

THE LIFE OF
SIR DAVID BAIRD

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THE LIFE OF SIR DAVID BAIRD





SIR DAVID BAIRD


From a painting by Raeburn

THE LIFE OF SIR DAVID BAIRD

BY

CAPTAIN W. H. WILKIN

THE SHERWOOD FORESTERS



LONDON
GEORGE ALLEN & COMPANY, LTD.

44 & 45 RATHBONE PLACE

1912

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HENRY MORSE STEPHENS

TO VIVID
ASSOCIATION

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PREFACE

WHEN I was stationed at Bangalore with my regiment, I paid several visits to Seringapatam, and then, quite naturally, I tried to find out what I could about Sir David Baird.

There have been few more dramatic events than the three visits of Baird to Seringapatam—first as a prisoner, then as a brigadier, and lastly as the leader of the storming party.

Another curious circumstance is the manner in which Sir David so frequently met the Duke of Wellington and Sir Home Popham on active service, and it is strange that his old regiment (the 71st) should have served under him in the capture of the Cape, and should have taken part in the Corunna campaign.

On the death of Sir David Baird, his widow handed his papers to Mr. Theodore Hook, who published a biography in two volumes in the year 1832. Unfortunately Mr. Hook was a violent partisan, and his comments on the events of the campaign of 1799 provoked the following rejoinder from the editor of *Wellington's Despatches* :—

“ The great end of history is the exact illustration of events as they occurred, and there should

be neither exaggeration nor concealment to suit angry feelings or personal disappointment. It should contain the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Mr. Hook has, however, in this respect wandered from his proper province as an historian, at the expense of the reputation of his gallant hero, by attacking the judgment, justice, impartiality, and duty of the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General, for the purpose of establishing a grievance and an insinuation, which the facts and results do not warrant, and to which Sir David Baird, had he been alive, would have never given countenance. But Mr. Hook, being a civilian, could not be aware of the impropriety of publishing these letters of remonstrance, which are so inconsistent with subordination and discipline; particularly when it is known that General Baird requested permission to withdraw his intemperate appeal, which General Harris, from personal regard, allowed to pass without further notice: and, certainly, what General Baird thought unworthy of him as a soldier, his biographer had no right to bring up against him, with no other apparent purpose than that of attacking the honour of those who are living, and the memory of those who are dead."

This reproof was deserved, for Mr. Hook not only suppressed the reference to Colonel Browne's force in the letter written by General Baird at Seringapatam, but absolutely ignored the Governor-General's despatch on the campaign recommending the General for the Order of the Bath.

I am particularly indebted to Mr. Hook's book,

to Fortescue's *History of the British Army*, and to Major-General Maurice's *Diary of Sir John Moore*.

Sir David Baird of Newbyth has very kindly given me permission to make use of Raeburn's portrait of the General.¹

I desire to take this opportunity of thanking the authors and publishers who have so kindly allowed me to reproduce the maps which appear at the end of this volume.

The Hon. J. W. Fortescue and Messrs. Macmillan have allowed me to reproduce the two plans of Seringapatam ; Mr. Oman and the Clarendon Press have permitted me to make use of the map of Corunna ; and for the map illustrating the campaign in Spain I am indebted to Major F. D. Maurice and Mr. Edward Arnold.

W. H. W.

April, 1912.

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THE LIFE OF SIR DAVID BAIRD

CHAPTER I

EARLY DAYS, AND THE SECOND MYSORE WAR

DAVID BAIRD, the fifth son of William Baird of Newbyth and great-grandson of Sir Robert Baird of Saughton, N.B., was born at Newbyth in December 1757.

The boy was only eight years old when his father died; but his mother obtained for him a commission in the 2nd Regiment of Foot, in which he was gazetted as an ensign on December 14, 1772, when he was just fifteen years of age.

He was now sent to Locie's Academy at Chelsea for some months to study military subjects; but he joined his regiment at Gibraltar in the year 1773.

At the close of 1775 the regiment returned to England. It embarked on the transport *Lively* on December 6th, sailed two days later, and reached Portsmouth on December 26th. During the voyage the commanding officer (Lieut.-Colonel Oswald) issued an order in which he expressed the hope "that the regiment will insure its welcome to England after an absence of half a century by the closest attention to duty."

On landing the regiment was stationed near Portsmouth, but it moved on May 9, 1776, to Kensington, and was inspected by the King on May 17th.

During the year young Baird obtained leave of absence, and visited his family in Scotland.

In the year 1778, ten new regiments were raised. Lord Macleod, the eldest son of the Earl of Cromarty, returned to England, having risen to the rank of Lieut.-General in the Swedish service. He was favourably received by the King, and he raised a regiment which was known as the 73rd (Macleod's Highlanders). The 1st battalion was formed at Elgin, and was composed of 840 Highlanders, 236 Lowlanders, and 34 English and Irish. Shortly afterwards a 2nd battalion was raised, and each battalion had a strength of 50 sergeants, 50 corporals, 20 drummers, 2 pipers, and 1000 privates. It is rather a noteworthy fact that there were nineteen officers named Mackenzie in the regiment when it was first raised.

David Baird was gazetted Captain-Lieutenant in the 73rd Regiment on June 6, 1778, and soon afterwards he was promoted as Captain, and antedated to December 26, 1777. He was given command of the Light Company in the 1st battalion.

The 1st battalion remained some weeks at Elgin and then marched to Fort George, and embarked on May 8, 1778, 1000 strong, for Portsmouth, where it was to be transhipped and accompany the East India Fleet.

The passage took fifteen days, so the fleet had sailed before the 73rd reached Portsmouth, and in

consequence the regiment was sent to Guernsey, where it remained till the autumn.

On being relieved in Guernsey, the 73rd again embarked, landed at Portsmouth on December 10th, and marched to Petersfield. Here there was a further delay, and one company mutinied at Fareham owing to a report that the men had been sold to the East India Company. The trouble was quickly suppressed, and the regiment embarked for India in January 1779—Captain Baird being in command of 150 men on the *Earl of Oxford*—but it was not till the 7th of March that Sir Edward Hughes left Portsmouth with a squadron consisting of six ships of the line and some frigates escorting about twenty East Indiamen, on board of which were the 73rd and 75th Regiments, and part of the African Corps.

The squadron remained for three weeks at Madeira, and then proceeded to Goree, its first objective. The French evacuated the place without offering any resistance, so the 75th Regiment and the African Corps were landed, and took possession of it.

From Goree the squadron sailed to the Cape of Good Hope. The *Earl of Oxford* and another Indiaman entered Table Bay on August 1st, but the men-of-war and the remaining Indiamen stood round for Simon's Bay, and some of them did not come to anchor there till three weeks later. The fleet remained at the Cape for three months, and sailed again in November. The 73rd Regiment landed at Madras on January 20, 1780—a year after its embarkation at Portsmouth.

The regiment remained for about a month in barracks at Fort St. George, and was then sent to Punamali.

At this time there was peace in India, and the authorities at Madras seem to have had no idea that they were sitting on a volcano.

In 1769, Haidar Ali of Mysore had dictated terms to the English at the gates of Madras. One of the conditions of peace was that Haidar Ali and the Madras Government each undertook to come to the assistance of the other with a certain specified force in the effect of any attack being made on either by a third party.

A year later the Marathas attacked Haidar, and he called on the English for the promised assistance. The Madras Government refused to aid him, merely alleging that to do so would involve them in a war with the Marathas.

In 1775 the authorities at Bombay, anxious to get possession of Salsette and Bassein, and hoping to take advantage of the dissensions among the Marathas, became involved in war with that nation.

Clive had realised that the two great dangers to the English power in India were Haidar Ali and the Marathas. The authorities at Bombay and Madras, with the folly engendered by utter selfishness, had made enemies of both.

In 1778 war broke out between England and France, and early in the following year the English attacked and took the settlement of Mahé, though Haidar Ali announced that the settlements on the Malabar Coast were under his protection. The

Madras Government tried to negotiate, but, in April 1780, Haidar Ali refused to see their envoy, and announced that he no longer trusted in the sincerity and good faith of the British.

In spite of this clear warning, the authorities at Madras did nothing. No efforts were made to collect supplies, fortify posts, or prepare an army for the field.

Haidar Ali had, quite naturally, never forgiven the English for leaving him in the lurch, so he came to an understanding with the Marathas and the Nizam, and in July 1780 he swept down through the Baramahals and the Changama Pass, and invested Arcot. His army consisted of 55,000 foot (of whom 15,000 were European-trained troops) and 28,000 horse, and he had 400 French soldiers under Colonel Lally. On the 24th of July the Mysore cavalry were within nine miles of Madras.

Great was the consternation. The English forces were widely scattered. Colonel Baillie was at Guntur in the Northern Circar with 2800 men, Colonel Braithwaite had 1500 at Pondicherry, Colonel Cosby had 2000 at Trichinopoly, and at Madras there were not more than 5000 troops. Orders were sent to Baillie to march to Conjeveram.

At Madras itself there was dissension. One party wished to keep Sir Hector Munro, the commander-in-chief, at the seat of Government, so as to secure a majority in the Council, and to send the army under Lord Macleod against Haidar Ali at once—without even waiting for the necessary equipment. Lord Macleod was an experienced soldier.

He said that while he was quite ready to assume the command and take the field when the army was properly equipped, he would not do so as things then were, but he was prepared to march at once at the head of his own regiment. He added: "I have been a great many years in the service, and I have always observed that, when you despise your enemy, he generally gives you a d—d rap over the knuckles." Accordingly, Sir Hector Munro assumed the command.

On August 24th Baillie had arrived safely within twenty-eight miles of St. Thomas' Mount, and he could without any risk have joined Munro at Madras. Sir Hector, however, at the instigation of the nabob, Mohammed Ali, had ordered Baillie to join him at Conjeveram.

Colonel Baillie reached the Cortelar River on August 25th, and foolishly encamped on the left bank. Heavy rain fell, and that night the river rose so much that Baillie could not cross it till September 3rd.

Munro left St. Thomas' Mount on August 25th, and reached Conjeveram on the 29th, on which day Haidar Ali abandoned the siege of Arcot, sent Tipu with 5000 foot, 6000 horse, and 18 guns to intercept Colonel Baillie, and marched himself to oppose Munro.

The 73rd Regiment (800 strong) formed part of Munro's army.

The British General had left Madras with only eight days' supplies, and when he reached Conjeveram he had to halt there and collect supplies.

On September 3rd, Haidar Ali appeared in overwhelming strength and entrenched himself only six miles to the west.

On September 6th, Colonel Baillie reached Perambákam (fourteen miles north of Conjeveram). Tipu attacked him, but was repulsed with heavy loss after an action of three hours which cost Baillie 100 men killed and wounded. On the same day Haidar Ali made a demonstration against Munro, compelled him to change front from west to north, and took up a position between the two British forces.

Baillie's guns could be plainly heard, but Munro remained inactive all that day and the next. On the 8th he received a message from Baillie saying that owing to his losses on the 6th he could not move, and also that he had not enough supplies to hold out where he was.

Sir Hector decided to remain at Conjeveram with his main force, and to despatch Colonel Fletcher with about 1000 men to the assistance of Baillie. Fletcher marched at 9 P.M. on September 8th, and making a wide detour to avoid Haidar Ali, he effected his junction with Baillie near Perambákam on the morning of the 9th. Baillie's force now consisted of 3853 men, composed as follows :—

Royal Artillery, 4 officers, 77 men ; and Madras European Infantry, 9 officers, 104 men. Colonel Fletcher had brought the flank companies of the 73rd under Captain Baird, and the Grenadiers of the Madras European Infantry (in all 301 of all ranks), besides 11 companies of Sepoys.

The total native infantry in Baillie's force now consisted of 46 European officers and 3312 men.

After allowing for his casualties on the 6th, Baillie probably had about 3700 available troops.

On the evening of the 9th, Baillie set out to march to Conjeveram. He was harassed by Tipu's troops, and an attempt to capture some guns which were galling him was frustrated by the darkness and the flooded state of the ground, which was intersected by ditches. Baillie had only marched five miles when he decided—in spite of the remonstrances of Colonel Fletcher—to halt till daylight, when he could see about him.

Munro remained inactive during the whole of the 9th, and in the evening Haidar Ali sent off the bulk of his infantry and guns to join Tipu and overwhelm Baillie. Haidar himself waited a little longer, but at 4 A.M. on the 10th he galloped off to assume the command in person.

At daylight Baillie resumed his march, but he had only gone two miles when the road debouched into an open plain. A village 1200 yards to the front was held by the enemies' infantry, and as the troops debouched a heavy fire was brought to bear on them by Tipu's guns on their left. Baillie halted, and sent ten companies of Sepoys under Captains Kennedy and Gowdie to take the guns. The Sepoys advanced with great steadiness and captured four guns. Just then a large force of cavalry swept down on the British right. Repulsed here, they swept round, attacked the rear-guard and threatened to cut off the retreat of Kennedy's and Gowdie's men.

The Sepoys were seized with panic and doubled back in confusion without spiking the guns.

Baillie now formed his men in line upon the bank of an old nullah, and opened his guns upon the enemy. There was a lull in the fight for about an hour. Baillie felt confident that Munro would come to his assistance.

A great cloud of dust was seen in front, drums were heard, and scarlet columns were seen advancing. Baillie's troops shouted for joy, but soon discovered that the advancing troops were not Munro's but Haidar Ali's.

The British force was completely surrounded, and more than fifty guns were in action against it. Baillie, however, repeatedly repulsed the enemies' attacks, and it is said that Haidar Ali wished to retreat till Colonel Lally pointed out that Munro was behind him. At this juncture two of the ammunition waggons blew up, causing great destruction. Ammunition began to run short, and the Mysore troops renewed their attacks.

Colonel Fletcher took off the Grenadier Company of the 73rd to assist the rear-guard, and was never seen again.

Colonel Baillie, though seriously wounded, now formed his men in a hollow square on an eminence hard by and repulsed thirteen attacks of the Mysore cavalry; but at last the square was broken and a panic seized the Sepoys.

Baillie tied his handkerchief on his sword as a flag of truce, and ordered Captain Baird, who was now second-in-command, to cease firing. At first

Haidar's officers disregarded the flag of truce, as some of our Sepoys were still firing. Baillie then directed Captain Baird to order his men to ground arms. The order was obeyed, and the Mysore cavalry at once rushed in and cut down the defenceless soldiers. Baird himself, having received two sabre cuts on the head, a bullet in his thigh, and a pike wound in the arm, fell senseless to the ground. Had it not been for the efforts of Colonel Lally and another French officer named Pimorin it is probable that not a man would have survived. Of eighty-six European officers, thirty-six were killed or died of wounds, thirty-four were taken wounded, and only sixteen were taken unwounded. The loss of men was in the same proportion, and but two hundred Europeans, most of them wounded, fell into the enemies' hands.

The following extract from the journal of a French officer who served under Lally bears testimony to the gallantry of the British soldier on this occasion :—

“ Too great encomiums cannot be bestowed on the English commander and his troops, for in the whole of this trying conflict they preserved a coolness of manœuvre which would have done honour to any troops in the world.

“ Raked by the fire of an immense artillery, the greater part of the action within grape-shot range, attacked on all sides by not less than 25,000 horse and 30 battalions of Sepoys, besides Hyder's European troops, the English column stood firm, and repulsed every charge with great slaughter.

The horse driven back on the foot, the right of our line began to give way, though composed of the best troops in the Mysore army."

This is the most serious defeat that the English ever sustained in the south of India. A large fresco may still be seen on the walls of Tipu's summer-house in the Darya Daulat at Seringapatam depicting the blowing up of the ammunition-waggons. Baillie is represented in a dooly with Baird standing near him—each of them smelling a rose.

It may well be asked : What was Munro doing ?

At daylight he marched four miles towards the sound of the guns, which were now only three miles away. He then changed direction to the left, then turned back ten miles to his right, and finally retreated to Conjeveram, in spite of the vigorous protests of Lord Macleod.

He regained Conjeveram at six o'clock that evening, threw his heavy guns and a large quantity of ammunition into the Great Tank, and then resumed his retreat. He reached Chingalpat at dawn on September 12th, and St. Thomas' Mount at 11 A.M. on the 14th, having been harassed all the way by the Mysore cavalry.

While Baird lay senseless on the field of battle he was stripped of everything but his shirt and trousers. On regaining consciousness he saw a sergeant and a private of his own company. The private was wounded in both arms, and the sergeant in one, but they could both walk. They brought him water, and helped him to his feet. It was then decided that they should try to reach Munro's

camp, for they did not know that the General had retreated. They struggled on, but saw no signs of the British force, and at last they lay down under a banyan-tree utterly exhausted, and Baird slept for several hours. When he awoke he was told that a large force of the enemy's cavalry had passed close by, so he decided that their only chance lay in reaching the camp of the French contingent under Colonel Lally. This they managed to do before darkness fell.

The French officers received them kindly, gave them tea and refreshments, and sent a surgeon to dress their wounds. On the following day Colonel Lally sent them under a guard to the camp of Haidar Ali, and here they found Colonel Baillie and the other survivors of the fight.

On the morning of September 14th the prisoners were divided into several parties. Colonel Baillie, Captain Baird, and five other officers were kept with Haidar's army, the unwounded officers and men were sent off to Bangalore, and the wounded officers and men to Arni. Some of the wounded were sent off in doolies and the rest were crowded together on rough bullock-carts. Haidar now marched on Arcot, and on the first day's march Tipu came up and complimented Colonel Baillie on his gallantry.

After spending a fortnight with Haidar's army, Baird and three of the other officers were sent off to Seringapatam. On their arrival here they were at once placed in prison. The prison in which Baird was confined is not the one which is still pointed out at Seringapatam. Baird's prison con-

sisted of an oblong enclosure about seventy feet in length, with a sort of shed at the sides and a small dark room at each corner. The centre was open to the sky. This building was destroyed after the capture of Seringapatam.

The prisoners were allowed one gold fanam (about sixpence) a day to provide themselves with food, clothing, and necessaries. A French surgeon was allowed to come and dress their wounds, and a few native servants who had been taken with them were allowed to go to the bazaar to buy provisions.

On December 23rd a party of wounded officers arrived from Arni. This brought the number in the prison up to twenty-five.

On January 29, 1781, two more officers were added to their number ; and on March 8th Colonel Baillie and several more officers reached Seringapatam, but they were confined in another dungeon.

On May 10th the visits of the French surgeon were stopped, and all the prisoners except Captain Baird were put in irons weighing about nine pounds a pair. Baird was completely disabled in his right leg and his wound was still open, but he too would have been ironed had not Captain Lucas sprung forward and volunteered to wear a second set of irons to save his friend. On the 4th of June the prisoners duly drank the King's health in a chatty of sherbet.

Their captivity now dragged on without any change, except that on November 10th Captain Baird was put in irons.

On March 27, 1782, an official came to inspect the prison, and announced that eighteen or twenty more officers would shortly arrive. These proved to be seventeen officers who had been captured in February in the Tanjore country. Tipu had treated them very well, and furnished them with clothes and money, but on their arrival at Seringapatam they were stripped of everything. Dr. White, the medical officer with this party, told Captain Baird that in his opinion they had no rational hopes of being released unless great efforts were made from England.

On April 9, 1782, Baird's irons were removed in consequence of sickness.

On May 15th the servants were forbidden to visit the bazaar.

On June 4th the prisoners once more duly drank the King's health.

Towards the middle of June serious illness appeared among the prisoners, but they asked in vain for medicine or the services of a doctor. On July 5th, Captain Lucas, who had so generously worn a second set of irons to save his friend, died in prison, and in the next few days two more officers died. At this time Baird was suffering from dysentery. In after years he used to say that, when he was recovering from this illness, his sufferings from hunger were terrible, and that the temptation to snatch food from others was almost irresistible.

Haidar thought this a favourable time to endeavour to persuade the British officers to enter his service by the offer of double pay, with as many

horses and wives as they liked. Needless to say his offers were rejected.

Towards the close of the year many more prisoners reached Seringapatam, some of whom had been circumcised and forced to profess the Mohammedan religion.

On December 15th the prisoners heard that Haidar Ali was dead. They now hoped that the worst of their hardships were over, and that Tipu would treat them more humanely than his father had done. They were doomed to disappointment. They found that Tipu was a bigot and was filled with fanatical zeal for the Mohammedan faith. He gave orders that all the youngest and handsomest of the British soldiers should be converted. Eighteen men of Captain Baird's company were drugged and circumcised, and then compelled to act as drill-instructors to Tipu's battalion of Carnatic boys.

On January 25, 1783, Colonel Braithwaite reached Seringapatam, and a month later four of the officers were taken away and sent to Mysore. On March 22nd, Haidar Ali was buried in the Lal Bagh, a mile from the Fort. On June 4th, the captives celebrated the King's birthday for the third time, and on the 26th of the month they received the following letter from General Matthews, who had, it appeared, been a prisoner in the Fort since May 27th:—

“ I am sorry for the misfortunes of my friends. Rumley is dead—Featherstone was killed. I was a brigadier-general and commander-in-chief on the Malabar Coast. Mangalore has a very good garrison, and I think will hold out till relieved from Madras.

Our fleet is superior to the French in India. Our army victorious in the Carnatic, likewise in the Cuddapa country. Lang, a brigadier-general, has taken Corrore, and has 10,000 good men under him. Our affairs wear a tolerable aspect. The Mahrattas have made peace and alliance with us. I had 300 Europeans and 800 Sepoys effective, at Nagram, and made a treaty with Tippoo, which he broke, plundered us, and made us close prisoners. I think that Tippoo wishes for peace with us, and that something towards it may take place in November. I am used ill, but not in irons. I have neither pen, ink, nor paper, and it is dangerous to correspond. All the strong forts are in our possession. I took the whole Malabar Coast. I brought from Bombay 400 Europeans and 1000 Sepoys, and was afterwards joined by the Calicut army. The number of places taken by me required all my troops to garrison, and I had not any support from any place. We knew not of your situation—if we had I should not have been a prisoner. General Stewart commands at Madras. The troops of the French, landed, have been defeated. For myself, two European servants, and one black, I am allowed one fanam and a half per day, with one sear of meat, three of bad rice, and three of ghee. I am compelled to receive what they give, and not allowed to buy any other from the bazaar. I cannot procure anything but through the Hircarrah. Should anything happen to my life I beseech you to remember that the Company owe me for money advanced by me during my command, 33,000 rupees, besides all my

pay and allowances from the time of my arrival in India. The troops that were with me are some in the nabob's service, the rest sent in irons to different parts of the country.

“ RICHARD MATTHEWS.”

On August 8th it was reported to the prisoners that they were going to be burnt in retaliation for some loss Tipu had sustained on the Malabar Coast.

On August 17th they learnt that General Matthews had been put in irons, and the following extract from the diary of one of the prisoners tells the story of the General's death :—

“ *September 8, 1783.* The washerman gave us the melancholy account of General Matthews' death. He died on the 7th, and at the time he departed this life he was in irons.

“ The General, when he learnt from a combination of suspicious circumstances, as well as hints let fall from those who were occasionally about his person, that it was the Sultan's intention to cut him off by poison, was afraid to taste the victuals that were sent to him, at stated times, from the killadar ; some of the guards, and even the servants who carried the poisoned food, took compassion, and gave him some of theirs.

“ The havildar who had charge of the General connived at these acts of humanity at first, but when it was found that General Matthews still protracted his melancholy existence, this officer was sent for by the killadar, who told him that the General's life, if much longer continued, must be paid for by

the havildar's death. Upon this, the havildar communicated his orders, with the threat that accompanied them, to his unfortunate prisoner, who had now no alternative left but perishing by poison or famine. The anxious love of life for several days maintained a struggle with the importunate calls of hunger. These, however, prevailed in the issue of the contest; he ate of the poisoned food; and drank too, whether to quench the rage of inflamed thirst or to drown the torments of his soul in utter insensibility, of the poisoned cup; within six hours after this fatal repast he was found dead. This is a faithful and true account of the death of Lieutenant-General Matthews, which has been set forth in various ways."

On October 3rd they learnt that the officers who had been sent to Mysore had been poisoned there; and two days later they learnt that eighteen or twenty other officers had been poisoned at Kavel Drug.

For the next five months no incident of note occurred to vary the monotony of their unhappy existence, but on March 7, 1784, Lieutenant Stringer went mad. He was convinced that his brother officers wished to poison him. Unfortunately he spoke the native language perfectly, and he forthwith went to the officer of the guard and announced that he had an important communication to make.

Great was the consternation among the prisoners, for among other things the possession of pen and ink had been prohibited on pain of death, and there

was no knowing what revelations the madman would make. A discussion arose as to whether it would not be best to smother the maniac during the night. Baird vigorously opposed this suggestion, and pointed out that, even leaving any questions of morality out of consideration, the action would be in the last degree unwise, and that it would be far safer to chance what a lunatic might say than to do away with a man who had told the officer of the guard that he had an important revelation to make. In the meantime, he advised them to hide or destroy any documents they might have.

The unfortunate maniac kept walking rapidly up and down the prison from five in the evening till two o'clock next morning, vowing vengeance against his brother officers.

Next morning an official came to see Stringer. The other officers gathered round. After some delay, the unfortunate maniac said that his life was in danger, and that his brother officers were trying to poison him, and he produced a piece of bread which he alleged was poisoned. Baird, who was standing next him, stated that the man was mad, and then seized the piece of bread and ate it. This closed the incident.

After the release of the officers, Stringer was confined in a lunatic asylum at Madras, and Baird saw him there many years later.

About this time reports reached the prisoners that several more British officers had been done to death by Tipu's orders.

One day in March an official came, had the irons

struck off Captains Baird, Lindsay, and Montrath, and ordered them to go with him to the killadar.

Baird felt certain that they were being led to execution, and declined to move unless he was told why he was sent for. Thereupon the official announced that peace had been made, and that he was to conduct Baird to Colonel Braithwaite, who had letters for him.

The killadar told Captain Baird that peace had been made, and that he was free. Several young English soldiers who had been forcibly converted to Mohammedanism were standing near. Baird said: "I hope that all the British are to be included," and the killadar replied: "Not so much as a dog shall be left behind." "Then," said Baird, taking hold of one of the unfortunate boys who had been circumcised, "I claim these." The boys, however, were hurried away by the guard.

Through Colonel Braithwaite, Baird received some letters from his family and friends, and some money from the officers of the 73rd for the use of himself and the other officers of the regiment. He was now taken to Sumna Pettah, a village two miles from Seringapatam, where all the prisoners were assembled next day.

The scene in the prison when the order for the release came is thus described by one of the officers present:—

"This tumult having in some degree subsided, a proposal was made, and most heartily embraced, to collect all the ready money in our possession, without the least regard to shares or proportions,

and to celebrate our approaching deliverance with a regale of plantain fritters and sherbet—the only articles of luxury we could command, on account of our extreme poverty.

“ By nine o'clock at night, supper was announced, consisting of sixty dozen of plantain fritters, and a large chatty of sherbet ; every one being seated on the ground, the repast was received with the utmost content and satisfaction. Friends and toasts were drunk as long as our chatty stood out ; and such was the agitation of our minds, that there was not one of us who felt the least inclination, or, indeed, who possessed the power, to compose himself to sleep.

“ We now waited with the utmost impatience for the return of day, and were impressed with a strong desire that our irons might be knocked off immediately ; but, to our mortification, there arrived, about seven in the morning, only one armourer. Every one struggled to have his fetters knocked off first ; promises, threats, bustling and jostling, every expedient that could be imagined was put into practice, in order to obtain that which would come unsought in the course of a few minutes, or hours at farthest. The same men who had suffered for years the rigours of imprisonment and the menaces of a barbarous policy with invincible patience and resolution, as well as with general sympathy, were so transported by the near prospect of liberty, that the delay of a few moments seemed now to be more insupportable than even the tedious languor of our long, most alarming, and anxious confinement.

About two or three in the afternoon our irons were all knocked off, and we were conducted to the killadar.”

At Sumna Pettah they were able to walk about, and to bathe in the river, but it was some considerable time before they could walk freely after wearing irons for so long.

On leaving Sumna Pettah they made their way, escorted by some of Tipu's cavalry, to Bangalore. Here they were kept for a fortnight in confinement, although Mr. Sadlier, the chief commissioner for the peace negotiations, was living in Tipu's palace at Bangalore.

Baird and several other officers dined one day with Mr. Sadlier. This was a notable event, for it was the first dinner they had eaten for nearly four years.

On arrival at Calle they were met by Lieutenant Dallas with a detachment of Madras cavalry and two companies of Sepoys. Dallas brought clothes, wine, and stores for their relief. The captives from Seringapatam were really free at last.

CHAPTER II

THE THIRD MYSORE WAR

CAPTAIN BAIRD, the Hon. John Lindsay, Lieutenant Melville, and about thirty men were the only survivors of the two flank companies of the 73rd Regiment who now rejoined the colours.

On his way to Madras, Baird passed through Punamali, where a detachment of the regiment was stationed. In after years the General used to say that his meeting here with his friend Captain Robertson was one of the happiest memories of his younger days. Next day Robertson went with him to Madras, and here Baird met with a great disappointment. He was the senior captain in the regiment, but General Stewart, believing that there was a vacant majority, had recommended Lord William Murray—a junior half-pay captain—for the step, and had actually given him the temporary rank of major pending the sanction of the authorities at home. It is curious to read that the officers of the regiment sent to the War Office a petition against this appointment, and that the authorities at home refused to sanction the suggested promotion.

Early in 1786 the 73rd Regiment became the 71st, in consequence of certain regiments being disbanded, and it remained the 71st till 1881, when the numbers of regiments were abolished. New

colours were received from England with the new number on them.

In March of that year the regiment moved to Wallajabad, and not long afterwards to Bombay. Here Baird had the only serious illness he ever experienced during his long career in India.

In consequence of the death of the colonel, Baird was promoted major on June 5, 1787. During this year he returned home on leave.

While he was staying at Newbyth with his elder brother he received a letter from Captain Dalrymple of the 71st, informing him that the new colonel had been put on board ship so ill that he was not expected to live a fortnight, and urging him to take post-horses instantly to the War Office and secure the command for himself and the majority for the writer. Baird hastened to London, but found that he was too late. Not only was the colonel dead, but Colonel Baring had been promoted to fill the vacancy. Baring, however, had no wish to serve in India, and said that if Baird could purchase another Lieut.-Colonelcy, he (Baring) would gladly exchange with him so that Baird could command his own regiment.

Baird now hurried over to Dublin to see the officer from whom he hoped to purchase, and to obtain the consent of the Lord-Lieutenant. All was satisfactorily arranged, but there was a short delay owing to the negligence of his agent at Edinburgh. Baird was promoted Lieut.-Colonel of the 71st on December 8, 1790. This delay had very serious consequences for Baird, for it made him a few days

junior to the Earl of Cavan and Sir John Moore, and so lost him the command of one army in Egypt and another in Spain.

Baird sailed for India in March 1791, and reached Madras in June. On his arrival he learnt that his regiment was once more on active service with the army under Lord Cornwallis.

War had broken out with Tipu in July 1790, and Lord Cornwallis, the Governor-General, had left Calcutta and assumed the command in person in January 1791. Cornwallis marched out of Vellore at the head of his army on February 5th. On March 21st he took the fort at Bangalore, and on May 13th he arrived at Arikera, nine miles east of Seringapatam. On the 15th he inflicted a defeat on Tipu, but supplies ran short and his baggage animals were dying in scores, so that on the 26th he was compelled to retreat, and on July 11th he again arrived at Bangalore. He left his sick, and heavy stores, at Bangalore, and moved with the bulk of his army to Hosur. There Baird joined him and was appointed to the command of a brigade of Sepoys. Cornwallis now set about preparations for a new campaign, and resolved first to capture Nandi Drug so as to open up his communications with the Nizam.

Major Gowdie was sent forward with the Madras European regiment and six battalions of Sepoys to commence the siege. Nandi Drug lies thirty-six miles north of Bangalore. The fort is perched on an enormous mountain twelve miles in diameter which rises to a height of 1500 feet above the surrounding country. The rock is absolutely

inaccessible except on one side, where it was defended by strong walls. With great labour, guns were dragged up by the help of elephants, batteries were raised, and by the 17th of October two breaches were made in the walls.

On the 18th Cornwallis moved up with his whole army, and resolved to storm the place an hour after the moon rose that night.

Captain Robertson led the Grenadiers of the 36th and 71st to the breach in the curtain.

The storming-party was commanded by General Medows, the second-in-command of the army. Just as the stormers were about to move to the attack, an officer foolishly observed in the hearing of the men that it was reported that there was a mine near the breach. Whereupon Medows cried out: "A mine! If it be a mine, my boys, it must be a mine of gold."

The attack was completely successful, and the stormers after mounting the breaches followed the defenders into the inner works and gained complete possession of the fort. The loss of the stormers was only two killed and twenty-eight wounded, and during the whole siege operations there were only 120 casualties.

Cornwallis could not yet advance on Seringapatam, for he felt compelled to wait for some remounts for his cavalry, and to give the Marathas time to join him.

Not to waste time he decided to capture the hill-fortress of Savandrug, which lies about twenty miles to the west of Bangalore.

Savandrug means the "Rock of Death," and was so called not so much from its strength as a fortress as from the deadliness of its climate. At the base the hill is eight miles in circumference, and it rises to a height of 900 feet above the surrounding country. Towards the summit it is divided by a chasm into two peaks which a hundred years ago were out of range of one another.

When Tipu heard that the British meant to attack Savandrug, he exultingly said that they would lose one half of their men from the climate and the other half in the assault.

With incredible labour a road was made through the jungle, and on December 17th two batteries opened fire on the wall of the Eastern Hill, at 1000 yards and 700 yards respectively. Two days later another battery opened at 250 yards, and on the 21st the breach was reported practicable, and, sheltered by the jungle, the attackers effected a lodgment within twenty yards of the breach.

At eleven o'clock the stormers rushed to the attack, while the band of the 52nd Regiment played "Britons, strike home." The defenders fled in panic, and within an hour the British were masters of the whole fortress with the loss of but one man wounded. About a hundred of the defenders were killed on the Western Hill, and several more perished by falling from precipices as they fled. Colonel Baird with his brigade of Sepoys had been sent round to show himself and create a diversion on the opposite side of the fortress. When the

assault took place, Baird advanced and entered the fortress on his side.

During the next three weeks Cornwallis took several more hill-forts and made his final preparations for the advance on Seringapatam, and on January 25th his army of 22,000 men was joined by the Nizam's contingent of 18,000 cavalry. Meanwhile, the Bombay army under General Abercromby, advancing from the Malabar Coast, had ascended the Ghauts and debouched on to the Mysore Plateau on January 22nd.

The following order of battle shows the composition of the British forces in this last phase of the war :—

ORDER OF BATTLE

ARMY COMMANDED BY EARL CORNWALLIS, *Commander-in-Chief*

Major-General MEDOWS, second-in-command.

Right Wing—Lieut.-Colonel STUART.

3rd Brigade—Lieut.-Colonel COCKERELL.

4 battalions of Bengal Sepoys.

1st Brigade—Lieut.-Colonel NESBITT.

H.M. 36th, 76th, and 52nd Regts.

4th Brigade—Lieut.-Colonel RUSSELL.

3 battalions of Bengal Sepoys.

Left Wing—Lieut.-Colonel MAXWELL.

6th Brigade—Major LANGLEY.

4 battalions of Coast Sepoys.

2nd Brigade—Lieut.-Colonel KNOX.

H.M. 72nd, 74th, and 71st Regts.

5th Brigade—Lieut.-Colonel BAIRD.

4 battalions of Coast Sepoys.

Reserve—Lieut.-Colonel FLOYD.

Cavalry Brigade—

19th L.D. and 2 Regts. Madras N.C.

7th Brigade—Major GOWDIE.

Madras European Regt. and 1 Sepoy
battalion.

Park of Artillery—Colonel DUFF.

46 field-guns, 4 howitzers, 36 mortars and
siege-guns; 1145 European artillery,
3077 Native artillery.

ATTACHED TO THE NIZAM'S CONTINGENT.

2 battalions of Coast Sepoys.

Europeans	6,066
Native troops	<u>15,967</u>
	22,033

Army of Major-General ABERCROMBY.

1st Brigade—Colonel BALFOUR.

H.M. 75th Regt. and 2 battalions of
Sepoys.

2nd Brigade—Lieut.-Colonel PECHÉ.

H.M. 77th Regt. and 2 battalions of
Sepoys.

3rd Brigade—Major STIRLING.

Bombay European Regt. and 2 battalions
of Sepoys.

Reserve—Lieut.-Colonel HARTLEY.

H.M. 73rd Regt. Grenadier battalion, 1
battalion of Sepoys, 20 field-guns, 16
siege-guns.

Europeans	3,026
Native troops	<u>5,932</u>
	8,958

Cornwallis decided to wait no longer for the Marathas, so he began his advance on February 1st, and on the 5th he arrived within sight of Seringapatam, and camped about six miles to the north of it.

Seringapatam lies on an island in the river Kaveri. The island is about three miles in length, and more than a mile in width at the widest part. The fort occupies the western end of the island, and the north face of the fort is a mile in length. The eastern portion of the island was occupied by the pettah or town, and here also lie the Lal Bagh in which Haidar Ali was buried, and the Darya Daulat which contains the Summer Palace, whose walls are decorated with the frescoes of the defeat of Colonel Baillie. The river front of this part of the island was defended by batteries.

The Kaveri is for the most part from two to three hundred yards wide in both branches. It is fordable at most points before the monsoon breaks in June, but the bottom is rocky and the current is swift, so that the river forms a serious obstacle.

At the time of which we write, a considerable piece of ground on the mainland on both banks of the river was enclosed by a bound-hedge. The space enclosed on the left bank was more than three miles in length from the point where the hedge left the Kaveri at the mouth of the river Lockany to the Eadgah redoubt. At the west end the enclosure was over a mile in width from the Eadgah redoubt to the Kaveri. Besides the hedge this space was

defended by seven redoubts which afforded one another mutual support, and there was another redoubt on the Karigat Hill to cover the right flank.

The forces at Tipu's disposal were reckoned at 45,000 foot and 5000 horse.

In after years Baird used to admit that he felt no small exultation on returning in command of a brigade to the scene of his long captivity.

Early on the 6th Cornwallis ordered Colonel Maxwell and the chief engineer, with a strong covering party under Lieut.-Colonel Baird, to ascend the Karigat Hill and reconnoitre the enemy's position.

On receiving their report the General decided to attack at once without waiting for the arrival of the Bombay army. The following orders were issued :—

“ *February 6, 1792.*”

“ The army marches in three divisions, at seven this evening, to attack the enemy's camp and lines. Picquets to join field-pieces, quarter and rear-guard and camp to stand fast.

Right division—General MEDOWS.

36th	}	Regiments—Lieut.-Colonel NESBITT.
76th		
3rd Brigade—Lieut.-Colonel COCKERELL.		
22nd Native Battalion—Captain ORAM.		

Lieut. LENNOX'S Pioneers, a detachment of officers from the Engineer Corps, and a proportion of scaling-ladders.

Centre—Lord CORNWALLIS.

52nd	}	Regiments—Lieut.-Colonel KNÖX.
71st		
74th		
4th Brigade—Major RUSSELL.		
2nd	}	Native Battalions—Major LANGLEY.
21st		

Lieut. DOWSE's Pioneers, a detachment of officers from the Engineers, and a proportion of scaling-ladders.

Left division—Lieut.-Colonel MAXWELL.

72nd Regiment	}	Lieut.-Colonel BAIRD.
5th Brigade		

Ensign SLOPER's Pioneers, and a proportion of scaling-ladders."

In the right division there were 900 Europeans and 2400 Natives—together, 3300 men.

In the centre, 1400 Europeans and 2300 Natives, making 3700.

And in the left division, 500 Europeans and 1200 Natives, making 1700.

Altogether, 2800 Europeans and 5900 Natives—a total of 8700 men.

The right column was intended to enter the bound-hedge a little to the east of the Eadgah redoubt, and then turn to the left, carry the interior works and establish communication with the centre division. Cornwallis gave particular directions that only a false attack should be made on the Eadgah redoubt. The centre column was to burst through the enemy's centre and follow the fugitives across to the island. The left column was to storm the

redoubt on Karigat Hill, and then turn to the right and join hands with the centre.

It will thus be seen that Cornwallis decided to attack an enemy 50,000 strong with 8700 bayonets. The officers of the Nizam's contingent were horrified when they heard of the proposed plan, and especially when they heard that the Commander-in-Chief was himself accompanying the centre column.

Floyd stayed to guard the camp with the remainder of the army.

At 8.30 the columns moved off in perfect silence. The night was calm, and there was a moon. The left column was the first to come in contact with the enemy. The redoubt on Karigat Hill was protected by a double line of breastworks, but the flank companies of the 72nd, with Baird at their head, at once rushed the works and drove out the enemy. This was at about 10.30 P.M. Baird followed the enemy to a point lower down near a pagoda, and then drove them completely off the hill.

Maxwell now left a small force to guard the captured works, and told Baird to push on down the hill and enter the bound-hedge to join the centre column. Baird hastened down the hillside, but the going was very bad, and on getting to a water-course he discovered that he had nobody with him except one officer, twelve Grenadiers of the 72nd, and a few Sepoys. However, hearing firing on the left, Baird again pushed on, and luckily fell in with the column, which had found an easier way down the hill. The column now burst through

the bound-hedge and effected a junction with Colonel Stuart's troops.

We must now briefly trace the fortunes of the other columns.

Just as the assault on the Karigat redoubt took place, the head of the centre column came upon an advanced post of the enemy's cavalry and rocketmen. These discharged their rockets to give the alarm, and fled. The column then moved in perfect silence till it came on the bound-hedge, when a heavy fire was opened on it. The hedge was carried with a rush, and the leading five companies of British infantry under Captain Monson pursued the fugitives, crossed the Kaveri, moved right across the island, and seized a work on the south side of it.

Meanwhile the rest of the column had lost touch, but two companies under Colonel Knox reached the ford only five minutes after Monson, crossed the Kaveri, and turned to the left into the Pettah.

A party consisting of seven companies of the 52nd and three companies of Sepoys missed the track of their leaders, swung more to the left, crossed the river by another ford, and seized the Darya Daulat. The remainder of the column received a check, for just after getting through the bound-hedge a battalion of Bengal Sepoys fled in confusion when their commanding officer was killed. Colonel Stuart brought up the 71st, the Sepoys rallied, and, supported by two more native battalions, Stuart advanced, occupied the Sultan's redoubt, and then

turning to his left got in touch with Maxwell's column, as already narrated.

Cornwallis halted the remainder of the centre column near the Sultan's redoubt as a reserve. With the right column, however, things had fared ill, owing to gross carelessness on the part of the staff. The Commander-in-Chief intended this column on passing the hedge to turn to the *left*, but the written orders given to the officer commanding the advanced troops ordered him to turn to the right, which brought the column straight on to the Eadgah redoubt. This work was carried, but at a cost of eleven officers and eighty men. Meadows now left four companies of the 36th and a battalion of Sepoys to hold the redoubt, and marched with the remainder of his column to join Cornwallis. He actually passed within a quarter of a mile of Lord Cornwallis's reserve without knowing it, and it was not till he reached the Karigat Hill at 3 A.M. that he learnt where the Commander-in-Chief was.

Thus at 3 A.M. the whole British force was scattered in small parties, none of which knew where the others were.

Stuart and Maxwell now advanced to the Kaveri with the intention of crossing over to the island. At first the troops received a check, for they came under the fire of the batteries on the island, and they did not know where the ford was. Very soon, however, Colonel Baird managed to cross the river with a small party of the 72nd Regiment. The water was up to the men's necks in some places, so that all the ammunition was ruined, but most fortunately

Colonel Knox, on hearing the firing, moved out and captured the enemy's batteries from the rear. A few minutes later Colonel Maxwell discovered a better ford further to the east, and crossed over on to the island with his troops, followed by those of Colonel Stuart.

Colonel Stuart now assumed the command of all the troops on the island, and took up a position across the east end of the island facing west.

Tipu made a counter-attack on the reserve under Cornwallis, but he was repulsed, and by 4 A.M. Cornwallis and Medows were at last united.

During the 7th, Tipu delivered an attack on the Sultan's redoubt, which was most gallantly held by Captain Sibbald of the 21st, and another against Stuart's troops on the island. Both attacks were repulsed. The British lay on their arms all night, and on the morning of the 8th it was found that the enemy had evacuated all the country on the left bank of the Kaveri, and also all the island with the exception of the fort. Thus the bold attack made by Lord Cornwallis was in the end crowned with complete success. The British casualties numbered 535. It was reckoned that 4000 of the enemy perished, and it was computed that Tipu's losses in killed and wounded and from desertion amounted to not less than 20,000 men.

Cornwallis was now able to commence siege operations. On the 9th of February, Baird and Knox were recalled with their brigades to the left bank of the Kaveri, while Stuart remained in the island.

On the 16th, Major-General Abercromby arrived

with the Bombay army, and on the 19th the trenches were opened. The Bombay army took up its position opposite the south-west face of the fortress. Tipu was greatly annoyed because the trees round Haidar Ali's tomb in the Lal Bagh were cut down by the besiegers to make fascines.

On the 22nd he made a desperate sortie against the Bombay army, but he was repulsed with heavy loss.

That night the second parallel was completed, and next day Tipu capitulated. He sent two of his sons to Lord Cornwallis as hostages, but even now he managed to protract the negotiations till 19th March, when the Governor-General brought things to a peremptory close.

By the terms of the treaty Tipu had to surrender about half his territory. The Nizam and the Marathas recovered the provinces which Tipu had wrested from them, and the British took possession of Coorg and Malabar on the west, and of the Baramahals on the east.

General Medows had been deeply mortified by the failure of his column on the night of 6th May. He had not been to blame, for the mistake was due solely to the negligence and stupidity of the staff. Still, the General could not forgive himself. During the siege operations he kept exposing himself recklessly to the enemy's fire, and on 26th May, three days after the capitulation, he deliberately shot himself. Fortunately the bullet fell out of the pistol, so that only the wad entered his body, and he recovered.

Both Cornwallis and Medows were very popular with the army. They both returned to the East India Company the gratuity awarded them at the conclusion of the campaign, which amounted in the case of Lord Cornwallis to £41,000. In spite of this, one is hardly surprised that a member of the House of Commons rose in the House and accused the Governor-General of entering on the war from motives of avarice.

This by no means unusual attitude of British politicians was well summed up by General Grant as follows :—

“The House of Commons at present puts me a little in mind of the American War. Tippoo has not so powerful and numerous supporters as Jonathan had ; but if the devil was to appear in the figure of an Asiatic prince and disturb the peace and quiet of the British Government, he would find some friends in this country.”

CHAPTER III

PEACE

ON the conclusion of the campaign the troops returned to their quarters, and the 71st Regiment proceeded to Warriore, near Trichinopoly. At this time the regiment was in first-rate condition, and floggings were very rare. The battalion paraded at sunrise on four mornings each week, the officers hunted two days a week, and the Colonel inspected barracks every Sunday.

In March 1793 the regiment moved to Secundermally, near Madura, and shortly afterwards it formed part of a force sent under the command of Colonel Braithwaite to capture Pondicherry. The fortifications had been destroyed when Sir Eyre Coote captured the place in 1761, so the French surrendered without offering any resistance.

The army broke up and the 71st Regiment returned to Secundermally, but early in 1794 the regiment moved to Wallajabad, and in June of that year to Tanjore.

The regiment remained for two years at Tanjore ; and Baird, who was promoted Colonel on August 21, 1795, was in command of the station.

Unfortunately Baird interested himself deeply in the political relations between the Madras Govern-

ment and the Rajah of Tanjore, and, becoming convinced that the Rajah was being treated unjustly, he attempted to intervene. His relations with the Resident became so strained that the matter was referred to the Madras Government, with the result that the 71st Regiment was ordered in May 1796 to leave Tanjore at once. The orders were to march to Pondicherry, but on reaching Trichinopoly the destination was changed to Wallajabad.

A few months later the following general order was published by the Commander-in-Chief after his inspection of the regiment :—

“ General Order by the Commander-in-Chief.

“ Major-General Clark experienced infinite satisfaction this morning at the review of his Majesty’s 71st Regiment. He cannot say that on any occasion of field exercise he ever was present at a more perfect performance. Where a corps is so striking in its appearance, and so complete in every branch of its discipline, little can occur to the Commander-in-Chief to particularise; he cannot, however, but notice that the 71st has excited his admiration from its expertness in those parts of its exercise which are most difficult and most essential to execute. He alludes to its order and regularity when moving in line, its extreme accuracy in preserving distance, and the neatness and promptitude that are so evident in all its formations. So much perfection in a corps, whose services in India will long be held in remembrance, does the greatest honour to Lieutenant-Colonel Baird and all his officers, to

whom, and the corps at large, the Commander-in-Chief desires to offer his best thanks.

“(Signed) BARRY CLOSE,
“*Asst. Adj.-Gen. of the Army.*”

“HEADQUARTERS, WALLAJABAD, *Jan. 2, 1797.*”

General Robertson, who was at that time a captain in the 71st, writes as follows about the state of the regiment:—

“Whenever any new regiments arrived at Madras from England, the officers were anxious to know the best method of managing the men and settling the economy of their corps; the Commander-in-Chief recommended them to go up to Wallajabad, where they would see the 71st Regiment in the highest state of discipline, not only with respect to their movements in the field, but with regard to their interior economy and arrangement.”

Colonel Baird started an Officers' Mess, which at this period was very unusual.

The regiment remained at Wallajabad till October 1797, when Colonel Baird received orders to draft 500 of his men to the 73rd and 74th Regiments, and to proceed at once to Madras with the colours, the officers, band, drums, and details, to embark for England.

Colonel Baird had been warned in August that his regiment was to be drafted, but he quite hoped that this might be avoided after all, as there were one or two other regiments which had been longer on foreign service.

On receiving the order the Colonel ordered all men to remain in barracks, as he had something to communicate to them from headquarters. Shortly afterwards he went down to the barrack-square, the men were fallen in, and the order for the drafting was read out by the Adjutant.

The breaking up of the regiment was a terrible blow to all ranks, but when the reading of the order was concluded, Colonel Baird addressed the men as follows :—

“My poor fellows—not a word—the order must be obeyed.”

He then ordered the band to strike up—

“The King commands, and we'll obey ;
Over the hills and far away.”

So perfect was the interior economy of the battalion, that within four days of the receipt of the order the regiment was dispersed, every man's accounts were settled up, and the colours, officers and details were on their way to Madras.

The skeleton of the regiment reached Madras on 14th October, and three days later it embarked on an East Indiaman for home. Of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men who had sailed from Portsmouth with the regiment in 1779, Colonel Baird and one sergeant were the only two who now embarked with it for home.

On this occasion the following general orders were published by the Madras Government and the Commander-in-Chief :—

“General Orders by Government.

“FORT ST. GEORGE, *October 16, 1797.*”

“The officers, non-commissioned officers, drummers, and privates of the 71st Regiment under orders for Europe to embark to-morrow morning at six o'clock.

“The President in Council has much satisfaction in expressing the just sense entertained by the Government of the active, zealous, and important services of the 71st Regiment during the eighteen years they have been stationed in India, by which they have contributed so largely to the reputation of the British army, and so essentially promoted the interest of the East India Company.

“By order of the Right Hon. the President in Council.

“(Signed) T. WEBBE,
“*Secretary to Government.*”

“General Orders by Lieutenant-General Harris.

“The Commander-in-Chief cannot think of parting with a corps that has been so eminently distinguished as the 71st Regiment in India, by a series of long, spirited, and arduous services, without requesting Colonel Baird, the officers, non-commissioned officers, and every man belonging to that regiment to accept of his warmest acknowledgments for conduct which has been equally honourable to themselves and advantageous to their country. The alacrity with which Colonel Baird has arranged, at a short warning, everything relative to the drafting

confirms Lieutenant-General Harris in the favourable opinion he had formed of the internal order and discipline of that corps, and he trusts that the regularity and zeal of the men destined for the 73rd and 74th Regiments will be such as to maintain the high reputation they have so deservedly acquired.

“(Signed) J. ROBERTSON,
“ *Dep. Adj.-General.*

“HEADQUARTERS, CHOULTRY PLAIN, *October 16, 1797.*”

The Indiaman reached Capetown in December 1797, and entered Table Bay on the very day on which the ringleaders of a mutiny were hanged on board the ships of the Cape squadron.

Colonel Baird at once landed, and went to Government House to call on Lord Macartney, the Governor. He was received by an aide-de-camp, who informed him that the Governor could not see him. A few hours later this young gentleman had to write a letter expressing his Excellency's regret at not seeing Colonel Baird, and hoping that the Colonel would call on him next morning. In after years General Baird used to say that he had never forgotten this incident, and that he always kept “a sharp look-out” after his own aides-de-camp so as to avoid episodes of this sort.

Next morning Lord Macartney urged Colonel Baird to send his regiment on to England, but to remain himself at Capetown as second-in-command, with the local rank of Brigadier-General. The reason of this request was that there was very serious friction between the commanding officers of the

different units and General Dundas, who commanded the troops in the colony. Baird asked for twenty-four hours in which to consider the matter, meaning to consult General Dundas. The General was away and so could not be consulted, but on Lord Macartney saying that he made the offer with the concurrence of the General, Baird agreed to remain, and his name appeared in orders the same day as Brigadier-General.

Not long after this Lord Mornington reached Capetown from England, on his way out to India to assume the post of Governor-General. He questioned Colonel Baird fully as to the state of affairs in India when he left it, and made many inquiries about the friction at Tanjore, but, naturally enough, he was not very communicative in return.

Colonel Baird threw all his energies into the task of training the regiments which were now under his orders, and the effects of his work are thus described by General Middlemore, who at this time was a captain in the 86th Regiment :—

“General Baird, soon after his arrival at the Cape, was appointed to the command of a brigade, composed of the 86th and the Scotch Brigade, each 1000 strong, and both remarkably fine bodies of men. This brigade he employed himself in drilling and completing on the new (Dundas’s) system.

“These young regiments required a master-hand to perfect them in discipline, and we (the 86th) had the good fortune to form part of the brigade.

“By some mischance we happened to labour under the ban of an ill name, and it must be

admitted that we felt somewhat uneasy, not to say indignant, under the constant animadversions of our superior ; but the very idea of becoming one of the Brigadier-General Baird's regiments roused us into zeal and energy. His open, manly, kind manner soon won our hearts ; and could you have seen a fine body of men, a thousand strong, levelling before them, at his command, a whole wood to form a field for exercise, you might have judged the effect of a stimulus given to exertion by the voice of authority when mingled with encouragement and approbation.

“ We were placed in a perfect wilderness, and, until he taught us first to laugh at difficulties and then to overcome them, had despaired of ever having ground to work upon ; but he instructed us how to use, and yet husband, our strength by mingling judgment with labour ; and in a week we had changed the whole face of the country, and, animated by his constant presence and his cheerful praise, had formed a regular and excellent parade, where a few days before was a forest which had stood undisturbed for ages.

“ Our intervals of labour and our time of relief from hard work and hard drills were occupied in hunting, a diversion to which our chief was extremely partial, and on these occasions we were favoured by invitations to his hospitable table.

“ Our review was excellent. The Commander-in-Chief was delighted to witness our great and rapid improvement. Nor was ours the only regiment that became perfect in order and appearance

under General Baird's care and abilities. The whole brigade was in the highest state of discipline, and every man that served in it gloried in belonging to General Baird."

Shortly after Lord Mornington left Capetown, news reached that place of the negotiations which Tipu had entered into with the French at Mauritius. This news was at once forwarded both to India and to England, and Lord Mornington and the Government at home simultaneously decided that Tipu must be instantly crushed. This intelligence reached London in June 1798, and H.M.S. *Albatross* was despatched to the Cape, bringing Baird the news that he had been promoted Major-General on 18th June, and ordering him to proceed at once to India with the Scotch Brigade, the 84th Regiment, and 200 men of the 28th Dragoons to be drafted to dragoon regiments in India. These troops sailed in September 1798, and the 86th Regiment followed five months later.

CHAPTER IV

THE FOURTH MYSORE WAR

GENERAL BAIRD reached Madras in January 1799, and found that Lord Mornington, the Governor-General, was himself at Madras, having come down from Calcutta to deal with Tipu.

At this time, in spite of many lessons, there was no permanent transport for the Indian army. When a force had to take the field, the very indifferent bullocks of the Carnatic were hastily purchased, native drivers were collected, and the army had to depend on improvised transport. The campaign of 1791 had been a notable example of the evil consequences.

In earlier days Haidar had owed his successes against the British chiefly to his superior mobility, and this was largely due to the fact that the cattle of Mysore were far better than those of the Carnatic.

Much time had been required to organise the transport, and meanwhile the army was assembled at Vellore. Here General Baird joined it, and he was given command of the 1st European Brigade, which consisted of the 12th, 74th, and 94th Regiments, and the Scotch Brigade.

The army, under the command of Lieut.-General Harris, left Vellore on 11th February, and on 9th March reached Kellamangalam in the Mysore country. Here it was joined by the Hyderabad contingent.

This force had been despatched by the Nizam, under the nominal command of Mir Alam, but it was arranged that the actual command should be held by a British officer, and General Harris selected for the appointment Colonel Arthur Wellesley of the 33rd Regiment (the Governor-General's brother).

General Baird was, not unnaturally, angry at an officer junior to himself being selected for this important appointment, and at another lieutenant-colonel also getting an independent command, so he wrote the following letter to General Harris :—

“ DEAR GENERAL,—By a conversation I had with Captain Young this morning, I was happy to learn your private sentiments with regard to myself, and to find that the reasons which have induced you to appoint a junior officer to a higher command in this army than that which I hold, were such as would have been satisfactory to me had they been publicly known. I am perfectly sensible that you have the right to select such officers as you may think proper for every service that may occur, without being obliged or expected to assign your reasons to any one, and I am the very last who would expect you to act inconsistently with your situation.

“ It must, however, appear to every one extraordinary that a major-general, sent out expressly by his Majesty to serve on the staff in India, should remain in command of three battalions, while a lieutenant-colonel serving in the same army is placed at the head of seven, or rather thirteen corps ; and, I may add, a lieutenant-colonel (Browne)

commanding a separate army, with the probability of having two of his Majesty's corps under him.

"Meer Allum's request to have the brother of the Governor-General in command of the troops under him is certainly a reason; but this is only made known to *me* privately, whilst, as the order now stands, I am apparently degraded in the eyes of the army and of my friends at home. Under these circumstances, I trust to your adopting such measures as to you may appear proper, that the real cause may be made known why Colonel Wellesley is appointed to a superior command,—I have the honour, &c.

D. BAIRD.

"To GENERAL HARRIS."

The General explained that the appointment was very largely a political one, and that in accordance with the agreement the Nizam would only pay for an officer of the rank of colonel. A few days later General Baird decided to let the matter drop, and General Harris acquiesced.

The army under General Harris's orders was now nearly 21,000 strong exclusive of the Hyderabad contingent, which was 16,000 strong, and was organised as follows :—

HYDERABAD CONTINGENT.

Colonel A. WELLESLEY.

2 battalions Bengal N.I., 4 battalions Madras N.I., and 2 companies artillery	6,836
Nizam's cavalry	6,000
Old French contingent	3,621
	<hr/>
	16,457

Also H.M.'s 33rd Regiment.

Cavalry—Major-General FLOYD.

1st Brigade—Colonel STEERMAN.

19th L.D. and 2 regiments Madras native cavalry.

2nd Brigade—Colonel PATER.

25th L.D. and 2 regiments Madras native cavalry.

884 Europeans,
<u>1757</u> Natives,
2641 N.C.O.'s and men.

Artillery—

608 N.C.O.'s and men, and 1483 gun Lascars.

Infantry—

Right Wing—Major-General BRIDGES.

1st Brigade—Major-General BAIRD.

H.M.'s 12th and 74th Regiments and Scotch Brigade.

3rd Brigade—Colonel GOWDIE.

3 battalions Madras N.I.

5th Brigade—Colonel ROBERTS.

3 battalions Madras N.I.

Left Wing—Major-General POPHAM.

2nd Brigade—Colonel SHERBROOKE.

H.M.'s 73rd and De Meuron's Regiment.

4th Brigade—Lieut.-Colonel GARDINER.¹

3 battalions Bengal N.I.

6th Brigade—Lieut.-Colonel SCOTT.

2 battalions Madras N.I.

4381 Europeans, N.C.O.'s, and men.

10,695 Natives, N.C.O.'s, and men.

Besides these, a Bombay army about 6000 strong, under Lieut.-General Stuart, was encamped on 2nd March near Peripatam.

The Bombay force was organised as follows :—

Right Brigade—Lieut.-Colonel MONTRESOR.

3 battalions Bombay N.I.

Centre Brigade—Lieut.-Colonel DUNLOP.

H.M.'s 75th and 77th, and Bombay European Regiment.

Left Brigade—Lieut.-Colonel WISEMAN.

3 battalions Bombay N.I.

European infantry and artillery, 1617

Native infantry and artillery, 4803

6420 N.C.O.'s and men.

Tipu's forces were reckoned as 33,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry, besides gunners, or about 50,000 in all.

Tipu opened the campaign by an attack on a detached brigade of the Bombay army at Siddeshwar on 5th March. Stuart marched to the relief of this brigade, and Tipu, heavily repulsed, fell back to Seringapatam.

From Kellamangalam, Harris moved towards Bangalore, and he was in sight of the latter place on 14th March. This movement, however, was only a feint.

It was vital to the success of the campaign that Tipu should be deceived, so that he could not destroy the forage. The army under General Harris and the Hyderabad contingent employed nearly 120,000 bullocks for transport purposes, and this was in addition to all the private transport of individuals, of which Colonel Wellesley wrote: "I have no scruple in declaring that the number of cattle and people in the employment of individuals was double that in the employment of the public."

On 15th March the army halted close to Bangalore, and it was not till the 21st that it reached Kankanhalli, having taken five days to cover twenty-five miles—to such a state had the transport come.

Harris reached the Maddur on 24th March, and arrived at Malvalli on the 27th. The enemy's infantry could be seen on the rising ground beyond the village, and the Mysore cavalry threatened the British right.

General Harris sent the Hyderabad contingent and the cavalry under Floyd against the enemy's right, and he himself advanced against their centre.

The enemy now withdrew, so Harris decided to camp, but while the camp was being marked out the enemy's cavalry advanced against the covering troops.

Harris now sent forward the brigades of Baird, Roberts, and Gowdie in the centre, and the Hyderabad contingent on the left, and the whole line moved forward over a low ridge. Ten thousand of the Mysore infantry now advanced against the Hyderabad contingent, but were repulsed by the 33rd Regiment, and then cut down by Floyd's cavalry.

Meanwhile another body of infantry attacked Baird's brigade. Baird sent forward three companies of the 74th, with orders to fire and fall back. The enemy swerved away, and thereupon the whole of the 74th fired and rushed forward just as a body of 300 horse charged the right of the brigade. Baird galloped forward and succeeded in stopping the

74th, while the 12th Regiment and the Scotch Brigade drove off the cavalry, who turned off towards the British right and galloped across the front, receiving the fire of five Sepoy battalions without losing a man or a horse.

Tipu now fell back, and Harris, after pursuing for two miles, returned to his camp at Malvalli.

In this action Tipu lost 1000 men killed and wounded. The British casualties were only 63 killed and wounded, of whom 40 were Europeans.

Next day Harris marched some four miles on the direct road to Seringapatam, but he decided to cross the Kaveri at Sosile, fifteen miles south-west of Malvalli, and the same distance from Seringapatam. This not only facilitated his junction with the Bombay force, but (as this move was totally unexpected by Tipu) it secured for the army a large stock of grain, several thousand head of cattle, and abundant forage.

The passage of the river took two days, and it was not till 4th April that the army took up a position within a few miles of Seringapatam, having taken five days to march twenty-eight miles.

In front of the British position was a grove of trees known as the Sultanpet Tope. This grove was intersected by deep ditches, and it was occupied by a considerable force of the enemy's rocket-men. It was decided to clear the tope, and General Baird was directed to do so with part of his brigade. He marched off at 11 P.M., but found the tope unoccupied, as the enemy had withdrawn. After scouring the tope in every direction, the General

decided to withdraw his force and return to camp. The officer who was acting as guide was confident that he knew the way, but the column had not moved far when Lieutenant Lambton of the 33rd came up to the General and told him that he could see by the stars that the column was moving north towards Seringapatam, instead of south towards camp. The General looked at his compass, and observing, as he used humorously to say, that "the stars were correct," he turned about and regained camp, surprising one of the enemy's pickets on the way.

Next day the enemy reoccupied the Sultanpet Tope, and also some other posts in front of the British left, and General Harris determined to dislodge them after nightfall.

Colonel Shawe with the 12th Regiment got possession of the post on the left, and at the same time Colonel Wellesley advanced with the 33rd Regiment to attack the Sultanpet Tope. In the darkness the 33rd fell into confusion, and the attack failed. The following account by Colonel M'Kenzie, who on this occasion commanded the light company of the 33rd, tells us what happened:—

"When the light company of the 33rd, with which Colonel Wellesley was leading the column, pushed perhaps too eagerly into the tope, they came suddenly on a work of the enemy, who opened a heavy fire upon them; the men, too much in advance, finding themselves not supported, retreated precipitately, leaving Colonel Wellesley and Captain M'Kenzie by themselves. In such a helpless and

hopeless situation, the only thing for these two individuals to do was to endeavour to regain the division, but in attempting it the darkness of the night was such that they lost their way, and it was not until they had groped about through strange ground for several hours that they alone reached the camp.

“ When they arrived, Colonel Wellesley proceeded to headquarters to report what had happened.”

Colonel Wellesley got back to camp, and reported his failure at midnight ; and the affair was summed up as follows by General Harris in his journal :—

“ *6th April 1799.*—Remained under great anxiety till near twelve at night from the fear our troops had fired on each other. Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe very soon reported himself in possession of the post ; but a second firing commenced, and as he had previously sent to know what had become of the two native battalions, I could not be satisfied but that, in the dark, they had mistaken each other. It proved that all the firing was from the enemy, his Majesty’s 12th Regiment scarcely firing a shot the whole night. Near twelve, Colonel Wellesley came to my tent in a good deal of agitation to say he had not carried the tope. It proved that the 33rd, with which he attacked, got into confusion, and could not be formed, which was a great pity, as it must be particularly unpleasant to him. Altogether, circumstances considered, we got off very well. General Baird’s expedition of last night so far answered our expectations, as he fell in with a

small party of the enemy's horse and cut up eight or ten of them, which will tend to prevent their plaguing us with rockets, I trust. He missed his road coming back, although one would have thought it impossible: no wonder night attacks so often fail."

Next morning large bodies of troops were seen coming over from the island of Seringapatam to reinforce the enemy in the tope, and also with the apparent intention of driving back Colonel Shawe.

General Harris at once prepared to support Shawe and to get possession of the tope.

The troops detailed for the latter operation were the Scotch Brigade and two battalions of Sepoys under Colonel Wellesley. Owing to bad staff-work in the adjutant-general's department, Colonel Wellesley was never warned for the duty. The result was that the troops were formed up ready for the attack, but Colonel Wellesley was absent. Several senior officers were present, including General Baird. General Harris waited a little longer, and then, fearing that the favourable opportunity would be lost, he turned to Baird and ordered him to take command and attack the tope. Baird drew his sword and rode towards the column, but had only gone a little way when General Harris called him back and said: "On further consideration, I think we must wait a little longer for Colonel Wellesley." General Baird agreed heartily with him. A few minutes later Wellesley appeared, took command, and in less than twenty minutes he had secured the tope.

This incident has been so much discussed that I think it well to insert the following statement by Colonel Meyrick Shawe as to what took place on the morning of April 6, 1799 :—

“ In the month of October 1828 I passed some days with Sir David Baird at his residence, Fernton, near Crieff, in Perthshire, and had a great deal of conversation with him relative to the campaigns of 1791 and 1792 in Mysore, when I served with him in the army under Lord Cornwallis, and also respecting the memorable campaign of 1799, when I was not present.

“ In the course of conversation I inquired whether a statement was correct, which I had not heard in India, but which had been recently circulated in this country, that he, Sir David Baird, had declined the command of the troops assembled on the morning of the 6th of April 1799 to take possession of the tope and post of Sultaunpettah, which had been attempted, without success, by Colonel Wellesley on the preceding night, and that he had represented to General Harris (who had proposed the command to him) the injustice of conferring it upon any other person than Colonel Wellesley.

“ Sir David Baird immediately replied : ‘ The statement is very incorrect, although there is a mixture of truth in it, and it is especially very unjust to Lord Harris. The facts are these. The troops destined for this service were assembled early on the morning of the 6th of April. General

Harris was on the spot on horseback, and several officers of rank, as well as myself, were present as spectators. But Colonel Wellesley was absent, although it was generally understood that he was to command the attack. We afterwards learnt that, by some accident, Colonel Wellesley was not warned for that duty, and, of course, he did not attend, but waited in his tent for the usual order or summons.

““ As the morning advanced, General Harris became impatient and apprehensive that the favourable moment for the attack would be lost by further delay, and he directed me to take the command and proceed to the attack. I certainly was surprised and embarrassed by this unexpected order, which I felt would interfere with Colonel Wellesley. But I need not remark to you, or to any soldier, that it would have been impossible for me to show any hesitation or to make any observation upon receiving an order from the Commander-in-Chief to proceed forthwith and assume an arduous and honourable service.

““ I made no reply, but drew my sword, and, turning my horse, I rode towards the column. I had not moved many paces, when General Harris called me back, and said, “ I think, upon reflection, that we must wait a little longer for Colonel Wellesley.”

““ I then expressed to General Harris, in the hearing of all around us, my great satisfaction at this determination, because I felt that it could not fail to be painful and mortifying to Colonel

Wellesley if any other person was employed to complete the operation which he had begun.

“ ‘General Harris’s mind was obviously influenced by the same reflections, when, of his own accord, he recalled me, and it is therefore unjust to ascribe to any one else whatever merit may belong to it.

“ ‘Colonel Wellesley (who, I presume, was sent for as soon as the mistake was discovered) appeared in a few moments afterwards, and, taking command of the troops, he led the attack, which in a short time was completely successful.’

“In the handwriting of MEYRICK SHAWE, Colonel.”

CHAPTER V

SERINGAPATAM, 1799

GENERAL HARRIS was now able to commence the siege of Seringapatam. On 5th April it was reported that there were rations for thirty-three days, but on the 15th the discovery was made that there were only half-rations for eighteen days more.

The Bombay army had arrived on 14th April. The General decided to attack the north-west angle of the Fort, and to hasten on the siege operations, for time was all-important. On the 16th the Bombay army crossed the Kaveri, and soon after a battery was established on the left bank of the river to enfilade the place selected for the assault.

By 27th April the besiegers had seized a water-course, which formed an excellent third parallel, and work was commenced on the breaching batteries.

The point selected for the assault was the curtain about sixty yards south of the north-west bastion of the fortress. The obelisk in memory of the siege has been set up on the battered north-west bastion itself, for the breach in the curtain was repaired after the capture of Seringapatam, but the new

piece of the wall is plainly distinguishable. Colonel Malleson laboured under the delusion that the stormers swarmed up the face of the bastion, which he aptly describes as a marvellous feat. The fact is that they entered by the breach in the curtain.

On the 2nd of May, fire was opened with twenty-nine guns and six howitzers, and by the evening of the 3rd the breach was reported practicable.

The General decided to storm the place next day, for his army was on the verge of starvation. There was only two days' rice left in camp.

General Baird had volunteered to lead the storming-party, and he received the following letter from the Adjutant-General :—

“ To Major-General Baird.

“ SIR,—You have been informed by the Commander-in-Chief that he proposes placing you in the command of the troops which are to assault the fort of Seringapatam.

“ A statement of the troops intended for this service is by his desire enclosed. He wishes the whole to be lodged in the trenches during this night, in the order detailed in the enclosure, from which you will perceive that the European flank-companies from the division under Lieutenant-General Stuart are to lead the attack.

“ Of the troops destined for the supporting-party in the trenches, the second battalion 5th Regi-

ment is to be ordered from camp. It will be on the general parade at three o'clock, and there wait to receive your orders.

“The whole of the troops for the assault will be placed under your orders this evening, and you will be pleased to direct the different corps to proceed to the trenches at such hours during the night and in such succession as will place them in the trenches agreeably to the order required a little before daybreak.

“Colonel Sherbrooke, coming on the duty of a general officer of the trenches, will be directed to obey such instructions as you may have occasion to send him relative to the movement or disposition of the troops in the trenches.

“When the whole of the troops intended for the assault have left camp, you will report on the subject to the Commander-in-Chief, who will then give you his further instructions.—I have the honour to be, sir, your very obedient servant,

“BARRY CLOSE,
“*Adj.-Gen. of the Army.*”

“HEADQUARTERS, CAMP BEFORE
“SERINGAPATAM, *May 3, 1799.*”

The force appointed for the storming-party is detailed in the following official return :—

RETURN OF THE STRENGTH OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMPOSING THE ASSAULT ON THE FORT OF
SERINGAPATAM ON THE 4TH MAY 1799.

	Lieut.-Colonel.	Majors.	Captains.	Capt.-Lieuts.	Lieuts.	Ensigns.	Adjutants.	Surgeons.	Assistant-Surgeons.	Sergeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.
HIS MAJESTY'S TROOPS.												
Flank companies of the 75th Regiment	1	...	2	...	6	1	6	6	200
" " 77th	2	...	4	...	1	1	...	8	6	200
" " Scotch Brigade	2	...	4	1	5	...	119
" " Regiment de Meuron	1	...	2	1	1	8	5	102
His Majesty's 12th Regiment	2	1	11	4	1	25	11	386
" 33rd	1	1	3	1	11	3	1	1	2	36	13	413
" 73rd	...	1	2	...	13	2	1	1	2	28	14	417
" 74th	...	1	2	...	13	3	1	24	20	403
THE HONOURABLE COMPANY'S TROOPS.												
Flank companies of the Bombay European regiment	6	8	4	200
10 " of Bengal Sepoys.	3	...	5
8 " of Coast
6 " of Bombay	1	...	4	...	4	1
Total	3	5	23	2	79	13	5	4	7	148	79	2440

N.B.—100 men not included in the above belonging to the artillery.

NATIVE TROOPS.

	Subidars.	Jemidars.	Havildars.	Naigs.	Drummers.	Sepoys.	Tindals.	Puckallys.
THE HONOURABLE COMPANY'S TROOPS.								
10 flank companies of Bengal Sepoys	900
8 companies of the coast Sepoys	8	8	33	34	16	498	...	8
6 companies of the Bombay Sepoys	30	30	6	420	...	12
Total	8	8	63	64	22	1818	...	20

British	2494	Naigs	64
Natives	1882		1882
Total	4376		
Artillery	100		
Total	4476		

This force, under General Baird's orders, was disposed of as follows :—

“Disposition of the troops ordered for the assault of the fort of Seringapatam, on the 4th of May 1799, under the command of Major-General Baird.

“Left attack, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop, to consist of six companies of European flankers from the Bombay army.

“His Majesty's 12th Regiment.

“His Majesty's 33rd Regiment.

“Ten companies of Bengal Sepoy flankers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Gardiner.

“ Fifty artillerymen, with a proportion of gun Lascars, under Captain Prescott.

“ To move in column, left in front.

“ To take possession of the cavalier close to the breach, and move along the north rampart of the fort; to proceed till they join the right attack, leaving a battalion company of the 33rd Regiment in charge of the cavalier already mentioned close to the breach, and occupying such other parts of the ramparts by detachments from the 12th and 33rd Regiments as shall be thought necessary by Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop.

“ Right attack, under Colonel Sherbrooke, to consist of four companies of European flankers from the Scotch Brigade and Regiment de Meuron.

“ His Majesty’s 73rd Regiment.

“ His Majesty’s 74th Regiment.

“ Eight companies of coast Sepoy flankers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple.

“ Six companies of Bombay Sepoy flankers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Mignard.

“ Fifty artillerymen, with a proportion of gun Lascars, under Major Bell.

“ To move in column right in front.

“ To move along the south rampart of the fort, leaving such parties as may be thought necessary by Colonel Sherbrooke from the 73rd or 74th Regiments in charge of such parts of the ramparts as he may deem it essentially necessary to occupy.

“ Half of the European and half of the native pioneers to accompany each attack with hatchets, the European pioneers to carry the scaling-ladders,

assisted by forty men from the battalion companies of each of the leading regiments ; the native pioneers to carry a proportion of fascines.

“ If the roads across the river and the breach shall be deemed sufficiently broad, the two attacks to move out to the assault at the same moment. On coming to the top of the breach they are to wheel to the right and left ; so as to get on the face they are ordered to move on, but if the road and breach are too narrow the left attack is to move out first.

“ The leading companies of each attack to use the bayonet principally, and not to fire but in cases of absolute necessity.

“ Each attack to be preceded by a sergeant and twelve volunteers, supported by a subaltern officer and twenty-five men.

“ The leading flank companies of each attack to be provided with hand-hatchets.”

The troops were all in the trenches before day-break, and as he passed along the ranks of the 73rd and 74th Regiments General Baird recognised some of the old 71st men who had been prisoners with him at Seringapatam. He reminded them that they would soon have a chance of “ paying off old scores.”

All through the morning the batteries played on the breach, and General Harris ordered the assault to take place at 1 P.M., thinking the enemy would not expect an attack to be delivered at the hottest hour of the day. Lieutenant Rowley, one of the

stormers, tells us that at one o'clock General Baird, who was in the advanced trench, drew his sword and said, "Men, are you ready?" "Yes," was the reply. "Then forward, my lads!" and the stormers rushed to the assault.

From the breach to the river was 100 yards, the Kaveri was fully 280 yards wide, and in places the water was waist-deep. A heavy fire was opened from the walls, but within six minutes the stormers had scaled the breach and the British flag was flying from the ramparts.

When Baird reached the top of the ramparts he discovered a second ditch full of water and a further work beyond it. "Good God!" cried the General, "how shall we get over this?" Fortunately Captain Goodall with a party of the 12th Regiment managed to cross the inner ditch by means of a plank, and they secured the cavalier. The stormers now divided, in accordance with their orders, and, turning right and left, secured possession of the ramparts.

The left column met with serious resistance as it made its way along the northern rampart. Tipu himself hastened to meet it, and vainly tried to make a stand. The presence of Captain Goodall and his party in the inner work was now invaluable, for they could enfilade the traverses on the outer rampart. The Mysore men were driven back, and Tipu was killed while endeavouring to regain the fort by a gate through the inner wall.

General Baird accompanied the right column, which met with less resistance. He cleared the

southern rampart, and then halted his men at the eastern cavalier till they were joined by the other column.

The whole of the ramparts were now in possession of the British, and the resistance was at an end.

While halting here, Colonel Close informed General Baird that he had just heard that Tipu had murdered the twelve grenadiers of the 33rd who were taken prisoners on the night of 5th April.

General Baird told Colonel Close to make sure if the story were true; and as he marched to the palace he informed Colonel Wallace of the 74th that, if it were true, as soon as he caught Tipu he would deliver him to the grenadiers of the 33rd to be tried for the murder of their comrades.

General Baird now sent Major Allan to demand the surrender of the palace, promising to spare the lives of all who surrendered unconditionally, but adding that if the palace was not at once surrendered it would be stormed and no quarter given.

Tipu's sons agreed to surrender the palace, but stated that they did not know where their father was. General Baird now arrived outside the palace. He accepted their surrender, and sent them to General Harris under a suitable escort. The General now set a guard over the zenana, and searched the rest of the palace for Tipu. At last a native stated that he had heard that the Sultan had been killed at the north gate. The General at once went to this gate, and after a long search the body of Tipu was discovered. The following is a contemporary

account of the death of Tipu, compiled from information furnished by his officials and servants :—

“When the Suldaun left the palace he was dressed in a light-coloured jacket, wide trowsers of fine flowered chintz, a sash of dark-red silky stuff, and a turban with one or two distinguishing ornaments. He wore his sword in a rich belt slung over his right shoulder, and a small cartridge-box hung to another embroidered belt thrown over his left shoulder ; his talisman was fastened under the jacket on his right arm, a little below the shoulder. He went out early in the forenoon, as was his custom daily, to one of the cavaliers on the outer rampart of the north face, whence he could observe what was doing on both sides. He remained there till about noon, when he took his usual repast under a pandal. It would appear that he had at that time no suspicion of the assault being so near, for when it was reported to him that our parallels and approaches were unusually crowded with Europeans, he did not express the least apprehension, nor take any other precaution but desiring the messenger to return to the west face, with orders to Meer Goffar and the troops on duty near the breach to keep a strict guard.

“A few minutes afterwards he was informed that Meer Goffar had been killed by a cannon-shot near the breach, which intelligence appeared to agitate him greatly. He immediately ordered the troops that were near him under arms, and his personal servants to load the carbines which they

carried for his own use, and hastened along the ramparts towards the breach, accompanied by a select guard and several of his chiefs, till he met a number of his troops flying before the van of the Europeans, who, he perceived, had already mounted and gained the ramparts. Here he exerted himself to rally the fugitives, and, uniting them with his own guard, encouraged them by his voice and example to make a determined stand. He repeatedly fired on our troops himself, and one of his servants asserts that he saw him bring down several Europeans near the top of the breach.

“Notwithstanding these exertions, when the front of the European flank companies of the left attack approached the spot where the Suldaun stood, he found himself almost entirely deserted, and was forced to retire to the traverses of the north ramparts. These he defended, one after another, with the bravest of his men and officers; and, assisted by the fire of his people on the inner wall, he several times obliged the front of our troops, who were pushing on with their usual ardour, to make a stand. The loss here would have been much greater on our part had not the Light Infantry and part of the battalion companies of the 12th Regiment, crossing the inner ditch and mounting the rampart, driven the enemy from them, and taken in reverse those who with the Suldaun were defending the traverses of the outer ramparts.

“While any of his troops remained with him, the Suldaun continued to dispute the ground until he approached the passage across the ditch to the gate

of the inner fort. Here he complained of pain and weakness in one of his legs, in which he had received a bad wound when very young, and, ordering his horse to be brought, he mounted ; but seeing the Europeans still advancing on both the ramparts, he made for the gate, followed by his palankeen and a number of officers, troops, and servants. It was then probably his intention either to have entered and shut the gate in order to attack the small body of our troops which had got into the inner fort, and, if successful in driving them out, to have attempted to maintain it against us, or to endeavour to make his way to the palace and there make his last stand ; but, as he was crossing to the gate by the communication from the outer rampart, he received a musket-ball in the right side, nearly as high as the breast. He, however, still pressed on, till he was stopped about half-way through the arch of the gateway by the fire of the 12th Light Infantry from within, when he received a second ball close to the other. The horse he rode on, being also wounded, sank under him, and his turban fell to the ground. Many of his people fell at the same time on every side by musketry, both from within and without the gate.

“The fallen Suldaun was immediately raised by some of his adherents and placed in his palankeen under the arch on one side of the gateway, where he lay or sat for some minutes faint and exhausted till some Europeans entered the gateway. A sergeant who has survived relates that one of the soldiers seized the Suldaun’s sword-belt, which was

very rich, and attempted to pull it off; that the Suldaun, who still held his sword in his hand, made a cut at the soldier with all his remaining strength, and wounded him about the knee, on which he put his piece to his shoulder and shot the Suldaun through the temple, when he instantly expired.

“Not less than three hundred men were killed and numbers wounded under the arch of this gateway, which soon became impassable excepting over the bodies of the dead and dying.

“About dusk General Baird, in consequence of information he had received at the palace, came with lights to the gate, accompanied by the late killadar of the fort and others, to search for the body of the Suldaun, and after much labour it was found and brought from under a heap of slain to the inside of the gate. The countenance was in no ways distorted, but had an expression of stern composure. His turban, jacket, and sword-belt were gone! But the body was recognised by some of his people who were there to be the Suldaun, and an officer who was present, with the leave of General Baird, took from off his right arm the talisman, which contained, sewed up in pieces of fine flowered silk, an amulet of a brittle metallic substance of the colour of silver, and some manuscripts in magic Arabic and Persian characters, the purport of which, had there been any doubt, would have sufficiently ascertained the identity of the Suldaun's body. It was placed on his own palankeen, and by General Baird's orders conveyed to the court of the palace, where it remained during the night, furnishing a

remarkable instance, to those who are given to reflection, of the uncertainty of human affairs. He who had left his palace in the morning a powerful, imperious Suldaun, full of vast, ambitious projects, was brought back a lump of clay ; his kingdom overthrown, his capital taken, and his palace occupied by the very man (Major-General Baird) who, about fifteen years before, had been, with other victims of his cruelty and tyranny, released from near four years of rigid confinement in irons, scarce three hundred yards from the spot where the corpse of the Suldaun now lay.

“ Thus ended the life and the power of Tippoo. It will require an able pen to delineate a character apparently so inconsistent ; but he who attempts it must not decide hastily.”

General Baird had the body taken to the palace, and then sent out parties to endeavour to restore order and suppress looting.

During the two hours of the assault it was reckoned that 10,000 Mysoreans perished. The British casualties during the assault were 69 Europeans and 12 Sepoys killed, 248 Europeans and 32 Sepoys wounded, and 4 Europeans and 2 Sepoys missing. These returns show clearly that the European troops bore the brunt of the fighting. During the whole siege operations the losses were :—

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
Officers . . .	22	45	—
Europeans . . .	181	622	22
Natives . . .	119	420	100

General Baird ordered the 74th and 33rd to pile arms in one of the courts of the palace, and he

himself lay down to rest ; but he was soon roused by reports that the town was on fire in several places, and that the camp-followers were looting. A little later it was discovered that some of the soldiers and at least one officer had broken into the treasury and were looting it.

Soon after the fall of the place General Baird sent a message to General Harris, asking that he himself and the regiments who had stormed the city might be relieved by fresh troops.

General Harris asked Major Turing, the D.A.G., who was the next officer for duty. Turing replied, "Colonel Roberts." "Then put him in orders to go," replied Harris. Turing then said, "No, sir, I have made a mistake; Colonel Wellesley is the next for duty, not Colonel Roberts." "Then let Colonel Wellesley be put in orders for the relief," said General Harris.

General Harris did not consider it practicable to relieve the troops in the town that night, so the force under Colonel Wellesley arrived on the following morning.

General Baird was exerting himself to stop the looting when Colonel Wellesley came to relieve him, and Baird returned to camp.

General Harris issued the following general orders to the army :—

"General Orders by the Commander-in-Chief.

"CAMP AT SERINGAPATAM,
"5th May 1799.

"The Commander-in-Chief congratulates the gallant army which he has the honour to command on

the conquest of yesterday. The effect arising from the attainment of such an acquisition as far exceeds the present limits of detail as the unremitting zeal, labour, and unparalleled valour of the troops surpass his power of praise. For services so incalculable in their consequences, he must consider the army as well entitled to the applause and gratitude of their country at large.

“While Lieutenant-General Harris sincerely laments the loss sustained in the valuable officers and men who fell in the assault, he cannot omit to return his thanks in the warmest terms to Major-General Baird for the decided and able manner in which he conducted the assault, and the humane measures which he subsequently adopted for preserving order and regularity in the place. He requests that Major-General Baird will communicate to the officers and men, who on that great occasion acted under his command, the high sense he must entertain of their achievements and merits.”

On the 5th of May Tipu was buried beside his father in the Lal Bagh.

That same day Colonel Wellesley was appointed Governor of Seringapatam.

Baird was furious at being again superseded by the brother of the Governor-General. He wrote as follows: “Before the sweat was dry on my brow I was superseded by an inferior officer.”

The fact is that Baird had asked to be relieved, and in the ordinary course of events Wellesley would have been relieved on the following day, but

in the meanwhile Harris had appointed him Governor of Seringapatam.

One cannot but feel that General Harris showed himself an excellent judge of character when he chose Baird to storm Seringapatam and Wellesley to administer it. Harris was Commander-in-Chief at Madras in 1797, and cannot have forgotten how Baird embroiled himself with the civil authorities at Tanjore ; so, even if Wellesley had not been present, it seems likely enough that Harris would have hesitated long before placing Baird in a position where tact and address in dealing with civilian authorities were indispensable.

CHAPTER VI

SERINGAPATAM (*continued*)

BAIRD was never the man to brook what he considered injustice to himself or others, so he at once sent to the Commander-in-Chief this report on the storming of the city and also the letter which follows it :—

“ To Lieutenant-General Harris, Commander-in-Chief, &c.

“ SIR,—Having, in obedience to your orders, taken the command of the troops ordered for the assault of the fort of Seringapatam, consisting of a corps of the six companies of European flankers from the Bombay army under Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop ; a corps of four companies of European flankers from the Scotch Brigade and the Regiment de Meuron under Colonel Sherbrooke ; his Majesty’s 12th, 33rd, and 74th Regiments ; ten companies of Bengal Sepoy flankers under Lieutenant-Colonel Mignard ; one hundred artillerymen, with a proportion of gun Lascars, under Major Bell ; the European and native pioneers under Captain Dowse—amounting, as per enclosed return of men actually under arms at the assault, to—

Firelocks	{	European	2494	} Total, 4376
		Natives	1882	

I have now the honour to report to you the measures I took to secure the success of the important object intrusted to me and the result, and to enclose a return of the killed and wounded on the assault. Having received your instructions to make the capture of the ramparts my first object, as the force under my command was not deemed sufficient to assault the ramparts and the town at the same time when defended by the whole of Tippoo's army, I directed Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop, with six companies of Bombay European flankers, supported by his Majesty's 12th and 33rd Regiments and ten companies of Bengal Sepoy flankers, with fifty artillerymen, to assault the north ramparts, and to push on with the European flank companies until he met the south attack under Colonel Sherbrooke, consisting of the flank companies of the Scotch Brigade and Regiment de Meuron, reinforced by the grenadier companies of his Majesty's 73rd and 74th Regiments, in consequence of the vigorous resistance there was reason to apprehend at the several heavy batteries on the south face of the fort; and supported by his Majesty's 73rd and 74th Regiments, eight companies of coast natives and six of Bombay native flankers, with fifty artillerymen, when the whole were directed to form on the east face until arrangements were made for the attack of such of the cavaliers as might not have already been seized, or for proceeding to the attack of the body of the place, if with the force remaining such a measure should be deemed advisable.

“The assault commenced, in obedience to your

orders, at 1 P.M. Colonels Sherbrooke and Dunlop were directed on no account to quit the inner rampart previous to their junction for any other object but that of seizing on the cavaliers in the neighbourhood of their respective attacks, and to lose no time in regaining their situation on the ramparts as soon as that object should be obtained ; and every cavalier or post on the ramparts which it might be deemed essential to secure were immediately to be occupied by a battalion company or companies from the supporting European regiments, so that the whole of the ground once captured might be secured, and the flankers, on their junction, be in full force to follow up their success by an attack on any of the cavaliers which had not fallen in their way, or by an assault on the body of the town and the palace of the Sultaun.

“ In the success of every part of this plan my warmest wishes were gratified. The whole of the ramparts and every cavalier in the fort were, in a vigorous assault of a few hours, in the possession of our troops, who were too well acquainted with the value of their conquest to render their retaining it against the whole of Tippoo’s army at all doubtful.

“ The place, therefore, being so securely our own, I was not anxious, by an immediate attack on the palace, to bring on a fresh and unnecessary slaughter ; and, indeed, the exhausted state of the gallant flankers rendered it expedient for me to halt a short time before I proceeded to the attack of the palace, which, if Tippoo was in it, there was every reason

to suppose would, if possible, be as gallantly defended as attacked.

“ During this halt two fresh battalions of Sepoys arrived, and trusting that by this time the Suldaun would see how fruitless any further resistance must prove, I requested Major Allan, deputy quarter-master-general, who had just arrived from camp, and who, from his knowledge of the language, was well qualified to execute the duty, to proceed with a flag of truce to the palace, and offer quarter to Tippoo Suldaun, and every person in his palace, on his immediate and unconditional surrender of himself and family to me ; at the same time informing him, if there was the smallest hesitation in accepting this offer, that an immediate assault on the palace would take place, and every man in it be put to the sword.

“ The grenadiers and part of the 12th Regiment, under Major Craigie, with the second battalion 9th Regiment of Sepoys, accompanied Major Allan to put this threat into immediate execution if necessary ; and I prepared the flankers, now a little recovered from their fatigues, to follow to the attack of the palace on the first signal of hostilities having recommenced (for the firing had ceased on all sides for upwards of an hour). In the meantime, I received intelligence from one of the prisoners, of whom I caused inquiry to be made, as to the place where the English soldiers who had been taken in the different assaults on the enemy's outposts during the siege were confined, that they had all been put to death, about ten days before, in the most

barbarous manner, by having nails driven through their skulls. On this, I immediately advanced with the flankers of the 74th Regiment, and the light infantry and remaining part of the 12th Regiment, resolved, if quarter had not already been granted, and the dreadful accounts of the fate of our fellow-soldiers were confirmed, to sacrifice the tyrant to their manes.

“On reaching the palace, Major Allan came out to me, and informed me he had been with Tippoo’s two youngest sons, who were ignorant where their father was, but were disposed to surrender themselves and the palace on a promise of protection. Anxious, if possible, to discover Tippoo, who, I had been informed, was certainly in the palace, I hesitated to agree to these conditions unless they would inform me where their father was, and threatened to search the most secret recesses of the palace if he was not instantly produced ; but not being able to learn from them where the Suldaun was, and wishing to get them out of the fort before it was dark, after giving them every assurance of protection and kind treatment, I sent them off to you under charge of Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew, your public secretary, and Captain Marriott, your aide-de-camp, escorted by the light infantry company of his Majesty’s 33rd Regiment. The palace was thus taken possession of without opposition.

“I now proceeded to search the palace, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Close and Major Allan, taking care, however, to avoid the zenana, round which I had posted a sufficient force to make his

escape from it impracticable. In the palace we found a man who, on being severely threatened, said that the Suldaun was killed in attempting to escape through the northern sally-port, and offered to conduct us to the body. We accordingly proceeded thither, and under a slaughtered heap of several hundreds, many of whom were men of consequence in his service, had the pleasure to discover the body of the Suldaun. He had been shot through the head and body, and was quite dead. I caused him to be immediately put into a palankeen and conveyed to the palace, where the body was identified by some of the principal men who had fallen into our hands, and by two of the eunuchs belonging to his harem.

“ I now proceeded to give such protection to the inhabitants as was in my power ; and, although it was by this time dark, as I have heard no complaints of outrage or insult being offered to any after the conflict ceased, I think I may venture to say the natives of India will be satisfied that the British soldiers are not more brave than humane.

“ Early the next morning Abdul Khalick, the second son of Tippoo, and the elder of the two who were delivered to Lord Cornwallis as hostages at the conclusion of the last war, was met by Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple coming from the island to deliver himself up. He was immediately assured of protection and the most liberal treatment, and I went to meet him, to show him how much satisfied I was with the confidence he placed in us, by thus delivering himself into our hands when the means of escape were perfectly in his power. Having

been led to expect you in the fort yesterday morning, I waited with Abdul Khalick to deliver him into your own hands, but, on being relieved by Colonel Wellesley, I proceeded with him to camp, and delivered him over to you.

“I perceive in the general order of yesterday that no mention is made of Colonel Sherbrooke. This, I presume, is owing to that order being published before I had time to make any report to you of the conduct of the troops under my command in the assault, which was highly exemplary throughout; and if, where all behaved nobly, it is proper to mention individual merit, I know no man so justly entitled to praise as Colonel Sherbrooke, to whose exertions I feel myself much indebted for the success of the attack.

“I make no doubt Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop, who commanded a party of equal force with that of Colonel Sherbrooke, would have merited equal praise for his exertions, had he not, most unfortunately, been disabled by a wound very early in the assault—a circumstance I most sincerely regretted, as, from the well-known character of that officer, and the clear manner in which he understood the instructions I gave him relative to the attack he was to lead, I felt the greatest confidence in its success.—I have the honour to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

“ D. BAIRD.

“CAMP, SERINGAPATAM,
“6th May 1799.”

“ To Lieutenant-General Harris, Commander-in-Chief, &c.

“ SIR,—Having, in a letter which I had this morning the honour to address to you, given a detailed account of the assault of the fort of Seringapatam, the conduct of which you did me the honour to intrust to me, permit me now, sir, to address you on the subject of the events which have taken place since that time.

“ Having been honoured with the conduct of the assault, and having executed that duty to your satisfaction, I naturally concluded that I should have been permitted to retain the command of Seringapatam, or, at least, that I should not be superseded in it by a junior officer. Judge, then, my surprise, when expecting to have the honour of delivering to you the keys of Seringapatam, in the palace of the late Tippoo Sultaun, and of congratulating you on the most brilliant victory that ever graced the British arms in India, to have an order put into my hands by Colonel Wellesley, by which I found myself instantly superseded in the command by that officer. I am really ignorant what part of my conduct could merit such treatment.

“ When, on a former occasion, Colonel Wellesley was appointed to the command of the detachment serving with his Highness the Nizam, while I remained in charge of a brigade, you informed me that matters of a political nature made it necessary to have that officer with the Nizam’s army. Although I severely felt the appointment of a junior

officer to so distinguished a command, while I remained in an inferior station, I submitted to the necessity which you informed me dictated this measure ; but this second supercession I feel most sensibly, as it must have the effect of leading his Majesty and the Commander-in-Chief in England to believe that I am not fit for any command of importance, when it has been thought proper to give the command of Seringapatam to Colonel Wellesley, while he at the same time continues to hold the command of the Nizam's detachment.

“ In camp it is rumoured to have been at my own request that another officer was appointed to the command of Seringapatam ; you, sir, must know that this is not the case. The request, if made, must have been made by me to you ; and, so far from its ever having been my intention to make such a request, if (after the assurances I have repeatedly received from you, that you would take the first opportunity of placing me in a situation more adequate to the rank I hold than that of the command of a brigade), I had deemed it necessary to make any request to you, it would have been to be placed in the command of Seringapatam ; and when I reflected that my two seniors, belonging to the coast army, continued to stand appointed to the northern and southern divisions of the Carnatic, and that the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, the next junior to me, stood appointed to the command of an *army*, while I remained in charge of a *brigade*, I should have felt that I was hinting a doubt, which I never entertained, of the sincerity of those assurances, if I had

made a particular application for the command of Seringapatam—indeed, I could not think it necessary.

“Some mistake may have arisen from my having, through Major Beatson, expressed a desire that the whole storming party might be relieved from camp, so that order might be established, and troops more equal to take the fatigue of guard-mounting during the night be placed in the fort; and I wished to be relieved for a short time that I might myself have had the honour of reporting our success, and informing you in person of every particular relative to the storm. This not having been found convenient, I desired Captain Young, deputy adjutant-general of his Majesty’s troops, who was proceeding to camp at daylight next morning, to inform you that, as I was much recovered from the fatigues of the preceding day, I wished not to be relieved till I had examined the state of the works and ascertained the number of cannon captured. I received a letter from Captain Young, long before Colonel Wellesley superseded me, informing me that he had made my request known to you.

“I cannot but feel obliged by your having enabled me to act so distinguished a part in the storm, though I find so little attention has, in every other instance, been paid to my requests, that I am almost led to believe my being employed on that occasion was owing to my being the only officer of rank who had made a voluntary offer of his services.

“I request that copies of this letter may be transmitted to his Royal Highness the Duke of

York, Commander-in-Chief, for the information of his Majesty, that, at the same time he is informed of my having been twice superseded by Colonel Wellesley, he may be in possession of such reasons as you shall think proper to give for it, that he may be satisfied the measure was dictated by necessity, and not by any want of capacity on my part to fill the situation.—I have the honour, &c.,

“ D. BAIRD.

“CAMP, SERINGAPATAM,
“6th May 1799.”

To this remarkable letter he received the following reply :—

“ *To Major-General Baird, &c. &c.*

“CAMP, SERINGAPATAM,
“8th May.

“ SIR,—The Commander-in-Chief directs me to inform you that he has this day received from Major-of-Brigade Falconer your report of the assault intrusted to your conduct on the 4th instant, and that, ever ready to do justice to the merits of officers under his command, he is happy in the occasion you have given him for taking particular notice of the conduct of Colonel Sherbrooke.

“ I am also directed to acknowledge the receipt of the very improper letter which accompanied your report.

“ The distinguished command for which you were selected by the Commander-in-Chief, and the sentiments he has so publicly and recently expressed on that occasion, sufficiently mark what was his

sense of your military merit ; and it is with regret that he now finds himself compelled to blame a total want of discretion and respect in an officer of your high rank and length of service, in terms so opposite to those in which he was lately so happy to applaud your gallantry, humanity, and zeal.

“ Lieutenant-General Harris is persuaded that an officer who thinks himself authorised to remonstrate with his immediate superior can never be usefully employed in the army he commands. Should you, therefore, continue to hold sentiments so opposite to the principles of military subordination, you have his permission to proceed by the first safe conveyance to Fort St. George.

“ The Commander-in-Chief will certainly forward to his Royal Highness the Duke of York copies of your letter and his reply.—I have the honour to be, sir, your very obedient servant,

“ (Signed) P. A. AGNEW,
 “ *Mil. Sec. to the Commander-in-Chief.*”

General Baird now wrote as follows :—

“ SIR,—I yesterday received a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew, your public secretary, which has created in me the greatest astonishment.

“ Conceiving myself injured, and my military character in some degree impeached, in the repeated preference that has been shown to my junior, the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, in nominating him to distinguished commands, while I, serving with the same army, was still left in my original situation

of commandant of a brigade; and feeling, as I conceived every military man in a similar situation would have felt, on being superseded by the same officer in the command of the important fortress of Seringapatam, I thought it due to my own character to address you on that subject, and I can safely affirm that, in that address, it was my firm intention to make to you the most respectful statement of facts.

“On the receipt of your secretary’s letter, I again and again perused the one I had had the honour to address to you, and, after every attempt, must acknowledge myself unable to discover one paragraph, or even one word, which can be construed into the smallest disrespect. God knows, such an idea was the farthest from my thoughts. I, therefore, feel with double sensibility the unmerited asperity of your secretary’s letter, which I can hardly bring myself to believe to contain your real sentiments. If, however, I am wrong in this conjecture, I trust you will enable me to clear myself before a general court-martial, from which I can have nothing to fear, being satisfied in my own mind that there is not an officer in this, or any, army who more abhors the crime of which I stand accused.

“It was my intention, from the moment I was superseded in the command of Seringapatam, to apply for permission to quit the army, as soon as I deemed my services to my King and country no longer required my remaining with it. My wish is still to do so, and I shall, when there is no longer

an appearance of the army's being actively employed, make an application to you to that effect. If, however, you should still persevere in your determination of ordering me from the army, in consequence of the respectful representation I have thought myself authorised to make to you, I shall, in that case, only have to regret the necessity there will be for making my removal from the army, and the circumstances which occasioned it, equally public. (Signed) D. BAIRD."

This correspondence was brought to a close by the following letter :—

"To Major-General Baird, &c. &c.

"SIR,—The Commander-in-Chief has received your letter of the 9th instant, and directed me to inform you in reply that the explanation therein given has produced no change in the sentiments expressed by his order on the 7th instant, in my letter to you.

"It was not the words, but the tenor of your letter of the 6th instant that the Commander-in-Chief thought it his duty to remark. He never can admit the right of any subordinate officer to remonstrate with him on the propriety of measures he has adopted for the public service, or on his selection of officers for situations of public trust. In assuming this privilege, he still thinks that you have been wanting in discretion and respect; and your letter of yesterday has in a great measure removed

the concern he felt at the necessity which obliged him to inform you that such were his opinions.

“Lieutenant-General Harris desires that this letter may conclude a correspondence which you are at liberty to make as public as you think proper.—I have the honour to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

“(Signed) P. A. AGNEW,
“*Mil. Sec. to the Commander-in-Chief.*”

“SERINGAPATAM,
“*10th May 1799.*”

In a few days General Baird expressed his regret to General Harris at the tone he had adopted in his letters, and General Harris accepted the apology and cancelled the entire correspondence. The whole unfortunate incident would have been buried in oblivion had not Mr. Hook, in his *Life of General Baird*, dragged the correspondence to light, and used it to make a violent attack on General Harris and Lord Mornington.

Meanwhile, Colonel Wellesley had found Tipu's State sword in the palace. This he sent with a polite note to General Baird. The Prize Committee heard of this, and requested that the sword might be delivered to them, so that General Harris might present it to Baird in the name of the army.

The presentation took place on 8th June, and the event is thus described by General Harris in his journal :—

“*8th June.*—Delivered to Major-General Baird the sword voted to him by the Prize Committee. I

had directed officers commanding wings, brigades, and corps to meet me at my tent, when I addressed them nearly as follows :—

“ ‘Gentlemen, I have assembled this very respectable meeting on an occasion which I have no doubt will give equal pleasure to us all. The Prize Committee, of which Major-General Floyd is president, have requested me to present to Major-General Baird, in the name of the army, the sword of Tippoo Sultaun, found in his bed-chamber on the day the tyrant fell, with an extract of their proceedings.’ The extract I then read, and, taking the sword from Scott (my aide-de-camp), said: ‘Major-General Baird, I have now the pleasure to present you the sword you have so honourably obtained, and most sincerely wish you long to wear it.’ He was too much agitated to make any connected answer.”

In the evening General Baird sent to the Commander-in-Chief a letter, of which the following is an exact copy :—

“ To Lieutenant-General Harris, Commander-in-Chief.

“CAMP NEAR SERINGAPATAM,
“8th June 1799.

“SIR,—From the state of my feelings this morning I really was incapable of making any reply to the distinguished honour which the army has been pleased to present to me through you, and which I receive with the utmost gratitude and respect. To know that I possess the good opinion

of this gallant army is most gratifying to my feelings, particularly so, as it ensures that of my King and country, which is the highest ambition of a soldier.

“Permit me to return you my warmest thanks for the very handsome manner in which you expressed yourself to me on that occasion; and I request you will have the goodness to forward these my sentiments to Major-General Floyd, President of the Committee of Prize.—I have the honour to be, sir, with the utmost respect, your obedient servant,
“D. BAIRD, *Major-General.*”

A few days before this, on the anniversary of the King's birthday, Major-General Baird received the following letter from the senior officer who served under him in the storming party:—

“*To Major-General Baird.*”

“SIR,—I am requested by the field officers who had the honour of personally serving under you at the storming of Seringapatam, on the 4th ultimo, to inform you that they have ordered Messrs. Jeffreys and Jones to make a dress sword, value two hundred guineas, bearing the following inscription: ‘SERINGAPATAM, taken by storm the 4th May 1799,’ on one side, and on the other, ‘Presented by the field officers who personally served under Major-General Baird on that occasion,’ which they beg you will do them the honour of accepting as a mark of their esteem, and of their admiration of your personal exertions on that day. Jeffreys and Jones

have been directed to send out the sword by the earliest conveyance, and we hope you will receive it before the anniversary of the capture.—I have the honour to be, with respect, sir, your obedient servant,

“ J. C. SHERBROOKE, *Colonel.*”

“ CAMP, 4th June 1799.”

To which General Baird returned the following answer :—

“ SIR,—I have been favoured by your obliging letter, informing me of the honourable testimony of their approbation intended to be presented to me by the field officers who served in the successful and glorious assault of Seringapatam ; and I beg you to assure them that this distinguished mark of the favourable opinion and esteem of those excellent officers, whose gallant exertions secured the memorable victory of that day, will ever be regarded by me as a recompense of the highest value.—I have the honour to be, sir, with the utmost respect,

“ D. BAIRD.”

When Lord Mornington wrote his despatch about the fall of Seringapatam to Mr. Dundas, the Secretary of State, he referred to General Baird as follows :—

“ It is impossible to bestow too much commendation on the conduct of Major-General Baird in the assault of Seringapatam. A more judicious operation, conducted with more heroic gallantry

and spirit, never was achieved; and when you recollect the decisive consequences of the success of that day, effecting within the course of two hours the entire destruction of our most formidable enemy in India, I am persuaded you will concur with me in an anxious solicitude to see the gallant leader of the assailants of Tippoo Suldaun's capital rewarded in a manner suitable to his exertions, and to their beneficial effect. I have made it my particular business to inquire into Major-General Baird's circumstances, and I have ascertained that they are by no means affluent; it would therefore be a peculiar satisfaction to me if the East India Company should exercise their known liberality in this case. When it is remembered that in the course of active and arduous service during the former war he fell into the hands of Tippoo Suldaun, and suffered a long and cruel imprisonment in the dungeons of that fortress, which, on the 4th of May 1799, submitted to his irresistible valour and skill, I am persuaded that his claim to public reward and honour will be deemed peculiarly interesting and powerful. I should also hope that his extraordinary merits on the 4th May would induce his Majesty to consider him as a proper object for the Order of the Bath. I enclose a letter from Major-General Baird, which reflects the highest credit on his sentiments of honour and public spirit."

On 4th October votes of thanks were passed in both Houses of Parliament to Major-General Baird and the other soldiers who distinguished themselves

at Seringapatam. When moving the resolution in the House of Commons, Mr. Dundas spoke as follows :—

“ With regard to the military, I can only say that, from the highest of them to the lowest of them, they vied with each other in doing service to their country—to all of whom a proper acknowledgment should be made by this House. But I cannot help observing here the great praise that is due to General Baird for his brave conduct in the storming of Seringapatam. It is singular that this heroic officer was upwards of three years in imprisonment by order of the very tyrant whose barbarity in this instance he was the instrument of Providence to avenge.”

The Governor-General, when enclosing to General Baird a copy of the vote of thanks, wrote to him as follows :—

“ FORT WILLIAM,
“ 6th February 1800.

“ SIR,—In obedience to the commands of the House of Commons of Great Britain, I have the honour to transmit you a copy of their resolutions of the 4th of October 1799.

“ It is a peculiar satisfaction to me to be employed to signify to you, in the name of the Commons of Great Britain, their sanction of those sentiments of applause and approbation which it has been my duty to express in public orders on various occasions during the progress and since the termination of the late glorious war in Mysore.

“ I have the honour to enclose a copy of the

letter from the Speaker of the House of Commons, which accompanied the resolution.

“ With the most grateful and cordial sense of your distinguished and meritorious services, I remain, sir, your faithful and humble servant,

“ MORNINGTON.”

The campaign had been crowned with brilliant success, yet absolutely no honours were conferred at the time on Harris, Stuart, Baird, Floyd, Colonel Wellesley, or any one else. It was not till sixteen years later that General Harris was rewarded by a belated peerage. In the meantime, so far from conferring upon him any mark of esteem, the East India Company tried to deprive the Commander-in-Chief of that share of the prize-money which had been allotted to him by the Governor-General.

CHAPTER VII

THE RED SEA

WHEN General Baird reached Madras he met with a most flattering reception from the Governor-General, who had just been created the Marquess Wellesley. The Governor-General even asked him to state what command he would like to have. Baird replied that as he understood that General Floyd was very shortly going home, he should like to succeed him in the command of the Southern Division of the Madras army. To this request the Governor-General answered that that command was in the gift of the Madras Government, and that General Baird had better apply to Lord Clive for it; at the same time he suggested that it would be better for Baird to accompany him to Bengal and accept a command there.

The General thought that there was more chance of seeing service in the Madras Presidency. Besides, he knew this part of India well, whereas he would be a complete stranger in Bengal. So he applied to the Madras Government for the Southern Division. This application was refused, so Baird now followed the Governor-General to Calcutta. He was well received, and given the only vacant command in the Bengal Presidency—at Dinapore.

General Baird remained at Dinapore for more

than a year. While here he heard from his friends in Madras that an expedition was being fitted out, and that rumour said it was intended for the conquest of Batavia and Mauritius. The General wrote to Sir Alured Clarke, the Commander-in-Chief, and applied for the command of this expedition. Sir Alured stated in reply that the Governor-General had taken into his own hands all appointments in connection with the expedition, but he gave Baird leave of absence to go and see the Marquess Wellesley at Calcutta on the subject.

Sir David at once hastened to Calcutta, and urged his claims to the command in a somewhat stormy interview with the Governor-General, and next day he was informed that his application was granted.

The troops detailed for the expedition were the 10th, 19th, and 80th Regiments, with detachments from the 86th and 88th, a corps of Bengal native volunteers, and two companies of European and native artillery. The troops were assembled at Trincomalee, and the objectives were Java and Mauritius.

Major-General Baird was appointed to the command, with Colonel Wellesley as his second-in-command. The Governor-General directed that the force should first proceed to Batavia, and that when that place was completely in our possession (probably by 30th March), Sir David was to remain there as Lieutenant-Governor, and Colonel Wellesley was then to proceed with as many troops as could be spared to the capture of Mauritius.

On February 5, 1800, Major-General Baird embarked on the *Phœnix* in the Saugar Roads, but on the very next day all arrangements were upset by the arrival at Calcutta of this despatch from Mr. Dundas :—

“To Marquess Wellesley.

“DOWNING STREET,
“6th October 1800.

“MY LORD,—By the private letter I received from your lordship, No. 25, dated the 5th of March last, and the communications I have since had with Major-General Stewart, I am apprised that the subject of annoying the French army in Egypt, from the Red Sea, has been under your consideration. For that reason, and because I concur in your lordship’s sentiments, as stated in the letter above-mentioned, I feel it the less necessary to enter into any details in this despatch, which cannot, indeed, be extended to any great length, as it is to be forwarded overland. I shall, therefore, confine myself to shortly stating to your lordship that Sir Ralph Abercrombie has received his Majesty’s orders to proceed up the Mediterranean, and, by an attack on Alexandria and the coast, to co-operate with the Turkish army assembling in Syria, in whatever plan may be concerted with them for expelling the French army from Egypt ; and that it is thought expedient that a force should also be sent from India to act in such manner as may appear conducive to that essential object, from the side of the Red Sea. With this view, Captain

Sir Home Popham, with a proper squadron, will be immediately sent into that sea, taking with him a regiment from the Cape of Good Hope. His first rendezvous will be the port of Mocha. I enclose for your information the letter I have written to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the subject of the expedition under his command, and I am to signify to your lordship his Majesty's pleasure that a force of about 1000 Europeans and 2000 native infantry is to be sent from India to the proposed place of rendezvous in the Red Sea, with as little delay as possible, to co-operate with Sir Home Popham in the object of his instructions. The command of these troops should be given to some active and intelligent officer, and care should be taken that they be furnished with every necessary requisite for such a service. I have thought it right to send a copy of this despatch to the governors of Fort St. George and Bombay. To the latter it is necessary, because Bombay is the most proper place from whence to send the proposed force; but I have thought it likewise proper to send it to Fort St. George, in case, upon a full consideration of the places where the force upon the two coasts is at present stationed, it should appear to that Presidency expedient to make any new arrangement of any part of the army under their Presidency, in order to enable the Bombay Government to detach the requisite force from their coast without any real inconvenience to the territories under their own immediate charge.

“ I have directed these two Presidencies to pro-

ceed in making these preparations without delay, and even to carry these orders into execution without waiting for your lordship's directions, if they are ready in other respects.

“ If nothing unforeseen occurs to prevent or to retard it, I hope that the armament under Sir Ralph Abercrombie will reach the coast of Egypt in the month of December, and that Sir Home Popham may arrive in the Gulph of Arabia in the month of February. It is, therefore, earnestly recommended that the forces from India may join him as soon after as possible. For this reason it will be desirable that you should not wait till the troops are all collected, if it will save time to forward them in two or three distinct detachments.—I have the honour to be, &c. &c.,

HENRY DUNDAS.”

Lord Wellesley at once wrote the following letter to General Baird :—

“ To Major-General Baird.

“ FORT WILLIAM,
“ 6th February 1801.

“ MY DEAR GENERAL,—I was upon the point of sealing my instructions, and of dispatching them to you by express this morning, when I received despatches, overland from England, which will probably render it necessary for me to make some essential variations in the objects of the armament which I have equipped. No change, however, can take place which will deprive you of a respectable and active command.

“ As much time would be lost by your returning

to Calcutta, I desire that you will remain on board the *Phœnix*, and urge the captain to make every necessary preparation for sailing. In the course of this day I hope to be able to decide the precise nature of such variations as the recent intelligence from Europe will require in my plans. I therefore entertain little doubt that you will receive your sailing orders within eight-and-forty hours after the receipt of this despatch.—I have the honour to be, my dear General, with great esteem, your faithful servant,

WELLESLEY.”

The destination of the expedition was now changed to Egypt, and the scope of the proposed operations is fully explained in the following despatch from Mr. Dundas to the Lords of the Admiralty :—

“DOWNING STREET,
“6th October 1800.

“MY LORDS,—It being judged expedient that measures should forthwith be taken for dispossessing the French of Kosseir, Suez, and any other ports and places they may now occupy upon the coast of the Red Sea, and to encourage the inhabitants of the countries bordering on that part of Egypt to assist in expelling them from the whole of that province, I am commanded to signify to your lordships his Majesty’s pleasure that a ship of war of not less than fifty guns, together with such armed troopships as may be competent to the accommodation and conveyance of a regiment of not less than 800 men, destined to assist in this service, are

forthwith to be fitted for foreign service, and sent to the Cape of Good Hope, where the said regiment is to be embarked.

“It will also be necessary that the troopships in question should, in the first instance, convey another regiment, amounting to at least the same number of men, from this country to the Cape; and it is therefore his Majesty’s pleasure that your lordships should give directions and make the necessary arrangements accordingly.

“Your lordships will not fail to select for this service an officer of acknowledged enterprise and ability; and, with respect to the instructions with which he is to be furnished from your lordships, it is his Majesty’s pleasure that, after receiving on board the regiment which the commanding officer at the Cape will be ordered to embark, he should be directed to make the best of his way into the Red Sea, and on his arrival there to endeavour to procure intelligence respecting the number of the enemy at Kosseir and Suez, and the state of defence of each of those places. Should the reports he may receive on this point be such as, in his judgment, and that of the officer commanding the land forces, to warrant an immediate landing and attack on one or both places, no time is to be lost in making the attempt; and should it prove successful, they are to make the best arrangements in their power for retaining possession of the same. As soon as in this, or in any other manner, a secure footing shall have been obtained in the country, or sooner, if possible, every proper method is to be used to

conciliate the inhabitants to our interests, and to induce them to make common cause against the enemy. In order to enable them to do this with more effect, it will probably be necessary to supply them with arms and ammunition; and I shall therefore give orders that a certain proportion of side-arms, muskets, and cartridges shall be sent on board the ships of the squadron with a view to this object.

“Supposing the enemy to be driven from Suez, Kosseir, and the whole coast, it will then remain for the respective officers of the land and sea forces to take every method in their power for harassing and annoying them in any other posts they may retain in Upper Egypt, and to prevail upon the Arabs, the Mamelukes, and other troops in that part of the country, to act against the French, wherever they may take post, with union and vigour, until they can be finally expelled from Cairo and the remainder of the province, giving the beys, or other officers having command in those countries, such advice and assistance as may appear best adapted for that purpose. Upon this point, as well as upon every other which relates to the mode and detail of proceeding in the execution of the services I have pointed out as the objects of this expedition, much latitude must be left to the discretion and judgment of the commanding officers; and it is therefore impossible for me to do more than point out, as I have already done, the views for the attainment of which the plan has been formed; and to add that they are to be pursued with the

utmost vigour, and by every means that may suggest themselves to the ingenuity of the commanding officers, provided only they are not inconsistent with those usages which are deemed fair and honourable between nations in a state of war.

“It is intended that the land forces to be sent from the Cape should be reinforced as soon as possible by another regiment of Europeans and about 2000 Sepoys from India. It will be right that the commanding naval officer should be apprised of this circumstance, in order that he may suspend until their arrival the proposed attacks against Kosseir and Suez, unless the prospect of success with the regiment from the Cape is so satisfactory as to warrant the attempt without waiting for a further reinforcement.

“Should this last division of troops, on the other hand, find our forces in possession of Suez and Kosseir, they will be employed from thence in making diversions in Upper Egypt, and in annoying and harassing the enemy as much as possible, in conformity to the suggestions already mentioned in these instructions.

“In the event (not impossible) of the French having actually evacuated Egypt before the arrival of the expedition in the Red Sea, the troops must be carried back to their former stations; and the ships, in that case, may be disposed of for such other purposes as your lordships may think proper. But should Kosseir and Suez be retaken from the enemy by his Majesty's forces, the one or the other, as may appear most commodious for the troops and

shipping, is for the present, and until further orders can be transmitted from this country, to be retained by a detachment of his Majesty's forces. The commanding officer, however, taking care, in order to avoid all jealousies, to have it understood that he remains there, not from any intention of interfering with the right of sovereignty vested in the Ottoman Porte, or with the rights and privileges of the native princes or their subjects, but that from considerations of military precaution, with a view to our Indian interests, which cannot appear extraordinary after what has happened, the British troops cannot be withdrawn without further authority from home.

"Your lordships will not fail to direct the commanding naval officer, and through him all other officers serving under him, to maintain and cultivate the friendship and good understanding now existing with the native princes and powers of Asia having ports or territories upon the coast of the Red Sea.

"You will also direct the said officer to transmit a detailed report of his proceedings, by every opportunity, for his Majesty's information; and to correspond with the Company's governor at Bombay, and with the Governor-General in council, who will give the necessary directions to furnish him with any supplies of which he may stand in need, and to pay every attention to such requisitions as he may make for the advancement of the service on which he is employed.

"HENRY DUNDAS."

It is clear that the Governor-General was somewhat uneasy lest there should be friction between his brother and Baird, and he wrote the following letter to the General :—

“ To Major-General Baird.

“ FORT WILLIAM,

“ 10th February 1801.

“ MY DEAR GENERAL,—You will find by your instructions of this date that your present destination is to the Red Sea and Egypt, for the purpose of co-operating in the great object of expelling the French from that most important position. A more worthy sequel to the storm of Seringapatam could not be presented to your genius and valour. I have chosen my brother to second you in this glorious enterprise ; and I rely on your giving the public the full benefit of his talents, by admitting him to your cordial confidence, and by uniting most harmoniously and zealously with him in the prosecution of my wishes.

“ I have manifested an honourable confidence in you by selecting you for this service, which, if successful, will attract the applause and admiration of the whole world. In return, I claim from you the full benefit for myself and my country, not only of your services, but of those of my brother, and of all the gallant and able officers whom he has brought with him into the army. I desire that you will arrange some mode of confirming in active and honourable stations the whole of his staff, and of those who have accompanied him.

“ I recommend it to you also to employ Lieutenant-Colonel Murray of the 84th, whom I shall send to Mocha ; he has been active, and has manifested ability at Suez and Aden. I also recommend Captain Wilson, aide-de-camp to Mr. Duncan, on the same grounds of experience in the affairs of Arabia and Egypt.

“ May the same providential protection which accompanied you to the gates of Tippoo Suldaun’s palace conduct you to Cairo ; and may you be the happy instrument of completing the expulsion of the French from India : a work so nobly commenced in Mysore. Remember that the harmony and cordial union of our counsels in the field were the main sources of all our triumphs in that glorious war, which has rendered your name memorable in the annals of your country. For the rest, I have no apprehension ; and I trust you will preserve my favourable opinion by preserving unanimity in your army.—Believe me, my dear General, your obliged friend and faithful servant,

“ WELLESLEY.”

In his reply Baird assured the Governor-General that he would do everything in his power to promote and maintain harmony in the army under his command, and that he had a sincere regard for Colonel Wellesley.

Baird left the mouth of the Hoogly on 14th February. He arrived at Trincomalee only to find that Colonel Wellesley had gone on to Point de Galle. When Baird reached Point de Galle on the 27th, he

learnt that Wellesley had left for Bombay on the 19th. Baird himself reached Bombay on 31st March, and there he overtook his second-in-command. Meanwhile the 19th Regiment had been retained in Ceylon. When the General arrived in Bombay, he found that, thanks to the exertions of the Governor and of Colonel Wellesley, some of the transports were nearly ready for sea, and six of them sailed before 3rd April with sealed orders under the command of Colonel Beresford.

On 3rd April Colonel Wellesley had another severe attack of the fever from which he had suffered at Trincomalee, and on the 5th (the date which General Baird had fixed for the embarkation) he was pronounced by the doctors unfit to accompany the force. Next morning General Baird left Bombay for the Red Sea, and he arrived at Mocha on the 25th.

On his arrival he learnt that the Bombay detachment had left on the 12th under Colonel Ramsay, and that Colonel Murray had sailed for Jedda on the 17th. Colonel Beresford with his detachment had arrived on the 21st and sailed again next day.

Baird now became very uneasy lest Murray and Beresford should make a premature attack on Kosseir, and he at once sent orders to them not to do so, but to wait at Jedda until he arrived with Colonel Montresor's detachment.

The difficulties in the matter of providing transport for the army are well shown in the following despatch which the General wrote to Lord Wellesley :—

“When I was at Bombay, Governor Duncan informed me of the very high expectations he had from the abilities and exertions of Mehedi Ali Khan in the present service, and recommended him to me in the strongest manner. On my arrival, the Khan came on board and explained his reasons for not wishing to proceed to Jedda ; since which I have had several conversations with him, and being convinced that every possible effort should be made to bring over the Sheriff of Mecca to our interest, or at least to be on friendly terms with us, I have with some difficulty prevailed upon Mehedi Ali to accompany me.

“From the present disposition of the Sheriff of Mecca towards the British cause, no assistance is to be expected from Jedda. I am given to understand that he has positively forbidden the pilots along the coast to carry any of our ships into that port ; and a number of dhows from this, with horses and forage for the army, are detained at Hodeida on that account. It is also reported here that Admiral Blankett has had some disagreement with the Sheriff. I have, however, to hope that through the good offices of Mehedi Ali Khan we shall yet be able to procure some assistance from him.

“Your Excellency is to be apprised that at this moment *there is not one camel with any part of the army*, and should those which Ali Khan has commissioned from this country not leave Mocha prior to the 20th of May, there is every reason to believe that from the lateness of the season they will not reach Kosseir in time to be of any use to the army.

It is also to be presumed, from the influence of the French, that the Arabs in the neighbourhood of Kosseir will be hostile to our cause, and that camels there will not be procurable at any rate.

“From these circumstances it follows that no movement of the army (in the event of the capture of Kosseir) can be possibly undertaken for a considerable lapse of time, unless the enemy have met with a check in Lower Egypt, and the communication is opened with some of the native beys, the Turkish, or Sir Ralph Abercrombie’s army.

“Of the total impossibility of an army attempting to march across the desert from Kosseir to Ghenna, a distance of 120 miles, without the requisite number of camels, your Excellency must be fully aware ; and I beg leave to enclose an estimate of the probable number of camels sufficient to enable an army of four thousand fighting men, and a thousand Lascars as followers, to perform the above march in twelve days.”

General Baird was compelled, in consequence of the lateness of the season, to relinquish all hope of getting to Suez by sea, and he had grave doubts as to the practicability of moving his army across the desert to the Nile. Moreover, the information which he received from Colonel Murray was vague and uncertain.

On 28th April Colonel Montresor reached Mocha with his detachment in safety, but the weather became rough and it was very difficult to water the ships.

Meanwhile news was received that a large fleet had sailed from France for Mauritius preparatory to an attack upon us in India. The General now thought it not unlikely that the campaign in Egypt would be abandoned, and that he would be ordered to capture Mauritius before the arrival of the French fleet.

It was clearly of the utmost importance, if the operations in Egypt were not to be given up, to conciliate the Sheriff of Mecca so as to obtain his assistance in getting the camels which alone could enable the march across the desert to be performed.

On 18th May Baird reached Jedda, where he learnt that Murray had not received his orders, and had sailed for Suez. Baird could not follow him at once, for it was absolutely necessary to remain and water the ships. On the evening of 18th May the General received from Admiral Blankett a despatch announcing the victory of 21st March and the death of Sir Ralph Abercrombie.

Next day Baird had a satisfactory interview with the Sheriff of Mecca, who promised to assist him in getting camels and horses.

Just as General Baird was preparing to sail to Kosseir, Sir Home Popham arrived in H.M.S. *Romney*, and announced that the rest of his squadron was hourly expected with the 61st Regiment, several troops of light dragoons, and a detachment of artillery from the Cape. He also reported, much to the General's surprise, that when he left Mocha there was no news of any provision-ships or of the

remainder of the force under the command of Colonel Wellesley.

This was the occasion of the first meeting between Baird and Popham, who were afterwards destined to co-operate in the reduction of the Cape Colony. They had a joint interview with the Sheriff of Mecca, who now offered to raise an auxiliary force of Arabs to co-operate with the British. This offer Baird did not accept, for he wisely judged that the expense would be considerable, and that it was very doubtful whether he would get any value for it.

The despatches which Popham brought with him contained the appointment of Colonel Auchmuty as Adjutant-General to the expedition, and directed General Baird to place the troops from the Cape on Indian allowances immediately.

General Baird embarked on the *Romney* on 26th May, and arrived at Kosseir on 8th June.

CHAPTER VIII

THE DESERT

ON his arrival at Kosseir, General Baird found that Colonel Murray had landed nearly three weeks before, and had managed to procure enough camels for the transport of his own detachment of 700 men.

The place is thus described by the Count de Noé, who at this time was a lieutenant in the 10th Regiment: "Kosseir itself is a miserable cluster of wretched hovels, built with shells and mud, yet it is nevertheless a port of considerable commercial importance, in fact is the point of communication between Arabia and Egypt. . . . The water at Kosseir is exceedingly bad, and so bitter that even boiling does not correct it. But the merit of finding the springs—bad as the water is—is due to the French soldiers; before their discovery all water consumed at Kosseir was brought over from Arabia."

General Baird wrote to General Hutchinson to report the arrival of the troops from the Cape, and in a letter dated 10th June he adds: "As Colonel Murray has repeatedly written to you without (as yet) receiving any answer, I shall, for fear of accidents, write daily, until I shall have the pleasure of hearing from you."

On 15th June Admiral Blankett arrived, and he delivered to Baird the following letter :—

“ To Major-General Baird, &c. &c.

“ HEADQUARTERS, BRITISH CAMP,
“ 15 miles above Rahamenie, on the Nile,
“ 13th May 1801.

“ SIR,—I have heard, with great satisfaction, from Admiral Blankett of your arrival at Jedda on the 17th April, and I am very happy to find that his Majesty’s troops from India are under the command of so able and experienced an officer.

“ I have thought it necessary to send my aide-de-camp, Major Montresor, who will give you intelligence of everything that has passed in this country.

“ It is my intention to push forward towards Cairo, so as to keep the French troops there in check, and to prevent the possibility of their attacking you before you have formed your junction with the Grand Vizier. I have also written, and caused the Captain Pacha to write, in the strongest manner to the Grand Vizier to give you all the assistance required for the passage of the desert. I am afraid that you will find great, but I hope not insurmountable, difficulties. The season is advancing—the hot weather is coming on, and I believe that you will find no water on the route ; but I speak with extreme diffidence, as the minds of men in this country are so brutalised that it is impossible to get just information of the state and circumstances of countries which are even within a few miles’ distance. I have a sanguine hope, however, that your troops, more inured to a hot climate than those

immediately from Europe, may be enabled to bear up against the fatigues incidental to such a march as that across the desert naturally must be.

“ I mean to continue in my position near Cairo until I hear that you are in a state of security ; it is then my intention to descend the Nile, and to besiege Alexandria in conjunction with the troops under the orders of his Highness the Captain Pacha. It is rather my present opinion that you should join yourself to the army of the Grand Vizier, and take the direction of military affairs with him. It will probably be necessary to besiege the citadel and forts of Cairo, which I do not think will be difficult, as we have found that the stone of this country being of a bad quality and the masonry new, they do not resist cannon for any lengthened period. I must, however, think of procuring you the necessary heavy artillery for that purpose, as you cannot bring any across the desert, and I know the Grand Vizier has none, from having been placed in similar circumstances.

“ I shall not enter into further details, as Major Montresor, a very intelligent officer, and perfectly in my confidence, will give you every intelligence which you can desire, and much more than could be contained in the bounds of a letter.

“ I am glad to find that you are accompanied by my friend Colonel Wellesley, to whom I desire to be remembered in the kindest manner.

“ I suppose, as you are coming from a wealthy country, that you have brought your own means with you. Don't hope to derive any assistance from us, for we are plunged in the most abject state

of poverty ; perhaps, in this respect, you may be able to assist us. If you could lend us ten or twenty thousand pounds it would be a great object. Everything is in arrear, even the pay of the soldier. You know that this arises from most of the ports of Europe being shut against us.

“ I fear I shall be under the necessity of making requisitions on the country ; I shall endeavour, however, to avoid this painful extremity as long as possible.

“ Colonel Wellesley being senior to Brigadier-General Oakes, now acting under my command, I suppose he also is to be a brigadier-general. I tell you this for your information, as I do not know how it may interfere with the regulations laid down in India, and whether there are any company’s officers with you, of the rank of colonel, senior to him.

“ If I can be of any manner of use to you, I need not say that you may command me, and that you may believe me to be, with much regard, sir, your most obedient and most humble servant,

“ J. H. HUTCHINSON.”

General Baird had sent out parties to dig wells on the desert route to Ghenna, and he now despatched Colonel Murray to that place in the hope that he would be able to open up communication with General Hutchinson.

As it was clear that no resistance would be met with at Ghenna, the General decided to send his force across the desert in detachments, one regiment at a time.

The first detachment began the march on 19th June. On this day Baird received a letter from General Hutchinson announcing that he would reach the head of the delta on 7th June, and that he meant to besiege Cairo forthwith.

General Baird accompanied the leading detachment on its first march. It at once became clear that a number of the water-skins were leaking so badly as to be useless. The General thereupon ordered up the camels which had been intended for the use of the second detachment, and he directed Beresford when he got to Moilah to halt there, to find out exactly how far it was on to Legeta, and to endeavour to secure water on the road by sinking wells.

The General issued the following orders for the march of the next detachment on the evening of 21st June, and he himself returned to Kosseir on the 22nd :—

“ You will march this evening to the new wells, distance 10 miles ; there fill your water.

“ 22nd. Half-way, if possible, to Moilah, distance 15 or 20 miles.

“ 23rd. To Moilah, distance 15 or 20 miles. There you will find water and provisions. You may halt a day there if you think it necessary.

“ 24th. Half-way to Legeta, about 15 miles ; no water.

“ 25th. To Legeta, about 15 miles. Water and provisions.

“ 26th. Half-way to the Nile, 15 miles.

“ 27th. To the Nile.

“The camels are not to be allowed to drink at the wells at Moilah. If it is necessary the camels should drink, they can have water at a short distance from Moilah. Bullocks and asses must also be sent there.

“Colonel Beresford thinks the best mode of marching is fifteen miles at night and five early in the morning; you, however, will judge for yourself. I would recommend marching the whole distance without halting, if you find your men are not too much fatigued.

“You will give particular attention to the orders of the 19th instant, for your guidance on the march.

“You will not issue more than one gallon of water per man, which may be given to them as soon as you arrive at your ground in the morning, but on no account is any to be distributed whilst on the march.

“The bags which leak most to be first emptied, and as your camp-kettles will not be wanted for cooking, water may be started into them from leaky bags whilst you halt.

“As your route is discretional, you will, of course, be guided by any information Colonel Beresford may give you. He is directed to correspond with you.”

The General now busied himself with the final preparations for the advance across the desert, and he sent orders back to Jedda to stop the purchase of any more camels. Meanwhile Colonel Beresford reported that his men were suffering considerably from dysentery, and the continued

absence of the detachment under Colonel Wellesley was a further source of anxiety.

The General, however, decided to wait no longer, and on June 24th he issued the following instructions about water :—

“ I have very attentively considered every mode by which water can be carried across the desert, and can devise no means in our power, except with casks or puckallies (mussacks). As to the former, I am now convinced that even if we had small casks (which we have not), and they could be slung between two camels, or on the camel's back—both of which modes I have endeavoured to adopt, with larger ones, without success—the plan would not succeed. If a corps with casks were to move from the wells, the next morning the water of many of the casks would be consumed, and the empty casks, exposed to the sun and land-wind during the whole of that day, would be so warped that they would be unserviceable at Moilah.

“ Casks, therefore, would not answer, and we must either trust to the puckallies or find water on the desert, or re-embark.

“ To-day's march of the 88th will decide the first point ; and if it is possible to carry water, it should be done in this way.

“ The 88th should take their bags on to Legeta, and, after the next day's march thence, send them back to Legeta for the next corps.

“ The 10th should take their bags on to Moilah, and, after the next day's march, send their bags back to Moilah for the next division. The artillery,

increased to a hundred puckallie camels, should take their bags one day's march to the wells, and send them back. By these three divisions of bags the whole army could, in succession, be supplied. Careful, steady men should be appointed to each division, and the principle should be well explained to everybody. A European officer should also go with each division of puckallies.

“ If the puckallies will not answer, and the 88th get on to Moilah, a company should be sent to clear the wells, seven miles from Moilah, and two companies should be sent half-way from that towards Legeta to dig wells, and as fast as they find water more companies should follow.

“ In the same manner, the 10th should send two companies half-way to Moilah, and endeavour to dig wells.

“ If water is found at these stations, the 88th must halt at Legeta, and send on two companies to dig wells between that and Ghenna.

“ The Sepoys at the stations may go and assist, and the two companies at Legeta should immediately begin between that and Ghenna.”

On 27th June a vessel arrived bringing the news that Colonel Wellesley had been prevented by sickness from leaving India. He wrote as follows :—

“ BOMBAY, 9th April 1801.

“ MY DEAR GENERAL,—The first circumstance I have to detail to you is the state of my health, which is indeed the cause of this letter. I have had no fever since I saw you, but I am sorry to say that

the breaking-out of which I complained is worse than it was, and has become so bad as to induce Mr. Scott to order me to begin a course of nitrous baths. This remedy, exclusive of the disease itself, is sufficient to induce me to be desirous to wait at least rather longer than the *Susannah* will, if not to give over all thoughts of joining you.

“I do this, I assure you, with reluctance, notwithstanding that I think it very probable that I shall soon hear of your being recalled. However, considering that circumstance, and the bad state of my body, and the remedy which I am obliged to use, I should be mad if I were to think of going at this moment.

“As I am writing upon this subject, I will freely acknowledge that my regret at being prevented from accompanying you has been greatly increased by the kind, candid, and handsome manner in which you have behaved towards me; and I will confess as freely, not only that I did not expect such treatment, but that my wishes before you arrived regarding going upon the expedition were directly the reverse of what they are at this moment. I need not enter farther into this subject than to intreat that you will not attribute my stay to any other motive than that to which I have above assigned it; and to inform you, that as I know what has been said and expected by the world in general, I propose, as well for my own credit as for yours, to make known to my friends and to yours, not only the distinguished manner in which you have behaved towards me, but the causes which have prevented my demonstrating my

gratitude, by giving you every assistance in the arduous service which you have to conduct.

“ I shall stay here as long as the season will permit, and then I propose to go round to Madras ; and if I cannot get well, I believe I must try a cold climate.

“ The *Maria Louisa* is unable to go on at present, and the 80th will sail by Saturday in the *Morad Bey*, 150 ; the *Nelson*, 70 ; the *Dundas*, 70 ; and about seventy followers distributed in the three ships. They will have six months' provisions of everything, even of meat. The *Asia* would have been taken up for this detachment, according to your desire, only that she is dismasted, and wants copper on her bottom, and the owners were desirous that she should go into dock, if only for three days, before she should take her departure for the Red Sea. This operation, however, and the equipment of her with masts, &c., was likely to take more time than will be lost by the slow sailing of the vessels above-mentioned, and I therefore preferred them, and they will be ready immediately.

“ I inclose the memorandum upon your operations, and I refer you to my public letter for other matters. Wishing you every success, believe me, my dear General, ever yours most sincerely,

“ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.”

“ *Memorandum on the Operations in the Red Sea.*

“ The objects proposed by Mr. Dundas and by the Governor-General in the expedition to the Red Sea are : First, to get possession of the forts and posts which the French may have on its shores.

Secondly, to urge and encourage the natives of Upper Egypt (Mamelukes and Arabs) to commence hostilities against them. Thirdly, to assist the operations of the natives, by giving them arms and ammunition, or by a junction with them, either of a part or of the whole of the force.

“The advanced state of the season renders it probable that it will be so difficult to reach Suez that that object is not attainable. It is possible, however, that the force which left Bombay in December last, under the orders of Admiral Blankett, may have succeeded in effecting the objects in view when it was fitted out, as far as they relate to Suez.

“Kosseir will then be the first object of attention, and the operations of the army ought to be directed, in the first instance, to gain possession of that place.

“The General is already acquainted with the measures which have been taken to facilitate these operations, and it is needless to enumerate them here ; and I shall now proceed to the consideration of the second object of the expedition, viz. to encourage the natives of Upper Egypt to shake off the French yoke, and to act on our side. The success of this measure, it is evident, will operate most forcibly in favour of Sir Ralph Abercrombie ; and it appears to me to be the principal object of the expedition.

“From the intelligence lately received from the Red Sea, I am induced to believe that after the Turkish army was beat by Kleber, in March last, and after Colonel Murray had evacuated Suez,

Morad Bey made peace with the French, and that the latter ceded to him all Upper Egypt.

“He is now stationed there, and from the accounts and distribution of the French force in Egypt, which I have occasionally seen, I am induced to believe that they have no troops in Upper Egypt excepting such as are necessary to watch Morad Bey, and such as are necessary to keep up the communication with their post at Kosseir. It is probable that when Sir Ralph Abercrombie commences his operations they will draw to Lower Egypt all the troops not absolutely necessary for their safety in Upper Egypt, and thus they will leave to Morad Bey the power of acting as his own sense of his own interest may point out.

“I have always understood this man to be the head of the Mamelukes, and certainly, till the French made peace with him, he was supposed to be a friend of the English, and showed his power of doing injury to the French by keeping in constant employment a large part of their army under Dessaix in pursuit of him.

“It is probable that he does not deem his tenure of Upper Egypt very secure; he must be aware that as soon as the French gain quiet possession of Lower Egypt they will have the power to break their engagement with him, and from his own experience of their fidelity in adhering to treaties he must expect that they will use that power to his disadvantage. Indeed, the fact that the French have found it necessary to have a body of their troops encamped with Morad Bey's army is a clear proof that they do not place much faith in him;

and as he must know that he is suspected and watched, he has still stronger reason to expect that as soon as the French have the power they will not fail to exert it to get rid of a neighbour and an ally in whom they have so little confidence. Without being too sanguine, we may expect, then, that as soon as Morad Bey shall perceive a prospect of driving the French from Egypt he will co-operate and join with those employed in that object. For this reason, the very first opportunity ought to be taken to open a communication with him ; his situation and his prospects, if the French should remain in Egypt, ought to be clearly pointed out to him, and he ought to be urged in the strongest manner to exert himself to shake off the yoke. The power of the armies employed on the side of Lower Egypt ought to be made known to him ; their prospects of success, founded as well on their own strength as on the impossibility that the French should receive assistance, ought to be stated to him ; and, finally, an offer ought to be made to supply him with arms and ammunition, and even to join him with a part or the whole of the army in the Red Sea, in order to insure the speedy success of the objects which he, as well as the English, must have in view.

“ The possession of the port of Kosseir, and of the navigation of the Red Sea, will be a strong inducement to Morad Bey, as the Governor of Upper Egypt, to be favourable to the English.

“ The trade in corn is carried on by this port to Jedda in Arabia ; and this trade is such an object both to Upper Egypt and to Arabia (and to Mecca in particular) that it may be expected that the

Governor of Upper Egypt will not be disinclined towards those who will have it so much in their power to annoy him. Having now stated the reasons which induce me to believe that it will not be difficult to urge the head of the Mamelukes to shake off the French yoke, I proceed to a consideration of the third object of the expedition, viz. to assist the natives with arms and ammunition, and even to join them with a part or the whole of the army.

“The first question which I shall consider, and which will lay the grounds for a consideration of and decision upon others, is whether it would be practicable or even desirable to cross the desert from Kosseir at all, if that operation is not performed in concert and co-operation with a body of the natives posted upon the Nile.

“It is needless to enter into a statement of the difficulties to be apprehended in crossing the desert : they are certainly great, but, I imagine, not insurmountable. But if it is not certain that the army or detachment which will cross the desert will partake of the plenty of the banks of the Nile when they reach them, if they should be certain of having water only and such forage as their cattle should be able to pick up, I apprehend that the difficulty will become so great that the operation ought not to be attempted. It is impossible that the Mamelukes in Upper Egypt can be neutral in the contest in contemplation : they must take part with the French or with us. If they take part with the French, the army will be in the situation in which I have above described it, enjoying no advantage

from having reached the banks of the Nile, excepting water and probably some forage; and it is needless to point out that, if the desert is to be crossed under those circumstances, care must be taken not only to send with the body of troops which will cross a very large proportion of provisions, but means must be adopted to add to them until the operations of this body shall have given them such a hold of the country as to leave no doubt of their steady supply of provisions. It is obvious that this will require a great number of cattle, a number much larger than the Governments of India, with all the zealous exercise of their power and means, can supply. But there is another consideration connected with this subject besides the supply of the cattle, and that is, the means of feeding them when landed from the ships.

“Upon this point I need only call to the General’s recollection the difficulties, to which he has been a witness, in moving large supplies of stores and provisions even in fertile, cultivated, and inhabited countries, well supplied with water, and under every advantage of arrangement in the supply, in the distribution, the care, and the food of the cattle, and draw a comparison between such difficulties and those to be expected in a march through a desert. But that is not the worst that is to be apprehended. The cattle will, of course, land in weak condition in a desert; and it must be expected that even those which survive the voyage will starve, or at least be in such a state before they commence their march as to render it very probable that they will not carry their loads to the

end of it. Upon the whole, then, I am decidedly of opinion that, if the Mamelukes are not on our side, no attempt ought to be made to cross the desert.

“ This opinion, the General will observe, is by no means founded on the impracticability of crossing with troops, because I am convinced that it can be done ; but it is founded upon the danger that the troops will starve if they do not return immediately, and upon the futility of the measure if they do.

“ It may be imagined that (supposing the Mamelukes to be wavering), if an attempt is not made to cross the desert, the advantage of their co-operation will be lost. Upon this point I observe that a knowledge of our strength (not of our weakness) will induce them to come forward, and that it might be expected that the sight of our weakness, occasioned by our march over the desert without concert with them, might induce them to take advantage of it and to join the French.

“ But those who will urge this consideration must suppose it possible that the Mamelukes can be neutral for a moment ; and this their history from the beginning of time, particularly since the French invasion, will show to be impossible.

“ I come now to consider the propriety and mode of crossing the desert, supposing that the Mamelukes should be inclined to shake off the French yoke and to co-operate with us. The first point for the General to ascertain is their sincerity in the cause, of which, as I have above stated, there is every probability. As soon as he will have

ascertained this, it will be necessary that he should make arrangements with them for posting a supply of water on that part of the desert where it is most wanted, and for having a supply of provisions ready on the Nile, and he might cross over a part of his army immediately. The first object on his arrival on the Nile should be to establish a post at Ghenna, and, if possible, another in the desert between that place and Kosseir, in order to insure his communication between the sea and the Nile. At Ghenna he should make a depot of his stores, &c., which might be brought across the desert by degrees, and then he might commence his operations against the enemy.

“In the consideration of the question regarding the crossing of the desert, I have omitted to mention the interruption which may be given to that operation by the enemy, because it is entirely distinct from the difficulties which are peculiar to the operation itself. It is obvious, however, that if the Mamelukes are not on our side, and if they should not have driven out of Upper Egypt the small French force supposed to be in that country, before the operation is attempted, that force, however small, will greatly increase the distress of the British troops who will cross the desert.

“I have not adverted to the supply of arms and ammunition to be given to the natives. As long as their co-operation is doubtful these supplies ought to be withheld, but promised; when they will have shown their sincerity in our cause the arms may be given to almost any extent.

“A. W.”

General Baird's plans were made before he received this memorandum, but I have inserted it in full because this appreciation of the situation by the future Duke of Wellington is full of interest.

The General also received a lengthy memorandum from Sir Home Popham, pointing out that the journey by boat from Ghenna to Cairo and back would occupy at least sixty-five days, and that, in consequence, if the army went to Cairo it could not be re-embarked at Kosseir because of the monsoon. In that case it would be necessary to embark at Suez.

General Baird left Kosseir on 30th June, and established his headquarters at Moilah on 1st July. He gave orders that on reaching Ghenna all camels were to be sent straight back to Kosseir, and not to be detained *en route*.

In a letter dated July 2, 1801, Colonel Auchmuty describes the march as follows :—

“ The 10th marched from Moilah Wells, about five miles in front of Moilah, last night, and the artillery from hence to the wells this morning.

“ The 10th was met with by Lieutenant Warden, the Commissary of Stores, suffering greatly and getting on badly. We are certainly in a bad scrape. We can hardly get forward or go back, and the prospect does not brighten ; but we must not despair. Among many causes of uneasiness is not hearing from Hutchinson. The General is much alarmed at it, and his plan is to push everything forward on the road to Ghenna, collect all the camels we can muster (and I fear we shall

not muster many), and send them back to Kosseir until we get a letter. We must then finally decide.

“In the meantime you must continue your preparations. Order the cavalry to send abroad their painted cloths, which are too weighty for their horses; order twelve camel-loads of rice to Moilah: the camels to deposit their rice, and then to push forward with two Bengal companies to Ghenna.”

The General left Moilah on the evening of 3rd July, reached Legeta on the 5th, and arrived at Ghenna on the 6th.

The route from Kosseir to Ghenna is thus officially stated:—

Kosseir to the new wells	11 miles.	Water may be had.
Half-way to Moilah	. 17 „	No water.
Moilah 17 „	Water and provisions.
Advanced wells 9 „	Water.
Half-way to Legeta	. 19 „	No water.
Legeta 19 „	Water and provisions.
Baromba 18 „	Water.
Ghenna 10 „	The Nile.
	<u>120</u> miles.	

The great heat proved very trying to the troops. They marched by night, but sleep was almost impossible by day, for the thermometer even in the tents registered from 110° to 115°.

The force which Baird led over the desert from Kosseir to the Nile was composed as follows:—

	Officers,	N.C.O.'s and Men.	Total.
BRITISH TROOPS.			
8th L.D..	5	80	85
R.A.	2	44	46
R.E.	1	...	1
10th Regiment	36	918	954
61st "	43	931	974
80th "	17	343	360
86th "	16	341	357
88th "	21	436	457
			3234
NATIVE TROOPS.			
Bengal Artillery	8	307	315
Bombay "	6	314	320
Madras "	5	248	253
Engineers	5	...	5
Madras Pioneers	2	92	94
Bengal Infantry Volunteers	26	605	631
1st Bombay Infantry	36	786	822
7th " "	38	723	761
			3201

Grand total, 6435.

There were 30 guns drawn by bullocks.

CHAPTER IX

EGYPT

ON 9th July General Baird wrote to the Duke of York to find out whether he was to remain in Egypt, and to point out that if he delayed much longer the monsoon would prevent him from returning to India and operating against Java and Mauritius.

Day after day passed and no information came from General Hutchinson, but at length Admiral Blankett enclosed a copy of a letter from Major Holloway containing the news that the French Governor of Cairo had capitulated.

Baird now felt convinced that his further stay in Egypt would be useless, so he began to make preparations to return to Kosseir; but he decided to stand fast where he was till he got authentic information from General Hutchinson. Meanwhile he despatched an aide-de-camp—Lieutenant Budgeon—down the Nile to try and get in communication with that General, and he dismissed some Turks and Arabs whom he had taken into his pay.

The march across the desert had been accomplished with the loss of only three men; and during the halt at Ghenna the line of communications had been improved by sinking more wells and by arranging an adequate supply of camels to carry water.

At last the situation was cleared up by the receipt of the following letter :—

“CAIRO, *July 10, 1800.*¹

“SIR,—I have this morning received your communication by Lieutenant Burdon,² who deserves much credit for the diligence he has made use of. I have written to you frequently. I did not inform you of the surrender of Cairo, because from my letters I concluded that you were then marching towards me, and I did not think it advisable to stop your march, for two reasons—because I doubted the sincerity of the French, and, though the capture of Cairo may be an event decisive of the fate of Egypt, yet still I could not think myself justified in giving you orders which might be contradictory to the instructions of the Government; indeed, everything that related to *you* tended to embarrass me in a most extraordinary degree.

“Before your arrival we had nothing but an unauthenticated rumour of a force coming from India, which Sir Ralph himself did not believe; consequently I could not have any idea of your force or of the time when you were likely to arrive. Your second destination was a matter of which I had never heard, and, indeed, when you mentioned it in cypher, I was incapable of comprehending it, as I do not possess the key.

“Lord Hobart’s despatch, though he says but very little, has put the matter out of doubt, and it is clearly intended that you should march into the

¹ General Hutchinson’s letter is so dated by mistake for 1801.

² *Sic. orig.*; the officer’s name was Budgeon.

interior of Egypt, as it is specified that the Sepoys are to compose part of the garrison of Alexandria. I should rather suppose, from the terms in which the letter is couched, that the remainder of the troops are destined for another service ; but this is rather conjecture than otherwise, though I have little doubt that I am founded in my opinion, provided the siege of Alexandria should not take up too much time.

“ Menou has refused to receive the French officer who was sent by General Belliard to lay before him the capitulation of Cairo, of which his garrison might have availed themselves, as it is so stipulated by an express article of the treaty. He is likely to defend himself with great obstinacy, and certainly may give us a great deal of trouble. I should be extremely glad, therefore, to have your able assistance and co-operation. I am thoroughly aware that, from the season and from the inundation, the march by land will be impracticable. You must do all you can to collect boats, but whether you should use force or not is entirely out of the question, because for the last thousand years force has been the only law in this country, and the inhabitants are so little used to think for themselves that they are at a great loss how to act when it is not adopted against them.

“ Upon my part, I will do everything in my power to procure you boats, and have given Colonel Stewart, Commandant of Gizeh, directions upon this subject ; but there are great difficulties in our way. We were obliged to furnish three hundred to transport the French baggage and sick ; the Turks

have seized on an immense number ; our commissariat and artillery occupy not a few. Upon this subject you had better apply to Osman Bey Perdicci. He knows the country, and, I think, will be active and diligent. There is a Frenchman with him, in whom I think you may place some kind of confidence.

“ In my last letter I gave you some intelligence of what was going on in the ports of France and Spain. They certainly have a great expedition in view, probably against Egypt ; a reinforcement of six thousand men is ordered out to us, part of which is already arrived, and I have no doubt of receiving the whole in the course of ten days. The Government at home attaches at least as much importance to Egypt as it deserves ; they appear to have set their hearts upon it, and are determined not to be foiled. I should wish you to advance as soon as you conveniently can, without pressing or fatiguing your troops. You can march by detachments ; and, let them be ever so small, there can be no risk in making your general rendezvous at Gizeh, which I have occupied entirely for your convenience. You have only to intimate your wishes to Colonel Stewart and everything will be procured for you that this country affords.

“ The army marched yesterday, and will arrive at Rosetta about the 29th. From thence I shall proceed, without loss of time, to besiege Alexandria. I wrote you a letter, dated the 2nd or 3rd of this month, but it was detained for several days, and could not have reached you in course. The conveyance in this country is very uncertain ; it is

often tardy, and frequently *never* reaches the place of its destination at all. I have sometimes received your first, second, and third copy at the same moment and from the same messenger. Your last letter was three weeks on the road. I should recommend you either to send forward your Quarter-master-General or one of his department to make preparations for you at Gizeh. I thank you very much for your offer of money, but we have no occasion for it, as we have received lately upwards of two hundred thousand pounds from England.—I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

“J. HELY HUTCHINSON, *Lieut.-General.*”

It was now imperative to push on at once. General Baird sent out parties to requisition every boat they could find, but he had no hope of securing enough water transport for his whole force, so he decided to send his guns, stores, and sick by river, while the rest of his force marched down to Cairo. He left one battalion of Bombay troops at Kosseir and in the desert posts to secure his communications, and another Bombay battalion in the fort at Ghenna.

About this time four companies of the 61st Regiment and two companies of the 80th arrived at Kosseir, together with the horse artillery from Bengal and the artillery and pioneers from Madras ; but two ships were lost on the voyage, one being the *Susannah*, on which Colonel Wellesley was to have sailed.

Another great source of annoyance to General

Baird was the behaviour of the Sheriff of Mecca. This worthy had undertaken to supply all the animals required, and he would not allow anyone else to do so. Out of forty-nine horses sent across in one ship, ten only were serviceable ; and of the first batch of fifty camels delivered, only seventeen were alive, and not one was fit for work.

On 24th July General Baird sent off Colonel Quarrill with the 10th Regiment to Girjee with orders to push on as quickly as possible to Cairo, but to be careful not to run any risk of being cut off by the rising of the Nile. If necessary he was to select some high ground and wait for the river flotilla.

About this time the following letter arrived from General Hutchinson :—

“ To Major-General Baird.

“ HEADQUARTERS, CAMP NEAR GIZEH,
“ July 13, 1801.

“ SIR,—I received your letters of the 22nd June only three days ago, as they were near three weeks coming. The delay has been very vexatious ; but, however, there is no relying on an Arab or even on a Mameluke. Osman Bey Perdicci kept my last letter *for you five days and then lost it*. The accounts you give of your own proceedings are very afflicting. I was always apprehensive that European troops would find difficulties almost insurmountable in passing the desert.

“ I yesterday received despatches from Lord Hobart, dated the 19th of May. From their contents I am led to imagine that, should you not be able to penetrate into the lower part of Egypt and

form a junction with me, it will be a great disappointment.

“In my last letter to you I expressed some doubts about bringing the Sepoys forward, but from a paragraph in his Lordship’s letter it has now become absolutely necessary, as he expresses a wish that they should be left in garrison at Alexandria ; and, provided that it is not inconsistent with any stipulations entered into with them, I am directed to leave them as part of that garrison whenever it shall fall into our hands.

“I tell you this and what follows in the utmost confidence. There are *six thousand* men to arrive immediately from Europe, and after the final departure of the French from this country we are ordered to rendezvous at Malta, there to wait for further instructions. I have no doubt, from the tone and tenor of the letter, that it is meant to employ the remainder of this army on some other service. I do not think of leaving above four thousand men behind in Egypt, so that I hope there will remain a considerable body of disposable troops. Should you not be able, however, to approach us, our calculation on the subject will be miserably defective.

“We move from this the day after to-morrow (15th July), and shall reach Rosetta about the 29th or 30th. I leave six hundred men, under Colonel Stewart, as a garrison for Gizeh. You had better communicate with him as frequently as you can. I shall direct him to do the same by you.

“I hear of nothing of any great importance. I am to congratulate you on succeeding to the command of the first battalion of the 54th Regiment by

the death of General Frederick. Major-General Cradock has got the second battalion. His Majesty has been pleased to appoint me to the chief command of the troops in Egypt, with the rank of Lieutenant-General in the Mediterranean.—I have the honour to be, with respect and regard, Sir, your faithful and obedient servant,

“ J. HELY HUTCHINSON, *Lieut.-General.*”

This letter was rather a blow, for Baird had quite hoped that, when the operations in Egypt were all over, General Hutchinson might lend him an extra regiment and the stores necessary for a descent on Mauritius. This would now be out of the question.

So many boats were requisitioned that Colonel Quarrill, when he got to Girjee, was allowed to keep enough to take his regiment down to Cairo. Some of the boats would take as many as one hundred and fifty men. The 88th Regiment, which was five hundred and ninety strong with eight horses, occupied seven boats in all.

General Baird embarked at Ghenna on 31st July, after appointing Colonel Murray to the command in Upper Egypt and ordering him to remain at Ghenna till the rear of the force had closed up there, and then to proceed with it to Gizeh. Orders were sent to Kosseir to send forward at once the 80th or any other regiment that might land there.

General Baird reached Gizeh on 8th August, and after making arrangements for the supplies necessary for his force, he transferred his headquarters to the little island of Rhouda on the 15th. He left Colonel Ramsey in command at Gizeh.

In a letter dated "Cairo, July 25, 1801," General Hutchinson wrote as follows to Baird :—

"Every exertion in my power shall be used to procure you boats as soon as the French prisoners are once embarked on board the ships. You shall have the earliest intelligence of everything that takes place at Alexandria, but I fear your corps cannot be collected at Gizeh before the end of September."

Such was the energy of General Baird that his whole force was assembled at the island of Rhouda by 27th August, and the right wing began to advance that evening.

Before leaving Rhouda the General sent Colonel Montresor to Rosetta to secure the supplies necessary for the troops on the march to Alexandria, for he had learnt to put no trust in the promises of the Grand Vizier.

General Hutchinson wrote saying that he would assist Baird as much as possible on his march to Alexandria, and urging him to leave the guns and heavy luggage behind. He added :—

"We commenced our operations against Alexandria, both on the east and west side, on the 17th of this month. It is weak on the west side and cannot, I should imagine, hold out more than three weeks or a month longer ; but in this I may be mistaken."

General Baird reached Rosetta on 30th August. Part of his army had arrived the day before, and the

General wished to push on to Alexandria at once with his whole force. To his great regret he learnt from General Hutchinson that the French had sent a flag of truce to him to treat for a surrender.

When General Baird reached Sir John Hutchinson's headquarters on the following day he learnt that the capitulation had actually been signed, and that the British troops were to take possession of the outworks next day.

It was a terrible disappointment to the Indian army, after all their hardships in crossing the desert and marching down country, to arrive too late to participate in the campaign against the French.

Some time before this, General Hutchinson had decided to return to England after the surrender of Alexandria on account of his health. He intended to leave General Baird with the Indian army and the 22nd Light Dragoons with orders not to quit Egypt till he heard from the ministers at home.

On 18th September a despatch arrived ordering General Hutchinson to leave six thousand troops in Egypt, exclusive of the Indian army, with the option of remaining in command himself or returning home. Should he choose to go home, Major-General Moore (afterwards Sir John Moore) was to be offered the command, and if he declined it, then Lord Cavan was to have the command.

Major-General Baird pointed out that it would be extremely injudicious to mix the Indian force with the English, for, apart from the risk of offending the susceptibilities of the native troops through ignorance of their customs, one force was paid by the British Government and the other by the East India

Company, and the pay and allowances of British regiments on the Indian establishment were quite different to those of the British establishment.

General Baird added that, if the amalgamation were decided upon, he desired to be permitted to give up his command and leave Egypt.

General Hutchinson admitted that grave inconvenience was likely to arise from the union of the two armies, but he was of opinion that the Indian army was not likely to remain long in Egypt, and he said that he could not permit Baird to leave the country. He added that in his opinion any of the King's regiments from India which were left in Egypt would probably be deprived of their Indian allowances.

At this time several cases of plague occurred among the 88th Regiment at Rosetta, and also among the Bengal troops. General Baird had the hospitals burnt down, and the disease was stamped out when only three Sepoys had died of it.

The attitude of the Turkish officials in Egypt towards the Mamelukes was at this time a source of great anxiety to Hutchinson and Baird. The Mamelukes feared treachery, so Baird sent Colonel Montresor down to Alexandria with them.

On 13th October General Baird again wrote to Sir John Hutchinson to protest against two of his staff officers being taken from him, and to point out that when any of the troops who had come from the Cape were removed from his command they must be struck off the Indian establishment. He ended by assuring the General that should his wishes be disregarded and he be compelled to remain in

Egypt in a subordinate command he would always support Lord Cavan to the utmost.

In his reply General Hutchinson stated that he was well aware of the inconvenience that might arise from mixing the two armies, and that he never intended to interfere with the allowances of the troops, but that as he was just about to leave Egypt he would not express any opinion on the matter.

On 15th October Lord Cavan wrote a letter to General Baird which contains the following passage :—

“ It is my intention, unless I receive orders from Europe to the contrary, not to consider the troops now under your command as forming a distinct or separate army, but as part of one army under my orders, and with only one military staff establishment.

“ I particularly mention my intention, as I much apprehend our ideas on the subject do not coincide ; should that unfortunately be the case, I am much relieved from my consequent distress by the very handsome manner in which you express, in your letter to Sir John Hutchinson, your readiness and zeal to support and enforce such measures as I may think best for the present service.”

At this time intelligence was received that General Fox had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the forces in the Mediterranean and Egypt, so Baird now wrote to him as follows as a last effort to prevent the fusion of the two armies :—

“ To His Excellency, Lieut.-General Fox, Malta.

“ HEADQUARTERS, INDIAN ARMY,
18th October 1801.

“ SIR,—I take the liberty to address your Excellency on the present occasion, having understood, although not officially, that his Majesty has been pleased to appoint you Commander-in-Chief of the forces serving in the Mediterranean and Egypt.

“ Having been specially appointed to the chief command of the army from India destined to co-operate with that from this side of the Mediterranean in the expulsion of the French from Egypt, I left Bengal in the month of February, and after experiencing considerable fatigue and hardship, the army arrived near Rosetta on the 30th of August, when it was halted by Sir John Hutchinson, in consequence of the garrison of Alexandria having agreed to surrender.

“ At this period no specific orders respecting the force to be left in Egypt had arrived from England ; but his Excellency Sir John Hutchinson was pleased to communicate to me his intention of leaving the Indian army (with the addition of the 22nd Light Dragoons) under my command, in order to garrison Alexandria.

“ On the 18th ult. I had the honour to learn from the General, that in consequence of orders just received from home, he was directed to leave in Egypt six thousand men, exclusive of the corps from India. His Excellency was also pleased to acquaint me with his having the option of retaining the command, but which his health would not

permit of. That Major-General the Earl of Cavan, in consequence of the arrangements from home, would be left senior officer in Egypt, as Major-General Moore, who also had the option of remaining, had availed himself of permission to return to England.

“Sir John Hutchinson further informed me, that he was directed to retain in Egypt Brigadier-Generals Hope, Stuart, and Oakes.

“I did myself the honour to address his Excellency in answer, and stated to him, that as my name did not appear among the general officers to remain in Egypt, and as the corps from India were actually directed to be retained, I was naturally led to conclude that the Indian army was meant to be kept a distinct corps under my immediate command, but subject of course to the orders of the senior officer in Egypt; or that it was intended that I should return to my station in India.

“I have the honour to enclose for your Excellency’s perusal, the correspondence which has taken place between Sir John Hutchinson and myself, which I have also judged proper to communicate to Lord Cavan, together with a copy of a letter from his lordship to me, which will point out to your Excellency the measures he intends to adopt on the departure of Sir John Hutchinson.

“In thus troubling your Excellency, I have to request your favourable indulgence; and I entertain a confidence that you will see the impropriety of blending the two armies together when there is no necessity for it, who are on different establishments and under different regulations.

“I need not point out to your Excellency the

confusion that must arise if Lord Cavan's intentions are carried into execution, which I much fear will be the case before I can receive an answer from your Excellency.

"My own situation is particularly unpleasant, as it is most probable that the treasure which has been intrusted to me by the East India Company for the payment of this army, will be taken from me by an officer who is neither in their service nor under their command, and who cannot of course be made responsible for its expenditure.

"Should the Indian army be broken up, and blended with that from England, I must either retire from it or remain in an inferior situation to that which I now hold. On the above event, therefore, taking place, I shall of course consider myself as exonerated from my responsibility and command. It is my intention to return to my station in India, unless positively ordered by Sir John Hutchinson to remain in this country, in which case I hope to be honoured with your Excellency's command.—I have the honour to be, sir, your Excellency's obedient servant,
D. BAIRD."

On 20th October General Hutchinson informed Baird that owing to a relapse he could not visit him as he had intended, but he expressed the hope that Baird would come to see him at Alexandria.

Soon after this, it became known that the Mamelukes had been inveigled on to a ship at Alexandria, and that several of them had been treacherously murdered.

Sir John Hutchinson at once demanded and

obtained the release of the surviving Mamelukes at Alexandria, and sent the following letter through General Baird to Colonel Ramsey ordering the latter to deliver it in person to the Grand Vizier :—

“ HEADQUARTERS, ENGLISH ARMY,
“ ALEXANDRIA, 27th October 1801.

“ I have just heard with great astonishment that, notwithstanding your most sacred promises, you have caused the Beys to be arrested ; that one of them has been assassinated, and that the others are your prisoners. I have frequently notified to your Highness that the Mamelukes are under the protection of the English Government, and that I had given them the strongest assurances of their property and lives being in safety. You know, then, what honour and the right of nations require of me ; you have left me the choice to avenge an assassination or to become an accomplice in it. As I will not dishonour my nation in the face of the universe, nor bathe my hands in the blood of the unfortunate, I have formed my determination.

“ I declare to you then, in the most explicit manner, that you must deliver up all the Beys and Mamelukes, with their baggage, effects, and families, and send them without the least delay to Gizeh, and place them under the orders of Colonel Ramsey, as he will have the disposal of them until he receives further instructions from me.

“ The Capidan Pacha has already given up to me those who were in his possession. But four of the Beys, the Kiage, and two Cachiefs have perished by the hands of assassins.

“ Your Highness, there is not a moment to lose ; I

have just reinforced the Governor of Gizeh, and General Baird is charged with the execution of my orders ; be assured that I will never retract them in the smallest degree. You have heaped oaths upon oaths. You have violated them all. I supplicate God to pardon my credulity, but I will not add to it the baseness of suffering you to enjoy the fruits of your enormous crime, and to say to indignant Europe, that you have deceived the English and massacred the Beys.

“ Give me up the Mamelukes—respect the rights of nations—adhere faithfully to your promises, or you will be responsible for all the unhappy events which must be the inevitable result of your obstinately persevering in a system of conduct which has already covered you with shame and opprobrium.

“ I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration, your Highness’s most humble and most obedient servant,

“ J. HELY HUTCHINSON, *Commander-in-Chief*.

“ P.S.—You will also have the goodness to furnish provisions and forage necessary for the subsistence of the Mamelukes and their horses. I shall persist in this demand ; because it is no more than what justice requires. You have taken everything from them, it is therefore just that you support them.”

The Grand Vizier now wrote to General Baird, and the negotiations were still proceeding, when on 6th November Sir John Hutchinson embarked on the H.M.S. *L’Egyptienne* and handed over the command of the army to the Earl of Cavan.

CHAPTER X

EGYPT (*continued*)

LORD CAVAN found himself placed in rather a delicate position by the very decided line which Sir John Hutchinson had taken up in the matter of the Mamelukes. It did not seem to the Earl that he would be justified in going to war against the Turks, and General Baird pointed out that if the Turkish Government were hostile the march of the Indian troops to Kosseir would be a very risky operation.

Just at this time a report reached Egypt that peace had been concluded between England and France. If this were true it would necessitate the evacuation of Egypt by the British, so General Baird wrote to Lord Cavan, as soon as the latter had taken over the command in Egypt, and informed him that, in view of the present strained relations with the Turks and of the strong probability that the Indian army would be very shortly withdrawn, he now wished to remain in the country.

On 9th November Lord Cavan wrote to acknowledge General Baird's letter, and said he was very glad to hear that the latter now wished to remain in Egypt.

In consequence of the peace with France, General Baird now began to make preparations for his return to India. He hoped to be able to leave Lower

Egypt before the plague season came on, and return to Kosseir, but should this not be possible, he would have to march to Suez. With a view to this latter contingency he directed Colonel Ramsey at Gizeh to find out whether a sufficiency of camels and water-bags could be obtained for the march to Suez, and also whether posts could be established on the route.

Colonel Ramsey was able to assure him that plenty of camels were available, and that the route was quite practicable.

The negotiations with the Turks about the Mamelukes dragged on, and Lord Cavan now heard that Lord Elgin, the ambassador at Constantinople, was himself coming to Egypt to conduct them.

At this time General Baird wrote to General Fox at Malta to point out that the retention of the Indian troops in Egypt, now peace was concluded, was not merely useless but was costing the East India Company £40,000 a month for the necessary shipping detained in the Red Sea.

On 1st December Baird received from General Fox an answer to his letter of 18th October approving of the Earl of Cavan's action in blending the two armies, and stating that he had forwarded the whole correspondence to the Commander-in-Chief.

Lord Cavan now determined to move some units of the Indian army, and issued orders for the 10th and 61st Regiments to march to Alexandria. He also asked General Baird where he would prefer to remain himself. In reply, Baird thanked Lord Cavan for offering him a choice, but said that he would leave the decision entirely to him.

On 5th December the Earl informed Baird that

he did not propose to give him the command of any particular brigade, but to appoint him second-in-command of the army in Egypt. On this date a despatch arrived bringing official intelligence that the preliminaries of peace had been signed between England and France.

The negotiations with the Turks were still in progress, and early in January a secretary of the Embassy arrived from Constantinople instead of Lord Elgin. The Mamelukes began to be uneasy for their safety, and on 24th January they left Gizeh and set out for Upper Egypt. This action relieved the British authorities from a great load of embarrassment, and the subsequent strife between the Turks and the Mamelukes does not concern us.

About this time General Baird received a despatch from Lord Wellesley, dated 17th October 1801, in which the Governor-General stated that owing to the internal state of affairs in India he had decided to relinquish the expedition against Java and Mauritius, and he directed General Baird to return to India as soon as he could be spared from Egypt. He added that he had put Sir Home Popham in political charge of the Red Sea, and concluded as follows :—

“ I cannot close this despatch without renewing to you the assurance of my most cordial approbation of the manner in which you have executed the most important service for which I have selected you. I consider your conduct in Egypt to have added to the honour which you had justly acquired in Mysore ; and I anticipate, with confidence, the assistance

which General Hutchinson will derive from the co-operation of your talents, zeal, and experience, if any exigency should demand your further active service in Egypt. Your return to India, however, at the earliest period of time will be highly acceptable to me."

The cold weather began to affect the health of the Indian troops, and it was necessary to issue extra blankets and warm clothing and to increase the scale of rations.

At this period the Indian army was in great straits for want of money.

When Sir Home Popham arrived from India without bringing any money, General Baird felt compelled to try and borrow some from the Earl of Cavan's treasury, so that he could pay his troops.

Lord Cavan would not accede to his request, so Baird raised 450,000 piastres (about £4600) through Lord Elgin's agent at Constantinople, by giving bills on his own responsibility, and informed the directors of the East India Company of his action in the matter.

On 23rd April a ship arrived from Leghorn bringing news that peace had been concluded and that the Treaty of Amiens was signed on 25th March.

General Baird now expected any day to receive orders to return to India, and he wrote to Lord Wellesley as follows :—

"On this occasion, my Lord, I deem it my particular duty to report to your Excellency, that during the whole of the service this army has been employed on, which from its commencement has been of a

fatiguing and harassing nature, I have ever found a most zealous and strict attention to duty, both in officers and men, and the utmost cheerfulness in combating every hardship and surmounting every difficulty.

“ I deeply regret that I had not an opportunity of bringing them into action against the enemy, as I am well convinced, from their superior state of discipline, and led on, as they would have been, by the able and active officers at the heads of brigades (Colonels Ramsay and Beresford, Lieutenant-Colonels Montresor and Harness), and corps, that they would have done honour to themselves, and gained the approbation of their King and country, by maintaining the character which the Indian army have so long and well supported.

“ From the General, as well as my own personal staff, I have derived every assistance which in their respective situations they could possibly afford me ; but more particularly from that active and distinguished officer, Colonel Auchmuty, whose ability and professional knowledge have been of the greatest benefit to the service. In a word, it is particularly gratifying to me to have to declare that from the first formation of the army under my command to the present moment, it has been actuated but with one spirit of zeal and cordiality.”

On 30th April a ship arrived bringing the following letter to Lord Cavan :—

“ DOWNING STREET, 18th March 1802.

“ SIR,—It being judged expedient that the native troops from India serving in Egypt should be sent

back to their establishments by the ships now at Suez, I have his Majesty's commands to direct that you will, upon the receipt hereof, take the necessary measures for carrying this service into execution, and that you will order Major-General Baird to proceed with those corps, and with such detachments of the European corps belonging to the Indian establishments as the separate instructions of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief may point out to you.

"You will give instructions to Major-General Baird to consult with the naval officer in command of his Majesty's ships in the Red Sea at what port of India it may be most advisable to land the Sepoys of the Bombay establishments, as well as to concert with him respecting the debarkation of the European detachments.

"The Bengal Sepoys should be sent by sea to Calcutta, unless the Governments in India should have otherwise directed, or unless, from well-authenticated information relative to the situation of affairs in the southern provinces, Major-General Baird should be induced to think it essential to the public service that the troops under his command should be landed to reinforce the army in those provinces ; in which event it will be proper that he should immediately acquaint the Governments of India with the motives of his conduct, and conform to whatever instructions he may receive from them.—I have the honour to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,
HOBART."

Lord Cavan at once informed Sir Home Popham

of these orders so that he could co-operate with General Baird.

The 10th, 61st, and 88th Regiments were ordered to return to Europe, so General Baird decided to utilise the extra accommodation on board ship by taking to India two hundred and twenty cavalry horses as well as three hundred and sixty men who had volunteered from the militia regiments in Malta and from the 61st Regiment for long service in India.

Parties were now sent out from Cairo to dig wells on the route to Suez.

General Baird left Alexandria on 7th May and reached Gizeh on the 11th. The Turkish Governor of Cairo promised to do all he could to assist the Indian army on its way to Suez. On 15th May the General paid a visit of ceremony to the Governor, and was presented by him with a handsome sword and a charger with a saddle of silver gilt. Two days later the Governor paid a return visit, and General Baird gave him some jewels, and some arms of English make.

At Cairo the General received a despatch from Lord Wellesley, dated 8th February 1802, which contained the following passages :—

“ I consider it to be my duty upon this occasion to express to you the high sense which I entertain of the zeal, fortitude, and ability which have distinguished your conduct in the execution of the arduous duties committed to your charge since you have held the important command of that part of the army of India destined to co-operate in the

expulsion of the French from Egypt. The successful march of the army under your command through Upper Egypt, under circumstances of extraordinary difficulty, embarrassment, and danger, is to be ascribed principally to your prudence and perseverance, aided by the approved skill and determined spirit of your officers, and by the discipline and firmness of your troops.

“It will afford me the highest satisfaction to submit to his Majesty’s ministers, and to the honourable the Court of Directors, my cordial approbation of your eminent merits and services, and those of your officers and men, on the late important service.

“Although the rapid progress of the British arms under the able conduct of the late Lieutenant-General Sir Ralph Abercrombie, and of Lieutenant-General Sir John Hutchinson, precluded the troops under your command from participating in the glory of those operations which terminated the conquest of Egypt, you omitted no exertion to render your approach useful to the common cause; and if the course of events had required your exertions and those of the army of India in the field, I am confident that your conduct, and that of your army, would have been correspondent to the character which you have acquired in this quarter of the globe and to the renown of the British arms in India.

“I desire you to consider this despatch as a public record of my thanks to you, and to your army, for your services in the execution of my orders, and you will be pleased to make such notification

as you may think proper, to the officers and troops under your command."

The distance from Cairo to Suez was sixty-nine miles, and the troops did the journey in five easy marches with the loss of only three men.

General Baird handed over to the Turkish authorities what was left of his ordnance shares, in return for the assistance that they had rendered and for the supplies they had given to the army.

The General ordered the Bombay troops to proceed direct to that Presidency, but all the remainder to go straight to Madras.

Just before he embarked he wrote the following letter to the Earl of Cavan :—

"I beg your Lordship to accept my warmest thanks for the ready assistance you have given me ; I have been in consequence enabled to cross the desert with great facility, comparatively little fatigue, and with the loss of but three men. On this subject I have taken the liberty to express my sentiments to his Royal Highness the Duke of York, and shall not fail to do so to his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley.

"Allow me to assure your Lordship that I am highly sensible of, and much gratified by, the handsome manner in which you have been pleased to carry on the service with me since I have had the honour to be under your Lordship's command, and for the very flattering terms in which your Lordship has been pleased to express your approbation of my

conduct in public orders and in your letters to me on that subject."

To Sir Home Popham the General wrote as follows :—

"The object of the expedition on which we have been mutually employed being now so happily brought to a conclusion, and as we are so soon to separate, I deem the present a fit occasion to publicly express how much I have at all times been sensible and felt the value of your zealous exertions and cordial co-operation in forwarding the service.

"It has been a duty on me, no less just towards you than a pleasing tribute to my own feelings, to convey these my sincere and perfect sentiments of your meritorious conduct and able assistance to his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, and to his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley, Governor-General of India.

"Should it ever be my lot on any future occasion to be on active service, where the navy and army may be required to act together, I can only add that it will be to me a source of real satisfaction again to co-operate with you, and, if not, I shall wish it may be my good fortune to meet with an officer possessed of your zeal, ability, and military experience."

For the operations in Egypt, Major-General Baird was made a Knight of the Crescent by the Sultan of Turkey, but no honour was conferred upon him by the British Government.

The General embarked on H.M.S. *Victor* on

5th June, and sailed that evening. The *Victor* called at Kosseir on 7th June and at Mocha on the 16th, reached Madras on 6th July, and arrived at Calcutta on 31st July.

On the arrival of Major-General Baird at Calcutta the following general order was issued by the Governor-General :—

“FORT WILLIAM, 31st July 1802.

“Major-General Baird, commanding the forces employed in the late expedition from India to Egypt, arrived this day at the Presidency, attended by the Governor-General’s state boats, and was received on his landing at Chaundpaul Ghaut by the officers of his Excellency’s staff.

“The Governor-General in council derived sincere satisfaction from the highly honourable testimony borne by Major-General the Earl of Cavan to the services of Major-General Baird and of the troops from the establishments of India lately employed in Egypt. Under a grateful impression of the important aid derived to the common cause of our country by the able and successful conduct of the expedition from India to Egypt, his Excellency is pleased to order that honorary medals be conferred on all the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, troops and Sepoys, golaundaza and gun Lascars, who have been employed on service in Egypt.”

The Earl of Cavan’s letter to which the order refers was dated Alexandria, 6th May, and contains the following passage :—

“ I am sensible no opinion of mine can increase the very high and deserved estimation that the professional abilities of Major-General Baird have acquired. But it is a justice I owe to him, and the troops he brought under his command from India, to testify to your Excellency the very full satisfaction they have given me on every occasion since I have had the honour of having them under my command.

“ Their excellent discipline and obedience, and their patience under great hardship and fatigue, have been equalled by their highly exemplary conduct in the correct and regular discharge of every duty of soldiers ; and though they may lament that circumstances rendered it impossible for them to have taken part in the brilliant actions of this country during the last campaign, it must be a satisfaction for them to know that their services in Egypt have been as important and as essential to their country as those of their brother soldiers that gained such distinguished victories in it.

“ I have requested of them to accept my humble approbation and very best thanks ; and I beg leave to recommend General Baird and them strongly to your Excellency’s notice.”

On 9th August the Governor-General entertained General Baird and the officers of the army who had served in Egypt at breakfast at Government House, and a royal salute was fired in honour of the return of the troops.

Major-General Baird was still anxious for a command in the Madras Presidency, and on 9th September

he received an official intimation that his wish was to be gratified.

He left Calcutta without delay, and on his arrival at Madras he learnt that he was to take part in the operations against the Marathas.

Major-General Baird was put in command of a division of the Madras army. On 12th January 1803 he reached Vellout, where he found the artillery from St. Thomas' Mount, the Scotch Brigade, and a detachment of the 17th Madras Infantry.

On 17th January the General reached Arcot. The troops had had the greatest difficulty in getting supplies on the line of march owing to the neglect of the collector of the district, who made no effort to assist them though he had been warned of the proposed movement.

At Arcot the General was joined by the 19th Light Dragoons and five companies of the 74th Regiment, and on 20th January he camped two miles north of Vellore. There the General received twenty guns and howitzers.

The General sent his force up through the Pass on to the Mysore plateau in three detachments, and concentrated at Venkitagherry on 29th January.

Baird now advanced towards the Tungabhadra, but many of his troops were taken from him and sent to Major-General Wellesley, who advanced from Harihar and crossed the Tungabhadra on 12th March. When Baird reached the river and found that his own command was so diminished, and that once again Wellesley stood between him and the object of his wishes, he remonstrated with the Madras Government, and then asked for and obtained

permission to resign his command and return to England.

He returned to Madras, and left India for the last time on the *True Briton*. A tremendous storm prevented the ship from making the Cape of Good Hope, but she eventually reached St. Helena. News had arrived that war had again broken out between England and France in May 1803, so the *True Briton* was detained to await a convoy.

Baird was impatient to reach England, so he decided to take his chance of getting home on a South Sea whaler which sailed soon afterwards. All went well for a time, but when crossing the Bay of Biscay the whaler was chased and captured by the French privateer *Le Brave*.

When the whaler was taken, Major-General Baird sent one of his staff-officers on board *Le Brave* and asked permission for himself and his officers to remain on the prize as all their baggage was there. The Frenchman consented, on condition that Baird would give him a written declaration to the effect that he and his officers considered themselves prisoners of war, and would not interfere with the voyage of the ship to Bordeaux.

The privateer now left for Bordeaux, but the weather became calm, and as provisions and water were scarce the officer in charge of the prize decided to make for Corunna. The whaler was in sight of the Spanish coast when H.M.S. *Sirius* bore down and recaptured her.

The *Sirius* joined Sir Edward Pellew's squadron that same day, and General Baird continued his journey in H.M.S. cutter *Mary*, which sailed a few

hours later to join Admiral Cornwallis's fleet off Ushant.

Even now the General's adventures were not at an end, for on a dark and foggy night the *Mary* unwittingly approached a French battery. When morning came the French fired several shots into the cutter, and one passed within a few inches of Baird's head as he stood at the gangway.

At length the General reached Falmouth, and went at once to London. It was decided that, though recaptured, he could not serve again till exchanged.

An exchange was effected with the French General Morgan, and Major-General Baird was given an appointment on the staff of the Eastern District. He was knighted soon after he reached England.

CHAPTER XI

THE CAPE

IN July 1805 Major-General Baird received the following letter from Lord Castlereagh:—

“ To Major-General Baird, &c. &c.

“ DOWNING STREET, 25th July 1805.

“SIR,—In consequence of information having been received that the Cape is now defended by not more than from fifteen hundred to two thousand regular troops, not of the best description, and that the militia and inhabitants look with anxiety for the arrival of a British force, and also from the facility afforded to an operation against that settlement from the troops now embarked and proceeding to India, being applicable without inconvenience to the service, in progress to their ultimate destination, it has been determined on to attempt the reduction of that colony by a combined operation of a force from Cork added to that now on board the East India Company's ships at Falmouth.

“ I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that his Majesty has been graciously pleased to select you for the command of this expedition, and that directions have been given to embark, with the utmost despatch, the regiments named in the margin (24th, 38th, 71st, 72nd, 83rd, 93rd), in transports now lying at Cork, to be employed on this service.

“As the troops cantoned in the neighbourhood of Cork have been directed to embark on board transports, which are kept constantly in readiness and victualled for six months, I have every reason to hope that the armament will be in readiness to put to sea in the course of a few days; and the whole naval and military force, when assembled at the Madeiras, will be as follows:—

NAVAL FORCE.

Diadem	64 guns
Raisable	64 „
Belliqueux	64 „
Diomede	50 „
Narcissus	32 „
Leda	32 „

MILITARY.

24th Foot	504 rank and file
38th „	925 „ „
59th „	1000 „ „
71st „	768 „ „
72nd „	730 „ „
83rd „	750 „ „
98th „	890 „ „
20th Light Dragoons	221 „ „
Artillery and artificers	320 „ „
Recruits	546 „ „
Total	<u>6654</u> rank and file.

“It is of the utmost importance that the object of this expedition should not transpire; and lest the enemy should be apprised of your approach, the troops at Cork have been directed to embark under your command for the Mediterranean. The India fleet has been ordered to proceed at once for India.

Both fleets will therefore sail with these ostensible destinations, but having sealed orders, to be opened in a certain latitude, directing them to rendezvous at the Madeiras, where the whole naval and military force, including the company's ships, will be directed to place themselves under your orders and those of Sir Home Popham.

"It is his Majesty's pleasure that you delay as short a time as possible at Madeira, and that even there every precaution is to be taken to prevent the object of the expedition being made public, which will best be done by giving out that the Cork fleet is to separate at a certain latitude for the West Indies.

"Having departed from the Madeiras, you are to proceed at once to the Cape, unless the officer in command of his Majesty's ships should think it advisable to land at St. Helena, in which case you will use your utmost diligence to obtain the latest and most precise information with respect to the state of the Cape, its garrison, defences, means of subsistence, &c., and you will confer with the Governor of St. Helena (who is directed to render you every aid consistent with the security of that island) as to the possibility of making any of the resources at his disposal applicable to the success of the expedition.

"Having arrived off the Cape, you will, should you have no previous reason to suppose that your approach has transpired, endeavour, by a vigorous and immediate attack (having previously summoned the garrison to surrender) to avail yourself of the probable neglect of due vigilance and precaution on the part of the garrison.

“ As it is not impossible, however, that two French ships-of-the-line, which sailed in May from Rochefort with troops on board, and which are yet unaccounted for, may have thrown themselves into the Cape with a reinforcement, you will not rely with too much confidence on the enemy’s means of resistance being confined to the numbers stated at the outset of their embarkation.

“ Should you be of opinion that the reduction of the place may be facilitated by opening a communication with the inhabitants and persons in authority, you are authorised and directed, in conjunction with the officer in command of his Majesty’s naval force (taking care not to waste too much time in such negotiations), to grant to the inhabitants and the garrison such favourable and liberal terms of capitulation as may appear to you best calculated to acquire possession of the place in the most expeditious manner, and with the least loss or hazard to the ships and troops employed on the service.

“ Upon the surrender of the place to his Majesty’s arms, taking possession of it in the King’s name, and duly attending to the stipulations of any capitulation which may be previously agreed upon, you will take upon yourself, under the title of Lieutenant-Governor, the civil government of the settlement until his Majesty’s further pleasure is declared, and continue to carry on the administration (preserving to the inhabitants the enjoyment of their private property, usages, and religion) as nearly as may be, according to the system laid down and established by his Majesty’s authority during the late war, and

under which the colony enjoyed, till the period of its restitution, so much prosperity and happiness.

“As I understand the troops now in garrison at the Cape are mostly Germans, and much disgusted with the Dutch service, you will take the earliest opportunity of inducing them to enter into his Majesty’s 60th Regiment, attaching them in equal proportions as supernumeraries to the regiments in garrison until measures can be taken for transferring them under their own officers. If after using your best endeavours to procure the whole of these men for his Majesty’s service in the manner above directed, any foreigners (not being French subjects), having so declined to engage, should nevertheless be willing to enlist for service in the East Indies, you will engage them for the service of the East India Company according to the terms of enlistment usual in the European branch of their army, a statement of which you will receive herewith enclosed, and you will use your own discretion in retaining or enlisting Hottentots, in case the public service should appear to you absolutely to require that this additional expense should be incurred.

“As it is important that the Company’s ships directed to co-operate in the expedition, and placed with a view to this special service under the orders of the naval officer in command, should be delayed at the Cape as short a time as possible, I have his Majesty’s commands to direct that you use your utmost diligence to have the troops and recruits destined for India expeditiously re-embarked, in order that they may proceed under the convoy of the *Belliqueux* to their ultimate destination, notifying by them, or

by the earliest opportunity which you can find, the surrender of the Cape, to the several Presidencies in India, in order that the accustomed intercourse with the colony may be opened, and such supplies received as may be required for the use of the settlement.

“ In the event of circumstances arising either to discourage you from landing the troops, or (in the event of your having made good your landing) to determine you to desist from the enterprise (contingencies, I trust, equally improbable), it is his Majesty’s pleasure (the India ships being detached to their destination) that you do return with the remainder of your force to St. Helena, there to refresh the troops and squadrons, and to receive further orders for the direction of your conduct.

“ In case you should not find fresh instructions at St. Helena, continuing there not longer than fifteen days unless the refreshment of the squadron should render a longer stay indispensable, you will at the end of that period return to Cork, unless you should receive a different destination at Fayal, where you are directed to call and enquire for orders.

“ His Majesty has entrusted to you the conduct of the military part of this service, under a full confidence in your experience, zeal, and discretion ; and his Majesty implicitly relies on your cultivating the most cordial good understanding with the officer to whom the command of his naval force has been confided—the ultimate success of the expedition depending on the cordial co-operation of the respective services. His Majesty is persuaded that their

united exertions will be such as to entitle them to his Majesty's gracious and unqualified approbation.—I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient humble servant, CASTLEREAGH."

On receipt of this letter General Baird at once hastened to Cork. In order to lend additional credit to the report that the expedition was destined for the Mediterranean, some horses belonging to the garrison of Gibraltar were embarked on one of the transports.

It was not only possible but even probable that the French ships of which Lord Castlereagh spoke had landed their troops at the Cape, and an officer who had just come from there in a Danish ship reported that the Dutch garrison was much stronger than our Government believed, so General Baird asked for a reinforcement. In his reply Lord Castlereagh was able to inform the General that it was now definitely ascertained that the French ships had gone to the West Indies.

Upon the arrival of Sir Home Popham at Cork in H.M.S. *Diadem*, General Baird at once removed his headquarters into that ship.

On 27th August, H.M.S. *Diomedé* arrived with the additional artillery and artificers, under Brigadier-General Yorke, and the detachment of the 20th Light Dragoons; but the volunteers from the militia at Plymouth had not arrived, so General Baird applied for the 8th Regiment, but did not get it.

The expedition put to sea on 31st August, and reached Funchal, in the Island of Madeira, on 28th September.

With the concurrence of the Admiral, General Baird now despatched Captain Sarel of the 86th Regiment to St. Helena in the frigate *Narcissus*, to obtain from the Governor all the information possible about the Cape.

Sailing again on 3rd October, the expedition reached St. Salvador on 10th November. It remained there some time to take in water and provisions, and to make some changes rendered necessary by the loss of the *King George* transport and the *Britannia* East Indiaman. These two ships had been wrecked on the morning of 1st November on an island called the Roccas. The ships were lost with all their cargoes, except that twelve chests of dollars were saved from the *Britannia*. Only three men were drowned, but among them was Brigadier-General Yorke, and the command of the artillery now devolved on Major Spicer. In the meantime Baird had been gazetted Lieutenant-General on 30th October.

During the stay at St. Salvador each regiment was landed in turn and inspected by the General. Fifty horses were purchased for the 20th Light Dragoons, but they proved almost useless. The expedition again put to sea on 26th December, and anchored off Table Bay, between Robben Island and the Blaueberg, on 4th January 1806.

The weather was favourable, but the day was too far advanced for the disembarkation to be completed before darkness set in.

General Baird decided to land his army next morning at Lospard's Bay, an inlet in Table Bay, about sixteen miles north-east of Cape Town.

During the night the wind got up, and in the morning there was such a heavy surf that a landing was impracticable.

After a consultation with the Admiral, General Baird now decided to land his army at Saldanah Bay, some fifty miles further to the north. This would involve a march of seventy miles to Cape Town, and communication with the fleet would be difficult; but, on the other hand, as the Admiral pointed out, there was no knowing when the wind would drop, and the present anchorage of the fleet was very exposed.

Accordingly, on the evening of the 5th, General Baird despatched Brigadier-General Beresford (the future Marshal of Portugal) to Saldanah Bay with the 38th Regiment and the 20th Light Dragoons, intending to follow himself with the rest of the army in the morning.

When dawn came it was seen that the surf had gone down considerably, and the General decided to revert to his original plan of landing at Lospard's Bay.

The Highland Brigade—consisting of the 71st, 72nd, and 93rd, under Brigadier-General Fergusson—was at once ordered into the boats, and a landing was effected. A few Boers attempted to oppose the disembarkation, but they were kept at a distance by the guns of the fleet, and driven off by the light companies under Major Graham of the 93rd. Our losses were only one man killed and two officers and two men wounded. The surf, however, was still violent; a boat containing thirty-five men of the 93rd Regiment was swamped, and the men were

all drowned. On 7th January the rest of the force was successfully landed, and the General decided to advance on Cape Town.

Meanwhile General Janssens, the Dutch Commander, had alarmed the country for fifty miles around by signal guns. Unfortunately for him the weather was exceedingly hot, and the farmers were very busy threshing. Apart from the Burghers, Janssens had about 1200 regular troops, consisting of the 22nd Dutch Regiment of the line (600 strong), a Waldeck battalion (400 strong), a battalion of sharpshooters of all nations (200), and a few dragoons and artillerymen. He had, besides, 240 French sailors, 300 or 400 coloured troops, and about 200 mounted Burghers. With this very mixed force of about 2000 men and 16 guns he marched at 1 A.M. on 8th January to oppose the British. On the same morning General Baird left Lospard's Bay for Cape Town with 4000 men, two howitzers, and four 6-pounders—the guns being dragged by sailors. Baird seized the Blaueberg heights, and from that point of vantage he could see the Dutch army in the plain below him—the infantry formed in two lines and the mounted Burghers threatening the British right.

Baird at once sent the Highland Brigade straight at the enemy's infantry, while the other Brigade consisting of the 24th, 59th and 83rd, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Baird of the 83rd (a brother of the General) in the absence of Brigadier-General Beresford, kept the mounted Burghers in check.

The Waldeck battalion fled as soon as the British guns opened on it, and the Dutch 22nd Regiment

gave way at sight of the Highlanders advancing. The French, the Boers, and the coloured troops fought well, but Janssens was now compelled to retire, which he did unmolested, as Baird had no cavalry with which to pursue.

General Janssens lost rather more than 200 men killed and wounded. The British loss was 1 officer and 14 men killed, 9 officers and 180 men wounded. Five-sixths of our casualties occurred in the Highland Brigade, for the First Brigade was but little engaged.

Janssens collected the remains of his army at Riet Vlei, sent the Waldeck battalion and the French sailors to Cape Town, and retired with the rest of the force to the mountains of Hottentots Holland Kloof.

To pursue Janssens was out of the question, for it would have been impossible to procure supplies or to compel the Dutch to fight, and Baird decided to march at once on Cape Town.

The men were out of condition after their long voyage, and were much exhausted by the heat and the absence of water, and it was late before the British force reached Riet Vlei, where it bivouacked for the night. The sailors managed to land some provisions by floating the casks through the surf.

On the 9th, General Baird advanced with his army to Salt River, about a mile and a half north of Cape Town. Here he hoped to ensure his communication with the fleet, and to land his siege-train if necessary. He was now joined by Beresford and the detachment which had been sent to Saldanah Bay. Soon after his arrival a flag of truce came in

from the Commandant of Cape Town asking for a suspension of hostilities, and on the following day a capitulation was signed and the town handed over to the British. By the terms of the agreement the regular troops in the garrison and the French sailors became prisoners of war, but the inhabitants who had borne arms were allowed to proceed to their homes, and private property was respected. Four hundred and fifty-six guns and mortars mounted on the works round the town were surrendered with it. The fleet at once moved in and took up the usual anchorage inside the Bay.

The following is the despatch in which General Baird announced his success. It will be noticed that he estimated the army of General Janssens at 5000 men with 23 guns.

*“ To the Right Honourable Lord Viscount
Castlereagh*

“ CAPE TOWN, 12th January 1806.

“ MY LORD,—I have the honour to announce to you the capitulation of the town and garrison of Good Hope to his Majesty’s arms.

“ In my despatch of the 24th ultimo, from St. Salvador, I had the honour to apprise your Lordship of the measures adopted to refresh the forces under my command, and having with much difficulty procured about sixty or seventy horses for the cavalry, and the sick being recruited, the expedition sailed on the 26th of that month, and we had the good fortune to reach Table Bay on the 4th instant.

“ It had been intended to disembark the army

immediately, and, with a view of covering our design, before entering the bay the 24th Regiment, under the command of the Honourable Lieut.-Colonel Macdonald, was detached under the charge of the *Leda* frigate, to make a demonstration of landing in Camps Bay, but the winds having failed the fleet did not arrive at its anchorage until the day was too far advanced to attempt a landing.

“On the morning of the 5th the First Brigade, under the orders of Brigadier-General Beresford, was embarked in boats, and proceeded towards the only accessible parts of the shore, in a smaller bay sixteen miles to the northward of Cape Town, whence it appeared practicable to effect a debarkation ; but the surf had increased so considerably that, combined with the local difficulties of the spot, it was found necessary to abandon the attempt.

“The rest of the day was devoted to a careful examination of the coast from Lospard’s Bay to within gunshot of the batteries in Cape Town, but which only produced the distressing conviction that the chance of effecting a landing depended on contingencies very unlikely to be realised except in a perfect calm.

“In consequence of this inference, and in order to obviate the disadvantages of delay in adopting a resolution which I apprehended would at last be necessarily imposed on me, I directed Brigadier-General Beresford to proceed with the 38th Regiment and the 20th Light Dragoons, escorted by H.M.S. *Diomedé*, to Saldanah Bay, where the debarkation could be accomplished with facility, and a prospect was afforded us of procuring horses and

cattle ; and I proposed following with the main body of the army, in the event of the beach where we were being impracticable the ensuing morning. The surf along the shore of Lospard's Bay having considerably abated next morning, I determined, with the concurrence of Commodore Sir Home Popham, to make an effort to get the troops ashore ; and accordingly the Highland Brigade, composed of the 71st, 72nd, and 93rd Regiments, effected that object under the command of Brigadier-General Fergusson.

“The shore had been previously very closely inspected by the Brigadier, and by his spirited exertions and example our efforts were crowned with success, although a confined and intricate channel to the shore (which had been accurately pointed out by beacons which had been laid down by the diligence and activity of the boats of H.M.S. *Diadem*) and a tremendous surf opposed the passage of the troops.

“The enemy had scattered a party of sharpshooters over the contiguous heights commanding the landing ; but the casualties of this service arose principally from natural difficulties, and it is with the deepest concern I have the honour to inform your Lordship that we lost thirty-five rank and file of the 93rd Regiment by the oversetting of one of the boats, notwithstanding every possible effort to rescue these unfortunate men.

“The remainder of the troops could only be brought on shore on the succeeding day, when the extraordinary obstacles to all intercourse with the fleet, which nothing but the courage and perseverance of

British seamen could surmount, barely enabled us to obtain the indispensable supplies of water and provisions for immediate subsistence.

“ On the morning of the 8th the army, consisting of the 24th, 59th, 71st, 72nd, 83rd, and 93rd Regiments about four thousand strong, was formed into two brigades, with two howitzers and six light field-pieces, and moved towards the road which leads to Cape Town ; and having ascended the summit of the Blaueberg, or Blue Mountains, and dislodged the enemy’s light troops, I discovered their main body drawn up in two lines, prepared to receive us, and even in motion to anticipate our approach.

“ The enemy’s force apparently consisted of about five thousand men, the greater proportion of which was cavalry, and twenty-three pieces of cannon yoked to horses. The disposition and the nature of the ground occupied by the enemy’s troops made it evident that they meant to reserve their right wing, and with their left attempt to turn our right flank. But to frustrate their design, I formed the army into two columns, the Second Brigade, under Brigadier-General Fergusson, keeping the road, while the First struck off to the right and took the defile of the mountains.

“ Having accomplished my purpose, our line was formed with equal celerity and order, and the left wing, composed of the Highland Brigade, was thrown forward, and advanced with the steadiest step under a very heavy fire of round-shot, grape, and musketry. Nothing could surpass or resist the determined bravery of the troops, headed by their gallant leader, Brigadier-General Fergusson, and the numbers of the

enemy who swarmed in the plain served only to augment their ardour and confirm their discipline.

“The enemy received our fire and maintained his position obstinately, but, in the moment of charging, the valour of British troops bore down all opposition and forced him to a precipitate retreat.

“The First Brigade, composed of the 24th, 59th, and 83rd Regiments, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Baird in the absence of Brigadier-General Beresford, was unavoidably precluded by its situation from any considerable participation in the triumph of the British arms. The flank companies of the 24th, however, had an opportunity of distinguishing themselves in dislodging a number of horse and riflemen from the heights on our right flank. This brilliant achievement was, however, clouded by the loss of Captain Forster of the Grenadiers, whose gallantry is recorded in the hearts of his brother soldiers and the universal regrets of the army.

“It is utterly impossible to convey to your Lordship an adequate idea of the obstacles which opposed our advance and retarded the success of our army ; but it is my duty to inform your Lordship that the nature of the country—a deep, heavy, and dry sand, covered with shrubs, scarcely pervious by light bodies of infantry ; and, above all, the total privation of water under the effect of a burning sun—had nearly exhausted our gallant fellows in the moment of victory ; and with the greatest difficulty were we able to reach Reit Valley, where we took our position for the night.

“ A considerable portion of the provisions and necessaries with which we started had been lost during the action, and we occupied our ground under an apprehension that even the great exertions of Sir Home Popham and the navy could not relieve us from starvation.

“ My Lord, on every occasion where it has been found necessary to call for the co-operation of British seamen in land enterprises, their valour has been so conspicuous, and their spirit of labour and perseverance so unconquerable, that no tribute of my applause can add a lustre to their character ; but I discharge a most agreeable portion of my duty in assuring your Lordship that on the recent employment of their services they have maintained their reputation ; and in this place it behoves me to inform your Lordship that the uniform good conduct of those gallant fellows, and the zeal of Captain George Byng who commanded them, together with that of every subordinate officer, have merited my fullest approbation.

“ The loss of the enemy in the engagement is reported to exceed 700 men killed and wounded ; and it is with the most sensible gratification that I contrast it with the enclosed return of our casualties. Your Lordship will perceive the name of Lieut.-Colonel Grant among the wounded, but the heroic spirit of this officer was not subdued by his misfortune, and he continued to lead his regiment to glory as long as an enemy was opposed to his Majesty's 72nd. I have the cordial satisfaction to add that his wound, although very severe, is not pronounced dangerous ; and I do indulge the hope

and expectation of his early recovery and resumption of command.

“ On the morning of the 9th, recruited by such supplies as the unwearied diligence and efforts of the navy could throw on shore (the 59th Regiment being, however, almost without food), we prosecuted our march upon Cape Town, and took up a position south of the Sael River, which we trusted might preserve a free communication with the squadron ; for our battering train, as well as every other necessary except water, had yet to pass to us from his Majesty’s ships.

“ In this situation a flag of truce was sent to me by the Commandant of the garrison at Cape Town (the Governor-General Janssens having retired after the action of the 8th into the country, moving by Hottentots Holland Kloof), requesting a suspension of hostilities for forty-eight hours in order to negotiate a capitulation. In answer to this overture I despatched Brigadier-General Fergusson, accompanied by Lieut.-Colonel Brownrigg, to stipulate as the condition of my acquiescence the surrender of the outworks of the town within six hours, allowing thirty-six for arranging the articles of capitulation.

“ My proposition being assented to, the 59th Regiment marched into Fort Kreecke ; and on the next day, in conjunction with Sir Home Popham, the terms were agreed upon, and his Majesty’s troops were put into possession of the several defences of the town. Of the modified capitulation as ratified by us, I have the honour to enclose a copy.

“ The cordial, able, and zealous co-operation of

Commodore Sir Home Popham, emulated by all the officers under his command, merits my warmest acknowledgments and commendations ; and I have the satisfaction to add that no united service ever was performed with more harmony than has uniformly been manifested by both branches of his Majesty's forces. Such of his Majesty's ships as could be spared from the service of Lospard's Bay constantly coasted the enemy's shores, throwing shot amongst her troops and people, and contributing to keep him ignorant of the actual place of our debarkation ; and a very spirited effort was made by the marines of the fleet and a party of seamen from the *Diadem*, under the Commodore's immediate command, to occupy a position in Reit Valley and co-operate with the army.

“ To the several commanding officers of corps I am under considerable obligation for their spirited, gallant, zealous, and judicious conduct in leading their men to the enemy. British troops headed by such men must ever, under Providence, command success ; and every man has, I trust it will be considered, preserved the character of the British soldier and faithfully discharged his duty to his King and country.

“ This despatch will be delivered to your Lordship by Lieut.-Colonel Baird, to whom I beg leave to refer your Lordship for any additional information you may wish to obtain respecting our proceedings, and I beg leave to recommend this zealous and meritorious old officer to your Lordship's protection.

“ I take the liberty of mentioning to your Lordship

that, not having been joined by the *Narcissus* frigate prior to our debarkation or subsequent operations in the field, I have unfortunately been deprived of the service of Captain Sarel, Assistant-Adjutant-General, who was charged with my despatches from Madeira to Governor Patton at St. Helena, and with the execution of my wishes to procure intelligence relative to the strength and condition of this colony, and from whose extensive local knowledge and professional talents, I expected to derive great assistance.

“ Herewith I have the honour to enclose for your Lordship’s information a return of the ordnance found in the citadel and other defences of the settlement, but which is perhaps inaccurate, for the reason assigned by the commanding officer of artillery.—I have the honour to be, my Lord, with the greatest respect, your Lordship’s most obedient and humble servant,

“ D. BAIRD,

“ *Major-General, Commanding in Chief.*”

CHAPTER XII

THE CAPE (*continued*)

GENERAL BAIRD had still to deal with the force in the interior under General Janssens.

He at once set to work to disarm the Burghers, and to requisition all horses suitable for the cavalry or artillery. The horses were paid for at a rate fixed by English and Dutch commissioners, and it was arranged that the owners could recover their horses at the conclusion of hostilities by repaying this sum.

Meanwhile detachments occupied Simons Town, Muisenberg, and Wynberg without encountering any opposition.

On 13th January, Brigadier-General Beresford left Cape Town with the 59th and 72nd Regiments, four 6-pounders and two howitzers, and occupied Stellenbosch, a village about twenty miles east of Cape Town. This not only enabled us to draw supplies from a considerable tract of country, but also threatened General Janssens at Hottentots Holland Kloof. The Dutch position was unassailable in front, but General Baird proposed to turn Janssens' right through the Roode-Sand Kloof, and at the same time to land a detachment in rear of the position.

Meanwhile Janssens' forces were dwindling away, and Baird, anxious to avert a protracted guerilla

warfare, sent him the following letter, and at the same time informed him that Brigadier-General Beresford was empowered to treat with him for a final settlement.

“ To Lieutenant-General Janssens

“ CAPE TOWN, 11th January 1806.

“ SIR,—You have discharged your duty to your country, as became a brave man, at the head of a gallant though feeble army. I know how to respect the high qualities of such a man ; and do not doubt that the humanity which ever characterises an intrepid soldier, will now operate in your breast to check the fatal consequences of a fruitless contest. The naval and military forces of his Britannic Majesty which have possessed themselves of the seat of your recent Government are of a magnitude to leave no question respecting the issue of further hostilities, and therefore a temporary resistance is all you can possibly oppose to superior numbers. Under these circumstances nothing can result but the devastation of the country you casually occupy, and such a consequence can never be contemplated without anguish by a generous mind, or be gratifying to the man who feels for the prosperity and tranquillity of the colony lately subject to his administration. But if, unhappily, your resolution is formed to oppose an enemy of such superior force by protracting a contest which must entail misery and ruin on the industrious and peaceably disposed settlers of this colony, I shall be exonerated from the reproach of my own conscience by this frank overture ; and you must justify to yourself and to

your countrymen the further effusion of blood and the desolation of the country.

“ You are necessarily so well acquainted with the extent of the calamities in which the interior of the country may be involved, that I shall not enlarge on your power of causing mischief to be done to all its inhabitants ; but I persuade myself that considerations of a more laudable nature will influence your decision on this occasion, and that you will manifest an immediate disposition to promote a general tranquillity.—I have the honour to subscribe myself, with sentiments of the highest consideration, Sir, yours, &c.,

“ (Signed) D. BAIRD,
“ *Major-General, Commanding in Chief.*”

Negotiations were entered into, but as the result seemed doubtful the 59th and 72nd Regiments were moved to Roodesand Kloof, the 93rd took their place in front of Hottentots Holland Kloof, and the 83rd embarked and sailed on 16th January for Mosell’s Bay to cut off the enemy from Swellendam.

General Janssens sent his military secretary, Captain Debitz, to General Baird with a modified draft of the terms which had been offered to him, but the British General refused to consent to any alterations, and on 18th January, Janssens capitulated on the following conditions :—

The whole colony of the Cape of Good Hope was surrendered to the British. The Dutch troops were to march within three days to Simons Town with guns, arms and baggage, and the honours of war. The officers were to retain their swords, but the arms

of the troops and public property of every description, including the cavalry and artillery horses, were to be surrendered; the troops to be embarked and sent direct to Holland at the expense of the British Government, under an engagement not to serve against the English or their allies until landed in Holland. The native troops were to be allowed to go to their homes or to enter the British service at their choice.

On his return to Cape Town after the negotiations with General Janssens, General Baird at once set about to secure the tranquillity of the colony. As far as possible he retained the former officials in office, but he appointed Captain Carmichael Smyth, of the Engineers, Colonial Secretary, and Mr. Reynevelt, Fiscal. Mr. Reynevelt had been Fiscal under the former British Government of the colony, and had joined General Baird before the capitulation.

The Indian fleet now departed, taking with it the 59th Regiment. At this juncture information was brought by a neutral vessel that a strong French squadron of six ships of the line besides smaller vessels was on its way to the Cape of Good Hope. Sir Home Popham had now only got the *Diadem* of sixty-four guns, the *Diomedé* of fifty, two frigates and two or three gun-brigs, so he took up such a position that his broadsides and the shore batteries would bring a cross-fire to bear on the approaching enemy; and the light company of the 71st was embarked as a reinforcement to the Marines. An embargo was laid on all foreign vessels to prevent the French learning of the capture of the colony, and the Dutch flag was kept flying.

The French Admiral, however, learnt what had occurred at the Cape, and took his squadron to the West Indies; but Sir Home Popham's preparations were not wasted, for on 4th March the French frigate *La Volontaire* of forty-four guns sailed unsuspectingly into the harbour and was captured. On board of her were found 217 soldiers of the 2nd (Queen's) and 54th Regiments, who had been captured in the Bay of Biscay when homeward bound from the Mediterranean and were being taken to Mauritius. It is rather a strange coincidence that the 2nd was the regiment in which General Baird had begun his military career, and he had been appointed Colonel of the 54th on 8th May 1801.

So far all had gone well.

Sir Home Popham now urged General Baird to lend him a portion of his force for an expedition to the Rio de la Plata. Popham was unquestionably an able officer. He had devised a code of naval signals, and had had great experience in continental operations with the army. There can be no doubt that General Baird entertained a very high opinion of him, and was over-persuaded into assisting in this hare-brained scheme. The Admiral told Baird that, if he refused to aid him, he would go with his ships alone and attack Buenos Ayres. In the end Baird agreed to lend him his old regiment, the 71st. On 14th April, Sir Home Popham set out with his squadron, taking with him the 71st Regiment (32 officers, 883 men), also one officer and six men of the 20th L.D., and three officers and thirty-three men R.A. with four guns under the command of Brigadier-General Beresford. Beresford received

instructions that if the attack on the Rio de la Plata failed he was to return at once to the Cape.

On the same day General Baird wrote as follows to Colonel Gordon, Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief :—

“CAPE TOWN, 14th April 1806.

“SIR,—In my private letter to you, by *La Volontaire* frigate, I took occasion to mention that I had been much pressed by Sir Home Popham to detach a regiment with the squadron under his command for the purpose of making an attack upon the Spanish settlements at Rio de la Plata, but that many reasons combined at the moment to prevent my acquiescence in the Commodore’s wish.

“The additional intelligence (since) received here of the weak and defenceless condition of those settlements, the great advantages derivable to Great Britain from the possession of them, particularly as opening a fresh and profitable channel for the exportation of our manufactures, the certainty that Admiral Villeaumez has proceeded to India, and cannot for some months interrupt the present tranquillity of this colony, and the rapidly increasing strength and discipline of the Cape regiments, have together united in determining me to detach a small part of the force under my command upon this service.

“I am aware that I have taken upon myself a high responsibility, but the importance of the object in a national point of view will, I trust, bear me out and ensure to me the approbation of his

Majesty and of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief.

“As I deemed it essential to the success of the undertaking that the command should be entrusted to an officer of rank and of approved ability, judgment, and zeal, I selected Brigadier-General Beresford, although I shall experience by his absence the want of his valuable services.

“Having also considered that, in the event of success, the officer discharging the civil and military duties of his Majesty’s Lieutenant-Governor and Commandant should possess a high military rank, I have taken upon myself to desire that Brigadier-General Beresford should assume, upon landing in South America with the troops under his command, the rank of Major-General in that country only. As the standing of this officer in the service induces the belief of his having already been appointed to that rank by his Majesty, I am the more induced to hope my making this appointment will meet with the approbation of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief.

“If success attend this undertaking, and his Majesty shall determine upon retaining possession of the Spanish settlement which may surrender to his arms, a reinforcement of troops cannot be despatched to General Beresford too soon. The country is well adapted to cavalry, and any number of dragoons may be expeditiously and well mounted.

“It will also be expedient to replace as soon as possible the troops detached from this, as well as to send out two general officers in the room of Generals Beresford and Fergusson; and were I

permitted on this occasion to express an opinion in favour of any individual I should certainly point out Sir Samuel Auchmuty, whose assistance I hoped for in the expedition against this colony, and whom I know to be qualified in an eminent degree for the situation of second in command here."

At first all went well with Sir Home Popham, but on 21st April there was a storm, and one of the transports with 200 soldiers on board parted company, so he made for St. Helena. There he secured a reinforcement of nearly 400 men from the Governor, and wrote the following letter of explanation to the Admiralty:—

*"Diadem, ST. HELENA,
30th April 1806.*

"SIR,—In consequence of my having borne up for St. Helena, as mentioned in my letter of this day's date, and a Company's packet giving me the opportunity of a safe conveyance to write on the subject of Rio de la Plata, I deem it right to trouble you with this letter for their Lordships' information.

"To satisfy their Lordships, in the first instance, that the project has not arisen from any sudden impulse or the immediate desire of gratifying an adventurous spirit, I take the liberty of transmitting for your perusal the copy of a paper which I wrote by the desire of Lord Melville when he was at the Board of Admiralty, after having previously had a conference with Mr. Pitt and his Lordship on that subject.

.

“ I am aware, however, that much has been said on the expediency of foreign territorial acquisition, taken simply as a conquest, but the arguments applied to situations without commercial resources, and which were exceedingly remote from the inspection or intercourse of the mother country.

“ In the present expedition no such objection exists : the destination of it is contiguous to that important colony, the Cape of Good Hope, and if the possession of Monte Video and Buenos Ayres is not absolutely necessary to its existence, it will be materially conducive to its prosperity and advantages ; and were I only on this calculation to consider the importation of corn to the Cape, I trust in that article alone the beneficial consequences, even speculatively taken, will far exceed any risk or expense that can be fairly said to attach to this enterprise.

“ It may be also thought that I have in some respects exceeded the bounds of discretion which are vested in a commanding officer. If, however, I have given too liberal a construction to that power, I have done so because I thought it would essentially serve my country ; and I have had the satisfaction of obtaining, by manifest demonstrations of eventual benefits, the concurrent sentiment of Lieutenant-General Sir David Baird to the policy of this measure, followed up by a co-operation of a detachment of his army under Brigadier-General Beresford:

“ The expedition will sail to-morrow evening, and

we calculate on four weeks' passage ; but I trust that this small armament will only be considered as a floating force to keep up the national characteristic enterprise, and ready to apply to any point of the enemy's possessions which have been neglected, provided there is moral certainty of success and no risk beyond the common calculation under such circumstances.—I have the honour to remain, Sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

“(Signed) HOME POPHAM.”

Popham left St. Helena on 21st May, and was off the mouth of the Rio de la Plata on 8th June. The ships ascended the river and lay off Buenos Ayres on 24th June, and three days later Beresford with his handful of men got possession of Buenos Ayres—a city of 70,000 inhabitants, with fortifications mounting eighty-six guns—at a cost of one man killed and a dozen wounded.

Beresford at once wrote to Baird asking for reinforcements, for he quite realised that the position was full of danger.

Baird ought never to have consented to send troops with Sir Home Popham, but, having done so, there can be no doubt that he was right to send them reinforcements to prevent their being overwhelmed. Unfortunately the aid arrived too late.

Two regiments had just reached the Cape on their way to India, but General Baird thought the crisis so important that he changed the destination of the 47th Regiment to Buenos Ayres. On

28th August Colonel Backhouse set out with the following troops :—

38th Regiment	.	.	.	811	strong
47th	„	.	.	685	„
1 company 54th	.	.	.	103	„
2 squadrons 20th L.D.	.	.	.	191	„
1 „ 21st L.D.	.	.	.	140	„
R.A.	.	.	.	6	„
				<u>1936</u>	rank and file,

besides the usual complement of officers and sergeants.

In the meantime, however, the populace had risen at Buenos Ayres, and on 12th August, Beresford had been obliged to surrender.

After the departure of Sir Home Popham, General Baird had at once to take measures to avert a famine. He immediately despatched a ship to St. Helena for a cargo of rice, threw open the Port for the free admission of grain, and offered a bounty for the importation of wheat. Sir David did not rest content with mere temporary expedients of this sort, but he went to the root of the matter, for this was by no means the first occasion on which the colony had been threatened with starvation. The Dutch had established a Grain Commission. The freedom of the market was destroyed by a law which gave the Grain Commission power to purchase as much corn as it wanted at a rate fixed by Government, generally much below the market price.

The result was that the Dutch farmers took to feeding their cattle on wheat rather than bring it to Cape Town, where the price was often not high enough to pay the expense of transport.

Sir David determined to remodel the Grain Commission and prevent these ruinous fluctuations in prices. He therefore issued a proclamation rescinding all former laws on the subject, and announcing that the Government stores would be open to receive wheat of a certain quality at the rate of sixty dollars a muid, and to issue the same at eighty dollars. These rates were fixed by a mixed English and Dutch Commission, and were to be revised from time to time. By this means the farmer was assured of a moderately good price for his wheat however great might be the supply, and the consumer was protected from a great rise in price in times of scarcity, because he could buy at a fixed rate from the Government.

Many farmers had concealed stores of wheat which they now produced, the markets were well supplied, and prices steadily fell.

Sir David also established a post office for the conveyance of letters from Cape Town to the interior. The mails were carried by native runners.

The death of Pitt had been followed by the appointment of the Whig Ministry known as "All the Talents," and the new Cabinet received the news of the capture of Cape Colony with coldness. No honours were conferred on General Baird, and the following letter is the only acknowledgment he received from the Government :—

"DOWNING STREET, 1st March 1806.

"SIR,—I have received and laid before the King your despatches, dated the 12th and 13th of January, containing an account of your proceedings with the

attack and capture of the Cape of Good Hope, and I feel great gratification in having it in my power to convey to you his Majesty's approbation of your conduct in the course of that service, as well as of the conduct of the troops under your command.

"It would have been more gratifying to his Majesty's feelings to have obtained possession of the Cape of Good Hope without any effusion of blood, but, from the resistance you describe, his Majesty feels great satisfaction in observing that the loss in killed and wounded was not so considerable as might have been apprehended. The measures which you have pursued after the capitulation of Cape Town appear to have been perfectly judicious; and I trust that General Janssens will have been either induced by the overtures which you had authorised General Beresford to make to him, or compelled by prompt and well-judged movements on your part, to abandon the project of maintaining any further resistance.

"In order to guard against a failure in the measures which you have pursued for procuring a supply of provisions, two victuallers laden with beef and pork, and two other vessels laden with wheat, meal, and flour, have been ordered to proceed with all possible despatch to the Cape, consigned to you; the two former are to take advantage of the present East India convoy, and the two latter, if they should not be in time to profit by that advantage, will be directed to proceed as soon as circumstances will permit.

"I will take an early opportunity of conferring with his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief on

your representation respecting a reinforcement of cavalry, and although the services of the 59th Regiment of infantry and the recruits destined for India appear, from the latest accounts from that country, to be urgently necessary there, still your detention of that regiment seems to be warranted by the circumstances of the case.—I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

“ W. WINDHAM.”

The Ministers were quite naturally very angry at Sir Home Popham's expedition to South America, and even before Brigadier-General Beresford met with disaster they decided to recall General Baird and the Governor of St. Helena. The Secretary of State for War communicated this decision to General Baird in the following letter :—

“ DOWNING STREET, 26th July 1806.

“ SIR,—I have received and laid before the King your letter, dated the 16th April, communicating that, from intelligence which you had received of the present defenceless state of the Spanish settlements at Rio de la Plata, you had been led to detach a small force with a view to attempting, in conjunction with the squadron under Sir Home Popham, the possession of these settlements. And I am commanded to acquaint you in reply that it is impossible a proceeding so extraordinary as that of detaching a considerable force on one service, destined by his Majesty's Government for another, without sanction or authority, either direct or implied, can meet with the Royal approbation, particularly as the measure

is not to be justified on the ground of necessity ; as you might reasonably have supposed that if his Majesty's Government had had it in contemplation to attack the Spanish settlements at Rio de la Plata, a force more adequate to the service would have been employed than that which you detached under the command of General Beresford ; and as you might have presumed also, that if such an enterprise had been meditated by his Majesty's Government, the measure might have been hazarded by your attempting prematurely to accomplish the object of it.

"I have it further in command to inform you that, his Majesty having been pleased to *order your recall* from the Cape of Good Hope, a communication to that effect will be made to you by his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief ; and I am to add that Lord Caledon having been appointed Governor, and Major-General the Honourable Henry George Grey, Lieutenant-Governor, you are to deliver over the civil government to either the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor, whichever of them may first arrive at the Cape of Good Hope.—I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient servant,

" W. WINDHAM."

Major-General Grey arrived in January 1807 on board the *Asia*, and took over the government from General Baird.

Sir David received several addresses from both English and Dutch inhabitants expressing regret at his departure. He left Table Bay on 19th January 1807 in the transport *Paragon*, and arrived in England in March.

CHAPTER XIII

COPENHAGEN

WHEN Sir David reached England he found that the Ministry of "All the Talents" had fallen, and that Lord Castlereagh was once again Secretary of State for War and the Colonies.

The General reported his arrival to the Duke of York, who was Commander-in-Chief, and then wrote the following letter to Lord Castlereagh :—

*"The Right Hon. Viscount Castlereagh,
Downing Street*

"LONDON, 15th April 1807.

"MY LORD,—Upon reporting to the Commander-in-Chief my arrival from the Cape of Good Hope, his Royal Highness was pleased to cause it to be intimated to me that he entirely approved of the whole of my military conduct during the period of my late command in that colony, and, in recalling me, had only acted in conformity with directions to that effect from his Majesty's ministers.

"In consequence of this communication my feelings prompted me to address your Lordship on the subject of that recall.

"During a series of many years' service it has always, my Lord, been my anxious wish and endeavour to discharge my duty to my Sovereign and my country with the strictest rectitude, zeal, and fidelity,

and I have ever deemed it incumbent on me to respect to the best of my ability the existing administration of the country, without adverting to the individuals who might compose it.

“ These principles have invariably governed my conduct in every act of my public life, but in no one to a greater degree than in the measure to which I have to attribute my recall.

“ My Lord, that measure was not adopted by me but on very mature deliberation, nor until Sir Home Popham, with whom it originated, had convinced me (by adducing a variety of arguments and documents) of the strong probability, or rather entire certainty of its success, and of the many advantages which in all likelihood would result from it.

“ Under this conviction, I considered it my duty to meet his wishes and solicitations by uniting with his squadron a small detachment from the troops under my command (the absence of which from the Cape could not endanger the security of that colony), and placing them under the orders of Brigadier-General Beresford, an officer in whose abilities, gallantry, and discretion I had the most implicit reliance.

“ For this act, my Lord, which at most can be considered an error in judgment, I have not only been dismissed from the charge of a colony, the conquest of which was achieved by an army under my personal command, but dismissed in a way that has mortified my feelings in the keenest manner, and must have disgraced me in the eyes of the army and of the nation at large, by apparently imputing

to me a degree of criminality of conduct of which I am proudly unconscious.

“Until the actual arrival of the Honourable Lieutenant-General Grey at the Cape, who had been appointed to succeed me, I had received no intimation whatever of my supersession, or of any disapprobation on the part of his Majesty’s ministers of my conduct. That officer was sent out in the *Sampson* man-of-war, arrived on the 15th, and landed at Cape Town on the 16th of last January. I made immediate arrangements for resigning my command to him, and accordingly did so on the 17th.

“It was my desire to proceed to England in the *Sampson*, but on expressing my wish to that effect to Captain Cummings, the commander, I was informed that he would be most happy to accommodate me, but that he had received positive orders from Rear-Admiral Stirling to remain at the Cape only twenty-four hours.

“I urged Captain Cummings to continue until the 18th, on which day I would be ready to accompany him; but he produced me his orders, which were peremptory. I had therefore no alternative but to embark in a common transport, much to the astonishment of the army and inhabitants at Cape Town, who attended me to the beach, and had the risk of missing the East India convoy and falling into the hands of the enemy.

“From this statement your Lordship must be sensible how deeply and cruelly my feelings had been wounded, as well by the act itself as by the manner of my dismissal from my late command, as

such dismissal must have cast a slur in the public opinion on the character and reputation of an old and faithful servant of the Crown, who presumes to flatter himself that his services to the State have been neither unimportant nor inglorious.

“ I confidently trust that his Majesty’s present ministers will consider that I have not deserved the harsh and mortifying treatment I have experienced, but that, as my degradation has been as public as unmerited, so ought it to be publicly done away.— I have the honour to be, my Lord, with perfect esteem, your Lordship’s most obedient humble servant,

“ D. BAIRD, *Lieut.-Gen.*”

Sir David was not left for long unemployed.

On 25th June the famous interview between Napoleon and the Czar took place on the raft at Tilsit. The British Government became acquainted with the secret articles of the Treaty, one of which was that, if England would not accept the mediation of the Czar, Denmark, Sweden, and Portugal were to be compelled to declare war against her.

It was imperative to forestall Napoleon and to gain possession of the Danish fleet. The Government did not hesitate.

On 18th July instructions were sent to the Admiral in the Baltic ordering him to allow no more troops to enter the island of Zealand, and Mr. Jackson was despatched on a mission to the Danish Government to demand for England the temporary possession of the Danish fleet, and to intimate that force would be used if necessary. It was decided to send

a fleet of sixteen ships of the line, besides smaller vessels, under Lord Gambier, and an army of twenty thousand men under Lord Cathcart, to enforce our demands.

An embargo was laid on all shipping for some days to prevent any intelligence reaching France. Lord Gambier sailed on 26th July, and three days later the transports put to sea with twenty thousand troops on board.

On 3rd August, Lord Gambier anchored in the Elsinore Roads, and by the 8th most of the transports had arrived. On the 12th, Lord Cathcart arrived from Stralsund, and on the 14th, Mr. Jackson left Copenhagen and reported that the Danish Government declined to hand over their fleet.

The action of the British Government in this matter was undoubtedly high-handed, but self-preservation is the first law of nature, and it was Denmark's misfortune to be placed between the devil and the deep sea. As a matter of fact, on 31st July Napoleon told the Danish minister at Paris that if England refused the Czar's mediation for peace with France, Denmark must take her choice between a war with England and a war with France.

By 14th August part of the King's German Legion had arrived from Stralsund and the rest were expected shortly, so Cathcart and Gambier decided to waste no more time.

On the 15th the fleet and transports worked their way up the Sound to Vedboek, while Spencer's Brigade was sent still further up the Sound to make a demonstration.

The force was organised as follows :—

General Officer Commanding—Lieut.-General LORD CATHCART.

Cavalry Brigade—Major-General VON LINSINGEN.
1st, 2nd, and 3rd L.D., K.G.L.

Artillery and Engineers—Major-General BLOOMFIELD.

First Division—Lieut.-General Sir GEORGE LUDLOW.

Guards Brigade—Major-General FINCH.
1/ Coldstream Guards, 1/3rd Guards.
1st Brigade—Brig.-General WARDE.
1/28th, 1/79th.

Second Division—Lieut.-General Sir DAVID BAIRD.

2nd Brigade—Major-General GROSVENOR.
1/4th, 1/23rd.
3rd Brigade—Major-General SPENCER.
1/32nd, 1/50th, 1/82nd.
4th Brigade—Brig.-General MACFARLANE.
1/7th, 1/8th.

Reserve—Major-General Sir ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

Brig.-General STEWART.
1/43rd, 1/52nd, 1/92nd, (5 coys.) 1/95th, 2/95th.

K.G.L.—Major-General VON DRECHSEL.

1st Brigade—Colonel DU PLAT.
6th, 7th, 8th line battalions.
2nd Brigade—Colonel VON DRIEBERG.
3rd, 4th, 5th line battalions.
3rd Brigade—Colonel VON BARRSE.
1st and 2nd line battalions.
4th Brigade—Colonel VON ALTEN.
1st and 2nd light battalions.

It was a strange coincidence that Baird should again meet Wellesley on active service, but still more peculiar that Sir Home Popham should also be with the expedition, and that Sir David and he

should find themselves once more serving together so soon after the South American fiasco.

On the morning of the 16th the Reserve landed, and was followed by the First Division and by Grosvenor's Brigade of Baird's Division. Macfarlane's Brigade had not yet arrived, and Spencer's Brigade was demonstrating further up the Sound.

On landing, Cathcart and Gambier issued a proclamation promising to protect life and property, but demanding the surrender of the fleet. If this demand should be acceded to, every ship would be handed back to Denmark, on the conclusion of peace between England and France, in the same state of equipment as when taken over; but should the Danes prove obdurate the British commanders would be obliged to employ force.

In Copenhagen there were less than five thousand regular troops, but there were also five thousand Burghers who had been enrolled in corps, and every man in the place was liable to serve in the militia. The defences of Copenhagen were very strong towards the sea, and on the land front the citadel was in perfect repair and it was covered by a deep double ditch. The west and south forces of the city were covered by a rampart and a deep ditch, and the approaches to the three gates ran across large and deep inundations.

Unfortunately for the defence, General Peimann, the nominal Commander-in-Chief, was controlled by a council of three.

On the morning of the 17th, the British advanced and invested the town. Ludlow's Division was on the right, and extended from the sea to Frederiks-

borg and Gladsaxe ; the Reserve occupied the centre from Gladsaxe to Emdkup, and Baird took post on the left from Emdkup to Tuborg. Spencer's Brigade landed on the 17th and joined the Second Division.

Lord Cathcart established his headquarters at Hellekup.

Every division threw out pickets towards the rear in case of attack from outside.

On the 18th the cavalry landed, and they remained in observation behind the army. The Danes made a sortie against Baird's Division, but they were easily repulsed.

Sir David himself was wounded. One bullet broke a finger of his left hand, and another struck his collar-bone but did not enter his body. The General put his hand inside his shirt and pulled out the bullet, which he gave to Captain Gordon, his nephew and aide-de-camp, who was riding with him.

During the next few days the cavalry dispersed several parties of raw Danish troops, but Lord Cathcart was much grieved that the Danes would not surrender.

On the 21st Macfarlane's Brigade joined Baird's Division ; and next day Lord Gambier and Sir Home Popham, accompanied by Mr. Jackson, visited Lord Cathcart and urged him to conduct the operations more vigorously.

On the 24th the British centre advanced, drove the enemy back across the inundation and occupied the suburbs. Our troops were now covered from view and from fire, and in some places they were within four hundred yards of the enemy's ramparts.

A relieving force was now reported near Borr-carup, and on the 26th Sir Arthur Wellesley was ordered to take the Reserve and disperse this force. The enemy fell back to Kjøge, but Wellesley followed them and crushed them on 29th August. The cavalry of the King's German Legion inflicted heavy losses on the Danes in the pursuit, and fifteen hundred prisoners were taken, but our casualties were trifling, for between the 16th and 31st of August we only lost two officers and twenty-seven men killed, six officers and one hundred and sixteen men wounded, and twenty-one men missing.

On 31st August the siege batteries were ready—mounting forty mortars, ten howitzers, and thirty guns. Cathcart again summoned the town, and said that if the Danes would surrender their fleet the British would at once evacuate Zealand and restore all captured property, and they would even return the ships when peace was made between France and England.

The Danes refused to yield, but Cathcart was loath to bombard the town, and the batteries did not open fire till 7 P.M. on 2nd September. The town was soon in flames.

The batteries ceased fire at 7 A.M. on the 3rd, but opened again that evening, and the bombardment was continued on the 4th.

On 5th September, General Peimann asked for an armistice, and on the 7th he capitulated. It was agreed that the Danish fleet and naval stores were to be handed over to us, all other captured property was to be restored on both sides, and the British were to evacuate Zealand within six weeks.

The bombardment had destroyed the Cathedral and the College, as well as two hundred and fifty houses, but the Danes did not lose more than seven hundred killed.

During the brief campaign the total British casualties were as follows :—

Killed	. . . 4 officers	38 men	8 horses
Wounded	. . . 6 „	139 „	25 „
Missing	. . . —	24 „	—

Before the army left Zealand a truly Gilbertian situation arose. The Ministers in Downing Street appeared much surprised that the Danish Government should regard the bombardment of Copenhagen as an unfriendly act, and actually declare war against England.

The Ministers were now in favour of keeping Zealand, but Lord Cathcart pointed out that the island was untenable. The British troops were entirely withdrawn by 20th October, and they returned to England.

Soon after this, it was decided to form a camp of instruction for thirteen thousand troops on the Curragh of Kildare, and Sir David Baird was selected to command.

He at once went over to Ireland and entered on his new duties.

CHAPTER XIV

SPAIN—THE LANDING

WHEN the news of the Convention of Cintra reached England, Sir Hew Dalrymple was recalled to answer for his conduct.

The Ministers decided to undertake operations in Spain. On 25th September instructions were sent ordering Sir Harry Burrard to hand over 20,000 of his troops to Sir John Moore, who was to enter Spain for the purpose of co-operating with the Spanish armies in expelling the French from the Peninsula. Moore was informed that Sir David Baird was being sent from home with about 13,000 troops to land at Corunna and join him.

In September 1808 Sir David left the Curragh and went to Cork to superintend the embarkation of his men. He was ordered not to wait for the artillery horses, which would be sent after him, but he declined to move without them. From Cork the transports sailed to Falmouth where the force was concentrated. The ships left Falmouth on 8th October, and reached Corunna after a very favourable passage on the 13th.

Baird's letter of service was dated 28th September, and he was directed to go to Corunna and canton his force in Galicia till it could be mobilised. The following regiments sailed with Sir David Baird :—

1/1 Guards and 3/1 Guards; 3/1, 2/14, 2/23, 1/26, 1/43, 51; 2/59, 2/60, 76, 2/81, 5 coys. 1/95, 6 coys. 2/95—in all, 12,298 rank and file, or about 14,000 of all ranks.

There were also 719 foot artillery and 308 horse artillery.

The cavalry, which consisted of the 7th, 10th, and 15th L.D. (3100 rank and file) and the three troops of the waggon train, did not accompany the force, but were sent off later.

It is now necessary to give a brief résumé of affairs in Spain.

After the battle of Baylen, King Joseph evacuated Madrid and retired behind the Ebro, and at the end of September he had 65,000 good French troops at his disposal.

At this time the Spaniards had about 80,000 raw troops on the Ebro. These troops were ill-trained, ill-equipped, and ill-disciplined; and there were wide gaps between the armies of Blake on the left, of Castanos in the centre, and of Palafox on the right.

The Spaniards were full of self-confidence. Sir Hew Dalrymple had sent Major-General Lord William Bentinck to Madrid. Bentinck was a soldier of considerable experience. He had served on the staff of the Duke of York in Flanders in 1794, he had accompanied Suwarrof in the campaign of 1799, and had been present with the Austrians in the campaigns of 1800 and 1801, including the battle of Marengo. Since then he had been Governor of Madras, but he was recalled in conse-

quence of the mutiny at Vellore. On 26th September Bentinck wrote a letter from Madrid discussing whether the Spanish armies could drive the French out of Spain without the help of the English or not, and also whether the Spanish Government would be willing, in the event of an Austrian war, to join the British in invading France.

Meanwhile Napoleon had decided to deal with the Peninsula, and I will now briefly state what he accomplished.

By the end of October there were 170,000 French troops in Spain, of which 116,000 were on the Ebro ; and on 15th November there were 335,000 French troops in Spain, of whom over 255,000 were available for operations. Napoleon himself left Paris on 20th October and reached Vitoria on 6th November.

Belvedere was routed at Gamonal on the 10th, Blake was overthrown at Espinosa on the 11th, Castanos was crushed at Tudela on the 23rd, Napoleon forced the Pass of the Somosierra on the 30th, and Madrid surrendered on 4th December.

So much for what actually happened ; but, as we shall see, it was some considerable time before the British generals learned of these events. Sir John Moore was operating in a friendly country, and he was not more than 150 miles from Madrid, yet he did not get certain intelligence of the surrender of that city till ten days after it occurred, and even then only by means of an intercepted despatch addressed to Marshal Soult.

On 13th October, Sir David Baird reached Corunna and met with an unexpected difficulty.

So far from offering every assistance to the British, the Galician Junta positively refused to allow the troops to land till the sanction of the Supreme Junta at Madrid should be obtained. The fact was that the resources of the province had been severely taxed in equipping General Blake's force, and the very last thing the Galicians wanted to do was to supply the needs of another army.

General Baird reported his arrival to Sir John Moore in the following letter :—

“ Sir David Baird to Sir John Moore, at Lisbon.

“CORUNNA, 13th October 1808.

“SIR,—I have the honour to report to you my arrival in the port of Corunna, in command of a division of his Majesty's forces, and to transmit, for your information, a return of the strength of the different corps of which it is composed.

“My instructions from Lord Castlereagh direct me, after reporting my arrival to you, to lose no time in disembarking my troops, and, immediately on clearing the infantry transports, to send them to Lisbon, for the purpose of receiving on board part of our force there, destined to act in this part of Spain, in conjunction with the troops from England under your orders.

“An unexpected difficulty has, however, arisen to prevent an immediate obedience to these orders, as the Junta of this province does not consider itself authorised to receive us, or to permit our disembarkation, without the previous sanction of the Supreme Government of the kingdom.

“ An extraordinary courier has accordingly been despatched to Madrid to obtain this permission ; and I have written to Lord William Bentinck, in that city, urging him to use every effort in his power to obtain a speedy and favourable reply to our application ; on receipt of which I shall lose no time in carrying my instructions into effect, &c.”

On the 15th of October, Sir David wrote again to Sir John Moore :—

“ Instead of arrangements being made for our reception, as I was led to expect would be the case, the provincial government was not only unprepared to receive us, but appears disinclined to afford us any active assistance.

“ As we brought no money with us, I have been compelled to endeavour to obtain a supply, and I am in expectation of procuring five thousand pounds. I am afraid we shall find great difficulty in fulfilling that part of my instructions which relates to the purchase of horses and mules, as these appear to be extremely scarce in this province.”

General Baird was able to raise about £5000 on English Treasury bills, and the Junta of Galicia advanced him £25,000, but still the scarcity of money seriously crippled his efforts to prepare for the mobilisation of his division. He received a letter from Sir John Moore dated 12th October, which contained the following passage :—

“ I mean to move upon Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo by three different roads ; when arrived

there, our progress will in every respect be easier ; our march from thence will be on Burgos, and at some intermediate place, which shall afterwards be settled, our junction must be made. In the meantime, when landed, you will place the troops in the most convenient cantonments in and about Corunna, and take steps for the immediate equipment of them to take the field. I have directed the Adjutant-General, Clinton, to send you some regulations with respect to regimental equipment, which I shall thank you to follow, besides which, you will endeavour to procure the means of carriage for the ammunition, medical, commissariat, and other stores, in such proportions as should attend a corps of your number.

“ I have not yet sufficient information to discover the points most proper for the establishment of magazines for the army when united ; you may perhaps be able to procure information on this head, which you will be good enough to communicate to me in your correspondence.

“ Let me know often the progress of your equipment ; and it will be well to put your commissary and chief officers of the Quarter-Master and Adjutant-General’s departments in communication with their respective chiefs, who are with me ; this will both be useful and save you and me much trouble.

“ It is possible that you will be pressed by General Blake, who commands the Galician army, or by some others, to join them, or at least to send them some portion of the artillery or cavalry ; it may happen that some of the British officers

who are attending upon the Spanish armies may join in the request ; but this you will on no account agree to, as it is quite contrary to the wishes of the British Government that any part of the British force should be committed partially or act until the whole is united.

“ You will hear from me frequently ; you will have due notice of my progress when we can agree as to the period when you can commence your march from Corunna ; and as to the place of junction, Corunna will necessarily be the place for our general depôt, and you will judge the propriety of landing any and what proportion of the stores and provisions for the army, or of leaving them in the ships until wanted.”

On 19th October, Mr. Frere reached Corunna on his way to Madrid to take up the appointment of Minister Plenipotentiary. He brought with him £410,000 in cash as a subsidy to the Spanish Government, and he consented to advance £40,000 of this to Sir David Baird to meet the pressing needs of the army.

The extreme difficulty of procuring transport animals at Corunna may be realised when we learn that it was a week before Mr. Frere could secure mules to pull the two carriages which were to convey himself and his staff to the capital.

On 22nd October the messenger returned from Madrid, and Sir David wrote as follows to Sir John Moore :—

“ Sir David Baird to Sir John Moore.

“CORUNNA, 24th October 1808.

“ The courier who was sent to Madrid on the subject of our disembarkation returned on the 22nd instant ; and another messenger arrived from that city yesterday, and brought me letters from Lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart. The answer of the Supreme Government to our application, as read by Mr. Frere last night, in presence of the Junta of this province, is certainly very different from what I expected. Instead of expressing any anxiety to promote our views, or dissatisfaction at the impediments thrown in our way by the Galician Government, it merely permits us to land here in the event of it being found impracticable to send us by sea to St. Andero ; and directs that, if a disembarkation takes place, it shall be made in detachments of two or three hundred men each, which are to be successively pushed on into Castille, without waiting for the necessary equipment of mules and horses. As the execution of this plan might bring part of my division in contact with the enemy (in the event of the Spanish armies experiencing a defeat) before a junction with you, and is in direct opposition to the instructions I received from Lord Castlereagh, and to your orders, I felt it my duty to object to it in the strongest terms, and finally to declare, that unless I was permitted to quarter the troops in this province until the necessary provision of draught cattle could be procured, I should feel myself compelled to suffer them to remain on board until I had communicated with you and received your further orders.

“ At length, after a great deal of discussion and much opposition on the part of the Junta, it has been decided that we should be cantoned in the towns and villages on the two principal roads leading from this place towards Leon and Castille, until such time as the necessary equipment could be effected to enable us to take the field.”

In the meantime, Sir John Moore replied as follows to Baird’s letter of 13th October :—

“ LISBON, 22nd October 1808.

“ MY DEAR SIR DAVID,—The *Champion* arrived here yesterday, and Captain Gordon delivered to me your two letters, private and public.

“ I take it for granted that the letters from Lord Castlereagh and Lord William Bentinck, announcing your intended arrival, had not reached Madrid, otherwise I must suppose that no difficulty would have been opposed to your landing. I trust that before this reaches you every facility will have been afforded to you ; and from everything I have hitherto heard of the conduct of the Spaniards towards the English, I daresay that whatever the country affords in the way of cantonment and supply for the troops will have been cheerfully given.

“ We are in such want of money in this place that it is with difficulty I have been able to spare £8000, which went in the *Champion* to you this day. This sum is so inadequate to your wants, that if it had not been to show you my goodwill, I should not have thought it worth sending to you.

“ It is to be hoped that money is at this moment on its passage from England ; and as it will probably call at Corunna, I beg you will not take more than is absolutely necessary for your wants, and that you will send me the rest, for I am beginning my march with very little, and if it does not come soon, in the heart of Spain we shall be in very great distress.

“ At present I can give you no directions beyond what I conveyed to you in my former letter. Your first object is to equip your corps, so as to make it serviceable, and I should imagine when the regiments are on shore the officers will soon contrive to get the mules they require. You will observe that a great many are not wanted, as I want to go light ; but a good many will be required for other services, to carry the ammunition, medical, and commissariat stores. I should hope, for forwarding what may be necessary to place in depôt, the means may be hired in the country.

“ I should willingly go to you, but I have a perfect confidence that you will be able to do, without my assistance, everything that is necessary ; and I have an operation to conduct in this march which requires every attention I can pay to it. . . .

“ When the cavalry arrives, if the difficulty is great in procuring forage in that part of Galicia, they may be sent forward a little, but with positive instructions to Lord Paget, or whoever commands them, to join no Spanish army, nor to risk committing the cavalry in any shape until it joins me and the British army. It must be sent forward,

if necessary, for the mere purpose of subsistence, but quite aloof from the enemy or the Spanish forces. . . .

“I hope to hear from you soon, of your being more comfortable than when you wrote last, and that your difficulties are found less than you expected. I have my share of them here, but I shall think them all over when we are able to join.—Believe me always very faithfully,

“JOHN MOORE.”

Sir David now landed his men, and on the 24th he managed to get bread for them for the first time. Four days later Craufurd left Corunna with his brigade, and set out for Lugo.

On 27th October, Sir John Moore left Lisbon, having written the following instructions to General Baird on the previous day :—

“I wish you to march on Astorga, and I should hope that by the time this reaches you, you will be equipped and ready to begin. If not, you will move the moment you are ready, and in such divisions as the route in which you are to march can cover and supply.

“The Governor of the province at Corunna or at Ferrol, I take it for granted, can give you every information on this head, and will give you every aid for procuring the supplies upon your march.

“You will regulate your march as you think best. As far as Astorga you are safe enough; beyond that we must both be guided by the movements and position of the enemy. If he continue,

as at present, a good way behind the Ebro, our junction may be forward ; if not, we must make it further back. You will direct to me at Almeida, but desire your messenger to ask for me at Salamanca, or any other town through which he may pass which has British troops in it.

“ Let me know the day you begin to move, and that in which the head will reach Astorga. . . .

“ I know what a troublesome task I am imposing upon you, but you will see the necessity of the arrangements I propose, and you will execute them in the manner you think best for the good of the service. Our communication will now be shorter, and you will be so good as to inform me of whatever you determine. Should the heavy rains overtake you upon the march, it will be best to make a halt ; they seldom last above a few days, but are tremendous, and after them there is generally a spell of fine weather.—Believe me always, my dear General, faithfully yours,

“ JOHN MOORE.”

Moore's plan at this time is clearly shown by the following extract from his diary :—

“ *Villafranca, 27th October.*—I go to meet the troops as they arrive by their different routes at Almeida, and shall collect them at Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca, and wait until Hope's and Sir David Baird's corps get to Astorga and Espinar, when according to circumstances I can direct the junction of the whole at Valladolid, Burgos, or wherever

else is thought best. My anxiety is to get out of Portugal before the rains."

On 3rd November, General Baird wrote as follows to Sir John Moore :—

"All the regiments of my division (with the exception of the 3rd battalion 60th) are now on shore and moving slowly towards Astorga. I cannot at this moment positively fix the day when my advance will reach that place, but I trust nothing will, at all events, occur to delay it beyond the 13th of this month. . . .

"In the meantime, measures are concerting for the establishment of a depôt; and the first division of waggons with provisions left Corunna for Astorga this morning. From all the information I have been able to collect, that town is a very proper place for the establishment of a magazine. The only doubt I entertain respecting it is whether it may not be rather too far advanced."

On 7th November, Sir David wrote again as follows :—

"The troops continue their route towards Astorga. The first division will arrive there (if no unlooked-for accident should delay it) on the 13th, and by the 19th I expect we shall have seven regiments in that town and in its immediate neighbourhood. We are also forwarding provisions and ammunition as quickly as our circumscribed means will permit. We have derived no sort of assistance

from the Government. The Junta have repeatedly promised us carts, but have invariably failed in sending them, and we have been compelled to rely solely on our own efforts to obtain the means of conveyance, &c.

“The first division of carts with provisions will reach Astorga about the 18th instant, and every exertion shall be made to complete the depôt you propose establishing there. I think, however, it may become a question (which you will hereafter be able to decide) whether it may not be advisable that a principal magazine should be formed further back, and in rear of the defiles leading from Galicia into Leon. I transmit copies of some letters and other documents respecting the state and proceedings of the Spanish armies, and the reinforcements which have arrived, or are expected by the French, in Navarre and Biscay; by which it appears that the enemy in those two provinces only will receive an accession to his force of 78,000 men by the 10th instant.

“It is my intention to leave Corunna about the 10th or 12th instant for Astorga,” &c.

On 8th November more transports arrived at Corunna, bringing the 7th and 10th L.D., two troops of horse artillery, and the waggon train.

On the 9th the sum of \$500,000 arrived for the army, and Baird was no longer crippled by scarcity of cash.

A few days later the 15th L.D. arrived, by 13th November all the cavalry was ashore, and on that date General Baird left Corunna.

On this same day the French entered Valladolid. Ten days had been wasted owing to the Galician Junta not allowing the British troops to land ; but there is even less excuse for the stupidity of the British authorities, who sent the cavalry and the waggon train to Corunna nearly a month later than the infantry.

CHAPTER XV

THE FOG OF WAR

AFTER leaving Corunna, Sir David Baird received from Moore a letter, dated "Ciudad Rodrigo, 11th November," which contained the following instructions :—

"I should wish to proceed from Astorga to Benevente in as large corps as can be conveniently covered, taking care first that provisions are ready for them. On my arrival at Salamanca I shall take steps to have them prepared; in the meantime, you will advance all the rear corps to Astorga as fast as can be with convenience to the troops, and from Astorga to Benevente by corps of such numbers as can be covered, as soon as supplies can be provided for them.

"Thus half of your corps might be at Benevente and half at Astorga; I should then have it in my power to bring on those from Benevente, if circumstances made it necessary, when the other half from Astorga would in that case follow.

"You must be guided in all your movements by what you hear of the enemy. If they continue beyond the Ebro, you may safely send on the troops as above detailed; but if they pass it, you must be more cautious. If the cavalry are arrived, bring them on amongst the first.

“When the troops pass Astorga, means must be prepared to bring on the depôt. On this I can write hereafter.”

Soon after writing the above, Moore learnt of the French advance, and wrote as follows:—

“Sir John Moore to Sir David Baird.

“SALAMANCA, 13th November 1808.

“The French have entered Burgos, and have driven from it part of the Estremaduran army. In what force they are, or whether their intention is to advance farther, I know not. If they advance whilst we are assembling, they will embarrass us. I do not understand the movements of the Spanish generals; they are separated without the possibility of aiding each other, the one in Biscay, the other on the Alagon, leaving the whole country in our front, whilst we are collecting, to the enemy. I have addressed Castanos to know his views, when I shall be better able to decide what step to take. In the meantime, the great object for us is to unite. I wish, as soon as you have ascertained that they can be subsisted, that you would push on your corps to Benevente. I shall probably, by the time they reach that, order them to continue on to Zamora, and ultimately we may be able to have the whole assembled in Zamora, Toro, and this place.

“In all this, however, you must be guided by the information you receive of the enemy. Were they to advance immediately, whilst the regiments on this side were moving forward in succession, I

should have no option but to fall back, in which case also you must get back to Astorga, and prepare, if pressed, to get back into Galicia. From the account I have of the road, this to you would not be difficult. If once all my regiments were assembled here, probably, rather than separate you, I would by a flank march join you. In short, we can only be regulated by circumstances, and we should be in constant communication.

“I still think that the probability is that the French are not in force to advance beyond Burgos while such strong corps as Blake’s and Castanos’ are on their flanks—the one of 40,000, the other 50,000 men. If we were once together, I should not care, and had two or three days to organize and arrange ourselves; but whilst collecting, it is distressing.

“We soldiers must do the best, and hope for the best; there is no use in dwelling upon evils which may, but which perhaps never will, occur.”

On the 15th he wrote :—

“MY DEAR SIR DAVID,—In the night of yesterday I was informed that the French had entered Valladolid on the 13th. This morning the post from Valladolid did not arrive, and the report of the French being there is confirmed. Their force is not stated; but as it is to be presumed that a small force durst not have ventured so far, I am preparing to retire upon Ciudad Rodrigo, in order to concentrate my force, which is now marching

on; and from that place to this, two regiments came in here yesterday, and two are coming in to-day. The whole will not be here before the 25th.

“Under such circumstances, I have no option but to fall back upon the Ciudad Rodrigo; my motions afterwards will depend on circumstances. I expect hourly intelligence of the movements of the enemy.

“I shall not quit this place till I find they are marching on it; in the meantime I keep everything.

“You must, of course, not separate your force, by sending any part of it towards this, until you find that the enemy have retired from Valladolid and that I continue here; in short, you must now look to yourself—be ready to fall back, if necessary, on Corunna, or take such steps as circumstances direct. You shall hear from me daily, as long as I am here, and as the communication is open. I can after that communicate with you through Portugal.

“The event has happened which I always said was a possible one; but as it was the very worst that could befall us, I was in hopes our good fortune would have saved us from it. There is no help for it: we have done what we could to join and be of use to this nation; if we have not succeeded it is their fault, not ours. We had a right to expect that they would have been able to cover us until united.—My dear Sir David, yours faithfully,

“JOHN MOORE.”

Next day he wrote as follows :—

“SALAMANCA, 16th November.

“MY DEAR SIR DAVID,—I expect in the course of this day accurate information of the movement of the French from Burgos; it does not appear that they have been at Valladolid in any number, and certainly, I believe, they have not yet been beyond it. In the present circumstances, I think you should collect your whole force at Astorga and its neighbourhood. By means of your cavalry you can keep a good lookout, and by other means you can be informed of every movement the enemy makes towards you; and at the same time that you keep your corps in readiness to join me when I desire it, you must prepare to retreat on Corunna should circumstances render it necessary. Of these last circumstances, you alone must be the judge.

“*You must retire rather than commit in any degree the safety of your corps.* It is when united we can alone do good, not by fighting separately partial actions, if they can be avoided.

“Castanos has been superseded, and the Marquis of Romana appointed in his place to command the armies of the centre and the left. I shall be guided by what I hear of his intentions, as well as by the movements which I perceive the enemy to make, in the order I shall send you to join me. In the meantime, I expect to hear from you your progress, and whatever comes to your knowledge of transactions on your side.

“Buonaparte is come himself, and his army

amounts to 80,000 men. If we can unite, we shall, I hope, do our duty.—Believe me, faithfully,

“JOHN MOORE.”

On the 17th, Sir John wrote a letter which contained the following instructions:—

“*To Sir David Baird.*”

“My wish is, if possible, to assemble the army between Zamora and this place. I hope the enemy is not yet prepared to disturb us; but in coming to me you must use your discretion, and act upon the information you receive of his movements. I shall let you know all I hear that can be of any use to you. By the time you receive this you will perhaps be prepared to forward to Benevente a considerable part of your force; let it march in as large bodies as can be covered, and include a proportion of artillery and of cavalry, if any of the latter are come up.

“Whilst this is doing, the rest of your corps will be collecting at Astorga, and, as it moves forward to Benevente, that already there may advance to Zamora, at which place there is cover for a great many men; and before they can reach it, Colonel Murray will have prepared the cantonment for the whole of your corps, in the manner it may be proposed to take it up.

“The artillery, stores, ammunition, blankets, &c., as mentioned in my former letter, you will forward to Zamora, at such intervals and in such manner as you judge best; and you will leave

directions with each corps or officers, as may be judged expedient, to remain for a time at Astorga, with respect to the second division of artillery, stores, and ammunition, which may perhaps not have reached it at the time the rest of the troops move forward.

“In short, my dear General, consider yourself as coming to me with a complete division of the army. The things which should attend it have at different times been explained; others have been left to your own judgment and discretion, and I look to you to manage the whole in such manner as you think best, and as circumstances will admit. As we approach nearer, our communication becomes shorter, and may be as frequent as we please; and the heads of your departments writing to their chiefs with me, may get every information and instruction. By sending forward proper officers, every necessary supply will be provided.

“A letter from Colonel Murray to Colonel Bathurst accompanies this. With respect to equipment, the mules for regimental purposes—viz. officers’ baggage, camp-kettles, &c. — should be bought; and if Spanish muleteers, as bat-men, are hired, one would be sufficient for the care of the mules of a company, and employ fewer soldiers. The mules required for the departments it will be best to hire.—Believe me, faithfully,

“JOHN MOORE.”

General Baird received all these letters before he got to Astorga, and on his arrival there he

wrote to Sir John Moore, on the evening of 19th November, as follows :—

“ In addition to the information you communicate respecting the movement of French troops, I have received positive intelligence that the army of General Blake, after sustaining repeated attacks, has been completely defeated and almost entirely dispersed. The General himself, with the very small portion of his force which he was able to keep together, has retired to the mountains bordering on the Asturias ; and it appears that a few of the fugitives and some artillery are collecting at Leon, which is threatened by the enemy.

“ I enclose copies of some reports which have been addressed to Colonel Craufurd and myself upon the subject.

“ Under these circumstances, I confess I am of opinion that it would be attended with much danger if I were to make any partial advance on Benevente until some cavalry has come up and a considerable portion of my force is collected, as it would be easy for the enemy, if they are in strength, to intercept and cut off the communication between my advanced corps and the rest. By the 28th or 29th we shall have at this place at least one regiment of dragoons, the horse artillery, three brigades of six-pounders, and the greater part of my infantry ; and I should then be in sufficient force to advance with some degree of security.

“ Should you, however, be desirous that I should move forward with what troops I have at present here, I will instantly do so ; and I beg to assure

you, my dear Sir John, that in every instance and on every occasion it will be my most anxious desire to meet your wishes and views.

“In pursuance of the advice and directions in your letter of the 15th, I am making arrangements to secure my retreat on Galicia, should such a measure unfortunately become indispensable. Corunna would be a bad point to retire on, as the harbour is completely commanded from the surrounding heights. I have sent directions to have Vigo and the neighbouring sea-ports examined, and I expect reports on the subject very soon.

“Every possible effort has been made to complete the equipment of the division, but owing to the total want of assistance which we experienced in Galicia from the local authorities, and which I have had repeated occasion to notice to you, our success has not been great. In this province I hope, however, to be more successful, and that we shall very speedily be able to collect the number of horses and mules we require.”

On the evening of 20th November, Sir David Baird learnt full details of Blake's defeat, and next day he wrote as follows to Sir John Moore :—

“. . . I enclose a letter I received late last night from General Leith, communicating the entire defeat and dispersion of Blake's army, and a report from Captain Pasley of the Royal Engineers upon the same subject. From that army I can now expect no assistance or support. A number of fugitives from that and the Estremaduran corps, entirely

destitute of order and without proper officers, have, I understand, entered Leon and joined a small party already in that city. The whole may amount to about 150 cavalry and 2000 or 3000 infantry, and they have some artillery and thirty-four pieces of ordnance belonging to Blake's army in that town. The commanding officer of the artillery came here last night, and proposed joining me with his guns, which I directed him to do, as there is no chance of Leon being successfully defended if the enemy advances in any force. I have also ordered the cavalry to join me as speedily as possible, as they may prove of great service in reconnoitring, &c., until such time as our own dragoons come up.

“ . . . In my last letter of the 19th, I pointed out that, as far as I was then able to judge, it would not be advisable to make any partial advance of the troops at present here, until such time as part of the cavalry, the ammunition, and the money were come up, and until we were able to procure some positive information respecting the movements and views of the enemy, who, in addition to Bessières' force (stated at 14,000 or 15,000), which advances by the road to Burgos, have now the army that defeated Blake unoccupied.

“ By the 29th I expect to have the greater part of my infantry, with one regiment of cavalry and a troop of horse artillery, in the neighbourhood, and I should then be able to move with greater confidence and security, if not previously compelled to fall back by the advance of a superior force of the enemy. Should I at present advance to Benevente, and the French approach, a retreat

would become very difficult for infantry through an open country and in face of a powerful cavalry.

“I must, however, repeat that if you are desirous that I should immediately advance what troops are here, I shall instantly do so, although I think such a measure might be attended with considerable danger, as in addition to our want of cavalry we are at this moment *destitute of spare ammunition*, which, from Colonel Murray’s letter to Bathurst, *appears also to be the case with your force*.

“I have caused persons to be sent forward by Leon, and on the road to Valencia, to obtain information, and I shall not fail to communicate the result of their observations to you. I enclose two reports, which reached me this morning. I have also despatched engineer officers to the rear, for the purpose of ascertaining what impediments to the progress of the enemy we might occasion by destruction of bridges, &c., in the event of being hard pressed, and compelled to fall back on Galicia.”

On the 21st, Moore replied as follows to Baird’s letter of the 19th :—

“MY DEAR SIR DAVID,—As I was sending off an officer to you with the enclosed,¹ your letter of the 19th arrived. My wish all along was, and still is, that you should use your entire discretion in obeying whatever orders I send you ; and I shall only feel comfortable in proportion as I am assured that you will do so. Do not therefore advance a man from Astorga until you think it safe to do so.

¹ A duplicate of Sir John’s letter of the 17th, to which at that moment he had not received Sir David’s answer.

“ When you are ready you will apprise me, and I shall move a corps from this to Zamora, and shall probably go with it myself; but if the French, in consequence of Blake’s defeat, turn a force against you, we must give up the junction, and you must retreat and re-embark. In this it would be well to send the cavalry, for which no ships will be found, through Portugal to Lisbon, from whence they might join me, and you yourself, with the troops, sail for that port, at which place I should write to you for your further proceedings.

“ Upon your retreat I should like to take the best care of myself I could. If Villa Franca is preferable for a depôt, establish it there. Bring on to Astorga only what is necessary to accompany the army. Salt provisions, when once you are at Astorga, will probably not again be wanted, therefore your consuming a part of what is coming forward is of no importance.

“ It does not appear from the information we have here, and I believe it is pretty correct, that the French have been in Valladolid, or in front of Valencia, since the 14th. On leaving Valladolid on that morning, they took the road to Leon, but after following it a few miles they turned to Valencia. They were 1000 cavalry, with two pieces of artillery.

“ The country has been thrown into such a state of alarm in consequence of the late defeats, that rumours are spread of French parties much more numerous than they are; no doubt, however, we must pay attention to rumours in our present comparatively defenceless situation, and act with much circumspection. I beg you will continue to let me

hear from you everything you think of the least importance, and apprise me of all your movements.

“I doubt if you will find a better place than Corunna for a re-embarkation, should you be reduced to such an alternative ; the probability is, that you will be closely followed through that mountainous country ; but Vigo, I suspect, is quite open.”

On the 23rd, Sir David wrote thus :—

“ASTORGA, 23rd November 1808.

“MY DEAR SIR JOHN,—I wrote you on the 19th and 21st from this place, explaining the nature of our situation ; and was in hopes I should have had the satisfaction of hearing from you in reply to my first communication before this. The length of time which has elapsed since I despatched that letter, makes me apprehensive that you may have felt it expedient to fall back on Ciudad Rodrigo, or that our communication may be intercepted.

“The more I consider our situation, the more I am convinced of the danger that would attend my making, at the present moment, any movement in advance, or attempt to join you, before my force is more collected. We have no kind of support to expect from the Spaniards, who are completely dispersed, and driven from the field ; and if I were to move forward the infantry I have at present here, I should necessarily expose myself to be beaten in detail, without a chance of being able to oppose any effectual resistance.

“The enemy are certainly at Mayorga, and their

parties have pushed forward almost close to Benevente. From my present want of cavalry, I have not been able to ascertain how forward their infantry may be.

“I enclose a copy of some intelligence communicated by a person who was sent from Leon to obtain information respecting the movements of the French, and of a letter written by Colonel Graham from the headquarters of Castanos’ army.

“From the latter, it is clearly apparent how very much exaggerated the accounts generally circulated of the strength of the Spanish armies have been. In all probability, Castanos and Palafox *may by this time have experienced a reverse similar to that of Blake*, in which case the Spaniards would have no force deserving the name of an army in the field. . . .

“As it never could be the intention of the British Government that we should engage in the defence of this country unaided and unsupported by any Spanish force, I confess, my dear Sir John, I begin to be at a loss to discover an object at this moment in Spain.”

It is interesting to note that as a matter of fact Castanos was defeated at Tudela on the 20th.

General Baird received no news of Moore for several days, and was in doubt whether he had not been compelled to retire, so he prepared to fall back on Galicia should the necessity arrive. On 28th November the position of the various forces was as follows :—

Baird’s Division was closing up at Astorga.

Hope was at the Escorial Pass, and Moore at Salamanca.

Napoleon was at Aranda, and Lefebvre's Corps was at Palencia and Valladolid.

Moore still hoped to effect a junction with Baird, and wrote as follows :—

“ I see my situation, and that of the army I command, in as unfavourable a light as you or any one can do. I have given it my best consideration. I know that you should have landed at Cadiz, and I should have met you at Seville, where the army could have been united and equipped, but it was ordered otherwise ; and it is our business to make every effort to unite here, and to obey our orders and the wishes of our country, to aid the Spaniards as far as lies in our power—it would never do to retreat without making the attempt.

“ If the enemy prevent us, there is no help for it ; but if he does not, I am determined to unite the army ; when that is done, we shall act according to circumstances ; we shall be from 32,000 to 35,000 men.

“ I have still a chance that the presence of so large a British force may give spirit to the Spaniards ; and I shall hope, if the cause is at last to be given up, to be able to make our retreat. I can give no orders more positive than I have already given you.

“ I hold my resolution to remain and form the junction in the manner already explained in my former letters. In the execution of this, you will use your own discretion, as I do mine. If the

enemy move against you, you cannot do it; you will in that case retreat, giving me notice. If he moves against me, I must do the same, and I shall give you notice. Your retreat cannot be more difficult than mine. I have but one brigade of artillery, and no cavalry.

“On the 1st of December you will be able to move with one regiment of cavalry, and such number of infantry as you choose to take. I wish, therefore, you would do so, as far as Benevente, where you may arrive on the 2nd. I shall move from this on the 1st, towards Zamora and Toro, at each of which places we shall arrive from this also on the 2nd. I shall myself be with the corps at Toro, where I will communicate with you.

You may leave orders for your cavalry to follow you to Benevente, in squadrons or by regiments, as you deem best, as well as such infantry as may not march with you at first to Benevente. You will make what arrangements you think proper for having a corps at Astorga, and forward the money and stores of every description to Zamora, and probably the Marquis de Romana may occupy Astorga when you leave it.

“As I have no cavalry, I shall want a regiment of yours at Toro, as soon as a second joins you; but on this and other subjects we can communicate when you arrive at Benevente, and I at Toro.”

A few hours after writing the above, Moore learnt of the defeat of Castanos, and he immediately wrote as follows:—

“SALAMANCA, 28th November 1808.

“MY DEAR SIR DAVID,—I have received this evening, despatches from Mr. Stuart, at Madrid, announcing the defeat and dispersion of Castanos' army. The French, in Spain, are estimated at 80,000 men, and 30,000 are expected in the course of a week. It certainly was much my wish to have run great risks in aid of the people of Spain; but after this second proof of how little they are able to do for themselves (the only two armies they had having made so little stand) I see no right we have to expect from them much greater exertions. At any rate, we should be overwhelmed before they could be prepared.

“I see no chance of our being able to form a junction, as certainly at Burgos the French have a corps, which will now move forward.

“I have, therefore, determined to retreat upon Portugal, with the troops I have here, and if possible with Hope's corps, if by forced marches he can join me. I wish you to fall back on Corunna. Send back immediately your stores under such part of your force as you judge proper. You may then stay with the rest a little longer, if you can depend upon knowing the movements of the enemy. I propose this, as were you at once to retire, it might encourage the enemy to push at once at Hope and me, and prevent our junction, which is the more necessary, as I must stop on the frontier of Portugal, and cover Lisbon as long as possible.

“On your arrival at Corunna, you will, of course, embark and sail for the Tagus, where orders shall be waiting you. Write immediately to England, and

give notice of what we are doing, and beg that transports may be sent to Lisbon; they will be wanted, *for when the French have Spain, Portugal cannot be defended.*—Believe me, &c.,

“JOHN MOORE.”

Moore assembled his general officers and told them the news of the defeat of Castanos. He then informed them that he had not summoned them to ask their advice, neither did he wish to know their opinions. He had decided to retire, and had called them together to inform them of the fact, so that they could make the necessary preparations.

On the 29th Moore wrote as follows :—

“SALAMANCA, 29th November 1808.

“MY DEAR SIR DAVID,—I have nothing to add to what I wrote to you last night. You will make your retreat, concealing your intentions as long as you can. I had written to the Marquis de la Romana, that I should assemble the army, and act, if possible, with him. That is now out of the question, tell him.

“When on the frontier of Portugal, I shall be ready to retire, if circumstances render it eligible, or by embarking and going round to another part of Spain, we may be more useful. We by no means abandon the cause of Spain, but only withdraw from a situation, where, without aiding it, we should ourselves be destroyed.

“We want money—if it can be sent by land, as Murray wrote to Bathurst, do it; if not, land it at Oporto. Order inquiries to be made what

victuallers are there, and if not sufficient, direct one or two of light draft of water to enter that port, as also a ship with oats.—I remain, faithfully,

“JOHN MOORE.”

On receiving Moore's letter of the 28th, Sir David Baird communicated its contents to the Marquis de la Romana in the following letter :—

“ASTORGA, 30th November 1808.

“I feel great concern in acquainting your Excellency that at a late hour last night I received a despatch from Sir John Moore, announcing the defeat of General Castanos' army, and directing me immediately to fall back, for the purpose of joining him, either by sea or by the way of Portugal ; it being impossible, under existing circumstances, to effect our junction by the road through Benevente and Zamora.

“I lose no time in apprising your Excellency, that in consequence of these orders I am preparing to move the infantry to the rear ; the cavalry I propose leaving at Astorga a few days longer.

“As I have every reason to believe that the Spanish troops are in great want of shoes, blankets, canteens, and havresacks, I beg to acquaint you, that I shall be able to spare you a quantity of each kind (which were intended for Sir John Moore's division), and to request you will appoint proper persons to receive them, at Villa Franca and Lugo.”

Baird also issued a proclamation in which he assured the people of Leon and Galicia that,

though he was retiring to join Sir John Moore in Portugal, the British Government had no intention of abandoning the cause of Spain.

Romana implored Baird not to retire, and Sir David agreed to allow his cavalry to remain for a few days longer at Astorga pending the receipt of further orders from Sir John Moore.

On December 2nd, Sir David received the following letter :—

“SALAMANCA, 2nd December.

“MY DEAR SIR DAVID,—I have received both your notes of the 29th and 30th, acknowledging the receipt of my letter to you of the 28th.

“My junction with General Hope is now pretty secure. The enemy are wholly occupied with Castanos and Madrid, and I have every reason to believe that at this moment they have no infantry in front of Burgos and no great body of cavalry in Castille—I should not think above a couple of thousand—and these much separated.

“As you have transports but for one regiment of cavalry, and you will perhaps be under the necessity of marching the other two through Portugal, I should be glad if you would send one to me. I do not think it will run the smallest risk at this moment on the route of Benvente to Zamora.

“I say this upon the supposition that you have not sent them all already back towards Corunna, in which case I should not wish one to be brought back ; but if one of the regiments is still at Astorga, and your intelligence, like mine, assures you that

it can be done without risk, I should wish to have it here. Both at Zamora and Benvente, forage may be procured by sending on a day before, and the intermediate stages one day's forage can be carried.

"You will let me hear your decision on this subject by courier, and apprise me of the march and arrival at Zamora, when orders shall be sent for the further proceedings of the officer commanding.

"When you leave Corunna, General Broderick should be left there with a small garrison, for the sake of communication, as long as it is left open; but he must have the means left with him to embark, should such measure become necessary.

"Buonaparte is at Burgos, probably waiting the arrival of reinforcements, to move forward in this direction. Whether my junction with you could have been accomplished or not, I know not. It would have been attended with the risk of the destruction of the whole, and if accomplished, would have left us to contend single-handed with the whole French army, for the Spaniards are dispersed; and until the present Government is changed, and men of more ability are brought forward, there is little chance of their being able to force anything to join us, or to resist France. If they *are* able, we shall see, and shall be able to go to their assistance. I am satisfied with the decision I have made; how it will be viewed by others, or approved in England, God knows.—I remain, faithfully,

"JOHN MOORE."

On 4th December, General Baird moved his headquarters from Astorga to Villafranca to superin-

tend the retirement. Fortunately the cavalry did not leave Astorga, but the infantry had already commenced their retreat when Sir David received fresh orders on the evening of the 7th.

On 27th November, Sir John Moore wrote to Mr. Frere, the Minister at Madrid, to ask for his views on the political situation.

Mr. Frere was a friend of Canning. He was a man of great ability who published an excellent translation of some of the plays of Aristophanes. He had not long before been Minister at Lisbon and at Madrid for nearly two years. In spite of this he showed himself hopelessly ignorant of the character of the Spanish people, and singularly devoid of tact and common sense.

Instead of replying to Moore's letter and stating what he believed the views of the Cabinet would be under the circumstances, Frere sent to Sir John Moore an unprincipled adventurer named Charmilly, and set forth his own views on military operations. Were it not so exasperating, it would be intensely funny to see a person like Frere instructing Sir John Moore in the art of war.

Sir John Moore in a letter to Frere dated 6th December summed the matter up as follows :—

“ With respect to the determination I made on the evening of the 25th, upon receiving from Mr. Stuart the account of Castanos' defeat, I should, had you been with me, have communicated it to you, but should never have thought of asking your advice or opinion, as that determination was founded on circumstances with which you could not be

acquainted, and was, besides, a question merely military, of which I should have thought myself the best judge."

On 4th December, Lieutenant-General Hope successfully effected his junction with Sir John Moore at Alba de Tormes.

On the next day Moore received a letter from the Junta of Madrid urging him to advance and join with the Spanish forces in the defence of the capital. He also heard that the people of Madrid had sprung to arms and were determined not to surrender. On receipt of this intelligence, Sir John Moore wrote the following letter :—

"To Sir David Baird.

"SALAMANCA, 5th December 1808.

"MY DEAR SIR DAVID,—The city of Madrid has taken up arms, has refused to capitulate to the French. The people are barricading the streets, and say they are determined to suffer everything rather than submit. This arrests the French ; and people who are sanguine entertain great hopes from it. For myself, I fear this spirit has arisen too late, and that the French are now too strong to be resisted in this manner. There is, however, no saying, and I feel myself the more obliged to give it a trial, that Mr. Frere has made a formal representation, which I received this evening. I must beg, therefore, that you will suspend your march until you hear from me again, and make arrangements for your return to Astorga, should it be necessary.

"All this appears very strange and unsteady ;

but if the spirit of enthusiasm does arise in Spain, there is no saying in that case what our forces may do. I hope in the meantime the cavalry is coming to me which I asked you for.—Believe me, very faithfully,

“JOHN MOORE.”

Moore now despatched Colonel Graham (afterwards General Lord Lynedoch) to Madrid to report on the actual state of affairs there, and next day he sent the following instructions to Sir David Baird:—

“SALAMANCA, 6th December 1808.

“MY DEAR SIR DAVID,—I wrote to you last night to suspend your retrograde movement. I now write to you to beg that you will put to the right about, and return bag and baggage to Astorga. The people of Madrid, it is said, are enthusiastic and desperate, and certainly at this moment do resist the French. The good which may result from this it is impossible to say; I can neither trust to it, nor can I altogether despise it. If the flame catches elsewhere, and becomes at all general, the best results may be expected. If confined to Madrid, that town will be sacrificed, and all be as bad or worse than ever; in short, what is passing at Madrid may be decisive of the fate of Spain, and we must be at hand to aid and to take advantage of whatever happens. The wishes of our country, and our duty, demand this of us, with whatever risk it may be attended.

“I mean to proceed bridle in hand, for if the bubble bursts, and Madrid falls, we shall have a

run for it. Let your preparations (as far as provisions, &c., go) continue for a retreat, in case that it should again become necessary; establish one magazine at Villa Franca, and one or two farther back, to which let salt meat, biscuit, rum or wine, forage, &c., be brought up from Corunna. Send to me to Zamora two regiments of cavalry and one brigade of horse artillery, keeping one regiment of cavalry and one brigade of horse artillery with yourself, and send on your corps by brigades to Benevente. The enemy have nothing at present in that direction; we must take advantage of it by working double tides, to make up for lost time.

“By means of the cavalry patrols, you will discover every movement immediately near you, and I take for granted you have got other channels of information; and both you and me, although we may look big and determined to get everything forward, yet we must never lose sight of this, that at any moment affairs may take that turn which will render it necessary to retreat.

“I shall write by this opportunity to the Marquis of Romana, and it would be satisfactory if you kept an officer constantly with, or sent one occasionally, to him, to judge his force and its state of preparation for service, to let us know how far we can depend upon it in action.—I remain, my dear Sir David, yours faithfully,

“JOHN MOORE.”

CHAPTER XVI

THE ADVANCE

ON the receipt of the instructions to suspend his retreat, General Baird at once issued the necessary orders, and next morning he wrote to Sir John Moore as follows :—

“ To Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore.

“ VILLA FRANCA, 8th December 1808.

“ MY DEAR SIR JOHN,—At a late hour last night I received your letter of the 5th instant. In compliance with your desire, immediate orders were sent off to halt the regiments in the different positions they occupied, and to suspend any farther preparations for re-embarkation. One brigade had reached within a day’s march of St. Jago on the road to Vigo.

“ I trust long ere this letter reaches you, that you will have been joined by Lord Paget and the cavalry. I was induced to send the three regiments for the reasons I have already stated in two former letters.

“ It has frequently occurred to me that, in the event of our being obliged to adopt defensive measures, it might be more advantageous for the combined British army to cover Galicia and part

of Leon, than, by my proceeding to join you at Salamanca, to abandon the defence of these provinces. The Asturias might be occupied by the troops of the Marquess de la Romana, and if you judged it proper, by a flank movement, to join us in the neighbourhood of Astorga, I entertain a confident belief that, by occupying the strong ground behind it, we should be able to cover the country in our rear, and might wait until it is seen what efforts the Spanish nation is disposed and determined to make in defence of the national independence. The royal road from Corunna to this place and Astorga is remarkably good, although mountainous; and, with the sea open to us, we should be able to receive with facility such reinforcements and supplies as the British Government might deem it proper to send. I do not think much difficulty would be experienced for a few months from a want of provisions. The country abounds with cattle; bread, indeed, would be required; but flour might be obtained from England; and, in the meantime, Galicia would have an opportunity of arming under our protection; and our presence in Spain would furnish a rallying point, and act as a stimulus to the Spaniards.

“I merely submit these points, my dear Sir John, to your consideration. I had before written a letter upon the subject to you, which I did not send, in consequence of receiving accounts of Castanos’ defeat at the moment I was about to despatch it. — Believe me, dear Sir John, yours faithfully,

“D. BAIRD.”

On the 8th Moore wrote as follows :—

“ To Sir David Baird.

“ SALAMANCA, 8th December 1808.

“ MY DEAR SIR DAVID,—Madrid still holds out, and I have some reasons to believe that some efforts are making to collect a force at Toledo, and a still larger one on the other side of the Sierra Morena. As long as there is a chance we must not abandon this country. The conduct of Madrid has given us a little time, and we must endeavour to profit by it. My first object must be to unite with you, and then connect myself with the Marquess Romana.

“ I shall move a corps from this on the 10th to Zamora and Toro, to which last place I shall move headquarters. I should wish you to push on your people by brigades to Benevente. . . .

“ In the meantime I am anxious to know the real strength and condition of the troops La Romana and Blake are assembling, and I will thank you to send an intelligent officer to Leon to see them, who is capable of judging without allowing himself to be humbugged.

“ You will, of course, order whatever troops arrive at Corunna to be immediately landed and sent forward. I have sent Colonel Graham (90th Regiment) to Madrid, and expect to hear from him this evening.—I remain, my dear Sir David, yours faithfully,

“ JOHN MOORE.”

In accordance with these instructions, General Baird sent Colonel Symes to Leon to report on the condition of Romana's army.

Lord Paget reached Zamora on the 9th with the cavalry, and next day Moore wrote the following letter :—

“SALAMANCA, 10th December 1808.

“MY DEAR SIR DAVID,—Lord Paget, with the cavalry, is at Toro. His brother, the Lieutenant-General, with the reserve, marches to-morrow, and will be with it, with Beresford’s brigade, on the 12th.

“I shall also move Hope’s and Fraser’s divisions on the 11th and 12th, on the roads to Tordesillas and Valladolid, and should wish, with the whole of mine in this quarter, to proceed to the latter place, if you, with any considerable portion of yours, will be ready to join me there. You may send on yours by brigades to Benevente with safety, and from thence to Valladolid. Your march, either by one or two brigades, could be concerted with ours, so as to make it perfectly secure.

“I am impatient to hear from you, to judge when to expect you at Benevente. Bring on a proportion of ammunition, both for guns and musquets, to Benevente.

“I have written twice lately to the Marquess de la Romana, but have received no answer. Will you have the goodness to let him know my intention to move, in order to put myself in conjunction with him, and to concert what can best be done for the general good? As we shall occupy Zamora and Toro, he had better not interfere with us on that line.

“Madrid has capitulated, but the people say that the Duke of Castlefranca and Don Morla have

betrayed them, and they refuse to part with their arms. The French have the gates, the Retiro, and the Prado. Madrid thus continues to occupy a part of the French army. Saragossa still holds out, and they say they are endeavouring to collect forces in the south. They all cannot be directed against us, and we must try our hands."

Sir John Moore's intentions at this time are clearly shown by the following extract from his diary :—

"SALAMANCA, 11th December.

" . . . I am moving the troops to the Duero, and shall assemble the army at Valladolid without waiting for Sir D. Baird's corps, which cannot be brought forward so soon. By this movement I shall threaten the French communications, which will make some diversion in favour of the Spaniards if they can take advantage of it ; but I much fear that they will not move, but will leave me to fight ; in which case I must keep my communications open with Astorga and Galicia."

On the 12th, General Baird received the following instructions :—

" MY DEAR SIR DAVID,—I have received both your letters of the 8th, in answer to mine of the 5th and 6th.

" Lord Paget is at Toro, to which place I have sent the reserve to General Beresford's brigade. The rest of the troops from this are moving to the Duero. My quarters to-morrow will be at Alaejos,

Hope's at Torrecillo. Frazer will be with me with his division on the 14th ; on which day Lord Paget, with the cavalry and infantry from Toro, will move along the Duero towards us, so as to enable the whole to reach Tordesillas and its neighbourhood by the 15th and Valladolid the 16th.

“ I have no answer from the Marquess de la Romana, to whom I wrote upon the 6th, and with whom it is my wish to form a junction, and to cooperate ; but although I am disappointed in not hearing from him, and must forego every assistance from him ; and though your corps will not be up in time, yet I think it an object with the troops I have to march to Valladolid ; from whence, according to the information I receive, I may move on to Placencia and Burgos, and thus threaten the enemy's communications, and may cause a divergence in favour of Madrid or Saragossa, or any movement which may be in contemplation from the south of the Tagus. I shall at all events cover you while assembling in Astorga and Benevente, and may bring you on to me or fall back upon you as occasion requires ; and in the meantime I shall be just as safe as at Salamanca or Zamora.

“ I think I shall call in to me Colonel Craufurd with his corps, either by Toro or Medina de Rio Seco, of which I shall give you notice from Alaejos.

“ I have attached a brigade of artillery to each division of the army ; whatever is over is considered as reserve. To each division also there is attached ten rounds of musket cartridge per man, carried in carts, and four mules with pack-saddles for the purpose of bringing up the cartridges from the carts

to the troops when wanted ; besides which, I am forwarding musket ammunition, and ammunition for guns to Zamora.

“ I think if you bring on with the troops two brigades of artillery, besides the two horse artillery, one of which is with Lord Paget, this will suffice. Leave the other two at Astorga, ready to come forward when called for.

“ I wish you would make the same arrangement for carrying with your brigades and divisions ten rounds a man, besides the sixty in the pouches. I shall enclose a letter from Colonel Harding, commanding the artillery, explanatory of everything else. I consider Benevente as a place to have certain stores advanced to, the rest should divide between Astorga and Villa Franca ; all the money should be brought to Villa Franca ; we shall want it.

“ I am much obliged to you for your opinion upon the Galicias and Vigo, and it is that which now I shall probably follow should such a measure become necessary. I am, therefore, most anxious that magazines should be formed on that communication. I have written home to direct that all transports, &c., should call at Corunna, and go to Vigo, unless otherwise directed. Corunna must be the place for all supplies from England ; the communication through Portugal is difficult and tardy.

“ Forward the enclosed to the Marquess de la Romana as soon as possible, and send me any letters which may come from him without delay. An officer will remain in Salamanca to forward letters to me. Should you not prefer the direct road by Toro to Tordesillas, or Valladolid, you will not think

it necessary to have more cavalry with you while I am in your front.

“I shall enclose a letter for Lord Castlereagh, which I shall thank you to forward to Corunna.— Believe me, yours sincerely,

“JOHN MOORE.”

On the 14th, Sir John Moore received a letter from Romana in which the Spanish General expressed his satisfaction at the advance of the British, and announced his own intention of co-operating.

On this very day, however, Colonel Symes, who had reached Leon on the 13th, wrote the following report, which is of interest as giving us a true picture of the state of Romana's force :—

“*To Lieutenant-General Sir David Baird.*

“LEON, 14th December 1808.

“SIR,—I have the honour to acquaint you that I arrived at Leon yesterday evening; the difficulty of procuring post-horses greatly retarded my journey. Between Membabre and Maugenal I met a brigade of Spanish artillery, viz. two howitzers and six field-pieces. They were proceeding to Ponteferrada, for what precise purpose I could not learn, possibly to defend the passes of the mountains.

“At a league north of Astorga I came on another brigade of Spanish guns drawn up on a rising ground. These guns had only three or four men to guard them, and no regular sentinel. I was told that the gunners and cattle were in the neighbouring villages. I examined the state of the guns and the ammunition as closely as I could without giving

offence. They appeared very defective. The men said they came from Leon fifteen days ago, and knew not when or whither they were to proceed.

“ At Orbigo, four leagues from Leon, I found the place occupied by a numerous body of troops—I was told four thousand—under Major-General Don Tenaro Figador. There were five regiments: three of the line—El Rey, Mayorga, and Hibernia—and two of militia, the Maldonado and another. The equipment and appearance of these troops were miserable. I had an opportunity of inspecting the arms of the general’s guard, which were extremely defective. The springs of the locks do not often correspond; either the main-spring or the feather-spring too weak to produce certain fire from the hammer. I tried sixteen; of this number six only had bayonets, and these were short and bad; the ammunition pouches were not proof against rain. The clothing of the soldiers was motley, and some were half naked. They were in general stout, fine young men, without order or discipline, but not at all turbulent or ferocious, and nothing like intoxication was observable. Soon after I left Orbigo I met the regiment of Vitoria, on its march from Leon, destined, as I was told, for Ponteferrada.

“ The men were wretchedly clad and armed.

“ I got to Leon early in the evening, and waited on the Marquis Romana. He had not heard of the capitulation of Madrid; expressed himself vaguely on the subject of moving; stated his forces at twenty-two thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry; complained much of the want of officers; had intended to form his army into five divisions,

but could not find officers to put at their head ; he therefore meant to divide his army into wings, one under General Blake, and the other under himself ; that his force was daily increasing by the return of fugitives. He expressed hopes that we had light troops to oppose to those of the French, who were very expert ; and added, that he was training six thousand of his men to that species of warfare.

“ There was a general review the next day, at which I expressed a desire to have the honour to attend his Excellency.

“ In the morning I waited on his Excellency, and pressed him, as far as I could with propriety, on the subject of joining Sir John Moore ; to which he evaded giving any more than general assurances. He does not think that the forces of the enemy in the north exceed 10,000 men in all, and that there is no danger to be apprehended of their penetrating into Asturias. He recommends to Sir John Moore to break down all bridges between Toro and Aranda, four in number ; that Zamora be fortified, and made a depôt, and that magazines be formed at Astorga and Villa Franca ; again regretted his want of cavalry ; expressed a wish to procure 2000 English firelocks and shoes for his army. When I asked *him* for one hundred draft mules for General Baird’s army, he replied it was impossible, he had not one to spare.

“ Whilst we were talking, a courier brought an account from Benevente of the repulse of the French at Madrid. It may be true, but it seems at present to stand in need of confirmation.

“ I attended the review. The troops were drawn up in three columns ; each might perhaps consist of 2500 men. The Marquis, on horseback, addressed each column separately. When that was over, the troops formed into line ; the right wing was badly armed and worse clothed ; the left was better, being chiefly provided with English firelocks ; and a corps of 1000 men in uniform, who, I was informed, were light troops, might be called respectable.

“ The movement from column into line was very confusedly performed, and the officers were comparatively inferior to the men. There was only one brigade of artillery in the field, and I doubt whether there is more in Leon. The guns were drawn by mules. No ammunition-waggons were brought for inspection.

“ On the whole, from what I have been able to observe since I came here, and from the tenor of my conversations with the Marquis, I am disposed to doubt his inclination of moving in a forward direction to join Sir John Moore ; I suspect he rather looks to secure his retreat into Galicia, unless the aspect of affairs alters materially for the better ; and if he were to join Sir John, I doubt whether his aid would prove essentially useful.

“ My reasons for these conclusions are as follow :

“ If the Marquis meant to advance, why send his artillery and troops into the rear, and why, as he is assured of the time when Sir John Moore intends to be at Benevente, decline to fix any precise day to make movement ? I do not know what communication he may have with you through

Captain Doyle, or by letter to Sir John Moore, to whom he says he has written fully ; but to me he has certainly given no cause whatever to suppose that he will move in concert with your army or that of Sir John Moore. I hope I may be mistaken.

“ My motive for doubting whether the aid which he might bring would be of any importance, arises from a sense of the inefficient state of his arms, and the want of discipline in his men. It is morally impossible that they can stand before a line of French infantry. A proportion of at least one-third of the Spanish musquets will not explode, and a French soldier will load and fire his piece with precision three times before a Spaniard can fire his twice. Men, however brave, cannot stand against such odds.

“ As to charging with the bayonet, if their arms were fit for the purpose, the men, although individually as gallant as possible, have no collective confidence to carry them on, nor officers to lead them. They will therefore disperse, probably on the first fire, and can never be rallied until they voluntarily return to their general’s standard, as in the case of the Marquis Romana’s present army, almost wholly composed of fugitives from the battles of the north.

“ A striking instance of this is given by the Marquis himself, who assured me that the Spaniards did not lose above 1000 men in their late actions with the French ; a proof, not of the weakness of the French, but of the incapacity of the Spaniards to resist them. In fact, the French light troops decided the contest ; the Spaniards fled before a

desultory fire. They saved themselves, and now claim credit for having escaped.

“By a repetition of such flights and re-assemblies the Spaniards may in the end become soldiers, and gently harass the enemy; but as *we* cannot practise that mode of warfare, our allies are not calculated to be of use to us on the day of battle, when we must either conquer or be destroyed.

“I do not mean to undervalue the spirit of patriotism of the Spaniards, which I highly respect, and which may in the end effect their deliverance, but they are not now, nor can they be for a long time, sufficiently improved in the art of war to be coadjutors with us in a general action.

“We must, therefore, *stand or fall through our own means*, for if we place any reliance on Spanish aid for success in the field, we shall, I fear, find ourselves egregiously deceived.

“I think the Marquis Romana should immediately be called upon to say on what day he will march, and on what day and at what place he will join Sir John Moore.

“I have thought it my duty, sir, thus to enter at length into the subject, with a view to prevent hereafter any disappointment in a matter of such high importance.—I have the honour to be, sir, with the greatest respect, your most obliged, faithful servant,

“MICH. SYMES, *Lt.-Col.*”

Colonel Symes died at sea on his way to England as a result of the hardships he endured during the retreat to Corunna.

On the 14th, Sir John Moore again changed his plans in consequence of the intelligence he got from an intercepted despatch addressed to Marshal Soult. He explained the situation in the following letter :—

“HEADQUARTERS, ALAEJOS,
14th December.

“MY DEAR SIR DAVID,—I received last night your letters of the 10th and 11th instant. It was my intention to have moved to-morrow on Valladolid, but a letter from Buonaparte to Marshal Soult at Saldanha, which we have intercepted (the officer who carried it having been murdered by the peasantry), has induced me to change my direction, and shall be to-morrow, with all the troops I have, at Toro and its immediate neighbourhood. It appears that Marshal Soult, Duc de Dalmatie, has with him two divisions at Saldanha, besides one under the Duc d’Abrantes, which is collecting at Burgos, and another under the Duc de Treviso, which has received orders to march on Saragossa, but which of course may be recalled. Madrid has submitted and is quiet, and the French from thence are marching upon Badajos. Their advanced guard was at Talavera la Reina on the 10th instant. My object is now to unite the army as soon as possible, you at Benevente and I at Toro, from whence, either by a forward or flank movement, the two corps can be joined. I shall direct all my stores from Zamora to be forwarded to Benevente. The arrangement with respect to yours, which I communicated to you in my letter of the 12th, may go on, by which we shall have a certain portion at Benevente and the rest at Astorga and the rear.

It appears from the intercepted letter, from deserters, and from prisoners we have taken, that the French are in complete ignorance of our present movements, and think we have retreated. As they will now know the truth, what change this may make in their march on Badajos I know not, but Marshal Soult will certainly be checked in his intended operations, which were projected upon the supposition that he had nothing but Spaniards to oppose him. Every arrangement which I before directed with a view to enable us to live in the Galicias should be strictly attended to, for though in the first instances we may not have opposed to us more than we can face, it will be in the power of the enemy to increase their force far beyond our strength.

“I have received a letter from the Marquess de la Romana, and I expect an officer from him every hour. Whatever I determine with him shall be communicated to you. In the meantime, I shall thank you to let him know that I have changed my intention of going to Valladolid in consequence of information, and that I am collecting the army at Toro and Benevente.—Believe me, my dear Sir David, yours faithfully,

“JOHN MOORE.”

On the 16th, Baird reached Benevente and Moore arrived at Toro, from which place he wrote as follows :—

“Upon my arrival here yesterday, I received from the messenger your letter of the 12th. Tomorrow I purpose to march to some villages, which

I understand will hold all the corps, within two or three leagues of Benevente. I shall then be so near to you as to give perfect security to the assembling of your corps at that place. I shall also be able to have the pleasure of meeting you.

“I cannot help again pressing you to take every measure for the forming of magazines at Astorga, Villa Franca, and on the road to Corunna, for, though we may do something here, we must always look to a retreat on Galicia. For the present, while the army united is so near, I do not see that any corps of the enemy can attempt to disturb the passage of our stores by Astorga, or endeavour to place himself between us and the pass into Galicia. They have no corps at present at hand, that when united we should hesitate to attack.”

At Toro, Sir John Moore received another letter from Mr. Frere urging him to attack the enemy, and promising him the assistance of 14,000 of Romana's troops. This egregious individual then concluded as follows :—

“I am unwilling to enlarge on a subject in which my feelings must be stifled, or expressed at the risk of offence, which, with such an interest at stake, I should be unwilling to excite ; but this much I must say, that if the British army had been sent for the express purpose of doing mischief to the Spanish cause, with the single exception of not firing a shot against their troops, they would, according to the measures now adopted, or about to be pursued, have completely fulfilled their purpose.”

The movements of the next few days are briefly described by Sir John Moore in his diary as follows :—

“ On the 17th, headquarters were at Castromuevo ; the advance guard at Villapondo, where I met Sir David Baird, who rode over from Benevente, where he was with three brigades. . . .

“ On the 19th, headquarters at Valderas, advanced guard at Mayorga. At Valderas I was joined by Sir David Baird with two brigades. On the 20th, headquarters were at Mayorga, where Brigadier-General Manningham’s brigade joined.”

The effective strength of the British force was now 23,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry ; 1700 men were on detachment and 4000 were in hospital.

At Mayorga the army was reorganised as follows :

Cavalry—Lieut.-General LORD PAGET.

Slade’s Brigade—10th, 15th L.D.

Stewart’s Brigade—7th, 18th L.D., 3rd L.D., K.G.L.

1st Division—Lieut.-General Sir D. BAIRD.

Warde’s Brigade—1/1 Guards, 2/1 Guards.

Bentinck’s Brigade—1/4, 1/42, 1/50.

Manningham’s Brigade—3/1, 1/26, 1/81.

2nd Division—Lieut.-General Sir J. HOPE.

Leith’s Brigade—51, 2/59, 76.

Hill’s Brigade—2, 1/5, 2/14, 1/32.

Catlin Craufurd’s—1/36, 1/71, 1/92.

3rd Division—Lieut.-General MACKENZIE FRASER.

Beresford’s Brigade—1/6, 1/9, 2/23, 2/43.

Fane’s Brigade—1/38, 1/79, 1/82.

Reserve—Major-General E. PAGET.

Anstruther’s Brigade—20, 1/52, 1/95.

Disney’s Brigade—1/28, 1/91.

1st Flank Brigade—Col. R. CRAUFURD.

1/43, 2/52, 2/95.

2nd Flank Brigade—Brig.-General C. ALTEN.

1st and 2nd Light Battalions K.G.L.

Artillery—11 Brigades (66).

Moore now intended to fall upon Soult. The French Marshal did not know that Moore and Baird had united. On the 19th he asked Junot for reinforcements, and on the 20th he ordered his two divisions of infantry to concentrate at Carrion and Saldanha covered by the cavalry at Sahagun.

At dawn on the 21st, Lord Paget at the head of the 15th L.D. fell upon the French cavalry at Sahagun, and drove them back after a brilliant little action. Sir David Baird's division occupied the town of Sahagun the same day, and Moore halted his army here on the 22nd and 23rd.

At Sahagun, Moore received a letter from Mr. Frere, in which the latter fairly excelled himself by informing the General that the fall of Madrid was still doubtful.

Moore issued orders for the army to march at 8 P.M. on the 23rd and reach Carrion at dawn. The troops were actually on parade and on the point of moving off when Sir John sent for General Baird and informed him that he had just learnt that the French were on the march from Madrid, and that in consequence he had given up all idea of attacking Soult, and must retreat at once.

It was a bitter disappointment to the army, but there cannot be the slightest doubt that Moore was right. He summed the matter up in the following words :—

“I gave up the march on Carrion, which had never been undertaken with any other view but that of attracting the enemy’s attention from the armies assembling in the south, and in the hope of being able to strike a blow at a weak corps whilst it was still thought the British army was retreating into Portugal. For this, I was aware that I risked infinitely too much; but something, I thought, was to be risked for the honour of the service and to make it apparent that we stuck to the Spaniards long after they themselves had given up their cause as lost.”

On December 19th, while Napoleon was holding a review at Madrid, he received a despatch from Soult, dated the 16th, stating that the British were advancing against him.

At first the Emperor could not believe that Moore could be so rash, but a few hours later he learnt from some deserters that the British really were taking the offensive.

At 10 P.M. a despatch was written telling Soult that the Emperor was sending a strong force to fall upon Moore, and ordering Soult to co-operate. At 10 A.M. on the 20th, Ney was ordered to advance to the Guadarrama, more troops were despatched on the 21st, and at noon on the 22nd the Emperor himself left Madrid, and ordered the infantry of the Guard to follow him. Before night he crossed the passes of the Guadarrama at the head of Lapisse’s division.

CHAPTER XVII

SPAIN—THE RETREAT

ON December 24th the retreat began. Rain fell all day and the roads were deep in mud.

Baird's division was ordered to march by Valencia de Don Juan and to cross the Esla by the ferry and the ford, while Hope's and Fraser's divisions were sent by Mayorga and Valderas to cross the Esla by the bridge at Castro-Gonzalo and proceed to Benevente.

Meanwhile the cavalry made a demonstration towards Saldanha and Carrion.

On Christmas Day, Napoleon's headquarters were at Tordesillas, but his troops were much exhausted. The British rear-guard, which consisted of the Reserve and the Light Brigades, fell back to Valderas.

On the 26th the main body of the British halted at Benevente. There were scenes of great disorder; many senior officers murmured openly against the General for retreating, and this bad example had very serious consequences. There can be no doubt that the disorder and excesses that took place in the retreat were due far more to the negligence of the officers and the bad discipline of the men than to the rapidity of the movement, for the rear-guard, which had all the fighting, lost far less men than the divisions, which retired without firing a shot.

On the 27th, Moore was obliged to issue special orders to repress pillaging.

That day the 2nd and 3rd divisions resumed their retreat, and Craufurd's Light Brigade held Castro-Gonzalo.

On the night of the 28th and 29th the bridge at Castro-Gonzalo was destroyed, and the Esla now separated pursuers from pursued.

On the 29th, General Lefebvre-Desnouettes forded the Esla near Castro-Gonzalo with the Chasseurs of the Guard. The British cavalry fell upon them and drove them back across the river, capturing the French general. Unfortunately, however, on this same day General Franceschi captured the bridge of Mansilla, higher up the Esla, from the Spaniards.

The 3rd division was now at Astorga, the 2nd at La Baneza, and the 1st at Acebes, and on the 30th the main body of the British was concentrated at Astorga. Here the disorder and confusion was worse than ever. Sir John Moore had expressly asked General Romana to leave the line of retreat through Astorga clear for him, and the Spanish General had promised to do so ; yet now the town was filled with the miserable Spaniards, naked, starving, and suffering terribly from malignant typhus.

Romana wanted the British General to fight, and even talked absurdly of assuming the offensive, but Moore pointed out that he had less than two days' food to take his army to Villa Franca, which was thirty-six miles as the crow flies and nearly fifty by road ; moreover, his transport was rapidly going to pieces, and the drivers were deserting. Many stores had to be abandoned at Astorga, as

well as the heavy baggage of Baird's division ; and 400 sick men had to be left behind in hospital.

The retreat was resumed, and from this time many regiments seem to have become mere undisciplined mobs. On leaving Astorga the road entered the mountains of Galicia, so the hardships of the march were much increased.

The infantry of the British rear-guard left Astorga on 31st December, and on 1st January Napoleon entered the town and learnt that the British cavalry had only left that morning.

The British had escaped, yet for all that, this march of the French is one of the finest recorded in military history. In ten days Napoleon, by his iron will, had marched 50,000 men and 150 guns from Madrid to Astorga, a distance of 200 miles. One day was lost at the River Esla, and this stupendous march was accomplished in mid-winter and in terrible weather. Even the snowy passes of the Guadarrama could not stop Napoleon.

On 30th December the British troops resumed their march ; and at Bonillas the two light brigades branched off and took the road which led through Fuencebadon and Orense to Vigo. They met with terrible hardships in the mountains, and Craufurd only kept his men together by means of the most relentless severity. There can be no doubt that he saved the lives of many of his men at the expense of their backs. Vigo was reached on 12th January.

Moore has been much criticised for detaching his two flank brigades, but his object was not to fight but to retreat.

He proved both at Lugo and at Corunna that he

had plenty of men to fight if necessary, and the absence of these two brigades certainly facilitated his retreat on the road through the mountains.

Hope's and Fraser's divisions reached Bembibre on 31st December, and Baird's arrived on 1st January. At Bembibre there were huge wine vaults. The soldiers broke into them, and when the force resumed its retreat several hundred men were left behind hopelessly intoxicated.

Hope's and Fraser's divisions got to Villa Franca on 1st January, and Baird's division on the day following. Fourteen days' rations for the army were stored in the town, but the soldiers would not wait for the commissaries to distribute them. There were the most frightful scenes of drunkenness and looting. Moore had one soldier executed in the market-place, but the troops were thoroughly out of hand, and it was impossible to re-establish order.

On 2nd January the army halted, but on the 3rd the retreat was resumed, and there was a rear-guard action at Cacabellos, in which the French general, Colbert, was killed. Moore had sent back officers to report on the facilities for embarkation at Corunna and at Vigo, and he had not definitely decided to which port he would retreat.

At Herrerias during the night of 3rd and 4th January Sir John Moore received the reports, and determined to retire on Corunna. He at once sent Captain George Napier, his aide-de-camp, to General Baird, who was at Nogales, ordering him to halt at Lugo and to pass these orders on to Hope and Fraser. Most unwisely, Sir David Baird did not send an officer to deliver the orders, but

trusted them to an orderly of the 15th L.D. The orderly got drunk and lost them. This carelessness of General Baird's had very serious consequences, for Fraser's division, instead of halting for two days at Lugo, marched on a further ten miles. It was recalled in haste, but this march cost the division 400 stragglers.

By now the main body of the British army was little better than a rabble. On 4th January the French captured 900 British stragglers, and next day £25,000 of treasure was abandoned and lost.

On the 6th the rear-guard joined the main body in a position a few miles east of Lugo.

During this trying retreat the reserve division under Major-General E. Paget behaved extremely well, kept off the enemy, and lost very few stragglers.

Moore now issued an order appealing to the army to pull itself together, as a battle was imminent. The effect was magical. Men rejoined their regiments in scores. Leith's brigade, which had been left behind, had joined the army between Villa Franca and Lugo, and Moore had 19,000 men under arms and spoiling for a fight.

All day on the 7th and 8th Moore offered battle, and by the afternoon of the 8th Soult had 18,000 men at his immediate disposal, including 4000 cavalry.

Moore could wait no longer, for he only had one day's rations left. It was necessary to retire at once. Guides had been detailed for each division, and marks had been set up to enable them to find their way.

At 8 P.M. the army moved off in perfect silence,

leaving the camp-fires burning. An awful storm arose and blew away the marks, and the guides lost their way. Paget's division was the only one that reached the road at the appointed place, and morning found the army drenched to the skin and still quite close to Lugo. At 10 A.M. the force halted, for it could go no further. The troops were strung out from Guitiriz to Astariz. Most fortunately the engineers had successfully destroyed the bridge over the Minho eight miles north of Lugo, and this delayed the French.

In the evening the march was resumed, still in terrible weather. During one very severe storm of rain Sir David Baird ordered some of his troops to take shelter in some houses at a distance from the road. The result was that the men left their ranks and could never be collected again.

Before nightfall the French secured 500 prisoners, but the British struggled into Betanzos.

The disgraceful state of the army at this time may be judged by the fact that when Manningham's brigade of Baird's division entered Betanzos, one distinguished regiment had only nine officers, three sergeants, and three men present with the colours. Yet the same battalion had 500 men under arms at the battle of Corunna.

On the 10th the army halted, and the main body entered Corunna on the evening of the 11th. Sir John Moore watched them come in, and it was a terrible sight. Out of three divisions of British infantry there were only two battalions which marched in like soldiers. The two battalions of the Guards marched into Corunna each 800 strong,

with ranks closed up and the men in step, but the rest of the force was little better than a mob.

Paget's division still covered the retreat admirably. It successfully destroyed the bridge over the Mero at El Burgo and camped just in rear of it.

The battle of Corunna was a brilliant episode, which would never have taken place if the transports had been in the harbour when the army arrived. The army fought to cover its embarkation, but Moore had really achieved his object when he reached Corunna. Up to this time the brief campaign had cost the British about 5000 men. Two thousand were taken to France as prisoners of war, and many perished in the mountains of Galicia, but 500 stragglers eventually made their way to Portugal and were formed into a provisional battalion. As I have already mentioned, this loss was very largely due to the scandalous lack of discipline in many regiments, and to the negligence and neglect of duty of many officers. No man knew the British soldier better than Sir John Moore, but he wrote as follows: "I couldn't have believed it possible, had I not witnessed it, that a British army could in so short a time have been so completely disorganised. Its conduct has been infamous beyond belief."

On two occasions Sir David Baird, by his mistakes, undoubtedly caused much struggling; but it is well to remember that when Napoleon was at his zenith he wrote: "I have so often in my life been mistaken, that I no longer blush for it." In the earlier stages of the campaign Sir David had shown himself a careful general, and had been fully

aware of the danger of establishing magazines too far in advance ; and when the time came to retreat he supported Sir John Moore most loyally.

The retirement to Corunna was regarded by the soldiers as a disastrous retreat involving terrible hardships. The man who was floundering through the mountains of Galicia knee-deep in mud was not likely to realise that the French were suffering nearly, if not quite, as badly. Still less could he realise that Sir John Moore had completely frustrated the plans of Napoleon.

What Moore actually achieved has been summed up by Sir Frederick Maurice as follows :—

“ I must once more emphasise the point that it was not merely on the success of Moore in drawing off Napoleon from the south of Spain, from Portugal, and from Saragossa, on his completely upsetting the whole scheme of Napoleon, that the greatness of his achievement depended. It was that he should have done all this in presence of Napoleon at the head of 300,000 of his best soldiers, and yet have not only saved his army, but, after inflicting on Napoleon himself a severe check, should, in the presence of that master of pursuit, have drawn off his army intact.”

CHAPTER XVIII

CORUNNA

THE army had now reached the sea, but the transports were not in the harbour, so it was quite likely that it would be necessary to fight a battle.

Moore at once ordered the land defences of Corunna to be strengthened and the sea batteries to be disarmed.

On the 12th as many of the sick as possible were embarked on the store-ships in the harbour together with some of the stores. On this day General Franceschi crossed the Mero by the bridge at Cela.

French infantry, supported by a battery of artillery, approached the bridge at El Burgo and compelled the British outposts to fall back. The French immediately began to repair the bridge.

Vast quantities of arms and equipment which had been sent to the Galician Junta were lying unissued in Corunna; and Sir John Moore made use of them to re-arm his infantry with new muskets and fresh ammunition.

On the morning of the 13th a magazine containing 4000 lbs. of gunpowder was blown up, and the explosion did a good deal of damage in the town. By this time the reserve had been withdrawn from El Burgo.

By the evening of the 13th the bridge at El

Burgo was repaired sufficiently to enable a few companies of French infantry to cross the river, but it was not fit for artillery till the afternoon of the following day. Soult then crossed with his whole army.

On the evening of the 14th the fleet of transports arrived, and that night nearly 3000 sick, the dismounted cavalry, over 50 guns, 250 cavalry horses, and 700 artillery horses were embarked. Teams were kept on shore for twelve guns, and all the rest of the horses were killed. They had been rendered useless, not because of the absence of shoes, but because there were no nails with which to put them on. The result was that their hoofs had been destroyed.

Moore decided to hold the ridge of Monte Mero, which lies about two miles to the south of Corunna.

About a mile further south lay the much higher ridge of Penasquedo, but this position was too extensive for the British to hold.

The weak point of the British position was the right flank, for at this point the ridge of Penasquedo lay only 1100 yards to the front, and it was also probable that the French would envelop this flank.

On the 14th, Moore occupied his position. He placed Baird's division on the right, with Bentinck's and Manningham's brigades in the first line and the Guards in support. The left was held by Hope's division, Leith and Hill occupying the position with Catlin Craufurd in support.

To protect his threatened flank Moore placed the reserve near the village of Oza, while Fraser's division was still further to the rear near Corunna.

Six of the British guns were placed on the heights of Monte Mero, and the remaining three were with the reserve.

Meanwhile the British advanced troops occupied the ridge of Palavea.

The halt for three days had done wonders for the British, and Moore now had 15,000 infantry under arms. When the army had moved out to the position on the 14th, Sir David established his headquarters at a small country house immediately in the rear of his division.

On the 15th the French advanced, and drove in the advanced posts of the British; and that afternoon Soult had twelve heavy guns placed in position on the heights of Penasquedo opposite the village of Elvina.

On the 16th the British army stood to arms before dawn. It was a bright and sunny day. All the morning the two armies watched each other without moving, and Moore issued the final orders for the embarkation which was to take place that night.

Soult may well have hesitated to attack, for, though he had 16,000 troops, he could only oppose 12,000 infantry to the 15,000 of the British, and the rugged and broken nature of the ground made his 3000 cavalry of very little use to him.

At about a quarter to two in the afternoon Sir John Moore said to his military secretary: "Now, if there is no bungling, I hope we shall get away in a few hours." A few minutes later he learnt that the French were advancing in force.

Soult launched Mermet's division against the

British right, while Merle and Delaborde threatened the centre and the left of the position.

Mermet's attack was directed against the village of Elvina and the portion of the ridge that was held by Bentinck's brigade, and the advance was covered by the heavy battery on the heights of Penasquedo.

The light company of the 50th Regiment was driven out of Elvina, and Moore ordered Major Charles Napier, who commanded the 50th, to re-occupy the village. After a sharp struggle the 50th Regiment was driven back, and Major Napier was wounded and taken prisoner, but he lived to become the conqueror of Scinde.

As the enemy's column, headed by the French 31st Regiment, advanced up the ridge of Monte Mero, Sir David Baird asked Sir John Moore whether he did not think it was time to advance and meet it, and, if so, whether Sir John would give the orders. Moore replied: "No, Baird; do you." Sir David gave the order, and the 42nd Highlanders advanced and drove the French down the ridge.

And now, at the very beginning of the battle, Sir David Baird was wounded in the left arm about an inch from the shoulder by a grape-shot. He did not fall from his horse, but dismounted, almost stunned by the blow.

He tried to remount, but finding himself unable to do so, he consented to retire, accompanied by his aide-de-camp, Captain William Baird. Sir David walked into Corunna. The bone of his arm was shattered, yet his manner was so calm and collected that several officers whom he passed did not notice that he was wounded.

He went first to the quarters he had occupied at the Duke de Veraga's house in the town, and then on board the *Ville de Paris*. When the ship's surgeon entered the cabin and saw how composed the General was, he expressed the hope that he would "soon be able to set all to rights again."

Sir David angrily asked whether the surgeon supposed that he would have left the field for a trifling wound. A brief examination of the arm showed the very serious nature of the injuries. The surgeon of the *Barfleur* was sent for, and both men were of opinion that it was absolutely necessary to amputate the arm, but they wanted to postpone the operation till the following morning. The General said: "No; I wish not to keep it longer if it is necessary to be done."

It was not possible to amputate the arm in the ordinary way, for the bone was splintered so high up that it was necessary to remove the arm out of the socket. Sir David sat leaning his right arm on the table. He did not utter a word of complaint, and only made a single exclamation of pain at the moment when the joint was finally separated.

What happened next is described in the following words by Colonel Sarel, who was at this time military secretary to Sir David Baird:—

"I remained on the field until the close of the action, at which time the enemy was completely repulsed, and our line considerably in advance of the ground it had occupied at the commencement of the contest, when, being extremely anxious to ascertain the state of Sir David Baird's wound, I

hastened into town, and, passing the house to which Sir John Moore had been removed, I learned with inexpressible regret that he had just then expired.

“ Proceeding to the hotel of the Duke of Veraga, in the upper city, where the headquarters of our division had been established during the two days we had remained in Corunna, I found Sir David Baird’s own man, who had just come on shore from the *Ville de Paris*, who told me that Sir David’s wound was seriously severe, and that he must lose his arm.

“ I immediately returned with him to the ship, and upon entering the General’s cabin, learned that the operation of extracting the limb had just been performed—indeed, the surgeons were then applying the dressings.

“ Sir David received me in his usual affectionate manner, gave me his remaining hand, and expressed great pleasure at seeing me unhurt. He then made anxious inquiries respecting the events of the day, deeply lamenting the loss of Sir John Moore, at the same time adverting to the necessity of his resigning the command of the army in consequence of his wound, the surgeons considering it proper that he should be kept perfectly quiet after so severe an operation. I saw him placed on a camp-bed, which had been prepared in an adjoining cabin, and then left him for the night, which he passed tranquilly under the influence of a powerful opiate.

“ Early the next morning Sir David sent to desire me to come to him ; and having despatched his aide-de-camp, the Honourable Captain Gordon, to Lieutenant-General Hope to notify his situation, and

to request a detailed report of the action, he directed me to write a letter to the Secretary of State, to accompany the report. The letter and the report being ready, he signed the former with his own hand, and they were despatched to England in charge of his nephew, the Honourable Captain Gordon, by his Majesty's ship *Slaney*.

"The embarkation of the army was completed on the morning of the 17th, and the same evening the fleet got under way for England. The *Ville de Paris* had received on board upwards of sixty officers (several of whom were wounded) and above a thousand men of different regiments. The wind blowing a heavy gale from the south, the Admiral, considering Sir David Baird's situation, made a signal for the *Ville de Paris* to part company in order that she might not be delayed by the heavy-sailing transports."

Captain Gordon reached London on 23rd January with the following letter from Sir David Baird, accompanied by the report sent to him by Sir John Hope:—

"‘VILLE DE PARIS,’ AT SEA,
18th January 1809.

"MY LORD,—By the much-lamented death of Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore, who fell in action with the enemy on the 16th instant, it has become my duty to acquaint your lordship that the French army attacked the British troops in the position they occupied in front of Corunna, at about two o'clock in the afternoon of that day.

“ A severe wound, which compelled me to quit the field a short time previous to the fall of Sir John Moore, obliges me to refer your lordship for the particulars of the action, which was long and obstinately contested, to the enclosed report of Lieutenant-General Hope, who succeeded to the command of the army, and to whose ability and exertions in direction of the ardent zeal and unconquerable valour of His Majesty’s troops, is to be attributed, under Providence, the success of the day, which terminated in the complete and entire repulse and defeat of the enemy at every point of attack.

“ The Honourable Captain Gordon, my aide-de-camp, will have the honour of delivering this despatch, and will be able to give your lordship any further information which may be required.—
Yours, &c.,

“ D. BAIRD, *Lt.-Gen.*”

The following is Lieutenant-General Hope’s report :—

“ *To Lieut.-General Sir David Baird.*

“ ‘AUDACIOUS,’ OFF CORUNNA,
18th January.

“ SIR,—In compliance with the desire contained in your communication of yesterday, I avail myself of the first moment I have been able to command, to detail to you the occurrences of the action which took place in front of Corunna on the 16th instant.

“ It will be in your recollection, that about one in the afternoon of that day the enemy, who had received reinforcements, and who had placed some

guns in front of the right and left of his line, was observed to be moving troops towards his left flank, and forming various columns of attack, at that extremity of the strong and commanding position, which, in the morning of the 15th, he had taken in our immediate front.

“This indication of his intention was immediately succeeded by the rapid and determined attack which he had made upon your division, which occupied the right of our position. The events which occurred during that period of the action you are fully acquainted with.

“The first effort of the enemy was met by the commander of the forces, and by yourself, at the head of the 42nd Regiment, and the brigade under Major-General Lord William Bentinck. The village on your right became the object of obstinate contest. I lament to say that soon after the severe wound which deprived the army of your services, Lieut.-General Moore, who had just directed the most able disposition, fell by a cannon shot.

“The troops, though not unacquainted with the irreparable loss they had sustained, were not dismayed; but by the most determined bravery, not only repelled every attempt of the enemy to gain ground, but actually forced him to retire, although he had brought up fresh troops in support of those originally engaged.

“The enemy, finding himself foiled in every attempt to force the right of our position, endeavoured by numbers to turn it; a judicious and well-timed movement which was made by Major-General Paget with the reserve, which corps had

moved out of its cantonments to support the right of the army, by a vigorous attack, defeated this intention.

“The Major-General, having pushed forward the 95th (rifle corps) and the first battalion of the 51st Regiment, drove the enemy before him, and in his rapid and judicious advance threatened the left of the enemy’s position. This circumstance, with the position of Lieut.-General Fraser’s division (calculated to give further security to the right of the line), induced the enemy to relax his efforts in that quarter; they were, however, more forcibly directed towards the centre, where they were again successfully resisted by the brigade under Major-General Manningham, forming the left of your division, and a part of that under Major-General Leith, forming the right of the division under my orders.

“Upon the left the enemy at first contented himself with an attack upon our picquets, which, however, in general, maintained their ground. Finding, however, his efforts unavailing on the right and centre, he seemed determined to render the attack upon the left more serious; and had succeeded in obtaining possession of the village through which the great road to Madrid passes, and which was situated in front of that part of the line. From this post, however, he was soon expelled with considerable loss, by a gallant attack of some companies of the 2nd battalion 14th Regiment under Lieut.-Colonel Nichols.

“Before five in the evening we had not only successfully repelled every attack made upon the

position, but had gained ground in all points, and occupied a more forward line than at the commencement of the action ; whilst the enemy confined his operations to a cannonade and the fire of his light troops, with a view to draw off his other corps.

“ At six the firing entirely ceased—the different brigades were reassembled on the ground they had occupied in the morning, and the picquets and advanced posts resumed their original station.

“ Notwithstanding the decided and marked superiority which at this moment the gallantry of the troops had given them over the enemy, who, from his numbers and the commanding advantages of his position, had no doubt expected an easy victory, I did not, on reviewing all the circumstances, consider that I should be warranted in departing from what I knew was the fixed determination of the late commander of the forces, to withdraw the army on the evening of the 16th for the purpose of embarkation ; the previous arrangements for which had already been made by his order, and were in fact far advanced at the commencement of the action.

“ The troops quitted their position about ten at night with a degree of order that did them credit. The whole of the artillery that remained unembarked having been withdrawn, the troops followed in the order prescribed, and marched to their respective points of embarkation in the town and neighbourhood of Corunna. The picquets remained at their posts till five of the morning of the 17th, when they were also withdrawn with similar orders, and without the enemy having discovered the movements.

“ By the unremitting exertions of Captains the Hon. H. Curzon, Gosselin, Boys, Rainier, Serret, Hawkins, Digby, Carden, and Mackenzie of the royal navy, who, in pursuance of the orders of Admiral de Courcy, were entrusted with the service of embarking the army; and in consequence of the arrangements made by Commissioner Rowen, Captains Bowen and Sheppard, and the other agents for transports, the whole of the army was embarked, with an expedition which has seldom been equalled. With the exception of the brigades under Major-Generals Hill and Beresford the whole was afloat before daylight.

“ The brigade of Major-General Beresford, which was alternately to form our rear-guard, occupied the land in front of the town of Corunna; that of Major-General Hill was stationed in reserve on the promontory in the rear of the town. The enemy pushed his light troops towards the town soon after eight o'clock on the morning of the 17th, and shortly after occupied the heights of St. Lucia, which command the harbour; but, notwithstanding this circumstance, and the manifold defects of the place, there being no apprehension that the rear-guard could be forced, and the disposition of the Spaniards appearing to be good, the embarkation of Major-General Hill's brigade was commenced and completed by three o'clock in the afternoon.

“ Major-General Beresford, with the zeal and ability which are so well known to yourself and the whole army, having fully explained to the satisfaction of the Spanish Government the nature of our movement, and having made every previous

arrangement, withdrew his corps from the land front of the town soon after dark, and was, with all the wounded that had not been previously moved, embarked before one this morning.

“Circumstances forbid us to indulge the hope that the victory with which it has pleased Providence to crown the efforts of the army can be attended with any very brilliant consequences to Great Britain. It is clouded by the loss of one of her best soldiers—it has been achieved at the termination of a long and harassing service. The superior numbers and advantageous position of the enemy, not less than the actual situation of this army, did not admit of any advantage being reaped from success. It must be, however, to you, to the army, and to our country the sweetest reflection that the lustre of the British arms has been maintained amongst many disadvantageous circumstances.

“The army which entered Spain amidst the fairest prospects had no sooner completed its junction than, owing to the multiplied disasters that dispersed the native armies around us, it was left to its own resources. The advance of the British corps from the Duero afforded the best hopes that the south of Spain might be relieved; but this generous effort to save the unfortunate people also afforded the enemy the opportunity of directing every effort of his numerous troops, and concentrating all his principal resources for the destruction of the only regular force in the north of Spain.

“You are well aware with what diligence this system has been pursued—these circumstances pro-

duced the necessity of rapid and harassing marches, which diminished the numbers, exhausted the strength, and impaired the equipment of the army. Notwithstanding all these disadvantages, and those more immediately attached to a defensive position which the imperious necessity of covering the harbour of Corunna for a time had rendered indispensable to assume, the nature and undaunted valour of British troops was never more conspicuous, and must have exceeded what even your own experience of that invaluable quality so inherent in them might have taught you to expect.

“When every one that had an opportunity seemed to vie in improving it, it is difficult for me in making this report to select particular instances for your approbation. The corps chiefly engaged were the brigades under Major-Generals Lord William Bentinck, Manningham, and Leith, and the brigade of Guards under Major-General Warde. To these officers, and the troops under their immediate orders, the greatest praise is due. Major-General Hill, and Colonel Catlin Craufurd, with the brigades on the left of the position, ably supported their advanced posts. The brunt of the action fell upon the 4th, 42nd, 50th, and 51st Regiments, with parts of the brigade of Guards and the 28th Regiment.

“From Lieut.-Colonel Murray, Quartermaster-General, and the officers of the general staff, I received the most marked assistance. I had reason to regret that the illness of Brigadier-General Clinton, Adjutant-General, deprived me of his aid. I was indebted to Brigadier-General Slade during

the action for a zealous offer of his personal services, although the cavalry were embarked.

“The greatest part of the fleet having gone to sea yesterday evening, the whole being under weigh, and the corps in the embarkation necessarily much mixed on board, it is impossible at present to lay before you a return of our casualties. I hope the loss in numbers is not so considerable as might have been expected. If I was obliged to form an estimate, I should say that I believed it did not exceed in killed and wounded from 700 to 800. That of the enemy must remain unknown ; but many circumstances induce me to rate it at nearly double the above number.

“We have some prisoners, but I have not been able to obtain an account of the number ; it is not, however, considerable.

“Several officers of rank have fallen or been wounded, among whom I am only at present enabled to state the names of Lieut.-Colonel Napier, 92nd Regiment, Majors Napier and Stanhope, 50th Regiment, killed ; Lieut.-Colonel Winch, 4th Regiment, Lieut.-Colonel Maxwell, 26th Regiment, Lieut.-Colonel Fane, 59th Regiment, Lieut.-Colonel Griffiths, Guards, Majors Miller and Williams, 81st Regiment, wounded.

“To you who are well acquainted with the excellent qualities of Lieut.-General Sir John Moore, I need not expatiate on the loss his country and the army have sustained by his death. His fall has deprived me of a valuable friend, to whom long experience of his worth had sincerely attached me ; but it is chiefly on public grounds that I most

lament the blow. It will be the conversation of every one who loved or respected his manly character, that, after conducting the army through an arduous retreat with consummate firmness, he has terminated a career of distinguished honour by a death that has given the enemy additional reason to respect the name of a British soldier. Like the immortal Wolfe, he is snatched from his country at an early period of a life spent in her service; like Wolfe, his last moments were gilded by the prospect of success, and cheered by the acclamations of victory; like Wolfe, also, his memory will for ever remain sacred in that country which he sincerely loved, and which he had so faithfully served.

“It remains for me only to express my hope that you will speedily be restored to the service of your country, and to lament the unfortunate circumstance that removed you from your station in the field, to throw the momentary command into far less able hands.—I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant,

“JOHN HOPE, *Lieut.-General.*”

The *Ville de Paris* reached Portsmouth on 25th January after a rough voyage, of which Colonel Sarel writes as follows:—

“I was almost constantly at his bedside. His mind constantly dwelt on the events of the campaign, and his anxiety for the safety of the troops during the stormy weather which prevailed was so intense as literally to endanger his recovery. On his arrival at Spithead he was met by his brother,

Colonel Joseph Baird, and on the following day was disembarked and carried from the landing-place by sailors, on a litter, to the apartments which had been prepared for him at Portsmouth, amidst the sympathy of the populace."

As soon as he could be moved the General was taken up to London.

CHAPTER XIX

CLOSING YEARS

ON 25th January, Lord Liverpool in the Lords and Lord Castlereagh in the Commons moved the thanks of Parliament to Sir David Baird and the officers and men under his command "for their gallant conduct in repulsing a superior French force before Corunna." The votes were carried unanimously.

On 1st February the Speaker read General Baird's reply, thanking the House for the honour conferred on himself and his army.

Soon after this, Sir David was made a Knight of the Bath. At this time he was suffering much, not only from the amputation of his arm, but also from a wound in his side. He bought a small estate at Yardleybury in Hertfordshire, and lived there till the spring of 1810.

On 13th April 1809 he was created a baronet with remainder to his brother, Mr. Baird of Newbyth, but he was much disappointed at not receiving a peerage.

On 4th August 1810 he married Miss Campbell Preston, and he afterwards lived on an estate in Perthshire which Lady Baird had inherited. He took the greatest interest in the management of the estate, and, though he had only one arm, he still shot—as he himself said—as well as ever.

In 1813 he applied to be appointed Governor of Cape Colony, but without success.

In 1814 he was in London when the Czar and the King of Prussia visited England. On this occasion peerages and pensions of £2000 a year were conferred on five of Wellington's Peninsula Generals. Sir David urged his own claims to a similar reward, but in vain. He was promoted General on 4th June 1814, and when the Order of the Bath was enlarged in the following year he was made a G.C.B.

On 11th March 1819 the General was appointed Governor of Kinsale.

At last, in March 1820, Sir David was once more in harness, for on the 25th of that month he took over the command in Ireland from Sir George Beckwith.

General Baird was very happy in Ireland, and the return to military duty improved his health and spirits. In 1821 King George IV. visited Dublin, and on this occasion Sir David wrote to Lord Sidmouth, and once more urged his claim to a peerage.

On 30th December the Marquess Wellesley arrived in Dublin and took over the duties of Lord-Lieutenant from Earl Talbot; and in June 1822 Sir David Baird handed over the command to Lieut.-General Sir Samuel Auchmuty, his old staff-officer on the desert march.

On this occasion Sir David wrote the following letter to the secretary to the Commander-in-Chief :—

“ To Sir Herbert Taylor, &c.

“ ROYAL HOSPITAL, DUBLIN,
24th June 1822.

“ SIR,—Having in obedience to his Majesty’s orders delivered over the command of the army in Ireland to Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Auchmuty, I feel anxious to submit to his Royal Highness a few brief observations on the state of the country at the moment of my departure from Dublin.

“ Considering the agitation and alarm which prevailed generally towards the close of the last and in the early part of the present year, and the character of open insurrection which the disorders had assumed in the south, it cannot but be a source of gratification to contemplate the tranquil state of the country at the present moment.

“ No act of outrage worth recording has occurred since my military secretary addressed to you the usual confidential report at the commencement of June, and I trust the severe check and consequent lesson the disaffected have received, may serve to show them the danger of acting upon the distresses and prejudices of the peasantry, and of misleading them into schemes subversive of the Government and public peace.

“ In expressing this hope I must, however, accompany it by my humble opinion (founded on all the observation I have been able to make since my arrival in Ireland), that the number of disaffected is very considerable, although they may be deficient in leaders of rank or influence ; that they entertain designs hostile to the Government and the present

order of things, and that they act under the obligation of an oath which binds them to secrecy and mutual support.

“ The small number of arms which have been surrendered by the peasantry will unfortunately justify a belief that there is no general disposition towards a final relinquishment of their designs.

“ The distress for food, arising principally from the want of means to purchase it, continues to prevail in various districts : and the late accounts from the south and west are of the most afflicting character. Colonel Patrickson, whose regiment (the 43rd) has lately relieved the 57th in Galway, reports the scenes which that town presents to be truly distressing. Hundreds of half-famished wretches arrive almost daily from a distance of fifty or sixty miles, many of them so exhausted by want of food that the means taken to restore them fail of effect from the weakness of the digestive organs, occasioned by long fasting.

“ Every effort is made by the Government to alleviate this distress, and the liberality of individuals has been very praiseworthy ; in the work of benevolence the military have borne their share.

“ Although I have repeatedly had occasion to report favourably of the conduct of this army, yet I feel it to be a duty incumbent on me in quitting it, again to assure his Royal Highness that its conduct whilst under my command has been most exemplary and excellent. I have had reason to be fully satisfied with every department and branch of the service.

“ The general officers, the heads of departments,

and the staff, have supported me with zeal and intelligence ; and the officers and troops in general, by their discipline, their temper, and their orderly conduct, have merited the esteem of the people amongst whom they are serving, and my best and warmest commendations. They have had harassing and painful duties to perform in the south, and the nature of the service generally in Ireland exposes the military to many privations and much fatigue, and to a dispersion which in a worse constituted army would prove fatal to its discipline and character.—I have the honour to be, sir, your most obedient and humble servant,

“ D. BAIRD.”

In reply to this letter, Sir David Baird received the following from his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief :—

“ *To the Right Hon. General Sir David Baird,
G.C.B., &c. &c.*

“ HORSE GUARDS, 29th June 1822.

“ DEAR SIR,—Sir Herbert Taylor having communicated to me your letter of the 24th instant, written upon the occasion of your having delivered over the command of the army in Ireland to Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Auchmuty, I directed him to convey it to Mr. Peel, and I have now the satisfaction of sending you the copy of a letter from him, expressing his sense of your services in the command which you have quitted.

“ I cannot do so without assuring you how cordially I concur in the sentiments which Mr. Peel’s

letter conveys, and how persuaded I am that there is not a member of his Majesty's Government who is not equally disposed to acknowledge the value of your meritorious and zealous services, under circumstances often very trying, and always requiring assiduous and laborious attention.

“ I am more particularly called upon to thank you for your steady and unwearied exertions to preserve the discipline and efficiency of the troops ; and I feel great satisfaction in assuring you that in this respect, as in every other, you have discharged the important duties confided to you in a manner which has secured to you his Majesty's entire and unqualified approbation, and has fully confirmed the opinion of your character which your previous long, faithful, and gallant services in various climes had established.—Believe me, dear sir, yours very sincerely,

“ FREDERICK, *Commander-in-Chief.*”

Thus ended the public services of Sir David Baird.

In the autumn of 1823 the General's favourite horse fell with him. He was much hurt, but he seemed to get all right again. That winter he went to London with Lady Baird. In London he was seized with giddiness which was followed by a long and severe illness from which he never thoroughly recovered. Sir David always seemed cheery and in good spirits, and he took the greatest interest in passing events, but he knew full well that he might die suddenly at any time. He was appointed Governor of Inverness on 1st December 1827.

In the spring of 1829 he appeared to be much better, and on 23rd April he went to a levée on receiving this new appointment.

From London he went to Leamington, and here he began to have violent pains in his head. He returned to London, and in June he left London for Edinburgh. On the journey he got much worse, so he stayed at Edinburgh for a time, but on getting a little better he was carried to Fern Tower—his home—and he arrived there on 20th July. On 16th August he had a severe relapse, and on 18th August he died. In the parish church at Crieff his neighbours placed a tablet to his memory with the following inscription :—

To the memory of
 GEN. THE RIGHT HON. SIR DAVID BAIRD, BART.,
 G.C.B., K.C., &c.,
 this Tablet is gratefully inscribed
 by
 the Inhabitants of the Parish of Crieff and its
 Neighbourhood,
 not to commemorate his martial achievements, for these
 are recorded in the annals of his country,

But as their humble testimony to those excellences in his character, which they desire to see handed down to posterity, that they may be held in remembrance "while there is any virtue, or any praise, in things that are true, and honest, and just, and pure, and lovely, and of good report."

In him the sterner virtues of uprightness and unbending integrity were blended with all the charities of the kindest and most generous nature. "He was a father to the poor, and the cause which he knew not he searched out."

Nor was the disinterestedness of his benevolence more sincere than was his respect for religion and its ordinances. And to his unceasing exertions are this congregation indebted for the comforts and accommodations which they enjoy, of having now a fit temple in which to worship the God of their fathers.

On the hill of Tom-a-chastel Lady Baird set up in 1832 an obelisk of the exact dimensions of Cleopatra's Needle. The foundation stone was laid on 4th May, the anniversary of the storming of Seringapatam.

Sir David Baird was not a heaven-born genius, and as a general he was not in the same class with Moore and Wellington, but there can be no doubt that he was a first-rate fighting man and an admirable regimental officer. His career is of interest as showing what could be accomplished in those days by an officer who owed nothing either to wealth or family influence. Most of the officers who achieved fame a century ago were men who had attained the command of their regiments very quickly by the help of patronage and purchase. Thus we find that Sir Stapleton Cotton (afterwards Lord Combermere) commanded the 25th L.D. at the age of twenty-one, and the Duke of Wellington was only twenty-four when he assumed the command of the 33rd Regiment. Things were otherwise with Baird. He served for five years with the 2nd Foot and for thirteen years with the 71st before he was promoted lieutenant-colonel of the latter regiment, which he commanded for seven years.

Baird came to the front by his excellence as a regimental officer; he was not pushed on from one staff billet to another.

The Duke of Wellington summed up Sir David in the following words: "Baird was a gallant, hard-headed, lion-hearted officer, but he had no talent, no tact." It is, however, only fair to remember that there had in early days been a good

deal of friction between the two men, and though the Duke had generally got what he wanted, he felt aggrieved at losing the command of the expedition in 1801. In 1833 he wrote: "It was of the unexplained supersession that I complained. The truth is that I never entirely approved of the expedition to Mauritius."

General Middlemore wrote as follows of Sir David Baird:—

"You might implicitly place your life and honour and happiness in his bare word, and as he was firm and inflexible upon every point of discipline and duty, so was he incapable of injuring a human being; with the courage of a hero, his heart was kind and gentle as a woman's."

It would be absurd to deny that Sir David had the defects of his qualities. He was quick to resent injustice either to himself or others, and apt to suspect it, and on several important occasions this had serious consequences. We have seen how he fell foul of General Harris at Seringapatam, and at Tanjore he believed the stories of an intriguing native and got at loggerheads with the Madras Government.

Nearly half a century later the conqueror of Scinde dubbed Outram "the Bayard of India," but Outram was not the first British soldier whose deeds recalled those of the gallant Frenchman; and the saying, "Not Baird but Bayard," shows what was thought of the man who stormed Seringapatam.

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF COMMISSIONS AND APPOINTMENTS OF GENERAL SIR DAVID BAIRD, G.C.B.

2nd Regiment.

	<i>Day</i>	<i>Month</i>	<i>Year</i>
Ensign	14	12	1772
Lieutenant	10	3	1778

73rd (71st) Regiment.

Captain-Lieutenant	6	6	1778
Captain	26	12	1777
Major	5	6	1787
Lieutenant-Colonel	8	12	1790
Colonel	21	8	1795
Major-General	18	6	1798
Lieutenant-General	30	10	1805
General	4	6	1814

54th Regiment.

Col.-Commandant 2nd Battalion —	—	—	1799
Colonel	8	5	1801

24th Regiment.

Colonel	19	7	1807
Governor of Kinsale	11	3	1819
Governor of Inverness	1	12	1827

K.B.	1809
G.C.B.	1815

APPENDIX B

LIST OF SOME WORKS CONSULTED

- Life of Sir D. Baird.* By T. Hook. 2 vols. 1832.
- History of the British Army.* By Hon. J. W. Fortescue.
- History of the Second Queen's Royal Regiment.* By Lieut.-Colonel J. Davis.
- The 71st Highland Light Infantry.* By Lieut. H. J. T. Hildyard.
- The War with Tippoo Sultaun.* By Major-General A. Beatson.
- Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan.* By L. B. Bowring.
- Life of General Lord Harris.* By the Rt. Hon. S. R. Lushington.
- The War in the Peninsula.* By Major-General Sir W. Napier.
- History of the Peninsula War.* By C. Oman.
- Diary of Sir John Moore.* Edited by Major-General Sir J. F. Maurice.
- From Cromwell to Wellington—Baird.* By Count Gleichen.

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
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SERINGAPATAM

1792

Scale of Yards



British Mysoreans



SERINGAPATAM

1799

Scale of Yards
0 500 1000 2000 3000

British Mysoreans

Karigat Hill

Ruins of Eadgah Redoubt

LINE OF ADVANCED POSTS

Agrar HART'S POST

Place

Bangalore Gate

Bridge

Little Kaveri

Aqueduct

Sultanpet Tope

BOMBAY ARMY (STUART)


MADRAS ARMY (HARRIS)

ARTILLERY PARK

WELLESLEY

R. KAVERI

where the gates were killed



ATLANTIC OCEAN

Bat.º del Caballo Praderas

Bat.º de Dormideras

CORUNNA

Harbour

C. de S. Antonio

Sta. Lucia

Castillo de S. Diego

Orzan

Bay

S. Roque

Altos de S. Pedro

Visma

Fraser


Altos de Sta. Margarita

Point from which French guns fired on the Shipping on Jan. 17th

OZA

Paget





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
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