

remains something of a puzzle, which the author seeks to resolve in a concluding chapter. Dr Donald acknowledges (p. 44) “the king was counselled by Scots, albeit not Scots who were completely attuned to the thinking of the Covenant”; but later doubts emerge on whether Charles was “uncounselled”, “poorly counselled”, “wrongly counselled” or “unable to be counselled”. Or was it simply that Charles declined to take the counsel offered?

JAMES KIRK  
*University of Glasgow*

Allan I. Macinnes, *Charles I and the Making of the Covenanting Movement 1625-1641*.

John Donald Publishers, Edinburgh 1991. Pp. ix + 228. £22.00.

In this monograph Allan Macinnes has set out to show how Charles I's policies toward Scotland, both his aims and his methods, produced a fierce backlash: he was himself the architect of the Covenanting movement, which by 1641 had reduced his authority to that of a Doge of Venice and had brought about the triumph of what Macinnes calls oligarchic centralism. This is hardly an original interpretation. What is new is a great deal of the detail, especially on financial matters. Macinnes has worked his way carefully through the unpublished sources in the Record Office, notably the treasury and exchequer records and the *sederunts* of the teind commission, and has given us a fascinating account of various aspects of the king's financial and economic policies and their impact. This is done in three topical chapters, on the revocation scheme, its ramifications, and what Macinnes calls “economic nationalism”, which he defines as a royal policy that subordinated Scottish economic interests to those of England. These chapters are the most valuable and original part of the book. They are preceded by a chapter on the Scottish class structure, and another on the “Scottish Inheritance” of Charles I in which Macinnes describes the economy and what he calls a government “losing touch”. The author follows the topical chapters with three essentially narrative chapters focusing on the period from the royal visit of 1633, which he rightly calls the critical turning point in Charles's personal rule, to the parliament of 1641, which reduced Charles to the status of Doge. The focus of these chapters is, of course, the religious issue, which led to constitutional, and then military, confrontation. There is nothing unfamiliar in the telling, though there is in the interpretation, in that Macinnes insists that what happened between 1638 and 1641 was politically and institutionally radical. It would be more accurate, perhaps, to describe what happened as restoration,

of the authority of the General Assembly to what it had been before James VI began to whittle away at it, and of the balance, tilted so drastically by the union of 1603, between the crown and the political nation, the latter's authority institutionalised now in parliament rather than in the council.

Macinnes throughout is concerned to stress the extent to which he differs from other scholars. This occasionally leads him into odd statements. To contend that this writer's observation that after Balmerino's trial the aristocracy felt that it had no spokesman or place in the government "wholly ignores the rôle of Traquair and Hamilton" (p. 152) is curious: the observation occurs in a chapter entitled "The Rise of Traquair". Neither the jumped-up laird nor the deracinated marquis was in any sense the spokesman of the aristocracy. There are factual errors. The Count of Onãte, the Spanish ambassador at the imperial court, becomes a treaty on p. 42. The length of the Council of Trent, and its starting date, are wrongly given on p. 27. Macinnes repeats the old-fashioned view that James as king of England "succeeded more in aggravating than solving inherited difficulties in matters of . . . parliamentary privilege and religious dissent" (p. 26), as though Conrad Russell and Patrick Collinson never were. More serious is the statement (p. 88) that on the final day of the parliament of 1633 the whole list of legislative measures was dealt with *en bloc*. The most detailed account we have, the letter of John Maxwell written on the day itself, which Macinnes himself cites, makes it very clear that the most important measures were separately considered. (W. Fraser, *Memoirs of the Maxwells of Pollok* [Edinburgh, 1833], ii, 235-40.)

Macinnes has not been well served by his editor. The three topical chapters, full of useful information though they are, are very lumpily written and difficult to follow. There are all sorts of signs of haste: typos, wrongly numbered footnotes, footnotes run together (nos. 39 and 40, p. 100), wrongly given monetary equivalents (£850 sterling becomes £102,000 Scots on p. 198), wrongly used words (a strategy struck a "responsible" chord, p. 161), and grammatical howlers ("That Laud's view prevailed were evident", p. 162). There is judgemental haste as well. To describe Charles's motivation in issuing the revocation as "social engineering on an unprecedented scale" (p. 54) and his pursuit of it as "remorseless" (p. 71), in view of the actual accomplishments of the various commissions and the irenic impact of Menteith during his years of power, is going pretty far. But he is certainly correct in saying that the revocation eroded people's willingness to uphold the royal prerogative.

This is almost a very good book. It has much fascinating material, unfortunately ill-digested. It is a promising first book,