seem to us to be only the occasions and immediate symptoms of disorder, and not the efficient and ultimate causes. To produce the effects that we have witnessed, there must have been a revolutionary spirit fermenting in the minds of the people, which took advantage of those occurrences, and converted them into engines for its own diffusion and increase. M. Mounier, in short, has given us rather an history of the revolution, than an account of its causes; he has stated events as depending upon one another, which actually proceeded from one common principle; and thought he was explaining the origin of a disorder, when he was only investigating the circumstances that had determined its eruption to one particular member.

He has thus accounted for the revolution, it seems to us, in no other way than an historian would account for an invasion, by describing the route of the assailing army, enumerating the stations they occupied, the defiles that were abandoned to them, and the bridges they broke up in their rear; while he neglected to inform us in what places the invaders

had been assembled, by whom they had been trained and enlisted, and how they had been supplied with arms, and intelligence, and audacity. He has stated, as the first causes of the revolution, circumstances that really proved it to be begun; and has gone no farther back than to the earliest of its apparent effects. He has mistaken the cataracts that broke the stream, for the fountains from which it rose; and contented himself with referring the fruit to the blossom, without taking any account of the germination of the seed, or the subterraneous windings of the root.

It is in many cases, we will confess, a matter of great difficulty to distinguish between the predisposing and occasional causes of a complicated political event, or to determine in how far those circumstances that have *facilitated* its production, were really indispensable to its existence. In the question of which we are now treating, however, there does not appear to be any such nicety. M. Mounier maintains, that the revolution was occasioned entirely by the financial embarrassments of France, by the convocation of the States-General, and the irresolution of the royal councils. The question therefore is not, whether the revolution could have been accomplished without these occurrences; but whether these are sufficient to account for it of themselves; and whether they leave nothing to be imputed to the influence of the preachers of liberty, and the writings of republican philosophers.

Now, upon this question, we profess to entertain an opinion not less decided than that of M. Mounier, though it happens to be diametrically opposite. Had there been no previous tendency to a revolution in France, the government might have declared a bankruptcy, without endangering the foundations of the throne; and the people would have remained quiet and submissive spectators of the quarrels between the ministers and the parliaments, and of the convocation and dissolution of the States-General themselves. This, indeed, is expressly the sentiment of M. Mounier himself (p. 29.); and it is justified by all preceding experience. But if events might have happened in 1690, without endangering the monarchy, that were found sufficient to subvert it in 1790, it is natural to enquire, from what this difference has proceeded? all parties, it is believed, will agree in the answer—It proceeded from the change that had taken place in the condition and sentiments of the people; from the progress of commercial opulence; from the diffusion of information, and the prevalence of political discussion. Now, it seems difficult to deny that the philosophers were instrumental in bringing about this change; that they had attracted the public attention to the abuses of government, and spread very widely among the people the sentiment of their grievances and their rights. M. Mounier himself informs us, that, for some time *before* the revolution, the French nation “had been enamoured of the idea of liberty, without understanding very well what it meant, and without being conscious that they were so soon to have an opportunity of attaining it. When that opportunity offered itself,” he adds, “it was seized with an enthusiastic eagerness that paralysed all the nerves of the sovereign.” He acknowledges also, that the deputies of the Tiers Etat were enabled to disobey the royal mandate for their separation, and to triumph in that disobedience, only because the *public opinion* was so decidedly in their favour, that nobody could be found who would undertake to disperse them by violence.

Now, if it be true, that for upwards of twenty years before this period, this love of liberty had been inculcated with much zeal and little prudence, in many eloquent and popular publications, and that the names

and the maxims of those writers were very much in the mouths of those who patronised the subversion of royalty in that country, is it not reasonable to presume, that some part of this enthusiasm for liberty, and some part of that popular favour for those who were supposed to be its champions, by means of which it is allowed that the revolution was accomplished, may be attributed to the influence of those publications?

We do not wish to push this argument far; we are conscious that many other causes contributed to excite, in the minds of the people, those ideas of independence and reform by which the revolution was effected. The constant example, and increasing intimacy with England—the contagion caught in America—and, above all, the advances that had been made in opulence and information, by those classes of the people to whom the exemptions and pretensions of the privileged orders were most obnoxious—all co-operated to produce a spirit of discontent and innovation, and to increase their dislike and impatience of the defects and abuses of their government. In considering a question of this kind, it should never be forgotten that it had many defects, and was liable to manifold abuses: but for this very reason, the writers who aggravated these defects, and held out these abuses to detestation, were the more likely to make an impression. To say that they made none, and that all the zeal that was testified in France against despotism, and in favour of liberty, was the natural and spontaneous result of reflection and feeling in the minds of those whom it actuated, is to make an assertion which does not sound probable, and certainly has not been proved. That writings, capable of exciting it, existed, and were read, seems not to be contested upon any hand: it is somewhat paradoxical to contend, that they had yet no share in its excitation. If Molière could render the faculty of medicine ridiculous by a few farces, in an age much less addicted to literature; if Voltaire could, by the mere force of writing, advance the interests of infidelity, in opposition to all the orthodox learning of Europe; is it to be imagined, that no effect would be produced by the greatest talents in the world, employed upon a theme the most popular and seductive?

M. Mounier has asked, if we think that men require to be taught the self-evident doctrine of their rights, and their means of redress; if the Roman insurgents were led by philosophers, when they seceded to Mons Sacer; or, if the Swiss and the Dutch asserted their liberties upon the suggestion of democratical authors? We would answer, that, in small states and barbarous ages, there are abuses so gross as to be absolutely intolerable, and so qualified as to become personal to every member of the community; that orators supply the place of writers in those early ages; and that we only deny the influence of the latter, where we are assured of their non-existence. Because a vessel may be carried along by the current, shall we deny that her progress is assisted by the breeze?

We are persuaded, therefore, that the writings of those popular philosophers, who have contended for political freedom, had some share in bringing about the revolution in France; how great, or how inconsiderable a share, we are not qualified to determine, and hold it, indeed, impossible to ascertain. There are no *data* from which we can estimate the relative force of such an influence; nor does language afford us any terms that are fitted to express its proportions. We must be satisfied with holding that it existed, and that those who deny its operation altogether, are almost as much mistaken as those who make it account for every thing.

But though we conceive that philosophy is thus, in some degree, responsible for the French revolution, we are far from charging her with the guilt that this name implies. The writers to whom we allude may have produced effects very different from what they intended, and very different even from what their works might seem calculated to produce. An approved medicine may have occasioned convulsions and death; and the flame that was meant to enlighten, may have spread into conflagration and ruin.

M. Mounier, throughout his book, has attended too little to this distinction. He has denied, for the philosophers, all participation in the fact; and has had but little interest, therefore, to justify them on the score of intention. It is a subject, however, which deserves a little consideration.

That there were defects and abuses, and some of these very gross too, in the old system of government in France, we presume will scarcely be denied. That it was lawful to wish for their removal, will probably be as readily admitted; and that the peaceful influence of philosophy, while confined to this object, was laudably and properly exerted, seems to follow as a necessary conclusion. It would not be easy, therefore, to blame those writers who have confined themselves to a dispassionate and candid statement of the advantages of a better institution; and it must seem hard to involve in the guilt of Robespierre and the Jacobins, those persons in France who aimed at nothing more than the abolition of absurd privileges, and the limitation of arbitrary power. Montesquieu, Turgot, and Raynal, were probably, in some degree, dissatisfied with the government of their country, and would have rejoiced in the prospect of a reform; but it can only be the delirium of party prejudice, that would suspect them of wishing for the downfall of royalty, and for the prescriptions and equality of a reign of terror. It would be treating their accusers too much like men in their senses, to justify such men any farther on the score of intention: yet it is possible that they may have been instrumental in the revolution, and that their writings may have begun that motion, that terminated in ungovernable violence. We will not go over the common-place arguments that may be stated to convict them of imprudence. Every step that is taken towards the destruction of prejudice, is attended with the danger of an opposite excess: but it is no less clearly our duty to advance against prejudices; and they deserve the highest praise, who unite the greatest steadiness with the greatest precaution. At the time when the writings we are speaking of were published, there was not a man in Europe who could discern in them the seeds of future danger. So far from denouncing them as the harbingers of regicide and confusion, the public received them as hostages and guides to security. It was long thought that their effects were inadequate to their merits: nothing but the event could have instructed us that it was too powerful for our tranquillity. To such men, the reproach of improvidence can be made only because their foresight was not prophetic; and those alone are entitled to call them imprudent, who could have predicted the tempest in the calm, and foretold those consequences by which the whole world has since been astonished.

If it be true, therefore, that writers of this description have facilitated and promoted the revolution, it is a truth which should detract but little either from their merit or their reputation. Their designs were pure and honourable; and the natural tendency and promise of their labours was exalted and fair. They failed, by a fatality which they were not bound

to foresee ; and a concurrence of events, against which it was impossible for them to provide, turned that to mischief, which was planned out by wisdom for good. We do not tax the builder with imprudence, because the fortress which he erected for our protection is thrown down by an earthquake on our heads.

There is another set of writers, however, for whom it will not be so easy to find an apology, who, instead of sober reasoning and practical observation, have intruded upon the public with every species of extravagance and absurdity. The presumptuous theories and audacious maxims of Rousseau, Mably, Condorcet, &c. had a necessary tendency to do harm. They unsettled all the foundations of political duty, and taught the citizens of every existing community, that they were enslaved, and had the power of being free. M. Mounier has too much moderation himself, to approve of the doctrines of these reformers ; but he assures us, that, instead of promoting their revolution, it was the revolution that raised them into celebrity ; that they rose in reputation, after it became necessary to quote them as apologists or authorities ; but that, before that time, their speculations were looked upon as brilliant absurdities, that no more deserved a serious confutation, than the Polity of Plato, or the Utopia of Sir Thomas More. — With all our respect for M. Mounier, we have some difficulty in believing this assertion. Rousseau, in particular, was universally read and admired, long before he was exalted into the revolutionary Pantheon ; and his political sagacity must have had some serious admirers, when he was himself invited to legislate for an existing community. Whatever influence he had, however, was unquestionably pernicious ; and though some apology may be found for him in the enthusiasm of his disordered imagination, he is chargeable with the highest presumption, and the most blameable imprudence. Of some of the other writers who have inculcated the same doctrines, we must speak rather in charity than in justice, if we say nothing more severe.

M. Mounier expresses himself with much judgment and propriety upon the subject of religion ; its necessity to a sound morality, and its tendency to promote rational liberty, and to preserve good order. He is of opinion, however, that there is no natural connection between irreligion and democracy, and thinks that the infidel writers of this age have not to answer for its political enormities. He observes, that it was during the devoutest ages of the Church, that Italy was covered with republics, and that Switzerland asserted her independence ; that the revolted States of America were composed of the most religious people of the world ; and that the liberty and equality which brought Charles the First to the block, were generated among fanatics and puritans.

Our limits will not allow us to enter fully into the consideration of this very important question. We shall take the liberty to make but two remarks upon the opinion we have just quoted. The one is, that the existence of insurrections in a religious age is no proof of the inefficacy of religion to promote a rational submission to authority ; — a check may be very strong, without being altogether insurmountable ; and disorders may arise in spite of religion, without discrediting its tendency to suppress them. It surely would be no good ground for denying that intoxication made men quarrelsome, to enumerate the instances in which people had quarrelled when they were sober. The other remark is, that instances taken from the conduct of enthusiasts and bigots have no fair application to the present question. Fanaticism and irreligion approach very nearly to each other in their effects on the moral conduct. He

who thinks himself a favourite with the Deity, is apt to be as careless of his behaviour, as he who does not believe at all in his existence: both think themselves alike entitled to dispense with the vulgar rules of morality; and both are alike destitute of the curb and the guidance of a sober and rational religion. Submission to lawful authority is indisputably the maxim of Christianity; and they who destroy our faith in that religion, take away one security for our submission, and facilitate the subversion of governments. This is a great truth, the authority of which is not impaired by the rebellions that priests have instigated, or the disorders that fanatics have raised.

After having detained our readers so long with the investigation of M. Mounier's own theory of the revolution, we can scarcely undertake to follow him through all his remarks on the theories of others. He treats with much scorn and ridicule the idea of accounting for this great event, by the supposition of an actual conspiracy of philosophers and speculative men; and, upon this subject, we conceive that his statement is correct and satisfactory. There never were any considerable number of literary men in France, we are persuaded, who wished for the subversion of royalty; and the few that entertained that sentiment, expressed it openly in their writings, and do not appear to have taken any extraordinary pains, either to diffuse, or to set it in action. In attempting to prove this pretended conspiracy of the philosophers against the throne, we conceive that the Abbé Baruel has completely failed; and are certain, that his zeal has carried him into excesses, which no liberal man will justify. We shall say nothing of the declarations of that miserable hypochondriac (Le Roi), who is said to have revealed the secret of the committee which met at Baron Holbach's: but when an obscure writer denounces Montesquieu as a conspirator, and loads with every epithet of reproach the pure and respectable names of Turgot, Malesherbes, and Neckar, the public will know what to think of his charity and his cause. It required certainly nothing less than the acuteness of the *odium theologicum*, to discover, in Neckar's book, on the importance of religious opinions, a proof of the *atheism* of the writer; and it would require a faith, that had superseded both charity and judgment, to believe that this virtuous minister "excited a famine, to drive the people to revolt; and then ruined the finances, to force them on to rebellion."

We agree, then, upon the whole, with M. Mounier, that the revolution was produced by apparent and natural causes; that there is no room for pretending to *discoveries* upon such a subject; and that the conspiracies and secret combinations which some writers have affected to disclose, have had no existence but in their own imaginations. In the year 1786, there probably was not a man in France who entertained the idea of overthrowing the throne of the Bourbons; and the party that shook it first had evidently no connection with that which laid it in ruins. It would not be easy to say, then, which party was the agent of this conspiracy of philosophers; and they who fought against each other could not well be pupils of the same school, nor acting from the same code of instruction. If the parliaments acted in subordination to this anti-monarchical conspiracy, the leaders of the first National Assembly must have acted against it. If Fayette was its emissary, Orleans must have been its foe. The conspirators who supported Brissot could not have contributed to the successes of Robespierre; and the devices by which Robespierre was successful cannot account for the triumphs of Bonaparte. The idea, in short, of a conspiracy, regularly concerted, and



successfully carried on, by men calling themselves philosophers, for the establishment of a republic, appears to us to be the most visionary and extravagant. Such a supposition has, no doubt, a fine dramatic effect, and gives an air of theatrical interest to the history; but, in the great tragedy of real life, there are no such fantastic plots or simple catastrophes. Events are always produced by the co-operation of complicated causes; and the theories that would refer them to extraordinary and mysterious agents may infallibly be rejected as erroneous.

We differ from M. Mounier, on the other hand, in believing, that though the philosophers did not concert or organise the revolution in their councils of conspiracy, they yet contributed, in some degree, to its production, by the influence of their writings; the greater part without consciousness or design, and a few through a dangerous zeal for liberty, or an excessive thirst for distinction.

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#### CONSEQUENCES OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.\*

AMONG the many evils which the French revolution has inflicted on mankind, the most deplorable, perhaps, both in point of extent and of probable duration, consists in the injury which it has done to the cause of rational freedom, and the discredit in which it has involved the principles of political philosophy. The warnings which may be derived from the misfortunes of that country, and the lessons which may still be read in the tragical consequences of her temerity, are memorable, no doubt, and important: but they are such as are presented to us by the history of every period of the world; and the emotions by which they have been impressed, are in this case too violent to let their import and application be properly distinguished. From the miscarriage of a scheme of frantic innovation, we have conceived an unreasonable and indiscriminating dread of all alteration or reform. The bad success of an attempt to make government perfect has reconciled us to imperfections that might easily be removed; and the miserable consequences of treating every thing as prejudice and injustice, which could not be reconciled to a system of a fantastic equality, has given strength to prejudices, and sanction to abuses, which were gradually wearing away before the progress of reason and philosophy. The French revolution has thrown us back half a century in the course of political improvement; and driven us to cling once more, with superstitious terror, at the feet of those idols from which we had been nearly reclaimed by the lessons of a milder philosophy. When we look round on the wreck and the ruin which the whirlwind has scattered over the prospect before us, we tremble at the rising gale, and shrink even from the wholesome air that stirs the fig-leaf on our porch. Terrified and disgusted with the brawls and midnight murders which proceed from intoxication, we are almost inclined to deny ourselves the pleasures of a generous hospitality; and scarcely venture to diffuse the comforts of light or of warmth in our dwellings, when we turn our eyes on the devastation which the flames have committed around us.

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\* Mémoires de Bailly. — Vol. vi. page 137. April, 1805.

The same circumstances which have thus led us to confound what is salutary with what is pernicious in our establishments, have also perverted our judgments as to the characters of those who were connected with these memorable occurrences. The tide of popular favour, which ran at one time with a dangerous and headlong violence to the side of innovation and political experiment, has now set, perhaps too strongly, in an opposite direction; and the same misguiding passions that placed factious and selfish men on a level with patriots and heroes, has now ranked the blameless and the enlightened in the herd of murderers and madmen.

There are two classes of men, in particular, to whom it appears to us that the revolution has thus done injustice, and who have been made to share in some measure the infamy of its most detestable agents, in consequence of venial errors, and in spite of extraordinary merits. There are none, indeed, who made a figure in its more advanced stages, that may not be left, without any great breach of charity, to the vengeance of public opinion; and both the descriptions of persons to whom we have alluded only existed, accordingly, at the period of its commencement. These were the philosophers, or speculative men, who inculcated a love of liberty and a desire of reform by their writings and conversation; and the virtuous and moderate, who attempted to *act* upon these principles at the outset of the revolution, and countenanced or suggested those measures by which the ancient frame of the government was eventually dissolved. To confound either of these classes of men with the monsters by whom they were succeeded, it would be necessary to forget that they were in reality their most strenuous opponents, and their earliest victims. If they were instrumental in conjuring up the tempest, we may at least presume that their co-operation was granted in ignorance, since they were the first to fall before it; and can scarcely be supposed to have either foreseen or intended those consequences in which their own ruin was so inevitably involved. That they are chargeable with imprudence and with presumption, may be affirmed, perhaps, without fear of contradiction; though, with regard to many of them, it would be no easy task, perhaps, to point out by what conduct they could have avoided such an imputation; and this charge, it is manifest, ought at any rate to be kept carefully separate from that of guilt or atrocity. Benevolent intentions, though alloyed by vanity, and misguided by ignorance, can never become the objects of the highest moral reprobation; and enthusiasm itself, though it does the work of the demons, ought still to be distinguished from treachery or malice. The knightly adventurer, who broke the chains of the galley-slaves, purely that they might enjoy their deliverance from bondage, will always be regarded with other feelings than the robber who freed them to recruit the ranks of his banditti.

We have examined in a former article\* the extent of the participation which can be fairly imputed to the *philosophers*, in the crimes and miseries of the revolution, and endeavoured to ascertain in how far they may be said to have made themselves responsible for its consequences, or to have deserved censure for their exertions; and, acquitting the greater part of any mischievous intention, we found reason, upon that occasion, to conclude that there was nothing in the conduct of the majority which should expose them to blame, or deprive them of the credit which they

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\* Vol. i. p. 9, 10, &c.

would have certainly enjoyed, but for consequences which they could not foresee. For those who, with intentions equally blameless, attempted to carry into execution the projects which had been suggested by the others, and actually engaged in measures which could not fail to terminate in important changes, it will not be easy, we are afraid, to make so satisfactory an apology. What is written may be corrected; but what is done cannot be recalled: a rash and injudicious publication naturally calls forth an host of answers; and where the subject of discussion is such as excites a very powerful interest, the cause of truth is not always least effectually served by her opponents. But the errors of cabinets and of legislatures have other consequences and other confutations. They are answered by insurrections, and confuted by conspiracies. A paradox which might have been maintained by an author, without any other loss than that of a little leisure, and ink and paper, can only be supported by a minister at the expense of the lives and the liberties of a nation. It is evident, therefore, that the precipitation of a legislator can never admit of the same excuse with that of a speculative enquirer; that the same confidence in his opinions, which justifies the former in maintaining them to the world, will never justify the other in suspending the happiness of his country on the issue of their truth; and that he, in particular, subjects himself to a tremendous responsibility, who voluntarily takes upon himself the new-modelling of an ancient constitution.

We are very much inclined to do justice to the virtuous and enlightened men who abounded in the Constituent Assembly of France. We believe that the motives of many of them were pure, and their patriotism unaffected: their talents are still more indisputable: but we cannot acquit them of blamable presumption and inexcusable imprudence. There are *three* points, it appears to us, in particular, in which they were bound to have foreseen the consequences of their proceedings.

In the *first* place, the spirit of exasperation, defiance, and intimidation, with which from the beginning they carried on their opposition to the schemes of the court, the clergy, and the nobility, appears to us to have been as impolitic with a view to their ultimate success, as it was suspicious, perhaps, as to their immediate motives. The parade which they made of their popularity; the support which they submitted to receive from the menaces and acclamations of the mob; the joy which they testified at the desertion of the royal armies; and the anomalous military force, of which they patronised the formation in the city of Paris; were so many preparations for actual hostility, and led almost inevitably to that appeal to force, by which all prospect of establishing an equitable government was finally cut off. Sanguine as the patriots of that assembly undoubtedly were, they might still have been able to remember the most obvious and important lesson in the whole volume of history, that the nation which has recourse to arms for the settlement of its internal affairs necessarily falls under the iron yoke of a military government in the end, and that nothing but the most evident necessity can justify the lovers of freedom in forcing it from the hands of their governors. In France, there certainly was no such necessity. The whole weight and strength of the nation were bent upon political improvement and reform. There was no possibility of their being ultimately resisted; and the only danger that was to be apprehended was, that their progress would be too rapid. After the States-General were granted, indeed, it appears to us that the victory of the friends to liberty was ascertained. They could not have gone too slowly afterwards; they could not have been satisfied with too

little. The great object was to exclude the agency of force, and to leave no pretext for an appeal to violence. Nothing could have stood against the force of reason, which ought to have given way; and from a monarch of the character of Louis XVI. there was no reason to apprehend any attempt to regain, by violence, what he had yielded from principles of philanthropy and conviction. The Third Estate would have *grown* into power, instead of usurping it; and would have gradually compressed the other orders into their proper dimensions, instead of displacing them by a violence that could never be forgiven. Even if the Orders had deliberated separately (as it appears to us they ought clearly to have done), the commons were sure of an ultimate preponderance, and the government of a permanent and incalculable amelioration. Convened in a legislative assembly, and engrossing almost entirely the respect and affections of the whole nation, they would have enjoyed the unlimited liberty of political discussion, and gradually impressed on the government the character of their peculiar principles. By the restoration of the legislative function to the commons of the kingdom, the system was rendered complete, and required only to be put into action in order to assume all those improvements which necessarily resulted from the increased wealth and intelligence of its representatives.

Of this fair chance of amelioration, the nation was disappointed, chiefly, we are inclined to think, by the needless asperity and injudicious menaces of the popular party. They relied openly upon the strength of their adherents among the populace. If they did not actually encourage them to threats and to acts of violence, they availed themselves at least of those which were committed, to intimidate and depress their opponents; for it is indisputably certain, that the unconditional compliance of the court with all the demands of the Constituent Assembly was the result either of actual force, or the dread of its immediate application. This was the inauspicious commencement of the sins and the sufferings of the revolution. Their progress and termination were natural and necessary. The multitude, once allowed to overawe the old government with threats, soon subjected the new government to the same degradation; and, once permitted to act in arms, came speedily to dictate to those who were assembled to deliberate. As soon as an appeal was made to force, the decision came to be with those by whom force could at all times be commanded. Reason and philosophy were discarded; and mere terror and brute violence, in the various forms of proscriptions, insurrections, massacres, and military executions, harassed and distracted the misguided nation, till, by a natural consummation, they fell under the despotic sceptre of a military usurper. These consequences, we conceive, were obvious, and might have been easily foreseen. Nearly half a century had elapsed since they were pointed out in those memorable words of the most profound and philosophical of historians:—“By recent, as well as by ancient example, it was become evident, that illegal violence, with whatever pretences it may be covered, and whatever object it may pursue, must inevitably end at last in the arbitrary and despotic government of a single person.”\*

The *second* inexcusable blunder, of which the Constituent Assembly was guilty, was one equally obvious, and has been more frequently

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\* Hume's History, chapter lx. at the end. The whole passage is deserving of the most profound meditation.

noticed. It was the extreme restlessness and precipitation with which they proceeded to accomplish, in a few weeks, the legislative labours of a century. Their constitution was struck out at a heat, and their measures of reform proposed and adopted like toasts at an election dinner. Within less than six months from the period of their first convocation, they declared the illegality of all the subsisting taxes; they abolished the old constitution of the States-General; they settled the limits of the royal prerogative, their own inviolability, and the responsibility of ministers. Before they put any one of their projects to the test of experiment, they had adopted such an enormous multitude, as entirely to innovate the condition of the country, and to expose even those which were salutary to misapprehension and miscarriage. From a scheme of reformation so impetuous, and an impatience so puerile, nothing permanent or judicious could be reasonably expected. In legislating for their country, they seem to have forgotten that they were operating on a living and sentient substance, and not on an inert and passive mass, which they might model and compound according to their pleasure or their fancy. Human society, however, is not like a piece of mechanism, which may be safely taken to pieces, and put together by the hands of an ordinary artist. It is the work of Nature, and not of man; and has received, from the hands of its Author, an organisation that cannot be destroyed without danger to its existence, and certain properties and powers that cannot be altered or suspended by those who may have been intrusted with its management. By studying these properties, and directing those powers, it may be modified and altered to a very considerable extent. But they must be allowed to develop themselves by their internal energy, and to familiarise themselves with their new channel of exertion. A child cannot be stretched out by engines to the stature of a man; nor a man compelled, in a morning, to excel in all the exercises of an athlete. Those into whose hands the destinies of a great nation are committed, should bestow on its reformation at least as much patient observance and as much tender precaution as are displayed by a skilful gardener in his treatment of a sickly plant. He props up those branches that are weak or overloaded, and gradually prunes and reduces those that are too luxuriant: he cuts away what is absolutely rotten and distempered: he stirs the earth about the root, and sprinkles it with water, and waits for the coming spring: he trains the young branches to the right hand or to the left; and leads it, by a gradual and spontaneous progress, to expand or exalt itself, season after season, in the direction which he had previously determined: and thus, in the course of a few summers, he brings it, without injury or compulsion, into that form and proportion which could not with safety have been imposed upon it in a shorter time. The reformers of France applied no such gentle solicitations, and could not wait for the effects of any such preparatory measures or voluntary developments. They forcibly broke over its lofty boughs, and endeavoured to straighten its crooked joints by violence: they tortured it into symmetry in vain, and shed its life-blood on the earth, in the middle of its scattered branches.

The *third* great danger, against which we think it was the duty of the intelligent and virtuous part of the deputies to have provided, was that which arose from the sudden transference of power to the hands of men who had previously no natural or individual influence in the community. This was an evil, indeed, which arose necessarily, in some degree, from the defects of the old government, and from the novelty of the situation

in which the country was placed by the convocation of the States-General; but it was materially aggravated by the presumption and improvidence of those enthusiastic legislators, and tended powerfully to produce those disasters by which they were ultimately overwhelmed.

No representative legislature, it appears to us, can ever be respectable or secure, unless it contain within itself a great proportion of those who form the natural aristocracy of the country, and are able, as individuals, to influence the conduct and opinions of the greater part of its inhabitants. Unless the power and weight and authority of the assembly, in short, be really made up of the power and weight and authority of the individuals who compose it, the factitious dignity they may derive from their situation can never be of long endurance; and the dangerous power with which they may be invested will become the subject of scrambling and contention among the factions of the metropolis, and be employed for any purpose but the general good of the community.

In England, the House of Commons is made up of the individuals who, by birth, by fortune, or by talents, possess singly the greatest influence over the rest of the people. The most certain and the most permanent influence is that of rank and of riches; and these are the qualifications, accordingly, which return the greatest number of members. Men submit to be governed by the united will of those, to whose will, as individuals, the greater part of them have been previously accustomed to submit themselves; and an act of Parliament is revered and obeyed, not because the people are impressed with a constitutional veneration for an institution called a parliament, but because it has been passed by the authority of those who are recognised as their natural superiors, and by whose influence, as individuals, the same measures might have been enforced over the greater part of the kingdom. Scarcely any new power is acquired, therefore, by the combination of those persons into a legislature: they carry each their share of influence and authority into the senate along with them; and it is by adding the items of it together, that the influence and authority of the senate itself is made up. From such a senate, therefore, it is obvious that their power can never be wrested, and that it would not even attach to those who might succeed in supplanting them in the legislature by violence or intrigue, or by any other means than those by which they themselves had originally secured their nomination. In such a state of representation, in short, the influence of the representatives is not borrowed from their office, but the influence of the office is supported by that which is personal to its members; and parliament is only regarded as the great depositary of all the authority which formerly existed, in a scattered state, among its members. This authority, therefore, belonging to the men, and not to their places, can neither be lost by them, if they are forced from their places, nor found by those who may supplant them. The Long Parliament, after it was purged by the Independents, and the assemblies that met under that name, during the protectorate of Cromwell, held the place, and enjoyed all the form of power that had belonged to their predecessors; but as they no longer contained those individuals who were able to sway and influence the opinion of the body of the people, they were without respect or authority, and speedily came to be the objects of public derision and contempt.

As the power and authority of a legislature thus constituted is perfectly secure and inalienable on the one hand, so, on the other, the moderation of its proceedings is guaranteed by a consciousness of the basis upon

which this authority is founded. Every individual, being aware of the extent to which his own influence is likely to reach among his constituents and dependants, is anxious that the mandates of the body shall never pass beyond that limit, within which obedience may be easily secured. He will not hazard the loss of his own power, therefore, by any attempt to enlarge that of the legislature; and feeling, at every step, the weight and resistance of the people, the whole assembly proceeds with a due regard to their opinions and prejudices, and can never do any thing very injurious or very distasteful to the majority. From the very nature of the authority with which they are invested, they are, in fact, consubstantiated with the people for whom they are to legislate. They do not sit loose upon them, like riders on inferior animals; nor speculate nor project experiments upon their welfare, like operators upon a foreign substance. They are the natural organs of a great living body; and are not only warned, by their own feelings, of any injury which they may be tempted to inflict on it, but would become incapable of performing their functions, if they were to proceed far in debilitating the general system.

Such, it appears to us, though delivered, perhaps, in too abstract and elementary a form, is the just conception of a free representative legislature. Neither the English House of Commons, indeed, nor any assembly of any other nation, ever realised it in all its perfection; but it is in their approximation to such a standard, we conceive, that their excellence and utility will be found to consist; and where the conditions upon which we have insisted are absolutely wanting, the sudden institution of a representative legislature will only be a step to the most frightful disorders. Where it has grown up in a country in which personal liberty and property are tolerably secure, it naturally assumes that form which is most favourable to its beneficial influence, and has a tendency to perpetual improvement, and to the constant amelioration of the condition of the whole society. The difference between a free government and a tyrannical one consists entirely in the different proportions of the people that are influenced by their *opinion*, or subjugated by *force*. In a large society, opinions can only be reunited by means of representation; and the natural representative is the individual whose example and authority can influence the opinions of the greater part of those in whose behalf he is delegated. This is the natural aristocracy of a civilised nation; and its legislature is then upon the best possible footing, when it is in the hands of those who answer to that description. The whole people are governed by the laws, exactly as each clan or district of them would have been by the patriarchal authority of an elective and unarmed chieftain; and the lawgivers are not only secure of their places while they can maintain their influence over the people, but are withheld from any rash or injurious measure by the consciousness and feelings of their dependence on this voluntary deference and submission.

If this be at all a just representation of the conditions upon which the respectability and security of a representative legislature must always depend, it will not be difficult to explain how the experiment miscarried so completely in the case of the French Constituent Assembly. That assembly, which the enthusiasm of the public and the misconduct of the privileged orders soon enabled to engross the whole power of the country, consisted almost entirely of persons without name or individual influence, who owed the whole of their consequence to the situation to which they had been elevated, and were not able, as individuals, to have influenced the opinions of one fiftieth part of their countrymen. There

was in France, indeed, at this time, no legitimate, wholesome, or real aristocracy. The noblesse, who were persecuted for bearing that name, were quite disconnected from the people. Their habits of perpetual residence in the capital, and their total independence of the good opinion of their vassals, had deprived them of any influence over the minds of the lower orders; and the organisation of society had not yet enabled the rich manufacturers or proprietors to assume such an influence. The persons sent as deputies to the States-General, therefore, were those chiefly who, by intrigue and boldness, and by professions of uncommon zeal for what were then the great objects of popular pursuit, had been enabled to carry the votes of the electors. A notion of talent, and an opinion that they would be loud and vehement in supporting those requests upon which the people had already come to a decision, were their passports into that assembly. They were sent there to express the particular spirit of the people, and not to give a general pledge of their acquiescence in what might there be enacted. They were not the hereditary patrons of the people, but their hired advocates for a particular pleading. They had no general trust or authority over them; but were chosen as their special messengers, out of a multitude whose influence and pretensions were equally powerful.

When these men found themselves, as it were by accident, in possession of the whole power of the state, and invested with the absolute government of the greatest nation that has existed in modern times, it is not to be wondered at if they forgot the slender ties by which they were bound to their constituents. The powers to which they had succeeded were so infinitely beyond any thing that they had enjoyed in their individual capacity, that it is not surprising if they never thought of exerting them with the same consideration and caution. Instead of the great bases of rank and property, which cannot be transferred by the clamours of the factious, or the caprice of the inconstant, and which serve to ballast and steady the vessel of the state in all its wanderings and disasters, the assembly possessed only the basis of talent or reputation; qualities which depend upon opinion and opportunity, and which may be attributed in the same proportion to an inconvenient multitude at once. The whole legislature may be considered, therefore, as composed of *adventurers*, who had already attained a situation incalculably above their original pretensions, and were now tempted to push their fortune by every means that held out the promise of immediate success. They had nothing, comparatively speaking, to lose, but their places in the assembly, or the influence which they possessed within its walls; and as the authority of the assembly itself depended altogether upon the popularity of its measures, and not upon the intrinsic authority of its members, so it was only to be maintained by a succession of brilliant and imposing resolutions, and by satisfying or outdoing the extravagant wishes and expectations of the most extravagant and sanguine populace that ever existed. For a man to get a lead in such an assembly, it was by no means necessary that he should have previously possessed any influence or authority in the community; that he should be connected with powerful families, or supported by opulent and extensive associations. If he could dazzle and overawe in debate; if he could obtain the acclamations of the mob of Versailles, and make himself familiar to the eyes and the ears of the assembly and its galleries; he was in a fair train for having a great share in the direction of an assembly exercising absolute sovereignty over thirty millions of men. The prize was too tempting not



to attract a multitude of competitors ; and the assembly for many months was governed by those who outvied their associates in the impracticable extravagance of their patriotism, and sacrificed most profusely the real interests of the people at the shrine of a precarious popularity.

In this way, the assembly, from the inherent vices of its constitution, ceased to be respectable or useful. The same causes speedily put an end to its security, and converted it into an instrument of destruction.

Mere popularity was at first the instrument by which this unsteady legislature was governed : but when it became apparent that whoever could obtain the direction or command of it must possess the whole authority of the state, parties became less scrupulous about the means they employed for that purpose, and soon found out that violence and terror were infinitely more effectual and expeditious than persuasion and eloquence. The people at large, who had no attachment to any families or individuals among their delegates, and who contented themselves with idolising the assembly in general, so long as it passed decrees to their liking, were passive and indifferent spectators of the transference of power which was effected by the pikes of the Parisian multitude, and looked with equal affection upon every successive junto which assumed the management of its deliberations. Having no natural representatives, they felt themselves equally connected with all who exercised the legislative function ; and, being destitute of a real aristocracy, were without the means of giving effectual support even to those who might appear to deserve it. Encouraged by this situation of affairs, the most daring, unprincipled, and profligate, proceeded to seize upon the defenceless legislature ; and, driving all their antagonists before them by violence or intimidation, entered without opposition upon the supreme functions of government. The arms, however, by which they had been victorious, were capable of being turned against themselves ; and those who were envious of their success, or ambitious of their distinction, easily found means to excite discontent among the multitude, now inured to insurrection, and to employ them in pulling down those very individuals whom they had so recently exalted. The disposal of the legislature thus became a prize to be fought for in the clubs and conspiracies and insurrections of a corrupted metropolis ; and the institution of a national representative had no other effect than that of laying the government open to lawless force and flagitious audacity.

It is in this manner, it appears to us, that, from the want of a natural and efficient aristocracy to exercise the functions of representative legislators, the National Assembly of France was betrayed into extravagance, and fell a prey to faction ; that the institution itself became a source of public misery and disorder, and converted a civilised monarchy, first into a sanguinary democracy, and then into a military despotism.

It would be the excess of injustice, we have already said, to impute these disastrous consequences to the moderate and virtuous individuals who sat in the Constituent Assembly ; but if it be admitted that they might have been easily foreseen, it will not be easy to exculpate them from the charge of very blamable imprudence. It would be still more difficult, indeed, to point out any course of conduct by which those dangers might have been entirely avoided ; but they would undoubtedly have been less formidable, if the enlightened members of the Third Estate had endeavoured to form a party with the more liberal and popular among the nobility ; if they had associated to themselves a greater number of those to whose persons a certain degree of influence was

attached, from their fortune, their age, or their official situation ; if, instead of grasping presumptuously at the exclusive direction of the national councils, and arrogating every thing on the credit of their zealous patriotism and inexperienced abilities, they had sought to strengthen themselves by an alliance with what was respectable in the existing establishments, and attached themselves at first as disciples to those whom they expected speedily to outgrow and eclipse.

Upon a review of the whole matter, it seems impossible to acquit those of the revolutionary patriots, whose intentions are admitted to be pure, of great precipitation, presumption, and imprudence. Apologies may be found for them, perhaps, in the inexperience which was incident to their situation ; in their constant apprehension of being separated before their task was accomplished ; in the exasperation which was excited by the injudicious proceedings of the cabinet ; and in the intoxication which naturally resulted from the magnitude of their early triumph, and the noise and resounding of their popularity. But the errors into which they fell were inexcusable, we think, in politicians of the eighteenth century ; and while we pity their sufferings, and admire their genius, we cannot feel any respect for their wisdom, or any surprise at their miscarriage.

## PART FOURTH.

## CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.

## HISTORY OF TOLERATION.\*

THE history of toleration is still a desideratum, and an important one ; for it affords very useful lessons both to statesmen and divines, as well as to private Christians of all denominations, besides some matter of curious speculation to philosophers. We shall therefore make no apology for offering a few observations on this subject, which have been suggested by the perusal of the work before us. We understand it to be the production of a learned clergyman in Northumberland, minister of a dissenting congregation in communion with the Established Church of Scotland. It was not published at any of the great marts of literature, and fell into our hands accidentally ; but we think it entitled to public notice, on account of the justness and ingenuity, as well as the liberality, of its general views. It is a short, but interesting and instructive account (which we hope will, in due time, be enlarged to a full history) of the slow progress of toleration, — combined with a judicious defence of that equitable, humane, and politic system, which it is painful to think there should be any occasion for defending in the nineteenth century, and in England. This last subject we have no intention of discussing in the present article, but shall confine ourselves to a few observations on the history of toleration — we should rather say, of intolerance, — for intolerance is the positive, active principle, — and the suppression of intolerance is the same thing with the establishment of toleration.

Our author justly observes (p. 145.), that “persecution has not resulted from any particular system, but from the prevalence of ignorance, and the force of those illiberal prejudices which are natural to the mind of untutored man.” In fact, it may be laid down as a fundamental principle, that intolerance is natural to man in every state of society. Much training is required before we can listen with patience, or even behave with civility, to those who dissent from our own settled opinions upon any subject. Our own opinions we of course presume to be right, and, from long familiarity, we conceive them to be evident ; so that we naturally ascribe all dissent from them to weakness or perversity, — but rather to perversity than weakness. Besides, it is irksome to change our habits of thinking ; and he who applies his arguments to destroy the sentiments and judgments which nature or education has woven into our constitution,

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\* Popular Reflections on the Progress of the Principles of Toleration, and the Reasonableness of the Catholic Claims. By a Protestant.—Vol. xxvi. page 51. February, 1816.

not only requires us to submit to a harsh operation, but also, which is incomparably worse, he mortifies our self-conceit. Hence the *eruditissimi et clarissimi viri*, who guide our way through the ancient classics, frequently betray their resentment of contradiction, and add a wonderful interest to their lucubrations by the bitterness of their sarcasms against their philological adversaries. Even in philosophy, where we might look, if any where, for calm and amicable discussion, the controversies are too often enlivened with a rancour altogether unnecessary for the discovery of truth: and many a doctrine which is now received as incontrovertible, was at first compelled to fight its way in opposition to the ridicule and anathemas of the reigning schools. Christian divines submitted for ages to Aristotle's yoke, and would tolerate no murmurs against their heathen master. It was not till after vexatious controversies that the authority of Newton was established. None of Harvey's cotemporaries, who had attained the age of forty at the time of his grand discovery, were able to perceive that he had demonstrated the circulation of the blood. Priestley, while he appeared to be so completely emancipated from prejudice, — while he treated with contempt so many doctrines which had been long and almost universally revered by the Christian world, — could not be persuaded, by all the evidence of Lavoisier's experiments, to renounce his faith in the mysteries of phlogiston. And in the controversy, which has not yet ceased, between the Huttonians and the Wernerians, the vivacity with which the learned philosophers darted their pleasantries against each other has been more remarkable than their cordial co-operation in their common enquiry.

The greater the importance that we attach to our opinions, the greater of course will be our intolerance of contradiction. But when our estimation in society, or when our fortune and station have any dependence on the respect of the public for the principles which we profess, it is most natural that we should be diligent in their defence and propagation. And if we can persuade ourselves that they are of the utmost consequence both in this life and the next, our zeal must be wonderfully animated by this identification of our own ambition with the eternal interests of our fellow-creatures. The propagation and protection of the orthodox faith will appear our paramount duty, dictated equally by piety and benevolence: and in the prosecution of this high design, the zealots will regard the end as sanctifying the means; they will address themselves, not to reason only, — but to the ignorance, to the passions, and, above all, to the terrors of the multitude; they will hold forth the heretic as the enemy of God and man; and, seeking at last for more powerful weapons than logic or even rhetoric can furnish, will call for the civil magistrate “to execute justice, and to maintain truth.” The civil magistrate himself is subject to the same dupery with the multitude; — he may be forced, like Pilate, to yield to the general frenzy against his better judgment; — or he may find it expedient to form an alliance with the popular priesthood; — one of the high contracting parties undertaking the suppression of heresy, the other the maintenance of loyalty. And it would be absurd to suppose that, in ignorant and barbarous times, gross delusions and cruelties will not be practised in so good a cause; delusions and cruelties which must be shocking, and almost incredible, to those who live in a period of knowledge and refinement. But although the hostility created by difference of opinions appears in its worst forms in barbarous times, yet in every state of society it is natural to man, the natural result of our

self-love and pride, two of our most natural principles of action ; and, in the case of religious opinions, it is too often sanctioned and inflamed by mistaken notions of piety and benevolence, by supernatural hopes and supernatural fears, till it burns with a zeal far exceeding the fury of speculative controversy in any other cause.

Many worthy persons, with the best intentions for the peace and union of these islands, have taken infinite pains to perpetuate the public hatred against their Catholic brethren, by detailing the persecutions inflicted by the Romish church ; and have thence inferred the necessity of perpetuating the present degradation of so large a proportion of our fellow-citizens, who are as good men and as good subjects as ourselves. But is it fair that the Catholics of this country, and of the present day, shall be judged, not by their own conduct, but by the conduct of other men in a very different situation ? And is it not manifest, from what we know of human nature, that if any of the protestant churches had been established in the darker ages, its priests would, in like manner, have availed themselves of the general ignorance to extend their influence, and to stop the progress of heresy by the sacrifice of the heretics, — while the barbarous habits of persecution would have been transmitted from father to son, till they became the scandal of more civilised times ? Unfortunately, this is not matter of inference or speculation. — Let us attend to facts.

There are two doctrines, purely speculative, which both Newton and Locke, though sincere Christians, and diligent searchers of the Scripture, did not believe : and there is at this day an eminent Protestant church, which directs all its congregations, both minister and people, to sing or say, thirteen times every year, in the most unqualified terms, that unless a man believe these two doctrines, “ he cannot be saved,” and, “ without doubt, shall perish everlastingly.” In one of its public articles, the same church declares, — “ They also are to be *had accursed*, that presume to say that every man shall be saved by the law or sect which he professeth, so that he be diligent to frame his life according to that law and the light of nature.” And to these articles is prefixed a declaration of the king, as supreme Head and Governor of the Church, in which we read the following words : — “ Requiring *all* our loving subjects to continue in the uniform profession thereof [of the said articles], and prohibiting the least difference from the said articles, which, to that end, we command to be new printed, and this our declaration to be published therewith.” Now, we leave it to men of common sense to judge what the conduct of this church would have been in the darker ages, if it had been established without a rival in almost every nation of Europe. We are far, however, from meaning to insinuate, that these denunciations of divine wrath against the Antitrinitarians, and against the heretics who would save virtuous heathens from eternal misery, form any part of the faith of the great body of Christians who now compose this respectable church. But nothing can be more manifest than the intolerant spirit of the theologians by whom these denunciations were most unnecessarily introduced into its standards, where they are most unnecessarily retained, along with the royal declaration, to this day. At all events, we know for certain, that time was when this church brought heretics to the flames ; that under the administration of its *governess*, Queen Elizabeth (so she is styled in the statute enacting her ecclesiastical supremacy), not fewer than one hundred and eighty persons suffered death by the laws against Catholic priests and Catholic converts ; that the same “ most religious and gracious

queen" (so she is styled in the Liturgy) instituted, with the advice of her clergy the English Inquisition, the notorious Court of High Commission; and that, from the first *establishment* of the Reformation in this island, — whether we date it in the reign of Henry the Eighth or of his son, till the accession of William, a presbyterian king, — all toleration was expressly prohibited by law; and, although sometimes protected illegally by the Stuarts and by Cromwell, was uniformly opposed by the Church of England.

With regard to the Protestant Church, which was finally established at the Revolution in Scotland, where, from the first introduction of the Reformation, it had been fondly cherished by the majority of the nation, the vehemence of its intolerant spirit, during a long period, is well known. Its celebrated founder, John Knox, proclaimed the awful sentence, which was loudly re-echoed by his disciples, that *the idolater should die the death*; in plain English, that every Catholic should be hanged. The bare toleration of prelacy, of Protestant prelacy, was the guilt of soul-murder. It was this church that framed the solemn league and covenant for the extirpation of prelacy by the sword, and enjoined it to be subscribed by all persons under pain of excommunication. And during the negotiations for the Union, it was this church who, in a formal petition, besought the Parliament of Scotland, that, "as they would not involve themselves and the Scots nation in guilt," they should not consent to the establishment of the English hierarchy and ceremonies — where? — in Scotland? — that was perfectly understood — But no, not even in England!

It is but too easy to account for this extreme animosity of the Presbyterians. The Episcopalians had been astonished at their unpardonable obstinacy in separating from the English worship, which is so manifestly founded on the express word of Scripture, and conformable to the practice of the apostolic and purest ages. Accordingly, during the two reigns immediately previous to the Revolution, the Presbyterians in Scotland were persecuted most unmercifully, and to death, not by the Papists, but by their Protestant brethren of the Episcopal Church, which was then established in both kingdoms? What was the consequence? — Not the conversion of the Presbyterians; not the security of the Establishment; but the reverse: — the schism became incurable; the former animosities were imbibed and perpetuated; absurd fanatics were changed into desperate rebels; those who perished in the cause were revered as martyrs; the contagion became more general and inveterate; the great mass of the people united in the most invincible zeal for their own worship, hatred to the civil government, and abhorrence of prelacy; till at last it was found necessary, in the settlement at the Revolution, to change the Establishment from the Episcopal to the Presbyterian Church.

Whence does it happen that these fierce animosities are now so greatly allayed? Each of the two churches retains at this day the same doctrines, the same worship, and the same hierarchy; and is as much or as little conformable to Scripture as formerly. The churches are the same, at least externally; but the nation is wiser and more tolerant. The Episcopalians and Presbyterians of the present times do not resemble the bigots who conducted the inquisitorial tyranny of the High Commission, or who imposed the test of the Covenant; — who visited the west of Scotland with the free quarters of the military, or who triumphed so brutally over the gallant Montrose. Episcopalians and Presbyterians

now sit together in the Privy Council, and in Parliament; two Presbyterians in our own days have been Chancellors of England, Episcopalians are Judges and Commanders-in-Chief in Scotland, and yet this strange medley has never interrupted the prosperity or peace of Britain; and the clergy of both countries have enjoyed, what they could not boast of formerly, the undisturbed and secure possession of their temporalities.

Towards our Catholic countrymen we act with a very different spirit. We still withhold from them the full restitution of their civil rights; we still exclude their nobility and gentry, their men of fortune and education, from eligibility to Parliament and the higher offices of the State, although they have given a security for their allegiance with which our greatest statesmen of the most opposite parties, Pitt and Burke, as well as Fox and Grattan, were perfectly satisfied; we still mark as a degraded and hostile people that great and respectable body, who amount to nearly *one fifth* of our whole population, and who compose more than the *half* of our army and navy.\* Other nations, where it was less to have been expected than in England, have acted more generously; we should rather say, more justly and more prudently. In Prussia and in Hungary there is no political difference between the Catholics and the Protestants; all the offices of the State are equally open to both parties:—and thus both parties are equally well affected to a Government, by which both are equally protected and encouraged, and the public peace is no longer disturbed by the disgraceful and dangerous animosities of religion. In the United States of America no inconvenience whatever has arisen from opening all the public honours and emoluments to citizens of every sect. And it must not be forgotten, that we have never had reason to regret our liberal treatment of Canada, where the Church of Rome is established by the British Parliament. On the contrary, we experienced the good effect of it on a most memorable occasion, when all our Protestant colonies in America formed an alliance with a Catholic kingdom, and declared their independence, — while Canada alone remained faithful to England. May we not hope, then, that the time is not distant when we shall do justice to our Catholic fellow-subjects in Britain and Ireland? They are at least as interesting as the Canadians; their feelings and comforts are at least as much entitled to our attention; and their friendship is of infinitely greater importance.

We are encouraged in this hope, when we attend to the manner in which the spirit of intolerance is gradually moderated in the course of human affairs. Religious intolerance is the result of selfishness and pride, and mistaken notions of duty. But it may be expected that civilisation will restrain our selfishness and pride, and direct them to proper objects; while increasing knowledge corrects our false notions of duty, and opens more distinct and enlarged views of the real interests of nations. It must be observed, however, that although refined and profound reasonings may produce a due impression on superior minds, and although they may be employed even by a person who does not understand them, in support of principles which he has already adopted, yet they are extremely feeble weapons when opposed to inveterate habits, to adverse passions, and adverse interests; and it is in a more homely way that the progress of civilisation and knowledge subdues the spirit of intolerance, both in the people and in their rulers. In fact, we conceive that the first great check to reli-

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\* See the article on Sir John Hippisley's Speech, in the 17th volume of the Edinburgh Review, p. 1.

gious intolerance — a check which continues to operate to this day — is the experience or apprehension of the evil consequences of persecution, when employed against a numerous party. A vigorous prince may sometimes, without much difficulty, though seldom or never without much cruelty, suppress a sect in its first rise, particularly before it has planted itself in different parts of his dominions. But, when it has become organised and numerous, neither its extermination nor conversion are possible: persecution both inflames its zeal and multiplies its numbers, and, moreover, is pernicious to the nation and perilous to government. It was by an obstinate perseverance in the design of suppressing all dissent from the Established Church, that Philip II. lost the Low Countries, and that France bled so long and so miserably under the civil wars of the League. The persecutor, finding it impossible, or unsafe, to discharge his sacred duty in its full extent, is constrained to adopt less decisive but more practicable measures for the support of orthodoxy, if it cannot be rendered universally triumphant; and for the discouragement of error, if it cannot be completely extirpated. Perhaps the secret conventicles of the heretics or schismatics, though prohibited by law, are connived at by government; but they are kept in awe by the occasional martyrdoms of obnoxious individuals; or, if it be hazardous to shed blood, the more lenient punishments of exile, fine and imprisonment, and the pillory, are substituted for the stake or the gibbet. Perhaps government may find it necessary, for the public peace and its own safety, to indulge the sectaries with the exercise of their offensive worship; but all the honours and emoluments of the state are reserved for the orthodox, while the sectaries, perhaps, are not allowed to educate their own children, and may even be liable to be stripped of their inheritance by the nearest relation who chooses to conform to the Established Church. In short, the friends of the truth — that is to say, of the predominant faith — conceiving themselves under the highest obligations to guard this most precious of all possessions, will make as hard a bargain as possible with its enemies; but the most despotic governments, and the most bigoted ecclesiastics, will be constrained to abate the fury of their intolerance, when they have to struggle against a numerous party.

We have a remarkable instance of this respect to the numbers of a religious party, in the establishment of the Presbyterian Church in Scotland at the Revolution. There is also at present another notable and extremely curious instance, in the distinction which has been made between the Catholics of Ireland and of Great Britain. The Catholic clergy of Ireland have received certain temporal endowments from government: the Catholic laity of Ireland are now admitted to all civil and military offices, with the exception of little more than forty of the higher stations; and yet, by the Corporation and Test Acts, the Catholics of England are still excluded from every public honour and emolument.

But the fury of persecution has been allayed, not only by the prudence, but also by the humanity, of modern times. The mitigation of cruelty in the legal punishments which were devised by barbarous ages, is a natural consequence of civilisation; and accordingly, even in the case of those heresies where the professors were too few to be formidable, it has come to pass that the horrible statutes of the good old times were first left unexecuted, but retained *in terrorem*, and at last repealed, and replaced by laws which were not so very shocking to the lukewarm habits of less savage Christians. The Church of England was established in its present form in the reign of Edward VI.; and in this reign, and by the pious vi-



giance of this Protestant Church, a Dutchman was burned in England for Arianism; and Joanna Bocher was condemned to the same death for maintaining a new theory of the Incarnation, which was unintelligible indeed, but perfectly harmless; and if not exactly the true theory, nor supported by Scripture, yet was not visibly inconsistent either with Scripture or with the orthodox faith. Every body knows that the warrant for this execution was extorted from the young and reluctant prince by the urgent remonstrances of Cranmer, the Protestant primate, who, by a just retribution, suffered martyrdom himself as a heretic in the succeeding reign. It ought also to be remembered, that the law which condemned heretics to the flames was retained by the Protestant Church of England during one hundred and thirty years. Two Arians, in the reign of James I., seem to be the last persons who suffered under it; but though these barbarities had become so odious to Englishmen that it was not thought expedient to execute the law, yet it was not till the year 1677 that it ceased to disgrace the code of a civilised people. And although the zealous churchmen were no longer allowed to inflict on the Antitrinitarians the punishment which they deserved, yet these heretics were by no means left at liberty to publish tenets which, though perfectly consistent both with good morals and the public peace, were directly contradictory to the standards of the church. These tenets were regarded as blasphemous, in which light they are still considered by the learned Dr. Burgess, the present Bishop of St. David's \*, and consequently were liable to be checked by the existing laws. But to make so important a business surer and easier, the legislature, in King William's reign, thought proper, in its wisdom, to enact (9th and 10th of William III.), that an Antitrinitarian Christian, upon the first conviction of professing his peculiar doctrines, should be disqualified from enjoying any office, civil or military, as well as ecclesiastical; and that, upon a second conviction, he should moreover be put out of the protection of the law, by being "disabled to sue, prosecute, plead, or use any action or information." He was also, upon this second conviction, disabled from being "guardian of any child, or executor or administrator of any person, or capable of any legacy or deed of gift." And lastly (which could hardly fail to convince him of his errors, if he was not a perfect reprobate), he was to "suffer imprisonment for the space of three years." But Englishmen became so effeminate, that even this mild law could not well be executed, and was only retained *in terrorem*, till at last it was repealed in the year 1813, to the regret of the worthy prelate already mentioned.\* And unless the Antitrinitarians are punishable as blasphemers, there remains nothing to check these daring heretics but the disqualifications of the Corporation and Test Acts, which, with admirable political sagacity, are still kept in reserve for the support of the truth, ready to spring forth as occasion may require, whenever the country is so far regenerated as to call for their execution. If, however, such times should return, there is a fact which may deserve the attention of the most zealous churchmen; namely, that under the weight of far severer laws, and under the never-ceasing anathemas of the Established Church, the Antitrinitarians have grown into a sect considerable both for their numbers and their learning.

Here we cannot help remarking, that the struggle between the zeal of

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\* See his Lordship's Brief Memorial on the Repeal of the 9th and 10th of William III.

Highchurchmen and the general civilisation of the country has produced a curious enough inconsistency between our laws and our practice. By the laws, the Irish Catholics are in a better situation than any of the Protestant Dissenters; for these last are legally excluded from all civil and military offices: whereas the Irish Catholics are now legally eligible to all these offices, with the exception of about forty of the higher stations. But the practice is extremely different. In fact, all the offices of the state, civil and military, even the highest, are open to Presbyterians, to Independents, to Anabaptists, to Methodists, to Arians, to Socinians, and even to the avowed disbelievers of Christianity. It is our Catholic countrymen alone who suffer from the intolerant statutes; the Catholics are the only subjects of this realm who are actually molested and degraded on account of their religion.

While this ungenerous treatment of our Catholic fellow-subjects in the present state of civilisation, is naturally disgusting even to those who dislike their peculiar tenets, there is also another effect produced by civilisation, extremely unfavourable to intolerance, namely, the familiar intercourse between all the different sects. That any person of decent conduct, and inoffensive behaviour, should be banished from the courtesies of social life, because he attends the Mass or the Dissenting Chapel instead of the Established Church, would be a specimen of barbarous manners, which cannot subsist in humaner times. We know the abhorrence which the Catholics and Protestants, the Episcopalians and Presbyterians, nourished against each other in the days of intolerance; but it is impossible for us now to shut our eyes, or our hearts, to the virtues which we find very equally diffused among all denominations of Christians. Fools and knaves, and tiresome proselytists, spring up in every sect; but ought not to be considered as a fair sample of any. A person who has been confined in the choice of his companions to a particular church, may be brought to conceive, that whatever is best and most amiable, can be found only among those who are happy enough to believe its peculiar doctrines; but such notions appear ridiculous to any body who lives, and in this country almost every body lives, in a friendly intercourse with persons of different persuasions. Catholic bigots may reserve salvation for their own church exclusively, and Protestant bigots may consign Catholics to perdition as idolaters; but a Protestant and Catholic, who live happily together as husband and wife, entertain far other sentiments; and so do the young Protestants and Catholics, who are equally cherished by both their parents. An eloquent Unitarian preacher, of Priestley's school, has very lately declared his persuasion, that the doctrine of the Trinity "is the parent stock of all that system of error which has branched out into the various forms of reputed orthodoxy, darkening with its deadly shade the brightness of the Divine character, and *shedding its poisonous influence upon the best charities of human nature.*"\* Another eminent divine, of the same church, has very lately told us, that "Arianism and Unitarianism [and *à fortiori* we presume Trinitarianism and Unitarianism] can no more unite than fire and water; than light and darkness; than *Christ and Belial.*"† And we all know the dreadful sentence denounced by a great college of Unitarian Divines, against every denomination of Antitrinita-

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\* Madge's Sermon, on Wednesday, May 17. 1815, before the Supporters of the Unitarian Fund, p. 13.

† Mr. T. Belsham's Letter in the Monthly Repository of Theology and General Literature for July 1815, p. 418.

rians. But while the different sects are connected by the bonds of affection, or even simply by the offices of good neighbourhood, or by esteem and confidence in the transactions of business, the *laity* learn to appreciate very justly the angry anathemas and rhetorical flourishes of their teachers; and will not be induced by them, so easily as in times past, to disturb either the public peace or the cordialities of social life.

One instance of the amicable intercourse of all the different sects deserves to be particularly remarked, we mean the Bible Society, with its various branches extending through the whole empire, and comprehending not only all the Protestant sects, but the Catholics also. Such an association we believe to be unexampled in history; and its magnitude naturally excites some degree of apprehension. But whatever opinion may be entertained of this society in other respects; and however, in the uncertain fluctuation of human affairs, it may eventually be turned by subtle politicians, or bold agitators, to purposes different from that which it is now pursuing; yet, in the first instance at least, the cause of religious freedom must be promoted by this union of the Established Church with the Dissenters, and of Catholics with Protestants, in one great work of piety and benevolence.

While civilisation goes far to mitigate the spirit of intolerance, much also is effected by the general diffusion of knowledge. The time is long past when learning was almost exclusively confined to the clergy, when consequently the clergy had the principal share in the direction of the civil government, and when of course the civil government restrained the propagation of opinions which had any appearance of inconsistency with the established faith. The laity are now as learned and as inquisitive as the clergy; and in religion, they are evidently more impartial judges. Hence it has come to pass, that their habits of implicit submission to their spiritual guides have been much relaxed, by discovering how often, and how cruelly, the public peace has been disturbed by controversies the most frivolous and nonsensical;—how often the world has been set on fire in the attempts to enforce uniformity of opinion, where it was perfectly indifferent to good morals, whichever way the question were decided, or whether it were ever decided at all;—how often the foundations, on which the weightiest conclusions have been supported, are found, upon nearer inspection, to be extremely frail,—reasonings of doubtful, or worse than doubtful, solidity,—texts of doubtful interpretation, and sometimes even of doubtful authenticity.

But, in order to discover the folly of intolerance, it is not necessary to be proficient in theology. This accomplishment is incompatible with the leisure, the abilities, and the scholarship of ordinary men. There is one thing, however, which every body knows, that our teachers are divided against themselves; and hence, from the acknowledged virtues and talents and learning of our teachers, the laity of every sect very naturally deduce an obvious apology for tolerating the errors of their heterodox friends. The apology we know to be very familiar to the laity; and, on that account at least, it may deserve the consideration of divines, more especially as the violence so usual in theological discussions renders the apology more obvious and more impressive. The matter stands thus. There are some doctrines about which there never has been any dispute among Christians. But there are several others, and some of them relating to subjects of the highest nature, which have given rise to bitter controversies and cruel persecutions. In this country, all the sects are now allowed to speak and write with equal freedom; and hence it cannot be

concealed, that the greatest theologians, good and learned and able men, after spending their lives in laborious investigations, come at last to conclusions, all of them perfectly positive and indubitable, but yet contradictory to each other. Now, whatever may be the case with the individuals who have soured their temper, or compromised their credit, by taking an active part in these never-ending controversies, it is natural for every other person to feel, that he ought neither to despise the understanding of his neighbours, nor to suspect their virtue; nor to abate one jot of good will or kindness for them, although they happen to differ from him upon subjects where the greatest doctors themselves disagree.

Another beneficial effect produced by the diffusion of knowledge, is the gradual conviction of government, that it has no interest in any degree of persecution or intolerance. The importance of the clergy in society, rises in proportion to the number of those who adhere to their ministry; and something is always wanting to their dignity, so long as any heresy or schism remains. The clergy of every sect have a palpable interest in the suppression of every sect but their own. But, with the nation at large, and with government also, the case is widely different. To a layman, the religion of his neighbours is of no consequence, if their moral conduct is good; to government, the religion of its subjects is of no consequence, if they live like good subjects; and it is notorious, that good morals and good citizenship are not monopolised by any sect whatever. We grant, that it is proper for the legislature, in its paternal care for the people, to provide for them the benefits of religious instruction and public worship, by the establishment of a national church; and that an ample provision ought to be made for the clergy who devote themselves to this important service. But, if any persons, after having contributed the share which the law requires from them for the support of the established clergy, choose to provide other ministers for themselves, government has no interest to prevent them, or to molest them in the least on that account. It cannot be the interest of government to exclude any of its subjects, on account of their religion, from those civil and military offices to which men of every religion are equally competent. It cannot be the interest of government to limit itself in the selection of those who are qualified by their station and talents for the service of the state. It cannot be the interest of government to narrow, to any of its subjects, the field of industry and ambition; or to degrade them below the level of their countrymen, in the same rank of life with themselves. It cannot be the interest of government to make its children its enemies.

All this will be more manifest if we attend to a very important circumstance, namely, the great number of the Dissenters. The Dissenters are no longer an inconsiderable body, whose feelings may be disregarded or insulted with safety. They cannot fall much short of half the population. It cannot now be wise to retain the Corporation and Test acts, which may put it into the power of a monarch, as bigoted as Charles the First, to exclude from the service of their country all those who do not conform to the Church of England. It is acknowledged by government itself, that these laws are unfit to be executed; and they are only retained to overawe the Dissenters. But, of all things in the world, men hate to be overawed; so that if these statutes have any effect at all, it is to render a vast portion of the country dissatisfied both with church and state, which cannot contribute much to the peace or safety of either. Our Catholic countrymen are nearly one fifth of our population, and compose the half of our army and navy. Now, let the members of the Church of Eng-

land consider for a moment what their own feelings would be, if they were treated in the same way in which they themselves treat the Catholics ;— if they were treated as the *children of the bond woman, and not of the free*, —and then say if it can be the interest of government to keep alive such feelings in so many of its subjects. It may be true that we are still powerful enough to subdue their insurrections if they attempt to rebel. But is it not distressing, that there should still be persons, who, in opposition to the decided opinions of our greatest statesmen, and even of our greatest churchmen\*, urge us most unnecessarily to persevere in measures which give any degree of excitement or plausibility to such insurrections? —insurrections which cannot be quashed without a world of misery, which, even when quashed, leave the seeds of future and worse insurrections ; and where, even in victory, there is no heart for triumph— *bella plus quam civilia —bella nullos habitura triumphos*. We trust, however, that from our dear-bought experience of the mischiefs of intolerance ; from the humanity and justice, as well as prudence, of civilised times ; from the amicable intercourse between the different sects ; from a general sense of the unimportance or uncertainty of the theological controversies by which the clergy endeavour to set Christian against Christian ; from the conviction, how little it can be the interest of government to make any political distinction between its subjects on account of their religion, more especially when so great a proportion of our countrymen are Dissenters, and even Catholics ;—we trust that, from these and other causes, all our fellow-subjects shall henceforth be treated as Englishmen, and all the various sects feel an equal interest in the peace and prosperity of England.

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#### TOLERATION OF THE REFORMERS. †

IN spite of all the mockeries of their reverend historian, we cannot bring ourselves to believe that JACK is at all a worse fellow than either PETER or MARTIN. The two last, indeed, have contrived somehow to make a better figure in the world, and affect to look down on their less opulent brother. Yet perhaps there are some particulars in which it would be as well for them if they were to follow his example. At all events, the whole history of these allegorical heroes must be allowed to be very important, and, when fairly detailed, will bring out many points of substantial identity in their character, which should allay the mutual animosities of their respective followers, and promote their final return to a state of brotherly concord and affection. To the inhabitants of these united kingdoms in particular, the prospect of such a consummation cannot fail to be peculiarly interesting, as all the three churches, shadowed out in the allegory, do not only exist among us, but each of them is actually *by law established*, in one part or other of the British empire ; and the inhabitants of this island have their souls consigned to the cure

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\* See the first Article in the 17th volume of the Edinburgh Review, *ut supra*.

† Cook's History of the Church of Scotland.—Vol. xxvii. page 163. September, 1816.

of Episcopal or Presbyterian pastors, according as they happen to reside in England or Scotland. These churches, too, had all of them, in former times, a considerable, and one of them a mighty influence, on the civil government; and their mutual hostilities, to which their alliance with the State gave a dreadful importance, produced effects which are still perceptible, and suggest lessons which may still be useful. At present, we mean only to state one or two observations concerning the Scottish Church, which we conceive to be neither unimportant nor unseasonable.

Protestant writers, in general, are apt to describe the Reformation as a struggle for religious freedom; and the learned author before us, distinguished as we think he is for the fairness and moderation, as well as the sagacity of his views, has very implicitly adopted the common opinion. Thus, in alluding to the intolerant spirit of the Covenant in the reign of Charles I., he represents it as “destroying that free exercise of private judgment, for which (he is pleased to say) the first Reformers, to their immortal honour, had strenuously contended.” (Vol. iii. p. 65.) Now, we humbly apprehend that the free exercise of private judgment was most heartily abhorred by the first Reformers—except only where the persons who assumed it had the good fortune to be exactly of their opinion.

For we may observe, in the *first* place, that in the questions concerning election, justification, and grace, which occupy the principal department in the science of theology, greater diversity of opinion was tolerated among the Catholics than among the early Protestants. Upon these subjects Catholic divines debated with much freedom and vivacity; and neither incurred the censures of their Church, nor ceased to be regarded as good Christians, whether they favoured the one or the other of the two great schools which we are now accustomed to distinguish as Arminians and Calvinists. But both Luther and Calvin adopted the peculiar tenets of this latter school exclusively, and in their utmost rigour; and these tenets were also stated as the true faith, in the third, seventh, eighth, and twelfth articles of the Confession, which was drawn up by our first Reformers in Scotland, and ratified by the Parliament in 1560.

We may observe, in the *next* place, that the freedom for which our first Reformers contended, did not include any freedom of dissent from the Athanasian creed. Grotius and Lardner, and Locke and Newton, those great and pious men, who were an honour to human nature, and the most illustrious advocates of Christianity, would have been adjudged by the first Reformers as well as by the Catholics, by Cranmer and Knox as well as by Bonner and Beaton, to be worthy of death in the present world, and of everlasting misery in the world to come. The martyrdoms of Servetus in Geneva, and of Joan Bocher in England, are notable instances of the religious freedom which prevailed in the pure and primitive state of the Protestant churches.

It is obvious also, that the freedom for which our first Reformers so strenuously contended, did not, by any means, include a freedom to think as the Catholics thought; that is to say, to think as all Europe had thought for many ages, and as the greatest part of Europe thought at that very time, and continue to think to this very day. The complete extirpation of the Catholic church, not merely as a public establishment, but as a tolerated sect, was the avowed object of our first Reformers. In 1560, by an act of the Parliament which established the Reformation in Scotland, both the sayers and hearers of mass, whether in public or in private, were, for the first offence, to suffer confiscation of all their goods,

together with corporal punishment, at the discretion of the magistrate: they were to be punished by banishment for the second offence; and *by death* for the third! (See *Knox's History*, p. 254. folio edition of 1732.)

We know what is urged in defence of these violent measures; — that the Catholic religion, at that time at least, was essentially hostile to every other form of Christianity, insomuch that even the toleration of its worship was incompatible with the safety of the Protestant interest. We must, however, beg leave to observe, that the first Reformers themselves, although they inveighed, with great vehemence, against the persecuting spirit of the Roman hierarchy, yet rested their own cause on principles of the same description — principles which, independently of every consideration of self-defence, demanded the persecution of the Catholics even to death, as one of the most sacred of Christian duties. But as most of our modern historians have been careful to keep this important subject in the shade, it will be proper to bring it forward a little, for the consideration of those who are so fond of contrasting the terrible intolerance of the Catholic with the liberality of the Reformed churches.

In 1564, Maitland of Lethington, who was Secretary of State, and several noblemen who were attached to the court, invited the most eminent of the reformed clergy to a private conference; and Knox, in the Fourth Book of his *History*, has recorded with great minuteness the debate which took place between himself and Lethington on that occasion. The whole passage is extremely curious; and as the book is scarce, we shall furnish our readers with some extracts, sufficient to manifest the nature of that hostility which our first reformers waged with the Established Church. After much reasoning upon the Queen's good dispositions, and unhappy affection for idols, Lethington says — “Our question is, whether that we may and ought to suppress the Queen's mass? or whether that her idolatry shall be laid to our charge? What ye may (said John Knox), by force, I dispute not: but what ye may and *ought* to do by God's express commandment, that can I tell. *Idolatry ought not only to be suppressed, but the idolater ought to die the death, unless we will accuse God.* I know (said Lethington), the idolater is commanded to die the death; but by whom? *By the people* of God, said the other. For the commandment was made to Israel, as ye may read; *That if it be heard that idolatry is committed in any one city, that inquisition shall be taken; and if it be found true, that then the whole body of the people shall arise and destroy that city, sparing in it neither man, woman, nor child.* But there is no commandment given to the people to punish their King (said the Secretary), if he be an idolater. I find no privilege granted unto kings (said the other), by God, more than unto the people to offend God's majesty.” (*Knox*, p. 357.)

When Lethington stated, that Calvin and some others of the foreign reformers had counselled their followers to be quiet and submissive even under persecution, Knox very truly and wisely observed, that this referred to Christians “so dispersed, that they have no other force but only to sob to God for deliverance. — That such indeed (he continues, p. 358.) should hazard any further than these godly men wills them, I could not hastily be of counsel. But my argument has another ground; for I speak of a people assembled together in one body of a commonwealth, unto whom God has given sufficient force not only to resist, but also to suppress all kind of open idolatry; and such a people, yet again I affirm, are *bound* to keep their land clean and unpolluted.”

When, in the course of the discussion, Knox quoted the example of Jehu, who, even while he was a private person, received a divine com-

mandment to destroy the posterity of Ahab:—“ We are not bound to imitate extraordinary examples (said Lethington, p. 360.), unless we have like commandment and assurance. I grant (said the other), if the example repugn to the law. But where the example agrees with the law, and is as it were the execution of God’s judgment expressed in the same, I say that the example approved of God stands to us in place of a commandment. For as God in his nature is constant and immutable, so can he not damn [condemn] in the ages subsequent that which he has approved in his servants before us. But in his servants before us, he by his own commandment has approved, that subjects have *not only destroyed their kings for idolatry*, but also has [have] *rooted out their whole posterity*, so that none of their race was left after to empire above the people of God. Whatsoever they did (said Lethington), was done at God’s commandment. That fortifies my argument, said the other; for God by his commandment has approved that subjects punish kings for idolatry and wickedness by them committed. We have not the like commandment (said Lethington). That I deny (said the other); for *the commandment, that the idolater shall die the death, is perpetual*, as ye yourself have granted; ye doubted only, who should be the executors against the king; and I said, the people of God; and have sufficiently proved, as I think, that God has raised up the people, and by his prophet has anointed a king, to take vengeance upon the king and his posterity, which fact God since that time has never retracted; and therefore to me it remains for a *constant and clear commandment to all people professing God, and having the power to punish vice, what they ought to do in the like case.*”

Dr. M’Crie, in his excellent *Life of Knox*, p. 299., has said, in reference to this discussion between Knox and Lethington, that “both parties held that idolatry *might* justly be punished with death.” But this is not to do justice to his hero. We have seen that our root-and-branch Reformer went a great deal farther. In fact, it was not possible for the most bigoted Catholic to inculcate more distinctly the complete extirpation of the opinions and worship of the Protestants, than John Knox inculcated as a most sacred duty, incumbent on the civil government in the first instance, and, if the civil government is remiss, incumbent on the people, to extirpate completely the opinions and worship of the Catholics, and even to massacre the Catholics, man, woman, and child.

At present, every sect of Christians will no doubt be shocked with principles so savage; but it has been pleaded in his favour, that, vehemently as he inculcated these principles, he did not practise what he preached. “They [the Reformers] discovered no disposition (says Dr. M’Crie), to proceed to capital punishment, even when it was completely in their power. I never read, nor heard of an instance, in the time of our Reformer, of a person being put to death for performing any part of the Roman Catholic worship. If the reason of this disconformity between their opinions and their practice be asked, it may be answered—their aversion to blood.” (*Life of Knox*, p. 299.)

Now, we doubt not that this observation was applicable to most of the Protestant Nobility, and even to some of the Protestant Clergy; though in all sects the clergy, from obvious causes, are less guilty than the laity of tolerating error. But we scarcely think that Knox would have thanked his advocate for his good-natured apology. It is a topic of reproach, and not of praise, that aversion to blood has prevented a magistrate from executing justice on a murderer,—or a general from saving his country by cutting off an invading army; and to a person who believed, what Knox believed, it must have appeared incomparably worse to spare the Papists, who were the murderers of souls, and whose idolatry was bringing down the wrath of heaven on the land.

The apology, however, might be admitted, if these principles had only been struck out in the heat of an accidental debate, without being gravely



maintained in cooler moments. But the fact was widely different. The very same principles which our great reformer defended with so much ardour and ingenuity in his debate with Lethington, he deliberately recorded for the public benefit, on different occasions, both before and after that celebrated conference. The account of them which we have quoted is taken from the Fourth Book of his *History*; and the introduction to this book appears to have been written in May 1566. (*Knox*, p. 282.) The same principles had been maintained by him ten years before, in his letter to the Queen Regent in 1556, which he afterwards published with additions and explanations in 1558; and they had been stated at greater length, and with equal intrepidity, in his Appellation to the Nobility, which was written soon after he left Scotland in July 1556, both which are engrossed in the folio edition of his *History*.

The following quotations, we trust, will show that we are not guilty of exaggeration. “After that Moses had declared what was true religion, to wit, to honour God as he commanded, adding nothing to his word, neither yet diminishing any thing from it; and after also that vehemently he had exhorted the same law to be observed, he denounceth the punishment against the transgressors, in these words:—If thy brother, son, daughter, wife, or neighbour, whom thou lovest as thine own life, solicitate thee secretly, saying, let us go serve other Gods, whom neither thou nor thy fathers have known, consent not to him, hear him not, let not thine eye spare him, show him no indulgence or favour, hide him not, but utterly kill him; let *thy* hand be first upon him, that he may be slain, and after, the hand of the whole people. Of these words of Moses, are two things appertaining to our purpose to be noticed. First, that such as solicitate only to idolatry, *ought to be punished to death*, without favour or respect of persons . . . . . The second is, that the punishment of such crimes as are idolatry, blasphemy, and others that touch the majesty of God, doth not appertain to kings and chief rulers only, but also to the whole body of that people, and to every member of the same, according to the vocation of every man, and according to that possibility and occasion which God doth minister to revenge the injury done against his glory, what time that impiety is manifestly known.”—“I fear not to affirm, (he adds, in a subsequent part of the Appellation,) that the Gentiles (I mean every city, realm, province, or nation among the Gentiles, embracing Christ Jesus and his true religion,) be bound to the same league and covenant that God made with his people Israel, what time he promised to root out the nations before them, in these words, Beware that thou make any covenant with the inhabitants of the land, &c. but thou shalt destroy their altars, &c. To this same law, I say, and covenant, are the Gentiles *no less bound* than sometime were the Jews, whensoever God doth illuminate the eyes of any multitude, province, people or city, and putteth the sword in their own hand, to remove such enormity from among them, as before God they know to be abominable. Then, I say, are they no less bound to purge their dominions and country from idolatry than were the Israelites, what time they received the possession of the land of Canaan. And moreover, I say, if any go about to erect and set up idolatry, or to teach defection from God, after that the verity hath been received and approved, that then not only the magistrates to whom the sword is committed, but also the people, are *bound* by that oath which they have made to God, *to revenge to the uttermost of their power* the injury done to his Majesty.” (*History*, p. 444.)

If the reader is shocked at these principles, and at what he may probably conceive to be an unwarranted extension of the commandment for the destruction of the Canaanites, he may perhaps be comforted, by learning from the same high authority, that although many Catholics contrive to save appearances, and impose on the world, yet every Catholic is in reality an abandoned reprobate, as bad as a murderer, and cannot possibly be otherwise. This we find explicitly stated in his famous letter

to the Queen Regent, both as it was first written in 1556, and as it was augmented and explained by the author in 1558. After enlarging on the idolatry of the mass, he says, "Yea, further, I say, that where this venom of the serpent (idolatry I mean) lurketh in the heart, it is impossible but that at one time or other it shall produce pestilent fruits, albeit peradventure not openly before men, yet before God, no less odious than the facts of *murderers*, publicans and harlots; and therefore in my former letter I said, that superfluous it was to require reformation of manners where the religion is corrupted. *Which yet again I repeat*, to the end that your Grace more deeply may weigh the matter." (*History*, p. 422.)

But perhaps the most striking evidence how deeply these principles were rooted in his heart, appears in the remorse with which he confesses, but without mentioning particulars, that at one time he had so far yielded to humanity or prudence, as to employ his influence in moderating the zeal of some of his brethren in the good cause. "For (he says) God had not only given unto me knowledge and tongue to make the impiety of that idol [the mass] known unto the realm, but he had given me credit, with many, who *would have put in execution God's judgments*, (what these were in his opinion, we have abundantly seen,) if I would only have consented thereto: but so careful was I of the common tranquillity, and so loth was I to have offended those of whom I had conceived a good opinion, that in secret conference with earnest and zealous men, I travelled rather to mitigate, yea to slacken that fervency that God had kindled in others, than to animate or encourage them to put their hands to the Lord's work; *wherein I unfeignedly acknowledge myself to have done most wickedly*, and from the bottom of my heart do ask of my God grace and pardon, for that I did not what in me lay to have suppressed that idol in the beginning." (*History*, p. 287.)

For our own part, we are tempted to ascribe this confession to that excessive tenderness of conscience with which some men are apt to be distressed, in those very cases, where all the world conceive them to have excelled the most: for it is not easy to discover that at any period he had not done every thing in his power for the suppression of the Catholics; insomuch that if he had attempted more, he must have been infatuated with a degree of imprudence which might well be called insanity, a feature which, notwithstanding all his vehemence, never appears to have belonged to his character. We presume not, however, to assert, in opposition to his own confession, and at this distance of time, that he never was betrayed into any inconsistency between his principles and practice. But we think it appears in sufficient evidence, that during ten long and trying years he most earnestly inculcated, both by word and by writing, the same principles which he maintained in his debate with Lethington; — principles, of which we must say that we receive a very inadequate idea from some of our modern histories; but which, as we have them at first hand from himself, are to the full as bloody and intolerant as any that were ever maintained by the Roman Catholics.

At the best, then, the true state of the matter is this: — the Catholics actually did persecute; but our first Reformers only preached persecution without having the heart to carry it into effect. But, before we admit even this, we must consider how far they actually possessed the power, and whether they could, with any reasonable hope of success, venture farther than they did in their attempts to exercise it.

From the beginning of the Reformation in Scotland, till its settlement by the parliament in July 1560, the Catholic was the established religion, as it had been for ages before. If, during *this* period, the Reformers had inflicted death on the sayers and hearers of mass, they must have been regarded as atrocious assassins of their countrymen, for conforming to

what all parties knew to be the law of the land. But, without dwelling on this legal topic, which, for any thing we know, would not have proved a very effectual obstacle, we are to remember that during the whole of this period the Protestants were either a feeble party, dispersed and unorganised, or they were engaged in an arduous struggle against their own Government and the French auxiliaries, which they were unable to bring to a successful conclusion without the aid both of English money and English forcēs. Even so late as October 1559, when they ventured to issue a proclamation suspending the Queen Regent from her authority, they found themselves in a situation extremely critical, beset with treacherous friends, and protected by ill-paid and mutinous soldiers. "The queen [Regent]," says Knox in his history, p. 188., "had amongst us her assured Espyells, who did not only signify to her what was our estate, but also what was our purpose, counsel and devises. Some of our own company were vehemently suspected to be the very betrayers of all our secrets; for a boy of the Officialis of Lothian, Mr. James Balfour, was taken carrying a writing which did open the most secret things that were devised in the counsel, &c. The men of war (for the most part men without God or honesty) made a mutiny because they lacked a part of their wages; they had done the same thing at Linlithgow before, when they made a proclamation that they would serve any man to suppress the Congregation, and set up the Mass again." It was not till the pacification on the 8th of July 1560, that the Protestants were in a situation to *give the law*; and then, it must be confessed, they lost but little time in making the necessary arrangements for the suppression of idolatry. For, on the 17th of July, that is to say, on the ninth day after the pacification had been proclaimed, the parliament established the Protestant Church to the exclusion of every other; and, on the 24th of the following month, bound the judges, by the statute already mentioned, to pronounce sentence of death against every person convicted for the third time of attending mass even in the most private manner.

That no capital execution followed immediately upon this law, is by no means surprising. The affairs of the Protestants were still uncertain; the law itself had not received the sanction of the sovereign, to whom it was well known it must be extremely disagreeable; and who might insist, with some plausibility, that it was not quite consistent with the articles of pacification which had just been settled. (*History*, 229.) It was to be feared also, that France, notwithstanding her internal dissensions, might still be extremely troublesome. "The papists were proud," says Knox; "for they looked for a new army from France at the next spring, and thereof was there no small appearance, if God had not otherwise provided." (p. 257.) The Scotch Catholics themselves, though checked for the present, were still a numerous party. The English army had departed on the 16th of July (p. 234.); and the Reformers knew with what difficulty they had procured the succours from Elizabeth, who was not disposed to quarrel with France, and was very far from being friendly to the form of the Protestant religion now established in Scotland, which breathed too much of the same spirit with the puritans in her own kingdom. In such a situation, whatever might be the intentions of the two parties, or however they might endeavour to overawe, by threatenings or by occasional riots of the populace, it was most natural for both of them to abstain for a season from any regular system of bloodshed, either by the civil or military power. Besides, we cannot but suppose that the Catholics, at the present juncture, would be extremely cautious not to expose themselves to the possibility of being detected in the crime at which the deadly statute was levelled. And indeed, without proceeding to capital

punishment, an experiment so hazardous in the unsettled state of public affairs, the Protestants had contrived to accomplish a wonderful purification of the land, which cannot be better expressed than in the following triumphant exclamation of our great reformer :—“ What adulterer, what fornicator, what known mass-monger or pestilent papist, *durst have been seen in publick*, within any reformed town within this realm, before that the queen arrived ?” (*History*, p. 282.)

The Queen's arrival produced a material change; that is to say, it mitigated the intolerance of the Protestant nobility; though it was far from producing the same effect on the clergy. The Protestants were at this time in complete possession of the government; the Catholics having neither power nor vote in the council (p. 285.); but then we must not forget, that the government was possessed, not by the Protestant clergy, but by the Protestant nobility; and in reasoning from the contrast so often stated between the conduct of the Protestant and Catholic churches, it is of the utmost importance that we should keep in view the great difference in the situations of their respective hierarchies. The dignitaries of the Catholic church, during its legal establishment, were wealthy and powerful lords, who in a great measure directed the civil government, and thus enjoyed ample means of executing vengeance on their enemies. But the Protestant clergy in Scotland, at the time of the Reformation, were small stipendiaries, dependent on the civil government, which, during the whole of Knox's life, and many years after his death, thought proper to retain them in very humble poverty. Such a clergy possessed only *spiritual* weapons; and it does not appear that they were backward in using them, though we hear many lamentations that they laboured in vain. The celebration of mass in the Queen's chapel was permitted and defended by a council, where no Catholic had either power or vote, and in particular by Lord James Stuart, who was afterwards Earl of Murray, and regent, the strenuous and steady supporter of the Reformation, “ the man whom,” Knox says, “ all the godly did most reverence.” A law indeed was afterwards enacted, making it capital, on the very first offence, to say mass any where except in the Queen's chapel; but this was in fact a parliamentary confirmation of the liberty which she had at first assumed in opposition to parliament.

Though we believe, therefore, with Dr. M'Crie, that in Knox's life no person was punished *capitally* for performing any part of the Catholic worship, we do not exactly see how this omission can be imputed to our great reformer, or to the clergy. Nothing could be more earnest than their remonstrances, nothing more awful than their warnings, against this impious toleration of idolatry; but so it was, that all their warnings and remonstrances served only to disgust the Protestant nobility. And during the distracted state of public affairs, and the hostilities between the Protestants themselves, from the period of the Queen's marriage till after Knox's death, it does not appear that any of the factions who successively assumed the government ever showed the least inclination to indulge the clergy with the execution of an idolater. The clergy, however, did what they could; they fulfilled with zeal the duty of good watchmen; they solicited, both in public and private, for the strict execution of the laws against Papists; they sounded the alarm with all their might; and it was not their fault if their alarms were disregarded, and their solicitations evaded.

Here it will not be improper to produce, from the testimony of Knox

himself, one or two instances of the variance between the government and the Protestant clergy with respect to toleration. The very next Sunday after the first celebration of mass, as we read in his history (p. 287.), "John Knox inveighing against idolatry, showed what terrible plagues God had taken upon realms and nations for the same; and added, that one mass (there were no more suffered at the first) was more fearful unto him, than if ten thousand armed enemies were landed in any part of the realm, of purpose to suppress the whole religion. For, said he, in our God there is strength to resist and confound multitudes, if we unfeignedly depend upon him; whereof heretofore we have had experience. But when we join hands with idolatry, it is no doubt, but that both God's amiable presence and comfortable defence will leave us; and what shall then become of us? Alas, I fear that experience shall teach us, to the grief of many. At these words *the Guiders of the Court mocked*, and plainly spake that such fear was no point of their faith; it was beside his text, and was a very untimely admonition." — The fourth book of the history details the lamentable backsliding of the rulers after the Queen's arrival; and in the introduction to it, we find the following passage: — "Whence, alas, cometh this miserable dispersion of God's people within this realm this day, in May, 1566? And what is the cause that now the just is compelled to keep silence, good men are banished, murderers and such as are known unworthy of the common society, *if just laws were put in due execution*, bear the whole regiment [rule] and swing within this realm? We answer, because that suddenly the most part of us declined from the purity of God's word, and began to follow the world, and so again shook hands with the devil and with idolatry, as in this fourth book we will hear. For while that Papists were so confounded, that none within the realm *durst more avow the hearing and saying of mass, than the thieves of Liddisdale durst avow their stouth* (robbery) *in the presence of an upright Judge*; there were Protestants found, that ashamed not at tables and other open places to ask, Why may not the Queen have her mass, and the form of her religion? What can that hurt us or our religion? And from these two, Why and What, at length sprang out this affirmative, — The Queen's mass and her priest will we maintain; this hand and this rapier shall fight in their defence. The inconveniences were shown both by tongue and by pen. *But the advertisers were judged to be men of unquiet spirits; their credit was defaced at the hands of such as before were not ashamed to have used their counsel in matters of greater importance, &c.* These, and the like reasonings, took such deep root in flesh and blood, that the truth of God was almost forgot; and from this fountain, to wit, that flesh and blood was, and yet alas is, preferred to God and to his *messengers* rebuking vice and vanity, hath all our misery proceeded." (*History*, p. 282.)

The *message* which they brought we have heard already, as it was delivered, in the presence of the clergy, from our great reformer's mouth to the nobles and rulers, at the celebrated conference already mentioned. The effect of this message on those to whom it was delivered is shortly, but emphatically, expressed by himself in these words, which immediately follow his account of that conference: — "After which time the ministers, which were called precise, were holden of *all* the courtiers as MONSTERS." P. 366.

We have no intention to justify the courtiers for using so uncourtly a term. It is not fair to apply harsh terms to messengers; and we think it would have been better, though perhaps very ineffectual, if the noble lords had stated, as they might have done with equal politeness and justice, "That the reverend gentlemen could not be sufficiently praised for their zeal and intrepidity in the service which they had undertaken, but really there appeared to be some small mistake in the business; that the Greek and Hebrew instructions on which the reverend gentlemen acted were pretty voluminous, written at different times and on different occasions, and contained a great variety of messages, several of which the predecessors of the present messengers had long ago delivered to the

parties for whom alone they were intended ; and that this was humbly apprehended to be the predicament of that particular message which Mr. Knox had enforced with so much ability and eloquence." But we have no business, at present, either to censure or justify the courtiers. All that we aim at is to vindicate our first reformers from the charge of gross inconsistency between their principles and practice ; and we think it appears, from unexceptionable evidence, not only that a great variance existed between the Protestant clergy and government, but also that if the government had followed the directions of the clergy, the Catholics would have been extirpated by the sword.

But whatever we may think of the intolerance of our first reformers, we ought never to forget the benefits which have resulted from the Reformation. Although that important event was sometimes disgraced in Scotland, by riots of those whom Knox calls the *rascal multitude*, it was, in fact, conducted and accomplished by a great party of the nobles, together with some persons distinguished by their talents and learning, as well as by their popular eloquence ; and whatever might have been the various motives which instigated this powerful combination, civil liberty was undoubtedly promoted by their conflict with the government and the Established Church. The despotism of the prelates was destroyed ; and the despotism of the court was checked by a well-regulated opposition, composed of men of influence and abilities. The nobles were enlightened by their learned coadjutors ; the ambition and rapacity of the Protestant clergy were counteracted by the ambition and rapacity of the nobles ; and not a little attention was shown, upon all sides, to the inclinations and instruction of the people. The Catholics, indeed, suffered hardships and indignities beyond what either justice or sound policy could warrant ; but great advantages were gained by the nation in general, and the seeds were sown of still greater advantages to succeeding generations, who, unfortunately, have not always known how to reap them.

The Reformation was also the dawn, though a clouded dawn, of religious freedom. The reforming clergy, indeed, seem to have had no other intention but to erect another infallible and persecuting hierarchy, in the place of that which they had overthrown. But their own example could not fail to be followed. Even the absurd interference of the civil government could not, in this country, long protect the new system from the free examination to which they themselves had subjected that great establishment, whose authority, for so many ages, it was held impious to question. The very first reformers were divided against themselves. Besides the unsuccessful contest of Knox with the nobles, for the complete suppression of idolatry, he had not sufficient influence to preserve in Scotland that pure form of Presbyterian government to which he was fondly attached, or to banish from the Church of England those garments and ceremonies which gave great offence to himself, and still greater to a very numerous party of the Protestants in both kingdoms. And thus gradually arose that multiplication of sects, which, although inconsistent with the exclusive dominion asserted by all the three established churches in their turns, is, perhaps, after all, the state of things most favourable, both for the discovery of truth and for the public peace.

But there is one change deserving of particular notice, for which we are indebted to the Reformation, — a change which, although accomplished with a harshness and injustice altogether unnecessary, was most indispensably requisite, both for civil and religious freedom, — for the safety of the state as well as the purity of the church ; we mean the reduction of

the immense temporalities of the clergy. While human nature continues what it is, every community may be expected to pursue its own aggrandisement, as far as may be consistent with prudence, and often a great deal farther; and it will not scruple, for the *public good*, to employ means to which no person of proper feelings could reconcile himself in his private concerns. Now, the church is a community which naturally identifies both its temporal prosperity and its spiritual dominion with the eternal interests of mankind; and it is only thus that we can account for many transactions which astonish us in ecclesiastical history. But at the period of the Reformation, and long before it, the Catholic Church, in almost every nation of Europe, had, from causes quite unconnected with its doctrine, acquired immense possessions, which endowed its dignitaries with princely revenues. In Scotland, half the property of the kingdom is said to have belonged to the clergy. It is easy to conceive what powerful means such a body must have possessed for controlling the government as well as the people. The mere circumstance, that so vast a proportion of the national wealth had become the unalienable property of a society distinct in its habits and interests from the rest of the country, must of itself have bestowed on the clergy a political preponderance extremely dangerous; and this preponderance would be wonderfully increased, particularly in the darker ages, by the awful influence of the spiritual character. The state was constrained to court the friendship of the hierarchy, which could be so useful an ally, and so formidable an enemy; and which, in fact, was sometimes an over-match for the most powerful princes. Besides, from the learning as well as the wealth of the clergy, the great offices of the state were, in those times, monopolised by the prelates; and the temporal lords, and even the kings, became interested in the prosperity of a church which held forth such splendid dignities to be enjoyed by their sons and brothers. When these circumstances are considered, we cannot wonder at the result. We cannot wonder that persons of the most unworthy character, but of powerful families, should sometimes find their way to the highest ecclesiastical preferments. We cannot wonder that, in this intimate connection, kings and priests were sometimes infected with each other's vices; that kings were inflamed with the bigotry of priests, and priests with the pride of kings; that they sometimes united in a dreadful league against the rights and liberties of the people; and that the selfishness and cruelty of worldly ambition sometimes disgraced the transactions of the mitred chiefs. We cannot wonder, in short, that the clergy, like other men, were corrupted by wealth and dominion — exorbitant wealth, and the transcendent power of spiritual dominion. We cannot wonder that they sometimes stooped to improper arts for securing this proudest of all supremacies; that they regarded heretics and reformers as the disturbers of the world, as the common enemies of church and state; and exerted against them that jealous and merciless hostility with which great wealth and dominion always are, and (where so many are eager for their plunder) always *must* be guarded.

This is the true secret of the terrible intolerance and merciless persecutions of the Catholics of old — not that their bigotry was worse, but that their wealth was greater; — not that their doctrines were more immoral or absurd, but that their possessions were more precious, and their power of maintaining them proportionably more irresistible. This is the plain and natural account of those enormities which have unquestionably disgraced the Roman Catholic far beyond any other Christian church, — but which would have equally disgraced any other church in

the same situation. But no other Christian church has been placed in the same, or nearly in the same, situation;—no other Christian church has been exposed to the same, or nearly the same, temptations, or possessed the same, or nearly the same, opportunities to execute the dictates of spiritual intolerance, and spiritual ambition. We know, however, what Knox thought it his duty to do, if he had only possessed the power; and we know it from his own repeated declarations deliberately recorded by himself. We know also that the reformed Church of Scotland, in its primitive purity, asserted the same lofty pretensions as the Roman hierarchy. For in a solemn remonstrance addressed by the first reformers in 1559 to the nobility of Scotland, this memorable declaration remains for the edification of posterity;—“Ye may perchance contemn and despise the excommunication of the Church (now by God’s mighty power erected among us) as a thing of no force; but yet doubt we nothing, but that our Church and the true ministers of the same, have the *same power* which our master Christ Jesus granted to his apostles in these words, ‘Whose sins ye shall forgive shall be forgiven, and whose sins ye retain shall be retained.’” (*History*, p. 133.) And the very same superhuman authority is to this day asserted by the Protestant Church of England; for to every young gentleman who is admitted to the priesthood, the bishop, in the very act of ordination, addresses the same *verba solennia* of awful import, but with a most emphatic variation of the pronoun from the plural to the singular number;—“Whose sins *thou* forgivest they are forgiven; and whose sins *thou* retainest they are retained.” To this day also the ecclesiastical constitutions and canons of the same Church denounce excommunication, not against her own clergy alone, but against every person who disapproves of this formula of ordination; and enjoin that he shall not be restored without the Archbishop’s permission, and a public revocation of his “*wicked error*.”

We do not believe that the temporalities of the established Church of England are sufficient to render her formidable to Government, more especially when we consider how great a proportion of the population have withdrawn from her communion. Whatever, therefore, may be the case with the ecclesiastical constitutions and canons, it must be imputed to the civil government alone, if any traces of religious intolerance remain in the statute book; and indeed we cannot but persuade ourselves that the statute book will soon be purified completely from these relicts of barbarous times. We should imagine also, that the Church would consult her real dignity, if she erased from her standards those lofty pretensions and disregarded anathemas so discordant with that pure, and humble, and benevolent piety, which is the general spirit of her admirable liturgy. But the Church has a right to judge for herself; and, if she still think proper to retain these pretensions and anathemas, they will certainly be valuable, both as a historical document, and, moreover, as a constant warning, fairly and honestly published by herself, of what may be expected as soon as the church and state shall be as much identified, or as soon as the church shall be as powerful as in the days of old.

That a Protestant church, when it happens unfortunately to be backed by the civil government, can persecute as stoutly as the Roman antichrist himself, is but too well exemplified in the history of Scotland. In the reigns of Charles the Second and of his brother, a Protestant prelacy, in alliance with a Protestant administration, outstripped the wishes of these arbitrary monarchs in the persecution of their Protestant countrymen. It



is needless to weary ourselves or our readers with disgusting details, which the curious in martyrology may find in various publications. Every body knows, that the martyrdoms were both numerous and cruel; but perhaps the comparative mildness of the *catholic* Church of Scotland is not so generally known. Knox has investigated the matter with commendable diligence, but has not been able to muster more than eighteen martyrs who perished by the hand of the executioner, from the year 1500, when heresy first began, till 1559, when the Catholics had no longer the power to persecute. The names of these persons, with several interesting particulars concerning some of them, will be found in pages 6. 19. 22. 40. and 62. of Knox's history. It is indeed a horrid list; but far short of the numbers who, during the twenty-two years immediately previous to the Revolution, were capitally executed in Scotland, for the "*wicked error*" of separation from the worship of the Protestant Episcopal Church.

Such was the cruelty of a Protestant Church, when in alliance with a profligate and tyrannical administration. On the other hand, if the church is destitute of political power, and if the state remembers its duty and dignity so far, that it scorns to be the tool of a particular sect, but reigns the common and impartial guardian of all the subjects, then, whether the church is Protestant or Catholic, and however intolerant her pretensions may be,—she will gradually acquire those habits of forbearance and general charity, which become those who are the ministers, not of the Old Testament only, but of the New. This also has been sufficiently exemplified in the history of *Scotland*, even although the state has not quite fulfilled the condition which is supposed. The church of John Knox, that "breathed out threatenings and slaughter," first against the Catholics, and afterwards with not less fury against the Episcopalians, has been happily converted by a better light; she now sees, without apprehension or jealousy, the sectaries admitted by law as freely as her own disciples to every honour and emolument of the state; and she has even addressed the throne in behalf of the injured Catholics of a sister kingdom. She wants many things indeed which, in the opinion of many, are essential to an Established Church. Her ministers have no representative in either House of Parliament; not even an elective franchise from their benefices, along with the lay electors: there are no dignities to reward her ministers, and no bishops to superintend them. They are merely a parochial clergy with moderate revenues, and not likely, we think, to be much corrupted by better revenues than we fear they have any chance of obtaining. And there is still another strange anomaly which deserves to be mentioned:—The ecclesiastical courts are composed, in pretty nearly an equal proportion, of clerical and of lay members. Yet, notwithstanding all these disadvantages, we have great pride and satisfaction in declaring, that we know not where to look for a church, which better answers all the good purposes of an Establishment,—which is so completely free from the reproach of allowing to any individual a plurality of pastoral charges, —or which maintains a more careful, but not inquisitorial, vigilance over the pastoral fidelity and morals of its clergy.

## THE CORPORATION AND TEST ACTS.\*

WE have never, we hope, lost any opportunity of expressing our sentiments in favour of toleration in general; but as the great question agitated since the commencement of our labours, has been that of the Catholics, we have not hitherto paid any attention to the state of the Protestant Dissenters, or examined the nature and utility of those penalties, to which they are exposed in consequence of their dissent from the Established Church of England. In order to do this effectually, we shall give a slight historical sketch of the penal laws to which Protestant Dissenters are subjected, — specify the present state of those laws, — and then examine their utility for the preservation of the Established Church.

The first *law*, by which any person was bound to receive the sacrament according to the rites of the Anglican Church, is that of the 3d of James I. c. 4. This was not intended against Protestant Dissenters, but against Papists: for Protestant Dissenters then thought it sinful to separate from the Established Church; and occasional conformity always existed between the different reformed churches. The old Puritans, indeed, were dreadfully afraid of falling into the crime of schism; and in 1587, one of the rules they imposed upon themselves was, that they should endeavour to wipe off the imputation of that crime, “inasmuch as *the brethren communicate with the church in word and sacraments*, and in all other things except their corruptions.” The nonconformists in general continued to communicate (at least occasionally) till the year 1645, when the Presbyterian form of worship was established. After the Restoration, and even after the act of uniformity, most of the Presbyterians, and many of the other sects, communicated occasionally with the Episcopal establishment. In the very year that the Corporation Act passed, out of fifty-six known Presbyterian members of Parliament, there were only two who had any scruples to obey the order of the House, and receive the communion after the manner of the Church of England. Occasional conformity indeed was so prevalent about this time, that in 1663, the year after the Presbyterians were turned out by the Act of Uniformity, Mr. Baxter proposed, at a meeting of their ministers, that they should consider how far it was lawful, or their duty, to communicate with the parish churches in the liturgy and sacraments; and used many arguments to prove that it was lawful: and this opinion of Mr. Baxter met with no sort of opposition from his brethren. And at another meeting held in 1666, it was agreed, *that communion with the Established Church was in itself lawful and good*. Bishop Stillingfleet, accordingly, dates the separation of the Dissenters from the Church, only from the time of the King’s declaration of indulgence, issued 1671–2; in consequence of which, they built meeting-houses for themselves, and continued ever afterwards to keep up separate congregations. The practice, however, of conformity continued to a considerable extent among the Presbyterians, as Bishop Stillingfleet tells us in his preface to his book on Separation, published in 1681; but he adds, “when they were earnestly pressed by those in authority to join in com-

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\* Papers on Toleration. By the Rev. C. Wyvill. — Vol. xix. page 149. November, 1811.

munion, they refused it, and have been more and more backward ever since, till now." Occasional conformity has been upon the decline since Bishop Stillingfleet wrote; but there has been no period in which it has not been practised.

The majority of every House of Commons throughout the reign of Charles the Second had a rooted dread and hatred of Popery; and although, at the beginning of the first Parliament, they fell in with the resentments of the King and Church, yet in a few years they discovered their error, and the danger to which they were exposing the country. The latter part of this reign was therefore passed in continual disputes between the House of Commons and the Crown;—the latter struggling hard to protect Papists from persecution, and the former pressing for further severities against them. In the year 1671, Charles the Second, in order to secure the nonconformists, issued a proclamation, suspending, by a dispensing power, all the penal laws, and granting to the Protestant nonconformists public places of worship—to Papists, freedom of religion in their own houses. This usurpation of power roused the drooping spirit of liberty; and the common danger united Protestants of all descriptions. The Dissenters accepted the indulgence, but provoked the resentment of the court, by reprobating that exercise of prerogative by which it was bestowed. Charles opened the session, by declaring, in high terms, his resolution to maintain his declaration of indulgence. The unprincipled firmness of the King, however, gave way to the virtuous firmness of his Parliament; and the indulgence was withdrawn. The Parliament, not content with this, proceeded to incapacitate Catholics from holding any place of trust in the kingdom; and, in their zeal to enforce *that* object, tacked on the present Test Act to the Bill of Supplies, and by that means got it passed.

The Test Act provides, that *every person who shall take any office, civil or military, or shall receive any salary, pay, fee, or wages, by reason of any patent of his Majesty, or shall be admitted into the family of his majesty, shall receive the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper after the manner of the Church of England, within three months after their admittance into the said office. Any person convicted of offending against this act, is disabled from ever after suing in any court,—from becoming guardian, executor, or administrator,—from profiting by any legacy or deed of gift, or from bearing any office within England or Wales,—and, in addition to these incapacities, is to forfeit 500*l.* Non-commissioned officers in the navy, petty constables, overseers of the poor,—and such like small civil offices, are exempted from the operation of the bill,—the preamble of which expressly states the design of the act to be, for preventing any dangers which may happen from *Popish recusants.**

To conciliate the affections of a people divided by religious distinctions, Charles the Second, immediately before his restoration, had published the declaration of Breda. "*We do declare,*" he says, "*a liberty to tender consciences, and that no man shall be disquieted and called in question for matters of religion which do not disturb the peace of the kingdom; and that we shall consent to such an act of Parliament as, upon mature deliberation, shall be offered unto us for the full granting that indulgence.*" This declaration was made in 1660. Copies were sent over to both Houses of Parliament; and it contributed materially to gain the support and assistance of the Dissenters. In 1661, however, the Corporation Act was passed, by which it was enacted, that "*no person shall ever hereafter be placed, elected, or chosen, into any corporation, that shall not, within one*

year next before such election, have taken the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper according to the rites of the Church of England." After the Corporation Act, came the Act of Uniformity, which compelled two thousand ministers, who could not comply with the tests it required, to quit their livings. "This bill (says Hume) reinstated the church in the same condition in which it was before the commencement of the civil wars; and, as the old persecuting laws of Queen Elizabeth still subsisted in their full vigour, and new clauses of a like nature were now added, all the King's promises of toleration, and of indulgence to tender consciences, were thereby eluded and broken."—Hume, vol. vii. 386.

In this way, the Corporation and Tests Acts were passed; and since their enactment several efforts have been made for the relief of the Protestant Dissenters. In October, 1673, a bill was brought in to distinguish between Protestants and Catholics, but was lost by prorogation of Parliament. The next year, the same bill was lost by the same means. Two other bills of the same nature were lost in 1680, by the same manœuvre of the court. Before their adjournment, however, the Commons had passed two strong resolutions in favour of the Dissenters.\* In 1678–9 a test was provided, which admitted Protestant Dissenters into Parliament, but excluded Catholics.

The high authority of King William himself was unsuccessfully employed to procure a repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts. "I hope," said he, in his speech to Parliament in March, 1689, "you are sensible there is a necessity of some law to settle the oaths to be taken by all persons to be admitted to such places. I recommend it to your care, to make a speedy provision for it; and as I doubt not but that you will sufficiently provide against Papists, so I hope you will leave room for the admission of all Protestants that are able and willing to serve. This conjunction in my service will tend to the better uniting you among yourselves, and strengthening you against your common adversaries."

Nothing, however, was done, either in that or the succeeding reign; and in 1711, an act passed, requiring all persons who should accept of offices, not only to take the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, but to conform strictly to the worship of the Church of England, during all the time they held them. In 1718 this act was repealed. A motion was made in the House of Commons for the repeal of the Test Act, on the 12th of March 1735–6, and lost by 251 to 123. On a similar question in 1739, the numbers were 188 to 89. In 1787, the majority against the Dissenters was 78; in 1789, only 20; but in 1790, they were repulsed by a very great majority.

But though the Dissenters have not been able to procure a direct repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts, their condition has been extremely ameliorated (if the inconveniences which they complain of have not indeed been totally removed) by the annual Indemnity Bills, which, since the year 1743, have constantly passed, in favour of all offences against these statutes. Each bill of indemnity pardons all past

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\* Resolved, *nem. con.* — "It is the opinion of this House, that the prosecution of Protestant Dissenters is at this time grievous to the subject, a weakening of the Protestant interest, an encouragement to Popery, and dangerous to the peace of the kingdom." (Com. Jour. vol. ix. 704.) — Resolved, *nem. con.* — "It is the opinion of this House, that the Acts of Parliament made in the reigns of Queen Anne, Elizabeth, and King James, against Popish recusants, ought not to be extended against Protestant Dissenters." (Com. Jour. vol. ix. 704.)

offences, if the test is taken before a certain day; and then another indemnity act succeeds, covering afresh offenders from the last-mentioned day: so that the original Test and Corporation Acts, the existence of which is considered by both sides to be of such extreme importance, which by one is complained of as so intolerable a grievance, and by the other cherished as such an impregnable bulwark of safety, have really had no sort of operation, nor been once carried into effect, for more than sixty-eight years.

From one of the greatest evils which grew out of the Corporation and Test Acts, the Dissenters have been relieved by the decision of a court of justice. They used, for a long time, to be nominated to corporate offices, because it was known they could not qualify to execute them; and by-laws, inflicting penalties on those who refused to serve, were expressly made to enrich corporations at their expense. The produce of these unjust exactions served, or nearly served, to build the mansion-house of the city of London. In 1736, it appears that no less a sum than 20,700*l.* had been raised from fines paid by persons to be excused serving the office of sheriff; and out of that money it was resolved to erect the mansion-house, the first stone of which was laid in 1739. At length, this system of oppression was overthrown. An action was brought by the chamberlain of London against Allen Evans, Esq., a Dissenter, for the penalty of 600*l.* for refusing to serve the office of sheriff of the city of London; but the House of Lords, to whose tribunal it was carried in the last resort, determined, *unanimously*, in 1767, that Dissenters who could not conscientiously take the sacrament, in obedience to the test laws, were excused from serving corporate offices. Upon that occasion, Lord Mansfield did himself the highest honour, by his defence of religious liberty;—evincing a hatred of oppression, a reluctance to indulge the bad passions of the multitude, and a zeal for the rights of mankind, which human beings generally lose, in proportion as they become old, rich, powerful, and famous.

Since that period, the Dissenters have suffered little or no practical oppression. A series of amnesties, for more than sixty years, has made them quite regardless of the penalties of taking office. Several corporations are in their hands; and the decision in Evans's case has established, that they are not punishable for declining the performance of duties to which they cannot conscientiously submit.

This is a short sketch of the history of the penal laws made against the Protestant Dissenters, and of the present state of these laws. It remains that we say something upon their expediency.

In the first place, we begin with a perfect admission of the right of the Legislature to exclude any description of men from civil offices, in consequence of their religious opinions—provided they are satisfied that such an exclusion is essential to the general well-being of the community. The Government has a right to do any thing that is for the good of the governed; and it is *possible* that a particular religious sect may be so notorious for dangerous political opinions, that their faith may be taken as a test, or mark, of their doctrines upon government. In the changes and chances of the world, Socinian doctrines may be firmly united to republican habits,—as dependence on the see of Rome may be combined with the love of despotism; and then it does not seem very unreasonable that religious creeds, in themselves innocent, and not the subject of punishment, should become so, from their accidental alliance with dangerous opinions upon subjects purely secular. Cases might be put where

it would be insanity in any government not to distinguish its enemies by any mark, religious, physical, or moral, that chanced to present itself. It is quite idle, then, to argue this question as a question of general right; and in all debates and publications on this subject, which have fallen into our hands, we have observed that manifest advantages have been gained over the Dissenters, by their adopting this method of arguing the question. They have been completely defeated, in the mere metaphysical part of the dispute, and by these means occasioned a great prejudice against the practical part of their case. We therefore give up the question of right as indefensible, or not worth defending; and shall argue the question merely upon grounds of expediency.

Admitting the right of Government to punish their own subjects, it will easily be allowed, that they ought not to be punished without reason; that no man ought to be cast into prison, to be put to death, to pain, or inconvenience, unless public utility requires it. A government that neglected such plain and obvious notions as these, would be universally execrated, and speedily destroyed.

The love of power is natural to man; and great and useful exertions are made to obtain it. Government, too, has a right to say who shall, and who shall not, possess power; but that right may be justly or oppressively, wisely or foolishly, exercised. It would be absurd and vexatious, if all the offices of the state were confined to persons born in the northern parts of the island. It would be equally absurd and capricious, if they were conferred only upon the sons of clergymen. Though the right to exclude is admitted, there must be a sound reason for each particular act of exclusion: to exclude from offices, without such reason, is a tyrannical and foolish exercise of a right. It remains then to be seen, by what arguments the exclusion of the Dissenters can be justified; and whether the right possessed by the legislature has, in this instance, been exercised under a sound discretion.

Bishop Warburton calls the exclusion from offices a restraint, and not a punishment; and builds (as many have done after him) a great deal of useless reasoning upon this supposed distinction. Be it a restraint or a punishment, or let it receive any other modified appellation, it is *an evil* to those who are excluded; and, if no sort of reason exists why the Dissenters should suffer this evil, it ought not to be inflicted. Whether such reasons do or do not exist, is the question before us.

Mere dissent from the dogmas of the Established Church, without the profession of any dangerous opinions in religion or politics, does not appear to us to be a sufficient reason for exclusion from civil offices. The first and readiest pretext is, that, by such wholesome inflictions, the Dissenters will be frightened back into the pale of the Church. This, however, is a pretext, which experience has long ago refuted. Mankind have shown themselves invincible upon religious topics, under much greater sufferings than any which the Corporation and Test Acts pretend to inflict upon them. The governments of all countries have, at one time or another, made death and cruelty the punishment for heterodox opinions; but, after long experience, have been compelled to give up the attempt as utterly hopeless. But, if men will brave death and pain in the preservation of their religious liberties, it does seem an hopeless undertaking to attempt to reclaim them by privation from civil offices. There is no man of sense, we believe, who does not regret extremely the torrent of fanaticism which is setting in upon this country; yet it would be the extreme of absurdity to attempt to arrest its progress, or to reclaim men

to the bosom of the Church, by telling them they should never be mayors and aldermen if they did not give up their religious tenets. The Church of Ireland, in spite of test laws, amounted, before their repeal, only to one fourth of the population of the whole island. Scotland has preserved its church without test laws. France lost its commerce, manufactures, and population, the moment they were established by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. We much doubt, if any one single convert to the Church has ever been made by them. They have slumbered for seventy years. If, at this moment, when the Church of England is losing ground so fast to the sectaries, they should be revived and carried into strict execution, is there any man so mad as to suppose, that such a remedy would not increase, rather than diminish, the evil?

But, though the penal laws against Protestant Dissenters may not be calculated to gain proselytes to the Established Church, they may be considered, perhaps, as useful in guarding against its already existing opponents, and rendering them less formidable, by depriving them of the power they would gain by the exercise of civil offices. It may be considered as a solid and necessary barrier to an establishment, that those who cannot assent to its doctrines should be prevented from exercising authority over their fellow-subjects. Now, if it were quite clear that those who differed from the Establishment wished to destroy the Establishment, there might be some justice in such a provision. But it is a very conceivable case, that a sect may be contented with the free exercise of its own worship, without having any desire to destroy the established religion of the country. There is nothing in the creed of any Protestant sect existing among us, which necessarily implies such a supposition, or makes the destruction of any other sect any part of their duty. We know of no general meeting of any dissenting ministers, where any resolutions or opinions to that effect have been professed, or even hinted at. The laws against Protestant Dissenters have been uniformly suspended for seventy years, — which we should presume they would not have been, had any such practices existed; and if the opinions of sects are to be gathered from the opinions of a few fanatical members, the Church of England must be subjected to the same rule, and be charged with plans and intentions against the Dissenters, which every respectable churchman, we are convinced, would disown. To disapprove the doctrines of a church is one thing, — to wish its destruction, and to attempt to subvert it, is another. The Protestant Dissenters have, however, had an opportunity of showing how they would act towards Episcopalians, when the power was placed in their own hands. After the power of England ceased in America, they have shown, in the northern and middle colonies of that country, that they have been falsely accused of objecting to the introduction of bishops; and, in New England, where the legislative bodies are almost to a man Dissenters from the Church of England, there is no test to prevent churchmen holding offices. The sons of churchmen have the full benefit of the universities; and the taxes for support of public worship, when paid by churchmen, are given to the episcopal ministers. All this would not have been so, if the Dissenters really entertained that violent hatred against bishops and Episcopalians, of which they are suspected in this country.

We are utterly unacquainted with any thing like an attempt against the safety of the Church or State, made by Protestant Dissenters, for this century and an half last past. The Corporation and Test Acts were certainly passed for no such reason. At the period at which they were

enacted, there was but one general feeling of suspicion and hatred against the Catholics. Every thing that was Protestant was highly popular in that Parliament. At that period, it was only the most rigid Dissenters who made it a matter of conscience not to receive the communion after the manner of the Church of England; and any inconvenience which they might suffer, was by themselves personally waved, in order to promote the great object of guarding against the Catholics. Alderman Sire, member for the city of London, and a most rigid dissenter, declared, in the debate upon the Test Act, that "it was his wish that a most effectual security might be found against Popery, and that nothing might interpose till that was done. At present, they were willing to lie under the severity of the laws, rather than clog a more necessary work with their concerns." And, not a month before the Test Act was brought in, a bill passed the commons, to give to the Dissenters a legal and constitutional toleration. "As the Dissenters (says Hume) had seconded the efforts of the commons against the King's declaration of indulgence, and seemed resolute to accept of no toleration in an illegal manner, they had acquired great favour with the Parliament; and a project was adopted, to unite the whole Protestant interest against the common enemy, who now began to appear formidable. A bill passed the commons for the ease and relief of the Protestant nonconformists," &c. &c. &c. (Hume, vol. vii. p. 506. 8vo.)

The arguments derived from the history of the test laws are not, to be sure, of any great efficacy. They are merely adduced to show, that if such laws are necessary to defend the Church from Protestant Dissenters, such necessity is inferred from general reasoning, not from any actual proof of danger existing when such laws were enacted. They were enacted, most unquestionably, not to guard the Church from Protestant Dissenters; but they were passed, by the assistance of Protestant Dissenters, to guard the Church from the Catholics. The Church of England requires, for its safety, that all dissenters from its doctrines should be excluded from civil offices; and yet, all those who elect to civil offices, may be Dissenters. A mayor or an alderman may be chosen by burgesses, not one of whom belongs to the Church of England; and why (if dissent is so dangerous to the Church) are Dissenters in Parliament? In that situation, where they can do the most mischief, they are left entirely undisturbed. A man may be a member of Parliament if he dissents — but not an alderman. It is extremely difficult to fix a limit to such sort of defences to any establishment. If a church is to weaken its opponents by depriving them of civil power, why not, by depriving them (as was done twenty years ago in Ireland) of the right of acquiring property, disposing of their estates by will? &c. &c. If an establishment, in short, is to be preserved by any other means than those of paying for its support, and then leaving it to the effect of opinion, we are quite at a loss to know where these means are to end. If men are to be driven into the national churches by the fear of losing their chance of civil offices, then the fear of losing their liberty, their limbs, or their lives, would be still a more powerful motive; and the spirit of ancient persecution has been unwisely permitted to sleep.

We must remember, too, that when these laws were passed, restricting the crown from selecting, for the greater number of civil offices, any but members of the Church of England, the King of England might legally be of any religion, and that he was actually a Catholic. The King of England must now not only be a Protestant, but a member of the Church of England. There is no reason, therefore, why the restriction placed upon



the royal prerogative, of choosing, should be any longer continued.— There is a test law, it is indeed said, for the King;— the first magistrate of the country must belong to the Established Church.— Why are subordinate magistrates to consider themselves as aggrieved by submission to the same restraints? In the first place, we have very little belief in the dangers of a dissenting king. But, if the necessity of his conformity be proved, can the necessity of conformity in every public functionary be inferred from it? Are there no reasons which make it necessary for a king of England to be an Episcopalian, which fly over the heads of custom-house officers and tide-waiters, and leave even mayors and burgesses untouched? If it were an evil to be submitted to for the good of the country, the example of the King would silence the murmurs of the suffering subject; but many thousand persons, subjected to useless restraints, cannot possibly be consoled, by the instance of one person who submits to the same restraints, where they are useful and proper.

We have already endeavoured to show, that the Corporation and Test Acts are very badly calculated to make proselytes to the Church; and if their principal use is to guard the church from the hostility of those who must be considered as enemies because they are Dissenters, then these laws are extremely ill calculated for this purpose;—*first*, because they give no real security against this enmity;—and, *secondly*, because they do a great deal more than there is occasion for, by compelling Dissenters to worship after a method of which they disapprove. It would be much better, in both points of view, that a Dissenter, before he took office, should merely make *oath that he would enter into no plan or conspiracy for the destruction of the Church of England*—an oath that would be more fair and rational than a test, and which, we are convinced, no Dissenter would object to take. This security, slight as it may appear, would be quite as effectual to the Church as the taking of the sacrament—for they are both religious ties of equal strength, where they are ties at all;—and in many instances the taking the sacrament is no tie;— for there are some very serious and honourable men among the Dissenters, who would make no scruple to take it after the manner of the Church of England, and yet might think themselves entitled, if opportunity offered, to deprive the Church of her privileges. The Corporation and Test Acts, therefore, are not direct or effectual safeguards against this imaginary danger, which this sort of oath would be, as far as any religious obligations are binding upon mankind. But if the basis of all these reasonings is sound—if, in all countries where there is an established church, there is to be an exclusion of Dissenters from civil and political offices—and no man is to serve the state who cannot think with the Church—this is to divide the human race into two parts, and to make them irreconcilable enemies to each other. The reasoning must be as good any where else as in England. Scotland should exclude Episcopalian Christians—Austria, Protestant Christians—Sweden, Catholic Christians—Russia, both Catholic and Protestant Christians. What a rich fund of animosity is here!

*Eheu quantus equis, quantus adest viris  
Sudor! Quanta moves funera!*

We have a very high respect for established churches, and think them wise institutions for preserving the purity of religion; but if they are to carry with them all these fruitful principles of hatred and persecution, it would be better for mankind that they had never existed at all. The real enemies to religious establishments are those who disfigure them with all

the odious and unnatural apparatus of penalty and exclusion,—who take away from a bishop his mild paraphernalia of crosier and chaplain, and place a common informer at his heels, and a cat-o'-nine-tails in his hand.

It may, however, be very fairly doubted, whether the Church of England would not lose, instead of gaining any thing in the number of its proselytes and the extent of its power, if these Corporation and Test Acts were really carried into execution. If men are let alone, religious fanaticism dies away,—or one folly chases out another. If there be no fanaticism, but only a rational difference of opinion from the Established Church, this slight difference (if it be not assisted by disqualification or persecution) would scarcely hold out against the superior fashion and *éclat* of the Established Church. But where men are told, that they must not be elected to offices, because they cannot believe in this or that speculative dogma of religion, they immediately become attached to their opinions; and the question between them and the church becomes, not a languid question of reason, but a lively question of passion. Men meet together, and talk of their wrongs and their persecutions; till dissent gets from the skin into the bone, circulates with the blood, and becomes incurable. If the laws against the Dissenters were really put into execution, the enemies of the Church would only be rendered more formidable, because they would be made more angry, and therefore more enterprising and more active. The mass of mankind, in this country at least, love peace, and love to follow their own occupations. If they had only to pay a few pounds every year to a church in which they did not believe, this would pass over tranquilly enough; but when, in addition to this, they were oppressed and insulted by severe disqualifications and exclusions, the *vis inertiae* would be overcome; and every Dissenter from the Church would be plotting against its existence. This appears to be the precise effect which these laws are calculated to produce:—*They contain an admirable receipt for converting all those who cannot agree with the doctrines of the Church into the furious and implacable enemies of its existence.* Luckily for the Church, they are too foolish to be acted upon.

All that we have now said respecting the Corporation and Test Acts is upon the supposition that they were enforced. But as an annual indemnity bill passes to protect all offenders under these acts, and to prevent any punishment that may follow upon the transgression; either these acts have no effect at all in protecting the Church, and are already as if they did not exist; or the good they do to the Church must be from a dread entertained by Dissenters, that the laws so suspended may at any period be enforced; and that a punishment is always awaiting them, in case of misconduct. If the first of these suppositions be true, and these laws produce no effect at all, then we presume that no human being can object to their abolition. And if they are supposed to protect the Church, not by any actual privation to the Dissenters, but by menaces of that evil, then all the arguments we have used against the punishment apply with redoubled force to the threat; for a law which punishes dissent from an established religion must aid that established religion (if at all), either by preventing the increase of Dissenters by making proselytes to the Church, or by checking mischievous combinations for the destruction of the Church. And, if it be true, as we have already contended, that actual exclusion from civil offices will neither bring men back to the Church, nor prevent them from quitting the Church, it must also be true, that the mere threat of exclusion will never produce those effects; and, though fewer enemies are made to the Church, and more civil power is granted to

the Dissenters by connivance, than if it never were actually withheld, — still a great degree of irritation is excited; and the very essence of the law (which was meant to deny civil power to heterodoxy) is destroyed.

There may be some utility and meaning in keeping penal laws suspended over the heads of justly suspected sectaries for some short time. But when laws have been suspended for seventy years, and the legislature has not found it necessary to let loose their terrors in one single instance for all that period, this does seem to be a probation which ought to satisfy the most vigilant and jealous orthodoxy: and, to talk of the ruin which must ensue to an establishment, from such an abolition, is really an offence against the common understanding of mankind. But the threat is an idle threat. The fact is, that it would be quite impossible to carry the Corporation and Test Acts into execution. The infliction would be far too sweeping and comprehensive to be tolerated. Prosecutions would lie against all Dissenters who had any concern in the Bank of England, the East India, Russia, or South Sea Companies, or in any of the insurance companies; — against the officers of many hospitals and other charitable institutions. Dissenters would be sometimes excluded from being vestrymen, and from managing almshouses. They would not be permitted, in some places, to govern workhouses, poorhouses, and houses of industry. They could not be keepers of madhouses or lazarettoes; and would be prohibited, in most cases, from acting as commissioners or trustees of any sort. It was doubted by the Court of King's Bench, when Lord Chief Justice Hall presided, whether the censors of the College of Physicians were not obliged to take the test. — All persons acting under royal charters are certainly obliged to do so. All non-commissioned officers, and the commissioned officers in the army, must receive the communion. All excisemen, custom-house officers, tide-waiters; all those who hold offices of inheritance. The Postmaster-general, the Lord Chancellor, the proprietors of mail coaches, all retailers of perfumery, venders of quack medicines, persons letting out post-horses, are all persons holding places of *trust under his Majesty, or those deriving authority from him*, and must therefore all appear at the altar, before they enter upon their respective functions. Those who had licenses to sell ale were formerly compelled to receive the sacrament, according to the Church of England; as Mr. Locke, in his second Letter on Toleration, p. 360., informs us. No Dissenters can be governors of hospitals, assisted by act of Parliament; nor commissioners for window-taxes, nor maids of honour, nor the meanest officers in corporations; nor could the King confer a pension, nor any other reward, upon the most meritorious Protestant Dissenter, who scrupled to receive the sacrament.\*

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\* All Scotchmen settled in England, and holding any offices there (a pretty numerous band), would be subjected to the penalties of these laws. A member of the Church of England has full and free access to all the offices of Scotland, while a member of the Church of Scotland is incapacitated from holding one in England. By the Act of Union, the two kingdoms are incorporated into one. There is to be one army, one navy, one parliament, and one privy council; and yet the members of the Scotch Church — who are not Dissenters, but appertain to a church recognised and established by our laws, — are cut off from all enjoyment of offices in England. The different predicaments in which the two countries are placed, show, ludicrously enough, how little the state of any country is to be judged of from its laws. The Scotch are prohibited, by the severest penalties, from bearing offices in England; and the English permitted, with the most generous magnanimity, to share in all the wealth and patronage of Scotland.

But the execution of these laws is impossible, not only from their ridiculously extensive operation, but from the enormity and atrocity of the punishments which they enact. He who offends against them *is deprived of the right to sue in any court of law or equity. He cannot be guardian to any child, or administrator or executor to any person. He can neither take a legacy, nor deed of gift, nor bear any office in England, Wales, or Berwick upon Tweed.* The pecuniary penalty for the offence is equally enormous, — 500*l.* would be the price to an exciseman or corporal of the army for his transgression. — No lapse of time bars prosecution for this class of offences. A man may be prosecuted to-morrow for not receiving the sacrament forty years ago. How is it possible to execute such laws as these? And what advantage can it be to the church to continue a threat of enforcing laws which are so extravagantly and preposterously cruel, that every man of common sense must know they are extinguished for ever? Last year Lord Sidmouth made a slight scratch in the epidermis of the Dissenting Church. Of the extraordinary consequences, we were all witnesses; and yet there are persons who may think it possible to revive the execution of the Test Acts! If there are no such extravagant persons, why may not those laws be repealed? And never let it be forgotten, against what species of men they have been enacted — against men who have run greater risks, and with greater unanimity, to preserve the free government and constitution of this country, than any other set of men whatever. During the reign of Charles II. the small remains of liberty were chiefly preserved and cherished by them. They resisted, with effect, the arbitrary designs of Charles and James II. when their own immediate interest would have led them to an unconditional submission. They joined cordially in the Revolution, and exposed themselves to the resentment of a bigoted princess and an infatuated people, to secure the succession of the house of Hanover. In two rebellions, the Dissenters, without the exception of a single individual, showed a steady attachment to the present government; and they have, at all times and seasons, (and when such praise was by no means due to the Church of England,) proved themselves the steady friends of that mild, moderate, and tolerant race of Kings, by which we have been governed for the last century.\*

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It is curious to observe, how intrepidly the one nation exposes itself to danger, and how constantly the other abstains from advantage. A very favourite argument, in support of the Corporation and Test Acts, is, that their repeal would be contrary to that article of the Scottish Union, which enacts, that all acts existing at the period of that Union, for the establishment and preservation of the Church of England, its doctrines, worship, discipline, and government, are to remain in full force for ever. It is very wrong, in important subjects, to leave weak arguments unanswered; for it is impossible to conceive any too weak to produce an effect in topics where many understandings interfere. We have to observe, therefore, that it is a folly to talk of the eternity of any human laws. If both nations wished one of the articles of Union to be altered, it ought to be altered. And as the power of altering it must exist somewhere, there is no other practical method of carrying such alteration into effect, than by act of Parliament, as in any common case. And next, we wish to observe, that the Corporation and Test Acts have nothing to do with the establishment, doctrine, worship, and discipline of the Church of England; and that, instead of contributing to the preservation of that Church, they add to the number, and inflame the animosity of its enemies, and therefore render its destruction more probable.

\* The Corporation and Test Acts having been wisely abolished, with other absurd remnants of English persecution, it was scarcely necessary to include this

THE LAST OF THE CATHOLIC QUESTION—ITS PRINCIPLE,  
HISTORY, AND EFFECTS.\*

THE tumultuous joy with which the sudden announcement of peace to Ireland was welcomed by the friends of civil and religious freedom, has gradually subsided to deep and solemn thankfulness for the purest political pleasure that this generation can live to witness. That nodding and impending danger, which, like the mysterious helmet in the "Castle of Otranto," was enlarging every hour before our eyes, is at length swallowed up. The thunder cloud, whose pressure took away our breath, is gone. The earth seems once more firm under our feet; and that future which we durst not look upon is rising bright and glorious; and on its forehead is the morning star! The whole aspect and character of the remainder of one's life are changed by it. Instead of feeling that our home and country were becoming a precarious leasehold, whose term we ourselves even might have the wretchedness of surviving, we shall now bow our heads to the *nunc dimittis*, come when it may, in confidence that we are leaving to our children the imperial inheritance of a united kingdom, secured, as far as human probabilities may approach security, by all the elements of an enduring greatness.

This question has stood of late years like a Michael Angelo in a gallery, blinding us to every thing else. Now that it is at last disposed of, we shall be enabled to return to other human objects, and to look at them in other than merely Protestant or Papist bearings. The present measure is wisely and simply framed. The best way to disarm your enemy is to disarm his mind. You want no security against him, when, by doing him justice, you have made him your devoted friend. A hundred little technical contrivances, however apparently ingenious and successful, would have reduced the real security in an infinitely greater proportion, by manifesting the jealousy of distrust, and keeping up so many occasions of possible division. They might have entangled posterity; and, at pre-

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Essay amongst the other Selections from the Review, the subject having lost its interest with the removal of the cause which, at one period, so powerfully attracted public attention. But as I have given one article on the Catholic Claims, and one on the Disabilities of the Jews, I could not with propriety reject a sensible and argumentative defence of the Claims of the Dissenters to an equality of political rights. As connected with this subject, I would direct the attention of the reader to some excellent observations on Dissenters' Marriages in Vol. xxxv. page 62.; and to an able defence of Religious Toleration in Vol. xvi. page 413.

\* 1. Ireland: Its Evils and their Remedies, &c. &c. By Michael Thomas Sadler.

2. The Christian Duty of granting the Claims of the Roman Catholics. With a Postscript, in Answer to the Letters of the Rev. G. S. Faber. By Thomas Arnold, D.D., Head Master of Rugby School, and late Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford.

3. Protestantism the Pole-Star of England; a Brief but Comprehensive View of the Political History of England since the Reformation; wherein the Prosperity of the Country is shown to have been identified with the Support of the Protestant Religion. Copied chiefly from the Preface to a Work on the Prophecies, lately published by the Rev. George Croly.—Vol. xlix. page 218. March, 1829.

sent, would only have afforded the great master of delay, who is as powerless in discussing principles, as he is unrivalled in the harassing warfare of detail, a splendid opportunity of crowning a consistent life, by seeking to intercept this national blessing by endless permutations and combinations of obstinate chicane.

The two wings, whose dovelike office it is to waft home this messenger of peace, are as favourable conditions as could be well proposed (if conditions we must have) for terms of reciprocal concession. The Catholic Association had accomplished the object of its existence. From the instant that its power and spirit had passed into the constitution, nothing but a sort of corpse was left, for either their own vote or that of Parliament to consign to an honourable grave. Our patrician policy had made its two great leaders the real tribunes of the Irish people for the time; and their faults have been the faults of that anomalous and stormy office. Ireland has not so many periods of brightness in her story, or so many candidates for her gratitude, that their names can ever be forgotten, in a country whose first patriot was Grattan, and where, it may now be hoped, that Lord Anglesey will be her last martyr. For the Association itself, it will need no other epitaph than the "*Circumspice*" of a nation it has freed.

The other part of the compromise — the disfranchisement of the forty-shilling freeholders — is in appearance more ungracious; since, however substantially valuable, it has, just at the present moment, too much the air of a punishment for their Roman virtue. But when once the feeling (for it is matter of feeling only) is got over, and the first disappointment is softened by kind and judicious explanation, the alteration will be found; in itself, a solid and lasting good. The virtue the peasantry have lately displayed is the heroic excitement of a crisis, when the heart swells over its banks, and sweeps away all ordinary considerations before it. But as soon as things had returned to their natural channel, the peasant would have found himself the serf of heretofore — without adequate means or motive of resistance; and must have again been crushed between the old alternative of ruinous collision, or perjured and degrading bondage. To relieve him from such a peril, is to prepare the way towards enfranchising him with a truer freehold — freedom of mind and character; that by which man is emphatically Man. The statistics of Ireland, which must lay the next stone in the foundation of moral improvement, will gain greatly by the removal of an electioneering ambition, which few landlords have had the forbearance to withstand. Independent votes are what we want. A wise legislature ought to stop wherever it can fix this standard, nor descend a shilling lower. Every age must take care of itself; and we must give those that come after us credit for re-opening the poll book, and letting in a new class of freeholders, as soon as one is formed which can exercise the right usefully to itself and to the public. The late system had, in common times, all the mischief of universal suffrage, and all the baseness of a rotten borough. As many, however, as thought this disfranchisement unjust and injurious if taken by itself, but yet believed it indispensable to the success of the great measure with which it was combined, were equally bound to support it on the plainest principles of moral prudence. To taunt such compromises with the name of trimming, and to cant, with half a line out of a copy book about "not doing evil that good may come," is to forget what all are doing every day they live. If a man is to fold his arms till a proposition of unmixed good is presented for his acceptance, he may take his stand with the farmer's boy, who waited till

the river should run out. All restraint is, for instance, evil; but the law-giver and the judge pass their lives in violating this goodly maxim. We presume there is no moral sense, or rule of Scripture, by which we can guide ourselves in respect either of the odd shilling more or less in the elective franchise, or concerning what is a proper, and what an improper, modification of the national adjustment of 1688. Individual rights can seldom clash so much with the general interest as to counterbalance the great principle that demands the inviolability of property; and it is still more seldom that society has not the means of making individual compensation. But it is otherwise in the case of great portions of a community; for their only compensation must arise from the increased prosperity of the whole. These rights, too, being political, are impressed with a stronger trust, and are held by the express tenure of public service. To hold them inviolable, would bar us from altering the quantity, as well as quality, of the new blood, whose infusion the constitution might require; and we could as little add as take away. A remonstrance against extending the elective franchise to copyholders, upon the ground that such an innovation was a disturbance of the vested right that the freeholder had in his monopoly, would be only this same moon in another quarter. It is clear that, when the general objects and the particular objects of an institution clash, the latter must give way.

Just in the degree that we trembled at the crisis from which we are now escaping, may be estimated our sense of gratitude to him, who, having "lurched all swords of the garland," has achieved this great civic victory of Justice, Mercy, and Peace. Whilst the clergy seem groping about us in the dark in all directions, we feel pretty much as we suppose Ulysses did, when he was eluding the clutches of the bewildered Polypheme (who at best had but one eye, and that now extinguished), under the guidance of the Leader of the flock. The Duke has broken in upon their magic forest — the Mona, defended with such Druidical fury; and notwithstanding the mist and the mutterings, the unholy words and spectral forms, arrayed against his entrance, he has pressed resolutely on to free this spell-bound subject, and break the enchanter's wand. Colonel Napier learned in Spain how the Tenth Legion came to worship Cæsar; and a greater than Cæsar is here — one who has not destroyed in peace the country he had saved by his sword. Untrammelled and uncommitted, not more protected by his splendid expatriations than averse by nature from the paltering which had gangrened this vital question through its whole domestic bearings, he has amply repaid the universal respect with which all eyes so anxiously watched him whilst yet wrapped in his impenetrable cloak. Although he came new to a question encompassed by contention and complicated by finesse, he saw that his choice upon it was indeed the choice in what class of statesmen he should hereafter stand. Having carried off the plate in military glory, he has refused, in his new career, to put himself into cart-horse harness — to leave the company of the Turennes and Marlboroughs of the Cabinet, and herd in the rear rank of our secondary civilians — among the Poloniuses and Osrics of the Court of Denmark.

The question certainly is not new to Mr. Peel; his present merit respecting it stands therefore on entirely distinct grounds, and yet is great. The reputation that he acquired whilst serving under his former colours, and his actual declaration that he has left them with reluctance, have enabled him to confer at last an important benefit on his country, by assisting to heal the wounds he had so long kept open. A confession

so announced must satisfy all who can be satisfied, that it has become, in any view of it, the least of two evils. We gladly pay him high interest for the aid which he is now giving to overthrow an opposition, which he himself had mainly raised, consolidated, and upheld. In such a case, when the last able layman who could be found to advocate the obsolete prejudices of a powerful party, is bowled out by the strong conviction of necessity, he must be prepared to undergo the obloquy of the mob of followers who had made him the representative of their opinions, and had put, as politicians, their whole moral and intellectual existence into his hands. But this privilege of scandal, within certain limits excusable enough, has been abused in a manner disgraceful to the Tory press, and to the party whom he provided with sense and speeches much longer than they deserved. The imps whom he conjured up and fed as companions and attendants, whilst he continued the practice of the "black art," are now flying at him because he has burnt his pernicious books, and resolved to trust to the despised faculty of human reason. Like Actæon, his own hounds are ready to devour him—and for the same offence—opening his eyes. Nothing can show more forcibly that Mr. Peel's understanding has got at length into its right place, than the different figure he is making this session and the last; when, though none of the Tory pecking at him had begun, and whilst the Whigs were extending to him a most generous forbearance, a feather seemed dropping off almost every night. Allowing for the disproportionate consequence he attaches to the turn of the scale in a parliamentary division, over the weightier matters of the question, he has shown at the last equal judgment, ability, and temper. Not only has Mr. Peel dealt usefully by the public, in undertaking the official superintendence of the present measures; amidst great personal difficulties, we feel convinced he has also chosen that which, being the most fair and manly, ought to be the least painful and least unsatisfactory for himself. The choice could be to him only one of evils. He was in the old British dilemma—the sea before him, the barbarians behind. Mr. Peel is well aware that it is not the year 1829 which he has to explain and justify. It is not when private opinions and public conduct are coincident, that a man has any thing to repent of, or the country any reason to complain. Could Mr. Canning have answered to his wish, "were our honoured Banquo here!" that princely and forgiving eye would have beamed with even unusual brightness in welcoming the new convert to his cause. He might have shrunk at the recital of the inward change of 1825,—at the thought of the eventful interval, and the continued resistance; above all, he must have felt the difficulty of reconciling with these communications, so long and so mysteriously concealed, the disqualification publicly pronounced on him in 1827, by reason of opinions, which, it now appears, were held at that very time, by at least one of his protesting and seceding colleagues. But sincerity is valuable, however late. The man who never changes his mind, must be about as great a fool as the man who is always changing it; and if there be an occasion when such an intellectual process ought to meet with indulgence, it is when you perhaps save a kingdom by submitting to it. "*Sape ego audivi apud milites eum primum esse virum qui ipse consulat quid in rem sit: secundum eum, qui benè monenti obediat: qui nec ipse consulere, nec alteri parere sciat, eum extremi ingenii esse.*"

This latter class, that cannot lead and will not follow, disdaining the *gratum certè nobis animorum gloriam*, has presented us with nothing in



the shape of argument but a battery of bitter and boundless personalities. Having hallooed their champion up to the hill top, that he might curse the tents of Israel, they have heard in desperation the words that the Spirit of Truth has put into his mouth, blessing them altogether. The great malignant sophism, by which they pander to ignorance and passion, lies chiefly in the abuse of a single word, (and this, too, patronised by members of conversion and missionary societies,) by which a change of opinions, and apostacy, are assumed to be the same. The blindfold consistency, on which all authority, experience, and warning, are thrown away, is nothing but a second-hand infallibility, made out of a worse-grained wood than any papal chair. "Old as I am, I put myself to school," was once esteemed a merit. The  *censor morum*  of antiquity learned Greek at eighty; and a love of liberty is to the full as honourable a preparation for the grave. In those great debates, by which the Petition of Rights is surrounded as with a glory, old Sir Edward Coke stood out, (and also at seventy-nine,) careless of the inconsistency between his youth and his age; and thus joined in making the professional learning of that day so dear to the friends of freedom.

This setting up a minister as a Shrovetide cock for half a session, is perhaps a necessary substitute for the exhausted state of reasonable mind and matter which their cause affords. They are as little scrupulous in calling names as in assuming them. The mask only is changed, the object remains the same; it is sought to extort to-day by violence, what has hitherto been pocketed by fraud. It is long since this party could venture to march through Coventry with the name of any of their natural leaders inscribed on their banners. They have consequently recruited for perorations to their harangues, and for followers to their processions, by one of the most unconscientious appropriations of titles and relationship to which they have no pretence, that ever was ventured upon by the unscrupulousness of faction. As  *Orangemen* , they affect the countenance of the House of Orange; that house which, in the monarchy of the Netherlands, is now manifesting the same steady friendship to universal toleration, that was justly regarded as its proudest distinction, whilst head of the Republic of Holland. As  *Brunswickers* , they assume the right of imposing their own corporation bigotries upon an illustrious family, in contradiction to that liberty of conscience which is now the common law of Germany, and in contradiction to the domestic example, of equality before the law, which the King of Hanover has so lately set to his relation, the King of England. The cheers of the  *Pitt Clubs* , under circumstances of denial so recent and so notorious, at a toast which has driven those most nearly connected with the person and principles of that great minister from these celebrations of his memory, well entitle the festival to the description of "the great annual imposture," by which we usually hear it called. Considering that these frauds have been perpetrated for the purposes of political trade, an injunction might almost be moved in the Court of Chancery against them. It is difficult to say in what Jesuit annals there can be found a more glaring abuse of words, than that by which Protestant zeal has endeavoured to press into its service the patronage of the two men, who in all our history, would most have scorned the degradation of such alliance.

Nursed in that country, whose greatest glory was, that it placed freedom of conscience above all other freedom and that it gave the earliest example of what security, prosperity, and happiness attend on toleration, William brought to England a most earnest wish to realise the appre-

hensions of the bigots, by making it “an Amsterdam of all religions.” No fact belonging to that most inglorious, but most blessed Revolution, is better known to all who know any thing of the matter, and more studiously concealed by those who call loudest on his name when they are most violating his principles, than that he had no sympathy with the planter-like insolence of oppression; that, volunteering on no exclusions, he yielded in this, as in other instances, to the cruel exigencies of his position; and that he would have held the title of our “Great Deliverer” much truer and much dearer, if no description of his subjects had been led captive at his triumph. Notwithstanding the authoritative disclaimer which Mr. Latouche so lately read the Orangemen, from Bishop Burnet, these societies, as long as they crawl, will doubtless re-hang their spider-web upon the statue of our hero, and seek to borrow some credit from a character whose services and virtues would go far towards sanctifying any error.

In respect of the Pitt Clubs, the scandal is only greater as the facts are more flagrant. In the history of a man whose natural and official life were almost one, what event can be so remarkable as that he should have chosen to abdicate the government, abandon his beseeching sovereign, and leave Lord Sidmouth to try conclusions with Bonaparte, rather than appear wanting in a conviction of the importance of *this* cause? They are bad husbands of his honour, who pass over this striking epoch: they are garblers of the memoirs of that necessary evil — the Irish Union — who do not wind up its story by doing justice to the manliness that refused to be a party in defrauding the expectations under which that Union had been obtained; the fulfilment of which expectations could alone turn it into that fusion of national interests and feelings, which the safety of both countries demanded, and which he intended it to be. His great political achievement has been thus corrupted into a monster, half slave, half free — a centaur, not a man: and thus has Ireland been, for upwards of a century, what Scotland would have been, had our statesmen also legislated, at the creation of the kingdom of Great Britain, upon the more plausible supposition that Presbyterians are ill-disposed towards monarchy, and therefore ineligible to office under a monarchical constitution. Mr. Pitt, whom they worshipped for party objects with so much mouth-honour, has been treated, in respect to these transactions, only one degree less treacherously than the Irish themselves. The single act of “wild justice” perpetrated on him, has been the publication of his admirable Letter to George III., which Lord Kenyon, in a headlong zeal to avail himself of royal prejudices, has, with a judgment so well worthy of the cause, lately printed. As for the Pitt Clubs themselves, it is clear, beyond all dispute, that Mr. Pitt would not dine at his own dinner.

The late appeals to the populace have been accompanied with language, for which, if it has failed in its own intelligible meaning, we yet owe no thanks to those who calculated upon gunpowder, when they shook their torch. The preparations for some time have shown, that reason had long ago gathered whatever was within reach, and that all further hope lay in shaking the tree. Strength of argument had been long dispensed with, and we stood on the intermediate point most favourable to strength of lungs. Dr. Philpotts had made way for Lord Winchilsea: the study-chair for Penenden Heath — the Runnymede of intolerance — where, within hearing of the Canterbury clergy, Archbishop Langton was lectured on his lukewarmness to freedom. The mere mention of the word Popery, it was known, had been sufficient,

any time these hundred years, to deprive a considerable portion of Englishmen of the perfect use of their understanding. Hence the craftiness of that favourite fallacy which brands with the epithet *Pro-poperly*, men whose Protestantism and patriotism are known to be equally intense; and who are earnest, in the precise proportion of those feelings, to relieve their religion from the disgrace of such gratuitous injustice, and their country from the danger of a policy so perniciously insane. Polemical irrelevances, whether foolish only, or malignant, yet equally injurious, have accordingly been scandalously abused in the mystifications professionally prepared for the delusion of the lower orders. The chief mistake which the friends of civil and religious freedom have all along committed, consists in their having despised these practices too much to be at the pains for circulating appropriate antidotes to such vulgar poisons. So far from being taken by surprise, whilst half of England is sick in longing for this measure, too many of our excellent countrymen have had time to raise the price of Lincolnshire sheepskins, and expose themselves egregiously. We make no complaint of those who so loudly appealed from Parliament to the people. We receive gladly any precedent of deference to popular opinion. Go through the form of asking for it often, and it will become more and more worth having. A village in the said county, with which we are well acquainted, was so earnest in availing itself of the opportunity of exercising this right, that, upon the Duke of St. Alban's very properly requiring of the clergyman that they should have a petition in favour, as well as against, the Catholics submitted to their choice, we are told that every man in the parish most impartially signed *both!*

Of late, there has been no attempt at reasoning, beyond an appeal to the test of numbers. Death must be daily turning even this against the side that has no recruits. The sere and yellow leaf is replaced by the vigorous promise of a forward spring. The young shoots refuse to put out buds of rotten wood. Now, as our religion is an historical religion, so is this in part an historical question. It also requires knowledge of the theory and practice of the Roman Catholic religion, in its natural state, in other countries at the present age. It would be as well, if those who are to decide, could form some conjecture of what the proposed alteration amounts to, and what is the possible danger to which it can open a door. Nor would they be the less competent, if they had correct opinions on the kind of risk to which the happiness of individuals and the safety of the commonwealth are exposed, by a continued refusal to do justice. The people are justified in watching jealously the class above them, wherever they see it employed in legislating or deciding in favour of interests of its own. But there is no reason for overruling the credit due to its superior opportunities and superior intelligence, when there is no separate interest to mislead it, and where the only possible consideration is the common safety of the state. Notwithstanding the confidence with which numbers have been arrayed, and the admitted probability that the popular prejudices are not yet numerically subdued, yet the comparative indifference with which the common people regard the subject, may be presumed from the unsparing abuse of every species of delusion with which the country has been deluged and disgraced. Nobody does work of this kind by preference, and for nothing. Could truth have served the purpose of this modern opposition, surely they would have spoken truth. It is amusing to see a sudden reverence for petitions and for universal suffrage, beyond what Major Cartwright ever dreamed of,

now sprung up among the Tory aristocracy; whilst their management of a machinery so new to them, sweeping in the charity girl, the lunatic, and the felon, might be considered by the suspicious as evidence of an ulterior conspiracy to bring the right of petitioning into contempt. A Florilegium of these placards and handbills will be a strange contradiction for posterity to reconcile with the opposite proofs of our contemporary knowledge and refinement. We are not disposed to flatter the present age by any worthless compliments on its discretion or its virtues. But a spirit of more comprehensive charity, improving upon the ancient petty modifications of self-love, is its noblest characteristic. Dryden's beautiful supposition, that man was created with an extended space of arms "to satisfy a large embrace," seems getting truer every day. But this is Philosophy's best and dearest work. Accordingly, all the great movements in advance have everywhere been fought up by intelligent minorities. This is the very picture of society in progress—as at the Reformation, the Revolution, and on this very question. There have been certain subjects wherein nobody, for a long time, ever dreamt of consulting humanity or justice. A Catholic was as much born to be excluded, as a negro to be sold. A few surviving representatives of an age, whose morals and politics were full of chasms, may be still found regular at church or chapel, whilst persecuting, up to the maximum the times will bear, those whom the law allows them to call heretics. Their complacency is of the same character with that which enabled Cowper's Newton to write, "that he never had sweeter communion with God than—on his last voyage to Guinea!" A spirit of perfect toleration is among the most brilliant innovations of very recent days. It is the dethroning of the last Aristotle of every Sorbonne. Whilst we take boundless pleasure in this triumph, we allow, on behalf of its veteran antagonists, their title to the whole benefit of Harvey's declaration, that he had found no physician turned of forty, who would admit the circulation of the blood.

It is to the credit of the lay-talent of this country, that, beset as this courtier superstition has been with temptations, yet its fortune has been long decided by a constellation of every distinguished name among our statesmen. There is not missing a star of any magnitude. It is singular, when no country exists in Europe, where the authority of great names is so strong a supplement to reason (indeed, it might be said, is so often stronger than reason, where they happen to be opposed) as England, that in a case where reason and authority cover each other in an entire coincidence, means were found for so many years of evading the grasp of their conclusions. Our premier, thus supported, need give himself little trouble about the obsolete and impenitent ultras, who reproach their own bishops for indiffence to Episcopacy; and whose hulls, mouldering on the strand, will soon serve only to measure the distance at which they are left by the current of the times. The survivors of the baffled minority on the abolition of the slave trade—those practical statesmen, who nailed their colours to the mast of the last Guinea ship—may be allowed to sun their harmless imbecility in the brightness of a similar exhibition, and to celebrate, with one cheer more, their favourite virtue of consistency, whether right or wrong. When the misguided villagers have had a respite, and have recovered from the saturnalia of inflammatory politics, at whose dramshop they had been drenched, they will see into what company they have fallen; and may judge of the real tendency of all this intolerance, by the rank and file with which it musters. This is only one leaf out of

a dark volume, whose Turkish text opposes emancipation from any oppressive error. They will recognise in the advocates for religious exclusions from civil rights, the consistent supporters of Corn Laws, Sugar Laws, Game Laws; men to whom every subject is equally dear, if it is but a monopoly and a wrong. Who can doubt but that these persons, if they had embarrassed 1688 by their presence, would have deprecated its proceedings, have quoted 1648, have shaken the head of the martyr King before them, and have been the same thorns in the side of Lord Somers, as at present they are in the Duke's? In the great national recovery which we are suffering, we have vouched every thing that a nation can rely upon, in the way of security for being right. Could we trust this party, and ruin an empire to please them, they have nothing to offer us either as indemnity or excuse.

A portion of the foam which the present storm has scattered on every wind, comes from a school with which we shall certainly never enter into controversy, till we meet together on the plains of Armageddon. Men that can see in the Apocalypse the present state of Europe, and who tell a British statesman to burn his Burke, and adopt the book of Revelations for a political manual, are carrying on madness upon too sublime a scale for our interference. We were brought up in the humble creed of looking at the prophecies chiefly in connection, not with the future, but the past; where a cautious divinity, looking backwards, might shadow out marks of anticipation and of promise, and lead on our faith by proofs of Divine foreknowledge, to an apparent accomplishment of the Divine will. But to use them as *this* year's almanac — to put the Millennium backwards and forwards, according as the facts of the last twelvemonth have falsified the predictions of the last edition — to jeopardise the state rather than tolerate a policy which might spoil a favourite criticism on some ambiguous text, or might intercept the vision that is floating for the week over the valley of Albury, is to turn the Apocalyptic eagle into the cuckoo of the spring. Propositions more absurd were never made by Cromwell's chaplains or by the Puritan ministers, of whom Clarendon gives so picturesque a sketch, coming out from the godly town of Gloucester. The Fifth-monarchy men could do no worse than pour out the vials on our heads, and throw us on the horns of the beast, in this great national dilemma. So much is said and written about the beast, that though superstition is cheated out of its fagot, it seems resolved to indemnify itself by a sort of Smithfield language still. There is little to choose between the fanaticism which would fire a kingdom, and that which fires a church. In the event of our modern commentators clearing up all difficulties by a civil war, it would be but moderate consolation, that Mr. Macneil had dipped his sword in the prophetic portion of the Scriptures; whereas "Old Mortality" preferred engraving the historical texts upon his blade. Of all "lights which lead astray," none can be so mischievous as that which is imagined to be "a light from Heaven." We should be startled at our blindness and presumption were there brought before us at one moment of view all the pages of our Bible, (given us for far other purposes,) which have been perverted, at different ages and on different subjects, into authorities for human folly and human crime. Religious feeling can answer for the heart only, but not the head. The regicides would not otherwise have prayed so heartily for a sign to "marshal them the way they should go," and yet have prayed in vain. Were virtue a protection against error in the use of so dangerous an instrument, posterity might safely see in the Memoirs of Mrs. Hutchinson

an encouragement, and not a warning. For her gallant husband, when he saw that "many who had preached the people into it, had apostatised, set himself to a more diligent study of the Scriptures, *whereby he attained confirmation in many principles he had before.*" It is scarcely credible that a nation, with eighty millions of heathens for its subjects, should be threatened with God's judgments upon those that unite themselves with idolaters, by a simple admission of fellow-Christians to equal political rights; especially when the precedent chosen for this bold distribution of the Divine displeasure, is that policy of brotherly love, which has already secured religious peace and civil concord to nearly the whole of Europe. Whichever of the hundred notions of Antichrist may happen to be true, Ireland must equally be saved. If religious enthusiasts once changed the politics of their age, it was when they formed in line with the friends of freedom. Let them turn against us now, and they shall find that we have an enthusiasm as ardent and invincible as their own.

The perturbation thus raised by shifting a question of politics into one of polemics, has not only broken the peace\* of the religious world, but

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\* From the first discussion of this great question, the Bishop of Norwich has supported a cause as truly that of Protestantism as of state policy; and the present Bishop of Rochester has succeeded to the liberal opinions as well as to the honours of Dr. King, the friend of Burke. It is to be hoped that these, with the more recent examples of churchmen most distinguished for their piety, and that of the great leader of the Scottish Church, Dr. Chalmers, will bring back to their moorings many of those whom the late tempest had driven half-seas over. The Roman Catholic interpretation of the Transubstantiation Text seems to us rightly described as a mistake of criticism, turning "Rhetoric into Logic." But it is indeed surprising that Mr. Faber should think it a suitable recreation for the present season, to labour a demonstration, that because the ceremony of the host would be idolatry in us, according to our interpretation, we therefore must act towards it as idolatry in them, with theirs. This is the very point which intolerance long dashed at with most impetuous objections; and which Jeremy Taylor ought to have put down for ever by the following triumphant answer. Observe, moreover, if Deuteronomy is to fix the offence, it also should award the punishment, and such prophet is to be slain. The extract is not too long, if they, who have been misled by the fallacy, will commune on it, and take it to their hearts and be still. (Works, vol. viii. p. 223.) "But here we must deliberate — for it is concerning the lives of men; and yet a little deliberation may suffice. For idolatry is a forsaking the true God, and giving divine worship to a creature or to an idol, that is, to an imaginary god, who hath no foundation in essence or existence; and is that kind of superstition which by divines is called the superstition of an undue object. Now it is evident that the object of their adoration (that which is represented to them in their minds, their thoughts, and purposes, and by which God principally, if not solely, takes estimate of human actions) in the blessed sacrament, is the only true and eternal God hypostatically joined with his holy humanity, which humanity they believe actually present under the veil of the sacramental signs. And if they thought him not present, they are so far from worshipping the bread in this case, that themselves profess it to be idolatry to do so; which is a demonstration that their soul hath nothing in it that is idolatrical. If their confidence and fanciful opinion have engaged them upon so great mistake, (as without doubt they have,) yet the will hath nothing in it but what is a great enemy to idolatry: 'Et nihil ardet in inferno nisi propria voluntas.' And although they have done violence to all philosophy and the reason of man, and undone and cancelled the principles of two or three sciences, to bring in this article; yet they have a divine revelation, whose literal and grammatical sense, if that sense were intended, would warrant them to do violence to all the sciences in the circle. And indeed that transubstantiation is openly

also the more profound repose of the Church of England. A thing, upon which no two men ought to differ, is mixed up with one on which no two men can be expected precisely to agree. The issue is artfully changed from that which Paley (in what we can hardly bring ourselves to call its more liberal days) taught the University of Cambridge was the only justifiable ground of any political exclusions—the supposed union of certain political with certain religious tenets—to enquiries, involving more comparative theology than many a candidate for holy orders takes with him to his ordaining bishop. In reference to the principle on which it has been sought to justify exclusions, they who insist in going at length into the respective merits of the two religions, not only enter upon a field of interminable debate, but are abandoning, in the nineteenth century, the distinction which the truest friends of our Protestant reputation have always insisted was her rule, in days when direct penalties on faith were more in fashion. Volumes have been written to establish, that Elizabeth's measures were aimed solely at the politics, and in no respect at the creed, of Rome. In reference to the object to be attained, it is now too late to renew, in any shape, the politico-religious sophisms by which Papists, Puritans, and even Quakers, have been tormented, together and in succession; not, forsooth, on the ground of their religion, but because their religion was dangerous to the state! The Church of England will hardly mend the matter much by its secular assurances, that it does not now ask for the penal exclusion of a Catholic dissenter, in restraint of his doctrine, or in aid of his salvation, but as a defensive bulwark to the loaves and fishes. The real danger to the church is, from its placing itself athwart the path that leads to public peace. The vehemence and astuteness with which every ecclesiastical possibility is battled, and the unnecessary infusion of so much of the spirit of unrectified theology among proper and plain political considerations, must needs darken this terrible catastrophe, should it ever come; and certainly will accelerate the causes that alone can bring it on. The real securities for any institution are the harmony of its principles with the character of the age, and the respect which its members draw to it, by personal feelings towards themselves. In pro-

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and violently against natural reason, is no argument to make them disbelieve it, who believe the mystery of the Trinity in all those niceties of explication which are in the school, (and which now-a-days pass for the doctrine of the church,) with as much violence to the principles of natural and supernatural philosophy, as can be imagined to be in the point of transubstantiation.

“But for the article itself; we all say that Christ is there present some way or other extraordinary; and it will not be amiss to worship him at that time, when he gives himself to us in so mysterious a manner, and with so great advantages, especially since the whole office is a consociation of divers actions of religion and worship. Now, in all opinions of those men who think it an act of religion to communicate and to offer, a divine worship is given to Christ, and is transmitted to him by mediation of that action and that sacrament; and it is no more in the Church of Rome, but that they differ and mistake infinitely in the manner of his presence: which error is wholly seated in the understanding, and does not communicate with the will. For all agree that the divinity and the humanity of the Son of God are the ultimate and adequate object of divine adoration, and that it is incommunicable to any creature whatsoever; and before they venture to pass an act of adoration, they believe the bread to be annihilated, or turned into his substance, who may lawfully be worshipped: and they who have these thoughts are as much enemies of idolatry, as they that understand better how to avoid that inconvenience which is supposed to be the crime, which they formally hate, and we materially avoid.”

portion to the affectionate connection by which every English gentleman must be bound to many of its order, (and none more devotedly than ourselves, by ties both of blood and friendship,) must have been the regret with which they witnessed the hawker and pedlar activity of the late clerical crusade against the liberty of their fellow citizens, and the tranquillity of the state. If successful, Peter the Hermit's would not have been so disastrous. Meanwhile, it bears little outward token of that candour in nature, and profound charity in conscience, which were held, in the character of Falkland, as being so excellent a temper for the propagation of Christianity. We hardly know whether the chief performers are entitled to the apology, that divinity seems to be, above all others, that study which makes those who involve themselves the farthest in its technical windings, pay for every inch of knowledge, by losing at least as much in charity.

The actual Church of England has great merit in many respects. But history certainly does not tax its liberal reader with any such burden of gratitude for past political favours at her hands, as to entitle her present interposition to any strong presumptions in its behalf. When we see its divines clustering together, almost in a hardened unanimity, whilst all enlightened lay opinion is broken up and siding off in the opposite direction, we cannot but recall the impracticableness and the absence of due national sympathy and discretion which they have so frequently shown. The moderate Selden was thus provoked to propose, as a preliminary to a chance of peace, that they should "chain up the clergy on both sides." It was the same painful experience which wrung from Clarendon, whose notions on church government satisfied even Charles I., and who has left us a delightful testimony of his intimacy with all that was distinguished among the ecclesiastics of his age, that melancholy averment: — "Clergymen understand the least, and take the worst measure of human affairs, of all mankind that can write and read." Burnet would tell us, on his episcopal knowledge and authority, what the 1688, of which we now hear so much, really owed them. "They are the most remiss of any in Europe;" and again, — "They are, for the greatest part, the worst-natured, the fiercest, indiscreetest, and most persecuting sort that are in the nation." Ever since the Reformation, they have generally withdrawn themselves from a free and comprehensive contemplation of public questions, and have been found trying every great domestic measure in a small monastic spirit, and with a narrow reference to themselves. A convocation, at the present day, would stand just as much in need, as in the most popish times, of an inhibition against their attempting aught therein to the prejudice of the king, his crown, and dignity. The truth is, that no "measure of human affairs" was ever worse taken than their recent conduct; which first assumed that their interest is distinct from that of the community; and next, that they are safer amidst disturbances thus provoked, than under the quiet protection and favour of the law. In such a case, ecclesiastical property always has been and must be the most exposed. We never felt clearer of any fact, than that the Church has more immediately at stake, in the present settlement, than any lay interest whatever. But were it unfortunately otherwise, and were we driven to choose between what is principal and what is accessory, between the loss of all and the loss of part, we would still say, "Save out of the fire what you can." The admonition of Jeremy Taylor, the more than Fenelon of the Church of England, is very applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to those who will have it that the parish was made for the church, and not the



church for the parish, — “ ‘ Augur cum esset Cato, dicere ausus est, optimis auspiciis ea geri, quæ pro reipublicæ salute gererentur; quæ contra rempublicam fererentur, contra auspicia ferri.’ Religion is to meliorate the condition of a people, not to do it disadvantage; and, therefore, those doctrines that inconvenience the public are no parts of good religion. ‘ Ut respublica salva sit,’ is a necessary consideration in the permission of prophesyings; for according to the true, solid, and prudent ends of the republic, so is the doctrine to be permitted or restrained, and the men that preach it, according as they are good subjects and right commonwealth’s men. For religion is a thing superinduced to temporal government, and the church is an addition of a capacity to a commonwealth, and therefore is in no sense to disserve the necessity and just interests of that, to which it is superadded for its advantage and conservation.” If they will not believe the greatest among themselves in thus marshalling the degree of their comparative importance, they will hardly accept from Selden the suggestion, that their ordinary circumstances and interests do not provide them with the appropriate knowledge which is indispensable in dealing with so practical a subject as the possible political necessities of any given year. “ The parson of the Tower (a good, discreet man) told Dr. Mosely, who was sent to me and the rest of the gentlemen committed, 3d Charles I., that he found no such words as *parliament, habeas corpus, return, tower, &c.* neither in the Fathers, nor the schoolmen, nor in the text, and therefore for his part he believed he understood nothing of the business! A satire upon all those clergymen that meddle with matters they do not understand.” They are bound to especial caution, considering the unfortunate influence such exhibitions may exercise over their proper jurisdiction. When parishioners, instead of the night of popery gathering round them, find year after year only a more profound peace and concord; when the drover, returning home from Smithfield, protests that he left there, instead of pens of Protestants to be burned, only pens of cattle to be sold; when the only martyrdom they can hear of in the country, is that of their own association against Guy Faux, which the bill leaves untouched, out of a kind consideration for protestant children; what may they not be brought to think of the intemperance of error into which their pastor would have led them? Their respect for his motives must borrow a little from their respect for his understanding. Some bad reasoners, who are behind hand with their tithes, will be concluding, that a man so wrong respecting this world may be mistaken about the next; and their rustic faith may possibly be carried away by unjust inferences, of *fit sacrificulus et Pagum decipit*, in more ways than one.

The late total want of all novelty, either in substance or in expression, we admit is no fault of the disputants. This is a town which has been taken by storm so often, that not one brick is left upon another. The mere abstract principle of intolerance, or the instinct that shrinks from any change, lest it may loosen some of the secret fastenings by which a monopoly is held together, can only serve, in the present day, for the underground and invisible foundations. But before we hand this question over to the shelves of pure theology, we will take a parting notice of the mode in which some of the most prominent topics have been brandished.

The repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts restored Protestant Dissenters to the evenhandedness of the common law. From that hour, the general principle of equality became again recognised, as politic, constitutional, and just. In addition, therefore, to the proof, which the

opponents of equal rights between members of the same community were always bound to give, (but never gave,) that a necessity existed for putting any religious parenthesis, or exception, into our definition of civil liberty, they were then subjected to the further obligation of showing, why Roman Catholics in particular should not stand in the same condition with other Dissenters from our national church. As we do not hold, with Cobbett, the superior excellence of this religion, we cannot understand the alarm — of which, if we were Roman Catholics, we should be so proud — that anticipates from the removal of a few penalties the success of their faith. The contrary extreme of vituperation with which it has been assailed, we understand as little. When the passions have ceased to blow a hurricane, men will duly estimate the force of arguments that prove too much. An error of this kind, in moral and political calculations, is as fatal to their possible correctness as any similar mistake that an accountant should discover in a sum of figures. Aware that the ordinary distinction which every Protestant believes to exist between his own form of Christianity and that professed by the Roman Catholics is not sufficient for the purpose of exclusion, the line of demarcation has been darkened by exaggerations of the worst description. These imputations can be good for any thing, only if true; and they can be true, only if the inferences which necessarily flow from them are confirmed by facts. But so far is this from being the case, that the inferences are contradicted by the experience of centuries, in our political relations with Roman Catholic governments, and by our intercourse, morning, noon, and night, with individuals of that persuasion.

Libels against human nature, from Calvinistic pulpits, we are all well aware, are no indictable offence; nor libels against Christianity, apparently, unless as far as Christianity is part and parcel of the law. Otherwise, we have shrunk with disgust and terror from the unsparing comprehensiveness of these ferocious denunciations against the Church of Rome — of a nature to disqualify it, not only for the duties of civil office, but for the common purposes that every religion ought to serve. Language of this description is as Athanasian as any thing the Vatican ever thundered in the darkest times. Books formerly were written to prove the truth of Christianity, as well by the progress it had made, as by the share it had taken in the general improvement of society; whilst, according to the statistics of modern controversy, the members of this communion must not only be deducted as bad debts, when we are reckoning the strength of Christendom, but a credit against Christianity must be allowed to the sceptics on their account. Whilst their ordination is recognised as conferring holy orders, they themselves are made out to be far worse than nothing. This is indeed thinning the fold of our Great Shepherd, and half emptying heaven; a pouring of doubts into the minds of calm observers, who are compelled to ask themselves whether the general arguments in favour of Christianity can afford to run the gauntlet of the hundred inferences which break out over all the surface of such a statement. Why will polemics burn the beams of our common temple to roast their eggs by, now that they can no longer roast each other?

In consequence of the abhorrence with which this obnoxious faith is regarded, a part of the religious world hangs to these disqualifications for their proselyting efficacy, as a gentle blifter, *pro salute animæ*, by which the medicines of the new Reformation may be assisted. In the first place, these mitigated penalties so levied, differ only in degree from the fagot; they are a branch bank to the Inquisition; they are the hu-

manity man-traps, which have succeeded to spring guns. Surely there are inducements enough in the present day, from the rewards and promises which surround the avenues to the Church of England, to ensure the entrance of all within its pale that honestly can come there, (and we should desire no others,) without our being driven to have recourse to an atom of deprivation, derived from the more odious table of the penal law. The truth is, that, by a mere reduction of the intensity of the furnace, without extinguishing it altogether, we have got the disadvantages of two extremes, without the advantages of either. Extermination has been recommended; and would have answered the purpose, if complete, just as play-wrights kill off, towards the end of a tragedy, the characters whom they find a difficulty in disposing of. When the brains are out, a man will die; but nations, in that condition, are often particularly troublesome. Conciliation, like mercy, would have been indeed twice blessed—blessing both the giver and receiver; and might have done as much for the Protestant church as for the Catholic freeholder. As it is, our relaxations have been specifically adapted to strengthen every thing Catholic in Ireland—numbers—means—intelligence—all, except her confidence in our justice or affection.

Directly in reference to the encouragement of Protestantism, our whole system is wrong, by at least two centuries. Europe has passed the period when religion could be propagated—ay, or kept alive in it—by force. It would be a contradiction to imagine that measures, which it is our boast are alien to its spirit, and opposed to the mode pursued on the first establishment of general Christianity, should be any thing but prejudicial to the interests of our own peculiar modification of it. They canonise a whole people with the crown of apparent martyrdom. They destroy those feelings which form the soil, if not the root, for probable conversions. An Irish peasant, at the present day, would answer the new reformation missions, as the Indian chieftains did the Spanish priest who recruited for converts in the rear of the army of Pizarro. That silent reformation (the most valuable of all, because the most ennobling and characteristic) which Paley so naturally anticipated from the ascendancy of truth, has been beat down in common with other honourable principles, by an ascendancy of a very different school. Nor have our theologians been content with the alienation unavoidably produced by this hostility of demeanour. As often as a ray of light was seen to be breaking through, and an approximation to Protestant opinion taking place, the fiend of controversy has delighted to creep forward; and, combining some passages in Bellarmine with the pretensions to unchangeableness, has rejected all such favourable advances, without the signature of an apology, and the surrender of their sword. “There is no change, there can be no change, there shall be no change!” It has made our blood run cold, to see the recklessness with which the winning of souls, and the union of hearts, have been thus sacrificed for the sake of a polemical syllogism, or a profitable sneer. Nothing is changed so reluctantly as a name; but to imagine that behind the same name there is always found the same idea, is to take the cover for the dish. Whatever the Roman Catholics may pretend about unchangeableness, the spiritual and political character of their religion has necessarily varied from age to age. It cannot resist the principle of assimilation which connects it with the state of civilisation, and the nature of the institutions under which it is professed. Is there any man living, who believes that the Roman Catholic religion is at this moment the same thing in Paris and in Madrid; at Rome and at Vienna;

in Switzerland and in South America? If in Ireland it appears occasionally to have contracted a coarseness and almost republican acrimony of spirit, the source is in its civil degradation. Received within the British constitution, it will immediately become itself constitutional.

In respect of the popular accusation against every Roman Catholic — that he is a sort of dragon, inflamed by a thirst for civil power — we cannot enough admire its coolness. As a preliminary proof of moderation, our monopolists insist that he should deliver in a slavish or philosophical renunciation, in their favour, of that portion of the British constitution which, were he not a Roman Catholic, it is admitted he would be entitled to enjoy. It seems expected that he should walk round the tree which his ancestors planted for their posterity, and should protest that the grapes are sour, although he knows his title to them to be unexceptionable, and believes them to be within his reach. Were he base enough to condescend to this hypocrisy, there would be a greater air of plausibility in the *opposite* charge, that, as Roman Catholics, they are of a nature too servile to hold office under a free government. This last imputation may be left for the present to balance the account with the simultaneous scandal so loudly manifested at their legal efforts for the recovery of their rights.\* Meanwhile, its insincerity is sufficiently ludicrous, considering the character of those persons by whom it has been bruited forth — unless monopolies are so very dear to them, that they would wish to keep even that of hating liberty to themselves.

The Roman Catholics complain that they are excluded from their proper share in the trust and service of their common country; that their blood, their money, their allegiance, are required, but that, however worthy they approve themselves, they are deprived of the capacity of rising out of the civil ranks. They do not ask either power or honours, but a mere conditional eligibility to either, when otherwise deserving; stipulating, in the meanwhile, that they shall not be branded at home with the mark of disloyalty and scorn, and that the common crier shall not be sent round Europe with notice that Ireland is not to be trusted; that like the Ergastula of ancient Rome, she is crowded with an enslaved and rebellious population, panting for the earthquake that may burst open their prison door. Niebuhr has traced a painful analogy between the distinctions of race that disturbed Rome formerly, and Ireland at present. Bacon has further exemplified the principle of nature, which insists on the legal allowance of a right, though afterwards we may wave its actual exercise, by the fact, that the plebeians, when they had carried the recognition of a plebeian Consul, let sixty years pass over without enforcing a single nomination. The refusal of a debtor to pay a debt which he has long

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\* In a season when charges made against Popery were not very impartially scrutinised, and when the particular appearances in English history gave a current popularity to such a notion, Lord Molesworth put it down by a reference to the *Gazetteer of Europe*. “It hath been a great mistake amongst us, that the Popish religion is the only one of all the Christian sects proper to introduce and establish slavery in a nation, insomuch that Popery and slavery have been thought inseparable. I shall make bold to say, that other religions have succeeded as effectually in this design as ever Popery did. For in Denmark, as well as other Protestant countries in the north, through the entire dependence of the clergy upon the prince; through their principles and doctrine, which are those of unlimited obedience; through the authority they have with the common people, &c., slavery seems to be more absolutely established than it is in France.” (*The Account of Denmark*.)

owed, on the pretext that he suspects his creditor of the intention of instituting one time or other a false demand, would be a novelty in the casuistry of injustice: whilst the charge of obstinacy, brought by the odd jurymen against the eleven whom he could not convince, seems a feeble copy of the insolence by which the attempt on the part of the Roman Catholics to replace themselves on a level with their fellow-citizens, is worked up into an imaginary usurpation of civil power. The crime which the Irish have been of late years committing, is not a new one — it is that of the *meri Hibernici* of our early connexion. It consists merely in seeking the full privileges of the English law, and admission within the porch of the English constitution. For the peace of Ireland, George IV. has been required only to complete what was begun by James I. There had better be no history, than that it should be perverted to the fraudulent pretence of finding there any peculiar appetite for undue power in a Roman Catholic, more than in a presbyterian or a Church of England man. Our own adjustment of these proportions, as settled from a survey of our domestic annals, would certainly incline the other way. But, without entering on a comparative criticism of the secular ambition of the Liturgy, the Confession of Faith, or the Missal, we think it may be affirmed that the Roman Catholics yielded in the first instance, and have since lain quiet under these extravagant restrictions, with fewer signs of restlessness, and fewer experiments of a re-action, than was at all likely to have been the case. There is clearly no sense in making a whole body answerable for the proverbial wrongheadedness of one man, the impolicy of whose conduct was disapproved of at the time, as much by his subjects of his own persuasion, as we learn, from Madame de Sevigné's Letters, that the bigotry of it was ridiculed even in the court of Louis XIV. The experience of a great part of Europe, at the present day, is conclusive evidence that Roman Catholics will rest satisfied with their due proportion of civil power, even in the most suspicious of all cases. If James II. had possessed a quarter of the good sense of the late King of Saxony, the English would have believed by this time, as stoutly as the Saxons or Mr. Sadler, the possible happiness of Protestant subjects under a Popish king. As it is, we have ourselves been re-enacting the stupidity of James; and, unless we had stopped in time, might, like him, have lost a kingdom for a mass.

A great alarm is professed to be entertained of designs nourished by the Roman Catholics against Protestant ascendancy, which, as distinct from the last apprehension, must signify the Protestant Church establishment. This is, again, a very visionary panic. Whether or no the Church of England is entitled to Hume's test of merit in an establishment — the keeping down religious zeal, — there can be no doubt that the intermediate position which she occupies between extreme sects, and the comparative moderation of her principles, are exceedingly favourable to her permanence, and likely to secure her the second votes of all contending parties. In this point of view, she can have nothing to fear from Roman Catholic intriguers, who, if gifted with a tithe of the subtlety attributed to them, will never assist to pull down a barrier which keeps out the fiercer adversaries of both. In the series of spirits by whom Lambeth would, in this case, probably be *possessed*, the last state of the Romanists would be worse than the first. Even if it be supposed that they would prefer the substitution of a national church of their own, we believe the laity to be sincere in renouncing the pomps and vanities of an opulent church government. They have an awful precedent of sinecurism too

near. But admitting an abstract wish of this description, under certain circumstances and to a certain extent, to be as unavoidable as it is harmless, to raise the supposition into an argument, it must be understood that Catholic emancipation will arm the wish with additional means for its execution. The question, thus stated, is one, not of will, but of power — a comparison between the means they gain and the means they lose. But the exchange is, in this respect, entirely in our favour. The power laid down by them is unnatural and immense. The only weapon which is substituted is influence in the legislature; and the supposition of its being successful, implies the religious conversion of a majority of both Lords and Commons, and of the King; any one of whom, standing out, must defeat such a speculation. In other words, it assumes the conversion of the least likely part of the English nation. In comparison of such a possibility, Don Quixote is a story of daily life. In fact, the danger to which the Church of England is exposed is that of force and passion, not of argument; and the late system, beyond all doubt, gave the most encouragement to violence. The compliment to the Roman Catholic religion contained in the above apprehension, is as absurd as the apprehension itself is inconsistent with two other favourite assertions. We are first told that the mass of public opinion is so hostile to the Roman Catholics, that it has overruled the national sense of justice, and would not permit them to be restored to their civil rights; and we are the next moment threatened with a danger which can only be realised when that public opinion is become Roman Catholic itself. Again, we are assured that the Roman Catholic religion is a heap of fraud and wickedness; and yet it is immediately insinuated, that, notwithstanding the illumination of a free press, mechanics' institutes, and the Bible in every hand, and in spite of all advantages of wealth and of possession, the Church of England could not contend with the limited species of competition that the mere removal of civil disabilities would create. Our power of calculating probabilities does not seem much improved since the time when every good Protestant was expected to be equipped with a contemporaneous belief of at least four incompatible versions of the supposititious birth of a son to James II. With respect to any likelihood that the Roman Catholics should, in the interim, disquiet the public peace, by violent attempts to beat down the Church of England, the chance of such an act of frenzy, minute enough at present, must decrease to an invisible point, the moment they have themselves a vested interest as partners in the constitution. As long as you insist on keeping up a class of men, pauperised of their rights, and who, accordingly, can lose nothing by a convulsion, you provide the enemies of your peace with the requisite instruments for risks of this description. *Ibit eo quò vis qui zonam perdidit.*

Another distinction taken, to the prejudice of the Roman Catholics, is grounded on the notion, supposed to be confirmed by recent events in Ireland, that their clergy have a peculiar art for governing this world, by an application of the terrors of the next.\* If this be indeed the case, in

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\* The excessive influence of the priesthood, that has been so much deprecated, may be easily accounted for by more honourable causes. It is the chief earthly reward of a life of sacrifices, such as a church, that has grown above its work, can form no idea of. If the political exercise of this influence had really much value in their eyes, they are entitled to proportionate praise for the readiness with which they have resigned it, and signified their acquiescence in the general usefulness of a measure directed so immediately against themselves. We have

no age has the poverty of a priesthood given such splendid proof of self-devotedness and denial. Whatever this influence may be, in nine cases out of ten it is an honest influence, virtuously obtained and virtuously exercised; and, without it, what would the Irish peasant be? Exclusion might certainly aggravate, but would never cure it; and exclusion alone could connect it with evil consequences to the state. However, in respect of modern politics, the Roman Catholic religion and its priest can make, as such, no title (whether it be praise or blame) to that noble attitude so magnanimously assumed of late by the Irish people in vindication of their wrongs. We know that some of the dignitaries at Rome, not long ago, expressed to that most excellent prelate, Dr. Baines, something more than their astonishment that the priesthood did not, or could not, keep their laity in better order. So little notion had they, at St. Peter's, of the rough-riding talents such an experiment would have required, or the sort of steed to which these ecclesiastical Mazeppas would have found themselves attached.

A similar attempt to separate their case from that of other Dissenters, has been hazarded in the renewal of the old jest of their being but half subjects — having another king at Rome! No objection was ever more disingenuous, even historically. In the present condition of papal power, one might as reasonably fear the humourist who always touched his hat to the bust of Jupiter. It was a small half that the Pope got, even in the olden time. When Boniface VIII. sought to rescue Scotland from the fangs of Edward I., by claiming it as a fief of the Church of Rome, the English Barons (whose names the Bishops may see in Rymer), in a Parliament at Lincoln, sent an answer that ought to put to shame those who, by mixing questions of politics and religion, have blundered out the appearance of an argument, under the calumny of a divided allegiance. Bacon, who, living under Elizabeth and James, lived at the only moment, in all our history, when circumstances might have given to such an accusation something like a colour of plausibility, pushes the fallacy aside with scorn. He expressly states, when speaking of the supposed challenge of the Pope to become competitor with the King for the hearts and allegiance of the people: — “This is that yoke which this kingdom hath happily cast off, even at such times when the Popish religion was nevertheless continued, and that divers states, which are the Pope's vassals, do likewise begin to shake off.” So, in another passage, he declares that the Roman Catholic conscience found no difficulty in distinguishing what belonged to Cæsar, and what to God. “Never kings of any nation kept the partition wall better, between spiritual and temporal, in times of greatest superstition. I report me to King Edward I., that set up so many crosses, and yet crossed that part of the Pope's jurisdiction, no man more strongly.” Prynne's Records were compiled expressly for the purpose of constituting an “exact chronological vindication and historical demonstration” of the

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not heard of the slightest dissatisfaction having been expressed by a single priest at the late disfranchisement. One of the principal agitators among them was canvassed by a great lay agitator, upon the speculation of getting up an opposition to the measure; and he refused to interfere. At a dinner in the county of Limerick, where thirty-three priests were assembled, they approved of it unanimously, in consequence of the temptations to perjury which will be thus avoided. So honourably have these calumniated men preferred their duty as ministers of the Gospel, to their supposed political vanity and ambition. Their credit is not the less, if we suppose them to have been confirmed in this course, upon observing who otherwise would be their new allies.

King's supreme ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Bishop Nicholson affirms, that the third volume has enough in all conscience to satisfy any reasonable reader, and supersede the necessity of enquiring into the case in earlier or later ages. Our Roman Catholic members will repeat in Parliament the words Lord Digby uttered there before them—"I am of the Church, but not of the Court, of Rome." The Roman Court at present is, to be sure, in Europe, much what the Court of Delhi is in Asia—resting on an acknowledgment not much more than verbal, and on a sort of ecclesiastical coin kept current in its name.

There is, however, a further class of objections, derived not from Roman Catholics, but from ourselves, and which equally comprises all Dissenters. It is founded on the peculiar nature of the church and constitution of England. As faithful members of that church, and admirers of our constitution, we deny utterly the *truth* of so unfounded and disgraceful a proposition. We deny that the church can want this sort of Corn Bill, to secure a protecting price, and keep her bad land in cultivation. Were it otherwise, and were it indeed true, that notwithstanding all its present advantages, it was still in danger, there could be no surer proof that it ought to fall. The *quousque tandem* must bring it back to reason, should it be really insane enough not to be satisfied with the sacrifices which are making constantly in its behalf, with the money of all sects voted to build its churches, &c.; but proceed to insist on our also voting away the rights, and perilling the peace, of the community. The notion of an alliance between church and state may be rational enough, when properly limited and explained. The evil lies in its indistinctness, and liability to be abused. And no abuse of it can be greater than to extend its terms beyond honours and endowments; thus turning the open constitution of England into a close borough, and engrafting on its comprehensive principles the disinheritance of any of its children. The shade of our ancestral oak stretched equally over all. Had Hume been aware of the late discovery, that there is an inherent incapacity in a free state to administer justice to all its subjects, with the same uniformity that more absolute governments possess, he would have been at once relieved from the refinements by which he endeavours to explain the melancholy axiom, that the freest countries have used their colonies the worst. But the truth is, that the more popular the spirit and mechanism of a government, the greater must be its real security that rights, once duly shared and balanced among its members, shall not be appropriated or perverted, by any fraction of a faction, to the disadvantage of the rest. A free constitution, properly understood, is one that is free to all. Accordingly, if none is entirely so, there will be all gradations of imperfection, more or less odious, from a republic with its few pet exceptions, down to the monopoly of a corporation, sole or aggregate—a despot king, or feudal, or Venetian nobles. But, among all the varieties of exclusion, bearing on the many or the few, none can be so fatal in its tendency, or so inexcusable in its principle, as that by which the majority or minority of a people are politically degraded into a religious caste.

The proposition that, after all, seems to have been scarcely seriously mooted, of their being some peculiar incompetency for religious toleration in the Church of England and in our constitution, would indeed cut deep into their boasted excellence. Such a doctrine must have spread abroad a just suspicion, that it was something worse than complication which made our institutions so difficult to be understood. The taking counsel by the example, and with the sympathies, of other coun-



tries, has been lately treated with a most insane and insular disdain; as if our proper continental policy lay in alliance with their moustaches and their kings, and not with their good opinion. Our own tendencies often lead us to indulge English feelings at the expense of English understanding: but a preference for being hated—to like to be despised—is an ultra patriotism of which we had no idea. On the contrary, returning home within these two years by Wirtemberg, Bavaria, and the Rhine, we felt ashamed of the perfection of good faith, in matters of religious differences, at which the honest Germans had arrived. Augsburg, for instance, is now as quiet, as if the chamber where the confession was drawn up had been used for the purpose of uniting men in charity, rather than in dividing them on faith. The population, 28,000, is nearly divided, being three sevenths Protestant, four sevenths Catholic. The Protestants have had occasion to build only one church for themselves, their other churches having been portioned off to them at the Reformation. We heard of no distinction,—except that the Protestants were thought to be the best brewers. Heidelberg and Bonn are two of the principal universities: and toleration is taught in them by the best of all instructors—by example. The day after Ascension day, the Catholic world being all *en fête*, we followed them to mass in the principal church at Heidelberg; when we were surprised at finding it only half the size within that it was without. A partition in the centre explained this mystery most agreeably. The prayers neither of Roman Catholic nor of Lutheran will ascend less acceptable to God, because under the same roof, and at the same moment, they are worshipping their common Father. The Prussian University of Bonn gains no less in charity than in doctrine, by the example of professors of divinity, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, leading, in virtuous rivalry, their respective youth towards heaven. The contrast between this harmony and the frenzy we had left, and were returning to at home, forcibly recalled to our recollection an interesting letter by John of Salisbury. It is one where he describes the delightful calm, as of a new world, which the Continent presented to him, on leaving England, during Beckett's quarrels. *Gratior it dies, et soles melius nitent!*

Could we but look upon these uncharitable and useless animosities at an impartial distance! could we but hear foreigners sneering at our folly, with as much contempt as we should ourselves shower down on a Mussulman empire sacrificing its peace to the jealousies of the Soonies and the Shyeites! mere shame might then have saved us from exhibiting to the world, in the nineteenth century, the spectacle of a great nation brought to the very brink of a civil war, under the colour and provocation of a sweeping proscription founded on a difference of religion: the proscribed religion being the Christian faith of a third of its people—the faith, once of all, and still of three-fourths of Europe. Looking at those historic maps, which represent the course of nations as streams of time, we might have hoped that the human race had passed the period of such an approximation to a religious contest. Congresses have, on the Continent, cut up its root, by the declaration of first principles, whose common charity and common sense have been proclaimed by Alexander over all the Russias. But, alas! recent signs among ourselves, who once boasted of our precedence in teaching nations how to live, have shown too clearly that good sense and good feeling are both, in certain quarters, in temporary abeyance. The war of the two roses which were plucked in the Temple gardens, on a point of pedigree, was the insanity of a nation; but it would be madder still to pluck them in the garden of the

Lateran, on a point of faith. The cry of "Free Trade and Free Man" has put down among nations that of "St. George and St. Denis." Nor can St. George and St. Patrick long stand against the motto of "Civil and religious liberty" among citizens, otherwise miscalled members of the same community. According to all reason, the being a natural-born subject is not being merely littered within the kingdom, but being recognised among its children, and nurtured on its hearth: and none are so much aliens as those who, descended of its blood and born upon its threshold, are yet made servants to their brethren. We are sufficiently unintelligible and unpopular abroad at present. Our discouragement to Continental freedom, our absolute institutions in both Indies, and above all, our Irish policy, have raised no very favourable estimate of the philosophy or philanthropy of our national character. But a religious war, on behalf of the Hind-and-Panther church (that is itself looked upon by other forms of Protestantism as semi-papal), for the express purpose of maintaining political inequality, would, in the advanced state of Continental liberality, have been a horror over Europe. Lord Bexley put in a petition that he might be allowed to *die in peace!* That six millions of our fellow citizens should *live in peace* (we might say twenty, for we are all in the same boat) was rather a more immediate object of national importance. It is difficult to know how to accommodate those fiery spirits who hold life no longer worth the having, when their countrymen, of all denominations, are admitted into the participation of one common freedom. America is at hand to take compassion upon Jamaica, if debarred its old West India sweetmeats—the luxury of flogged women and Sunday markets. But Ireland cannot so conveniently be spared. We fear, therefore, should the sight of a mixed community, in the enjoyment of equal rights, prove absolutely intolerable, that his Lordship and the Brunswick Clubs must consent to emigrate. No doubt but Mr. Wilmot Horton will be too happy to provide them with instructions for location, in the waste parts of Italy, Spain, and Portugal, the only bright examples, it is admitted, now remaining of similar exclusions. Lord Winchilsea, however, it is hoped, will remain behind, to superintend the comprehensive reforms he meditates: especially as he has set so useful an example, in the only case strictly in his power, by promising to remove himself out of the House of Lords. If he could persuade the rest of the minority to a similar secession, we dare say the bishops would find them a *Mons Sacer* somewhere, for their divan.

We had hoped, for the credit of fair dealing, that a sepulchral stone was laid over the doctrine, that there could be any laws, however designated, of a nature to incapacitate future parliaments from the duty of providing for the contemporaneous exigencies of the state. Yet the zeal of our legal resurrection men has burst these cerements. They have availed themselves of the advantage which the Catholic Question offered them, of reviving this objection in its two most plausible cases. First, "That of the union of an independent legislature upon certain essential conditions" — example, the Union with Scotland. And, next, "That of an oath prescribed by act of parliament to preserve, without alteration, any of the established laws," — example, the coronation oath. Both of these objections have been long at rest, as far as reason and authority can exorcise the evil spirit of political polemics.

This sentimental tenderness for the very letter of the union with Scotland, in the mouths of those who themselves were parties to the Irish Union, and have passed the remainder of their days in violating its spirit,

is part of the amusing by-play of the present moment. In 1772, it was urged that the repeal of the act of uniformity would be a dissolution of the union between the two kingdoms. Burke opposed the repeal; but treated with contempt the notion that either contracting party could mean, or was competent, to impose at the outset a disability of this description upon the joint legislature it was then about to form. "History shows what it meant, and all that it could mean, with any degree of common sense." Charles I. had attempted to establish in Scotland the rites of the Church of England. The Scotch covenanters retaliated, and marching into England, prevailed on parliament, by the ordinance of 1643, to plant their church on the ruins of that of England. (Vol. x. p. 8.) "To prevent such violent enterprises on the one side or on the other, since each church was going to be disarmed of a legislature wholly and peculiarly affected to it, and lest this new uniformity in the state should be urged as a reason and ground of ecclesiastical uniformity, the act of union provided that presbytery should continue the Scotch, as episcopacy the English establishment; and that this separate and mutually independent church government was to be considered as a part of the union, without aiming at putting the regulation within each church out of its own power, without putting both churches out of the power of the state. It could not mean to forbid us to set any thing ecclesiastical in order, but at the expense of tearing up all foundations, and forfeiting the inestimable benefits (for inestimable they are) which we derive from the happy union of the two kingdoms. To suppose otherwise, is to suppose that the act intended we could not meddle at all with the church, but we must, as a preliminary, destroy the state."

The supposed difficulty arising from the coronation oath, is compounded out of multifarious mistakes. The true answer to this objection, when it is adduced against the free exercise of the king's legislative authority, is, that the oath applies to the king in his executive, and not in his legislative capacity. The constitutional security against misconduct on the part of the sovereign, as a member of the legislature, is in fact that his legislative authority can never be called into action, except in the case of a measure which has already received the sanction of both houses of parliament. Our present oath is that of William III.; and we know that this was the very distinction with which he took it. On the same principle, the oath of allegiance binds the subject till he is discharged from it by parliament, but was never understood to control the free agency of a member of parliament, when acting in that character. So far from it, by his own vote, he can be a party to the dissolving and transferring his own allegiance. Suppose, however, that the oath may regard the king as a member of the legislature. In this case, it must be considered in one of two lights, either as a *compact* entered into with the nation, the fact and sincerity of which engagement it was the object of this solemnity to witness and record, — or as a religious *vow*, to which there is no other party but the king and God, and in which, therefore, the royal conscience is alone concerned. It must be observed, however, that the history of the coronation oath, and the part that parliament has taken in drawing it up, is totally irreconcilable with this latter view of it. If the coronation oath is regarded as a contract between the king and his subjects, the sense and obligation of the royal promise must be construed according to the known understanding of the imposer, — or the people. It can never have been intended to bind a monarch *against* such changes as were sanctioned by the national consent. No people in their

senses could ever dream of imposing terms so purely prejudicial to themselves. In the event of doubts, we are not in this case, as in that of the 39 articles, without a tribunal to refer to for explanation. The British parliament represents the British people; and no stronger proof can be given, not so much of a discharge from the promise, as of their sense of its meaning, than the fact that parliament is itself requiring the royal concurrence in these measures. If the coronation oath is regarded simply as a vow, the scruple in question looks like part of the ill-informed conscience of some frightened nun, rather than the prudent deliberations of a manly reason; whilst it treats the Supreme Being as an unmeaning idol, instead of the fountain of all goodness. Such infatuation is as incompatible with the real duties of a public magistrate, as with any proper notion of the Divine nature. Further, whether the oath is to be considered as a constitutional contract, or as a religious vow, the construction that has been attempted must, in many cases, avoid the obligation altogether. For it will occasionally lead to consequences that are impossible — to consequences that are inconsistent with a more general engagement — and to consequences that are unlawful. The Japanese, who are said to swear their emperor to the maintenance of fine weather on all suitable occasions, do not bind him to a greater impossibility than is required of an English sovereign, by those logicians who stipulate that he shall maintain the Church at all seasons, by laws and institutions of one particular description. This limited interpretation may be inconsistent with the more comprehensive obligation by which a king is pledged to consult the good government of all his people. Lastly, Bishop Saunderson, or any *ductor dubitantium* in cases of conscience, would undoubtedly give a Protestant the benefit of the same enlightened common sense by which the ecclesiastical authority of Roman Catholic discipline overrules a rash engagement. Every man must exercise a dispensing power over himself in such a case, — and not the less because the jurisdiction may be full of peril. Any promise, however solemnised, which stands in the way of the interests of a nation and of the public happiness, is as unlawful as the oath of Herod, or Jephthah's vow. In the debate 1689, on altering the wording of the oath, it is clear from the language used by Somers and Pollexfen, that, although they would have wished greater latitude in the expression, yet they had not, in this respect more than in any other part of the arrangements of that crisis, an idea that they were laying a further burden on posterity than that of gratitude for their present services. "It is said that by this we are going about to alter the constitution of the Church. Though the constitution be as good as possible for the present time, none can be good at all times. Therefore, I am for the word 'may,' and that will be a remedy at all times." (Somers.) "We are all agreed, and, I hope, ever shall be, to the Protestant religion, 'established by law.' We desire to consider, whether the latter words shall be added, or not? I see no manner of reason against it. We all agree in substance; but if, by the wisdom of the nation, it shall be thought fit to alter, we are at liberty to do it. No man that maintains the law but maintains the whole legislature, which alters and redresses the law from time to time, as there is occasion." (Pollexfen.) Mr. Amos, in that great repository of constitutional learning, (his edition of Fortescue, p. 126.) has given references to the history of the difficulties that have arisen out of narrow notions of the obligation of the coronation oath. Thorpe, C.J., was hanged for breaking that part of it in which the king swears that he will administer justice. But this

notion of perjury by proxy, is much more reasonable than to suppose that a sovereign, when acting with and for his people, can be in danger of breaking the oath himself.

“To die for treason,” and to “be hanged for nonsense,” are two things which Dryden put in opposition; late effusions seem, however, to show that they may, at times, draw very happily together. Divines have the privilege of safely expatiating in sermons concerning “legislative treason against the majesty of heaven.” They are only qualifying to join Sibthorpe, Mainwaring, and Sacheverell, as chaplains to Lord George Gordon and his humble imitators, in the Elysian Fields. But sergeants-at-law are on more dangerous ground, when they preach to his majesty George IV. on what conditions they hold their allegiance, and he his crown. Our learned friends know full well, that, by statutes both of Elizabeth and Anne, it was declared high treason to deny by writing the power of king and parliament to limit the succession of the crown of England. They know too, that Matthews, a printer, was executed, in 1719, on this latter statute, for a treasonable pamphlet, with the motto, which they now so much admire, “*Vox populi vox Dei.*” Notwithstanding what ex-speakers and ex-chancellors may tell the house of Savoy, this parliamentary doctrine is indeed the one great continuous maxim, which has never, from the reign of Edgar downwards, been silenced or displaced by any absolute tenet of legitimate succession. The constitution is as little conversant with theories of divine right. “The divinity that doth hedge a king,” certainly never meant that body of it which is comprised in the 39 articles, or on the bench of bishops; any more than the “heirs of the body of the Princess Sophia being Protestants,” meant Protestant, in the sense of the Brunswick Clubs.

As we are much less equitable in our political conduct towards the Roman catholic religion than those ancestors to whom we owe its reformation, and who saw in it no general ground of disqualification, but were content to meet particular civil emergencies with separate and successive provisions; so some among us seem much less faithful children of our true English constitution—that is, of the sovereign authority of the king and the three estates in parliament assembled—than our popish forefathers approved themselves. It is a fitting occasion to recall to our modern Jacobites, with the Church for their Pretender, the two following testimonies, borne by Roman Catholics, to the practice and understanding of our earlier and plainer times. They are particularly interesting and conclusive, from being connected with names the most illustrious in our history—the one for nobility of virtue, the other for nobility of blood. Rich went, as solicitor-general, to Sir Thomas More, when he was prisoner in the Tower for declining to subscribe to the king’s supremacy, on the honourable errand of worming out evidence from him against himself. The answer of this celebrated chancellor marks how clearly the line between the spiritual and temporal power of the pope—between the keys and the sceptre—was then recognised. Of course, no dissenter of any sort can be expected to admit that the king is, spiritually, the supreme head of any church but that of England; and few ministers of the Church of England, we imagine, although the Reformation transferred most of the pope’s ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the crown, acknowledge in the crown the same spiritual supremacy over the religion, as religion, which Roman Catholics attribute in some measure to the divine appointment and succession of St. Peter’s chair. “Rich, protesting that he had no commission to talk with him, demanded of him, if it were enacted by

parliament that Richard Rich should be king, and that it should be treason for any to deny it, what offence it were to contravene this act? Sir Thomas More answered, that he should offend if he said no, because he was bound by the act; but that this was *casus levis*. Whereupon Sir Thomas More said he would propose a higher case:—Suppose by parliament it were enacted, that God should not be God, and that it were treason to contravene, whether it were an offence to say according to the said act? Richard Rich replied yea; but said withal, I will propose a middle case, because yours is too high. The king, you know, is constituted supreme head of the Church on earth; why should not you, Master More, accept him so, as you would me, if I were made king by the supposition aforesaid? Sir Thomas More answered, the case was not the same, because (said he) a parliament can make a king and depose him, and that every parliament man may give his consent thereunto; but that a subject cannot be bound so, in the case of supremacy.” (Herbert’s Henry VIII. p. 421.) Half a century earlier, Lord Surrey had replied to the reproaches of the Earl of Richmond (whose usual name for Richard was afterwards tyrant and usurper) in words equally emphatical, on Bosworth Field:—“Sir, he was my crowned king. Let the authority of parliament place the crown on that stake, and I will fight for it. So would I have fought for you, had the same authority placed the crown upon your head.” Papists, it would thus appear, may make better parliament-men than certain of their revilers. There have been reigns when the desperate plunges, which certain gentlemen have not had the self-command to refrain from, would have risked getting necks, however stiff and venerable, into a halter. The Earl of Eldon and Baron Redesdale would almost seem to have been amusing themselves with speculative possibilities, as deep and dangerous as what Sir John Scott and Mr. Mitford felt bound to prosecute in 1795. At the same time, we must do them the justice to admit, that they themselves meant always to stop discreetly, with the *spargere voces in vulgum ambiguas*, and to leave those, whom their language might mislead, to go on with the remainder of the line.

There are certain words which convey to no two minds exactly the same meaning; such as Religion, Church, Constitution. Therefore, when a particular line of argument is made to rest on them, we must, however unwillingly, sometimes seek for light concerning the sense in which they are employed out of the character of those that speak them. For instance, it may explain matters, should we find that, according to some creeds, the use of a church is, not to be entered, but to be given away; and that it is not in spite of its exceptions and deformities, but because of them, that the Constitution of England is venerable and dear. The cause of all this fury is nothing more or less than the atrocious proposition, that, inasmuch as the Constitution of England was originally no respecter of persons, and as the necessity on which certain distinctions were afterwards introduced has long ceased, the statutes which introduced them should be repealed, and the common law restored. The Reformation was a reformation of the Church, and not of the State — an ecclesiastical, not a civil transaction. The mitred Abbots lost their places in Parliament, together with their abbeys; but the Talbots and the Howards were no more deprived of theirs, than of their titles or estates. It merely substituted, in lieu of the ancient faith, our peculiar modification of Protestant discipline and doctrine. This became thenceforth the national religion, or that form of Christianity for the maintenance of which the funds set apart for the

payment of religious instructors was to be reserved. There was no idea of interference with civil rights through the reign of Henry VIII., Edward VI., or Mary. Elizabeth stood in a position which would have explained and justified any precautions. Still she behaved, upon the whole, with her usual magnanimity, and with more than her usual forbearance. The immediate policy of her statute respecting the oath of supremacy, as it was confined to the House of Commons, was probably the same as that which afterwards brought in the Septennial Bill at a less critical conjuncture. Whether the oath soon ceased, in point of fact, to be demanded of Roman Catholics, or whether their objections were removed by the commentary upon it contained in the Queen's declaration, it is universally admitted that they continued to sit, as freely as Protestants, in the Lower House. Meanwhile there was no want of hostile measures in that portion of the field of legal injustice which was considered as left open to such experiments. From time to time, offensive weapons for enforcing conformity of opinion were taken down. M. Guizot properly notices the practice by which Charles I. and his Protestant subjects were wont to make up their quarrels, by agreeing to persecute the Papists. Thus, also, there cannot be a stronger proof that, during the great era of the Reformation, and among our greatest statesmen and divines, the fictitious dread of political union with Popish idolaters, or the necessity of a solely Protestant legislature for a Protestant people, was no principle of theirs, than that the Catholic Lords of Parliament were left for near a century and a half in undisturbed possession and exercise of their hereditary right.

One of the most mournful and humiliating pages in the history of any people is that conspiracy against piety, grey hairs, and loyalty, to which the English Protestants lent themselves, under a miscreant apprenticeship to Titus Oates. The too celebrated statute, which was then baptized in the blood of guiltless victims, is entitled to no respect from its antiquity, and to still less from the mood and moment to which it owes its birth. It was as much a novelty in itself as a disgrace in its immediate cause, and an injustice in its subsequent operation. Our constitution existed, in all that is characteristic of it, long before the 30th Charles II. was ever heard of; and, we trust, will flourish for ages after it has sunk into the forgetfulness of the grave. It was passed by a family that never scrupled sacrificing their friends; and was demanded by a people whom, for their credit, we must believe panic had absolutely demented, as a substitute for the much simpler and sounder measure which the Bishops had rejected — the exclusion of a single noxious prince. It was continued, during the long personal unpopularity of the new regime, in order that (by identifying the Stuarts with Popery, and thus mixing up a horror of Popery with our daily bread) the great objects of all reasonable men — a pure parliamentary succession, and a disclaimer of debateable prerogatives — might be secured against the infamy of a second Restoration. In proportion as the Whigs were foremost in acting upon this supposed necessity, whilst it lasted, it has been a duty especially binding on their honour, and which they have most disinterestedly discharged, to be as forward in insisting that the rights of their fellow-citizens, which were thus for a time impounded under the custody of the law, should be redeemed and set at large when that necessity had passed away. If Lord Somers were now alive, he would protest against this misuse of his name, and those of his great colleagues. He would discriminate between the common-law principles of the British Constitution, and the temporary

provision of 1678. He would show the necessity of carrying on the collateral guarantee of these subordinate securities for a time, as a hold of sympathy between the Whigs and the doubtful portion of the people, and as a protection against the mischief of any communication between a religious class of avowed and necessary Jacobites and the Stuarts. Observe the difficulties of that period. Half William III.'s ministers, notwithstanding this precaution, in correspondence with the exiled family at St. Germain — the natural calculations upon the succession of the Stuarts, founded in feelings of sisterly affection, as well as on principles of legitimacy, during the reign of Anne — the two rebellions of 1715 and 1745, in their behalf. Such are the facts which Lord Somers (could he startle those that privateer under his colours, by rising up among them) would offer as the contingencies which he foresaw, and against which no bond, no security, no penalty, however levied, could possibly be too great. But that it was engrafted as a permanent part of the great measure then confirmed, he would as assuredly deny. It was no more part and parcel of the Bill of Rights or the Act of Settlement, because, at the period when these separate transactions took place, it happened to be a contemporaneous and serviceable portion of the law, than the Test and Corporation Act, or than the Statute of Frauds. The Hebrews spoiled the Egyptians the day they escaped from the house of bondage; but if succeeding patriots had proposed, in honour of their 1688, to keep the year of their deliverance holy by a repetition of the practice, we have too much respect for Samuel and David, to think either the proposition or its proposers would have met with much encouragement at their hands.

We repeat, that the exceptions thus introduced into the English Constitution were proposed on the plea of an immediate necessity. If the necessity did not exist, shame on the authors of such a falsehood! — the more shame, too, on those who wrong the children of this century, because they wronged the fathers of the last; and who use their former offences, not as grounds for repentance and restitution, but as precedents for new and premeditated errors! But supposing the necessity did then exist — the moment that it ceased, and the exclusions might have been dispensed with, it was as wicked to prolong them for a day as it would be madness now to keep them up in the face of the contrary danger they have provoked. At all events, a necessity of this description during the period it is assumed to last, was cause for sympathy and sorrow; it should have been submitted to in sackcloth and in ashes, and not celebrated in the orgies of a festival, or paraded in brutal triumph. These are the feasts that shiver a kingdom, and where God might be looked for to interpose upon their walls *mene tekel*. What should we think of sons who, succeeding under a will, either made in pique or obtained by fraud, were not content with dividing among themselves the patrimony of their common parent, but outraged, by indecent anniversaries of drunken congratulation, their unfortunate and despoiled brother, starving at their door? What would the father of the prodigal son have answered to the demand of a holiday and fatted calf, to feast the messenger who brought him word that the self-made orphan was feeding upon husks?

Besides, were the fact historically otherwise, still it is pedantry to put the age we live in, and of whose character and wants we alone can judge, into bondage to the accidents and apprehensions of an earlier and different society. The blessing of one century must not therefore become the destruction of the next. Politics cannot be dealt with as fixed quantities. What was simply *just* one year, becomes expedient the next



—immediately and peremptorily indispensable the third. The scales, where yesterday you were calmly weighing principles of confidence and affection, may break from you to-morrow under the weight of an instant and preponderating danger. The modern notion that some men seem to affect of the English constitution, is no less unreasonable than the ancient fanaticism, by which both liberty and virtue were often found nothing but a name. It is spoken of as the object of a metaphysical passion, abstracted from the rights it guarantees, and without the slightest reference to the amount or nature of the blessings enjoyed under it. If its form in skeleton can be pointed out in the museum, no matter that its noblest tendencies are undeveloped, or its general spirit overruled! If the surrender of a vain ceremony or irritating distinction (the growth of a middle age, or some late invention,) would reclaim the wavering and pacify the discontented: no! they would sooner see both country and constitution reduced to dust and ashes!\* And strange to say, these ravings are paramount and supreme among the creatures of expedience and of circumstances, who declaim against the name of theory, principles, and system, as the crochets of a wayward and ungrateful generation.

When we think of the disproportion of the stakes — of the sort of object for which all this wretchedness was risked — of the little that we could win, and the immensity that we might lose; no words can approach to the expression of our astonishment at the wildness of the game which we have been playing. What we could gain by persevering in our Irish policy was just this — the pleasure of insulting a high-minded and excited people some few years longer. What we might be throwing away was certainly our honour, possibly an empire: the first now — the next that day when the foot-ball should spring from under our feet, and stand before us an armed man. It is sometimes foolishly argued *ex converso* that the disease cannot arise from causes slight as those debateable at present between the countries: as if what they would acquire must be a trifle, because it is but a trifle that we are parting with. It is true, the only men who at any time could put their fingers on probable loss, by conceding justice, have been the few Protestant monopolists of the Irish representation; for whose benefit alone the injustice has been done. But none are now more aware than they, that the tide has turned; and that their only chance was to regain by concession what the struggle had wrested from their hands. Nationally, the mere arrogance of the superiority implied on one side in these exclusions, will be soon replaced a hundred-fold by sounder and more honourable pleasures: to say nothing of the unreasonableness of any one requesting leave and license of the law

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\* This defiance of the happiness of a nation has, to be sure, a parallel in a letter from Lord Clarendon to Digby, in reference to the treaty of Newport, quoted by Mr. Hallam. “You may easily conclude how fit a counsellor I am like to be, when the best that is proposed is that which *I would not consent unto to preserve the kingdom from ashes*. I can tell you worse of myself than this; which is, that there *may be some reasonable expedients*, which possibly might in truth restore and preserve all, in which I could bear no part.” We quite agree with this celebrated Ex-Chancellor on the sentence of incapacity, which he is aware he is passing on himself by so desperate a declaration. Laud could write nothing more unstatesmanlike. The proud impracticability of Lilliput, which never forgave Gulliver for putting out a fire in the royal residence, is common sense, compared to a conspiracy of this nature between the pilot and the chaplain against the safety of the ship committed to their charge.

to kick his neighbour, on the score of the peculiar relish he takes in the recreation. On the other side, nothing can be proposed, either as an explanation or as an indemnity, to men branded with civil inferiority and religious stigmas, which is not in itself an insult — to be resented always as such — to be resisted the instant they have the power. Surely, too, the moral enjoyments arising from self-respect, from political independence, and an undegraded relation to the Supreme Being, are cheap indulgences. They cost nothing either to government or landlord. At the same time, they may become, in the eyes of those to whom they constitute the sole distinction, precious to a degree of which more worldly natures, devoted to the pomps and sensual greatnesses of life, can have no idea. To make little of such matters, is to know nothing of those feelings which can alone make men or nations truly great. It is part of the insolence of wealth and station to overrate their own advantages, and to measure all comparative conditions by that ignoble standard. Thus, in the planter's creed, if you drive your negro and your other cattle together into the same stable, tie them with the same halter, and feed them at the same stall, the negro, *if better fed*, ought to be better satisfied than the freeman out of doors! Besides, all injury directed against the mind and its moral character and religious faith, is so far the worst of any, as it must be seen to be altogether voluntary and gratuitous. The victim of other grievances may be taught that they are natural and necessary evils: but this, he knows, exists not in the nature of things, or in the organisation of society; but exists by modern statute — the artificial machinery of English and Protestant oppression. Of all moral degradations, none can vibrate so deeply through the human frame, none seems so daringly to pollute the sanctuary of the heart and conscience, to break in on those awful hopes and fears which reach through eternity, and which dim even kingdoms into specks, as a degradation that plants its colours over a vanquished and calumniated faith. Of all chains that whose iron enters furthest into the soul, and whose clank must wake up imaginings and visions that can never rest, is the chain that we are compelled to drag up to the very altar, in order that its presence may insult our God.

We are not aware what the Almanac-makers have prophesied for the present year; but before its curtain drew, we brooded with intense anxiety over what it might bring to pass. Our quiver of prevarications had shot evidently its last bolt. The peril had become so imminent, "that the politic and artificial nourishing of expectations, and carrying men from hopes to hopes," instead of "being an antidote against the poison of discontentments," was itself become a poison. Pandora's box was shaken empty; the cry of Hope, like that of Wolf, had been falsely raised so long, that the idiot echo would no longer be at the trouble of repeating it. We felt ourselves standing, with Hercules in the allegory, where two roads part, within a peremptory circle drawn round us by a necessity stronger than any sword. We could not stand there long; we might be standing there for the last time! What was to be done, if to any purpose of humanity or policy, must be done quickly. A principle was at work as universal as any in all nature. It would be as easy to put off high water, or adjourn an earthquake, till to-morrow. A policy made up of actions and reactions, with its divided cabinets, raising, sinking, thwarting the strongest opinions and feelings that circulate throughout society, had left us to drift on where the breakers were ahead, till we must almost graze the reefs as we shifted the helm.

In this great national arbitration, on one side, we saw justice to be had for nothing, and yet which would be received with tears of joy; on the other, injustice, that must cost us every thing which a nation has to lose.

It is one of the misfortunes of all relations that commence in inequality, that as the proportions change, unless the mind of the superior is sufficiently enlightened to change too, the intercourse can end only in irritation and collision. Mother countries that will keep their dependencies in leading-strings for ever, are like fathers that forget their children are become men. The effort to prolong a power that nature is wrenching from us, is usually as injurious to the character and happiness of the superior who struggles to enforce it, as to the inferior on whom it is attempted to be imposed. Painfully as the Roman Catholics have suffered in the stunting of their natural development, and in the fever of a century of indignities, their political adversaries have come out of this moral warfare with still deeper wounds. Satan knows that other passions besides revenge have their recoil.

The passionate opposition which has been raised in England, has its chief source and excuse in the ignorance of the many, and the artifice of a few. In Ireland, it was raised and inflamed by the traditional pride of a dominant ascendancy. The Brunswick Clubs were not only impotent as protections against the fictitious danger of a violation of the public peace by their opponents; but they were powerful in calling forth opportunities and passions by which that peace might be disturbed. They and the Catholic Association were alike lawful as assemblies for the collection and expression of certain opinions; but societies convened for the purpose of perpetuating oppression, (however peaceably conducted,) can receive no better justification, moral or political, from the opposite precedent of a society, whose object is the restitution of legal rights, than what a club of slave-dealers might draw from the analogy of the African Institution. The mode, however, of pursuing their respective objects has differed as widely as the objects they had in view. If the Catholic Association have shocked at times their distant friends by intemperance of language, the others have raised nothing but one war-whoop, and cry for arms. No lover ever fixed more intense and beseeching eyes on the countenance of his mistress, during the pause, and hope, and agony, of a long sought for answer, than they have watched the looks of government, for leave to draw the sword, whose hilt was always in their hand. They were ever speaking as though the indictment of a whole nation were an easy thing to draw; and an easier thing to carry through. But Ireland has more than one neck. She would have risen *secto corpore firmior*, and have dashed to pieces both the torturer and the rack on which he dared attempt once more to stretch her limbs.

The Church of Ireland, no less rancorously than insanelly, has allowed itself to be mixed up with words and wishes alike scandalous to its character, destructive to its usefulness, and perilous to its existence. By a like miserable degeneracy, the University of Dublin has become a fit pendant to its corporation, and is perverted to, what the worst revilers of Maynooth would describe but faintly, by calling it a Protestant Maynooth. What bitter waters must flow from such a fountain! when, by their earliest education, the youth of Ireland, through impressions thus wickedly ingrained, are more disqualified for the discharge of every duty of social life within their native land, than they could be

by a hundred statutes! We had made a collection of these speeches; but shame for our age and country holds back our pen, and prevents our circulating, for the astonishment of Christendom, these atrocious anticipations of a religious carnage. How impossible to imagine the meek and lowly Jesus, whose Gospels are a manual of good will to man, present at the orgies and listening to the harangues of these, the profaners, not the ministers, of his Word! And how difficult to believe, that the Church of England will compromise its fame and unite its fortune, by leaguering with ecclesiastics, whose passion it must reprobate, and whose demeanour it must despise!

These men should really know the edge of the precipice on which they have pushed us; and that their cry being properly interpreted, is nothing more than that "I will be drowned, and nobody shall save me." Mere strength and courage are not securities enough for victory; or America would still be ours. Let those who will regard nothing in a contest but its issue, look back to that fatal war, also with a kindred nation. It began with every thing in our favour but justice. Such was the unanimity, that the minority ranged from five to ten in the House of Lords. Lord Rockingham's party, when joined by Fox, was always under fifty in the House of Commons. For mere law, the lawyers were all clear on the legislative authority of this country. The people at home so positive, that they would have stoned the man who had proposed to surrender it, without one dissentient voice. The soldiers thought the Yankees were a sort of negroes escaped from Newgate, and sailed, delighting in the expedition. The Americans themselves were divided. None dreamt of independence. The hottest would have been satisfied with some slight concessions. They were scattered over a vast country, unprepared, and shrinking from the idea of a battle. Yet the principle of freedom, and the sympathy of Europe, were stronger than the bayonet of England; and we were shortly seen closing a disgraceful war, where two armies had laid down their arms, with a peace that left us not even our honour. With this example yet burning in the memory of even the present generation, are we asked to forget so soon Burke's touching lessons of charitable wisdom,—those beautiful contrasts between compromises entered into by friends, and terms imposed by enemies? If nations will learn by nothing but experience, is not one experiment of political arrogance enough? It lost us half an empire, and has raised against us an enemy, in the long run, more formidable than Napoleon himself, from the deep and now hereditary feelings with which the shock of that separation was enforced.

Nothing is more dreadful than to see men of serious demeanour, and in the gentle tone of summer, going through their fearful calculations, and casting up the whole arithmetic of blood. Swift calls hanging the natural death of a footman. It seems insurrection acts and rebellions are to pass of course, as a mode of existence quite good enough for Ireland. Its story might be written upon the roll visioned by Ezekiel, inscribed, both from within and from without, with Woe. Surely the misery of past rebellions might satiate any ordinary appetite for misrule. Sir W. Petty computed that, in his time, the loss of human life, during eleven years of war, exceeded 600,000. At that period, the population of Ireland amounted to 1,466,000: it has now swelled to 7,000,000. The forces then employed in Ireland (80,000) were four times the military strength now stationed there, and their expenses reached the sum of 13,200,000*l*. The destruction of property, in houses alone, is cal-

culated to have exceeded 2,000,000*l.*, and the total loss in wealth to have amounted to 37,000,000*l.* Could these casters of horoscopes in “the house of Mars” revolve the destiny of Ireland in perpetual cycles of rebellion, they must be prepared for their becoming of wider and darker orbit at each recurrence. During the rebellion of 1798, the force maintained was 100,000 men; and 11,000,000*l.* were raised by loan, for the expenses of Ireland, over and above the entire revenue of the year. Listen to present ravings, and we never shall conclude the terrible recitals of these drains on our honour and our strength. In such case, unless Providence in its mercy scuttle and sink her in the ocean, Ireland must remain the one constant reference, to which all who hate our pre-eminence shall appeal during peace in argument, and with rebellion during war. A generation may perish in such a struggle, but a nation never dies. It passes on the torch, with one circle more of blood upon it—the *aliquis nostris ex ossibus ultor* is behind. Whatever ruin may befall themselves, they have the certainty that it must come tenfold on their tyrants. The storm which levels their cabin with the earth, will roar through the silent and dismantled halls that have frowned in hostility on their cause.

Let us not deceive ourselves. It is the nature of a cause of this description, based so deep on all that is most central in human interests and feelings, to feed itself on internal fuel. Though no flame had broken through the earth, it would not be the less certain that the conflagration was moving mysteriously within. Individual nature may be trifled with, bought off, and intimidated, or by its quick turns may deceive you in a hundred ways. But the minds of six millions of sentient beings, bound together and impelled by common wrongs, form a moral universe, whose march you may calculate as certainly as that of any comet. Under such circumstances, individuals are nothing—the foam of the moment, cresting the highest wave, or the sea-gulls that shriek by. The harp of Ireland, rocking with every blast, wanted no hand to strike it; swept by the winds of heaven, its fierce and fearful music must have found an echo in every heart. To talk of this meeting or that, of one man or another, a priesthood more or less active, as answerable for its excitement, is to mistake the flags and music for the army. Insanity alone would think that any force can arrest it, but a moral force acting on the mind, whence issues the original disturbing power. To us, the wonder is, not the attitude which Ireland has taken lately, but that she had not taken it long ago. When this opinion is acknowledged by Englishmen like ourselves, murmured over Europe, shouted in America—what must Irishmen themselves be feeling? Ever since their connection with England, they have been used as bondsmen, not as brethren; sent to eat at the second table, and supplied in each successive century with some experimental minimum of law and justice, as low both in quantity and quality as might hold society together for the time. Like some giant figure, rising and expanding in the mist, they have in the interval snapped their former fetters by the mere growth and enlargement of their bulk. The log which they now throw down and refuse to carry any farther, is not the less detestable and detested, because it is the most servile and the last. It is clear that the time was come, when, in the extremity on which they stood, they would offer us only one alternative. Out of the saffron folds of their Milesian mantle they shook to us peace or war; or, if national pride likes the expression better, they gave us two sorts of peace to choose between—the peace of solitude in the annihilation of a people, or the peace of an

attached and prosperous confidence, which will even yet rush into the arms of our tardy justice.

Swift, very little more than a hundred years ago, describing the contemptuous treatment of Ireland by some of its chief governors, in their speeches from the throne, says, they looked down upon that kingdom "as if it had been one of their colonies of outcasts in America." He would not have been more surprised, in 1829, at learning, that those outcasts had taken precedence by half a century in successful resistance to misgovernment, than on finding that the actual strength of Ireland was, to so many purposes, at present represented by the Papists, whom he not only then described as having less power and less land than Papists in England, "but as being just as inconsiderable in point of power as the women and children." This change having taken place—for what we might expect from their remarkable talent for combination, he would go no further than his own experience in the trumpery question of Wood's halfpence, where the national refusal to receive them enabled the Drapier's letters to defeat the government of England. "General calamities without hopes of redress are allowed to be the great uniters of mankind; since nature hath instructed even a brood of goslings to stick together while the kite is hovering over their heads. It is certain that a firm union in any country where every man wishes the same thing with relation to the public, may, in several points of the greatest importance, in some measure supply the defect of power; and even of those rights which are the natural and undoubted inheritance of mankind."

The necessary result of an attempt to combine two things that will not unite (the forms of freedom and the practice of despotism) had reached the point at which both the national feeling and national arrangements that are opposed to it might be considered as complete. The only thing ever wanting from the Irish people was a patience and prudence equal to their zeal and resolution. If they could but bide their time, and, "hushed in grim repose," wait the opportunity which Providence, to punish man's injustice, sooner or later offers a wronged dependency, (whether it be called Greece, Italy, or Poland,) their country, however wasted and bleeding from the contest, must have come out avenged and free. The state of Ireland, so singular in every thing at present, is not the least so in another test, by which we may measure the intensity of that passion, in which for the time all others have been absorbed. We allude to the diminution of crime, that has made the late circuits throughout all Ireland rather a judicial pageantry, than the presence of a tribunal necessary for the public peace. The same enthusiasm and high purpose, by which their boon companion, whisky, was scouted as an unholy thing at Ennis, carried some months ago seventeen prisoners, without interruption, through Tipperary, under the escort of one policeman and the gaoler. Ireland was again the land of saints: and Moore need no longer ask, "Were Erin's sons so good or so cold," &c. Constabulary Acts were waste paper; feuds were suspended, and hereditary enemies had embraced, in order that private animosities might not withdraw the energy of individuals from the concentration of their common cause. This spectacle of a nation, as it were, under arms, would not be one of un-mixed evil, if ordinary times could preserve, for the virtues of daily life, some permanent advantages from the self-command and forbearance imposed by this awful period. It manifested, whilst it lasted, the omnipotence of the excitement, the perfection of the organization, as well as the skill with which it was wielded; and, what is chief of all—that, like

American Indians, they had learned at last to join with their native versatility and fire, the whole philosophy of hatred—that power of long, intermediate, stoical endurance, so necessary to those that hope to graduate in revenge. There is no passion on which, when you have good security, compound interest may be so well allowed to run. This reliance on the combination of their own forces, the concurrence of all natural passions, the result of all arguments, the encouragement of the friends of liberty all over the world, have been for some time aided by feelings from other countries, of unfortunately a more mixed and uncertain character. Nothing but a settlement of this question would have enabled us to distinguish between the friends of freedom and the enemies of England. A book has been lately published in France, under the name of Colonel Roche Fermoy, exciting the Irish to resistance, and instructing them how to make that resistance effectual. The American press teems with writings breathing the same spirit: such as Wolfe Tone's Memoirs, Teeling's Life, Sampson's Memoirs; the *Vindiciæ Hibernicæ*, printed at Philadelphia, by a subscription extending throughout the union. America, meantime, was becoming not merely the house of refuge for Irish carbonari, but a bank for raising and transmitting the "Peter's pence" in aid of religious freedom; Catholic rent would have been ere long as regularly collected at Baltimore and New York, as in the county of Kerry.

Under these circumstances, civil war has been the mad alternative called for! Upon this, there remains a last and fearful question. Those who will hear of nothing but the sword, should be at least certain of the temper of their steel. The soldier of the present age, however drilled, and dressed, and barracked, must remember always that he is still, and was first, a citizen. Even if the great Duke, Lord Anglesey, Sir G. Murray (the army's household gods), had not in peace come forward in behalf of their comrades who had stood with them side by side in the day of danger, could the Irish private have been indeed relied on, when ordered out to bayonet his countrymen for the crime of seeking to remove an insult from their common faith? A soldier already, having attended the Association, wrote of the "brave Catholic soldiers who shed their blood," &c. Already the regiments in Munster had cheered O'Connell on his return for Clare. Already have we heard, even in quiet English quarters, of some that were "running rusty about what was called Catholic emancipation."

Rupit Amor leges; audet transcendere vallum  
 Miles, in amplexus effusas tendere palmas;  
 Hospitis ille ciet nomen, vocat ille propinquum,  
 Admonet hunc studiis consors puerilibus ætas,  
 Nec *Romanus* erat, qui non agnoverat hostem.

Such might have been the case, had the Connaught rangers taken the field against that Association, of which the Catholic rent had made the cottage of their fathers a component part. The man must have a strange notion of human nature, who thinks that in a country where such sympathies are a passion and a disease, that the ties of blood will break at his bigot bidding. It is dotage not to feel, that every peasant lad who was good for any thing, from one end of Ireland to the other, who was not bodily at Ennis, must have been there in spirit; and that his heart must have burned within him whilst yet communing on the way. These late resisting millions are hurrying on to seven. To their numbers, every year is adding an equal progress in intelligence and wealth: half a million of

Catholic children are now in course of education, and a great portion of available resources are getting into Catholic hands. Their wealth makes them more sensible of the value of the object, as well as more qualified to attain it. Their intelligence convinces them of the clearness and sacredness of the right. They further know that all Europe is confederate in one general protestation, denouncing us as tyrannical and unjust—themselves as degraded and enslaved. They know, that without exception, every English minister, in proportion as he has approached the genius of a statesman, not a clerk, has declared, that the restitution of these rights was politic and even necessary. They know that all liberal-minded men in English society, not only deem it safe and reasonable, but demand it as the great national security of the age. They know that their commanders of the forces, and their Lord Lieutenants, one after another, have “come to scoff, and stayed to pray” on this great subject. For ourselves, we should be ashamed of every throb by which we have ever sympathised, either as schoolboys or as men, in the struggles of Greece or Italy, whether of ancient or modern times; we should, like Burke, suspect ourselves of some base theatrical delusion, had we justice and enthusiasm only for the closet and the stage of history, but could regard the actual misfortunes of brave nations and brave men with Christian meekness and forbearance.

These are difficulties which no negotiation could have reduced, as long as the great principle was denied. Hampden was quite as likely to have recognised ship money, and paid his shilling. No tax presses so hard as that on conscience; and our waiting gentlewomen are mistaken, who imagine that a duty on religious liberty is not a more stirring matter than a duty on a pound of tea. Yet Chatham could cry even then, “I rejoice America has resisted; three millions of men consenting to be slaves would be fit instruments to make slaves of all the rest.” Considerations like these would obtain a hearing even in Bedlam. In the anticipation and prevention of such evils, the very object of the institution of a government consists. There is one danger, immediate and paramount. In the face of it, to talk to the Duke of Wellington about the Pope, is to seek to frighten him with ghost stories the morning that Waterloo is to be fought;—it is watching the shadows that are cast by the smallest hair, and not noticing the gloom of an impending and rifted rock. To be squabbling about securities, in a thing which is itself the great security, is to be busy repairing a mosquito net when the lava of Vesuvius is within a few inches of our homes.

Such was the crisis when the Duke providentially rode up. No other umpire could unite so many titles to the confidence of all parties. Had he failed, nothing would have been left for it but despair; since, in that event, all hope of parliamentary arrangement must be forever at an end. Our prophets could then want no further motto for their New Jerusalem than, “O thou that stonest them that are sent unto thee! if thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things that belong unto thy peace!” There is only one “Book of Martyrs” really applicable to this question; and it is ennobled with the names of the most faithful of our public servants, who have successively offered themselves up as sacrifices to their country and to truth. It would have been a perpetual infamy had the conqueror of a hundred fights lived to be worsted before this wretched household Dagon. But he could not fail. “His Majesty’s Opposition” rejoice to see “their thunder” pass into his illustrious hands; they have



cheered him on to this bloodless Waterloo; and have put upon his head the civic crown, worthy to be worn by one who has saved his country, in spite of the madness of fanatics and the unprincipledness of party.

Misgovernment would not be half the evil that it really is, if you could get rid of its bad effects at a moment's notice. There must be at least a century's work in Ireland for our political economists, whose hands were tied until this bill had become the law. But when we look on the state of the English population at the time of Edward VI. (for example, see Latimer's Sermons), and that of Scotland, as represented a hundred years afterwards by Fletcher, we need not fear. The fever once subdued, the physicians will be able to see their way.

This act has, in one hour, expunged the national debt of hatred which had been so long accumulating against us, and which was worse than one of three per cents. Seven millions of injured countrymen were a more formidable antagonist even than the 8, with the eight succeeding ciphers, which is so awfully arranged against us. Amenders of our law have done well indeed to tear out of the statute book the waste paper which embarrassed the Custom-house and the Old Bailey. But there was no encumbrance so great, no subtleties so disgraceful, no consequences so appalling, as hoarding up the follies and the passions of former times. Even Lord Eldon will live to see that his king O'Connell has lost the crown of Ireland, and it is again on the head of George IV. We have taken off our standing premium on faction, and given loyalty its due and honourable encouragements. A Roman Catholic will no longer get more by his faults than by his virtues, or be bound to a litigious obedience in his own defence. We no more insist upon his qualifying by political indiscretions, before he can become a member of our Magdalen Asylum. The threatening and wasting fire that broke from out the clouds of the Catholic Association will make the warmth and ornament of our household hearth; and Catholic orators will as freely shed their blood in metaphor at Westminster, as their brethren have already done, after their own more Popish and Jesuitical fashion, at Waterloo and Trafalgar. This might be called a Bill to remove the exclusion of English capital from Ireland, which will now flow in to cheapen labour, and lay the first security for the improvement of the people, through their employment, by means more advantageous than any poor laws. Protestant families, of the middling class, will not be driven to emigration by a pressure, and by an atmosphere, which they dare not stand. It is a safety-lamp for their neighbourhood. The position between landlord and peasant must assume quite another character; and residence among their tenantry is more likely to be promoted by the reciprocal feelings of this new alliance, than by any acts against absentees. It will be henceforth a matter of indifference what is the creed of any juryman. One law for the rich, and another for the poor, will soon be a thing as incredible as among ourselves. We need no more alternate between the rival dangers of Ireland's strength or Ireland's misery. That withered arm of the empire is restored to health and vigour. Her prosperity is now all ours. We shall feel it in the Budget, when Irish taxation pours in its supplies. We shall feel it in the release of those numerous regiments that have stood sentinel over our prisoner. We shall feel it in the respectful caution of those continental courts which have lately trespassed on our divisions, and defied our weakness. To foreign Protestants it is a cup of peace—to foreign despots, one of wormwood.

The domestic moral of this great event should be a warning to leaders

in party politics not to trifle with great subjects, and, by putting off the day of reckoning for a time, accommodate their own convenience, or their private jealousies, at a nation's risk. It should teach a rising generation to emancipate itself betimes from those traditional prejudices which stand in the way of great living interests, and of the necessities of their age. Above all, as long as the sun and moon endure, it should, amidst evil days and evil tongues, encourage the Abdiels of politics to press on, in straightforwardness of heart and purpose, to the substantiating of those principles of civil and religious freedom whose ultimate success repays all sacrifices, and is our exceeding great reward.

In point of fact, we have always felt that this might be much more properly called "the Irish," than the "Roman Catholic," question. The disqualification was national in its spirit, though religious in its form. The temper with which it has been received in Ireland is the sure pledge that it will successfully execute its great object — the public peace. The very promise of justice has already bound up the wounds of that long-bleeding country, and is uniting her citizens within herself. The rest will soon follow. Ere long, there will be no Irish Channel — or at least one no wider than the Tweed. This is the real year from which the Irish Union ought to run. It has existed hitherto only on paper. The national feeling, which dwelt under the "Union in partition," was as distinct as though the act had been literally repealed; and could not but remain so, till the happy day of conciliation and equality should arrive. The padlock on the rolls of Parliament was nothing, without a padlock on the mind. The pleasures of ascendancy and affection could never have been combined; since nations can escape as little as individuals from the gracious condition by which the human heart is brought into obedience, and its service made perfect freedom. Like Theseus, we had a fancy for an Amazon as a bride; and both parties, it may be hoped, will learn from him that Heaven can secure the happiness of such a marriage upon no other terms than that of our agreeing to recollect acts of kindness only, and forgetting whatever blows have passed before we went to church.

I woo'd thee with my sword,  
And won thy love, doing thee injuries :  
But I will wed thee in another key,  
With pomp, with triumph, and with revelry.

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We now close for ever, and with unspeakable satisfaction, our long labours on the Catholic Question. But before finally leaving the subject, we must be indulged with a parting observation on the singular and most meritorious conduct of the two great parties in the state — the Government and the Whig Opposition — in the happy settlement of this great question. Among the many peculiarities which distinguish this memorable passage of our history, it is eminently deserving of remark, that it is almost the only recent instance in which the Government has manfully insisted upon a great liberal measure, against the wishes of many of those by whom it was generally supported, and who rested their opposition upon the precise ground of liberality; while it presented, on the other hand, one of the most conspicuous instances in which the Opposition magnanimously renounced all party feelings and interests, and not only concurred

heartily with those to whom they were habitually opposed, and by whom they were excluded from power, in carrying through this great work of national pacification; but scrupled not to ensure its safety by sacrifices that might seem to touch, not only upon the prejudices, but the principles of their party, and thus tend in some respects to compromise their character for consistency.

The singular merit of this conduct upon both sides has attracted, we think, rather less attention than it deserved;—and, as its chief title to praise is founded on the noble disdain which it indicates of the obloquy it was sure to provoke, we feel called on the more indispensably to offer our humble tribute of applause, with the same ungrudging and impartial cordiality which marked the services that called it forth.

And first, as to the leading persons in his Majesty's Government, it should ever be remembered to their honour, not only that, when once resolved on the great measure of emancipation, they granted it in the true spirit of generous and confiding magnanimity, but that they pursued and carried it through at the manifest peril, not merely of their credit with their own party, but of their continuance in power. This latter hazard, we are aware, has been stoutly denied; but nothing, we conceive, can be more certain and indisputable.

It is sometimes said, and not untruly, that the lookers on see more of the game than they who play it. But then they must be near enough to look on; and those assuredly were not within sight, who cried out that “the Duke ran no risk of breaking up his Government, and made no sacrifice—for what had he to fear?” Such happy fearlessness, we know, is common enough in those who are far from the hazard. It is very easy to say, “Only let the minister put himself in the power of the opposition, and he has nothing to dread; only let him trust the patriotism of his political adversaries,—their consistency and attachment to principles so often avowed,—and he is safe.” *We* certainly think he was safe, and the event has proved it; but we are equally clear, that a politician might well have been excused for doubting whether any party could be found capable of acting with so pure a devotion to their principles, as never even to think of seizing the opportunity which seemed to present itself, of breaking up the Government, and putting some other in its stead. They who affected to hold cheap such risks were also the loudest in their cry, that it was unworthy to yield any thing, from an apprehension of civil war; and they brought down upon themselves that memorable rebuke, so gracefully bestowed by him, who was not more eloquently than truly said “to be covered with the blood of a hundred battles, and the laurels of as many victories\*,”—and so fresh in every man's recollection, as to spare us the ungrateful office of marring by repeating it. But let us ask the cavillers, if they really think a man at the head of the Government likes to place his continuance in power at the mercy of others? Suppose the Whig friends of the Catholic question had been influenced only by selfish and factious views, and more anxious for a triumph to their party than the success of their principles, what more easy than to have accomplished the object of flinging the Government into confusion, without exposing themselves to the charge of inconsistency, or even of violence; nay, as it did happen, with the certainty of gaining new credit for consistency and honour? It was not at all neces-

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\* Lord Grey's speech, in which, by common consent, he appears to have excelled all others and himself.

sary to do any thing so monstrous as join the anti-Catholic party in opposing the Relief Bill; or even (what we dare to say would have been done by other men, and in worse times), in carping at the details of the measure. They might have given it their hearty support, and only opposed the disfranchisement. What would have been the consequence? The enemies of emancipation would have joined in this opposition, with but a few exceptions; and the measure would either have been thrown out, and the Relief Bill also been withdrawn; or both must have been carried with the whole odium of the disfranchisement resting on the head of the Government, and spoiling the effect of the concessions. The strong probability, however, is, that both would have been lost: and then the friends of emancipation would have saved, nay raised, their character for consistency, while they broke up the government of their former antagonists, who had explicitly declared that the concessions were become absolutely necessary.

Such was the risk to which the Duke of Wellington, in the honest and manly discharge of his duty, exposed himself; and it is not saying more than strict justice requires, if we add, that the entire confidence with which he was met by the other side, was an ample, but most merited reward. For there seemed even an extreme delicacy on the part of the old advocates of the question; as if they were afraid of appearing to take too forward a part in maintaining it, lest they might encroach upon the praises due to those who were carrying it through. Accordingly, in the House of Commons, where there was no adversary to meet, they took scarcely any part in the debate; leaving the defence of the measure, as they well might, in the hands of those who propounded it with such signal ability; and it was only in the Lords where the opposition from high authority, both ecclesiastical and legal, and distinguished talents, as well as learning, assumed a formidable aspect, that the friends of religious liberty recognised their tried and veteran supporters.

In commenting upon the invidious remarks to which the conduct of the ministers was exposed, we have been led to make mention of that pursued by their adversaries — perhaps we should rather say, those who had been their adversaries. But where all are praiseworthy, there may be some peculiarly entitled to admiration; and we doubt if at this moment there is any one so blinded by party prejudice, as not to reflect with feelings of heartfelt respect upon the course followed by Lord Grey in reference to this great question. He sacrificed power in 1807, with his colleagues Lords Grenville, Lansdowne, Holland, &c., and was made the object of a religious and political outcry, which, having driven him from office, deprived him also of his seat for his native county. Those who succeeded upon the clamours thus raised (some of them all the while friends of emancipation\*) carried silently a few years after the very measure for which they had cried him down. For no other reason than his attachment to this great question has he been, during by far the greater portion of his life, excluded from the service of the state. He now sees it brought forward by his adversaries; and he hastens to lend them, in completing the work, an aid as hearty and zealous as it is bril-

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\* Of these several have since made ample atonement to the cause. Witness the important efforts of Mr. Canning for so many years, and in so many ways. On this last occasion, too, a speech of the very highest ability was delivered by Lord Palmerston, of which the sense was worthy of his great ancestor, Temple, and the eloquence superior.

liant and decisive. Yet we doubt not there are, who still go on with the cuckoo note, that all politicians are alike, and there is no virtue in public men !

The debate in the Lords, for the reason above given, excited most interest ; and few things connected with it were more calculated to produce an impression both within doors and without, than the manly and eloquent speech of Dr. Lloyd, the Bishop of Oxford. He did not disguise from his hearers the leaning of his own opinion, nor affect to say that he would not have preferred maintaining the law as it stood ; but he admitted that things had now reached a point which rendered the alteration no longer a matter of choice. He triumphantly exposed the folly of those who regard the question as one of a spiritual, or merely religious nature — a matter of theological faith or dogma. He demonstrated (and here he was ably followed by Bishop Coplestone) that it is a political question, to be tried like all others by the test of expediency, and that the interests of the Established Church require the prudent yielding to the necessities of the times. Among the circumstances prominently enumerated by Bishop Lloyd, as rendering it impossible much longer to delay concession, was the fact, which he deemed undeniable, of all the *young* men who possess any weight, from their station, their capacity, or their acquirements, almost without exception, being ranged on the side of emancipation. The speech of the learned and able prelate is said to have produced a very powerful impression on the House ; and the pains unavailingly taken by the enemies of the measure, in its subsequent stages, to make head against him, sufficiently attest the efficacy of his exertions.

To the protection of a zeal so judicious, and of such eminent and useful talents, the establishment may in all safety be committed ; but it must not be supposed that those venerable prelates, who espoused the opposite side of the argument, were without exception deficient in moderation and sagacity. The opposition given to the bill by the Archbishop of York was remarkable for its candour and good sense ; and the Bishop of London, though he resisted it somewhat more strenuously, expressed his hopes, that when carried, it would produce peace in the Church, and his resolute determination to employ all his influence in furthering the final settlement of differences, so greatly to be desired by the friends of all our institutions.

In human affairs there is no unmixed good. The picture, on the lighter parts of which we have been dwelling, has its shades ; perhaps there is even a reverse which it might be our duty to look upon. But the present is no time for such prying ; and the friends of the great cause, now crowned with full success, ought not at this moment to be in the vein for any but pleasing contemplations.\*

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\* Of the many eloquent and convincing articles in the E. Review on the Catholic Question I have selected only the last one published. It is from the pen of a masterly writer, and forms a splendid termination to the labours of the Journal whose pages it adorns, in defence of the principles of civil and religious liberty. I could have chosen several other valuable Essays upon the subject, the productions of men eminent for their learning, their patriotism, and their devoted attachment to the rights of the people ; but the interest with which dissertations on the claims of the Catholics were once read, subsided with the settlement of that great and healing measure which crowned their long-contested and constitutional struggle for civil and political freedom. I should think, therefore, that the foregoing specimen will be sufficient to display the talent and power of the E. Review in its consistent efforts to promote the cause of toleration. The distin-

## CIVIL DISABILITIES OF THE JEWS.\*

THE distinguished member of the house of commons, who, towards the close of the late parliament, brought forward a proposition for the relief of the Jews, has given notice of his intention to renew it. The force of reason, last session, carried it through one stage, in spite of the opposition of power. Reason and power are now on the same side; and we have little doubt that they will conjointly achieve a decisive victory. In order to contribute our share to the success of just principles, we propose to pass in review, as rapidly as possible, some of the arguments, or phrases claiming to be arguments, which have been employed to vindicate a system full of absurdity and injustice.

The constitution — it is said — is essentially Christian; and therefore to admit Jews to office is to destroy the constitution. Nor is the Jew injured by being excluded from political power. For no man has any right to power. A man has a right to his property; — a man has a right to be protected from personal injury. These rights the law allows to the Jew, and with these rights it would be atrocious to interfere. But it is a mere matter of favour to admit any man to political power; and no man can justly complain that he is shut out from it.

We cannot but admire the ingenuity of this contrivance for shifting the burden of the proof from off those to whom it properly belongs, and who would, we suspect, find it rather cumbersome. Surely no Christian can deny that every human being has a right to be allowed every gratification which produces no harm to others, and to be spared every mortification which produces no good to others. Is it not a source of mortification to any class of men that they are excluded from political power? If it be, they have, on Christian principles, a right to be freed from that mortification, unless it can be shown that their exclusion is necessary for the averting of some greater evil. The presumption is evidently in favour of toleration. It is for the persecutor to make out his case.

The strange argument which we are considering would prove too much

gished writers who, in the pages of that work, have advocated for nearly thirty years those sound principles, which have at length been acted upon by the legislature, though tardily and reluctantly, have reason to congratulate themselves on their labours, and to feel delighted that they have lived to see the triumph of truth and justice over a system of policy persecuting in its character and disastrous in its results. The reader will find, in the numerous papers on Catholic Emancipation published in the *E. Review*, a greater body of information, of solid reasoning, and of powerful writing, than is contained in any other periodical Journal. See Vol. viii. page 311. Vol. x. page 58. Vol. x. page 124. Vol. x. page 299. Vol. xi. page 116. Vol. xiii. page 77. Vol. xiv. page 60. Vol. xvii. page 1. Vol. xix. page 435. Vol. xx. page 54. Vol. xx. page 350. Vol. xxi. page 93. Vol. xxvii. page 310. Vol. xxxi. page 246. Vol. xlii. page 224. Vol. xliii. page 125. Vol. xlv. page 513. Vol. xlvi. page 163. In some of the articles here referred to, Catholic Emancipation is only incidentally touched upon. I would recommend, in particular, an Essay in vol. xlv. page 423., attributed to the Rev. Sidney Smith, written in his happiest manner, and exhibiting that felicitous union of wit and argument for which his compositions are so justly admired.

\* Statement of the Civil Disabilities and Privations affecting Jews in England. Vol. lii. page 363. January, 1830.

even for those who advance it. If no man has a right to political power, then neither Jew nor Christian has such a right. The whole foundation of government is taken away. But if government be taken away, the property and the persons of men are insecure, and it is acknowledged that men have a right to their property and to personal security. If it be right that the property of men should be protected, and if this can only be done by means of government, then it must be right that government should exist. Now, there cannot be government unless some person or persons possess political power. Therefore, it is right that some person or persons should possess political power. That is to say, some person or persons must have a right to political power. It will hardly be denied that government is a means for the attainment of an end. If men have a right to the end, they have a right to this — that the means shall be such as will accomplish the end.

It is because men are not in the habit of considering what the end of government is, that Catholic disabilities and Jewish disabilities have been suffered to exist so long. We hear of essentially Protestant governments and essentially Christian governments — words which mean just as much as essentially Protestant cookery, or essentially Christian horsemanship. Government exists for the purpose of keeping the peace, — for the purpose of compelling us to settle our disputes by arbitration, instead of settling them by blows, — for the purpose of compelling us to supply our wants by industry, instead of supplying them by rapine. This is the only operation for which the machinery of government is fit, the only operation which wise governments ever attempt to perform. If there is any class of people who are not interested, or who do not think themselves interested, in the security of property and the maintenance of order, that class ought to have no share of the powers which exist for the purpose of securing property and maintaining order. But why a man should be less fit to exercise that power because he wears a beard, because he does not eat ham, because he goes to the synagogue on Saturdays instead of going to the church on Sundays, we cannot conceive.

The points of difference between Christianity and Judaism have very much to do with a man's fitness to be a bishop or a rabbi. But they have no more to do with his fitness to be a magistrate, a legislator, or a minister of finance, than with his fitness to be a cobbler. Nobody has ever thought of compelling cobblers to make any declaration on the true faith of a Christian. Any man would rather have his shoes mended by a heretical cobbler, than by a person who had subscribed all the thirty-nine articles, but had never handled an awl. Men act thus, not because they are indifferent to religion, but because they do not see what religion has to do with the mending of their shoes. Yet religion has as much to do with the mending of shoes, as with the budget and the army estimates. We have surely had two signal proofs within the last twenty years, that a very good Christian may be a very bad chancellor of the exchequer.

But it would be monstrous, say the persecutors, that a Jew should legislate for a Christian community. This is a palpable misrepresentation. What is proposed is not that Jews should legislate for a Christian community, but that a legislature composed of Christians and Jews, should legislate for a community composed of Christians and Jews. On nine hundred and ninety-nine questions out of a thousand, — on all questions of police, of finance, of civil and criminal law, of foreign policy, the Jew, as a Jew, has no interest hostile to that of the Christian, or even of the Churchman. On questions relating to the ecclesiastical establish-

ment, the Jew and the Churchman may differ. But they cannot differ more widely than the Catholic and the Churchman, or the Independent and the Churchman. The principle, that Churchmen ought to monopolise the whole power of the state, would at least have an intelligible meaning. The principle, that Christians ought to monopolise it, has no meaning at all. For no question connected with the ecclesiastical institutions of the country can possibly come before Parliament, with respect to which there will not be as wide a difference between Christians as there can be between any Christian and any Jew.

In fact, the Jews are not now excluded from political power. They possess it; and as long as they are allowed to accumulate property, they must possess it. The distinction which is sometimes made between civil privileges and political power, is a distinction without a difference. Privileges are power. Civil and political are synonymous words, — the one derived from the Latin, the other from the Greek. Nor is this mere verbal quibbling. If we look for a moment at the facts of the case, we shall see that the things are inseparable, or rather identical.

That a Jew should be a judge in a Christian country, would be most shocking. But he may be a juryman. He may try issues of fact; and no harm is done. But if he should be suffered to try issues of law, there is an end of the constitution. He may sit in a box plainly dressed, and return verdicts. But that he should sit on the bench in a black gown and white wig, and grant new trials, would be an abomination not to be thought of among baptized people. The distinction is certainly most philosophical.

What power in civilised society is so great as that of the creditor over the debtor? If we take this away from the Jew, we take away from him the security of his property. If we leave it to him, we leave to him a power more despotic by far, than that of the King and all his cabinet.

It would be impious to let a Jew sit in Parliament. But a Jew may make money, and money may make members of Parliament. Gatton and Old Sarum may be the property of a Hebrew. An elector of Penrhyn will take ten pounds from Shylock rather than nine pounds nineteen shillings and eleven-pence three farthings from Antonio. To this no objection is made. That a Jew should possess the substance of legislative power, that he should command eight votes on every division, as if he were the great Duke of Newcastle himself, is exactly as it should be. But that he should pass the bar, and sit down on those mysterious cushions of green leather; that he should cry “hear” and “order,” and talk about being on his legs, and being, for one, free to say this, and to say that, would be a profanation sufficient to bring ruin on the country.

That a Jew should be privy-councillor to a Christian king, would be an eternal disgrace to the nation. But the Jew may govern the money market, and the money market may govern the world. The minister may be in doubt as to his scheme of finance till he has been closeted with the Jew. A congress of sovereigns may be forced to summon the Jew to their assistance. The scrawl of the Jew on the back of a piece of paper may be worth more than the royal word of three kings, or the national faith of three new American republics. But that he should put Right Honourable before his name, would be the most frightful of national calamities.

It was in this way that some of our politicians reasoned about the Irish Catholics. The Catholics ought to have no political power. The sun of England is set for ever, if they exercise political power. Give them every



thing else ; but keep political power from them. These wise men did not see, that when every thing else had been given, political power had been given. They continued to repeat their cuckoo song, when it was no longer a question whether Catholics should have political power or not ; when a Catholic Association bearded the Parliament, when a Catholic agitator exercised infinitely more authority than the Lord Lieutenant.

If it is our duty as Christians to exclude the Jews from political power, it must be our duty to treat them as our ancestors treated them—to murder them, and banish them, and rob them. For in that way, and in that way alone, can we really deprive them of political power. If we do not adopt this course, we may take away the shadow, but we must leave them the substance. We may do enough to pain and irritate them ; but we shall not do enough to secure ourselves from danger, if danger really exists. Where wealth is, there power must inevitably be.

The English Jews, we are told, are not Englishmen. They are a separate people, living locally in this island, but living morally and politically in communion with their brethren, who are scattered over all the world. An English Jew looks on a Dutch or a Portuguese Jew as his countryman, and on an English Christian as a stranger. This want of patriotic feeling, it is said, renders a Jew unfit to exercise political functions.

The argument has in it something plausible ; but a close examination shows it to be quite unsound. Even if the alleged facts are admitted, still the Jews are not the only people who have preferred their sect to their country. The feeling of patriotism, when society is in a healthful state, springs up, by a natural and inevitable association, in the minds of citizens who know that they owe all their comforts and pleasures to the bond which unites them in one community. But under partial and oppressive governments, these associations cannot acquire that strength which they have in a better state of things. Men are compelled to seek from their party that protection which they ought to receive from their country, and they, by a natural consequence, transfer to their party that affection which they would otherwise have felt for their country. The Huguenots of France called in the help of England against their Catholic kings. The Catholics of France called in the help of Spain against a Huguenot king. Would it be fair to infer, that at present the French Protestants would wish to see their religion rendered dominant by the help of a Prussian or English army ? Surely not. And why is it, that they are not willing, as they formerly were willing, to sacrifice the interests of their country to the interests of their religious persuasion ? The reason is obvious ;—because they were persecuted then, and are not persecuted now. The English Puritans, under Charles I., prevailed on the Scotch to invade England. Do the Protestant Dissenters of our time wish to see the Church put down by an invasion of foreign Calvinists ? If not, to what cause are we to attribute the change ? Surely to this,—that the Protestant Dissenters are far better treated now than in the seventeenth century. Some of the most illustrious public men that England ever produced, were inclined to take refuge from the tyranny of Laud in North America. Was this because Presbyterians are incapable of loving their country ?—But it is idle to multiply instances. Nothing is so offensive to a man who knows any thing of history, or of human nature, as to hear those who exercise the powers of government accuse any sect of foreign attachments. If there be any proposition universally true in politics, it is this, that foreign attachments are the fruit of domestic misrule. It has always

been the trick of bigots to make their subjects miserable at home, and then complain that they look for relief abroad;—to divide society, and to wonder that it is not united;—to govern as if a section of the state were the whole, and to censure the other sections of the state for their want of patriotic spirit. If the Jews have not felt towards England like children, it is because she has treated them like a step-mother. There is no feeling which more certainly develops itself in the minds of men living under tolerably good government, than the feeling of patriotism. Since the beginning of the world, there never was any nation, or any large portion of any nation, not cruelly oppressed, which was wholly destitute of that feeling. To make it therefore ground of accusation against a class of men, that they are not patriotic, is the most vulgar legerdmain of sophistry. It is the logic which the wolf employs against the lamb. It is to accuse the mouth of the stream of poisoning the source. It is to put the effect before the cause. It is to vindicate oppression, by pointing at the depavation which oppression has produced.

If the English Jews really felt a deadly hatred to England — if the weekly prayer of their synagogues were, that all the curses denounced by Ezekiel on Tyre and Egypt, might fall on London; if, in their solemn feasts, they called down blessings on those who should dash our children to pieces on the stones, still, we say, their hatred to their countrymen would not be more intense than that which sects of Christians have often borne to each other. But, in fact, the feeling of the Jews is not such. It is precisely what, in the situation in which they are placed, we should expect it to be. They are treated far better than the French Protestants were treated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, or than our Puritans were treated in the time of Laud. They, therefore, have no rancour against the government or against their countrymen. It will not be denied that they are far better affected to the state than the followers of Coligni or Vane. But they are not so well treated as the dissenting sects of Christians are now treated in England; and, on this account, and, we firmly believe, on this account alone, they have a more exclusive spirit. Till we have carried the experiment farther, we are not entitled to conclude that they cannot be made Englishmen altogether. The tyrant who punished their fathers for not making bricks without straw, was not more unreasonable than the statesmen who treat them as aliens, and abuse them for not entertaining all the feelings of natives.

Rulers must not be suffered thus to absolve themselves of their solemn responsibility. It does not lie in their mouths to say that a sect is not patriotic:—it is their business to make it patriotic. History and reason clearly indicate the means. The English Jews are, as far as we can see, precisely what our government has made them. They are precisely what any sect,—what any class of men selected on any principle from the community, and treated as they have been treated,—would have been. If all the red-haired people in Europe had, for centuries, been outraged and oppressed, banished from this place, imprisoned in that, deprived of their money, deprived of their teeth, convicted of the most improbable crimes on the feeblest evidence, dragged at horses' tails, hanged, tortured, burned alive,—if, when manners became milder, they had still remained subject to debasing restrictions, and exposed to vulgar insults, locked up in particular streets, in some countries, pelted and ducked by the rabble in others, excluded every where from magistracies and honours,—what would be the patriotism of gentlemen with red hair? And if, under such circumstances, a proposition were made for admitting

red-haired men to office, how striking a speech might an eloquent admirer of our old institutions deliver against so revolutionary a measure! "These men," he might say, "scarcely consider themselves as Englishmen. They think a red-haired Frenchman or a red-haired German more closely connected with them than a man with brown hair born in their own parish. If a foreign sovereign patronises red hair, they love him better than their own native king. They are not Englishmen—they cannot be Englishmen—nature has forbidden it—experience proves it to be impossible. Right to political power they have none; for no man has a right to political power. Let them enjoy personal security; let their property be under the protection of the law. But if they ask for leave to exercise power over a community of which they are only half members,—a community, the constitution of which is essentially dark-haired,—let us answer them in the words of our wise ancestors, *Nolumus leges Angliæ mutari.*"

But, it is said, the Scriptures declare that the Jews are to be restored to their own country; and the whole nation looks forward to that restoration. They are, therefore, not so deeply interested as others in the prosperity of England. It is not their home, but merely the place of their sojourn,—the house of their bondage. This argument first appeared, we think, in the *Times* newspaper, and has attracted a degree of attention proportioned rather to the general talent with which that journal is conducted than to its own intrinsic force. It belongs to a class of sophisms, by which the most hateful persecutions may easily be justified. To charge men with practical consequences which they themselves deny, is disingenuous in controversy,—it is atrocious in government. The doctrine of predestination, in the opinion of many people, tends to make those who hold it utterly immoral. And certainly it would seem that a man who believes his eternal destiny to be already irrevocably fixed, is likely to indulge his passions without restraint, and to neglect his religious duties. If he is an heir of wrath, his exertions must be unavailing. If he is pre-ordained to life, they must be superfluous. But would it be wise to punish every man who holds the higher doctrines of Calvinism, as if he had actually committed all those crimes which we know some of the German anabaptists to have committed? Assuredly not. The fact notoriously is, that there are many Calvinists as moral in their conduct as any Arminian, and many Arminians as loose as any Calvinist.

It is altogether impossible to reason from the opinions which a man professes, to his feelings and his actions; and, in fact, no person is ever such a fool as to reason thus, except when he wants a pretext for persecuting his neighbours. A Christian is commanded, under the strongest sanctions, to do as he would be done by. Yet to how many of the twenty millions of professing Christians in these islands would any man in his senses lend a thousand pounds without security? A man who should act, for one day, on the supposition that all the people about him were influenced by the religion which they professed, would find himself ruined before night: and no man ever does act on that supposition, in any of the ordinary concerns of life, in borrowing, in lending, in buying, or in selling. But when any of our fellow-creatures are to be oppressed, the case is different. Then we represent those motives which we know to be so feeble for good as omnipotent for evil. Then we lay to the charge of our victims all the vices and follies to which their doctrines, however remotely, seem to tend. We forget that the same weakness,

the same laxity, the same disposition to prefer the present to the future, which make men worse than a good religion, make them better than a bad one.

It was in this way that our ancestors reasoned, and that some people in our own time still reason, about the Catholics. A Papist believes himself bound in duty to obey the pope. The pope has issued a bull deposing Queen Elizabeth; therefore every Papist will treat her grace as an usurper; therefore every Papist is a traitor; therefore every Papist ought to be hanged, drawn, and quartered. To this logic we owe some of the most hateful laws that ever disgraced our history. Surely the answer lies on the surface. The Church of Rome may have commanded these men to treat the queen as an usurper. But she has commanded them to do many things which they have never done. She enjoins the priests to observe strict purity. You are always taunting them with their licentiousness. She commands all her followers to fast often, to be charitable to the poor, to take no interest for money, to fight no duels, to see no plays. Do they obey these injunctions? If it be the fact, that very few of them strictly observe her precepts when her precepts are opposed to their passions and interests, may not loyalty, may not humanity, may not the love of ease, may not the fear of death, be sufficient to prevent them from executing those wicked orders which she has issued against the sovereign of England? When we know that many of these people do not care enough for their religion to go without beef on a Friday for it, why should we think that they will run the risk of being racked and hanged for it?

People are now reasoning about the Jews, as our fathers reasoned about the Papists. The law which is inscribed on the walls of the synagogues prohibits covetousness. But if we were to say that a Jew mortgagee would not foreclose because God had commanded him not to covet his neighbour's house, every body would think us out of our wits. Yet it passes for an argument to say, that a Jew will take no interest in the prosperity of the country in which he lives, — that he will not care how bad its laws and police may be, how heavily it may be taxed, how often it may be conquered and given up to spoil, — because God has pronounced, that by some unknown means, and at some undetermined time, perhaps a thousand years hence, the Jews shall migrate to Palestine. Is not this the most profound ignorance of human nature? Do we not know that what is remote and indefinite affects men far less than what is near and certain? Besides, the argument applies to Christians as strongly as to Jews. The Christian believes, as well as the Jew, that at some future period the present order of things will come to an end. Nay, many Christians believe that the Messiah will shortly establish a kingdom on the earth, and reign visibly over all its inhabitants. Whether this doctrine be orthodox or not, we shall not here enquire. The number of people who hold it is very much greater than the number of Jews residing in England. Many of those who hold it are distinguished by rank, wealth, and talent. It is preached from pulpits, both of the Scottish and of the English Church. Noblemen and members of Parliament have written in defence of it. Now, wherein does this doctrine differ, as far as its political tendency is concerned, from the doctrine of the Jews? If a Jew is unfit to legislate for us, because he believes that he or his remote descendants will be removed to Palestine, can we safely open the House of Commons to a fifth-monarchy man, who expects that, before this generation shall pass

away, all the kingdoms of the earth will be swallowed up in one divine empire?

Does a Jew engage less eagerly than a Christian in any competition which the law leaves open to him? Is he less active and regular in business than his neighbours? Does he furnish his house meanly, because he is a pilgrim and sojourner in the land? Does the expectation of being restored to the country of his fathers render him insensible to the fluctuations of the Stock Exchange? Does he, in arranging his private affairs, ever take into the account the chance of his returning to Palestine? If not, why are we to suppose that feelings which never influence his dealings as a merchant, or his dispositions as a testator, will acquire a boundless influence over him as soon as he becomes a magistrate or a legislator?

There is another argument which we would not willingly treat with levity, and which yet we scarcely know how to treat seriously. The Scriptures, it is said, are full of terrible denunciations against the Jews. It is foretold, that they are to be wanderers. Is it, then, right to give them a home? It is foretold, that they are to be oppressed. Can we with propriety suffer them to be rulers? To admit them to the rights of citizens, is manifestly to insult the Divine oracles.

We allow, that to falsify a prophecy inspired by Divine Wisdom would be a most atrocious crime. It is, therefore, a happy circumstance for our frail species, that it is a crime which no man can possibly commit. If we admit the Jews to seats in Parliament, we shall, by so doing, prove that the prophecies in question, whatever they may mean, do not mean that the Jews shall be excluded from Parliament.

In fact, it is already clear, that the prophecies do not bear the meaning put upon them by the respectable persons whom we are now answering. In France, and in the United States, the Jews are already admitted to all the rights of citizens. A prophecy, therefore, which should mean that the Jews would never, during the course of their wanderings, be admitted to all the rights of citizens in the places of their sojourn, would be a false prophecy. This, therefore, is not the meaning of the prophecies of Scripture.

But we protest altogether against the practice of confounding prophecy with precept, — of setting up predictions which are often obscure against a morality which is always clear. If actions are to be considered as just and good merely because they have been predicted, what action was ever more laudable than that crime which our bigots are now, at the end of eighteen centuries, urging us to avenge on the Jews, — that crime which made the earth shake, and blotted out the sun from heaven? The same reasoning which is now employed to vindicate the disabilities imposed on our Hebrew countrymen will equally vindicate the kiss of Judas and the judgment of Pilate. “The Son of man goeth, as it is written of him; but woe to that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed.” And woe to those who, in any age or in any country, disobey his benevolent commands under pretence of accomplishing his predictions! If this argument justifies the laws now existing against the Jews, it justifies equally all the cruelties which have ever been committed against them, — the sweeping edicts of banishment and confiscation, the dungeon, the rack, and the slow fire. How can we excuse ourselves for leaving property to people who are to “serve their enemies in hunger, and in thirst, and in nakedness, and in want of all things,” — for giving protection to the persons of those who

are to “fear day and night, and to have none assurance of their life,”—for not seizing on the children of men whose “sons and daughters are to be given unto another people?”

We have not so learned the doctrines of Him who commanded us to love our neighbour as ourselves, and who, when He was called upon to explain what He meant by a neighbour, selected as an example a heretic and an alien. Last year, we remember, it was represented by a pious writer in the *John Bull* newspaper, and by some other equally fervid Christians, as a monstrous indecency, that the measure for the relief of the Jews should be brought forward in Passion week. One of these humourists ironically recommended, that it should be read a second time on Good Friday. We should have had no objection; nor do we believe that the day could be commemorated in a more worthy manner. We know of no day fitter for terminating long hostilities, and repairing cruel wrongs, than the day on which the religion of mercy was founded. We know of no day fitter for blotting out from the statute book the last traces of intolerance, than the day on which the spirit of intolerance produced the foulest of all judicial murders; the day on which the list of the victims of intolerance—that noble list in which Socrates and more are enrolled—was glorified by a yet more awful and sacred name.\*

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\* This unanswerable vindication of the rights of the Jews has been attributed to the Rev. Sidney Smith, one of the earliest and most talented contributors to the *E. Review*. It is scarcely possible to mistake his close and vigorous reasoning, his forcible appeals to the understanding, his striking illustrations, and the engaging peculiarities of his style. The ornament of a church, whose ministers have not been always conspicuous for their desire to extend those privileges to others which they claim for themselves, it redounds to the honour of the Rev. Sidney Smith, that, at a period when a cringing servility to the reigning authorities, and an open approval of intolerant and persecuting laws, would have led to ecclesiastical power and preferment, he was found battling side by side with the champions of liberal principles in the cause of civil and religious liberty.