



*Lt. General  
Sir J. Hope Grant. G. C. B. 118611  
April 53*

LIFE  
OF  
GENERAL SIR HOPE GRANT

WITH SELECTIONS FROM HIS CORRESPONDENCE

EDITED BY

HENRY KNOLLYS

COLONEL (H.P.) ROYAL ARTILLERY, HIS FORMER A.D.C.


EDITOR OF 'INCIDENTS IN THE SEPOY WAR' AND OF 'INCIDENTS IN THE CHINA WAR'  
AUTHOR OF 'SKETCHES OF LIFE IN JAPAN,' 'ENGLISH LIFE IN CHINA,'  
'FROM SEDAN TO SAARBRUCK,' ETC.

WITH PORTRAITS OF SIR HOPE GRANT, AND  
MAPS AND PLANS

IN TWO VOLUMES

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# LIFE OF GENERAL SIR HOPE GRANT.

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## CHAPTER XIV.

1857.

### INDIAN MUTINY—(*continued*).

SIR HOPE GRANT PROMOTED, CONSEQUENT LOSS OF £12,000—FRUITLESS APPEAL—THE KUPPERTOLA RAJAH—EXPEDITION TO NAWABGUNJ—DESPERATELY CONTESTED ENGAGEMENT—SIR COLIN AND THE GOVERNMENT SECRETARY—RELIEF OF MAUN SINGH—TEMPLE AT ADJUDIA—ENGAGEMENT AT SOOLTANPORE—INVESTITURE OF THE BATH—LADY CANNING—CAPTURE OF THE FORT OF RAMPORE KUSSIA—SURRENDER OF THE RAJAH OF AMETHIE—PASSAGE OF THE GHOGRA AT FYZABAD, AND PURSUIT OF THE REBELS—CAPTURE OF BUNKUSSIA—RECOVERY OF LOOTED PICTURES—PREVALENCE OF CRIME IN OUDE—REBELS ESCAPE TO TOOLSEPORE—OVERTAKEN—INTERVIEW WITH LORD CLYDE—JUNG BAHADOOR AND THE REBELS—LETTERS FROM NANA SAHIB AND BALA RAO—THE RAJAH OF BULRAMPORE—ENGAGEMENT AT SERWA PASS—MISERY OF THE REBELS—BRIGADIER HORSFORD—SIR HOPE GRANT APPOINTED TO COMMAND OF CHINA EXPEDITION—VISIT OF GOVERNOR-GENERAL TO LUCKNOW—LETTERS FROM LORD CLYDE.

[Some time before the date at which the latter portion of the Journal was written, Brigadier-General Hope Grant had been greatly gratified by having been nominated a Knight Commander of the Bath; and

the value of this honour was much enhanced by a General Order, shortly afterwards issued, dated Horse Guards, 20th February 1858, and worded as follows:—

The Queen has been graciously pleased to command that Colonel Sir James Hope Grant, K.C.B., of the 9th Lancers, be promoted to the rank of Major-General in the army, in consequence of his eminent services in command of the Cavalry Division at the siege of Delhi, and in that of a division at the relief of Lucknow under General Sir Colin Campbell, G.C.B.; also in the subsequent operations at Cawnpore, when the rebel army sustained a total defeat. By order of H.R.H. the General Commanding in chief.

(Signed)

G. A. WETHERALL,  
*Adjutant-General.*

About the same time, likewise, Sir Hope had awarded to him a distinguished service pension of £200 a-year.

We see, then, that his grateful country recognised his heroism by promoting him to the rank of Major-General; but his grateful country at the same time deprived him of £12,000. The civilian will, of course, suppose I am expressing myself with frivolous jest; I shall therefore explain the grim earnest.

Sir Hope Grant, as Lieut.-Colonel of the 9th Lancers, had been at liberty to retire on half-pay, making arrangements, which were fully recognised in the days of purchase, to obtain from his juniors, who would benefit by his retirement, the over-regulation money, which, with the regulation money, would amount to over £12,000. Of course, on the outbreak

of hostilities he cast all monetary considerations to the winds. When the 'London Gazette' one day informed him that the Queen had rewarded him with the rank of Major-General, he could no longer "make his book," as it was called, because his regulation money fell in to Government. His over-regulation money was entirely lost by the fact that Sir Hope had been promoted out of the regiment *nolens volens*, and that his successors would not, of course, pay thousands of pounds for that which in the course of succession had been awarded to them for nothing. In subsequent years the General incessantly appealed to the British Government, suggesting, in point of fact, that it was hard he should be so heavily fined because, in the opinion of his country, he had performed his duty with a distinction which deserved promotion. The British Government thought otherwise, and refused to give him one single farthing. The following is a copy of one of the letters which Sir Hope wrote many years subsequently<sup>1</sup> on the subject :—

ALDERSHOT, 21st April 1874.

SIR,—I trust you will do me the honour to lay this letter before H.R.H. the Field Marshal Commander-in-Chief, in the hope that, should he deem it advisable, H.R.H. may be induced to lay it before her Majesty's Government.

In 1857, during the Indian Mutiny, I was promoted

<sup>1</sup> See also *post*, p. 342.

for "distinguished service" to the rank of Major-General, and received the distinction of Knight Commander of the Bath. I was thereby, by a stroke of the pen, deprived of the value of my commission, which in all probability, as my regiment, the 9th Royal Lancers, in 1858 was ordered home, would have amounted in value to £12,000 or £15,000.

If this had taken place in the fair course of promotion, and I had remained in the service, knowing the loss I was to sustain, I should have had nothing to complain of; but as this promotion was in a measure forced upon me, the pecuniary loss I sustained could not, I conceive, have been intended by those who conferred the honour on me. I was during this campaign for three successive hot seasons on active service. The China expedition which followed, and which I had the honour to command, has proved most satisfactory in its results to Great Britain. This great nation was conquered; Peking, their capital, taken; the country opened to valuable commerce, and a large indemnity paid towards the war.

The difficulties were greatly increased, being obliged to act with the French, who were our allies.

The rewards of later years conferred upon distinguished officers I cannot but feel form a great contrast to what I have received. For the China campaign I was only raised from a K.C.B. to a G.C.B.

My contemporaries in India—Lord Strathnairn, Lord Sandhurst, and Lord Napier of Magdala—have

all been raised to the Peerage, and in addition to this have received the Grand Cross of the Bath, as well as the Grand Cross of the Star of India; while no class of the latter order has been offered to me.

I trust this statement may not meet with H.R.H.'s disapproval.—I have the honour to be,

J. HOPE GRANT, General.

To the MILITARY SECRETARY, Horse-Guards.

Sir Hope remarks: "This letter was well received by H.R.H., who forwarded it to the Secretary of State for War with one from himself."

Certainly the replies elicited teemed with compliments. But Sir Hope did not recover one penny of his money, nor was the Order of the Star of India ever awarded to him.

The case is without precedent, except for one curious duplicate instance. Sir James Scarlett was promoted Major-General for the heavy cavalry charge at Balaclava. Like Sir Hope Grant, he thus forfeited the whole of his commission money. Unlike Sir Hope, he was richly endowed with this world's goods; but the old soldier, though an extraordinary model of liberality, did feel his gorge rise at what he considered downright plunder. He applied for compensation, and was refused, but he was wont to express his sense of such a proceeding with as much energy as was compatible with his kindly disposition.

How thoroughly Sir Hope ignored these considerations may be gathered from his Journal, in which he expresses himself to the following effect:—

“How marvellous my good fortune appeared to me! We were under orders, though unofficially, to go home as soon as the few remaining months of hot weather had elapsed, and I myself had no hope of being able to remain in the regiment after its arrival in England. Then this fearful Mutiny broke out. My good regiment is now considered one of the most distinguished corps in the service. How wonderfully I have been taken care of!”—H. K.]

*Journal continued.*—From Mr Montgomery I received fresh information that the enemy under Beni-Madhoo, a rich and influential talookdar, was threatening the Cawnpore road, and that proclamations had been distributed over the country, warning the inhabitants of Lucknow to quit the town, as it was to be attacked. I therefore considered it prudent to recommence our march, and to occupy the endangered road. Though we were in the middle of the hot weather, the change of living in tents again was very charming. I had before been living in the “Tara Koti,” a detestable hole. I considered it advisable to take with me my old friends the 53d, a healthy and acclimatised Indian regiment, instead of the 38th, who were somewhat sickly. Nevertheless, the former lost 4 men from sunstroke during the first day’s march, and had 70 in hospital. The second

day they lost 8 more, and I began to fear that at this rate we should break down altogether. But a change set in; the two following days were comparatively cool, and we were afterwards almost entirely free from sickness. I also substituted Mackinnon's troop for Olpherts'.<sup>1</sup>

I proceeded to Nawabgunj, where I remained a few days, awaiting the arrival of the contingent of the Rajah of Kuppertola, which was ordered to garrison Poorwah. Nearly every evening, between nine and ten o'clock, I used to receive a despatch from Mr Montgomery, marked "immediate," and generally containing unpleasant news. For instance, "Large force of rebels attacking towns—coming down upon us from all sides—Beni-Madhoo said to be at Jessenda, eight miles from Bunnee, with a force of 85,000 men," &c., &c. Thinking the latter was getting too close to us to be pleasant, I resolved to attack him, and marched with the force to Jessenda. When we got there, however, the enemy had vanished.

On 4th June we proceeded to Poorwah, where we found the Kuppertola Rajah had arrived. I was honoured by a visit from him the same afternoon, and on his arrival I gave him a salute—an unexpected compliment, as when the first shot was fired the worthy gentleman sprang from his chair, as though the enemy were at hand. The following day I returned the Rajah's visit. He was a stout, com-

<sup>1</sup> Now General Sir W. Olpherts, V.C., K.C.B.

portable-looking, little gentleman, about twenty-seven years of age, good-looking and gentlemanlike. He spoke English very fairly, and wrote it extremely well. We were shown into his durbar tent, and I was placed in a silver chair of honour. After a good deal of complimentary butter, I incidentally praised a fine horse he had, upon which he immediately begged I would accept him. Of course I declined; but two days before his departure he asked to be allowed to give me a Sikh sword, which was, he said, of first-rate temper. I tried to refuse again, but he urged with such apparent good feeling that he trusted it might be looked on as a memento of our meeting, that at last I gave way. Moreover, the intrinsic value of the present was small.

The news of the capture of Kalpee, with all its guns, 25,000 barrels of English gunpowder, and immense quantities of stores, by Sir Hugh Rose, now reached us. I had not heard a word from Sir Colin, or his chief of the staff, for a long time, and I was not quite certain whether he would have approved of my return to Lucknow. At length I received the following kind letter:—

FUTEGURH, *June 1, 1858.*

MY DEAR GRANT,—I have received all your reports, and demi-official communications to Mansfield, with great interest. Your operations towards Roy Bareilly have been conducted with much skill, and I have much reason to thank you for the manner in which you executed the difficult task assigned to you. . . .



I do not hear of a single word of sympathy being expressed on the part of the press of this country for the troops who are carrying on operations during this hot weather.

I have seen your very moderate and nice reply to Mr Montgomery's memo upon the head-dress of our troops and other matters connected with discipline, which it does not legitimately belong to him or to his position to meddle with. So long as operations in the field are carried on at this season of the year, you will have deaths from sunstroke and apoplexy, whatever be the head-dress of the men; and this fact is ignored by Mr Montgomery in his observations forwarded to you. I desire peace with all men, but this desire is sorely tested occasionally—as in the case of these remarks of Mr Montgomery, which were put forward in the shape of a lecture to you and me. . . .

It will be my endeavour to try and scrape together by the time the cold season comes round such an amount of force as will be sufficient not only to subdue, but to permanently occupy, as much of Oude as our means will admit. The march of a column, or even of columns, through the country does not appear to produce any permanent result. The people hate us and our rule, and have in every instance risen against us immediately after our column has passed. If we cannot occupy the whole, we must be content to occupy a part of the country with our troops, and reduce it gradually. . . .—Yours most sincerely, C. CAMPBELL.

By degrees the rebels in Oude had begun to collect again, especially about Nawabgunj, eighteen miles from Lucknow, and I determined to drive them away. On arriving at Chinhut, I learned that the enemy was assembling in great force at Nawabgunj. The position they had taken up was very strong. They were encamped upon a large plateau, surrounded on three

sides by a stream, which was crossed by a fine old stone bridge at a little distance from the town. On the fourth side was a jungle.

My object was to turn their right, and to interpose between them and the jungle. I ascertained that there was a ford, or rather a platform bridge, about two miles up the stream, by which I determined to cross; and as we had twelve miles to march, I ordered the column to start at night, in order that my men might suffer less from heat, and that we might the better surprise the enemy.

Every description of baggage and other encumbrance was left behind. The troops mustered at 11 P.M., on a fearfully dark night, and it was no easy matter to find our way in the open plains—the latter six miles being entirely across country; but fortunately we had an excellent native guide. Wonderful to say, we accomplished the whole distance without much difficulty: we had, however, the misfortune to lose several men from apoplexy. We reached the bridge before mentioned about half an hour before daybreak, and my poor fellows were thus enabled to rest a little and get their breakfast. As soon as it was daylight, the troops fell in. The enemy had two or three guns bearing upon the bridge, but they were not under shelter, and were too distant to be effective against our infantry. I brought up a battery of 9-pounders, and soon succeeded in silencing them, dismounting one of their number.

Four companies of Rifles, a troop of horse-artillery, and some cavalry, now crossed the stream, followed in time by the main body; and then we found we had struck at the centre of the enemy, who, having been thus surprised, had as yet been unable to concentrate. Their forces appeared to be divided into four parts, each commanded by its separate leader, and of course acting without any unanimity. Still their attacks were vigorous, if unsuccessful, and we had much ado to repel them. A large body of fine daring Zemindaree men brought two guns into the open, and attacked us in rear. I have seen many battles in India, and many brave fellows fighting with a determination to conquer or die, but I never witnessed anything more magnificent than the conduct of these Zemindarees. In the first instance, they attacked Hodson's Horse, who would not face them, and by their unsteadiness placed in great jeopardy two guns which had been attached to the regiment. Fearing that they might be captured, I ordered up the 7th Hussars, and the other four guns belonging to the battery to within a distance of 500 yards from the enemy, opened a fire of grape, which mowed them down with terrible effect, like thistles before the scythe. Their chief, a big fellow with a *goitre* on his neck, nothing daunted, caused two green standards to be planted close to the guns, and used them as a rallying-point; but our grape-fire was so destructive, that whenever they attempted to serve their pieces

they were struck down. Two squadrons of the 7th Hussars under Sir William Russell, and two companies of the Rifles, now came up, and forced the survivors to retire, waving their swords and spears at us, and defiantly calling out to us to come on. The gallant 7th Hussars charged through them twice, and killed the greater part of them. Around the two guns alone there were 125 corpses. After three hours' fighting, the day was ours: we took six guns and killed about 600 of the enemy. Our own loss in killed and wounded was 67; and, in addition, 33 men died from sunstroke, and 250 were taken into hospital. Sun and heat are fearful scourges in this country during the hot weather; but, singular to say, the sufferers generally died during the night. The men fell asleep in their tents and never awoke—apoplexy, resulting from exposure to the sun, being the immediate cause of death. Regiments had for some time been endeavouring to obtain the special description of head-dress suitable for the climate, but had only just been supplied with them.

[In order to illustrate the opinion entertained by the Commander-in-Chief concerning the above-mentioned operations, I have thought it well here to insert the following extract from a letter written by the chief of the staff to G. Edmonstone, Esq., secretary to Government, in answer to some remarks made by a Civil Servant of which Sir Colin did not approve.

— is pleased to criminate the officers for adhering to the rules of their profession, a departure from which is an unflinching source of disaster ; and he sneers at the caution which, combined as it is in the case of Sir Hope Grant with extraordinary personal courage, is a more certain source of victory than almost any quality which can be named.

Sir Hope Grant left all his baggage in charge of that force (1200 men at Chinhut), moved without any encumbrance with a division of about 3500 men, and attacked the enemy after a very masterly night-march, which gave him the advantage of a surprise. The ground was strongly disputed, and the battle lasted for three hours before “the rabble” enemy finally gave way, and left six guns in the hands of our troops. Sir Hope Grant’s success was complete.

Extracts from a private letter from Lord Clyde to Sir Hope Grant, dated Allahabad, June 19, 1858 :—

. . . I congratulate you from my heart on your late most brilliant and important success. This great advantage has been obtained very opportunely as regards certain official statements and complaints which have been addressed to Government by Mr Montgomery<sup>1</sup> respecting military operations in Oude. . . . Happily they (his complaints, or rather charges) can be refuted, and their injustice exposed. . . . In the meanwhile, I would recommend you to be very guarded in any private correspondence you may find it advisable to carry on with Mr Montgomery. It is evident he desires to throw the blame of his not having succeeded in reducing his new charge to order and peaceful government to want of energy, and even of *daring*, on the part of the military in dealing with “the rabble” opposed to us.

<sup>1</sup> Sir Robert Montgomery, died 1887.

A decided spirit of fault-finding is evident on the part of Mr Montgomery, and which, I suspect, extends to all those about him. I think it right to make known to you the existence of such a feeling for your government in your relations with these gentlemen; and while you observe the most perfect courtesy and civility towards them, be prudent and guarded in your speech and in writing to them.

Pray forgive the liberty I take in thus offering *you* such kind of advice. . . .—Ever, my dear Grant, most sincerely yours,  
C. CAMPBELL.

The following is an extract from a letter written by Mr R. Montgomery, the Chief Commissioner of Oude, to Government, dated Banks' House, 3d July 1858: "I would take this opportunity of particularly alluding to their noble commander, Sir J. H. Grant, and joining in that well-merited eulogium which his Excellency is pleased to bestow on that officer."—H. K.]

*Journal continued.*—Our victory was of the greatest possible importance, and completely broke the spirit of the rebels, who were flocking from all quarters to join the force which we had driven away from Nawabgunj. The 15,000 who had already congregated there were so effectually dispersed, that we did not anticipate any more trouble in the neighbourhood of Lucknow. Though we only took six guns, there were a good many more in the field. Each party retreated in a different direction; and as I was unable to follow them up with my small force of 3500 men, they ultimately succeeded in escaping.

For the first time the commissioner now breathed freely, and the continual "immediate" telegrams, filled with alarms, did not flow in so regularly.

[Private letter from Sir Hope :—

LUCKNOW, 6th July 1858.

. . . The Mutiny, I may say, is now at an end, but the country is not quieted yet. There are occasional small forces in this locality which go about plundering the poor villagers. . . . Every man of wealth here is a king, and the strongest bullies the weakest. They are just in the state of the Highlands of Scotland formerly, when the clans used to wage war against each other. . . . I am convinced it was determined by the Almighty that this nation should fall, for it is impossible we could have subdued it without His great power. Their rulers are villains of the deepest dye, and are idolaters; but they are high-bred gentlemen too, and one can scarcely believe they are such blackguards till one knows their history. . . . I am now living in a fine large English house, but it is not comfortable. . . . I would gladly be in the field again. That is the enjoyable life.]

My force was ordered to remain at Nawabgunj, while I proceeded to Lucknow, whence I was shortly after recalled by an order from Sir Colin Campbell to march to the relief of Maun Singh, a Rajah of great power and wealth, who had deserted the rebel cause, and was once more loyal. He was besieged by a force

of the enemy, numbering 20,000 men, with some 20 guns, in a large mud fort, with high thick walls and a broad ditch around it. It was of great importance to retain the adherence of this powerful chieftain.

On 22d July we proceeded from Nawabgunj eight miles along the Fyzabad road, when, hearing that 1200 of the enemy were posted in a village twelve miles to the south-east, I detached the 5th Punjab Infantry, 200 of the 7th Hussars, 200 of Hodson's Horse, and a troop of horse-artillery under Major Peel Yates,<sup>1</sup> the whole under Colonel Hagart, to clear them away. They started at night, hoping to surprise the enemy; but on this occasion the rebels were too wide-awake, and had decamped.

I received a letter from Maun Singh stating that if we did not come to his relief immediately, he could not answer for the consequences, as he had only four days' provisions left on quarter-rations. I therefore pushed on as fast as possible, without waiting for Hagart, who joined me at Derriabad on the 24th July. On 26th I got another despatch from Maun Singh, this time written in much better spirits. He said the rebels were fast disappearing, and if we did not make haste, would all slip through our fingers.

We continued to hasten forward, and when within a day's journey of our destination we heard that the whole of the besieging force had melted away. Some had joined the Begum on the other side of the

<sup>1</sup> Now General Peel Yates, C.B.



Ghogra, and two parties of 4000 each had gone to Sooltanpore.

On 29th July we entered Fyzabad. After halting there for about an hour, I proceeded with the cavalry and horse-artillery to the Ghat of Ajudia, four miles lower down the Ghogra, and formerly the capital of Oude. There we found several boats pushing off for the other side. We fired a few shots from our 6-pounders into them, and most of the crews threw themselves overboard, and swam down the river. One boat, however, braved us all; and though we fired shot after shot, not one struck it, and it escaped to the opposite bank. Out of some deserted boats we took a double-poled tent, a Dollond's telescope, two European carts, and a quantity of powder.

On our return we stopped at the famous Hindoo temple in Ajudia, said to be one of the most sacred in this part of the country. It was a curious-looking building, with a long flight of steps leading up to it. Inside were the most filthy, abominable, nearly naked savages, with their faces and bodies smeared over with mud, and their dirty platted hair wound round their heads. They were lying about the ground, and they looked at us as though we were polluting their sacred shrine. This temple, we were told, was very wealthy, and had been dedicated to the monkey demon Hum-mayon. After a certain amount of compulsion, we induced the head priest to show us the image, and we beheld it in all its magnificence. It was as unlike

a monkey as could be imagined, carved out of stone, covered with red paint, a rich robe thrown about it, its cap bedizened with diamonds and precious stones, and a necklace of gold mohurs bound round its throat.

The next day Maun Singh paid me a visit. He was an intelligent, slight, short man, about thirty-eight years old, rather pleasing-looking than otherwise. With him was his younger brother, a jolly, stout, good-natured fellow. Maun Singh told me fine stories about the hardships he had undergone and the courage of his troops; but this I did not think it necessary to believe. I told him I should return his visit on the 2d August at his fort, twelve miles in a southerly direction; and at 9 A.M. on the morning of that day, accompanied by an escort of 200 cavalry, I arrived at his residence. I was received with a salute, and then conducted through gates to the interior of his large fort, and to a small comfortable-looking house, which he called his palace. We inspected the walls of the fortress, which was about two miles in circumference; and the principal points of the enemy's attacks were pointed out to us. There were few traces of any damage, and the houses had not apparently suffered. The Rajah presented to me several men, who, he said, had fought very bravely; and two guns were shown which it was alleged had been taken from the rebels during a sortie. In addition, Maun Singh had ten of his own; and he very wisely said, "Now that the British have become

possessed of the country, they will be of no more use to me, and the walls of my fort may come down." He himself was, for the present, our servant, and was better as a friend than a foe.

The chief of the staff now telegraphed word to me that the Commander-in-Chief wished me to send two regiments of infantry, a battery of artillery, and 600 cavalry, to drive away the enemy from Sooltanpore, and to occupy the town. Owing to a heavy fall of rain, I was for several days prevented from complying with this order; but at last, on 7th August, the column marched, under Brigadier Horsford. On 12th they arrived within three and a half miles of the town, which was situated on the banks of the river Goomtee, and which was held in force by the enemy, guns being posted so as to dispute the passage. Upon Brigadier Horsford's approach the rebels retired to the far side; but as his force was small and the rebels were numerous, he reported the state of affairs to me, and awaited further orders. The Commander-in-Chief had likewise heard that the enemy amounted to 14,000 men, with 15 guns. He therefore telegraphed to me to send reinforcements to Horsford, and I thought it well to accompany them myself.

On the morning of the 19th August I marched with all my guns of position and all my available force, which had been recently strengthened by a wing of the 53d Regiment. Sooltanpore, which we reached on the fourth day, lay in a bend of the river.

The site originally selected for our encampment was in an exposed situation, commanded by some ground 1000 yards on the other side of the river, and I was obliged to shift to a new position.

Brigadier Horsford pointed out for my approval the spot where he proposed to effect a passage. I considered it well sheltered from the fire of the enemy, and suitable in all other respects; and I posted two guns of position to cover the operation. Our main difficulty was to procure boats. Horsford had been unable to collect any, as the enemy had command of the river for fifteen miles in either direction. All that we had been able to obtain were three small very rotten canoes, hollowed out of a tree. Our Engineer officers, Captain Scott and Lieutenant Rainsforth, with a party of sappers belonging to the Madras Presidency, set to work with a will, and soon converted these three into one good substantial raft. Captain Reid, deputy commissioner, also discovered six more little boats in a creek, out of which two additional rafts were constructed. I therefore determined to cross without delay, and on the morning of the 25th August the operation was begun by the Madras Fusiliers and 5th Punjab Infantry, who got over in two hours. Next came two 9-pounder guns; but in embarking one of them the back of a canoe was broken, and the whole raft collapsed. We were therefore obliged to dismount the guns from their carriages and ferry them across separately. The horses were

forced to swim, and some of them were inclined to jib in the water, but the Sikhs managed them admirably. Each man swam across leading a horse, of which he rarely loosed his hold, keeping clear of the animal's heels, although he often became restive. Only two horses were drowned during the entire operation.

I now directed Colonel Galwey, commanding the force which had crossed over, to attack and occupy two villages in his front, where the river formed a bend, and where the enemy had a picket. Two guns posted on high ground and on the left flank opened fire, and the Fusiliers and Punjab Infantry quickly gained possession of the post. Although the position we had taken up was naturally very strong, I judged it best to move the Rifles across in support, as the enemy opened a heavy fire upon our advanced force. The main body did not complete the passage until 27th August, and forthwith I resolved to begin offensive operations. On the evening of the 28th the rebels anticipated us: we repelled their attack, but the darkness became so thick that I did not consider pursuit advisable.

On 29th August we turned out at 3 o'clock A.M., and advanced up to the position which the enemy had previously occupied; but they had retreated, and the only traces of them were a number of straw huts.

I now received a letter from Mansfield directing me to come to Allahabad, where Lord Canning and Sir

Colin were staying, if I considered the roads sufficiently safe. He added that there was to be an investiture of the Order of the Bath, at which ceremony we were both of us to be appointed Knights Commanders. This was very pleasant, not only by reason of the honour, but because I should now be able to get a little rest and shelter from the sun. I set off at once, escorted by a detachment of Sikhs, and after a ride of seventy miles, which occupied two days, we reached Sir Colin's house at Allahabad, and were received by him with the greatest kindness and cordiality.

On the occasion of the investiture a troop of horse-artillery was posted outside the house, and a guard of the 79th Highlanders and 5th Fusiliers lined the sides of the room wherein the ceremony was to be performed. The Governor-General, Lady Canning, Sir Colin and his staff, together with many very charming ladies, were present. I had no full dress of my own; so I had to be rigged out by the Commander-in-Chief, the only individual present who had an extra coat. It lapped round me like a dressing-gown, he being rather a stout man, and I somewhat spare: but loose apparel was all the fashion of the day, and the room was dark; so I passed muster very fairly. Two royal salutes were fired in honour of the Queen; then the royal warrant was read, followed by two more salutes out of compliment to the chief of the staff and myself. Mansfield's investiture

took place first; mine followed. The Commander-in-Chief, after a very complimentary speech, invested me with the Ribbon and the Star, and I had now gained my spurs. Lord Canning also made a flattering and dignified speech.

After the ceremony, Lady Canning came up and shook hands with both of us. I was much struck with her thoroughbred dignity and graceful kindness of manner. Indeed she was one of the most charming persons I had ever seen. She had been very beautiful; but the heat of the climate, anxiety during the Mutiny, and the sorrows of a troubled life, had told on her.<sup>1</sup>

I returned to Sooltanpore, and on 23d October, in compliance with fresh orders, I again marched to Pandoo Nuddee, to drive away a body of about 4000 rebels who were strongly posted there with two batteries in position commanding the bridge. On the other side of the stream was a thick jungle. The enemy, however, would not wait for us, and the moment we appeared turned and fled in the most abject terror. Their faint-heartedness was truly remarkable. I sent some cavalry and horse-artillery in pursuit, who, after a thirty miles' chase, picked up two guns, one of which was a brass 24-pounder. Owing to the jungly nature of the country, few of the rebels were killed.

About the end of October 1858, I received orders

<sup>1</sup> She died in 1861. Lord Canning survived her only a few months.

to take up a position between the fort of Amethie and Purseedapore, as Sir Colin Campbell, who had recently been created Lord Clyde, was determined to reduce this stronghold. Meanwhile the fort of Rampore Kussia, within six miles of me on the Sye river, was held by a troublesome scoundrel called Ram Goolam Singh. It was reported that he had 18 guns, and that numbers of the rebels had congregated there. It was therefore necessary to capture this work; and I arranged with Brigadier Wetherall,<sup>1</sup> who was marching up with a column from Soraon, to attack it on 4th November. However, early on the 3d, I heard heavy firing in the direction of the fort; and at 2.30 P.M. I received a letter from Wetherall, wherein he informed me that he had assaulted the place, and begged me to cut off the rebels, who were retiring in an easterly direction. This news somewhat surprised me, as he was ordered not to attack without my assistance; and Lord Clyde was much annoyed with him for having disregarded these instructions. I immediately ordered out the cavalry and 4 guns of the horse-artillery, and made for Rampore Kussia as fast as possible, where I arrived just in time, *Hibernicè*, to be too late. Wetherall had captured the fort a short time previously, and with it 23 guns. He had killed about 300 of the enemy, and his own loss was about 78 killed and wounded. The

<sup>1</sup> Major-General Sir Edward Wetherall, K.C.S.I., died 1869.



next morning we rode over the stronghold, which was three miles in circumference, and enclosed a thick jungle. Inside was another fort, and within this again the residence of the Takoor, or chief, of the Khanpooria tribe. Outside, likewise, there was a dense jungle in every direction except on the north-west, together with a formidable abattis in front of the mud walls, which were strongly built, and 7 or 8 feet high. The ditch was deep, but narrow, and there were rifle-pits in what would correspond to our berm. On one side a small part of the ditch and wall was unfinished, on which spot Brigadier Wetherall had most fortunately lighted, and had here effected an entrance with very little difficulty. But for this chance, he must have been repulsed. Shortly after, I was ordered to proceed to the north-east of the fort of Amethie. We arrived within two miles of the fort at 2 o'clock P.M., and I at once rode up to within 400 yards of the gate in order to reconnoitre. As soon as I showed myself outside the cover of the numerous adjacent trees, the enemy opened fire upon us, thus indicating their intention to make an obstinate resistance. The fort itself was almost entirely concealed by jungle, but the fire gave us the important advantage of ascertaining the lines of the fortification. On my return I found a messenger from the Commander-in-Chief, informing me that he was encamped three miles to the east of the fort. I immediately

rode over, and informed him how my force was situated. Contrary to our expectations, however, the following day the Rajah tendered his submission, and rode into camp, attended by only one follower, stating that he had done so without the knowledge of his troops. He asserted that the force under his command amounted to 2500 of his own men and 1500 rebel sepoys. During the subsequent night, it was discovered that all these heroes had bolted; and the Commander-in-Chief forthwith rode into the fort. It was known that the armament had amounted to 30 guns. Sixteen only could be found; and Lord Clyde taxed the old scoundrel with playing a double game, and with having made away with the rest. However, the loss did not much signify; they were old, and the fort was in our possession. It was three or four miles in circumference, with a mass of jungle both inside and out, and a river running through it—in many respects similar to the Rampore Kussia stronghold. By order of the Commander-in-Chief I next marched to Purseedapore, arriving there on 11th November, in order to take up a position north of Shunkerpore, a fort belonging to Beni Madhoo. Lord Clyde had sent him a proclamation that all who gave themselves up should, provided they had not murdered Europeans, be treated with great leniency, and that the Rajah's claims to be allowed to retain possession of his property should be taken into consideration.

The same evening the Commander-in-Chief received his answer, stating that he felt it his duty to stand by his king—that he would not give himself up; but that his fort should be abandoned, he himself being about to cross the Ghogra. He prayed that his son might be permitted to retain his estates. The same night he and his followers, amounting to about 15,000 men, evacuated the fort, and the next morning we found it deserted, and everything in it taken away except one gun and an elephant. There was so much jungle in the country that it would have been very difficult to intercept him. Lord Clyde now directed me to make the best of my way to Fyzabad, where I found a force of 4300 men, assembled under command of Colonel Taylor,<sup>1</sup> 79th Regiment. The enemy was in force on the other side of the river Ghogra, and it was my intention to effect a passage as soon as possible. Colonel Nicholson,<sup>2</sup> of the Royal Engineers, formed a bridge over the river without much difficulty, the enemy firing on the working party at very long ranges. One shot went through a steamboat which was near the bridge, and we were obliged to shift her position as soon as the bridge was completed. I ordered a heavy gun and mortar battery to be constructed on the far side of the river, supported by a

<sup>1</sup> Now General Sir Richard Taylor, K.C.B.

<sup>2</sup> General Sir Lothian Nicholson, K.C.B., Governor of Gibraltar, died 1893.

regiment of infantry, by which means we were able to keep down the fire of the enemy.

Everything being in readiness, I arranged to cross on the morning of the 25th November. During the night, the Sikh regiment, under Major Gordon, moved to the other side of the river in boats. There they were to await until the fire from the first gun should announce to them that the main column had attacked in front, when they were to make a simultaneous advance against the flank of the enemy. Our main body crossed by the bridge before daybreak under my immediate supervision, and at the first dawn the heavy guns opened. Gordon's Sikhs advanced, and we stormed the enemy's position, who, unable to withstand this double attack, retired, taking with them all their guns but one. The country over which we had to pass was so sandy, swampy, and jungly for two miles, that we had great difficulty in picking our way. At last we came to sound ground; and though the enemy had by this time a considerable start of us, our cavalry and artillery followed them up by the track of their carriages, and after some time we came upon two of their guns, abandoned. I then made a cast round, and found a hackery laden with 18-pounder ammunition, while a flanker on our right informed us that he could make out about 500 rebels with a gun. We hastened to the place mentioned, and saw them retreating towards an adjacent jungle. On we galloped as fast as our guns

could be got along; but when we were within 300 yards of them, there was a puff of smoke, the boom of a heavy gun, and a shower of grape whizzed over our heads, many of the shot falling amongst the men, though without doing them any damage. The pace Middleton had gone at had saved his battery: had he been a little slower, the grape would have pitched right into the middle of the battery, and must have swept away men and horses wholesale. We here captured four guns, including the piece which had opened fire on us — one of our Government brass 24-pounder howitzers. Two of them had reached the edge of the jungle, so we were only just in time.

After a ride of twenty-four miles we returned to our camp, which had been brought across the Ghogra. On 3d December we marched to Bungaon, from whence we proceeded to Muchligaon, where, we had heard, there were several rebels. On our arrival none were to be seen; but on reconnoitring a mile beyond the village with cavalry and artillery, I discovered a body of men close to a jungle, who immediately opened on us with three guns. I kept them in play until our main body came up, and then went at them. We took two of their guns, but they managed to escape with the third through the thick jungle.

We next took possession of a deserted fort at Bunkussia, belong to the Rajah of Gonda, con-

taining five brass guns and a quantity of gunpowder, saltpetre, grain, oil, and ghee. It was rumoured that the Rajah, on hearing of our approach, had fled across the Raptée to Bhinga. It was evident he had been completely taken by surprise, as preparations had been made for a good dinner; and several papers were discovered, despatches from his generals to himself, in one of which it was mentioned that "guns would be placed at the different ghats on the river, to prevent our crossing,"—to which was appended the wholesome opinion, that "if we *did* manage to get across it was all up with them."

Major Hughes, who had joined my force with the 1st Punjab Cavalry, one day casually told me that when pursuing the enemy at Rampore Kussia, one of his sowars had killed a sepoy, and discovered two miniatures tied up in the latter's kummerbund. The sowar had handed them over to Hughes, who had shown them to several people, but had been unable to find out their history or their owner. He said he would bring them to me, in case I might be able to recognise the portraits. Shortly after, his regiment was ordered to join Brigadier Rowcroft's column across the Raptée, and the afternoon before his departure he came to take leave of me. I had forgotten all about the miniatures, but he said he had brought them with him. On opening the case, to my extreme astonishment I found that I had

frequently seen them before, for they were likenesses of Mr and Mrs Tayler, my father- and mother-in-law, and had been given to Mrs Shakespeare, my wife's sister. The Shakespeares had with difficulty escaped from Shahjuhanpore at the outbreak of the Mutiny, and their house had been looted of everything they possessed. The pictures must have been taken at the same time, and in all probability had been in possession of the sepoy for at least a year and a half. What rendered the discovery of them still more singular was, that Hughes had that very morning handed them over to the magistrate of the district, who, owing to some mistake, had omitted to take them away.

I, together with another brother-in-law, were the only persons in India to whom these miniatures were valuable; and it is wonderful how an Unseen Hand from above should have so guided us, even in this small matter.

On 16th December, after a march of three days, we arrived at Bulrampore. The Rajah was a slight active little man, about thirty-five years old, modest and intelligent, an excellent sportsman, rode well, and during the first part of the Mutiny had saved a number of our poor country-people who were fugitives from Sekrora. He possessed written documents from Colonel Sleeman and Mr Wingfield,<sup>1</sup> who spoke

<sup>1</sup> Afterwards Chief Commissioner of Oude. Sir Charles Wingfield, K.C.S.I., died 1892.

of him most highly. The former gentleman described him as "honest and truthful," qualities equally valuable and rare in a native of India generally, and of Oude especially, where lying is considered an honourable distinction, and where every man's hand is raised against his neighbour. This was the district where Thuggee was carried on to such an extent, and where murder and infanticide are still terribly prevalent. No father's life is safe from his son, brother murders brother, and robbery in its worst form is an everyday occurrence. But this is the case over every part of India not under British rule. I remember a singular illustration of this in the north of the Punjab, in the Affredee hills, where Brigadier-General Chamberlain was stationed with his Irregular horse. One day he met two fine handsome young fellows, sons of a native gentleman, riding over the hills, and coursing with greyhounds. He entered into conversation with them, and asked them to take service in his regiment; but they replied that they were so happy in their wild life that they had no wish to change it,—and then bounding away on their gallant steeds over hill and dale, they were soon lost to sight. The next year Chamberlain was marching over the same country, when he again chanced to meet with one of these young men, and asked him where his brother was. The lad answered in the coolest way possible, "He is dead; I killed him." It appeared that a dispute had arisen about some land which had been



left them, and the young miscreant thought the simplest way of settling it was to get rid of his brother.

At Bulrampore we heard that Bala Rao, the Nana's brother, had taken refuge in the old fort of Toolsepore, twelve miles distant, with a number of followers and eight guns; and that a great scoundrel, called Mahomed Hussain, had joined him with a reinforcement. I summoned Brigadier Rowcroft with his force from the Goruckpore district, and sending the 53d Regiment to strengthen him, directed him to march to Toolsepore and attack the enemy. I knew the fort to be old and dilapidated, and not in a condition to offer much resistance. Rowcroft found the enemy drawn up in readiness to receive him. He soon drove them off, and they disappeared in the jungle, taking apparently a westward course, and carrying away all their guns—of which they possessed a considerable number—except two. As I was not satisfied with the result of this attack, I rode to the fort to make personal inquiries, and discovered that the rebels had in reality retreated eastward, instead of westward, as we had been led to suppose, and that Brigadier Rowcroft had not succeeded in taking any more guns, owing to a want of cavalry. I therefore returned, and brought my own force to Toolsepore. Then I marched to Dulhurree, close to the Nepal frontier, where I waited for Rowcroft's column. A few rebels were in an adjacent jungle, but they bolted very quickly. I

next made for Pushuroa, and there I ascertained that I had succeeded in preventing Bala Rao and his force from escaping. With 6000 men and 15 guns he had retreated along the margins of jungles to near Kundakote, where there was a half-ruined fort at the confluence of two rivers, with a jungle in rear. I had left Brigadier Taylor with the 53d Regiment and a troop of horse-artillery on the other side of Toolsepoore, near the jungle, and I now sent off 200 of the Bengal yeomanry to join him. I then advanced to within five miles of where the enemy was supposed to be, and halted for the night. On 4th January 1859 I moved forward to the attack, and in about two hours I saw a sprinkling of red-coated rebels in the border of the jungle. I immediately directed a small column to advance through it in a westerly direction towards Kundakote, and shortly after I followed in the same direction with the main body, until I came to where the principal force of the rebels was posted in thick cover. My advanced column on the right had already engaged them, and had thus diverted their attention, most fortunately for us, as their guns were so well concealed in the thicket, that had they opened fire, they would have inflicted severe loss on our advancing troops. However, all the courage had been driven out of the faint-hearted wretches, and they would not stand a moment, running away like wild-fire, and leaving their 15 guns in our possession. I pursued them

through the jungle, but we had a hard scramble : our guns were obliged to proceed along the edge outside. At last we reached open ground, and I was delighted to find that the other two columns had arrived at the rendezvous, with the same precision as though we had been going through a field-day manoeuvre. Brigadier Taylor had seen some of the enemy a long distance off, and had sent cavalry and artillery after them ; but the guns got into difficulties at a nullah, so the poor wretches escaped. We took one miserable sepoy so "banged"<sup>1</sup> up to the eyes that he could not run away. He told us they had been living in a wretched state, and were almost starved. No wonder their courage failed them.

This was almost the closing act in the rebellion. The Queen had offered an amnesty to all except those who had murdered, or been concerned in the murder of, Europeans or Eurasians. On this occasion we found one of the proclamations in the possession of a follower of Bala Rao, whom we had taken prisoner. He said the promised pardon had been known to all, but they had not dared to avail themselves of it, as Bala Rao had given out that any one attempting to leave his force should be hanged.

The manner and the extent of our success was indeed wonderful and providential. At the outbreak our affairs wore the gloomiest possible aspect. Over the whole of the three Presidencies we had little

<sup>1</sup> *Bang* is a preparation of *opium*.

more than 30,000 European troops, and these were in almost every case broken up into fractions of battalions. The rebels numbered about 200,000 men, and were collected in large masses; the whole of the Mussulman population was against us; and the people of Oude, fighting for their country, were resolved to make a stout resistance. But the British nation was carried safely through its difficulties by the Almighty Ruler of all.

I now received a letter from Lord Clyde, desiring me to come as soon as possible to Chunderpore; but on arriving there, I found that the chief had started down country. So I started off on my charming little Arab pony<sup>1</sup> for Bareich, only twenty-two miles distant, where I hoped to find Lord Clyde. In this I was successful. He had been thrown from his horse when in pursuit of some rebels, and had been severely shaken, dislocating his shoulder. He was now carried in a doolie, a species of conveyance he did not at all like. As usual, he was as kind as possible, and he instructed me to keep the frontier on the borders of Nepal closely shut up, so as to prevent, if possible, the escape of any rebels into the lower country.

The Commander-in-Chief continued his journey, and I went to join Horsford's camp on the Raptee,

<sup>1</sup> The same little white charger, which was called by the natives "Doon-ka-Gharee," or steam-carriage, from the pace he used to go at, afterwards carried Sir Hope through the whole of the China war. It died at Aldershot, April 1873, after a happy and honoured old age—a splendid little animal to the last.—H. K.

across which he had driven a strong rebel force, and where Hughes' corps and the 7th Hussars had lost several men in trying to ford it. They had chased a rebel cavalry regiment into the river, and in following them up the strength of the current swept them away, and poor Major Horne and two privates of the 7th Hussars, together with several other men, were lost. After some search the bodies were drawn out of a deep hole—Horne with a fast grip of two of the enemy, and the two privates each clutching a sowar. This was probably the result of the death-struggle.

The whole force in Oude was under my jurisdiction, and I had about a hundred miles of frontier to watch; but my task was not difficult, as the rebels did not apparently wish to leave Nepal, where they were comparatively safe. Above this line of country, also opposite Nepal, Brigadier Horsford had command, and the enemy had still a few guns left; but Horsford could not pursue them into this territory, and could only keep a look-out to prevent them coming into our own provinces. Jung Bahadoor had, however, issued a proclamation, stating that he would not afford the rebels any protection,—in consequence of which many were throwing away their arms, and were returning to their homes, trusting that they would be allowed to remain there quietly. This was actually allowed; and unless individuals were known to have participated in deeds of murder or violence,

no notice was afterwards taken of them. They had been living in the dense jungles under the hills for a long time during the worst season in the year, when the miasma is sure to produce fever and dysentery. They had little to eat, and their only shelter from the severe rains was branches of trees, so they must have been in a sorry plight, and had paid a heavy penalty for their crimes. Towards the end of January I proceeded to Lucknow, to which place I had ordered the 79th Regiment and the 9th Lancers to march. Jung Bahadoor gave us permission to enter Nepal with our troops in order to drive out the rebels. Brigadier Horsford accordingly entered the Soonar (Golden) Valley, and crossing the Raptée at Sidonia Ghat, caught a body of the enemy, and captured 14 guns.

Mahomed Hussain, finding he had lost the stakes he had played for, sent to me to say he would give himself up, and he was brought into camp. No evidence of importance could, however, be brought against him, and he was merely placed under surveillance. He was a horrible brute to look at—a fat, sensual-looking Mussulman, and evidently a man of a coarse mind. He told me the rebels had numbered upwards of 50,000 in Nepal, of which 30,000 were sepoys. As soon as they found that Jung Bahadoor would not assist them, they dwindled down to half that number. He added that they were now in a miserable condition—that the Nana and Bala Rao were both

in the jungle, and that the latter was very ill with fever.

On 7th May I arrived at Bulrampore, and there learned that the Nana, Bala Rao, Mammoo Khan, and numerous other chiefs, were in the Nepal jungles under the hills, and a short distance from the Oude and Goruckpore frontier. Here, too, I received letters from Bala Rao and the Nana. The former wrote in a most penitent manner, declaring he had murdered no European, and that, if allowed, he could prove his innocence. He also stated that he had a little English girl, about ten years old, living with his wife, who was at Lucknow. The child had been left by the sepoys on the banks of the Ganges at Cawnpore for dead when the massacre took place, where she was found by some dhobies terribly wounded, but able to ask for water. They conveyed her home. A native doctor cured her, and she was taken possession of by Bala Rao, in order, I suppose, that she might mediate between him and the British, in the contingency of his being taken prisoner. The Nana's letter was written in quite a different strain. He abused the Company's government, and asked what right we had to establish ourselves in the country, and to declare him an outlaw.

On 9th May we started for the palace of Bulrampore, where the Rajah had promised to show us a fight between a boar and a tiger. We found the little gentleman fast asleep, with loaded revolvers

and daggers disposed about him, ready for immediate defence; but it would have been easy to have destroyed him with his own weapons before he awakened. He roused himself like a lion from his lair. A large wild boar was put into the cage of a magnificent tiger, who took not the slightest notice of the intruder. The boar walked coolly up to the tiger, gave him a poke with his tusk, and walked quietly about. We left them very peaceably disposed apparently; but the next morning the boar was found quite dead—in fact, nearly eaten up.

On 10th May we marched to Biskohur, and here our prisoner, Mahomed Hussain, treacherously offered to catch the Nana, and to bring him into camp. His plan was to pretend he had escaped, and then to inveigle his victim into some place where he might be easily captured. I did not think it advisable to trust Hussain with his liberty.

Both the Nana and Bala Rao were, a short time after, reported to be dead. As regards the former, I considered the fact to be extremely doubtful, but in the latter case equally probable. These rumours were brought to us by an unfortunate Hurkhara who had been sent to Jowar Khan, one of the rebel commanders, and had come back with his left hand and nose cut off.

It was now stated that the rebels were at the Serwa Pass; and I ordered Pinkney to move to Toolsepore. My own force I strengthened with



Jones' 1st Sikh Irregulars and a wing of Colonel Brasyer's regiment, and on 21st May we entered the pass. The enemy opened on us with musketry from the hills on either side, and from two guns on the low ground. I sent a company up the hill to turn their right; but finding that they were not very clever in their ascent, I directed Captain Biddulph,<sup>1</sup> my Assistant Adjutant-General, together with Wolseley<sup>2</sup> and Wilmot,<sup>3</sup> both on my staff, to lead them up. These three officers did their work well. After a toilsome march of four miles, the infantry succeeded in taking the enemy in flank. At the same time the 7th Punjab Infantry captured the two guns. A sepoy, when within a few yards of Wilmot, levelled his musket at him and pulled the trigger. The piece missed fire, and the rebel was at once killed. My aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Torrens of the 2d Dragoon Guards, was slightly wounded in the chest by a spent bullet.

On the 23d May we followed up the enemy across the hills, and came to some ground dabbled with pools of blood, where wounded men had been struggling on; and further on we discovered two of the rebels in a state of helpless exhaustion, dying from their wounds and from starvation. It was sad to see many

<sup>1</sup> Now General Sir Robert Biddulph, G.C.M.G., Governor of Gibraltar.

<sup>2</sup> Now General Viscount Wolseley, G.C.B., Commander of Forces in Ireland.

<sup>3</sup> Now Sir Henry Wilmot, V.C., C.B.

of the poor wives of the sepoy who had accompanied their husbands, deserted and left to die on the bare ground. One of these wretched women was lying in the last stage of exhaustion, and sinking fast, with her long black hair hanging dishevelled about her face, one child at her breast and another standing by her side. I told one of my staff to fetch a doolie for her and her children. When she heard the order she raised herself up and gave a look of wild and unutterable joy, thinking, in all probability, that her poor starving babies would be saved; but the effort was too much for her, and she again sank back into her previous position. The sight was truly touching. Poor creature! she was put into a doolie and taken care of. She ultimately recovered.

We afterwards came upon a dead elephant, and then a sudra, or class of Hindoo, with his wife and children seated on the ground, and apparently unable to proceed any further. We offered them some food; but they shook their heads, and would not eat anything that had been contaminated by our touch. They asked us, however, to give it to their children, who devoured the sandwiches with famished appetites. Still further on, the ground was strewn with dead and dying camels and bullocks.

[Amongst several general orders, &c., referring to Sir Hope Grant, the following are specially noteworthy:—

*General Order from Lord CANNING, after the relief of the  
Residency of Lucknow.*

To Brigadier-General Hope Grant, who immediately commanded the division employed, his Lordship in Council tenders his warm acknowledgments for the admirable manner in which he performed the arduous duties of his command. This well-tried officer had already greatly distinguished himself in the operations before Delhi, and has received the public thanks of Government.

*November 23, 1857.*

*From Sir COLIN CAMPBELL on the same occasion.*

I have also to express my very particular acknowledgments to Brigadier-General Sir Hope Grant, who was in immediate command of the division by which this service was effected. His activity in carrying out the details has been admirable, and his vigilance in superintending the outpost duties has been unsurpassed.

COLIN CAMPBELL.

*Extract from General Order by the GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF  
INDIA, publishing Despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel  
MAHEW, Adjutant-General, dated September 1858.*

I am directed by his Excellency<sup>1</sup> to beg you will draw the attention of the Right Honourable the Governor-General to the admirable manner in which Sir J. Hope Grant has conducted the operations of the last six weeks, and more particularly those for the passage of the Goomtee, with most imperfect means.

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<sup>1</sup> Lord Clyde.

*Extract from a Despatch from Lord CLYDE to Lord CANNING, dated Headquarters Camp on the Raptée, January 7, 1859.*

Sir Hope Grant's despatches during the last six months have told the story of the admirable part taken by him in this war. I cannot say too much in his praise. He has the rare merit of uniting the greatest boldness in action, a firm and correct judgment, and the most scrupulous regard for his orders and instructions.

The following is an extract from a letter which has been shown to me, wherein the writer describes an interview he had with Lord Clyde shortly after his return from India. Speaking of Sir Hope Grant, Lord Clyde remarked: "Hope has a clear head for business, and a sound judgment; and as to handling troops in the field, he is quite perfection, and has no master."—H. K.]

Thus ended the terrible Mutiny which, for a time, had shaken the British power in India to its foundation. The last two guns of the rebels had been taken, and all that remained of the dispersed and miserable mutineers were driven far away over the hills into the Nepal territory. Our troops were posted at different points along the frontier as a precaution against any attempt of the rebels to break through. There was now no longer any necessity for my presence, and I proceeded to Lucknow on 4th June 1859. I took up my residence in the Dilkoosha Palace, which was repaired for my use; and after I had purchased a beautiful new piano by Collard,

which had belonged to a lady at Lucknow, and collected a few articles of furniture, my staff and myself made ourselves very comfortable there.

In the month of October I received a letter from Lord Clyde, dated Cawnpore, requesting me to come and see him. I arrived there on the 14th, and was received by him with great cordiality. He informed me that the home authorities had decided to nominate me to the command of the British force about to proceed to China, to co-operate with the French in repairing the disaster which had been suffered in the attack on the Taku Forts. I was greatly pleased at this information.

My wife joined me in Calcutta in December, having returned from England, where she had been staying for the recovery of her health.

My command in Oude had now come to a close. I was gazetted a Lieutenant-General, and I sailed on 26th February 1860 for China.

[We have seen that, after Delhi, Sir Hope was nominated a K.C.B. For his subsequent brilliant services during the Mutiny he received no recognition whatever. Lord Clyde writes on the subject as follows :—

SIMLA, *July 10, 1859.*

MY DEAR GRANT,—

In January last I recommended you for the Grand Cross of the Bath, one year having elapsed since you had conferred on you the distinction of a K.C.B., during which your services have been most distinguished. I received last night a very

kind letter from the Duke of Cambridge, in which he speaks of you in terms of the warmest praise, and expresses his regret that, in consultation with the Minister of State for War, they have found themselves compelled to defer for the present your promotion to the highest rank of the order, in consequence of the short time that has intervened since your nomination to be a K.C.B. He observes also that you are only a Colonel, an observation which surprised me not a little, and is put forward as a reason for delay in conferring on you the honour to which you have so well and justly entitled yourself.

These refusals have caused me pain and great disappointment. . . .—Most truly yours, dear Grant,

C. CAMPBELL.

*Letter from Lord CLYDE to Sir HOPE GRANT.*

CAMP, MEERUT, *December 22, 1859.*

MY DEAR GRANT,—

Sir Robert Napier has been chosen by Sir Robert Montgomery as Commanding Officer of the native troops of this Presidency, and he names every officer to accompany these troops, not only to the regiments but to the general staff. Napier himself will be an excellent assistant to you. When Lord Canning told me of Napier's appointment, I reminded him that the regular troops of her Majesty would require to be commanded by their own staff. . . .

Your two assistants, Biddulph and Wolseley, [will] hold the same appointment they now hold, in the force destined for China.—Always, dear Grant, most truly yours,

C. CAMPBELL.

It was long ere Lord Clyde, when writing to his old friends, dropped his former designation, and signed himself by his Peerage title.—H. K.]

## CHAPTER XV.

## CHINA WAR.

SIR HOPE GRANT APPOINTED TO COMMAND CHINA EXPEDITION—SIR WILLIAM MANSFIELD DECLINES POST OF SECOND IN COMMAND—ARRIVAL AT HONG-KONG—ACQUISITION OF KOWLOON—EXPEDIENT FOR QUIETING CANTON—PROCEEDS TO SHANGHAI—WAR DECLARED—CONSULTATION WITH FRENCH CONCERNING PLAN OF OPERATIONS—SEIZURE OF CHUSAN—THE FRENCH AND THE FLAG-STAFF—RETURN TO HONG-KONG—DELAY ON THE PART OF THE FRENCH—THEIR WANT OF TRANSPORT—ENGLISH TROOPS SAIL FOR GULF OF PECHILI—THE NEW ARMSTRONG GUNS—LETTERS—SAILS FOR SHANGHAI—CONFERENCE WITH THE FRENCH—SIR HOPE GRANT'S AND GENERAL DE MONTAUBAN'S RESPECTIVE PLANS OF ATTACK—DEPLORABLE CONDITION OF CHINA—IGNATIEFF—VISITS CHE-FOO—THE NEW FRENCH GUN—DISEMBARKATION OF BRITISH TROOPS AT TA-LIER-WAN—ARRIVAL OF LORD ELGIN—SIR HOPE URGES ON GENERAL DE MONTAUBAN THE NECESSITY FOR QUICKLY BEGINNING OPERATIONS—SPLENDID CONDITION OF OUR TROOPS—INSPECTION BY FRENCH—GENERAL DE MONTAUBAN ABANDONS HIS ORIGINAL PLAN, AND RESOLVES TO ACT WITH US IN ATTACK ON PEH-TANG—EMBARKATION OF TROOPS FOR PEH-TANG.

[In dealing with the following campaign, I have continued the method I adopted in the Indian Mutiny chapters, and have curtailed the record of many of the events described in 'Incidents in the China War.'<sup>1</sup> I have, however, added a considerable amount of fresh matter.]

<sup>1</sup> W. Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London.

*Journal.*—I appreciated my nomination to the command of the China expedition the more, because I had sought for it neither directly nor indirectly. Indeed I heard from home that, in the first instance, Sir Charles Wood,<sup>1</sup> Secretary of State for India, had offered great opposition to my appointment, and had requested that Sir William Mansfield, whom he considered much superior to myself, might be selected instead. But the Duke urged my fitness for the command, and at the same time pointed out the injustice of passing over a senior and competent officer who, his Royal Highness was good enough to say, had always done his duty.

I received private letters from the Duke, and from Mr Sidney Herbert,<sup>2</sup> Secretary of State for War, notifying to me my appointment, and explaining that Sir William Mansfield would be nominated my second in command, in consequence of his being a first-rate diplomatist and French scholar. Mansfield and I had always been the best of friends, and I felt sure that we should continue to work together harmoniously; but it was hardly to be expected that he would consent to act as my junior, for he was considerably senior to me as a local Major-General, though below me in army rank. Accordingly, in course of time, he wrote to tell me that he had declined the appointment, provided the Government

<sup>1</sup> Afterwards Viscount Halifax.

<sup>2</sup> Afterwards Lord Herbert; died 1862.



approved of his refusal. I replied that I thought the view he had taken of the matter a mistaken one; but, of course, he adhered to his opinion. We reached Hong-Kong on 13th March 1860. Admiral Hope,<sup>1</sup> who was there in command of the fleet, carried his flag on board the Chesapeake, and I at once proceeded to make his acquaintance. He was a tall noble-looking man, with a prepossessing and most gentlemanlike appearance, and we were not long in becoming excellent friends. From him I learnt that Lieut.-General Cousin de Montauban,<sup>2</sup> the French military commander-in-chief, had gone to Shanghai, but that their senior naval officer, Admiral Page, was living on shore at Hong-Kong. I was most hospitably welcomed at Government House by the governor, Sir Hercules Robinson,<sup>3</sup> whose residence was beautifully furnished in English fashion, and well warmed with blazing coal-fires. Lady Robinson made herself very popular at Hong-Kong, an attainment here specially valuable. Although we were in the same latitude as in Calcutta, the climate was entirely different—in Hong-Kong the weather in March was bitterly cold.

On the opposite coast, and within three-quarters of a mile of Victoria, was the promontory of Kow-

<sup>1</sup> Afterwards Admiral Sir James Hope, G.C.B.; since dead.

<sup>2</sup> Afterwards Count Palikao. After the fall of the Ollivier Ministry in July 1870, he was head of the Government, until the battle of Sedan, September 1, 1870, overthrew the French empire. Since dead.

<sup>3</sup> Afterwards Governor and Commander-in-Chief of South Africa.

loon, a spot of which I was most anxious to gain immediate possession — firstly, because its occupation was absolutely essential for the defence of Hong-Kong harbour and the town of Victoria; secondly, because it was an open healthy spot, admirably suited for a camping-ground on the arrival of our troops; thirdly, because at the conclusion of the war it would be a salubrious site for the erection of barracks, required for the Hong - Kong garrison; and lastly, because if we did not take it, the French probably would. This tract was about two miles in length and two miles in breadth, and was particularly healthy, owing to its being exposed to the south - west monsoon. There were, however, difficulties in the way. Mr Bruce,<sup>1</sup> our plenipotentiary, had sent an ultimatum to the Chinese Government, allowing them a month to reply, and war had not as yet been actually declared; so the forcible seizure of the promontory would not have been quite legal. Meanwhile, Mr Bruce directed Sir Hercules Robinson to apply to the governor of the two large provinces of Kwang-tung and Kwang-si for a lease of a portion of the ground, about two square miles in extent. The mandarin governor was at that time resident in Canton; and Sir Hercules Robinson charged our consul at that

<sup>1</sup> The Hon. Sir Frederick Bruce, G.C.B., British Minister in the United States, died 1867.

town, Mr Parkes,<sup>1</sup> a clear-headed and able young man, with all his wits about him, to take steps for the attainment of our object. This, to my surprise and satisfaction, he accomplished most successfully. The mandarin agreed to give us a lease of Kowloon, together with "Stone - Cutter's Island," in perpetuity, on our engaging to pay a yearly rent of £160. Of course we instantly closed with these terms, and the lease was signed by both parties. On 18th March the promontory was occupied by a detachment of the 44th Regiment. The 8th April was the day fixed on for the reply to our ultimatum; and I decided that if war were declared I would at once despatch a force of 2000 men, comprising 67th and 99th Regiments, Rotton's battery of artillery, and a company of Engineers, &c., to take possession of Chusan, which would serve as a base of operations. Admiral Hope agreed to aid me with 600 marines; and Admiral Page, with the permission of General de Montauban, likewise promised to send 500 marines and sailors. The French regulations differ from our own with regard to command when the sea and land forces co-operate. The military officer, if he happens to be the senior, is empowered to employ the navy as he thinks fit, and *vice versa*.

I was anxious to start at once for Shanghai, that

<sup>1</sup> Afterwards Sir Harry Parkes, K.C.B., Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Japan; died 1885.

I might proceed without delay to Chusan, should the answer to our ultimatum prove unfavourable; and Admiral Hope placed at my disposal a nice little steamer of about 800 tons called the *Granada*. Before setting off, I paid a visit to the town of Canton, where were stationed the 3d Buffs, the 67th Queen's, and the 65th and 70th Native Infantry Regiments, under Major-General Sir Charles Van Straubenzee,<sup>1</sup> who had commanded the troops in China previous to my arrival, but who was now about to return to England—a very gentlemanlike active officer, and young for his rank.

Canton had been in a very disturbed state for some time; and on one occasion a gingal had been fired by some Chinese in concealment upon a party of fourteen military police as they were going their rounds, killing seven of their number; whereupon the General, in reprisal, demolished the whole street in which the outrage had taken place, and thus effectually put a stop to a repetition of such occurrences. Canton was now very fairly quiet; and Lady Straubenzee, Mrs Straubenzee, wife of the aide-de-camp, and my wife, were carried in sedan chairs through the crowded streets and bye-lanes without meeting with any incivility. On 31st March 1860 we set sail from Hong-Kong for Shanghai, where we arrived on 6th April; and I at once went to call on General de Montauban and Mr Bruce. The

<sup>1</sup> General Sir Charles Van Straubenzee, G.C.B., died 1892.

latter was our plenipotentiary in China; but his brother, Lord Elgin, was shortly expected to take over the management of affairs during the war.

I had formerly known Frederick Bruce well. In disposition he was a fine, upright, honourable fellow, and in appearance tall and strong made, with a remarkably good expression of countenance. I was sorry to find that the chief diplomatic power was to be taken out of his hands; but Lord Elgin had more experience, and had been in China before. General de Montauban was a fine, handsome, soldier-like-looking man, apparently under sixty years of age, with a pleasant expression, and in general appearance quite the *beau sabreur*.

On 8th April the official reply to our ultimatum arrived from Peking, and was "cheeky" in the extreme, refusing point-blank all our demands. No doubt one reason for this was that our conditions were too moderate, and led the Chinese Government to think that we were frightened. Their answer was, however, quite what we expected, and war was at once declared. [The following are the concluding words of the Chinese official reply:—

The despatch written on this occasion is in much of its language too insubordinate and extravagant for the Council to discuss its propositions more than superficially. For the future the British Minister must not be so wanting in decorum. . . . It will behave [him] not to adhere obstinately to his own opinion, as so doing he will give cause to much trouble hereafter.]

On 14th April Mr Bruce, Monsieur Bourboulon, the French plenipotentiary — afterwards succeeded by Baron Gros — General de Montauban, Admiral Page, who had arrived from Shanghai, Admiral Jones, second in command to Admiral Hope, and myself, assembled to arrange about the preliminaries of the war, and to decide on a few points bearing on the blockade of the Gulf of Pechili, and the immediate occupation of Chusan. We all agreed that it would be inexpedient to blockade the gulf—the war was not being waged against the poor inhabitants; we had not thought it necessary to seize their junks; and indeed, had we done so, our interests would probably have suffered more than those of the Chinese Government. We were likewise unanimous, with the exception of General de Montauban, in favour of immediately seizing Chusan. The French general, however, objected so strongly, that our conference lasted three hours ere we could reconcile our differences of opinion.

The French admiral, Page, was a superior man, with a great deal of dry humour, but bad-tempered. He informed me he was not married, and I asked him why. “Oh,” he said, very slowly and in broken English, “I was once going to be married, and I dreamed a dream that I was married. I was almost suffocated; I felt choking. I awakened, and found it was a dream; I was not married, and I was so happy. I immediately went to the lady and broke it all off.”

Another time he told me he was very fond of *la chasse*. I asked him if he hunted, as we do in England, foxes with hounds. "To be sure I do; certainly. I hunt foxes with hounds, and I have killed five in one day with my gun." I had observed that when he was introduced to Lady Robinson, he bent down into a most lover-like position, and with profound respect kissed her hand. When I told this to my staff, they said: "That is nothing; when you are introduced to General de Montauban, he is sure to kiss you on both cheeks." However, I was spared this.

On 18th April we set sail with the troops I have before mentioned<sup>1</sup> for Chusan, and the next day anchored at King-tang, at the mouth of the river Ningpo, the appointed rendezvous of our little force. On 20th all our vessels got under way, some towed by steamers, and the rest sailing-vessels, and on 21st we entered the beautiful harbour of Chusan. The batteries had all been dismantled since the last war in 1841, and no opposition was offered to us. A summons was at once sent to the chief mandarin to surrender to us quietly the town of Ting-hai<sup>2</sup> and the island; and it was also explained that all we required in addition was that the Chinese military forces should deliver up to us their arms and guns, which would be kept in safety and returned to them

<sup>1</sup> The numbers were 2000 English, and about 200 French marines.

<sup>2</sup> The population of which was 400,000.

at the conclusion of the war. Mr Parkes, a very fearless man, was appointed our interpreter, and was sent into the town with the summons, and with instructions to endeavour to persuade the chief mandarins to come on board ship. Accordingly, in about a couple of hours he returned to the Granada, accompanied by the two chief men, a military and a civil representative. I notified their arrival to Admiral Page, and he at once joined our conference. The poor mandarins were humble and submissive, chiefly owing, I believe, to the kind manner with which they had been formerly treated when our people held possession of their island. But I was much vexed with the French admiral, whose manner to the Chinese was harsh and overbearing. They soon came to terms, and agreed to all our demands; and after disposing of a good number of glasses of cherry brandy, they took their departure.

The next difficulty was in housing our troops. The French, after all, only brought with them about 200 marines, and Admiral Page had selected a joss-house at the north gate, near the French Roman Catholic Mission, which had for a long time been established there. I supposed, therefore, that they were all comfortably located; and I forthwith allotted the other available buildings, in the town to my own troops, of which I had over a thousand to every hundred of the French. I then went with Admiral Jones to Admiral Page's ship, and laid before him



my proposed detail. He looked askance at the paper for some time, and I perceived that an explosion was gurgling up. "What is this I see?" he broke out at last; "nine, ten, eleven, twelve places for your men, and I have not one! I will not stand this. No, no; this must not be;" and he got up and stamped about the room as if I had grossly insulted him. I laughed, let his excitement calm down, and then asked him what he wanted. I told him I was most anxious to meet his wishes; but that in consequence of the number of troops I had with me it was necessary for me to avail myself of all the accommodation which he did not himself require, and that notwithstanding all my efforts, I had still been compelled to leave the 67th Regiment on board ship. "Only write down," I wound up by saying, "what you require." He flew to pen, ink, and paper, put his hand to his head, and began to consider. At length, after some deliberation, he wrote down that he required a building for the officer commanding the French marines, and a small hospital. Of course I instantly acceded to his demand. We also agreed that the joss-house on the hill, a building invested with a sort of official dignity, should be occupied by a force of twenty men from the English and French troops. And here another difficulty arose. Under such circumstances, custom prescribes that the national ensigns shall be hoisted. The French got hold of a good long pole and fixed their flag to it.

Our men, after considerable difficulty and search, laid their hands on a stout beam which was considerably loftier, and from the top of which our standard floated in the breeze as if looking down contemptuously on its ally. I have no doubt that herein our seamen were actuated by some little malicious feeling; but the commotion created amongst our allies did not tend to promote the good feeling which I was so anxious to establish. At last the French soothed their feelings by hoisting their banner on a still higher beam, and the rivalry of the poles ceased.

All these small troubles having been at last smoothed over, on 23d April I set sail and returned to Hong-Kong, where there was a great deal of work awaiting me. Admiral Hope was an excellent officer and a first-rate colleague, and we got on together admirably. Nearly all our force was now concentrated on the newly-acquired promontory of Kowloon. Its total strength was 13,116 men, of whom about 1000 were cavalry.

The two irregular cavalry regiments were really magnificent. They were composed of fine handsome men—Sikhs—becomingly dressed, well mounted, and commanded by two excellent officers—Major Fane<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Fane, C.B., Commandant of "Fane's Horse"—an Irregular cavalry officer of great repute during the Indian Mutiny. He died 1885.

and Major Probyn, both of whom I had known well in India during the Mutiny. Probyn's Irregulars were the admiration of every one. The King's Dragoon Guards was also one of the finest regiments in the service; and, altogether, I had reason to be proud of my little cavalry force. It was commanded by Brigadier Pattle,<sup>1</sup> of the King's Dragoon Guards.

My staff comprised Colonel Stephenson,<sup>2</sup> Scots Fusilier Guards, Deputy Adjutant-General. I considered myself most fortunate in this appointment, as not only was he in every respect a first-rate staff officer, but he possessed a peculiarly conciliatory manner, which smoothed over many difficulties, and specially qualified him for the post of an adjutant-general. Major Hon. C. Dormer,<sup>3</sup> Assistant Adjutant-General, and Lieut.-Colonel Wolseley, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General — a very excellent officer.

Major Reboul<sup>4</sup> was appointed French Commissioner with the English headquarters. He was a very

<sup>1</sup> Major-General Pattle, C.B., died 1874.

<sup>2</sup> Now General Sir F. Stephenson, G.C.B., Colonel of the Coldstream Guards.

<sup>3</sup> Lieut.-General Sir James Dormer, K.C.B., Commander-in-Chief of Madras, was killed by a fall from his pony, 1893.

<sup>4</sup> Major Reboul was afterwards appointed to the Chasseurs of the Guards, and was taken prisoner at the battle of Sedan, September 1, 1870. In consequence of the personal application of Sir Hope Grant to the Prussian authorities, the rigours of his confinement were much modified.

agreeable gentlemanlike officer, and spoke English like an Englishman.

[The fortunes of war are strangely illustrated by the accompanying letter :—

WEISSENFELS, near LEIPZIG,

Nov. 11, 1870.

SIR,—I was far from thinking some ten years ago that the time would come when, a prisoner of war, I should take advantage of the kindness I have always met from you and your family, and have to apply to you for assistance.

After the surrender at Metz, I asked at Mayence to be sent to a town on the Rhine ; but there being no room there, the Prussian officer on duty advised me to choose any other place, adding that there would be no difficulty in getting leave afterwards to change my residence. I therefore accepted Weissenfels, believing, as I was told, that it was a pleasant place, and not the dirty village I find it to be.

“Promettre et tenir sont deux,” says a French proverb ; so I am now told that no change of residence can be allowed, on account of the large number of appliances [applications] from different quarters. I am therefore condemned to remain here, unless some powerful hand can get me out.

Misfortune brings friendly names back to one's memory. I hope you will therefore excuse me if I take the liberty to ask you whether you can help me in this circumstance by having a line written to some one belonging to the British Embassy at Berlin, begging that a word may be said at the Prussian War Office, so as to get me allowed to go, at my own expense, to Hamburg, Hanover, Dresden, or any other town where I shall be likely to find some English families and sufficient accommodation to rally my own near me.

Since the last three months I have been without the slightest news from my wife and children, and am in the most painful anxiety lest anything may have happened to them, though I left them at Poitiers in a comparatively

quiet part of France. . . .—Believe me, sir, yours ever  
sincerely,  
CH. REBOUL, C.B.

Colonel REBOUL,  
9<sup>e</sup> Dragons français,  
Prisonnier de guerre,  
Weissenfels, près Leipzig.]

*Journal.*—The two Generals of Divisions were Major-General Sir John Michel<sup>1</sup> and Major-General Sir Robert Napier<sup>2</sup>—both excellent officers. Captains Green and Allgood<sup>3</sup> were Deputy Assistants Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General to Sir John Michel. Major Dillon<sup>4</sup> and Lieutenant Lumsden<sup>5</sup> filled the same positions on Sir Robert Napier's staff.

The Brigadiers were Sutton, Jephson,<sup>6</sup> Staveley,<sup>7</sup> and Reeves.

About the middle of May the French troops began to arrive at Shanghai; but they had not yet made any arrangements to procure horses for their guns, and had organised little or no commissariat. Upon hearing this, I offered General de Montauban to let him have 170 ponies, which we had collected at Shanghai, and were in excellent condition, provided he paid their cost. He was much pleased with my offer; but after consulting with his staff, he declined

<sup>1</sup> General Sir John Michel, G.C.B., died 1886.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Napier of Magdala, G.C.B., Field-Marshal, died 1890.

<sup>3</sup> Now Major-General Allgood, C.B.

<sup>4</sup> Now General Sir Martin Dillon, K.C.B.

<sup>5</sup> Now General Sir Peter Lumsden, G.C.B., Member of Council for India.

<sup>6</sup> Now Major-General Jephson, C.B., retired.

<sup>7</sup> Now General Sir Charles Staveley, G.C.B.

it, considering the price of the ponies excessive. This little piece of economy was more expensive in the end, and did not further the main object in view—viz., to bring the war quickly to an end. The ideas of the French on this subject evidently differed from ours, for his officers stated that they did not expect to be able to get to work this year. I understood, however, that instructions had been received from the Emperor to delay as little as possible, and they then set to work with vigour. In course of time they obtained a number of ponies from Japan, and began breaking them into harness.

QUARTIER-GÉNÉRAL DE SHANGHAI,  
*le 11 Mai 1860.*

MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,—M. Le Colonel Schmidt, mon chef d'Etat Major, m'a communiqué votre intention gracieuse de nous céder un certain nombre de chevaux achetés par vos agents. Je viens vous remercier, et vous exprimer, mon cher Général, toute ma reconnaissance de cet acte bienveillant de votre part; et si vous voulez bien donner des ordres dans ce sens au commissionnaire de votre gouvernement chargé des achats, je prescris de mon côté au commandant de la remonte française et à l'Intendant en chef de l'armée de prendre ces chevaux dans les mêmes conditions que celles auxquelles ils vous ont été livrés.

Veillez, mon cher Général, agréer l'assurance de ma haute considération et de mes sentiments tout dévoués.  
Le Général-en-Chef, CH. DE MONTAUBAN.

À S. E. Le Général-en-Chef HOPE GRANT.

By 1st June the whole of the British force had sailed for the Gulf of Pechili. Unfortunately, the

Assistance, a fine steam-transport, commanded by Captain Balfour, R.N., struck upon a rock going into "Deep Bay" and went down. No one was drowned, and nothing was lost except some provisions. The French sustained a severe loss in two large transports. One, the *Isère*, laden with harness for their gun-horses, and 400 tons of gunpowder, struck upon a rock entering Amoy, and sank; and the other, the *Queen of Clippers*,<sup>1</sup> containing stores of various kinds, and especially a quantity of warm clothing for their soldiers, took fire off Macao and was burnt. Our troops had scarcely sailed when a severe north-east gale set in so strongly that thirty of our vessels were obliged to put back into Hong-Kong, where they remained until the 8th June, when the wind shifted to the south-west, and the expedition started afresh. Admiral Hope sailed on the 9th June; but I remained behind to meet Lord Elgin, who was daily expected.

Thus far everything had gone wonderfully well with us. The men were in excellent health; and our cavalry and artillery horses were assembled in capital condition. We had purchased and collected, from various places, numbers of ponies and mules; and had also organised a coolie corps. I must also mention that two batteries of the newly-invented Armstrong guns had arrived from England; and,

<sup>1</sup> An English transport hired by the French, and designated by them *Reine des Clippères*.

to judge from some experiments made with them at Kowloon, we had every reason to consider them a great improvement upon the old smooth-bore 9-pounder.

[Sir Hope Grant, in his journal, here gives a minute description of these weapons, which at that time had been recently introduced into our service. Great importance was then attached to the fact that they were loaded at the breech; and, as will be seen in the sequel, they fully came up to the expectations formed of them.]

At last I determined to wait no longer for Lord Elgin, and I once more embarked on board the *Granada*. My wife remained behind me in the Commander-in-Chief's residence, over which had been established a guard of native soldiers—but for these the Chinese care little. On one occasion, one of these sentries was pacing up and down in front of Government House, when a Chinaman crept up behind, tripped up the sentry by means of a long stick with a crook at the end of it, wrested the musket out of his hands, and bolted.

[In all military operations beyond Europe, the provision of transport has invariably been a gigantic difficulty, and the present instance proved no exception. Native horses, mules, and ponies were with much difficulty and expense collected from India, Manilla, and Japan. In one instance the fittings of a ship conveying ponies from Japan gave way, and 70



out of 270 died. It was in a great measure owing to the scarcity of draught animals experienced by the French that the armies were unable to take the field until so late a date that, as will be subsequently seen, Peking was captured but just before the severe winter set in. But for the strenuous efforts which were made to hasten the preparations, there is reason to suppose that the operations of the expedition would have been prolonged into another year. Our embarrassments were increased by the ignorance of all foreigners as to the resources of the country—thus requiring an accumulation of every sort of supplies. Our English practice of protecting the inhabitants, and of paying for whatever we consumed, once more met with its reward. When we landed in Ta-lien-wan Bay, proclamations in the Chinese language were distributed throughout the adjacent villages, assuring the inhabitants that we intended to pay them liberally for their supplies; and that if any of them received ill-treatment at the hands of the English, the injured parties would obtain redress by representing their cases to certain indicated civil officers who understood Chinese. At first all the inhabitants fled; but after a few days, realising the fact that our reign was a reign of order, honesty, and justice, they gradually returned, bringing with them every description of provisions into our camp. These were bought up by the commissariat at a fair rate, and a plenty prevailed which more or less attended the English army

throughout the campaign. So great was our solicitude on this point, that in one of the semi-official, semi-private documents with which I have been furnished I find the following entry: "*June 30.*— Compensation ordered for the crops destroyed by the camps."

*Despatch from Viscount CANNING, Viceroy of India.*

UMBALLA, 9th May 1860.

DEAR SIR HOPE GRANT,—

It is a great relief to find that, notwithstanding the outcries from home, and the early presence on the scene of General de Montauban, we are not behindhand. It is an excellent thing that the material force should, at starting, be mainly at your back and not at his. I hear a good account of General de Montauban as a sensible, conciliatory man; but nobody in England seems to know much of him as a soldier.

The despatch which I was obliged to send you last month respecting the [supposed] undue excess of our force will, I hope, give you no trouble. The truth is that, as therein shown, we exceed the prescribed 10,000 by very little, when garrisons are deducted; and that little can, if you think right, be sent back to us, either to Singapore, or Calcutta, or whatever Indian port may best suit the remanded men. It was not until many weeks after our Indian force had been warned for service, and much of it despatched, that I heard of any agreement with the French Government that it should not exceed 10,000; and up to that time the cry had been, "send all you can." . . .

The only part of your letter which makes me a little uneasy, is what you say of the French not contemplating to begin work until the middle of August. I am glad that they

should not be ready before ourselves ; but this surely will be very inconveniently late.

Good-bye, my dear Sir Hope Grant. I hope you will continue to let me know how you get on ; and, believe me, very faithfully yours,  
CANNING.

Strength of expeditionary force, as embarked at Hong-Kong up to 7th June 1860: officers, 439 ; men, 13,116 ; horses, 1826 ; besides troops stationed at various garrisons.

French forces in China, *approximatif*: 7500 men (no cavalry).—H. K.]

*Journal.*—On 11th June I sailed from Hong-Kong for Shanghai, which we reached on the 16th June ; and I immediately went on shore, and arranged with Mr Bruce for a conference with General de Montauban the following day, that we might concert plans for our further proceedings. Colonel St George Foley,<sup>1</sup> the English Commissioner with the French, Major Reboul, and Monsieur Bourboulon, were likewise present at the conference. General de Montauban laid before us his plan of attacking the Taku defences. He proposed to land at a spot twenty-five miles south of the large fort which had done so much damage to our fleets the previous year, and then to march up along the coast through a wretched semi-barren country, taking with him his light guns only. For provisions and water he would rely upon his ships. This scheme appeared

<sup>1</sup> Now General Sir St George Foley, K.C.B.

to me very hazardous. The difficulties of landing would be great; heavy winds might very probably arise, and prevent communication with his ships for days; and, above all, it was most unlikely that the large fort, which was armed with about sixty very heavy guns, could be compelled to yield to the fire of light field-pieces only.

Before attending the conference I had consulted with Admiral Hope, and we both came to the conclusion that our most judicious course would be to proceed up the river Peh-tang, eight miles north of the Peiho, capture the town of Peh-tang, and there establish a base for future operations. The Taku forts were four in number, two small upper and two large lower works—a large and a small fort being on each side of the river.<sup>1</sup> In front of the lower forts, near the mouth of the Peiho, were fixed two very strong chain-barriers, impassable for ships under fire; and on each side of the river was a salt-marsh. The plan which I proposed to the French general was first to attack Peh-tang, the defences of which were, so far as we could ascertain, of a less formidable description. Here, too, there was, it is true, a fort on each side of the river, but there were no barriers thrown across; and by landing near the town of Peh-tang we could attack in rear the Taku forts, which would thus probably fall after a short resistance.

<sup>1</sup> See plan.

General de Montauban remained wedded to his opinions, and proposed that we should each of us carry out our own scheme independently, as far as possible. To this I readily agreed. I had an amply sufficient force for my purpose, and we should thus avoid many causes for disagreement. My satisfaction was marred by the French general's statement that he could not be ready to begin operations until the 15th July. This delay was serious, as by that date the rainy season would in all probability have set in, and would have so inundated the country as to render it almost impassable for troops. We were prepared to open operations on 1st July, but the French very naturally insisted on a simultaneous start; and as I had received strict injunctions from home to act in unison with our allies, I had no alternative but to wait patiently.

The long-haired rebels<sup>1</sup> who had risen against the Chinese Government were now becoming very formidable. They had taken Foo-Chow, the great emporium for silk, and had treated the inhabitants with great brutality, murdering women and children wholesale, and committing great destruction of property. They next began to make their appearance in the neighbourhood of Shanghai, where the panic amongst the native population was excessive, and the trade was stopped in consequence. Ho, the governor of the province, applied to us to protect

<sup>1</sup> The insurgents were distinguished by the length of their hair.

the town; and we therefore took possession of the gates, and I brought up the Loodianah Regiment from Hong-Kong. With this regiment we occupied three strong posts, which covered the town on the side from which the rebels were expected. It was curious that a European enemy was defending the Chinese Government in the centre and south,<sup>1</sup> and preparing to carry on war and destruction against the same enemy in the north.

[When I visited Shanghai in 1884 this defence of the wealthy city by the English was a vivid tradition among the Chinese inhabitants.]

The garrison then consisted of 1030 men, which, with 600 French marines and a party of their sailors, was sufficient to insure tolerable safety for the place. China was indeed in a deplorable condition, with rebellion and misgovernment within, and a war with two great European nations from without. About this time General Ignatieff,<sup>2</sup> the Russian ambassador, arrived at Shanghai from Peking. He spoke English very well, and appeared to me a straightforward, gentlemanlike man. He told me that the Emperor of China, a young man, thirty-two years of age, had worn out his intellects and brought on paralysis, which deprived him of the use of his legs, by debauchery.<sup>3</sup> The government was in the hands of a

<sup>1</sup> Viz., at Shanghai and Canton.

<sup>2</sup> Afterwards Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, where he played a momentous diplomatic part in 1883.

<sup>3</sup> He died in 1862.

party of civilians, who were determined to wage war to the last extremity. They overruled their famous general Sang-ko-lin-sin and the military mandarins, who were inclined for peace.

[The intestine strife which was then raging in China materially complicated the difficulties of the expedition, so far at least as the English were concerned, and powerfully influenced the ultimate result. On the one hand, the Imperial Government were unable to resist us with their whole force, owing to the necessity imposed on them for employing a large portion of their army in attempting to suppress the rebellion. But for this diversion, it is probable that by the mere force of numbers they would have succeeded at all events in rendering our subsequent march to Peking a more perilous and a more protracted undertaking. On the other hand, the last thing to be desired was the overthrow of the ruling dynasty, or the flight of the Emperor from Peking, whereby there would be no responsible Government with which we could negotiate, or from which we could take guarantees for the fulfilment of a treaty. Hence our wise anomaly of striking them in the north at Taku, and serving them in the south at Canton. These complications little affected the French, as their commercial interests were small, and their longing for laurel-leaves in the shape of victory over the Imperial hosts of China great.—H. K.]

*Journal.*—On 22d June I sailed from Shanghai for

the Gulf of Pechili, as I wished to ascertain a suitable spot for the formation of a depot. On the way we touched at Woosung. Here I made the acquaintance of Admiral Charner, who had been sent out from France to supersede Admiral Page. He was an elderly gentlemanlike person, had been a long time in the service, and I at once saw we should get on well together, as he did me the justice to believe that I was most anxious to promote good feeling and cordiality between the nations. Altogether I welcomed the change very gladly, for his predecessor was a person with whom it was difficult to harmonise.

We continued our voyage, and reached Che-foo, thirty-five miles higher up the coast,<sup>1</sup> where the French had established large magazines under the supervision of General Baron Jamin, a most civil obliging officer, and particularly popular with his men. He showed me over his lines, formed round a conical hill, where his soldiers had pitched their *tentes d'abri*, which looked fairly comfortable on a fine day. He also directed my attention to the new French rifled guns<sup>2</sup> of the same description as those which had been used with so much effect in the late war with Austria. They were so light that four Japanese ponies could easily draw them, and their range was considerable; but they had not the care-

<sup>1</sup> And opposite the English rendezvous of Ta-lien-wan.

<sup>2</sup> Commonly called the Napoleon gun—a converted muzzle-loading bronze gun with studded projectiles, rifled.





fully adjusted sights which made our Armstrongs so formidable, and their fire was not particularly accurate. I told Baron Jamin that General de Montauban had stated he hoped to be ready to take the field by the fifteenth July; but he laughed at the notion, and declared it to be utterly out of the question. The number of ponies required for the artillery and other purposes was, he said, 620. As yet they had only 114, and these were still unbroken to harness.

The English forces had been collected at Ta-lien-wan, a magnificent bay to the west of a promontory in the Gulf of Pechili. I now betook myself to this spot, and arrived there on the 26th June, where I found that our whole army, with the exception of 120 of the King's Dragoon Guards, had arrived in 73 vessels. This splendid fleet rode at anchor in the bay. The French force had not yet made its appearance; so, without any further delay, I landed all my troops and encamped them on three sides of the bay—the cavalry and artillery on the east, near the entrance, at a place called by us Odin's Bay, after the name of a vessel commanded by Captain Lord John Hay. On the north was the 2d Division under Sir Robert Napier; and on the west the 1st Division, Sir John Michel's: the baggage animals were stationed near Sir John Michel's position. The men were in excellent health, and the horses in first-rate condition; and though they had travelled so far over a troubled sea, there had been

scarcely a casualty amongst them. At first we apprehended a deficiency of fresh water, but in course of time we discovered one or two small streams; reservoirs were formed, and we were thus enabled both to supply the troops and to keep the ships well stored. The inhabitants were Tartars; and though at first surprised and frightened at our large ships of war and red-coats, soon became friendly, and brought us in abundance of supplies.

About this time I received an official letter from General de Montauban, in which, to my great satisfaction, he stated that his force would be ready to begin operations by the 25th July at the latest.

[The following despatch serves to point out one of the difficulties attendant on carrying out military operations in conjunction with an allied Power:—

HEADQUARTERS, TA-LIEN-WAN,  
*9th July 1860.*

MY LORD,—I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the British land forces at this place amount to about 12,000 men.

By a despatch from Lord Canning, I learn that the Home Government had arranged that the British expeditionary force should not exceed 10,000 men, and his Lordship requested me to act in accordance with this arrangement. To effect this reduction, it will be necessary for me to leave 2000 men at Ta-lien-wan. As the aim of the expedition is a speedy success with as small loss as possible, it seems unwise thus to

throw away the services of these men—the expense of bringing them to China having been already incurred; whilst the stronger the force, the fewer in all probability will be the casualties in action.

From what I can gather, I understand that the French effective force will not greatly exceed 6700 men, including the garrison of Che-foo.

Having informed Mr Herbert that the wishes of H.M. Government as expressed to Lord Canning will be attended to, and that the surplus force would be left at Ta-lien-wan, I venture to request that your Excellency will, if you think fit, obtain the concurrence of H.I.M.'s Plenipotentiary to the English force exceeding the limit of 10,000 laid down, in which case I would propose to leave only 600 men to guard the depot at Ta-lien-wan. . . .—I have the honour, &c.,

J. HOPE GRANT, Lt.-Gen.,

*Commander of the Forces.*

His Excellency the EARL OF ELGIN AND KINCARDINE,  
K.T., K.C.B., &c., &c., &c.

The authority requested was granted.

Apparently Sir Hope refers to the following,<sup>1</sup> which I have discovered amongst his correspondence. I cannot ascertain that he returned any official reply to De Montauban's high and mighty State paper, pregnant with an international rupture. I deduce that Sir Hope laughed, said little, and, according to his wont, substantially got his own way.

<sup>1</sup> Not previously published.

QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DE CHE-FOO,  
le 6 Juillet 1860.

Monsieur le GÉNÉRAL-EN-CHEF.

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception à votre Excellence de la lettre par laquelle elle me manifeste le désir d'opérer un débarquement immédiate à Pehtang, malgré que par clause insérée au procès verbal de la séance qui a eu lieu à Shanghai, nous nous soyons engagés à n'opérer le débarquement sur les points convenus que le 15 Juillet au plus tôt, et le 25 Juillet au plus tard.

[Marginal note in Sir Hope's handwriting: "No agreement to this effect could be obtained conference of 18th June."—J. H. G.]

Votre Excellence ne peut ignorer que le Pehtang n'est que 2 lieus et  $\frac{1}{2}$  du Peiho, et que l'occupation de ce point par les forces que vous commandez serait un véritable commencement d'hostilités auquel l'armée française ne peut prendre aucune part.

Les raisons que j'ai eu l'honneur d'exposer dans la conférence du 18 Juin dernier aux membres qui en faisaient partie subsistent toujours, et je ne puis dans aucun cas accepter l'offre que votre Excellence me fait d'adjoindre à l'armée anglaise une petite force française pour occuper Pehtang.

D'après nos instructions communes, et d'après une lettre de *Lord John Russell* aux lords de l'Amirauté en date du 7 Janvier 1860, il est expressément recommandé qu'il ne peut être question en aucun cas d'une arrivée séparée dans les eaux du Peiho de l'un ou de l'autre pavillon des deux puissances alliées; et bien certainement un débarquement à Pehtang serait une véritable contravention de nos gouvernements, comme elle serait contraires aux conventions établies le 18 Juin dernier.

[Note by Sir Hope: "An enclosure in Lord J. Russell's letter of 7th January says the French Government do not require us to wait for an *equal* force on both sides."—J. H. G.]

General Montauban dwells plaintively on the fact that the French troops had endured a voyage of six months ; suggests that Sir Hope had much better wait at Ta-lien-wan Bay ; urges that the Queen's Government thought we were about to attack the Peiho, not Pehtang, six miles distant ; and continues :—

Il ne m'appartient pas, Monsieur le Général, d'entrer en quoique ce soit dans les raisons qui ont déterminé votre choix, mais permettez moi de vous faire observer en réponse au désir que vous manifestez de ne pas voir fortifier la rivière du Pehtang que d'après un rapport de M. le Capitaine du Génie Fisher,<sup>1</sup> fait à bord du cruizer le 19 7<sup>bre</sup> 1859, ces forts étaient déjà armés à cette époque, puisqu'il parle de la nécessité de les attaquer avec du canon, et que M. Le Commandant du cruizer lui-même, M. Bythesea, dans un rapport du 17 7<sup>bre</sup> 1859, précédant de deux jours celui du Capitaine Fisher, énumère le nombre des canons qui garnissent les deux forts : le fort nord en possède 11, le fort sud 13 ; en tout 24.

Si je suis entré dans un pareil détail, votre Excellence reconnaîtra que je n'ai en vue qu'une seule chose ; c'est de lui démontrer que l'occupation du Pehtang amènera nécessairement une action de guerre dans les deux eaux du Peiho, et que le pavillon de la France n'y sera pas représenté. J'ajouterai une dernière réflexion, c'est que si les chinois n'ont pas augmenté jusqu'à ce jour les défenses du Pehtang, il est peu probable qu'ils les augmentent d'ici au 25 Juillet, dernier délai que nous avons fixé pour commencer nos opérations.

[Note by Sir Hope : "Last day ! It is not fixed."—J. H. G., 12th July 1860.]

J'espère que votre Excellence accueillera mes observations

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Fisher, C.B., died 1879.

avec la bienveillance qui a toujours présidé à toutes nos relations, et qu'elle ne verra dans mon désir de maintenir intactes les conventions du 18 Juin dernier que l'accomplissement d'un devoir à remplir, d'après les instructions qui nous sont communes, aux commandants en chef de mer comme aux commandants en chef de terre.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, de votre Excellence, le plus obéissant serviteur, Le Général Command.-en-Chef l'expédition française en Chine, CH. DE MONTAUBAN.

À son Excellence le GÉNÉRAL GRANT,  
Command.-en-Chef les forces anglaises in Chine.

—H. K.]

*Journal.*—On the 9th July, Lord Elgin<sup>1</sup> arrived, and I immediately went on board to pay my respects. My eldest brother was married to his sister, Lady Lucy Bruce, and in former days I had known him well. Twenty years at least had intervened since we had last met, and we were, of course, both much changed; his hair had become perfectly white, and mine was well sprinkled with grey. We renewed our old acquaintance, and he told me how he and Baron Gros, the new French ambassador, had been wrecked in the harbour of Galle. Just as his ship, the Malabar, was preparing to sail, a severe squall suddenly came on and bumped her fifteen times on a rock, which knocked a hole in her bottom. Her steam was up, and they managed to run her ashore ere she sank; but nearly all the property of the passengers was lost. After Lord Elgin had made me acquainted with his views bearing on the politics

<sup>1</sup> Afterwards Governor-General of India; died 1863.

of the war, I determined to start at once for Che-foo, in order that we might fix on a day for both armies to begin their move. I arrived there the next day, and proceeded to confer with the French general and admiral. Admiral Hope had been obliged to remain at Ta-lien-wan, in consequence of an injury he had sustained on the shin-bone.

I impressed upon General de Montauban the expediency of getting to work at once, and I showed him his own letter to me, binding himself to be ready by the 25th July. He seemed to have forgotten the existence of such a document, shrugged his shoulders, and declared his present inability to fix a day; but added that by the 20th July he would, at all events, let me know the exact date when he would be prepared to start. I dined with him that evening, and then returned to Ta-lien-wan. On 13th July, General de Montauban and Admiral Charner came to pay an official visit to Lord Elgin and myself, and I took the two French officers to Odin's Bay to inspect the portion of our troops stationed there. On disembarkation we found the King's Dragoon Guards, and Probyn's and Fane's Horse, with a field-battery on each flank, drawn up to receive us. A salute was fired in honour of our guests, and we proceeded along the line. Though the force of cavalry and artillery was small, the sight in such a distant land was undoubtedly one to be proud of showing to the representatives of a great foreign Power. It must be remembered that this

force had been conveyed a distance of 5000 miles from India; that they had been embarked and disembarked several times during the process; and that, though frequently unprovided with proper landing-places, scarcely a casualty had occurred. Each English soldier was a splendid fellow, and looked as though he were a thoroughbred gentleman—powerful and strong enough to contend with any men the world could produce. The Sikhs, too, with their beautiful turbans wound gracefully over their ears and drooping down the backs of their heads, were almost equally splendid, and looked as if they intended to vie in acts of daring with the British. I need scarcely add that the Royal Artillery was, as usual, in the most beautiful order. And then the horses were turned out in a manner which did credit to both branches of the service. They had been taken from the stud-depots of India; and having recently had plenty of rest and good food, they looked handsome, imposing, and full of breeding.

The French general walked down the line with me, and frequently expressed his admiration of our troops. Such a sight, he said, would not have been extraordinary in Hyde Park or in the Tuileries, but he could never have expected to witness it in China. In the evening Lord Elgin, General de Montauban, and Admiral Charner, dined with me; but I am sorry to say that I cannot report so favourably of my dinner as of my parade.



[The hero of the following extraordinary escape from drowning is that distinguished officer, the present General Sir Peter Lumsden, G.C.B.]

Lieutenant Lumsden, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General of Sir Robert Napier's division, a countryman of my own and a very fine fellow, was sent from my ship, together with Lieutenant Gordon, Madras Engineers, to Hand Bay on duty. When they were still five miles from shore, a sudden squall upset their yawl. The two officers and three sailors clung to the bottom of their craft, but Gordon lost his hold and was drowned. Lumsden held on in the water for two hours, and at last, thinking he would have a better chance for his life by swimming, in which he was a great proficient, he let go and struck out for the shore. Darkness came on, and he could only trust to a strong wind and tide to carry him to land. He floated and let himself drift, until after five and a half hours from the time he had let go of the boat he reached the shore, at 3 o'clock A.M., from whence he walked ten miles to camp.

The three boatmen, unable to swim, clung on to the capsized craft with desperation, until they were finally picked up by a chance man-of-war's boat.

Very plentiful supplies, in the shape of bullocks, sheep, goats, and vegetables, were daily brought in to us at Odin's Bay, so I determined to establish here a depot for supplying the rest of our army, and to leave a small force to protect it.

Lord Elgin had gone over to Che-foo to see Baron Gros; and he wrote me word that the French had discovered the impracticability of landing a force south of the Taku forts. On hearing this, I at once went to Che-foo to see General de Montauban, who told me that he had sent a ship to reconnoitre the coast where he had proposed disembarking; but the report was so unfavourable that he had relinquished his original intention. He now wished to ask me whether I had any objection to his men landing at the place I had selected—viz., Peh-tang. I told him that he was at perfect liberty to do so, as it was my sincere wish to keep up a good understanding between the two nations. He then said that he should be quite ready to start by the 26th July. We afterwards rode out together into the country, which appeared fertile, well wooded, and cultivated. Here, too, the people were bringing in supplies freely, and also numbers of capital mules. Baron Gros allowed me to purchase two of these animals for my private use, which, from my experience during the Indian Mutiny, would, I knew, prove most serviceable. During my last campaign in India, many a good breakfast had my old mule carried for me on the line of march.

On returning to Ta-lien-wan, we set to work in earnest preparing for the real business of fighting. We had no difficulty in embarking the infantry, but the cavalry and artillery proved a more onerous affair. Thanks to Admiral Hope's judicious arrangements,

and to the care and energy displayed by all the officers concerned in the operation, the whole of the horses were got on board safely, with the exception of one officer's charger, which broke its leg, and had to be destroyed. Our force amounted, in round numbers, to about 11,000 men; that of the French to 6700.

[Summary of expeditionary forces, as arrived at Ta-lien-wan Bay up to 9th July 1860: officers, 419; men, 10,491; horses, 1731.]

## CHAPTER XVI.

CHINA WAR (*continued*).

DISEMBARKATION NEAR PEH-TANG—ADVANCE THROUGH THE MUD—SURRENDER OF THE TOWN—THE HIDDEN SHELLS—TALES OF VIOLENCE—DREAD OF FIRE—RECONNAISSANCE—SIR HOPE GRANT RESOLVES TO CONTINUE MARCH, AND GENERAL DE MONTAUBAN AT LENGTH ACQUIESCES—MEASURES FOR ATTACKING THE SIN-HO FORTS—FRESH STRUGGLES THROUGH THE MUD—GALLANT ATTACK OF TARTAR CAVALRY—SIR R. NAPIER—CAPTURE OF THE SIN-HO FORTS—FRENCH ADVANCE AGAINST TANG-KU, BUT ARE FORCED TO RETIRE—PRISONERS CAPTURED BY THE TARTARS—ATTACK AND CAPTURE BY THE ALLIES OF TANG-KU ON 14TH AUGUST—INCIDENTS IN THE ENGAGEMENT—DESPATCH FROM LORD ELGIN.

*Journal.*—On 26th July 1860 our fleet got under way. It consisted of 173 vessels, some of which were sailing-ships, and the others steamers, drawn up in two lines. The French fleet, composed of 40 transports and men-of-war, formed the third line. On 27th and 28th July we anchored within twenty miles of the Taku forts, which loomed large in the distance; and on 30th we approached to within ten miles of Peh-tang. We had intended to cross the bar the following day, and to anchor within 2000

yards of the forts; but owing to the storminess of the weather, we deferred our further advance until 1st August. The depth of water over the bar proved to be only 13 feet, and at low tide only 3 feet, in consequence of which large vessels could not cross; and the admiral determined to ship the troops in men-of-war boats, towed by gunboats. This was effected with admirable precision, and we anchored on 1st August just out of fire of the batteries. It had been originally settled to land on the left bank of the Peh-tang river; but on further examination the muddy state of the beach deterred us, and the troops disembarked on the right or south bank.<sup>1</sup> Even here the ground appeared to be little better than slush; and General de Montauban, just as he had set foot on shore, suddenly found the river rising, and the water surrounding him. There were close at hand two or three high mounds of earth, apparently serving as a guide for navigation, and on one of these the French general placed himself; but even here he was in a few minutes surrounded by a sea of water extending for miles. The two forts on the river-banks looked very imposing. They were constructed of mud and straw, with a high cavalier<sup>2</sup> in the centre of each. That on the right bank was armed, so far as we could see, with 13 guns; the one on the left bank with 11 guns. No notice was taken

<sup>1</sup> About a mile and a half east of Peh-tang.

<sup>2</sup> A raised terreplein with parapet.

of our approach beyond that of a few "Braves"<sup>1</sup> looking at us from the parapets.

A total of 2000 troops, in equal numbers of French and English, were forthwith landed; and as we had the prospect of wading through at least two miles of mud, I took off my boots and stockings, tucked up my trousers, and pushed forward at the head of my men towards a raised causeway, which led apparently from the gate of Peh-tang to the Taku forts.<sup>2</sup> On our way we came across a deep water-course, concealed by the high tide, and many were our cooling tumbles therein. The French chief of the staff had landed on his pony, and both came to terrible grief in this briny bath.

Some Tartar cavalry were seen moving along the road, but on our approach they retired in the direction of the Taku forts. At last all our wading difficulties were got over; our men reached the causeway, which was found sound and dry, and were ordered to bivouac on it for the night. I arranged with Admiral Hope and the French that at daybreak we should make a simultaneous attack on Peh-tang from the road. At the same hour the gunboats were to steam up past the forts and support us with their fire.<sup>3</sup> During the night the admiral sent up one of his

<sup>1</sup> The term adopted for themselves by the Chinese army.

<sup>2</sup> See plan.

<sup>3</sup> Preparations were also made for landing the remainder of the troops the next day.

small boats to find out whether any barriers impeded the passage of the river; and having ascertained that all was clear, we felt confident of being able to establish ourselves in the town without much difficulty.

When we lay down for the night in the open on the road, we had no apprehensions of being attacked during the darkness, as there was nothing but water and swamp on our flanks, which, moreover, were guarded by a few pickets. At midnight, to my surprise, firing commenced in the centre of our line, and it was reported that some Tartar cavalry had ridden close up to us. However, it soon ceased, and next morning a Tartar pony, fully accoutred, was found within a stone's-throw shot dead by a rifle-bullet. Not far from Peh-tang was a bridge, which was occupied by one of our pickets; and as everything appeared perfectly quiet, I sent a flag of truce with an interpreter to demand the surrender of the town. A respectable-looking old man came up and said that no opposition would be offered to our entrance, and that no Chinese soldiers were in the place; but he warned us that inside the fort were concealed some large shells filled with gunpowder, which would explode on being touched. This information, so kindly given, proved of great importance. The party with the flag of truce followed the old man into a deserted fort, and were there shown where the gunpowder was buried. The top surface was scraped

away for about an inch, and revealed several small gunlocks, so placed that the weight of the foot would cause them to go off, and, by means of some trains of gunpowder, would have exploded the shells. These missiles, sixteen inches in diameter, were placed in two mines, ten in each, and would have caused a pretty commotion had a company of soldiers marched over the spot.

Very early in the morning we entered Peh-tang, and found that our gunboats had taken up the position previously assigned to them. On examination, it was ascertained that there was no site outside the walls suitable for the encampment of our troops. All around was swamp, or covered with water at high tide; and now commenced the miseries of war. We were compelled to lodge the men of both armies in the town, which was densely populated. The unfortunate Chinese women all had the small deformed feet common to the females of their nation, and were scarcely able to move. The Chinese coolies, of whom we had a large number—about 2500<sup>1</sup>—were for the most part atrocious villains, though extremely useful; and in the first instance, when they could be comparatively but little controlled, the robberies and crimes they committed in the town were fearful. In one respectable-looking house which some of our officers entered, were found the corpses of two young

<sup>1</sup> A large number of coolies had been temporarily engaged in addition to the regular Coolie corps.



women, and their father apparently at the point of death. The latter turned out to be the same kind old man who had received our interpreter and had pointed out to us the existence of the loaded shells. They were all taken to the hospital, where it was ascertained that they had swallowed opium. After some difficulty, the father was brought round again, and he told his sad tale. A party of coolies came to his house, and demanded admission. He was obliged to let them in, whereupon they plundered and ransacked his dwelling. They had scarcely taken their departure when fresh coolies came with the same intention, which so terrified the unhappy family that they resolved upon suicide, and took a quantity of opium.

The inhabitants evacuated the town as quickly as possible, the men carrying their helpless, footless wives and their children on their backs, and other poor females hobbling along as best they could, supporting themselves upon sticks to the river-side, and then getting into boats, or toiling along the banks to some other village. Some French soldiers were removing a box out of a house to increase the available space, when on opening it were discovered the bodies of two young girls about fourteen and fifteen years old, who, there was reason to suppose, had been strangled by their relations.

At last the place was cleared of its population; one half of the town was allotted to the French and

the other half to ourselves, and we forthwith began disembarking the main body of our troops.

I took up my abode in one of the bastions of the fort, which was cool and airy,—perhaps too much so, for I shall never forget one night when a storm of thunder, lightning, wind, and rain broke over us, flooding the place, and converting our beds into the appearance of tubs filled with dirty clothes, and ourselves into half-drowned rats. I had a slight attack of fever during the two following days. The occupation of this town was fraught with the most fearful risks it has ever fallen to my lot to encounter, and had we not been protected by that great Being who rules above, terrible and fearful consequences would have ensued. The town was very small, not much more than 500 yards square, and in it were crowded 11,000 of our men, exclusive of the French force amounting to above 6700 more, and about 4000 of our horses, mules, and ponies, all stowed away in houses and in narrow lanes. The buildings were almost all thatched, fires burning, dinners cooking, men smoking—in fact, all the accessories for the outbreak of a blaze. After the storm, the weather became very hot, and the thatched roofs as dry as tinder. Had a spark fallen on one of them, it is difficult to say what would have been the result. Probably almost all our fine horses and ponies would have been destroyed; and many of the men would have been unable to effect their escape out of the

narrow thickly-thronged lanes. At length heavy rain set in, and the danger of fire was much lessened; but the streets became almost impassable from the mud, filth, and dead animals. These latter seemed to cling to us persistently; for when thrown into the river the returning tide cast them back on to the bank, where they decomposed in the sun, creating a horrible stench. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the pestilential nature of the place, our troops, wonderful to say, never enjoyed better health. During the whole period of our occupation we had not above one and a-half per cent sick. The French likewise were remarkably healthy.

On 3d August, General de Montauban and myself arranged to send out reconnoitring parties of 1000 men each, on the road to the Taku forts, to ascertain the position of the enemy. Brigadier Sutton commanded the British force; and General Collineau,<sup>1</sup> an excellent officer who had commanded a regiment with great gallantry during the attack of the Redan in the Crimea, the French. The party advanced along the narrow road for about four miles, with water and swamp on both sides, and on their way met with a picket of Tartar cavalry which retired on our approach. The ground now sloped upwards and about a mile to the front; an intrenched position became visible, whereupon General Collineau deployed his whole

<sup>1</sup> General Collineau died at Tien-tsin the following November of smallpox.

force. The troops had hardly got into line when the enemy opened on them with a heavy fire of gingals, wounding several of their number. This weapon is a species of long heavy duck-gun, carrying a ball weighing about 2 lb.: its range is at least 1000 yards. Placed upon a tripod, from which tolerable aim can be taken, it is very handy and effective in a country where, owing to innumerable large ditches, watercourses, and marshy ground, field-artillery would be useless. The enemy appeared to be in considerable force; and General Collineau having reconnoitred their position, thought it advisable to retire: my force followed his example. The Tartar cavalry, however, harassed the retreat. On 4th August we occupied with a strong picket the position abandoned the previous day by the Tartar cavalry.

Probyn's Horse had been landed, and I had posted them within the fort of Peh-tang. On 5th August heavy rains and violent squalls flooded the horses up to their knees in mud, and, moreover, we were in great straits for drinking-water. There were a few wells in the town yielding a very brackish supply, and in each house were five or six earthen jars large enough to hold a man, in which fresh water had been stored away; but in a short time, with the number of horses to be provided for, these sources became exhausted, and it was a matter for anxious consideration how we could meet this grave impending difficulty. On the spot where at first landing we had

found the dead Tartar pony, a cart-track was perceived; and anxious to discover to where it led, I sent out a reconnoitring party, consisting of two squadrons of Probyn's Horse, and a troop of the King's Dragoon Guards—the whole under Colonel Wolseley, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General. They started on the morning of the 9th August; and on their return the same day, Wolseley reported to me that for the first two miles the track was very muddy and difficult, but that afterwards it became sound, and well adapted for the passage of cavalry and artillery. Above all, he discovered several large pools of excellent rain-water, at which the horses drank greedily. This information was most satisfactory, because, provided the difficulties of the first two miles' mud could be surmounted, I could send a division by the newly-discovered track, and thus attack the enemy in flank as well as in front. I was also much relieved at the discovery of this additional supply of water, though we had now begun to eke out our resources by distilling, which was carried on on board our steamers by Admiral Hope's orders.

Once more the rains came down in constant heavy showers, and in the intervals the sun shone with an intense heat. Great indeed was my anxiety lest, in consequence of the stench and crowded state of the town, disease should break out; and I resolved at all hazards to march off and attack the enemy the instant

the country should become passable after a few days' dry weather.

General de Montauban and myself had come to an agreement that our forces should take precedence of march by turns, and that the British should have the first right to the privilege. The arrangements for the start, therefore, devolved upon me, and I went to tell him of my wish to march off on the morning of the 12th August. The French general objected strongly, and urged that the state of the country would be the destruction of his men. To this I replied that we had had several days of fine weather, which had rendered the ground much sounder, and that every moment we remained in Peh-tang was fraught with danger. Indeed so strongly was I impressed with the latter consideration, that I urged my point with all the force in my power. General de Montauban, who was the essence of good nature, I am happy to say was not in the least offended, and merely replied—"Very well: if you go I must go with you." The force he detailed for immediate advance, however, amounted only to 1000 men.

On 12th August, therefore, Sir Robert Napier was directed to start with his division an hour before the rest of the troops, to cross the salt-marsh by the cart-track turning to the right, and to attack the enemy's intrenchments on their left. He was reinforced by the cavalry under Brigadier Pattle, one battery of Armstrong guns, three 6-pounders, smooth bore, and

a rocket-battery. Sir John Michel was ordered to advance with his division, and to attack the enemy posted behind their earthworks, in front, as soon as Sir Robert Napier should have cleared off the causeway.

I accompanied Sir Robert Napier's division in order that I might assure myself that he had succeeded in crossing the marsh, and here we encountered great difficulty in dragging the artillery along. The horses got bogged, the guns sank up to their axle-trees, and the waggons stuck fast. At last we were compelled to leave the waggon-bodies behind us, and to content ourselves with the gun and waggon limbers.<sup>1</sup> The cavalry likewise were much embarrassed in struggling through the mud, and even the infantry found it hard work, and lost many a good pair of boots. At one time I really thought we should be obliged to give up the attempt; but Sir Robert Napier was full of energy: the struggle was continued, and, by means of drag-ropes and perseverance, the artillery was hauled over the two miles of mud, and sound ground reached. I then retraced my steps, and accompanied Sir John Michel's division along the causeway, and on reaching the high ground deployed the whole line, the French force of 1000 men being formed upon our left. From the roof of a house a little to our front I

<sup>1</sup> The limber and body when hooked up together form a four-wheeled carriage. The limber can be moved separately without the body, but not *vice versé*.

obtained a good view of the whole system of the intrenchments. They appeared to consist of several small redoubts, open at the gorge, and weak in profile, but connected with each other by crenelated walls.

The enemy soon began to open fire upon us, to which we replied with 18 guns at a range of 900 yards, consisting of Desborough's<sup>1</sup> smooth-bore 9-pounders, Barry's<sup>2</sup> Armstrongs, and a battery of French artillery. Govan's<sup>3</sup> rocket-battery also came into action. Every one of our shot pierced right through the slight mud Chinese walls, and in half an hour the forts were all evacuated.

Meanwhile Sir Robert Napier had been engaged, two miles to our right, with the enemy. A body of about 4000 Tartar cavalry attacked us in the most gallant style, very nearly captured Stirling's<sup>4</sup> three 6-pounders, and surrounded the whole of our column in the manner customary with Eastern horsemen; but the Armstrong guns opened, and our own cavalry was let loose upon them with great effect. The Sikhs understood this style of warfare, and committed great havoc amongst the Tartars—driving them eventually off the field. They took refuge in the village of Tang-ku, on the north bank of the Peiho. We followed up our success to the village of Sin-ho, which


<sup>1</sup> Now Major-General Desborough, C.B.

<sup>2</sup> Since dead.

<sup>3</sup> Now Major-General Govan.

<sup>4</sup> Lieut.-General Sir W. Stirling, K.C.B., Governor Royal Military Academy, Woolwich.







was also covered by intrenchments; but the enemy had received such a thrashing that they did not wait to defend it.

General de Montauban now wished to attack another fortified position inclosing the large village of Tang-ku. The distance between this post and Sin-ho was about three miles; the enemy had retreated by a causeway, and the fortifications were large enough to have contained 40,000 men. The ground along each side of this single road appeared to be very marshy, and consequently the whole of our deep columns of infantry would be exposed to an overwhelming fire of artillery from behind the walls, to which we could make no reply, as there was not sufficient breadth of ground for even half a battery in line. I therefore strongly objected to advance any further until, by a reconnoissance, we could mature our plans with greater safety. The French general, however, was resolute, and I at length consented to follow his troops in support. He accordingly moved forward with his columns massed on the highroad, and when within 1700 or 1800 yards of the forts managed to bring a few guns to the front, with which he opened fire. The enemy responded with vigour; but, fortunately for the French, the range was too great to be effective, otherwise their loss would have been heavy indeed. General de Montauban at last recognised the futility of the attempt, and withdrew his force.

[Extract from a private letter from Sir Hope Grant:—

“On the day of our taking the forts, half an hour afterwards it began to rain most heavily, and we were quite shut up. We could not get our guns along, and if it had commenced earlier in the day, we must have stuck, and probably have left our guns for the enemy to get possession of. I had only a small portion of Sir R. Napier’s division. He is truly a first-rate fellow, and has the fear of God in his heart. He has been of more use to me in this campaign than any one. He has such determination and decision, and puts his trust in the right place.”]

On the morning of the 13th August we carefully inspected the position. The river Peiho ran parallel to the road, and at a perpendicular distance from our right flank of about a mile. A watercourse likewise flowed alongside the road. This was bridged, and I then rode up to the river-bank, where the site proved at a much higher elevation, and far sounder than in the direction of our original advance. In fact, we found that, by throwing bridges over several little intervening streams, we could march on an extended front up to the very walls of the fort of Tang-ku.

I am sorry to say that, during the fight, two of our men, with several coolies, were taken prisoners as they were conveying a cart with rum to the 2d

Division by the track across the salt-marsh. The mishap occurred owing to the carelessness of the Europeans, who had not exerted themselves to keep up with the column, and were captured by some of the Tartar cavalry who had attacked Sir Robert Napier.

[In a journal of the operations kept by an officer on Sir Hope Grant's staff, the following entry occurs, characteristic of the nation with which we were at war :—

*August 8th.*—A mandarin brought a letter for Lord Elgin this morning from the governor-general of the province, saying they wished for peace, but recommended us to keep off, as they were very strong.

This same nation, who at a later date violated the laws of nations and of humanity by murdering some of our envoys,<sup>1</sup> captured during our advance on Sinho several enlisted coolies, actually assisting an army of foreigners against their own countrymen. The instant execution of the captives could not have been possibly condemned; but the Chinese merely cut off their tails—a mark of degradation—and sent them back to us under a flag of truce.—H. K.]

The 14th of August was a hot dry day; and at an early hour, all our preparations having been completed, the British and French troops filed across the bridges, and were deployed in two lines. The enemy opened on us from the other side of the river with

<sup>1</sup> See p. 157.

some guns, in two junks, hauled up on the mud near a village called Ta-leang-teze, close to the bank on the other side, and with a battery on some rising ground, about 1200 yards distant from us. Our guns opening upon them soon silenced their fire, and Captain Willes,<sup>1</sup> Flag-Captain of Admiral Hope, crossed the river with a few men, and spiked the guns in the village.

The two Armstrong and the two 9-pounder batteries then came into action, and with two French batteries, 36 guns in all, opened fire upon the fort. The enemy's intrenchments were traced in the form of a square, one face of which rested on the river, and the other three were strengthened with a crenelated wall, with two wide ditches in front. Our attack was directed against the side of the work at right angles to the river, where the ditches and walls were of weaker profile. The heavy fire from our 36 guns soon knocked the intrenchment to pieces; and by advancing by alternate batteries up to within 350 yards—a movement which was skilfully executed by the officer commanding the Royal Artillery, Brigadier Crofton<sup>2</sup>—the enemy's pieces were dismounted, and their parapets ruined. The flags with which the walls had at first been bedecked were fast vanishing. One brave fellow mounted on the battlements, and proudly waved a red banner in the air, until a shot

<sup>1</sup> Now Admiral Sir George Willes, G.C.B.

<sup>2</sup> Major-General Crofton. Died 1863.

from one of our guns struck him, and he disappeared. Meanwhile some companies of the 1st Royals and 60th Rifles crept through some sedges along the banks of the river, reached the foot of the fort, and succeeded in forcing their way in. An entrance once effected, the Chinese abandoned the whole of their works, turned, and fled.

The French met with obstinate resistance at the point they had selected for their attack, a little to our left; but, gallantly led by Colonel Schmitz,<sup>1</sup> the French chief of the staff, they scaled the walls about the same time as ourselves. Ten guns in good condition fell into our hands. One of them which had been troubling us considerably was found dismounted by a shot from an Armstrong gun, and around it were lying thirteen dead Chinamen. Our two rocket batteries were also used with great effect. The enemy on the other side of the river fired the same sort of missiles at us, with an arrow attached to them. Their range was great, and they were well directed, but they did us no harm. During the engagement Sir John Michel had his horse killed under him. We were now well sheltered in the large village of Tang-ku, which lay within the enceinte of the works. I directed Sir Robert Napier to occupy it with his division, and from the roof of the house wherein he lived we could make out

<sup>1</sup> Served as General Schmitz under General Trochu during the early part of the siege of Paris in 1870.

the distant outline of the Taku forts. I was convinced that the capture of the small upper northern work would entail the surrender of the three others, and I determined to reconnoitre it carefully, availing myself of the assistance of Sir Robert Napier, whose opinion was, as an engineer officer, particularly valuable. In Tang-ku we found a number of capital boats, which were very useful to us in bridging the river.

The next day I visited our poor wounded fellows, whom I found doing well, and comfortably cared for in the village of Tang-ku.

*Despatch from Lord ELGIN.*

THE GRANADA, 16th August 1860.

MY DEAR GRANT,—The Chinese authorities are very desirous to put a stop to further military operations. I have received three despatches from them on the subject. As I am of opinion that the forts should be in our hands, and the Peiho river opened before their terms are accepted, I shall do what I can to keep things going till you are ready to effect these objects. But of course it becomes every day more difficult for me to do so. My last despatches from the Governor-General<sup>1</sup> inform me that an Imperial Commissioner is on his way from Pekin.—Yours very sincerely,  
ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.

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<sup>1</sup> Of the province of Pechili.







## CHAPTER XVII.

CHINA WAR (*continued*).

DESCRIPTION OF THE SMALL NORTH TAKU FORT—PETITIONS FOR PEACE—GENERAL DE MONTAUBAN'S PLAN OF ATTACK—HIS REMONSTRANCE AGAINST SIR HOPE GRANT'S SCHEME, TO WHICH HE FINALLY YIELDS UNDER PROTEST—CANNONADE—EXPLOSION OF MAGAZINE—STORMING AND CAPTURE OF THE TAKU FORT—BRAVERY OF THE CHINESE—CAPTURE OF THE LARGE NORTH FORT—SURRENDER OF THE SOUTHERN FORTS—SIR HOPE GRANT PROCEEDS TO TIEN-TSIN—INHABITANTS CONCILIATED—CHINESE REBELS THREATEN SHANGHAI—ARRIVAL OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES AT TIEN-TSIN—COMFORTABLE QUARTERS—REMARKS BY THE EDITOR ON THE PLAN OF ATTACK ON THE TAKU FORTS—SIR HOPE GRANT AND SIR ROBERT NAPIER.

*Journal.*—ON the 20th August I made a reconnaissance in company with Sir Robert Napier, and advanced to within 600 yards of the north fort without being molested. I then sent forward Mr Parkes and Captain Graham,<sup>1</sup> Royal Engineers, with a flag of truce, with a view of demanding a surrender; but the Chinese showed no signs of yielding, and my two envoys were compelled to retire. The fort was enclosed with the usual crenelated walls, and with two broad ditches. On the space between the walls

<sup>1</sup> Now Lieut.-General Sir Gerald Graham, V.C., G.C.M.G.

and the ditches, corresponding to our berm, the ground was thickly studded with upright bamboo spikes. The adjacent country consisted of a salt-marsh, with innumerable broad deep water-courses intersecting it in all directions. But following a winding course, however, ground could be picked out sufficiently sound to admit of the passage of artillery. I arranged with Sir Robert Napier where the ditches were to be bridged, and where the batteries for our heavy guns were to be placed. A bridge of boats was also nearly completed across the Peiho, when the Chinese, discovering our purpose, established a battery to oppose the passage; whereupon General de Montauban sent a force across which succeeded in driving the enemy away. The whole of the Tartar cavalry, so far as we could ascertain, had crossed over to the right bank, by means of a bridge of boats in their possession, lower down.

Flags of truce now came in to us from the Viceroy Hang-foo; and the unfortunate inhabitants sent deputations begging for the cessation of hostilities. As these overtures in no way emanated from the Emperor, Lord Elgin wrote a letter to the viceroy saying that it was now too late to think of peace. This letter was taken across the river under a flag of truce, by Mr Parkes and Augustus Anson, my aide-de-camp. Hang-foo, to our surprise, sent back

two of our men and thirteen coolies who had been captured by the Tartars.<sup>1</sup>

As a proof of the swampy condition of the country at the time of which I am now writing, I may mention that some days before the river had risen so high that the ground in the vicinity of our camp was flooded, and the headquarter tents of the 1st division were a foot under water.

The French general now proposed to me that both our armies should cross the river, and attack the town of Taku, which was intrenched, and the large southern fort on the right bank. This plan, upon further consideration, appeared to me very hazardous, as our right flank would thereby be uncovered and exposed to the attacks of cavalry; while even were the main fort, with its numerous and powerful armament, to fall into our hands, the remaining defences would give us much trouble. I therefore determined to adhere to my original intention, and endeavoured to convince General de Montauban that by gaining possession of the upper northern fort, we should be able to command all the others. In vain: he remained unmoved, but told me that if I was determined to carry out my plan, he of course would give me his assistance—but that he should feel obliged to write a protest against it. Accordingly, in course of time, I received the following letter:—

<sup>1</sup> See p. 137.

(*Translation.*)<sup>1</sup>

BIVOUAC AT SIN-HO, 20th August 1860.

*Answer to the Memorandum.*

1. The attack of the forts situated on the left bank appears to me completely useless, as was admitted by General Grant himself three days ago—when we agreed to pay no heed to these forts, which will fall in the natural course of events, as soon as those which are on the right bank, and in which are combined every means of defence, shall have given way. Consequently, all our active measures should be directed against the southern forts. Every attempt against the northern forts will only result in retarding the operations of the sea forces.

2. The northern exterior fort being about 3000 metres [3280 yards] from the inner fort, the fire of the gunboats will not attain the proposed object.

As for silencing the southern forts, the gunboats will encounter in the river obstacles which will not allow them to approach sufficiently close to obtain this result. The true attack of the southern forts is by land, and in this case only can it be supposed that the navy will be able to assist. To leave the gunboats exposed to the fire of the southern forts, without distracting their attention on the land side, appears to me a radical error, opposed to the most elementary rules of the art of war.

3. Considering how great must be the distance of the gunboats from the inner northern fort, I cannot understand how they can open fire against it.

4. River communication between the land and the sea forces appears to me impossible, even with the aid of gunboats, so long as the southern forts hold out; and, in order to clear the river of these obstacles on the northern bank,

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<sup>1</sup> The original is now in my possession.—H. K.

these obstacles must be assumed to be at such a distance from the southern forts that the workmen would be out of range—a fact which I cannot for one moment admit.

To sum up, there are two alternatives: either the northern forts will be defended or they will be abandoned. In the first case, to carry out any attack against them will not seriously affect the solution of the question—will not even give any satisfactory result to the navy. The loss of life involved will, perhaps, be small, but useless. In the second case, of what use will be their occupation?

At all times the southern forts have been considered as the true basis of the power of defence, and it is in attacking these forts in concert with the land forces that our brave allied navy will find an opportunity for a glorious revenge.

Notwithstanding that I consider the proposed plan as contrary to what we had previously agreed on, and opposed to my ideas of the method of conducting this operation of war, I shall nevertheless send a French land force to work conjointly with our allies, and to prove by its presence my desire to co-operate in all the operations.

The object of my observations is, above all, to free myself from military responsibility with reference to my own Government, in the event of its judging the question from the same point of view as that from which I myself regard it.

*The General of Division Commanding in chief,*  
C. DE MONTAUBAN.

I sent the following reply to General de Montauban's memorandum; but I did not alter my opinion, and I arranged that the attack should take place on the 21st August:—

HEADQUARTERS CAMP, SIN-HO,  
20th August 1860.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's memorandum of this date, which

embraces so many distinct points, that it becomes necessary to reply to it in detail.

Your Excellency observes that in the forts on the right bank are collected all the means of defence. To this I cannot assent; for, from personal observation, I find that the north forts do not only in themselves possess great means both of offence and defence, but also, from their position, their fire can sweep that part of the right bank along which an army must pass to attack the south forts. Nor can I see how their capture<sup>1</sup> would delay the operations of the army; for the bridge is being equally advanced across the Peiho, and is not being delayed by this measure, whilst the bridges which have been constructed over the creeks beyond Tang-ku will be ample for both French and English.

It has never been proposed by the admirals to bring the fire of the gunboats to bear on the inner forts; on the contrary, it was expressly stipulated that they should fire only on the outer forts.

I fully agree with your Excellency in thinking that it would be a grave error to expose the gunboats to the fire of the south forts without any co-operation from the land forces; but I have yet to learn that this is proposed to be done. It has not been part of my plan, of which I shall treat more fully below.

I think it most probable that when the north forts

<sup>1</sup> *I.e.*, the capture of the north forts.



are in our possession, the obstacles in the river can be removed; but, of course, this may be doubtful. At all events, we ought to be able to silence any fire they can bring to bear on our working parties. In short, the case resolves itself to this: the bridges over the Peiho will not be completed for three or four days at the soonest. Should we wait for this, and make the great movement down the right bank, the troops would be exposed to such severe fire from the north forts, that the losses would be increased to a very serious extent—losses not only serious, but unnecessary. Nor could the fleets act with any better effect by this plan. I imagine rather the reverse.

I have already expressed my opinion that the co-operation of the navy is not a military necessity—their object can only be to harass the enemy and divert his attention. No risk should therefore be run by them of losing vessels. It is true that after the capture of Tang-ku I mentioned my opinion that a move to the south bank would be good, but that was before any reconnoissance had been made to the front; and it is still my wish to cross the river as soon as the bridge is completed, and co-operate with your Excellency in the attack of the south forts.

Much as I regret that my opinion should differ from that of your Excellency, I must still remind you that I never agreed to any plan to which the present is opposed; and I can only repeat that my

object is to cause the forts to fall speedily and with little loss, and to avoid that hazard which every day's delay at this late season of the year must incur, when it is taken into consideration how much yet remains to be done by the allies before the end of the season.—I have the honour, &c.,

J. HOPE GRANT.

The nature of the ground prevented our drawing up a large force, and our total strength amounted to 2500 men, in addition to which General de Montauban stated he would contribute 1000<sup>1</sup> and two field-batteries. Our heavy guns were placed in position, and consisted of four 8-inch guns, two 8-inch howitzers, two 32-pounders, and three 8-inch mortars. We also had in the field two Armstrong batteries, two 9-pounder batteries, and one rocket battery.

At five o'clock on the morning of the 21st August, the enemy opened on us a heavy fire from the two upper forts, one on either side of the river. Our guns quickly responded, and a cannonade from our forty-seven pieces was maintained with great vigour for three hours. Our shot fell thick upon the doomed fort, and at about 6 o'clock A.M., an 8-inch shell falling on their powder-magazine blew it up with a terrific explosion. For some time the fort was so

<sup>1</sup> Such is the number stated in Sir Hope Grant's diary. Other sources of information, however, lead to the conclusion that the actual strength of their infantry on this occasion did not exceed 400 of all ranks; and Sir Hope himself, on being appealed to, was inclined to consider the latter estimate correct.—H. K.

shrouded in dense clouds of vapour and smoke, that it appeared to have been entirely destroyed; but by degrees it cleared away,—the enemy recommenced fire, and seemed determined not to give up the place without a desperate struggle. Inside the work was a high cavalier from which heavy guns were opened on us, but we soon succeeded in silencing them. The general direction of our attack was against the enemy's rear—a fact on which they had by no means calculated, as they were thus almost entirely exposed to our fire.

Our marines now brought up the pontoons for the purpose of forming a bridge across the broad ditches. They were baffled in their endeavours owing to the heavy matchlock-fire from the walls, and sixteen of them were knocked over. The French were more successful. By means of scaling-ladders carried by Chinese coolies, they constructed a way across the ditch. The Chinamen jumped into the water up to their necks, and supported the ladders upon their hands and shoulders, to enable the men to get across. These poor fellows behaved gallantly, and though some of them were shot down they never flinched in the least.

The allied forces now pushed forward. Our storming-party consisted of the 44th and 67th Regiments. Some of our men swam across the ditch, and others got over with the French. On reaching the escarp they were sheltered from fire. The French placed

their ladders against the parapet and endeavoured to get over; but the defenders offered a vigorous resistance with their swords and pikes, and knocked them off the crest as soon as they showed themselves. At last my aide-de-camp, Anson, gallantly succeeded in clambering across a drawbridge which had been hauled up over the ditch in front of my force, and with his sword cut the supporting ropes. In this operation he was nobly aided by Lieut.-Colonel Mann of the Royal Engineers. The bridge fell into its proper position, and afforded to our men a means of crossing. Some of our officers perceived a small breach which we had effected in the wall close to the gate, and here Lieutenant Burslem of the 67th Regiment forced his way in, but was driven back. Lieutenant Rogers<sup>1</sup> was the next to enter, but was wounded.

The French, who behaved as gallantly as possible—worthy of the great nation to which they belonged—entered the breach at the same time as our men, and their great ambition was to plant their standard first upon the walls; but young Chaplin<sup>2</sup> of the 67th Regiment, who carried the colours of his corps, outdid them, and placed the British standard upon the highest part of the works. He was wounded in three places.

Our combined navies had brought up gunboats to within 1800 yards of the two forts at the mouth of


<sup>1</sup> Now Major-General Rogers, V.C., C.B.

<sup>2</sup> Now Major-General Chaplin, V.C., C.B.



*Sir H. Grant.*

BOMBARDMENT OF THE NORTH TAFTI BOUT. — P. 111. — 1811. — 1812. — 1813. — 1814. — 1815. — 1816. — 1817. — 1818. — 1819. — 1820. — 1821. — 1822. — 1823. — 1824. — 1825. — 1826. — 1827. — 1828. — 1829. — 1830. — 1831. — 1832. — 1833. — 1834. — 1835. — 1836. — 1837. — 1838. — 1839. — 1840. — 1841. — 1842. — 1843. — 1844. — 1845. — 1846. — 1847. — 1848. — 1849. — 1850. — 1851. — 1852. — 1853. — 1854. — 1855. — 1856. — 1857. — 1858. — 1859. — 1860. — 1861. — 1862. — 1863. — 1864. — 1865. — 1866. — 1867. — 1868. — 1869. — 1870. — 1871. — 1872. — 1873. — 1874. — 1875. — 1876. — 1877. — 1878. — 1879. — 1880. — 1881. — 1882. — 1883. — 1884. — 1885. — 1886. — 1887. — 1888. — 1889. — 1890. — 1891. — 1892. — 1893. — 1894. — 1895. — 1896. — 1897. — 1898. — 1899. — 1900.



the river and commenced firing. Their practice was excellent, and one of their shells exploded a large magazine in the lower fort on the left bank of the river. The damage inflicted we were unable at first to ascertain. The poor Chinese now had a sad time of it: they had fought desperately and with great bravery, few of them apparently having attempted to escape. Indeed they could hardly have effected their retreat by the other side of the fort—the wall was very high, and the ground below bristled with innumerable sharp bamboo stakes. Then intervened a broad, deep ditch, another row of stakes, and, finally, another large ditch. The only regular exit, the gate, was barred by ourselves. Numbers were killed, and I saw three poor wretches impaled upon the stakes; and yet, notwithstanding all the difficulties which I have pointed out, a considerable number succeeded in getting off.<sup>1</sup> The upper fort on the southern side of the river was completely commanded by the guns on the northern bank, only about 400 yards distant. The enemy was therefore compelled to abandon it. The fort we had captured presented a terrible appearance of devastation, and was filled with the dead and the dying. The explosion of the magazine had ruined a large portion of the interior; many of the guns were dismounted, and the parapets battered to pieces. Seventeen of

<sup>1</sup> It was afterwards ascertained that the garrison of this little fort was 500 men, of whom about 100 succeeded in effecting their escape.

our men were killed, and 184, including 21 officers, wounded. Sir Robert Napier, whose conduct was very gallant, was struck by shot in five places, but was not actually wounded. Shortly after the fall of the work, Lord Elgin rode down and examined it.<sup>1</sup>

During the early part of the day numerous war-flags had waved defiantly over the other intrenchments, but about this time we suddenly perceived that they had been replaced by white banners. I sent Mr Parkes and Major Sarel, one of my acting aides-de-camp, to summon the defenders of the other northern fort to surrender; but the garrison returned a very insulting answer, to the effect that only one of their works had fallen, and there still remained four more to be captured. I therefore made arrangements with General Collineau, who commanded the French force, at once to proceed to the attack. With this view I moved two 8-inch guns up to within about 900 yards of the work, and caused three heavy guns which had been captured in the cavalier, and which were not more than 1600 yards distant, to be turned in the same direction. The French, however, would not wait for us, hurried forward, reached the fort without a shot being fired at them, marched in by one of the large embrasures, and thus<sup>2</sup> the place was

<sup>1</sup> See also the very brilliant account of the storming of the Taku forts, in Lord Wolseley's Narrative of the China War, p. 132.

<sup>2</sup> About two hours after the capture of the first fort.



captured without resistance. The fortification was strong towards the sea, but weak on the land side, by which an entrance had been effected, and unenclosed, save by a thin wall, which was not shot-proof. In it were two cavaliers; and it also completely commanded the large fort on the right side of the river about 200 yards distant: and though this latter work was likewise strengthened with two cavaliers, a few shot from our last capture would have silenced all their guns. This showed that I was justified in assuming beforehand that the plan of attack which I had projected would prove successful. About 2000 prisoners fell into our hands, and much to their surprise they were allowed to go away in peace. We likewise captured some enormous brass ordnance, and several of the iron guns lost by our navy during their severe engagement of 1859. We now sent flags of truce across the river to Hang-foo<sup>1</sup> by Mr Parkes and Anson, and demanded the surrender of all the remaining forts, with their guns and other military stores. After a long delay this was agreed to, upon condition of the inhabitants being protected, and their property spared, to which, of course, we instantly assented.

That afternoon heavy rain commenced to fall, which ere long swamped the whole country, rendering the task of removing our guns a difficult

<sup>1</sup> Governor-general of the province.

one. Several sank up to their axle-trees, and had to be left for the night.

The next day, 22d August, I sent over Sir Robert Napier to take possession of the forts on the right bank. They were all handed over to him in due form, including 600 guns. The same day Admiral Hope broke away the chains and barriers which had been placed across the river. He was now able to get his gunboats up, and on the 23d he started for Tien - tsin, about sixty miles distant. He met with no opposition, and on approaching the town he found a deputation inviting us to occupy it. I accordingly sent forward the 1st Foot (the Royals), the 67th Regiment, and an Armstrong battery of artillery, under Brigadier Staveley, to take possession of it; and on the 24th August I myself started up the Peiho river in the Granada for the same destination, which we reached in four hours' time. Before setting out I left a small garrison in the large southern fort. Tien - tsin was a much larger town than we had anticipated.

About two and a half miles south of the town, and on the river-banks, were two strong newly-constructed forts, but their guns had been removed, and were afterwards found buried close at hand. On 26th August we procured some Tartar ponies by the aid of Mr Parkes, and rode out into the adjacent country to select a site for an encampment. Our choice fell on some ground near the

temple where Lord Elgin had signed the treaty in 1858. The building was turned into a commissariat "godown."<sup>1</sup> The Tartar general, Sang-kolin-sin, had constructed a crenelated wall round Tien-tsin, which, with a broad ditch, he had expected would keep us at bay. But after our easy conquest of all his other forts, he thought it wiser to retreat forthwith with his army, and the place was denuded of troops. The inhabitants at first were frightened; but finding that, so far from molesting them, we treated them with kindness, they soon gained courage, and brought us in plentiful supplies, amongst which were fine fat sheep weighing 70 or 80 lb. each, fat oxen, apples, pears, grapes, peaches, and the great luxury of enormous blocks of ice.

Information reached us from Shanghai that the rebels intended to attack that town; so, on the 24th August, I sent the 44th Regiment from the Taku forts, under Brigadier Jephson, to strengthen the force at Shanghai. Lord Elgin and Baron Gros came to Tien-tsin, and we all three took up our quarters in an excellent clean house, the property of a wealthy and important grain merchant. Around the main building were courtyards, along the sides of which were ranged small rooms with the peculiar circular entrance, showing that they were the ladies' apartments. The couches inside were so constructed as to admit of fires being lit underneath them in

<sup>1</sup> A "godown" is a large storehouse.

winter. As may be supposed, extreme care was necessary in the indulgence of this luxury. The good people of the house seemed quite to approve of our having taken possession of their domicile.

[The following letters<sup>1</sup> may here be appropriately introduced, as showing the light in which the China war was regarded by our English administrative authorities :—

CALCUTTA, Oct. 17, 1860.

MY DEAR SIR HOPE,—I was delighted to get your letter of 24th August, dated from the Taku Forts. . . . Those who know less than I have learned of the difficulties with which you have had to contend, . . . are still well aware that there have been difficulties, and that it is due to you that they have been surmounted. All sorts of rumours of divided councils—opposition on the part of the French, their intended withdrawal and sundry other threatenings, had reached me by a preceding mail; and I confess that, with the Crimea fresh in mind, I was anxious. . . . I am the more delighted at this [success], because from the beginning I have always expected that our risk of failure or of imperfect success lay much more with our allies than with our enemies. . . . As to the military questions, I have nothing to say but to congratulate you heartily. The Government at home have not yet done with reproaches, direct or implied, against me for the scale of excess and extravagance, as they think it, on which the expedition was organised; but I don't grudge you a single man or rupee, and you have given me the best possible reply to any further fault-finding on the subject.

I wish you would let me know (quite confidentially) how you have found the behaviour of the native troops and their

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<sup>1</sup> Not previously published.

officers, and at what value you estimate their usefulness on service such as yours. Have you any misgivings about them on any score? Is there any screw loose with them? Could we, necessity arising, turn them to any account in Egypt or Syria, or anywhere else short of Europe?

Believe me, dear Sir Hope, ever yours sincerely, CANNING.

From an officer holding a high official position :—

10th Oct. 1860.

MY DEAR GRANT,— . . . As I told you before, the whole business [of the Chinese war] is unpopular at home, for more reasons than on account of its fearful expense, which of itself makes the hair of the Chancellor of the Exchequer stand on end. The sooner, therefore, all is brought to a successful close, the more credit will be given to all concerned.

Poor Outram has come home. I saw him . . . very soon after his arrival, looking *wretchedly* ill . . . We are very anxious just now for some news of your proceedings, in consequence of a report having been current in the city of your having met with some disaster!! It is wonderful how these rumours originate. No doubt they are often invented for stock-jobbing purposes, but once or twice they have proved true. For instance, they say that the last Peiho affair was reported in the city from Russia weeks before anything was heard direct. . . . —Sincerely yours,

Extract from private letter from Sir Hope :—

Near TIEN-TSIN, 25th August 1860.

. . . The French are naturally very down in the mouth, but they behave very well, and are most civil. Their commissioner with me, Monsieur Reboul,

whose mother was an Englishwoman, is a most gentlemanlike, nice fellow. The best understanding appears to exist between the two nations, and the way in which they knock under to us in every way surprises me. Baron Gros is very pleasant and gentlemanlike.]

*Some additional remarks on the plan of attack on the Taku forts. By the Editor.*

General de Montauban was so strongly opposed to the projected plan of attack, that he declined to give any countenance to the undertaking beyond assisting with a single battalion of 400 men of all ranks, with a feeble force of artillery<sup>1</sup>—our own force so employed amounting to 2500 men. Moreover, in order to mark still further his disapproval, he did not appear on the scene of conflict—as I am informed by English staff officers who were eye-witnesses—until after the fight for the north fort had been brought to a successful conclusion. He was then unprovided with his sword.

Seldom indeed have commanders been willing to assume the amount of responsibility which Sir Hope Grant so readily took upon himself. Had there been

<sup>1</sup> After careful investigation and numerous inquiries, I am led to the conclusion that the French furnished one field-battery, of 4 guns only, and not two field-batteries, as promised the previous day by General de Montauban. Moreover, Captain (now Major-General) Desborough informed me, "Assistance from General Collineau was asked to support his storming columns, and two howitzers of my own battery, under Sir John Campbell, were placed so as best to attain this object."

the slightest miscarriage, had the result been even indecisive, the military reputation of the projector would have received a death-blow. The war had never been popular in England; and an outburst of censure would have arisen, based on the fact that our allies had emphatically condemned the course we had adopted. It must be remembered that in 1860 there was attributed to the French a knowledge of, and aptitude in, the science of war which was supposed to leave every other nation far in the rear. On the other hand, in the event of a successful issue, the hazards attendant on the assumption of responsibility would be forgotten in the feeling that "all's well that ends well"—were, in point of fact, forgotten in the anxiety to smooth over the susceptibilities of our allies. I trust, therefore, it will not be unbecoming in me to enlarge upon one or two points connected with the most critical operation in the campaign. The works south of the Peiho were in themselves much stronger; they had numerous guns mounted on cavaliers; they were surrounded by two, and in places by three, wet ditches, together with abattis and pointed stakes, the escarps were 15 feet high, and the parapets were literally bristling with cannon, and enormously thick. From the river-side the only means of approach was across a muddy open expanse; and General de Montauban himself admitted that an attack from this direction was not to be thought of. But supposing that we had split up

our army, and had brought the greater part of it across the Peiho in the very face of the enemy—thus repeating on a small scale the operations of the Russians at Friedland—our next step must have been the capture of the works about Suku, after which we must have marched against one of the main southern forts, each of which was far more susceptible of defence from the guns on the opposite side of the river, than were the north forts capable of being aided by the south. Moreover, in our advance over the open country, we should have been especially liable to be surrounded by the numerous Tartar cavalry, which had so nearly performed that feat in front of Sin-ho, and which we knew had crossed the Peiho in a body. Lastly, it was made manifest that the fall of the southern works would not have involved the surrender of those on the other bank.

Let us now review the advantages of the plan of attack which was actually carried out. The works assailed were of a comparatively less formidable construction. By means of our temporary road we were enabled to make a detour, whereby we avoided to a great extent the fire from the opposite bank. Under any circumstances we could only have been exposed to this fire while crossing the portion of ground between the upper and lower north forts. General de Montauban miscalculated this interval in fixing it at 3280 yards. A reference to the map shows it to have been not more than 1500 yards. With these two



forts in our possession, we should command the similar ones on the other side; we should be able to enfilade completely the two long faces of the large southern fort; and, finally, we should take in reverse the sea-defences of the principal northern work, from which direction alone the Chinese expected to be attacked.<sup>1</sup> Every single one of these anticipations was fulfilled to the letter. The capture of the weakest of the four largest works was followed by the almost instant submission of the remainder; and if success be a test of sound reasoning, it can hardly be denied that the step which Sir Hope resolved upon, in opposition to the counsels of the French, was based on the soundest military wisdom.

*Sir Hope Grant and Sir Robert Napier.*

In the original work from which the present chapter has been compiled—‘Incidents in the China War,’ published in 1875—I omitted, in accordance with Sir Hope Grant’s express wish, every allusion to the question which had been once mooted as to whether any share of credit could be justly assigned to Sir Robert Napier for the selection of the north Taku forts as the point of attack instead of the southern

<sup>1</sup> I was told by Sir Hope Grant that during the first China war in 1842 there was a current statement—which seems to have been revived for the present occasion—to the effect that, in a subsequently captured Chinese despatch, it was mentioned that “the ignorant barbarians, not knowing that guns could not be fired against an object behind them, came upon us in rear, and thus rendered all our cannon useless.”

works. Both these Generals have passed away: I cannot ignore the contingency that some record of the life of Lord Napier may be published, and I must face the possibility that the above question may be therein resuscitated. Therefore justice now seems to require that I should lay before the reader certain extracts from Sir Hope's Journal on the subject.

In July 1868 he writes: ". . . At a great dinner given to Sir Robert Napier [on his return from Abyssinia] by the East India United Service Club, the chairman, Sir Bartle Frere, in his speech in honour of Sir Robert, made use of these words:—

“‘Again, in that celebrated expedition to China . . . we have yet to learn how, when the oldest warriors in the force stood appalled at the immense strength of the Chinese position, and looked for a vast expenditure of life as likely to occur, Sir Robert Napier by his skill and science discovered the weak points of the Chinese position, and the strong forts which they held fell in a single day.’

Now, it so happened that the plan of attack had been formed by me in conjunction with Admiral Hope before Sir Robert's men joined the force; and, as I stated before, I had great difficulty in carrying out my proposal with General de Montauban, who wished to attack the forts from quite a different direction. Sir Robert Napier was no doubt an Engineer officer, and the day before the attack I took him round with me, and we then arranged the position for the batteries, and it so happened that his division on

that day was the attacking division. [Sir Hope clearly means that it was for duty according to the regular roster.] I was also especially glad that this duty fell to Sir Robert, as he was a Company's officer, and I was anxious that he should have an opportunity of showing his fitness for command, for there was naturally a little jealousy between the two services.

“However, this speech of Sir Bartle Frere . . . quite ignored the Commander-in-Chief of the China force, and assigned all the credit of the fall of the forts to Sir Robert Napier.”

Sir Hope then explains that certain friendly communications thereupon ensued, but that they were brought to a climax by the following letter to the ‘Times’ from his former aide-de-camp, Lieutenant-Colonel Anson, then M.P. for Bewdley:—

*Extracts.*

To the EDITOR of the ‘Times.’

SIR,—

I make no comparison between the China and Abyssinian expeditions, nor do I compare the honours awarded to their respective leaders. Both expeditions were equally well organised, well managed, and successful. The only difference was, that while Lord Napier of Magdala had the sole management of the expedition under his command, Sir Hope Grant had to consider the views and opinions not only of Lord Elgin and of the English admiral, but also of the French general with whom he was associated; and it must not be forgotten that Sir Hope Grant, having decided on the

best mode of attacking the Taku forts, took upon himself the responsibility of carrying out his plan of operations, notwithstanding the protest of the French general.

I can myself speak with confidence on this point, having, the night before the attack, spent some hours with Sir Hope Grant in General Montauban's tent.

In the China expedition, Sir Robert Napier had the command of a division, the responsible engineer-in-chief being Colonel Mann. What advice was given to Sir Hope Grant by his subordinate officers whom he may have consulted, it is not for me to say; but whatever may have been the detailed mode of attack, the rapid and comparatively bloodless success of the expedition, and the end therefrom resulting, was mainly due to Pehtang having been chosen as the landing-place, and to Sir Hope Grant having had the courage to persist in his own plan of operations despite the opposition of his colleague.

I am emboldened to write thus, having served many years under Sir Hope Grant, and feeling how hard it is that so eminent a person as Sir Bartle Frere, in his endeavour to add to the laurels of Lord Napier, should have, no doubt unintentionally, detracted from the merit due to Sir Hope Grant.—I remain, &c.

A. ANSON.

Sir Hope notes in his Journal: "The next day there appeared the following letter from Lord Napier himself, written in an excellent spirit, and very satisfactory."

*Extracts.*

To the EDITOR of the 'Times.'

SIR,—

I can safely say that no one could have been more distressed than both Sir Bartle Frere and myself that any remarks which fell from him should have appeared to detract

from the honour due to Sir Hope Grant, or be calculated to hurt the feelings of his friends.

The moment that the subject was brought to our notice, we simultaneously wrote to Sir Hope Grant to express our regret at what had been inferred from what Sir Bartle Frere had said. I explained to Sir Hope Grant that I had not particularly marked the interpretation that might be put on Sir Bartle Frere's speech, as I was at that time rather more occupied with my own. I wished subsequently to take an opportunity of noticing the subject, but I considered that after-dinner eulogies were not history, and that any particular allusion to Sir Bartle Frere's words would give them an importance which was never intended.

At the Mansion House [at a subsequent public dinner] I endeavoured to do honour to my old friend and commander, but unfortunately all my remarks could not have been audible to the reporter, as they were not fully given.

As Major Anson has brought the subject to notice, I am glad of the opportunity of saying that I quite agree with him that the landing at Pehtang was the great strategical point of the campaign, and no one will more willingly admit that the responsibility and success of the whole campaign belong to our distinguished and gallant commander, Sir Hope Grant.  
—Yours, &c. NAPIER OF MAGDALA.

It seems almost superfluous to pile up additional evidence, and yet I cannot forbear adding that General Sir Robert Biddulph, during the China war Military Secretary to Sir Hope Grant, assures me that in the early part of July 1860, and while Sir Robert Napier was still on the high seas, Sir Hope frequently discussed the plan of attack, and emphatically decided on the north fort as the selected point.

Sir Hope's friendship with Sir Robert Napier con-

tinued of the warmest nature up to the day of his death. He was no whit behindhand in the appreciation of the military abilities, and in respect for the rectitude and kindly disposition, which caused Field-Marshal Lord Napier to be admired and beloved by all grades in the British army.—H. K.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

CHINA WAR (*continued*).

MARCH FROM TIEN-TSIN TO HO-SI-WU—CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS AT LATTER PLACE—CHINESE OPEN NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE—MONTAUBAN'S DOCILE LETTER—ADVANCE TOWARDS CHAN-CHIA-WAN—SYMPTOMS OF TREACHERY—HAIRBREADTH ESCAPE OF COLONEL WALKER'S PARTY—ENGAGEMENT OF CHAN-CHIA-WAN—PROBYN'S CHARGE—DEMAND FOR THE RELEASE OF THE ENVOYS—SIR ROBERT NAPIER ORDERED UP FROM HO-SI-WU—ENGAGEMENT AT PA-LE-CHIAO—SIR HOPE GRANT NEARLY CAPTURED BY TARTAR CAVALRY—CHARGE OF ENGLISH CAVALRY—GALLANT FRENCH ATTACK ON CANAL BRIDGE—CHINESE OVERTURES FOR PEACE—PROBYN'S RECONNAISSANCE—GENERAL IGNATIEFF LENDS A MAP OF PEKIN—DIVERSITY OF OPINION BETWEEN ALLIED COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF AS TO TRUE POINT OF ATTACK OF PEKIN—ARRIVAL OF SIR ROBERT NAPIER'S DIVISION AT TANG-CHOW—PROBYN'S SECOND RECONNAISSANCE—THE ALLIED ULTIMATUM—LETTERS FROM PARKES—FURTHER ADVANCE—FRENCH "MISS" OUR TRACK—THEY ARE DISCOVERED AT THE SUMMER PALACE—SIR HOPE VISITS SUMMER PALACE—LOOTING—CHINESE RELEASE THE ENVOYS—THEIR SAD STORY.

[THE following unsigned memorandum, apparently forwarded to Sir Hope by Mr Sidney Herbert in 1860, illustrates the relative positions of the War Office and the Horse-Guards at the time:—

The despatches sent home by Sir Hope Grant addressed to the Secretary of State for War are, it appears, sent under cover to the General Commanding in Chief. The result is,

great delay occurs in the receipt by Mr Sidney Herbert of Sir Hope Grant's despatches. It has always been usual for an officer commanding an army in the field to send his despatches to the Secretary of State for War *direct* to the War Office. If Sir Hope Grant would follow this course in future, it would prevent the delay which at present results from the despatches intended for the Secretary of State for War being sent in the first instance under cover to the Horse-Guards.

WAR OFFICE, 27th November 1860.]

*Journal.*—On 31st August, three Commissioners arrived<sup>1</sup> from Peking with a view to stop our advance. They gave out that they were intrusted with full powers; but this turned out to be false. They were only mandarins of small importance; and therefore, when on the 7th September they brought forward pretended terms of a convention, Lord Elgin and Baron Gros instantly broke off negotiations, stating their resolution not to conclude a treaty before reaching Tang-chow, fifteen miles from Peking.

On 8th September we recommenced our march with a small mixed force of 800 infantry, 600 cavalry, and two batteries of artillery. Lord Elgin and I set out, and overtook them on the 9th. During the third night after our start the rain came down in a deluge, whereupon nearly the whole of our drivers, Chinese cartmen, together with their mules and ponies, conveying our baggage, absconded. This delayed us for a day, until with great difficulty

<sup>1</sup> At Tien-tsin.



we obtained water transport. On the 13th September we reached the pretty little town of Ho-si-wu, half-way between Peking and Tien-tsin, and on the 16th I was joined by Sir John Michel's division, raising our force to 2300 infantry, a company and a half of engineers, three batteries of artillery, and the whole of the cavalry. The French with 1200 men marched into the town the day after ourselves. Sir Robert Napier's division remained behind to hold Tien-tsin, forty miles to our rear; and as there was good water communication the whole way, I arranged with Admiral Hope to establish a depot at Ho-si-wu, in furtherance of which end he sent us up a flotilla of junks as transport. I also left a regiment, three 6-pounder guns, and 25 sowars to hold the place.

From Sir Robert Napier to Sir Hope Grant :—

14th September 1860.  
[From TIEN-TSIN.]

MY DEAR GENERAL,—

I send you a copy of a letter received from Mr Turner about boats. I therefore immediately ordered all that were required to be seized, and put a sentry on the bridge to stop all ascent of boats until our wants shall have been supplied. The Chinese authorities evade all our demands by saying that this or that is out of their province, or that it is the prefect who must order it. I then sent for the prefect, who refused to come and visit me on the ground of his high rank. Of course if that line of proceeding is permitted, you will receive no assistance, or rather every obstruction. . . .

The second set of coolies supplied for the 60th Rifles deserted in the city [of Tien-tsin], I understand, and some

bad feeling is reported as having been shown by the populists of a suburb. It all seems to indicate that the officials are determined to put as many obstacles in your way as possible.

Of course it could not be permitted that a petty magistrate should refuse to attend the summons of the Commander of British troops: the Chinese will begin to order us out of the town. So I have sent an escort for the prefect, and if he is not brought to his senses by civil treatment, I shall pitch a tent for him, and beg him to reside here near me.

Believe me, my dear General, yours very truly, R. NAPIER.

On 11th September despatches arrived for Lord Elgin and Baron Gros from Peking, and Messrs Parkes and Wade, the latter consul and interpreter, started off on September 13th with an escort to meet the Commissioners at Matow, twelve miles from Ho-si-wu, but found the latter had gone back to Tang-chow, to which place our envoys followed them. They proved to be mandarins, one of whom was Tsai, Prince of I, a nephew of the Emperor's, and a conference was held, which lasted until past midnight; but the Chinese had to make their way back to Peking to obtain the Imperial authority. Parkes and Wade returned to us on the 15th, stating that they had seen about 2000 Tartar cavalry drawn up alongside the road for their inspection, and that they had been treated very civilly. The Commissioners through them prayed us not to advance any further with our army. Lord Elgin sent word in reply that we must march to within five miles of Tang-chow, but would

not exceed this limit. To this concession the mandarins agreed with great reluctance. On 17th September we marched for Matow, twelve miles distant, Lord Elgin and Baron Gros remaining behind at Hosi-wu for a few days. The roads were heavy, and the baggage did not arrive until very late. The entire country appeared to be in a high state of cultivation. The crops of millet and maize were so lofty as to close in the view to within a distance of 20 yards to a man on horseback. Parkes and Loch,<sup>1</sup> one of Lord Elgin's staff, Mr De Norman,<sup>2</sup> Colonel Walker,<sup>3</sup> Quartermaster-General, and Mr Thompson, a commissariat officer, had gone on ahead to Tang-chow<sup>4</sup> to select a site for encampment and to procure supplies.

The following somewhat docile letter<sup>5</sup> is in amusing contrast to that addressed by the same writer on 16th July (see p. 76):—

QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DE HO-SI-WU,  
le 16 7<sup>bre</sup> 1860.

MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,—Nous sommes dans une singulière position qui n'est ni la guerre ni la paix.

Si nous faisons la guerre, nous courons le risque de voir le vide se faire devant nous et Pékin devenir une ville déserte

<sup>1</sup> Now Sir Henry Loch, G.C.B., Governor and Lord High Commissioner, Cape of Good Hope.

<sup>2</sup> Subsequently treacherously captured by the Chinese. Died whilst a prisoner in consequence of the hardships of captivity.

<sup>3</sup> Now General Sir Beauchamp Walker, K.C.B.

<sup>4</sup> About sixty-five miles distant from Tien-tsin.

<sup>5</sup> Not previously published.

comme le reste. Si nous devons faire la paix, pourquoi un déploiement de forces inutiles, et une marche nouvelle qui ne peut que fatiguer nos troupes ?

J'ai vu le Baron Gros ce matin, et il m'a parlé de marcher avec l'escorte jusqu'au delà de "Meataou," qui n'est, d'après son dire, qu'un amas de huttes.

Je ne demande pas mieux que d'aller jusqu'au point dont il parle ; mais je désire vivement que nous ne partions pas avant après demain. Car, confiant dans ce qui avait été d'abord arrêté, j'avais pris mes dispositions pour laisser tout mon monde ici, ou je me fais adresser un grand convoi de Tien-tsin.

Veillez me faire savoir, mon cher Général, si vous adoptez mon projet de ne pas partir avant après demain. Le Baron Gros m'a dit qu'il s'en entendrait avec Lord Elgin.

Quand à l'affaire d'argent, . . . je vais faire dire à l'Intendant-en-chef de l'armée de se rendre auprès de votre commissaire afin qu'il s'entende avec lui sur le partage de la somme que, aux termes des règlements militaires français, je dois faire verser au trésor.

Veillez recevoir, mon cher Général, l'assurance de mes sentiments de sincère affection.

Général CH. DE MONTAUBAN.

On the 18th September we recommenced our march at 5 A.M., the French on this occasion following us. When we had proceeded about three miles, to my surprise we found a strong Tartar picket occupying a farmhouse on the roadside, who retired on our approach. A little further on were seen great bodies of cavalry and infantry, the latter drawn up behind a large nullah or watercourse to our right front, displaying innumerable war-banners. We halted for



THE OUTPOSTS AT HO-SI-WU.—A Moonlight Scene on the Peiho.



the purpose of forming up our infantry; and seeing that we were likely to meet with resistance, I massed our baggage in rear near the farmhouse, where the Tartar picket had been posted. Meanwhile Loch galloped in from Tang-chow with some sowars, and brought letters from Parkes, announcing that the matters with which he had been busied were going on satisfactorily. Lieutenant Anderson, a very fine young fellow, had been sent with Parkes in command of 20 sowars as escort; and Mr Bowlby,<sup>1</sup> the correspondent of the 'Times,' had accompanied the party. Loch further stated that Mr Parkes had started on the return journey with him, but finding that works had been thrown up, guns placed in position, and a large army assembled, had ridden back to ask the meaning of these preparations, and, if necessary, to remonstrate with the mandarins for this active resumption of hostilities after the conference and the proposals for peace. Loch now requested me to allow him to return, under a flag of truce, to look after Parkes; and an artillery officer, Captain Brabazon,<sup>2</sup> asked for leave to accompany him. At first I refused this latter request; but Brigadier Crofton, commanding the Royal Artillery,

<sup>1</sup> Shared the same fate as Mr De Norman.

<sup>2</sup> Subsequently treacherously captured and murdered by the Chinese. From what Sir Hope Grant states, it is evident that Captain Brabazon lost his life in the performance of a duty with which he was intrusted, and not through volunteering for an undertaking merely to satisfy curiosity.—H. K.

pointed out how valuable would be the knowledge of the ground thus obtained, and I regret to say I yielded. Captain Fane, of Fane's Horse, likewise applied for permission to go, but I refused peremptorily—fortunately indeed for him, as will be seen.

A mandarin of high rank, by name Hang-ki, now came to us in his sedan-chair with a flag of truce, and requested to see Lord Elgin. He was told that the ambassadors were not with the armies, and after a short time he went away. A Chinese petty officer and three men also rode up and offered to show us our camping-ground, but they were ordered off.

The name of the place where the enemy had taken up a position, and where we were to have encamped, was Chan-chia-wan. We looked through our telescopes along the line of Chinese troops, and made out Colonel Walker and three of the Dragoon Guards on their horses, but to our surprise they did not come out to meet us. The space of ground occupied by the enemy extended over three miles, and as they were moving round both our flanks, I sent a squadron out to our right and left with directions to keep a good look-out, and advanced a battery of 9-pounders to some high ground on our right flank, with orders to prepare for action. Suddenly we heard a heavy fire of matchlocks and gingals, and a number of horsemen were seen galloping furiously towards us. They turned out to be Colonel Walker



and his party. They soon reached us, and told us their story. They had been detained by the enemy, but were civilly treated, when a French officer rode up and began to dispute with some Tartars about a mule he was riding. At last he drew a pistol and fired it, when his mule was immediately shot, and he himself murdered. Colonel Walker rode to his assistance, but his sword was struck out of his hand; and though it was restored to him by a Chinese officer, fresh efforts were made to wrest it from him, and in his endeavours to retain it, his fingers were so badly cut that his hand was disabled. Then finding that their only hope of safety was to force their way out, he shouted to his party to ride for their lives. All charged through the enemy and made their escape — viz., Colonel Walker, Mr Thompson of the commissariat, one sowar, and four Dragoon Guards, one of whom was shot through the leg. Mr Thompson received several spear-wounds in the back; and one horse was shot through the body, but managed to convey its rider back in safety.

Loch and Brabazon had been absent for two hours, and it was evident they had been detained. At all events, after the treacherous conduct of the Chinese, we had no option but to proceed with our attack, and General de Montauban and myself agreed that he should take the right and turn the enemy's position. I placed at his entire disposal a squadron

of Fane's Horse, which had already pushed on in that direction. General de Montauban accordingly advanced, and soon got on the left flank of the Chinese, who were lining the dry watercourse. He then brought up his artillery and opened an enfilading fire upon them, from which they must have suffered considerably, as they had not apparently the power of moving their guns, and were unable to reply. They therefore attacked him with their cavalry, and for a short time the French guns were in jeopardy. Colonel de Bentzman commanding the French artillery afterwards told me that he drew his revolver as a last resource to aid in endeavouring to save them. Our gallant little force of cavalry, with about half-a-dozen troopers which General de Montauban had with him,<sup>1</sup> the whole led by Colonel Foley, the Commissioner with the French, now charged the Tartars, and, though a handful compared with them, used their sharp swords with such effect that the enemy was compelled to retreat.

I had already ordered the 9-pounder battery to open fire, which diverted the attention of the Chinese from the French flank attack, which was further supported by the 99th Regiment and the Dragoon Guards. Sir John Michel was sent to the left with the 2d Queen's, Stirling's 6-pounder battery, and the native cavalry, to act against the enemy's right; and

<sup>1</sup> The French expedition was unprovided with cavalry, with the exception of a few mounted orderlies.

I proceeded to the point with the Armstrong guns, the Musbee Sikhs, and a squadron of the Dragoon Guards. The enemy opened upon us from all points, but their fire was ineffectual.

Sir John Michel encountered such heavy masses on his left that he had some difficulty in holding his position, and was attacked by a large body of Tartar cavalry. Probyn, who had only 100 of his regiment with him at the time, was ordered to charge to the front, which he did in most gallant style, riding in amongst them with such vigour and determination that they could not withstand his attack for a moment, and fled in utter consternation. The Musbees then advanced in a steady line, carrying everything before them, and taking several guns. By-and-by we were joined by the 99th Regiment, the 9-pounder battery, and the Dragoon Guards; and Sir John Michel having sent to say that the enemy was still very strong in front of him, I sent the Armstrong battery to his assistance, and shortly after they retired. The whole of their position was now captured, and I sent a message to the French, who had made a long circuit, to say that I intended to advance and take the town of Chan-chia-wan; but General de Montauban replied that his men were so knocked up that he did not propose to advance any further. The squadron of Fane's Horse, commanded by Lieutenant Cattley, crossed over and joined Michel, and I rode on and found the enemy

had evacuated Chan-chia-wan. Advancing through it with the Musbees, about a mile on the other side I came to a large Chinese camp in which we took several guns. The total number which fell into the hands of the allies that day amounted to 80. Our combined forces did not exceed 4000 men. We occupied the town.<sup>1</sup>

During the night a fire broke out, and I was in great trepidation lest it should spread: fortunately it was confined to one house. In the evening I sent out a picket on the Tang-chow road; and on the following day, 19th, fresh pickets were pushed still more forward. Wade was sent with a flag of truce into Tang-chow to find out what had become of the prisoners, and to warn the authorities that, if they were not given up, our forces would take Peking. The Prefect stated that Mr Parkes had left the town on the day of the fight, and, he supposed, had gone back to us. As Wade was returning he saw a large camp to the west of Tang-chow, but on trying to communicate with it was fired at. Lord Elgin and his suite joined our camp this day from Ho-si-wu; and on the 20th September General Collineau's brigade arrived, raising the French force to 3000 men. I also sent an order to Sir Robert Napier to march up from Ho-si-wu with two regiments, one of which was to be the 60th, as soon as possible. Our head commissariat officer, Mr Turner, also ar-

<sup>1</sup> The strength of the Chinese was estimated at about 20,000 men.



FORT TANG-CHOW.—Mr (now Sir T. F.) Wade, with a Flag of Truce, demands the release of the Prisoners.



rived, and, to my great satisfaction, reported that he had brought up the flotilla with commissariat stores to Ho-si-wu from Tien-tsin.

On 21st September, at 5 A.M., we resumed our march. The weather had become much cooler, and the country more easy for marching. When two miles outside Chan-chia-wan, I had to wait to enable the French to come up and take their position on our right, according to their turn. Our baggage was collected in two small villages, and 100 infantry left to guard it. We were only a short distance from the enemy; and after we had advanced a mile, their guns opened on the French. Opposite the latter was the canal bridge of Pa-le-chiao,<sup>1</sup> apparently strongly fortified. Our troops were formed up with the infantry on the right, artillery in the centre, and cavalry in echelon on the left, and I then rode up to the French to reconnoitre the position of the enemy. As I was quietly riding back, I saw some cavalry on the left front of our allies, which I at first took for some of their skirmishers, when they suddenly approached me, and I found that they were Tartars. I immediately galloped off to Stirling's guns, and opened fire with case at a range of 200 yards, which quickly made them retire. The King's Dragoon Guards and Fane's Horse, with Probyn's regiment in support, now advanced to the charge; the first-

<sup>1</sup> Whence General de Montauban subsequently derived his title of Count Palikao.

named taking a bank and ditch on their way, and, attacking the Tartars with the utmost vigour, instantly made them give way. Fane's men followed them in pursuit, and on reaching the margin of a road, jumped into it over an interposing high bank and ditch. The front rank cleared it well; but the men in rear, unable to see before them owing to the excessive dust, almost all rolled into the ditch. Nevertheless, the Tartars had but a poor chance, and suffered severely. The whole of their cavalry retreated, and we followed them up for some time, occasionally firing long shots at them with our Armstrongs with good effect.

We continued our advance until we were stopped by a force firing at us from a strong position in a village and from a tope of trees. We soon, however, brought up some infantry, and dislodged them without difficulty. It must have formed the camping-ground of a Tartar general of some importance, as we there captured two yellow silk banners belonging to the Imperial Guard, one of which I have now in my possession: 18 brass guns likewise here fell into our possession. The French attacked the bridge of Pa-le-chiao with great gallantry. The *élite* of the Chinese Imperial Guard was drawn up to resist them, but had to give way before European discipline. The French took with the bridge 25 guns.

The enemy had apparently disappeared, and I retired towards the bridge, where our camp was being



pitched, when suddenly fire was opened on us from the other side, whereupon the Musbees crossed the canal, took the guns, and killed 60 of the enemy. We finally encamped upon some high ground on the right bank of the canal, and the French on the other side, near the Pa-le-chiao bridge. The next morning, 22d September, a flag of truce was sent in, with letters from the highest mandarin in the empire, Prince Kung, brother to the Emperor. He stated that he had been appointed chief commissioner in room of the last two, whose conduct had not been approved of, and that he was anxious to come to terms with us; but he said nothing with regard to our poor prisoners. Lord Elgin and Baron Gros replied in strong terms, that they declined to open negotiations until the captives were returned. The next day another letter came from the Prince, stating that our people were safe; that Sang-ko-lin-sin had seized them the day of the first fight; and that the only conditions on which they would be sent back were the restitution of the Taku forts and the evacuation by our fleet of the Peiho river. He added that the Emperor had agreed to sign the treaty; but that he could not consent to Lord Elgin delivering to him in person a letter from the Queen of England. Upon this Lord Elgin wrote a most decided letter. He told the high commissioner that if the Chinese Government chose to break through the law of nations with regard to flags of truce, they must

abide by the consequences, and that the vengeance of the British and French would be visited upon their country for such an act of perfidy. As for delivering in person her Majesty's letter to the Emperor, he would waive that point; but that not a ship or any part of the army should leave the country until the provisions of the treaty had been carried out. The Chinese still evaded giving up the prisoners; and Lord Elgin therefore resolved that our advance upon Peking should not be arrested.

[Prince Kung also threatened that the entry of our forces into the capital would be followed by the instant massacre of the prisoners. The perils which environed these latter placed both the military and the diplomatic chiefs in a position of the most painful perplexity. The plenipotentiaries, therefore, made the surrender of the prisoners a *sine qua non* before hostilities could be suspended.—H. K.]

Sir Robert Napier arrived with his deputy assistant quartermaster-general, Lieutenant Lumsden, on the 24th September, but his division was a few days' march in rear. I sent the Irregular Cavalry to make a reconnaissance up to Peking; and on their return, Probyn, who was in command, told me that, along the whole distance, he had seen neither troops nor camps, but that report stated that the Chinese army was in position to the north of the town. He had ridden up to within 200 yards of the walls, which he described as being very high and in excellent repair.

On the 26th, Lord Elgin and I rode to Chan-chia-wan to pay a visit to General Ignatieff, the Russian ambassador, who had throughout followed us up in our march, and was now on his way to Tang-chow. He received us very cordially, and showed us an excellent map, which he had caused to be made, of Peking, wherein was represented every street and house of importance. This plan he kindly lent me to copy, merely stipulating that it should not be published, as it had not yet been sent to St Petersburg.<sup>1</sup> I had it photographed by Signor Beato, whom I had specially allowed to accompany the expedition, and who had previously photographed scenes in India and the Crimea. I also obtained some further very valuable information from the Russians—to the effect that the Tartar town, separated from the Chinese by a wall, occupied the northern portion; that the city was surrounded by large suburbs and numerous trees, and that the ditch was deep and broad on three sides, but on the north side shallow, and in many places almost dry. In this direction, moreover, the ground was much more open. General de Montauban was of opinion that the town ought to be attacked on the south side, but in consequence of the above information, I differed with him. We wished to molest the Chinese as little as possible: on the north, where it

<sup>1</sup> This acquisition ultimately proved of great value. The streets therein laid down had been "traversed" in a cart from which angles had been taken, while indicators fixed to the wheels marked the distances gone over.

was stated that the Tartar streets were wide and the population scanty, there would be greater facilities for forcing an entrance; and lastly, in this direction the Summer Palace of the Emperor was little more than four miles distant from the city.

On 27th September the two regiments of Sir Robert Napier's division from Ho-si-wu, together with Penny-cuick's and Bedingfield's batteries, marched in, and on the 29th our siege-guns arrived, under the charge of Captain Dew, R.N. He had had great difficulty in bringing them up, owing to the shallowness of the river, and at places had been obliged to have recourse to the company of Madras sappers, which I had sent with the guns in order to cut channels. The day before I had ordered Probyn, with the 1st Irregular Cavalry, to make another reconnoissance, and to ascertain the whereabouts of the Tartar camp—a task which this excellent officer performed with great judgment. He came upon their pickets, drove them in, and discovered their camping-ground to be on the north-east of the town. On 30th September an ultimatum was sent by Lord Elgin and Baron Gros to Peking, to which the Chinese returned an answer, that if we would retire to Chan-chia-wan, they were willing to sign a treaty there. Our plenipotentiaries rejoined that this reply was not at all satisfactory, and that the forces should march to Peking. I left the marines and a couple of guns at Tang-chow<sup>1</sup> to

<sup>1</sup> This town had surrendered without opposition.

hold that place as a protection to our convoys coming up, and I also established a depot in some roomy old tombs, near the bridge of Pa-le-chiao and the village. These places were built with substantial walls, and were capable of making a good defence. As a temporary measure, I also left there our siege-train, with 200 infantry. Several of our sowars had been fired at conveying letters from Chan-chia-wan down the road, and, in compliance with my request, General de Montauban took possession of the town with 100 men, to whom I added 25 irregular cavalry, thus enabling us to keep up our communication with the south.

On the 1st October, Prince Kung again wrote praying us to stay our march, and hinting that Mr Parkes should be employed as a mediator; but on the 2d the allied ambassadors again replied that they would listen to nothing until the prisoners had been given up. The same evening Kung sent another letter accompanied by one from Parkes written in Chinese semi-officially, requesting that clothes might be sent for himself and Loch. In the margin were added the words in English, "We two are quite well treated," and another sentence in Hindostani by Loch, which conveyed to us a warning that the rest of the letter was written under compulsion. The clothes were forwarded, and a letter was written which would do the prisoners no harm should the Chinese choose to

read it, stating what we menaced if they were not given up.<sup>1</sup>

On the 3d October we marched again, crossed the canal, and halted at the depot, which was called Chan Kia-Ying. Here we were obliged to wait pending the arrival of a French convoy. On the 4th the merchants of Peking sent presents of supplies to Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, entreating at the same time that we would not advance further. We also heard from Parkes and Loch, saying that they had received the clothes, that they were confined in a temple near the Teyshun gate, and that only three of the remaining prisoners were with them. Parkes added an official note stating the wishes of Prince Kung and his colleagues. On the morning of the 5th October we marched, the men carrying three days' rations. The country was so intersected with houses and trees that our progress often became difficult. We only accomplished about five miles, and then encamped round some old brick-kilns about three miles from the north-east angle of Peking. On the 6th October, after a couple of hours' march, we came upon a large grass-covered ruined rampart where the men halted for breakfast, and where

<sup>1</sup> Upon some of the clothes thus sent were written in Hindostani the following sentences around the name marked on them: "In three days we shall commence hostilities again;" and "What is the name of the place in which you are confined?" By the next letter received from them, we learned that they were lodged in the Kaon-meon Temple, near the Teh-shun gate.—Wolseley, p. 211.

General de Montauban and I agreed that, as the army of Sang-ko-lin-sin had apparently retreated, we should make for the Summer Palace, where we should probably find the Emperor or principal Government officials. It was the turn of the English to march first, and as the country was much enclosed, rendering our advance in a regulated line impracticable, I pushed on in front with a strong advanced-guard and with flankers. At the same time our cavalry moved off to the right, and were directed to take a wide circuit on that flank. When we had gone a couple of miles, it was reported to me that a strong force of Tartar cavalry was moving ahead of us. They retreated, however, so quickly, that we soon lost sight of them amongst the trees and houses; but I was determined to follow them up, and moved my force along a road which led up to a rampart, forming a part of the same ruined fortifications before mentioned. Our troops were now much fatigued; and I gave orders for them to encamp near some fine temples situated on a large open plain within the line of works, while I myself went in search of the French general, whom we supposed to be on our left, for the purpose of holding a conference with him. But he was nowhere to be found, and the cavalry which I had sent out as flankers had also disappeared. He and his force must have lost us in the enclosed country. I rode all along the line of ramparts to try and find them, but in vain. It had no doubt

been arranged between us that we should ultimately march to the Summer Palace, but I expected that in the first instance the French would follow us.

Lord Elgin and I took up our quarters in a handsome old temple dedicated to Confucius. As soon as it became dark, I ordered large fires to be lighted to indicate to the French and to our cavalry the position of our camp, in the event of their having lost their way; and the following morning, the 7th October, I caused a salute of 21 guns to be fired from some rising ground outside the rampart with the same object. Even this was of no avail, and so I sent a squadron of the King's Dragoon Guards to find out the exact position of the Summer Palace, and to ascertain if the French and our cavalry were there. Wolseley, deputy assistant quartermaster-general, went with his party, and at 9 A.M. returned with the information that he had found them at Yuan-min-yuan—the Chinese name of the palace. The French during their march had missed our track, and had therefore proceeded to the palace. After breakfast Lord Elgin and I rode over to see General de Montauban. In the distance we at last perceived the palace beautifully situated amidst gardens and woods, and a range of large suburbs in front. We passed the park walls by a fine old stately gateway, and proceeding up an avenue, came to a range of handsome dwellings roofed over with yellow tiles,



turned up at the ends, Chinese fashion. In different parts of the grounds were forty separate small palaces, in beautiful situations. The park was carefully kept—the footpaths and roads clean, and in excellent order; and there were various pretty pieces of ornamental water. We found that the French had encamped near the entrance of the Great Audience Hall, and it was pitiful to see the way in which everything was being robbed.

[When, in 1875, Sir Hope, who was then on his death-bed, revised my original MS. of 'Incidents in the China War,' he caused me to expunge several passages of a most interesting nature concerning the looting of the Summer Palace by the French. Although the lapse of years would ere now have probably neutralised his objections, and I am sorely tempted to reproduce some highly entertaining details, I still prefer to adhere to the letter of my chief's last injunctions, and to content myself with the eloquent silence of the printer's rows of stars.—H. K.]

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The principal palace was filled with beautiful jade-stone of great value, and carved in a most elaborate manner—splendid old China jars, enamels, bronzes, and numerous handsome clocks and watches, many

of which were presents given by Lord Macartney<sup>1</sup> and ambassadors from other countries. In a building close to the main palace were two mountain-howitzers<sup>2</sup> which had been made at Woolwich, and likewise presented by Lord Macartney to the Emperor. They had apparently been kept as curiosities, and never used. They were afterwards sent back to Woolwich. One room only in the palace was untouched. General de Montauban informed me he had reserved any valuables it might contain for equal division between the English and French. The walls of it were covered with jade-stones, and with ornaments of various descriptions.

General de Montauban told me that the only opposition the French had met with was from a small guard at the palace gates, where two of his officers had been wounded in forcing an entrance. The Emperor and all his grandees had taken flight only a short time previously, and had carried little or nothing away with them.

General de Montauban and I agreed that all that remained of prize property should be divided between both armies. A quantity of articles was set aside for us, and I determined to sell them for the benefit of our officers and men. The French general told me that he had found two *joës*, or staves of

<sup>1</sup> Probably in the year 1793.

<sup>2</sup> They bore the date "1782," and were complete with carriages, limbers, and ammunition.

office, made of gold and green jade-stone, one of which he would give me as a present to Queen Victoria; the other he intended for the Emperor Napoleon. In a stable we found eleven of Fane's horses, two of Probyn's, and one belonging to the King's Dragoon Guards, all of which had been taken from the escort sent with Parkes. On returning to camp we found a letter from Prince Kung, evidently written in great fear, saying that the prisoners would be sent to us to-morrow, and that a high commissioner would meet any delegate we might be disposed to send at a house outside the main gate of the city. The letter was signed by Parkes. A verbal message was returned that Mr Wade would meet the commissioner at the appointed place. Thither Wade repaired, and was informed by Hang-ki, the head mandarin appointed for this duty, that the total number of European prisoners in Peking was eight — viz., Parkes, Loch, a sowar, and five Frenchmen, one of whom was an officer. He promised that they should be delivered up to-morrow. The Emperor, he added, had fled with the army, and he believed that the remainder of the prisoners were with him.

The next day, the 8th October, a quantity of gold and silver was discovered in one of the temples of the Summer Palace, and a room full of the richest silks and furs. This treasure was divided in two equal portions between the French and ourselves.

Private letter from Sir Hope :—

PEKIN, 8th October 1860.

. . . Just now a French soldier threw into my servant's hands, a Sikh, bales of the finest China silk and fur cloaks, with a great sum of money, and made him a present of them, because, I suppose, he could not carry them away. . . . We get abundance of provisions in the shape of mutton and beef. We have at present with us 1200 sheep, enough to feed our army for twenty-four days. The fields are full of sweet potatoes and different kinds of vegetables, and we want for little or nothing. . . . Letters came in from Prince Kung begging for peace, and stating that he was ready to give up the prisoners and to sign the convention. . . . I am delighted to say Messrs Parkes and Loch and a Sikh soldier have been sent back. . . . Elgin is a very fine fellow, and excellent in his present position.

At about 3 P.M., to our inexpressible satisfaction, Parkes, Loch, and the five Frenchmen came into camp to the temple in which Lord Elgin and I resided. Parkes told me their sad story. On the 18th September Loch and Brabazon, having ridden into Tang-chow, collected all the party, consisting of De Norman, Mr Bowlby ('Times' correspondent), Lieutenant Anderson, 19 sowars, one man of the King's Dragoon Guards—Phipps by name—and Parkes himself, and started on the way back. Ere long, how-

ever, they were fired at from the Chinese lines; and on riding round a field of high maize they came across a body of infantry, who, levelling their matchlocks at them, desired them to halt. Parkes spoke a few words of remonstrance, but was told that no one could be allowed to pass without an order from Sang-ko-lin-sin, who was not far distant, and to whom he was referred. Loch and a sowar accompanied him, and thus they became separated from the rest of their party. That general, however, turned round upon him, abused him, said that all the evil of the war had been brought upon the Chinese owing to his misconduct, and ordered both him and Loch to be made prisoners. They were then made to dismount, and forced to kiss the ground. Their arms were tied tightly behind their backs, and they were taken to the rear, where their custodians began to ill-treat them, and they expected every moment to be killed. They were, however, put into a cart and driven to Peking, thrown into a common prison in company with 75 common malefactors, murderers, and robbers, and loaded with chains—one round their necks, one round their bodies, two round their arms, and two round their legs. These were connected by a main chain to a ring in the roof so tightly that they could not sit down. It was afterwards lengthened, which relieved them considerably. Parkes told me that they were treated with the greatest kindness by the wretched people who were in the same prison with

them, who gave them a part of their miserable food. A jailer kept close to each of them day and night. In this state they were kept badly fed for nine days, when they were released from their chains and put into a prison by themselves, where they were interrogated by inquisitors as to the strength of our force, and other matters connected with us; but the two Englishmen refused to answer. At length they were taken away and placed in a very excellent joss-house, where, up to the time they were brought back to us, they were fed like turkeys preparatory to a Christmas feast. The poor sowar was kept chained in a separate dark dungeon. For three days no one came near him, and he had nothing to eat. At last coarse grain and some water were given him to keep up life. The endurance of these poor natives of India was wonderful, and they stand hardships which would break down a European. Three only of our prisoners had been saved, and the fate of the others was not known until the 13th October, when eight Sikhs and one Frenchman, the sole survivors, were given up to us. They were in a sad state, and their hands and wrists were ulcerated from the manner in which they had been tied up. They then gave us a shocking account of the way in which they had been treated.

When Parkes and Loch left to remonstrate with the Chinese general, a crowd of soldiers set on them, and tied their feet and hands together behind their

backs as tightly as possible, afterwards pouring water on the cords to increase the tension, and they were kept in this terrible position until the condition of their hands and wrists became too horrible for description. Poor Anderson was affected by delirium, and died after nine days of captivity. De Norman suffered still more, and lived for seventeen days. Anderson was a noble fellow, clever, amiable, and much looked up to by his brother officers. De Norman and Mr Bowlby were also great favourites. In course of time all the others died, or were put to a violent death, with the exception of those whom I have already mentioned. Private Phipps, of the King's Dragoon Guards, was especially distinguished by the fortitude with which he endured his sufferings, and with which, up to the day of his death, he strove to keep up the courage of his fellow-captives.

## CHAPTER XIX.

CHINA WAR (*continued*).

LETTERS FROM LORD HERBERT—CHINESE OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

THE following correspondence, irrespectively of the fact that it deals with the main points connected with the China campaign, may perhaps possess an interest of its own, as illustrating the disposition of one who was probably the best War Minister England ever possessed.—H. KNOLLYS.

*From* Right Hon. SIDNEY HERBERT, *Secretary of State for War*, to Lieut.-General Sir HOPE GRANT.

WAR OFFICE, Nov. 26, 1859.

DEAR SIR J. HOPE GRANT,—I trust that an early mail will bring your acceptance of the appointment to the command of the expedition to China. In that case, our relations will henceforth be of such an intimate character that I feel I may without scruple address you as I have done in this letter.

The force under your command will consist of . . .  
[Here follows the detail of troops, the total of which is estimated at 10,000 men.]

The French send 5800 infantry, four batteries of field-



artillery (with a double set of guns), and some *compagnies de débarquement*, consisting of seamen trained to land manœuvres—in all, about 8000 men. Your formal instructions will go out by the next mail; but it is necessary to have an understanding with the French Government upon them before they are finally despatched to you.

The command which has been offered to you is one requiring, from the peculiar circumstances which surround it, both temper and judgment; and I do not think the Queen could have chosen an officer more likely than yourself to discharge its duties successfully.

There are two difficulties which beset our course—one as regards our enemy, the other as regards our ally.

As regards the Chinese, the deplorable mishap at the mouth of the Peiho<sup>1</sup> makes retaliation unavoidable, unless we could in the interim receive—which I fear is very unlikely—a disavowal of the act and some offer of reparation.

But our quarrel is not with the people, but with the Government. At the ports where we trade our peaceful relations have remained unimpaired. Our object in going to China is to trade; and they trade with us uninterruptedly, though the central Government fires on our ships, and arrests the progress of our ambassador. It is important to maintain, if possible, this good understanding with the Chinese people at the trading ports.

The pressure, therefore, whatever it be, should be as far as possible confined to the central Government. They can be approached by the Gulf of Pechili and the Peiho. I trust that the reduction of the forts at the mouth of the river, or if that operation, though successful, should fail to bring them to terms, an advance up the Peiho to Tien-tsin, would probably enable us to dictate a peace to the Chinese Emperor.

Our object is to get our peace ratified without being obliged to have recourse to an advance on Peking itself. With the

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<sup>1</sup> In 1859.

numbers which the Chinese Government have at their command, the advance of what, after all, is but a handful of men, into an enormous capital, is hazardous; and the operation, if successful, might possibly, in the present disorganised state of the Chinese empire, end in upsetting the existing dynasty, and throwing the whole country into a state of anarchy, fatal to the interests of commerce, because destructive of all production.

Again, the Chinese capital is so situated that it is, first, from ice, and, secondly, from the north-east monsoon, almost unattackable till the beginning of May; and the great heats of June and July are almost as powerful for its defence. Add to this, that the Government are most anxious, whether from China or from India, to effect a greater concentration of our troops in England as soon as possible.

An early termination of our Chinese difficulty is therefore most desirable. Our allies probably have different views. They have no great commercial interests at stake. The goodwill of the Chinese or the stability of the Chinese empire is not important to them; but the prestige of a bulletin dated from Peking would give great satisfaction to the French people.

Our plenipotentiary, Mr Bruce, may therefore have difficult cards to play. I need scarcely impress upon you the necessity of a most open, cordial, and conciliatory bearing towards the commanders of the French forces. Although the two Governments are on perfectly friendly terms, it is impossible to deny that there exists between the two nations a jealous and uneasy feeling.<sup>1</sup> A perfectly frank and unreserved course of conduct is, as in all such cases, the best and safest.

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<sup>1</sup> This was written shortly after the attempt of Orsini to assassinate the Emperor Napoleon. The consequent excitement against England gave rise to the first formation of Volunteer corps.

I will now only further add, that at this distance it is impossible to give directions as to the operations to be undertaken. It is left to the discretion and judgment of yourself and colleagues, naval and military, French and English, all acting—which is most important—in concert with the two plenipotentiaries, upon whom the ultimate question of peace or war must rest.

All I can undertake is that you shall be honestly and heartily supported at home.

SIDNEY HERBERT.

WAR OFFICE, *December 10, 1859.*

DEAR SIR J. HOPE GRANT,— . . . The battalions going to China are weaker than we had assumed they would be. I see by Lord Canning's letter that they numbered no more than 780 men, and those now going out will not be above 850 men. . . . The whole force will be larger than was first contemplated. Under these circumstances the Government have considered the necessity of sending out a second general officer, and have selected Sir William Mansfield to serve under you in command of the infantry division. I have no doubt that you will find him in every way most useful to the public service.<sup>1</sup> . . .

These [new Armstrong] guns are all ready, and the batteries are to be inspected by the Duke of Cambridge on Friday. I am very anxious that they should be thoroughly tested on service. I have the greatest confidence in their merits; but for fear of accidents, we have sent duplicate batteries of the ordinary brass field-pieces by long sea.—  
Pray believe me, &c.,

SIDNEY HERBERT.

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<sup>1</sup> But Sir W. Mansfield expressed his unwillingness to go. See *ante*, p. 48.—H. K.

WAR OFFICE, *April 9th*, 1860.

DEAR SIR HOPE,— . . . As regards the question which you put to me, whether my statement of the risks of an advance on Peking<sup>1</sup> is to be taken as an order not to go there, I thought it best to consult Lord Palmerston upon it. He says, "I should be for leaving to the military commanders (who should, of course, consult with the diplomatists as to the diplomatic bearing of the question) full latitude of discretion as to advancing on Peking."

Lord Palmerston thinks that the belief that an occupation of Peking might lead to the overthrow of the dynasty, and, by plunging everything into confusion, destroy our trade, is unfounded.<sup>2</sup>

It is clear, however, that we could not winter there, and we should have to leave almost immediately after our arrival.

You, however, on the spot, will be able to judge far better than we can here of the prudence of the advance. I doubt now whether the French are much bent upon it. They have, apparently, some other designs in the way of settlement in some part of the China seas. . . . —Pray believe me, &c.,

SIDNEY HERBERT.

LONDON, *May 10*, 1860.

DEAR SIR HOPE,—I am very glad to hear by your letter of the 14th March that you have formed good expectations of your French colleagues. Admiral Hope seems to have well studied the coast on which he has to operate, and to have a clear perception of what may be done.

We have been surprised here at the large amount of native force despatched from India to China, making the whole forces 18,000 or 19,000 men. Our agreement with

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<sup>1</sup> Probably referring to letter of November 26, 1859.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Palmerston's opinion was verified by subsequent events.

France included no more than 10,000 altogether, exclusive of the then garrison at Canton and Hong-Kong. We were of opinion that, in a country in which the climate will not permit military operations by Europeans for much more than three months, and that period intersected by a spell of intolerable hot weather, a small force, compact, but well appointed, would have been more effective. Almost the whole operation will be on the coast or up rivers. We therefore spoke of a small proportion of cavalry, and a reduced number of followers. In fact, I fear that you will find that you have not steamers enough to move rapidly so large a force. I trust you will not find difficulties as to feeding them; but we know very little of the country, or of the possibility of drawing supplies from Japan or the neighbouring localities.

Lord Elgin will be with you before this. He is, I think, too sanguine as to the probability of the Chinese yielding to mere demonstrations. But his arrival—not having been mixed up with the Peiho affair,<sup>1</sup> and having successfully negotiated before—may have a good effect on the policy of the Chinese.

We have been advised here, first, that it is difficult to send furs or skins by the long sea route without great risk of injury; secondly, that they are very difficult to get good here, where such things are little worn, and the mode of preparing them therefore not understood. But excellent sheep-skin clothing can be obtained at Bombay in great quantities at low rates, with a comparatively short voyage. But I should think that the intense cold in China itself would cause the use of garments fit to resist it, and that a supply of some description of warm clothing could be found there.

Sir Edward Lugard<sup>2</sup> mentions that the Military Train

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<sup>1</sup> In 1859.

<sup>2</sup> Now General Right Hon. Sir E. Lugard, G.C.B.

made excellent cavalry in India<sup>1</sup> when not wanted for train purposes. You will have been aware of this, and may possibly find them again useful in the former capacity.

We shall soon be looking for the first indications of the effect of your preparations on the Chinese Government. Though the war is not popular here, every one sympathises with the men who compose and the officer who commands the expedition.—Pray believe me, &c.,

SIDNEY HERBERT.

LONDON, *June 10, 1860.*

DEAR SIR HOPE,—The Chinese are certainly the most extraordinary people on the face of the earth; and your excellent arrangement with regard to the peninsula of Kowloon certainly would prove it, had we no other evidence on the subject.

The commissariat speak of readiness to provide supplies; but I fear that, as you get farther north, you will meet with a more patriotic but less convenient spirit on the part of the Chinese population.

I have read with the greatest interest your account of the meeting and discussion with the French officers; and the Government entirely approves of the arrangement you have made. By it you seem to have secured what is best for both. Each will act on the plan they themselves advocate.<sup>2</sup> There will be complete co-operation; but each army will act under the sole direction of its own general in the particular operation. There will be a common object separately attained, and no collision or jealousies on the road to it. Last, but not least, you seem to have the best plan and the least hazard.

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<sup>1</sup> During the Indian Mutiny in 1857-58.

<sup>2</sup> Referring to General de Montauban's intention, subsequently abandoned, of landing independently on a point south of the Peiho.—See p. 82.

We shall, I apprehend, have to raise at least an additional three millions sterling; but at this distance it is mere guess-work. I trust you will prove right in the hopes you entertain of a bloodless termination to all our preparations, and that the Chinese, who have rejected rather contumeliously the ultimatum of a distant enemy, will yield to a visible force appearing off Taku; but I fear that their success last year, and their numbers this year, may encourage them to hold out. I should be very glad to have some of your battalions home in the winter; but it is too good to hope for.—Pray believe me, &c.,

SIDNEY HERBERT.

WAR OFFICE, *July 21, 1860.*

DEAR SIR HOPE,—I am very glad you have retained the additional force which Lord Canning proposed to stop. Once the expense has been incurred of their transport to your seas, it is well to get all the good out of them which is possible, and you have exercised a sound discretion in keeping them and turning them to the best account. Clearly, by your account of the French, we shall have to do the work, and the more we have to do it with the better.

We got our China vote not without the display of a good deal of dissatisfaction from all parties in the House of Commons. . . . The war was, in my opinion, after the Peiho affair, inevitable; but though the country was keen for war on the miserable lorcha affair,<sup>1</sup> in which we were in the wrong, it is now weary of the expense and unsatisfactory results, and ready for any means of escape from the difficulty. There is no fear, however, but that the good conduct of the forces engaged will meet with all the approbation and reward they deserve.—Believe me, &c.,

SIDNEY HERBERT.

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<sup>1</sup> Alluding to the boarding of the lorcha Arrow by Sir John Bowring in 1858.

WAR OFFICE, *November 10, 1860.*

MY DEAR SIR HOPE,—I must add to the public despatches which go out to you by this mail my own congratulations on the brilliant success which you have achieved.<sup>1</sup> There is really not a drawback to it. All the departments seem to have been well up to their work—good commissariat—good medical staff—good health, and good discipline,—things not to be attained without vigour and vigilance on the part of the commander. You have every reason to be proud of the force under you, and never was Grand Cross better won. . . .

I trust no rancour is left in the minds of our allies. At any rate, the joint success *should* remove any if it existed.

We are looking eagerly for your next despatches, which will give us the complement of your last ones, by specifying the names of those who most distinguished themselves, and bring us, I have no doubt, the account of important events as regards the prospects of peace.—Pray believe me, my dear Sir Hope, &c. &c.,

SIDNEY HERBERT.

WAR OFFICE, *November 10, 1860.*

MY DEAR SIR HOPE,—

I am inclined to think that the Military Train has been made too military in its organisation, and too much like a combatant corps. They will not consider themselves as acting under the various departments whose transport they are to carry on. They ought to be like a postmaster, who supplies with post-horses any one who wants them. The commissariat at Aldershot have been applying for a transport of their own, separate from the Military Train, and entirely under their own control. — is strongly for it; — against it. The latter says, justly enough, why maintain a Military Train if you are to have other people to

<sup>1</sup> The capture of the Taku forts.



do their work? But then the Military Train should do it themselves, and without making difficulties. I should be very much obliged if you, who have now seen the practical working of the present system in war, would tell me what your conclusions are, what the defects of the system may be, and what remedies you would apply,—whether it should continue to be a purchase corps; whether the officers should more frequently come from among the non-commissioned officers of the army, &c. &c. . . . —Pray believe me, &c.,  
S. HERBERT.

WAR OFFICE, *November 27, 1860.*

MY DEAR SIR HOPE,—I have again to congratulate you on two successful engagements.<sup>1</sup> . . . You have not much margin in the way of time; and as the Chinese, if they knew how to play their game, could put you into an awkward fix, we here cannot but be anxious as to the future. I am glad to hear that you do not intend wintering in Pekin or near it; so long as you have open and clear communications with the sea, you can do well. . . . So much depends on the conditions of the treaty, that it is difficult to give any positive directions at this distance.

I expect the Duke of Cambridge in town to-morrow, when we will go over your list of officers recommended. I hear from Lord Cowley that Colonel Foley<sup>2</sup> has been promoted in the Legion of Honour, no communication between the Governments being necessary for the promotion of an officer who has already the lower grade of the Order; but that they (the French Government) will communicate with us when the operations shall be over as to the decoration to be bestowed on the Commandant Reboul.<sup>3</sup> The red-tapists here were, I find, much shocked at your specially recommending

<sup>1</sup> On 18th and 21st September. See pp. 135, 141.

<sup>2</sup> English military attaché with the French force.

<sup>3</sup> French military attaché with the English force.

him for the Bath. I did not see who else could if you did not; but they say that you should have spoken to his merits, but not specified the reward.

Your accounts of the Armstrong guns are very satisfactory. The defects noticed in the reports of your officers had, I think, nearly all been discovered in practice here, and have been more or less remedied. The injury to the fuses, as you know, was owing to an unpardonable neglect in storing on board ship, by which they got damaged. The only defect which I think serious is the flying out of the breech-piece, because it can only be prevented by tight screwing up, and you cannot depend upon this being done in great hurry and excitement. Those we now are fitting have a better carriage, and single block trail.

[It must be remembered that although a few converted rifled guns were used by the French in the Italian campaign of 1859, the breech-loading cannon on the Armstrong principle was in 1860 an entirely new and untried weapon, and was regarded with suspicion and dislike by many of our military judges. The defect in the breech-piece, which Lord Herbert points out, was remedied shortly after.—H. K.]

I won't take your judgment on the Enfield as final. At Inkermann, at close quarters, it saved the day; for its penetration was such that it killed not only the front man fired at, but two, three, and even four behind. But if at short distances men fire high, the better the weapon, the less harm they will do. The badness of Brown Bess made the ball drop so soon that a bad aim if too high was corrected. But it proves, I think, that our men want more training still to make the marksman equal to his weapon. . . . —Believe me, &c.,

SIDNEY HERBERT.

WAR OFFICE, *December 10, 1860.*

MY DEAR SIR HOPE,— . . . On Saturday we had a telegram from Alexandria [announcing the surrender of the gates of Peking, &c.] . . . Militarily everything seems to have been a great success; but the flight of the Emperor, and the possession even partially of Peking, constitute a great difficulty. The danger most apprehended has come to pass; but I must say that I do not see how under the circumstances you could have avoided the advance. We have, however, now the prospect of a winter in the north, and very little prospect of a treaty at any time. A protraction of the war, with its enormous expenditure, will, I fear, meet with a doubtful reception in Parliament. Now, however, the first thing to be done is to re-establish the amount of supplies, which I had checked in some instances and stopped in others. I have therefore brought together again a committee we had formed to discuss and decide these questions.

We will take every precaution in packing the Armstrong fuses so as to secure them from damage. Medical comforts, of which half supplies only have been sent lately, will be sent out in full. Warm winter clothing I hope you will have got either from Bombay or in China itself. I fear the winter is rigid; but with the stores of Peking under your hand, I hope there is no danger of your being short.

I can only wish you God-speed with all my heart. I have perfect confidence in your judgment, and will do my utmost for your assistance, so far as at this distance can be done. The performances of the force under your command are fully appreciated here.—Believe me, &c.,  
SIDNEY HERBERT.

WILTON, *December 25, 1860.*

DEAR SIR HOPE,—We heard last week . . . of the termination of the war in China. . . . The announcement has given immense satisfaction here. The prospect of a winter

passed in China by the whole force, and the necessity of a renewal of the campaign next spring, was a subject of serious anxiety; and your position seemed very uncertain and precarious. But the peace seems to have been made with the same skill on the side of the diplomatists as the military operations were conducted by the commanders. I most heartily congratulate you on all you have achieved. . . . The fate of the poor prisoners has created a most painful impression here. Of both Mr De Norman and Captain Brabazon I have heard a high character. The whole proceeding, from beginning to end, seems to have been of the most rascally character; and its wantonness and short-sightedness are even more astounding than its cruelty. I see by the telegram that the Summer Palace was burnt to the ground. I suppose this had a good deal to do with the fate of the prisoners.<sup>1</sup>

This is Christmas-day: I wish you a happy enjoyment of it, and many still to come. I hope before long to have the pleasure of converting our paper acquaintance to a personal friendship.—Pray believe me, &c.,                      SIDNEY HERBERT.

WAR OFFICE, *January 10, 1861.*

MY DEAR SIR HOPE,—I hope by the next mail to send you the list of promotions and honours for the China campaign. We were very much puzzled how to select from the large list<sup>2</sup> you sent us—the more so as the limits of the Bath have been more than reached, and there is great unwillingness to exceed or add to the numbers. As soon as the Queen's sanction is obtained, they shall be despatched to China.

The public here are, I think, very much pleased at the way in which everything has been done in China—firmness, temper, skill, success. But they are puzzled as to the future. They doubt the stability of any treaty, and have a growing

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An inaccurate assumption. The prisoners had been murdered before the Summer Palace was destroyed.

<sup>2</sup> *Tempora mutantur.* Compare the lengthy lists of more recent wars.

objection to wars which succeed in obtaining indemnities, but which cost far more than the indemnities recovered. I trust, however, that the severity of the lesson, the appearance of a hostile force in Pekin, and the rapidity and completeness of the campaign, may produce a lasting effect. In the meanwhile, the whole thing has been so well done that, provided it does not recur, every one seems satisfied. A first-rate general, a capital staff, an excellent commissariat, and a good medical department, are four things which the English public are especially pleased to see, and the more so when all are got together.

I hope when you are at Hong-Kong you will look carefully over Kowloon. There is a strong feeling among the Hong-Kong civilians that all the advantages of the acquisition must be reserved for them. I have urged on the Colonial Office that merchants go out to Hong-Kong or elsewhere at their own risk for their own good; but the soldier is sent out to protect the merchant, without any option on his part, probably against his will, and certainly not for his good, and that the duty of the Government is to give them the best chance of health and comfort. . . .

I see that your occupying force amounts to something about 10,000 men. Whenever a reduction takes place, the Indian troops should, if possible, be sent home first, as their employment under us is an exceptional proceeding, and is objected to by some on constitutional grounds, as not being included in our estimates, nor under our Mutiny Act,—not that the objection is worth much if put in the scale against practical convenience.

I am about to change my appellation under circumstances which are far from agreeable. I had a very hard session last year, and got through it apparently well enough; but I have suffered from it since so much that I am forbidden to try another in the House of Commons, and I am forced therefore to take refuge in the Upper House, by the title of Lord Herbert. It has been a great blow to me; for I was fond of

the House of Commons, and had many and old friends in it, beside whom I have been fighting through various fortunes for a quarter of a century.—Pray believe me, &c.,

SIDNEY HERBERT.

*Extracts from Chinese Official Documents found in Sin-ho by  
Mr PARKES on 12th August 1860.*

The French Barbarian, not being in fact the person who began the quarrel, is merely mixing himself up in it at the instance of the other. . . .

The Heart of the troops of the French Barbarians, it is ascertained, has reached Hong-Kong, and, it is reported, will arrive at Shanghai immediately. . . . This he has the honour to submit to your Majesty for perusal, and, prostrate, he implores your Majesty's sacred glance thereon.

*Translations from a newspaper dated the 18th of the  
Chinese 12th moon.*

The reinforcements being sent out from England to China will amount to 10,000 troops, white and black. The French, in addition to the 8000 men already despatched, are sending 2000, which will make a total of 10,000 men. The English and French will land 30,000 fighting men. . . . It is the purpose of England in this expedition to put forth all her strength. A great brass mortar will go to China. It has reached Sha-tun-tun,<sup>1</sup> and has been shipped on board the Hai-mi-lei-ya.<sup>2</sup> Thence it will go to A-la-shan,<sup>3</sup> and from A-la-shan to So-ho-sy,<sup>4</sup> as at So-ho-sy there will certainly be a ship to carry this mortar to Hong-Kong.

It is said that the newly appointed French chief, Man-tau-pan,<sup>5</sup> has reached Hong-Kong, and will arrive at Shanghai shortly.

<sup>1</sup> Southampton.

<sup>2</sup> Himalaya.

<sup>3</sup> Alexandria.

<sup>4</sup> Suez.

<sup>5</sup> Montauban.

*Memorial by SANG-KO-LIN-SIN.**7th month, 10th day (August 26).*

Your slave Sang-ko-lin-sin, kneeling, presents a memorial. Judging that the changeable disposition of the Barbarians will make it impossible to carry into effect the pacific policy, he, in the name of the princes and dukes of the six leagues, prays your Majesty to proceed on a hunting-tour, in order that measures for attacking and destroying the Barbarians may be facilitated. Your slave lately lost the position at Taku, where he commanded, in consequence of the unforeseen explosion of the powder-magazines at two of the north forts simultaneously, and not from any slackness in the defence or insufficiency of means. Therefore he apprehends that now it will be difficult to make the Barbarians submit; and yet that their demands can hardly be granted. . . .

Your slave does not shrink from thus, in the name of the princes and others of the leagues, expressing his and their obscure views, and which he yet urgently solicits your Majesty to permit to be carried into effect.

He would then be at liberty to choose his own time and mode of attack, and might advance or retire as events should make necessary. Without any doubt he would sweep the vile blood from off the earth, and redeem his previous shortcomings. He addresses this secret memorial to your Majesty for your decision thereupon, &c. &c.

*Extracts from a semi-destroyed fragment of a Decree in Vermilion,<sup>1</sup> dated 10 P.M., 7th September, found in one of the EMPEROR'S private apartments in the Summer Palace on the 8th October 1860, drawn up by the EMPEROR OF CHINA.*

If Kweiliang and his colleagues have so madly lost themselves as to presume on their own authority to concede these

<sup>1</sup> Decrees emanating from the direct authority of the Emperor are written in vermilion-coloured pencil.

last two points,<sup>1</sup> they have not only disobeyed our written commands, and shown fear of the Barbarian,<sup>2</sup> but they have simply taken up the empire and put it into his hands; and we will at once vindicate the law by the execution of these ministers, and then fight it out with the Barbarians.

As to the admission of the chief Fa<sup>2</sup> into the capital, peace once negotiated between the two countries, orders will of course have to be given to the proper departments to make satisfactory arrangements for the supply of all requisites. What need will there then be for Fa's personal inspection? Besides, this rebellious chief, idly yelping, frantically barking, is certain to bring forward other restrictive conditions, and once he is come will not go away. . . . Is it reasonable [of the Barbarians] to exact compensation by holding a knife to the throat? . . . Lastly, as to war to the knife, it is essential that this should begin soon—that it should not be postponed. We should avail ourselves of the autumn and winter, using therein our advantage, and pressing them on their weak side. If we wait until the spring and summer of next year, these Barbarians will of course raise large bodies of black Barbarians, and will bring the force of all the world to try conclusions with us. And they will league with the long-haired rebels; and then between war with those from afar and those close at hand, we shall have trouble enough to hold our own.

The remarks above, which exhaust our opinions, we have written with our own hand. . . .

A special decree.

*Extracts from a Memorial by TSAI-TANG-YUNG, ex-Censor of the Hoo-kwang Provinces, dated 13th September.*

This document is chiefly remarkable for the manly

<sup>1</sup> Viz., the payment by the Chinese of a war indemnity, and the entry of the allied troops into Peking.

<sup>2</sup> Mr Parkes.



outspoken terms in which the writer addresses the Emperor, who in China is generally treated as a kind of divinity. After alluding to the rumours of disasters which were causing so much terror, Tsai writes :—

The confusion and alarm are indescribable. But there has been nothing so strange as the report now heard, that your Majesty intended making a tour to Gehol. This has caused the utmost consternation ; but your Minister does not believe in it. . . . If, indeed, the report is true, the effect produced will be like a convulsion of nature, and the mischief must be irreparable. In what light does your Majesty regard your people? in what light the shrines of your ancestors, or the altars of the tutelary gods? Will you cast away the inheritance of your ancestors like a damaged shoe? What would history say of your Majesty for a thousand generations henceforward? It has never been known that a sovereign should choose a time of danger and distress to make a hunting-tour, suppose that thereby he would prevent trouble. If the capital should be disturbed, what would there be to save Gehol alone from being disturbed? Your Majesty is besought to return without delay to your palace, in order that the people's minds may be reassured against the enemy. . . . From the above, it appears that your Majesty's northern tour is positively decided on. Does our Emperor, then, think nothing of his people? of the temples of his ancestors? and of the altars of the tutelary gods? . . .

## CHAPTER XX.

CHINA WAR (*continued*).

BRITISH TROOPS DIRECTED TO GIVE UP "LOOT" FROM SUMMER PALACE—AUCTION—CONFIRMATION OF THE STEP BY THE HOME GOVERNMENT—HAN-KI'S SEARCH FOR THE GOVERNOR OF THE SUMMER PALACE—ESTABLISHMENT OF BATTERIES TO BREACH PEKIN WALLS—PRINCE KUNG'S COMPLAINT OF THE LOOTING OF THE PALACE—HE PROMISES THAT OUR TERMS SHALL BE AGREED TO—THE PRISONERS GIVEN UP—DETAIL OF THE BATTERIES—EXTRAORDINARY STRENGTH OF THE WALLS—FUNERALS OF THE MURDERED PRISONERS—BURNING OF THE SUMMER PALACE—RUMOURS OF TREACHERY, AND PROBYN'S CONSEQUENT RECONNAISSANCE—ENTRY OF BRITISH TROOPS INTO PEKIN—THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY—PRINCE KUNG'S TERROR OF THE PHOTOGRAPHIC APPARATUS—PREPARATIONS FOR DEPARTURE—THE TOWN OF PEKIN—THE TROOPS BEGIN THEIR RETURN MARCH TO TIEN-TSIN AND TAKU—REMARKS BY THE EDITOR ON THE MARCH TO, AND DESTRUCTION OF, THE SUMMER PALACE—RESULTS ATTAINED BY THE WAR—PARIS—MADAME VINOY—EMPEROR NAPOLEON.

*Journal.*—A great change of temperature now took place, and on the 9th October the rain fell, and a cold north-east wind set in like the blasts of Edinburgh in March. I went to Sir Robert Napier's quarters, and in the course of conversation he told me that his aide-de-camp had brought away from the Summer Palace a large piece of gold, which he had

found lying on the ground, and which at first had been taken for brass. Sir Robert asked whether I had any objection to his giving it to the men of his division. I did not, however, think that, in justice to the other division, I could accede to this request; and I therefore decided to issue an order directing the officers to give up any valuables they might have obtained from the Summer Palace for the purpose of putting them into a general stock, which would afterwards be divided equally. These directions were accordingly promulgated; and I was greatly pleased to find that a quantity of articles of value were given up by a number of gentlemen who, when they found the French making such havoc among the treasures, had thought there could be no harm in appropriating a few things to themselves. I felt very proud of their liberal and honourable behaviour; and I therefore resolved to take a great responsibility upon myself, and at once to divide the spoil amongst the officers and men of the British force at that moment at Peking. It was sold by auction, and, together with what had been handed over to us by the French, realised a good round sum. Colonel Walker, Major Wilmot, and Captain Anson were appointed prize agents. Their task was a difficult and an arduous one, but they performed it with great ability. Wilmot took sole charge of the accounts, and kept them with admirable regularity. I declined to take my own

share of the proceeds of the sale; and the two generals of division, Sir John Michel and Sir Robert Napier, in the handsomest way waived their claims. Strictly speaking, I had of course no right to take this step; but considering the lenient laws of France on the subject, and the strict way in which I had as much as possible prevented the men from plundering, I thought I was justified in thus acting. I wrote to Mr Sidney Herbert, Secretary of State for War, informing him of my intention, which I hoped, I said, would be approved of.

HEADQUARTERS, PEKIN, *October 21, 1860.*

SIR,—This palace was full of valuable works of art, chiefly of Chinese manufacture; and although an attempt was made to effect a division of the property between the two nations, yet it became virtually a state of indiscriminate plunder. Being unwilling to expose the English army to the demoralising influence of such a state of affairs, I kept them confined to their bivouac in front of Peking, and appointed officers to collect as far as possible what belonged to the English. The whole of the property thus collected by officers was sold at public auction by my orders, realising about £8000. In addition to this, specie to the amount of about £18,000 was discovered in the palace, and the whole amount being comparatively small, I considered it would only be a just and proper thing to divide

this money on the spot amongst the army. My principal reason for this was because our men saw all the French soldiers laden with dollars and sycee silver, and knowing that the palace had been given up to plunder, might naturally feel dissatisfied at not being allowed to participate; whereas, if they saw everything fairly divided, they would have no reason to complain. Moreover, without the prospect of such a division, it would have been difficult to have prevented any but the best men from going to the palace without leave, to plunder for themselves. I have therefore caused the money to be divided in the following manner—viz., one-third between the officers, and two-thirds between the non-commissioned officers and men; the major-generals and myself resigning all claims to share in the prize. The distribution has been restricted to those actually present with the force before Peking.—I have the honour, &c.,

J. HOPE GRANT, Lt.-Gen.,  
*Commander of the Forces.*

The Right Hon. the SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.

In course of time I received an answer from Lord John Russell, saying that "I had taken a grave responsibility upon myself"; but her Majesty had, under the circumstances stated by me, approved of what I had done.

[The sum realised by the sale amounted to about £8000, which with £18,000 in specie, handed over to

us by the French, was divided into three shares. One share was reserved for distribution among the officers at a more convenient date, and the other two were on the spot divided among the men, so that by the 16th October every private soldier with the army before Peking received about £4; and thus for the first time, perhaps, British troops rejoiced in the speedy apportionment of the spoils of war. Probably the general considerations by which Sir Hope Grant was actuated are best made apparent by the following extract from a despatch written by him at the commencement of the campaign, in defence of a subordinate who was supposed to have exceeded his powers: "— must be aware that officers of her Majesty's army and navy are called upon to take on themselves certain responsibilities, and that an illegal act done to avert a great public evil is not only justifiable, but praiseworthy."—H. K.]

Numbers of beautiful ornaments were now put up for sale; and the officers, knowing they were to get their prize-money, at once bade freely, and the articles sold for great prices. A small, yellow, Chinese teacup realised £22. The prize committee secured a beautiful gold jug, from which the Emperor of China used to pour rose-water upon his delicate hands, and this they presented to me in a very handsome manner. There were two beautiful large enamel vases which had been given up by Major Probyn, and they were so handsome that I requested him and the prize

committee to allow me to send them to the Queen, to which they readily agreed.

On the 10th October the Commissioner Hang-ki begged to be allowed to visit the Summer Palace in company with Parkes. I consented, and gave him an escort. Parkes told me it was most distressing to see the poor man. He seated himself upon the edge of one of the little lakes, put his head between his hands, and burst into tears, saying that everything was lost, and that he should destroy himself. His principal object in coming, however, was to discover the body of the governor of the palace, who was a great friend of his, and who was supposed to have drowned himself. The body was afterwards found in one of the lakes, and Hang-ki returned to Peking.

This day, 10th October, General de Montauban and I, with the approval of Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, sent a letter to Prince Kung, informing him that unless he chose to give us up one of the gates of the Tartar town, we should batter down an entrance for ourselves. We gave him until twelve o'clock mid-day on the 13th to consider our proposal, and if it were not then agreed to our guns would open fire. The French general and I then started off to the An-ting Gate to reconnoitre. White flags were hoisted in every direction, and Tartar soldiers lined the parapets; but they took no notice of us, and I rode so close up to the walls that I was able to let my horse drink out of the ditch. Within 200

yards of the town was the "Temple of the Earth," a set of handsome buildings surrounded with high massive walls; and opposite this point the water in the ditch was scarcely a foot deep. I fixed on this spot for my breaching batteries, and I ordered the heavy guns which had been brought up from the depot to be taken within the temple, and covering earthworks to be thrown up. The French established their batteries a little higher up, and within 60 yards of the wall. They had only field-artillery, brass rifled guns, throwing a 24-pounder shot; and their commanding officer of artillery, Colonel de Bentzman, told me he much doubted their power to effect a breach, but that they would serve to distract the attention of the enemy. On 12th October a proclamation was published for the benefit of the inhabitants of Peking, warning them that if peace were not made by mid-day on the morrow, the attack against the place would begin, in which case they were recommended to quit the town, as we could not answer for the consequences. The merchants realised the peril of their situation, and went in a body to Prince Kung, whom they urged to give up the gate. Poor Kung, in an agony of distress, replied that it might cost him his life to comply with their request; but that, nevertheless, if they would support him, and declare their earnest desire that our demands should be agreed to, he would yield. Parkes accordingly went to meet Hang-ki by



appointment, and was informed by him that the Chinese agreed to our terms, and that the An-ting Gate would be given up on the following day, on the understanding that if the treaty were signed and the prisoners returned to us, the town should be uninjured, and our soldiers should not enter it in greater numbers than might be required as an escort for the ambassadors. To all this we agreed, and then Hang-ki delivered up nine of the still missing prisoners—viz., eight Sikhs and one Frenchman.<sup>1</sup> Late in the evening of the 12th, a letter arrived from Prince Kung for Lord Elgin, wherein he bitterly complained of the state to which the Summer Palace had been reduced—the more unjustifiable, he said, because peace had been concluded. This was false, because it was as yet by no means even certain that the terms would be agreed to.

The 13th October was the great day on which the question of peace or a continuation of the war was to be decided, and all was made ready to recommence hostilities should the gate not be given up. At 10 A.M. Parkes set off for another interview with Hang-ki. The guns were placed in position ready for breaching the wall—viz., four 8-inch guns for battering, two Armstrong guns to play also upon the breach, two to fire down the road, and two in reserve.

<sup>1</sup> In all probability the current report of the rebel army being only 100 miles north of Peking, and about to march on the capital, powerfully influenced Hang-ki in coming to terms with us at any price.

The 9-pounder battery, about 400 yards to the right of the heavy guns, was destined to keep down the fire from the walls. The mortars, in the south-west angle of the Temple of the Earth, would supplement the fire on the breach ; and a ledge in the wall served as a banquette for our infantry.

However, by noon<sup>1</sup> on the 13th October the An-ting Gate was given up, and Sir Robert Napier marched in with 300 of the 67th Regiment, and with 100 of the 8th Punjab Infantry. Our force took possession of a portion of the wall, extending from the right of the gate ; and the French occupied that to the left. We, both of us, posted a battery so as to command the approaches. The gate itself was a fine massive structure, with a three-storeyed guard-house on the top of it. The wall round the town, which, as far as I could ascertain, extended over a circumference of sixteen miles, was indeed a wonderful sight. Ancient history tells us the walls of Babylon were so broad that several chariots could be driven abreast on the top of them ; but I really think those of Peking must have exceeded them. They were upwards of 50 feet in breadth, very nearly the same in height, in excellent repair, and paved on the top, where, I am sure, five coaches-and-four could with a little management have been driven abreast. Lieut.-Colonel Thomas,<sup>2</sup> 67th Regiment, was placed in command of our troops at this gate ; and the position was

<sup>1</sup> At a few minutes only before twelve o'clock.

<sup>2</sup> Since dead.



WALLS OF PEKIN.—Hang-Ki and the Tartar Commander-in-Chief surrender possession to the British.



further strengthened by Sir R. Napier, by a traverse, with a couple of guns.

On the 14th October two more sowars, the only remaining survivors of our prisoners, were sent in. They reported the deaths of Mr Bowlby, Private Phipps of the King's Dragoon Guards, and two sowars. The bodies of eight of the victims—six English and two French—were brought in in coffins, which contained little but mere bones. By the clothes, however, we were able to identify the remains as those of Lieutenant Anderson, Messrs De Norman and Bowlby, and two sowars. General Ignatieff very kindly expressed his hope that the bodies of our countrymen might be buried in the Russian cemetery at Peking, and asked to be allowed to attend the ceremony. We were, of course, very grateful for the offer; and on the 17th October the funeral took place. General de Montauban and his staff were present. The Russian ambassador was, owing to indisposition, unable to attend, but was represented by his suite. Lord Elgin and I were the chief mourners; and a procession, consisting of a troop of the King's Dragoon Guards, a troop of Fane's Horse, and one officer with 25 men from each English regiment, followed in the *cortége*. The band was furnished by the 60th Rifles.

I shall never forget the bitter cold of that day: the hills were white with snow, and a north-east wind blew with the cold piercing blast of winter. We

marched down to the cemetery, which was situated just outside the walls of Peking; the coffins were laid in one large grave; the burial-service was read without any pomp or display; and we then left the bodies of our poor countrymen in their last sad resting-place.

General de Montauban was not prepared for such a simple ceremony, and expressed his surprise when it was concluded. It was certainly a contrast to the funeral of the French soldiers, which took place on the 28th October. Of course I attended with many of my officers; and I also sent a squadron of the King's Dragoon Guards. General Ignatieff, his staff, and that of the British embassy, accompanied the procession; but Lord Elgin, owing to a severe attack of influenza, was confined to his house. We passed under the walls of the city—which by this time was in possession—and through the suburbs, to the old French Jesuit cemetery, a handsome enclosure, wherein was dug one large deep grave, with a ramp down which the coffins were conveyed, thus sparing the awkwardness and annoyance of lowering by ropes, and laid side by side. Then the ceremony was begun by an old French *abbé*,<sup>1</sup> who had been so long at Peking that he had almost forgotten his own language. Sundry other priests, attended by Chinese boys, assisted—all in full canonicals. One of them came forward and made an oration on the merits of the deceased; this was followed by reading the service,

<sup>1</sup> The Abbé de Luc.



THE RETURN OF THE PRISONERS.—Identification of the Bodies by Moonlight.





accompanied by continual tinklings of bells. Then General de Montauban put an instrument into my hands, which contained the holy water, and with which I was requested to sprinkle the coffins. This went rather against the grain; but as I perceived Sir Robert Napier—an excellent man—occupied with the same business, with stolid gravity, but with a look of suppressed humour, I no longer hesitated. Next Colonel de Bentzman read a funeral oration; and General de Montauban made an excellent speech, winding up by saying, “Adieu, mes amis, adieu!” Now came the most singular part of the whole ceremony. Every French soldier present marched past the tomb singly, firing his rifle against the coffins, which in a short time were covered with exploded cartridge-papers. This concluded the funeral.

In consequence of the murder of the greater number of our captured countrymen, and the barbarities committed on all, Lord Elgin and I thought it was necessary that the Tartar Emperor should be visited with some severe punishment and signal mark of retribution, and we therefore decided to burn his splendid Summer Palace to the ground. General de Montauban objected to this destruction, and would not co-operate with us.

By this time the prisoners had been delivered up into our hands, or had been otherwise accounted for, and therefore their fate could not be affected by any retaliatory measures I might adopt.

[Sir Hope Grant's reasons for thus acting are explained in detail in the following despatch :—

HEADQUARTERS, PEKIN,  
18th October 1860.

SIR,—With reference to your Excellency's letter of yesterday's date, No. 123, I have the honour to state my reasons for wishing to destroy the palace of Yuan-min-yuan—first, because it was in that place that the prisoners were treated with such barbarity, being bound hand and foot together for three days, with nothing to eat or drink; and, secondly, because the English nation will not be satisfied unless more lasting marks of our sense of the barbarous manner in which they have violated the laws of nations be inflicted on the Chinese Government.

If we were to now make peace, sign the treaty, and retire, the Chinese Government would see that our countrymen can be seized and murdered with impunity. It is necessary to undeceive them on this point.

The Summer Palace of the Emperor has certainly been plundered, but the damage inflicted upon it could be repaired in a month. The very day the French army left Yuan-min-yuan, the palace was again taken possession of by the Chinese authorities, and five Chinamen caught plundering there were executed by them. My patrols have since found the place locked up, and the houses not destroyed.

It has been well ascertained that the palace of Yuan-min-yuan is considered as a most important place. The destruction of it is a blow aimed entirely at the Chinese Government, by whom, and not by the people, have these atrocities been committed; and it is a blow that will be felt most severely by the Chinese Government, whilst on the score of humanity there can be no objection urged against it.

I beg further to add that Lord Elgin holds the same opinions as I do on this subject.—I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HOPE GRANT, Lt.-Gen.,  
*Commander of the Forces.*

To his Excellency Lieut.-Gen. DE MONTAUBAN,  
Commanding H.I.M.'s Forces, China.

A despatch to the same effect was written by Sir Hope Grant to the Secretary of State for War, London.—H. K.]

On 18th October Sir John Michel's division, with the greater part of the cavalry brigade, were marched to the place, and set the whole pile of buildings on fire. It was a magnificent sight. I could not but grieve at the destruction of so much ancient grandeur, and felt that it was an uncivilised proceeding; but I believed it to be necessary as a future warning to the Chinese against the murder of European envoys, and the violation of the laws of nations.

We had written to Prince Kung stating our intention to burn the palace, and demanding an in-

demnity of 300,000 taels,<sup>1</sup> which would be given to the families of the murdered prisoners. The French demanded 200,000<sup>2</sup> taels for a similar purpose. The money was at once paid, and the signature of the treaty fixed for the 23d October.<sup>3</sup>

On the 22d October a report was brought to me through the French Roman Catholic missionary, Monsieur Mahé, that treachery was intended on our entering the town. He stated he had heard from many Chinese converts on whom he could rely, that infernal machines were placed in different houses by which we should have to pass, and that the guns on the walls were turned against the building in which the treaty was to be signed. He added that a large force of the enemy was encamped on the west side of the city. As I thought there might be some truth in all these rumours, I sent Major Probyn, with the two Irregular Cavalry regiments, to reconnoitre in the direction alluded to. The force suddenly came upon an intrenched camp, where further progress was stopped by infantry lining a bank, and who with levelled matchlocks threatened to open fire. As Probyn had obtained all the information that was necessary, and as nothing was to be gained by

<sup>1</sup> £100,000.

<sup>2</sup> £66,666.

<sup>3</sup> On 22d October. This was in addition to the sum demanded for the expenses of the war, amounting to 8,000,000 taels = £2,666,666. It was further guaranteed on the part of the English that out of this sum, 2,000,000 (£666,666) should be given to the British Canton merchants for losses sustained by them. The whole of this money was paid.—H. K.

bringing on a collision, he very wisely retired. This decided me to make every preparation for emergencies, and on the morning of the 24th October, to which date the signature of the English treaty had been unavoidably postponed, I directed Sir Robert Napier to march in, and with the 2d division to occupy the main street leading to the "Hall of Ceremonies," a task which he performed with great accuracy and judgment. I also posted a field-battery at the An-ting Gate, ready for action at a moment's notice. Lord Elgin started in the afternoon, accompanied by myself and staff, 400 infantry, 100 cavalry, and two bands playing at the head of the procession. I rode alongside our ambassador, who was conveyed in a richly-ornamented sedan-chair, to the hall, a distance of three miles. The main street was broad and handsome, but the roadway was atrocious. The centre was raised high and much broken, and was flanked by two minor tracks, almost impassable from holes and pools of water. There was a vast concourse of spectators, men, women, and children, but none of them showed the slightest animosity against us. It took us about an hour to reach the Hall of Ceremonies, where the treaty was to be signed, and which was quite separate from the Tartar portion of the town. We entered the gates of the hall, marched through gardens, up the paved way, and on approaching the grand entrance were met by Prince Kung and about 500 mandarins,

some of whom were princely looking fellows, dressed in silk robes of state. The Prince came up and closed his hands in front of his face, according to the Chinese salute; but Lord Elgin returned him a proud contemptuous look, and merely bowed slightly, which must have made the blood run cold in poor Kung's veins. He was a delicate gentlemanlike-looking man, evidently overpowered with fear. We were placed in chairs of state, in the most honourable position, the left-hand side, and the convention was laid before the Imperial Commissioner, who on this occasion was invested with full powers. After talking over several points, he signed it and ratified the former treaty. Hang-ki, the other commissioner, was evidently a clever and clear-headed person, old in appearance, pale, delicate, and very thoroughbred-looking.

In the midst of the ceremony the indefatigable Signor Beato, who was very anxious to take a good photograph of "the Signing of the Treaty," brought forward his apparatus, placed it at the entrance door, and directed the large lens of the camera full against the breast of the unhappy Prince Kung. The royal brother looked up in a state of terror, pale as death, and with his eyes turned first to Lord Elgin and then to me, expecting every moment to have his head blown off by the infernal machine opposite him—which really looked like a sort of mortar, ready to disgorge its terrible contents into his

devoted body. It was explained to him that no such evil design was intended, and his anxious pale face brightened up when he was told that his portrait was being taken. The treaty was signed, and the whole business went off satisfactorily, except as regards Signor Beato's picture, which was an utter failure, owing to want of proper light. Refreshments were offered to us, which Lord Elgin declined, and, after a proper amount of bowing, we took our departure. The following day the French treaty was also signed. The war was now at an end, and the good tidings were conveyed home by my aide-de-camp, Anson.

The weather became bitterly cold, some of the hills being covered with snow; and as—according to the information which General Ignatieff, with his usual extreme kindness, furnished me—the Peiho would soon become frozen up, and as it would be unsafe to linger at Peking, I was anxious to return as soon as possible to Tien-tsin, there to make preparations for embarking our troops. In the first instance, therefore, I settled to start on our return journey on the 1st November; but Lord Elgin was very desirous that we should remain eight or ten days longer—by which time, it was hoped, an edict would have arrived from the Emperor at Gehol, on the north side of the great wall of Tartary, and 130 miles from Peking, to which he had retreated. Without this edict the proclamation of peace could not be

published; and Lord Elgin was very anxious that the terms should be made known to the Chinese at Peking before his departure. I therefore agreed to postpone our march until the 7th and 8th November. The French general, however, would not wait, and started on the 1st November, leaving a battalion of 450 men as a guard for Baron Gros, who had taken up his residence in the town.

As a general rule, our soldiers were not allowed to enter Peking, but commanding officers were empowered to give passes to non-commissioned officers and very steady men. Thus order was maintained, and the inhabitants soon gained confidence. In this, as in all Chinese cities, there was a street occupied by curiosity-shops, and it was amusing to see the way these houses were beset with English and French purchasers; and the sums they paid away must have been very great. There were quaint articles of antiquity in carved rock, jade-stones, enamels, porcelain, and bronzes.

On the 2d November the edict arrived from the Emperor, giving full powers to publish the treaty. The printing of it was a tedious and troublesome affair; but Parkes and Wade set to work Chinese carvers, who cut it out on wooden blocks, and it was ready for circulation on the 7th. Sir Robert Napier's division had already started; and on that day, Bruce, Lord Elgin's successor, arrived at Peking, and on the 8th he was formally installed as ambassador. On the



9th I marched away from the place with the remaining (Sir John Michel's) division — as did likewise Baron Gros with his escort. Both forces moved off without any attempt to annoy us on the part of the people, who indeed seemed rather sorry than otherwise at our departure. At the end of the third day's march I hastened on to Tien-tsin, the place of embarkation, and on the arrival of the infantry I instantly sent them off.<sup>1</sup> It was fortunate that I thus acted, as, shortly after their departure, the frost set in with such intensity that in three days the river was frozen over, and navigation rendered impossible. The cavalry waited to the last, as I intended to march them down from Tien-tsin to Taku, thirty-four miles distant, in two days, where they were to embark. A severe snowstorm, accompanied with frost, came on, with symptoms of the water communication being closed, and I became very anxious to hurry them down as soon as possible. I therefore gave orders that the whole distance should be accomplished in one day's march—somewhat to Brigadier Pattle's dismay, who declared that I should kill men and horses, and asked if I would allow him to write a formal remonstrance. I told him he might write what he liked, but that go he must. A thirty-four miles' march was nothing for cavalry to perform in one day. Probyn, on the other hand, was most

<sup>1</sup> To England, India, and some few regiments to the garrisons in China.

anxious for the plan,<sup>1</sup> and I allowed him to march independently. He started very early, and got in a little after 3 P.M.; the King's Dragoon Guards at 8 A.M., and arrived at 8 P.M.

[I have found comments elsewhere in Sir Hope's handwriting on this circumstance. After praising Probyn, he concludes: "Where there's a will there's a way."]

Every man and horse reached their destination the same evening, although the roads were certainly in a fearful state; and in two days after they were all safely on board ship.<sup>2</sup> The Taku forts, Tien-tsin, Shanghai, Hong-Kong, and Canton, were, for the

<sup>1</sup> Extract of a despatch from Sir Hope Grant to Lord Canning relating to the services of the two Sikh Irregular Cavalry regiments:—

HEADQUARTERS, TIEN-TSIN, Nov. 21, 1860.

MY LORD,—The 1st Sikh Irregular Cavalry, under Major Probyn, and Fane's Horse, under Captain Fane, have performed their work most admirably. On more than one occasion these regiments have been opposed to, and have successfully charged, a vastly superior force of the enemy's cavalry; and their conduct in the field excited the admiration of the French as well as of the English troops.

It is not only on the field of battle that their services have been so important during the recent campaign, but in performing the numerous other duties required of them of an infinitely more harassing nature—patrols, escorts, reconnaissances, as well as the task of carrying letters almost daily between Tien-tsin and Peking (a distance of seventy-five miles) for upwards of a month, during which they were frequently fired upon—their services have been of the utmost value to the expedition. I beg to recommend Major Probyn and Captain Fane to your Excellency's most favourable notice.

—I have, &c.,

J. HOPE GRANT, *Lieut.-General*,  
*Commander of the Forces.*

<sup>2</sup> A similar feat was performed by Stirling's Battery *minus* their guns.

present, occupied by strong English garrisons; but the greater part of our army was now embarked, and on the way either to India or England.

At Tien-tsin I found my wife, who was attended by an extraordinary old Chinese hag. One night my wife was disturbed by her special aversion, a rat, which was drinking the oil out of a lamp. She invoked the assistance of the hag to drive away the intruder, but the only answer she got was, "What for you wake me? I no cat; I no can killee rat;" and the surly old creature went to sleep again.

*[Remarks on the French march to Yuan-min-yuan, and on the pillage and destruction of the Palace. Results attained by the war.]*

It would be almost an affectation of silence to write any record of the China war without bringing forward the topic. Sir Hope has in his Journal treated it with the utmost tenderness; but I trust that, in my capacity of Editor, and with a view of refuting unjust aspersions, it may be allowable for me to enter at greater length on the points at issue. There surely cannot be the smallest doubt that the march of the French on the Summer Palace took us completely by surprise. It is certain that, about 9 A.M. on the 6th October, Sir Hope Grant and General de Montauban agreed that their joint forces should make Yuan-min-yuan their objective point, whither Sang-ko-lin-sin's

army had, it was reported, retreated; it is certain that, at the same time, the British cavalry was pushed well forward to the right front, with instructions to endeavour to cut off the enemy's retreat on the palace road: but it is equally certain that, when this plan of operations was concerted, the English general did not for an instant anticipate that his coadjutor would accomplish alone that which they had settled should be carried out hand in hand. When the armies, after a halt for breakfast, resumed their march at 10.30, the French, according to the arrangements for precedence for that day, were on our left, next to Peking. Between them and the road leading to the Summer Palace was the entire British force, and Sir Hope assumed, as a matter of course, that this relative position would be maintained. During the march the French dropped a little behind, crossed our rear, and then made straight for Yuan-min-yuan. No intimation had been given by them that they contemplated any such change of direction; and the English, utterly unacquainted with this movement, continued their march in search of the enemy, and halted late in the afternoon, not far from the north-west gate of the city of Peking. There they expected to find the French in position on their left, and we fully anticipated an attack from the Tartars. But their allies had disappeared.

The presence of our cavalry with the French might at first sight lead to the inference that the latter

assumed Sir Hope Grant to be aware of the fresh route taken, and to have tacitly agreed to the change of programme. Such a chain of reasoning is rendered entirely untenable by the following statement.

Brigadier Pattle was ordered to march to some convenient place on the broad northern road leading to the Teh-shun, or second gate, on the north face of Peking, as it was thought that in all probability the Tartars would retreat along this road whenever the design should be put into execution of attacking their encampment outside the city with British and French infantry from the east. The cavalry brigade, on reaching their destination, found, to their surprise, that the French had arrived before them. General de Montauban expressed his determination to march on to the Summer Palace; and as Brigadier Pattle had been ordered to endeavour to keep up a communication with the French on his left, it is to be presumed he thought that, under the altered circumstances, he could not do wrong by now feeling into them on his right; and he therefore followed them in their march.

"On arriving at the Summer Palace, the French Commander-in-Chief persuaded the Brigadier to move on with the English cavalry to more open ground, while the French encamped just outside the palace, and French guards were put over the entrances to the palace instead of joint French and English guards, as might easily have been done."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "One who was there," *'Times,'* March 13, 1874. See also *'Narrative of the China War,'* p. 221.

Extracts from a letter from Lieut.-Colonel A. Anson to Sir Hope Grant :—

MENTONE, *March 16* [1874].

. . . This Summer Palace controversy has roused me, and particularly Foley's letter on Saturday. I had written a letter to the 'Times,' which may or may not be in to-morrow. I said the French were between us and the city in our advance on Pekin; that, waiting till their flank was clear of us, they marched across our rear straight for the Summer Palace; and I wound up by saying that Montauban had no business there at all. Foley, however, says the contrary—that the Summer Palace was our original destination, and that you diverged from your course, not Montauban. This seems to me to be incredible; it is opposed to all my recollection. The wonder in our camp as to where the French had got to; the fact of the cavalry being sent to cover our right flank; and, above all, that if you had such intentions, you would have left Pekin a few miles on your left rear unwatched,—this alone makes Foley's account impossible.

I think that point ought to be cleared up. Montauban had no right to speak as he has done, and throw all the blame on us; and the truth of these things ought to be known.

Count Palikao, in his evidence before a French Committee, 1874, declares that the palace itself was never sacked.

When we had driven away the Tartars<sup>1</sup> who took refuge at the extremity of the enclosure, I had sentries posted, and directed two officers, with two companies of marine infantry, to protect the palace from depredation, and to allow nothing

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<sup>1</sup> About twenty badly-armed slaves made some pretence at resistance, but were quickly disposed of.—See 'Narrative of the China War,' p. 224.

to be removed until the arrival of the English commanders, to whom I immediately sent. Thus there could be no pillage." "Nothing," the General distinctly asserted, "had been touched in the palace when the English arrived."

Evidence to the contrary, however, exists in overwhelming abundance. Major-General Foley says:<sup>1</sup>—

I cannot agree that the palace was not sacked. It is true that General de Montauban gave orders that nothing should be touched until the arrival of Sir Hope Grant; but I saw a woful difference in the appearance of the wondrously magnificent collections which met the eye upon the first entrance into the palace, at 6 A.M. on the 7th October, of General de Montauban, his staff, and myself, and that which presented itself upon our return to the palace after breakfast about 11.30 A.M. Sir Hope Grant arrived about 1 P.M.

All the above is fully confirmed by "An Eyewitness"<sup>2</sup> and "One who was there." The former writes:—

Those who were present when the English Ambassador and the French General met, will long remember . . . the impressive assertion that nothing in the palace had been removed or injured. But they will remember also the evidence of their own senses. They saw that tents occupied by French officers of all ranks were full of plunder, &c.

"One who was there" states:—

At the palace I found looting going on everywhere. Officers of the French army of all ranks, French non-commissioned officers and men, were looting systematically.

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<sup>1</sup> 'Times,' March 14, 1874.

<sup>2</sup> Letter to 'Times,' March 18, 1874.

The following is an extract from the note-book of an officer on the English Headquarter Staff:—

*October 7th.*—The General and Lord Elgin rode over to the palace. The French were looting it from end to end. . . . *October 8th.*—The looting in the palace [is being carried on] to a frightful extent to-day. Many of the things put aside for the Queen had been looted by the French.

Lastly, Sir Hope Grant himself declared that any attempted refutation of any single one of the above allegations would be a puerile waste of time, so certain beyond cavil was their truth. He used to laugh at the mere recollection of the dodge, the burglary, and the Whitechapel-like plundering perpetrated by, not only the lowest but the highest of the French.

It is scarcely too much to say that the China war of 1860 may be considered the most successful and the best carried out of England's "little wars." "Little" as regards our expense and numbers; "great" indeed as regards results. No mistake occurred to mar the outline of the whole, and in the short space of three months the Chinese received three defeats in the open: their strong forts of Taku, on which they based their powers of resistance, were captured; and their capital itself was forced to succumb under the guns of the invaders. We obtained freedom of action for our merchants throughout the whole of the empire; we procured for the civilised world protection from the oppression and barbarous outrages



which the nation had been previously wont to inflict upon strangers ; we struck a salutary blow at the pride of China, which, as experience shows, has been successful in convincing her that she is no match for the peoples of Europe ; and, above all, we exacted from them the Treaty of Peking, which has proved far more lasting than any former engagements with that nation. And yet this subjugation of a great and remote oriental empire was, and still is, but coldly regarded by the British public, and those who accomplished it received but scanty acknowledgment. The reason is not far to seek. The exploit was unaccompanied by reverse or blunder, and without these features it is in vain to hope for enthusiasm and interest.

After the signing of the Treaty of Peking Sir Hope Grant proceeded first to Shanghai, then to Japan, then retracing his steps returned to Europe, staying on his way at Paris, where he arrived in April 1861, and where he was treated with considerable distinction by the French Government, who warmly appreciated his loyal co-operation with, and his forbearance towards, General de Montauban, afterwards created Count of Palikao.—H. KNOLLYS.]

*Journal resumed.*—When I was in Paris I met General Vinoy and his wife at dinner. He had a very taking manner, and his wife was quite charming. After dinner I was talking with her whilst holding in

my hand a cup of coffee, which caused her the greatest disquietude lest it should be spilt over her beautiful dress. She could not forbear begging me to take care, and I got up to relieve her mind by putting the cup on the table, when, in so doing, I jerked against a footman's elbow, stumbled, and emptied the whole of the coffee into the lap of the lady's lovely dress. My annoyance and mortification were excessive, and I did my very best to apologise; but Madame Vinoy, with the most charming French manners, passed it off as a matter of no importance, and accepted the mishap with the utmost good nature.

The Emperor Napoleon sent for me to the Tuileries, and I was conducted there by our Ambassador, Lord Cowley. We were ushered into a room with a large table covered with papers, and I beheld the great autocrat of the world, seated like a scribe amongst his documents, and completely absorbed in them. He rose on our entrance, and with a manner perfectly unlike a Frenchman, came up to me, shook hands, and after some complimentary remarks began to talk about the China campaign. He observed that he thought it would have been advisable that the Allied Armies should have put down the rebellion<sup>1</sup> which was distracting the empire before leaving the country. We had a long conversation upon similar matters, and at last he rose up, and we took our departure,

<sup>1</sup> *I.e.*, the Taeping revolt.



MR. (NOW SIR H. B.) LOCH DEPARTS FROM PEKIN FOR ENGLAND WITH CHINESE TREATY.



his farewell words being, "Will you give my respects to the Queen?" His manner was high-bred and gentlemanlike. He appeared to weigh every sentence before he spoke, and there was a stolid, sober look about his countenance, which corresponded to my idea neither of a Frenchman nor an Englishman.

## CHAPTER XXI.

1861—1865.

ENGLAND, AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AT MADRAS.

SPEECH AT ROYAL ACADEMY DINNER—INVITED TO DINE WITH QUEEN  
 —BILL OF COSTS FOR G.C.B.—RECEIVES FREEDOM OF PERTH—SIR  
 CHARLES WOOD WITHHOLDS OUTFIT ALLOWANCE—PROCEEDS TO  
 MADRAS—SPORT—LAWRENCE ASYLUM—INSPECTIONS—SALAR JUNG  
 —SYSTEM OF IRREGULAR TROOPS—SHOOTING AND HUNTING—PRACTICAL  
 JOKES—RIFLE PRACTICE—SIR WILLIAM DENISON—SIR C.  
 WOOD APPOINTS SIR W. MANSFIELD OVER SIR HOPE'S HEAD—AN-  
 DAMAN ISLANDS—DEPARTURE FROM MADRAS.

SHORTLY after I reached London, I attended the dinner of the Royal Academy, of which my brother Frank was President. I foresaw that I should have to make a speech, but I also knew that this necessity would frequently be imposed upon me, and so I decided that the sooner I began the more quickly I should feel at home at the work. I managed to make my maiden speech without much difficulty or a breakdown. I only said a little, but little was expected from me. I confess that after it was over I felt as if a horrible load had been taken off my mind, and it was more trying than having to fight a battle.

[Sir Hope's inaptitude at speaking was extreme. Even when his opinions and intentions were as clear as daylight, he could never find grammatical sentences to fit them, although he possessed a certain rough pathos of expression both in speaking and writing.]

I was sitting next to my brother, and after dinner David Roberts the painter came up and said, "You two have made the most charming picture of 'Peace and War.' There is your brother, happy, contented-looking, and comfortable; and you, tall, worn, and gaunt. It has quite delighted us."

I was elected an Honorary Member of the Senior and Junior United Service Clubs. The Senior gave me a dinner, at which the Duke of Cambridge presided, and proposed my health in very complimentary terms. I also dined at the Mansion House and at the Merchant Taylors. Lord Elgin and myself were also invited by our respective staffs to a dinner at the London Tavern—the very best to which I ever sat down.<sup>1</sup>

Sir Charles Phipps,<sup>2</sup> Comptroller of the Household, wrote to me, by direction of the Queen, stating that she regretted very much she had been unable to see me in consequence of the death of her mother, the Duchess of Kent, but that she hoped soon to

<sup>1</sup> It has been implied that during the Chinese operations a little occasional tension—friendly tension—existed between Lord Elgin and Sir Hope. The entire tenor of the private correspondence and personal communication between the two points to an exactly contrary conclusion.

<sup>2</sup> Colonel Sir Charles Phipps, K.C.B., died 1866.

have an opportunity of receiving me. The letter seemed to require no answer, but some days afterwards a second communication came from Sir Charles, through the Horse Guards, inquiring why I had not sent a reply. I could only say I was very sorry. In May I was invited to dine at Buckingham Palace. A few days before the date I betook myself to —<sup>1</sup> in order to find out some particulars as to my proper behaviour, and I said to him, "Will her Majesty shake hands with me?" My reason for the inquiry was that I really wanted to know whether I ought to go down on one knee or two knees, or in fact what I ought to do. But — drew himself up, looked dignified, and said, "Her Majesty never shakes hands with any one. She will bow to you, and perhaps speak to you." So —'s speech relieved me much.

On reaching Buckingham Palace, I was ushered into a long gallery where were several guests, and after waiting about twenty minutes, her Majesty and suite entered. She was accompanied by her charming daughter, the Princess Alice, a tall, high-bred, graceful young lady, who was about to be married to the Prince of Hesse. King Leopold of Belgium was also present. Her Majesty in passing gave me a very graceful bow, and Prince Albert came up and shook hands with me. There was no particular constraint in the conversation. Of course it was not

<sup>1</sup> One of the Court officials.



noisy, but every one seemed quite at ease. After dinner I was talking with Colonel Biddulph,<sup>1</sup> when he suddenly warned me that her Majesty was coming up to speak to me. I looked up and saw the Queen advancing towards me. Nerves are very singular. Whether owing to my uncomfortable pair of tights, which every moment I feared were about to split, or whether owing to the solemnity of speaking to the Queen of England, I must confess I felt very awkward, and did not know what to do with my hands. Her Majesty, however, was most graceful and affable in her manner, and after a few words of conversation with her I felt quite at my ease. Her figure was very pretty and graceful and young looking for her age, and her voice was beautifully melodious.

[Here follow some very interesting notes of a very interesting conversation. After weighty matters had been discussed, Sir Hope remarks: "I was very much tempted to relate to the Queen an incident connected with the Rajah of Mysore, but thought it better taste to forbear. He had given a splendid gold cup, value £1000, at a race meeting. On this cup was an equestrian statue of her Majesty, and, anxious to do English royalty full justice, he had caused the head of the Queen to be encircled with a turban, and a ring to be passed through her nose—the highest honour awarded to native ladies."]

The Queen, after talking with me for a considerable

<sup>1</sup> General Sir Thomas Biddulph, K.C.B., died 1878.

time, bowed and retired. King Leopold also had a long conversation with me, which I found very interesting. He was an old man with a fine countenance, which I remember was very handsome in the days of my youth, when he was married to the late Princess Charlotte. In conversation he showed much talent. He was dignified in his demeanour, and he spoke our language as well as an Englishman. Then Prince Albert came up and conversed with me. He had a very agreeable countenance, and spoke English extremely well. He asked me whether I thought our troops at Tien-tsin might be removed. I said I thought it would be wise to take this step at once, on the ground of the good effect it would produce on the Chinese if they were led to believe we could remove and send back our forces with equal facility; whereas, were we to retain a small body in their country, they would cease to fear us. Her Majesty retired, and after her departure, Colonel Biddulph was sent with a message from the Queen that she was much obliged for a beautiful jade bowl from the Summer Palace which I had sent her, and that she regretted she had not thanked me for it when she spoke to me. I was also the bearer of a green jade and gold imperial sceptre, presented by the French General Montauban, for which her Majesty directed a letter of thanks should be written.

The Duke of Cambridge had treated me with great

kindness since my return home. I believe this was in consequence of the China war having been brought to a speedy and successful termination. He no doubt remembered the opposition made to my appointment as commander of the expedition, and was pleased that his selection had turned out well. He invited me to dinner, and there I met Sir Charles Wood,<sup>1</sup> Secretary of State for India. His first observation to me was, "I am happy to make your acquaintance, but sorry to find you here." I opened my eyes, and thought I had not heard him properly, but he went on to say, "Did you not receive my letter in China?" I said I had not. Dinner was announced and we were interrupted, but from the opposite side of the table Sir Charles Wood again called out to me, "Did you mean to say you have not received my letter?" Astonished, I again answered in the negative. After dinner he took me aside, and told me he had written a letter desiring me to proceed at once to take up my command at Madras, where my presence was much required to settle and carry out the amalgamation under the new system of the Queen's and Company's troops. This document should have arrived in China before my departure, but by some fortunate coincidence I had not received it. What an untimely bit of paper it would have been! I had been in the field

<sup>1</sup> Sir Charles Wood, afterwards Lord Halifax, was a warm supporter of Sir William Mansfield. Evidence suggests that he was not equally friendly disposed towards Sir Hope Grant.

under canvas for three hot seasons during the Mutiny, and I hardly think any living person could say likewise. I had also been through another hot season campaign in China, and it was absolutely necessary to have a little of the invigorating air of my native land to set me up before I again proceeded to the sultry atmosphere of Madras.

In June I was invested by the Queen with the Grand Cross of the Bath at Buckingham Palace. Sir Thomas Brotherton, an admiral, and Sir Patrick Grant received the order at the same time, and I felt proud that two Grants were to be thus distinguished simultaneously, since it told well for the old clan.

[Honours in this country are not unaccompanied with expense. I find a bill vouched for by "Albert Woods, Lancaster Herald," to the amount of £84, 4s., for "Fees, charges, and disbursements . . . for the matriculation of your arms, &c., . . . as G.C.B." Apparently the French do not tax the recipients of their compliments so heavily, for in a correspondence nominating him Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour, signed by Marshal Randon, there is no bill of costs. At the same time, with a perfect adherence to business-like economy, "Albert Woods, Lancaster Herald," requests Sir Hope Grant to send back his insignia of his former lower order, K.C.B., "for the use of her Majesty's Government."

Sir Hope Grant then proceeded to St Andrews, where he was absolutely absorbed in his delight at

once more playing golf. Several pages of his Journal are devoted to expatiating on this subject. Would indeed that he had been equally diffuse on his personal exploits at Sobraon, Chillianwallah, or Delhi.]

I have, I believe, played almost every game of the United Kingdom, but I have never seen any to equal the glorious game of golf. I have got up early in the morning and played till breakfast, which I scarcely gave myself time to finish, so keen was I to resume play. Then I used to set again to work, and played till it was dark, when I was sorry that the daylight had failed, and that I had been reluctantly driven from my amusement. Play ever so well or ever so indifferently, every one seems to feel the same excitement in the glorious game. There is an interest attached to each hole, and to each club in your possession. These latter you oil, and polish up, and look at with the delight a fond mother does on a dearly loved child. If you explain your fine strokes to some friend, and if he takes no interest in them, you set him down as an Englishman, and think of him with sorrow.

[At Perth, the freedom of the city was presented to him, and he was afterwards entertained at a grand banquet. In returning thanks he observed: "During the China campaign, amidst all the horrors and dangers of war, there was much to interest and amuse. When we landed at Peh-tang, the country around us was a large salt-marsh, and ere we were

enabled to set foot on shore, the tide had risen and covered the whole country. There was a raised causeway which ran from the Taku forts to Peh-tang, and General Montauban and myself determined to make for this position. There was a large Tartar cavalry picket on this road, but they seemed struck with surprise and terror at our amphibious appearance, and at two such fine armies marching up to their knees in water, with their trousers tucked up, carrying shoes and stockings in one hand, and in the other their weapons of destruction, and they never waited for an attack. Our first day's fight was upon the 12th August—grouse-shooting day. But we had, unhappily, other creatures to destroy. In the house where the famous Tartar general, San-ko-lin-sin, had resided, a despatch was found written by him to the Emperor, in which he said: 'English newspapers have been put into my hands which I have had translated, and in them it is stated the English mean to land at Peh-tang and take our forts. We know very well this is not likely to be the case. No nation would ever be so foolish as to state publicly the tactics they intended to pursue. Besides which, the country is quite impracticable, and I have troops all along the road who will soon annihilate them.' So, gentlemen, you will see that the way in which we tried to forewarn the Tartar general had the effect of putting him off his guard, as he could not believe in the truthfulness of our published prints."

I now began to make preparations for a start to Madras, where I was to take up my command of the troops in the Presidency. It was always usual for the Indian Government to give an officer going out in the above capacity the sum of £2000 to procure outfit, so I applied to Sir Charles Wood, Secretary of State for India, to be allowed to draw this money; but Sir Charles refused, stating that I was on leave in England, and was not entitled to the money unless I was sent out direct from home, and some old printed resolutions were shown me to this effect. No doubt I had commanded in China during the war, but I had had no opportunity of getting anything in the shape of an outfit, and Sir Charles Wood might have been amused had he witnessed the meagre equipment which I possessed. However, I had to grin and bear it. On the 26th of December 1861 I landed at Madras, and as there was no pier, I was carried through the heavy surf in a chair with my legs dangling beneath,—certainly not a dignified manner of marching into my command.

[Although the following possesses little special interest, it illustrates in a pleasant manner the thoroughness and courtesy with which Lord Canning, so inadequately appreciated in India, supervised his vast scope of government:—

CALCUTTA, *Jan.* 10, 1862.

MY DEAR SIR HOPE,—I have seen with pleasure the announcement of your safe arrival at Madras. I cannot pretend

to congratulate you individually on exchanging England for India; but on public grounds, at all events, I am heartily glad that the command which you have just taken up has been placed in such hands.

I had thought at one time of asking you to come on in the first instance to Calcutta for ten days; but I felt that the useful results of the visit would be small without a previous opportunity to you of seeing something of your new charge,—and I could not offer you a very cheerful reception.<sup>1</sup>

By this mail the instructions regarding the reduction of the army will go to the Madras Government. The amount to be reduced is eight regiments of infantry—a smaller number than I at one time contemplated, and certainly quite on the safe side. You are not asked to diminish your number, four, of native cavalry regiments.

If any measures for easing the hardship of reduction to the officers should occur to you, over and above those which have been adopted on this side of India, pray tell me of them. Any suggestion which could be applied to your army, without unfairness towards the armies of Bengal and Bombay, I should receive gladly. [Then follows a consideration of some details.]

I daresay you know more about Elgin's movements than I do. The Feroze has gone to meet him, and his last word on the subject was that he should be at Suez before the end of January. This will enable him to relieve me by 1st March, which was my only requirement. If sooner, so much the better. I hope you bring a good account of Lord Clyde. It will be a great pleasure to me to see him again.—Believe me, my dear Sir Hope, yours very faithfully, CANNING.]

During the hot months my wife and I used to go up to Ootacamund, in the Nilgherries, and a more

<sup>1</sup> Lord Canning was then stricken with grief by the recent death of his wife.



charming place does not, I think, exist. The villas are dotted round a pretty little lake. The climate was glorious, and so were the fine grass-hills, over which one could gallop for miles; and many a good run have I there had with a pack of fox-hounds after jackals instead of after foxes. The adjacent forests were very beautiful, and contained not only fine sambur (deer) but tigers. One day when we were on a picnic excursion with Sir William Denison,<sup>1</sup> Civil Governor of Madras, a most able, resolute, and charming man, with a fine temper, we were informed that a tiger had during the night killed a cow and a pony within half a mile of the house. Full of ardour, off we started after the ferocious animal, and the ladies proceeded to the top of the hills to witness the sport. It was not without danger; for to shoot tigers on foot is always a risky undertaking, in the event of the animal not being shot dead, however desperately wounded. On reaching the spot indicated, sure enough we saw the dead cow and the dead pony, and we were told that the tiger had probably taken up his abode in a small wood close at hand. We surrounded the cover, and several natives proceeded to beat the thick jungle. They made a most tremendous row, and had scarcely entered the wood when out bolted two fine tigers. One soon re-entered the wood, after two or three shots had been ineffectually fired at him, and from thence he

<sup>1</sup> Lieut.-General Sir William Denison, K.C.B., died 1871.

could not be dislodged. I fired a long shot at the other as he passed close by Sir William Denison, who, fortunately, was stationed upon a high bank above the animal's pathway. Sir William fired and struck him, and the brute turned round to charge; but, being badly wounded, he could not climb up the steep hill and reach his enemy ere he was bowled over by another shot from Sir William's son-in-law. As for the jackals to which I have alluded, they gave us many a good gallop over the open turf hills; but they ran in such form that they were seldom killed, and seemed to care so little for the hounds that they always resorted to the same spot.

[I have found the following incidents of sport cursorily noted amongst Sir Hope's papers, but without any accompanying dates:—]

Major Callnet one day when out shooting suddenly encountered a tiger, and was in the act of firing when the howdah gave way, and he fell almost into the animal's mouth. The tiger immediately seized him by the thigh and carried him off. While in this situation, he recollected he had a brace of pistols in his pocket. He managed to withdraw one, and snapped it at the beast's head, but it missed fire. He had, however, presence of mind to pull out the other, and fired. The tiger bounded on a few yards, and then dropped dead. Callnet told me of this occurrence himself. He was very badly wounded, and is still dreadfully lame.

Mr Young, of the Civil Service, told me that one day when he was in the jungle a native came up and reported that a tiger had forced his way into a hut, had badly wounded the occupant, and had subsequently taken up his abode in the dwelling. He made his way to the place indicated, and found the door closed. The wounded man, who was lying in another house, told him that the tiger had entered and struck him with his paw, whereupon the native had rushed out, closing the door behind him. Mr Young then further investigated the first-named hut, became aware of a most horrible smell, and mounting the roof, effected an entrance. The tiger charged; he fired both barrels, and turned round to get his second gun from his attendant, but the terrified fellow had bolted. The tiger was close up, and Young in despair lifted the gun with both hands in front of his head. The beast sprang, seized the barrel in his mouth, and then dropped dead. I saw the gun dented with the tiger's teeth.

Captain Drysdale, of the 9th Lancers, was out tiger-shooting on an elephant in the Dogra Daur, when he suddenly saw a large wild elephant standing in the jungle close to him. He fired, and the huge animal made for him. In rapid succession he discharged all his four guns—indeed at the last shot he had not time to raise his piece to his shoulder, but from his thigh fired point-blank against the elephant's head. Each bullet apparently glanced off harmlessly, and the

beast bowled Drysdale and tame elephant together head over heels. Drysdale was pitched forward a considerable distance, his legs were hurt, and fancying his antagonist would rush on him, was trying to scramble away. To his surprise, the wild elephant took no further notice of them, but, with every appearance of contempt, quietly marched off into the jungle.

My wife was incessantly occupied with the Female Military Orphan Asylum, with the "Lawrence Asylum" at Ootacamund, and with the Asylum for Soldiers' Sons at Madras. She spent the greater part of her time working amongst these children, till she nearly knocked herself up. We had a desperate fight in endeavouring to carry out arrangements for sending the children to the hills, but at last we were successful, and a magnificent plateau at Ootacamund was selected for the new site, called Lovedale.

In January 1862 we went to Calcutta on a visit to poor Lord Canning, who had recently lost his amiable and charming wife through jungle-fever contracted through sitting out in the sun sketching. He was terribly broken, in fact a complete wreck. Shortly afterwards, on his return home, he was carried off by liver-complaint. On the occasion of our visit his demeanour was, as usual, charming, agreeable, and high-bred to the utmost degree. Shortly after, Lord Elgin, who had been appointed to succeed Lord Canning as Viceroy, arrived at Madras on his way to

Calcutta. He differed entirely from his predecessor, and his appearance was far less favourable. But he was very talented, and was characterised by a keen dark eye, with a very proud aspect when it suited him to put it on.

While I commanded at Madras, I used every year to make long tours of inspection, usually travelling 3000 miles, and even more. The very idea of my visiting a station produced a wonderful effect, stirred up old, sleepy commanding officers, and greatly stimulated their endeavours to improve, not only the drill of their regiments, but their interior economy.

[Sir Hope records his visits to an innumerable number of places, where he devoted a considerable amount of time and trouble to improving the condition of those under his command. Workshops, reading and coffee rooms, were established, and institutions were organised for the employment of soldiers' wives. I find myself, however, compelled to restrict my transcription of his accounts to a few possessing special features of interest.]

I visited Mercara amongst other places, the beautiful residence of the Koorg Rajahs. It was situated 4200 feet above the level of the sea, and the palace was surrounded by a fortified wall. Here the brutal father of the present Rajah used to slaughter his prisoners with a rifle. There was a dungeon in the prison walls, with a small door, out of which the unhappy captives used to be allowed to bolt, and to run for their lives

to the main gate. The Rajah, stationed 50 yards off, potted at them in their flight, and seldom missed. If, however, a prisoner reached the main gate in safety, he was nevertheless cut down by the guard outside. Their infamous rule has now been stopped, and the territory has been taken over by the Indian Government. The natives of Koorg are a fine, handsome, strong race, and hold their possessions on condition of serving our Queen in their own country, when called on. They are loyal and well behaved, and have become so attached to a German missionary, Mr Richter, that, notwithstanding their poverty, they have volunteered to give £600 towards building two schools. Secunderabad greatly interested me. The principality belongs to the Nizam of Hyderabad, a sensual, fat, disgusting-looking Mahomedan. He is seldom or never seen; but the government is intrusted to the Maharajah, Salar Jung, one of the most talented, upright, and honest of natives, who admires the English nation, and rules the dominions with wisdom and equity. He has a most trying position to hold, with a jealous Nizam and a strong opposing faction. He has been twice shot at, but without effect. The Indian Government maintains a contingent to keep the country in order, and sorely is it needed, for the inhabitants are a most disorderly, lawless, villanous set of scoundrels.

General Browne, a Company's officer, commanded at Secunderabad, and in all my knowledge of human

nature I have never seen an officer or man so high minded, so thoroughly to be depended upon, so upright and conscientious, so full of good sense, and so heavenly minded. He was looked up to and respected by every one. He had an excellent force under him. Salar Jung gave us a beautiful entertainment in true Eastern style. He is the only native gentleman I have ever known who is to be thoroughly depended upon. He is married to one wife only, a very pretty woman, I understand, of whom he is very fond; and they have an only daughter. He never drinks wine; he understands English fairly, but will never speak it. He wishes extremely to travel to England; but the Nizam, who hates foreign nations, and the English more especially, will not hear of his leaving the country, and in fact will not let him go ten miles beyond his own home.

The evening entertainment was beautiful beyond conception. Two large palaces, very handsomely fitted up, were lighted with nearly one million lights. The dining-hall was magnificent, and there 250 persons sat down to a first-rate dinner, with open Eastern arches looking upon a sheet of water diversified with fountains. After dinner Salar Jung conducted Lady Grant to his other palace about a quarter of a mile distant. Part of the way lay through the town of Hyderabad, and each side of our route was draped with pink gauze, and was beautifully illuminated. This drapery completely

concealed the walls on either side, and not a sound was audible, as all the houses were closed in obedience to a strict order to that effect. On reaching the second palace a magnificent display of fireworks was opened to our view. The reflection upon the water was beautifully effective. We then witnessed a fine display of dancing. The nautch (dancing) girls were handsomely dressed, and moved about with much grace, but in a very different manner from our own ballet-dancers. Several little bottles of otto of roses were presented to each of our party, according to our respective ranks; and we were then escorted by Salar Jung to his state carriage, drawn by four splendid Australian horses, which were driven by a portly handsome Parsee dressed in scarlet and gold, who had learnt his coachmanship in Rotten Row. Shortly after, Salar Jung gave us a breakfast at his country residence, and then showed us some antelope-hunting and some hawking.

We afterwards visited the famous tombs of Golconda, which are at least three hundred years old. Close to them is a fine old fort situated amongst rocky hills. The mines of Golconda are proverbial, but the diamonds were only polished there. They were found in their rough state about 150 miles distant.

When at Gubhelpore we rowed some distance up the river Nerbudda, which for half a mile runs through a precipitous chasm formed by lofty rocks



of the purest white marble. High up in the cliffs are great numbers of bees' nests, which at certain times of the year are a source of great danger—so much so that the native boatmen refuse to pass the spot. A few years ago two Engineer officers were rowing by when a shot was fired, and the bees were disturbed. Down they rushed with the utmost fury, and so fiercely attacked the two Europeans in their boat that the latter plunged into the deep water. One escaped, though with great difficulty, but the other was drowned. His grave was pointed out to me.

My further destination was Lucknow, where I wished to confer with Sir Hugh Rose,<sup>1</sup> the Commander-in-Chief of Bengal, concerning the amalgamation and the proposal to make the Irregular system general throughout the armies of the three Presidencies. In my opinion the latter intention was a great mistake. Formerly the Irregular force was effective. A portion of the army was conducted on this system, and by means of selection we could always make sure of appointing to regiments first-rate commanders, young men full of zeal and energy, so that the corps were in a high state of discipline, and there was always a strong reserve from the regular army from which vacancies among the officers were filled. But according to the future plan only seven officers would be appointed to each corps, and

<sup>1</sup> Field-Marshal Lord Strathnairn died 1887.

there would be no reserve from which to replace them. Thus we shall deprive ourselves of the power of selection, and, as a matter of course, the regiments will fall off in discipline; and in cases of sickness there may be but two or three officers, none of them possibly over good, to look after their efficiency. Almost every general officer in the Company's service was opposed to the plan; but Sir Charles Wood, Secretary of State for India, from financial motives, adopted the opinions of two or three individuals, amongst whom were Sir William Mansfield, Commander-in-Chief of Bombay, Sir Robert Napier, and Colonel Norman, the principal instigator of the change. I found that Sir Hugh Rose agreed with me in being thoroughly opposed to the scheme. At Lucknow I visited all the principal scenes, which were interesting to me beyond conception from the terrible events I had so lately witnessed in it; but the whole place was already greatly changed. Old ugly walls had been pulled down, good buildings had replaced them, and waste grounds, which a short time before had been the scenes of tumult and death, were now converted into beautiful gardens.

I next made my way to Calcutta, where I stayed with General Sir Robert Napier, who had been under my command in China. He was an Engineer officer of great talent, judgment, and efficiency, and was an excellent man in every respect. He was a great friend of ours.

[Sir Hope gives detailed accounts of his shooting expeditions as well as of his runs with hounds, for he was an enthusiastic sportsman. Among his shooting notes I find an entry of the following incident:] Two officers were out shooting in the Terai when they discovered the skeleton of a small deer and of a large boa-constrictor. They stuffed the deer's head into the snake's mouth, with the horns sticking out through the boa's eyes. Shortly afterwards another European traveller chanced to light upon the two animals lying in this position, and assumed that the snake had died in the act of attempting to swallow the deer. He sent an account of this wonderful circumstance to the 'Calcutta Magazine,' much to the amusement of the two officers who had played the hoax.

I spent a considerable part of the following summer at Bangalore, twelve miles' railway journey from Madras. I had bought a very fine Australian horse appropriately called "Buck," indicating a propensity common to all the horses of that country. One day when out for a gallop with the hounds we were in full cry, and the horse was jumping everything splendidly, when suddenly we came to a rather wide honeycombed water-course. When he came to this jump, from full gallop he stopped dead short, put his head down between his legs, rounded his back, and thus shot me, taken quite unawares, like an arrow over his head. I was precipitated, head foremost, into a deep ditch, and upon a downy couch of big stones.

I lay there for some time unable to move; but after recovering a little I sat up, and found my horse standing at the edge of the ditch, looking down at me very composedly, and apparently much amused at my discomfiture. I remounted and followed the hounds a little way further, but felt so unwell as to be obliged to return home. The doctor pronounced that I had broken a rib, and I had to lay up for about six weeks. Our stay at Bangalore proved very pleasant. The division was under the command of Major-General Sir Augustus Spencer,<sup>1</sup> a first-rate officer, and a most gentlemanlike person. His wife and his two charming daughters were with him.

In 1863 I made an expedition to visit the Cawvery Falls. The adjacent country is extremely beautiful, and is encircled with hills covered with forest and jungle. My staff accompanied me, and comprised Major Biddulph, Military Secretary, and Captains Campbell and Macleod, aides-de-camp: the latter was a great sportsman. He had been shooting in these jungles shortly before, and when lying in wait for a tiger had fallen asleep. Suddenly he awakened, and saw a large tiger a few yards off looking steadily at him. He put his gun to his shoulder, but before he could fire, his attendant, realising the risk of such an act, jerked up the muzzle of the rifle, and the bullet passed clear over the head of the brute, which then

<sup>1</sup> General Sir A. Spencer, G.C.B., died 1893.

went back into the jungle. The chances were greatly against his killing the tiger dead, and he would in the event of failure have been instantly clawed to pieces. We chaffed the young gentleman a great deal about it, much to his annoyance, and he was determined, if he had another chance, to regain his character. Our party was further increased by Dr<sup>1</sup> and Mrs Mackenzie. He was a Highlander, and a most gentlemanlike, talented, and excellent man. Mrs Mackenzie was a charming Irish lady, and was very amusing, and I used to delight in chaffing her. She took this very well, but was determined to pay us out. One day, early in the morning, we were having a breakfast-picnic on the ground near the falls, and the ladies were busy getting the meal ready, when a voice was heard some way off in the jungle calling out, "*Bagh! bagh!*" which in the Hindustanee means "Tiger! tiger!" A thrill of excitement passed over us, the breakfast was forgotten, and we shouted out eagerly for our guns. Campbell had some awkwardly shaped bullets, which he had the greatest difficulty in ramming home, and so excited was he that at every stroke of his ramrod he was bedewed with perspiration. Biddulph's man brought up his pony by mistake instead of his gun, which also caused great irritation of temper; but at last we started. I told Dr Mackenzie to look after the two ladies, and not to allow them to run any

<sup>1</sup> Now Sir William Mackenzie, K.C.B.

risk, a task which he kindly undertook, and we soon came up to the native who had shouted out to us, who looked pale and frightened, and who pointed out to us the direction in which the tiger had moved off. We had in addition a great shikarree (native sportsman), who preceded us in an endeavour to track the beast, while we followed him through the jungle. At length the native who had first given the alarm pointed with his finger and whispered, "There he is." After gazing steadily for some time, I saw a large yellow animal crouching in the jungle, and I whispered to my next neighbour that he appeared a very large brute. Thinking, however, that discretion is the better part of valour, and considering that I was not more than 40 yards distant from the dangerous animal, I decided that it would be wise to get behind a tree. Biddulph was of the same opinion, and he placed himself behind me. Macleod, however, determined not to be again subject to ridicule, so he crawled up to within 30 yards, followed by Campbell, took a very steady aim, and fired. His shot apparently took deadly effect, as the animal did not move, and Campbell in his excitement rushed up to his victim, exclaiming, "He is dead!" Then, to the utter discomfiture of every one of us, the supposed horrible brute proved to be a stuffed animal! We all looked awfully sheepish, then became very irate, and began to consider who could have played us this trick. We returned very crestfallen to our breakfast,

and then, to our still further chagrin, we found the ladies laughing immoderately. It turned out that our friend Mrs Mackenzie, whom we had been incessantly chaffing, had in retaliation thus payed us off. The stuffed skin was one which she happened to have in her possession, and had been that of a leopard, and the previous night she had had her rehearsal with her native servants, who had thus led us astray. Never had a party of gallant sportsmen been more completely taken in. Our next perplexity was how to prevent the story getting wind. One of my A.D.C.'s advocated licking the poor native. Others were for trying to hush the matter up. But I declared it would be best to make it known to the whole world. This course we adopted, and many a good laugh I have had recounting to a large party the plucky way in which my staff behaved upon this memorable occasion.

[Sir Hope Grant never enjoyed a joke so much as when it was directed against himself. Many years after, at a charitable bazaar, a sketch was produced for sale which represented him and his whole staff at an Aldershot field-day. The sketch had been made by an officer, and though perhaps verging on a caricature, was of a thoroughly good-natured description, and was marked with singular ability. Nevertheless some, with a less vivid sense of humour, were furious, and requested Sir Hope to take some official notice of the alleged disrespect. But the General never ceased

laughing, and although he occupied the most prominent place in the group he purchased several copies, and did his utmost to promote the sale.

Some of his jokes were boyish. Once, during some autumn manœuvres, he concerted with his staff the plan of making apple-pie beds for the rest—shoving brushes into their couches, &c.,—and he was as much delighted with the success of these pranks as though he were a Harrow schoolboy.]

At Bangalore rifle practice was being carried on with great zeal, and the accuracy and improvement in weapons of destruction were surprising. When I left England to go to China in 1841, a soldier who could hit the bull's-eye once in four or five shots was considered an excellent marksman. Now he makes wonderful practice at 1000 yards. I remember, when I was recently at St Andrews, I was present when the range was at 800 yards, and in fact I could scarcely see the bull's-eye. When I asked the instructor if he expected to hit it, he informed me that if I could not put five or six bullets running out of seven, I should have no chance of winning a prize. I had a trial shot, and to my utter surprise found that I hit the bull's-eye at the above distance. The King's Dragoon Guards were firing at Bangalore with short carbines, at a distance of 600 yards. Their practice was not good, upon which I asked one of the men to let me have a shot, took his carbine, fired standing, and to my astonishment made a bull's-eye. I



returned the weapon with perfect nonchalance, and took care not to fire again.

On our return journey Dr and Mrs Mackenzie were capsized out of their bullock-cart down a bank. One of the bullocks lay with its legs extended, and the learned M.D., in much consternation, went to examine him, turned up his eye, and seeing it quite white, exclaimed, "The poor animal is dead!" However, the driver gave the bullock a whack on the neck with his great wooden-handled whip, when, to the utter surprise of the doctor, the animal jumped up none the worse. It turned out that the bullock had a "game" eye, and that the learned gentleman had got upon his wall-side.

We visited the old Portuguese settlement of Goa, where the Archbishop showed us in the Cathedral the tomb of Francis Xavier, the celebrated Roman Catholic missionary. It was a fine work of art, with a large basso-relievo representing scenes in his life. He died in China, but his body was brought to Goa and placed in a silver coffin.

In consequence of the sudden death of Lord Elgin, Sir William Denison, our Governor at Madras, was ordered to Calcutta to take up the reins of government. At this time a war of considerable importance was taking place in Upper India, on the frontier at Sitana. The Government had, contrary to Sir Hugh Rose's wishes, sent too small a force to quell the insurrection of these powerful frontier tribes,

who, consequently, had got the best of us in operations. The Government was in great consternation, and, in accordance with the advice of numerous high military and civilian officials, had decided to withdraw our troops and to allow the tribes to remain victorious. Sir William Denison reached Calcutta just in time to stop this foolish measure. The new acting Viceroy, who was a good soldier, and was strongly backed up by Sir Hugh Rose, recognised the folly of yielding, and instantly ordered sufficient reinforcements to the frontier. Consequently, in about a fortnight the war was finished, and the enemy were completely subdued and humbled. A contrary course would have involved us in no end of trouble. The tribes would have infested our frontier, pillaged and destroyed our villages, and injured our prestige. I am very sorry to say Sir Charles Wood never gave Sir William Denison credit for the admirable service he had rendered to the country and to Government.

About this time I received a letter from Sir William Mansfield, commanding at Bombay, in which he stated that he had seen several newspaper paragraphs asserting that the succession to Sir Hugh Rose as Commander-in-Chief lay between himself and me. For his part, he said, he knew nothing. All he could state was that he had used no influence towards getting the command. This was all very civil, and I wrote in reply that of course my supersession by

a junior officer would not be pleasant to me, but that I knew that he was well adapted for the command, and that if he were appointed I could have nothing to say.

Shortly after, I received a letter from the Duke of Cambridge intimating to me that the chief command in India would be given to Sir William Mansfield, but offering to me the post of Quartermaster-General at the Horse-Guards. My old friend General Forster,<sup>1</sup> the Military Secretary, also wrote to me expressing his annoyance at the turn events had taken, which, he said, had been due to Sir Charles Wood, Secretary for India. There was, however, no help for it, and feeling that it would not be satisfactory to remain in the position of Commander-in-Chief at Madras with a junior officer in the chief command in Bengal, I accepted the Duke's kind offer. I was not, however, to quit the country until my successor had arrived.

[Extracts from General Forster's correspondence with Sir Hope:—

I only hope your circumstances will permit your coming to the Horse-Guards, which would be such a comfort to me. . . . Although the office of Quartermaster-General is a very high one, it will not enable the possessor to save money, although with a regiment in addition it may pay its way. I cannot write on this subject without losing my temper.]

Previous to relinquishing my command, I made an

<sup>1</sup> General Forster died 1880.

inspection of our troops in Burmah, and on the way visited the group of Andaman Islands, a penal settlement where convicts, mutineers, Thugs, and other villains are incarcerated. These islands are hilly, covered with forest, and very beautiful. Their population comprises a species of savage who can scarcely be called human—pigmy little animals, almost like orang-outangs. They are very dexterous in the use of bows and arrows, with which they shoot fish, their principal sustenance, and sometimes kill a pig. These little creatures live in the dense jungles near the sea-coast, and are thoroughly at home in the water. They constantly swim over to Port Blair, a distance of five miles out at sea, built upon a small island which has been thoroughly cleared of forest and jungle. In these undertakings they carry with them a long piece of bamboo, upon which they rest when weary with swimming. They are completely destitute of clothing, and look like naked monkeys without tails. With the exception of a company of the 60th Rifles and a company of Madras Sappers, the population consists almost entirely of convicts, about 10,000 in number, who are allowed to live in comparative comfort. They are lodged in good barracks, their irons are knocked off as soon as they land, and the best and steadiest are after a time allowed to keep shops. The remainder are compelled to perform a certain amount of work; but with the exception that they are not allowed their liberty, they are

much better off than the generality of natives in India.

From the Andaman Islands we proceeded to Rangoon and Prome, where the headquarters and a wing of the 19th Regiment were quartered. The Brigadier, General —, was an excellent officer, but his sad, sombre expression seemed to diffuse a depressing effect over his command. It must have been very catching, to judge from the general appearance of all around him. From thence we went to Moulmein, another military station. I was interested beyond measure in here watching the elephants stacking timber. Immense logs of teak are piled in large heaps. Two elephants drag the timber to the spot where it is to be stacked. One lifts up the end of the beam with his trunk and rests the extremity on the top of the pile, the other elephant pushing it up into position. When the building becomes high, the elephant brings a log, adjusts it in position on the ground, mounts upon it, and so, by obtaining greater elevation, is enabled to continue his work. The sagacity and endurance of these animals are truly wonderful, and when they are kindly treated by their mahouts, they will do anything possible for might and strength, and will rather drop than give in, even though the labour be too hard for them.

Shortly after my return to Madras, my successor, Sir Gaspard Le Marchant,<sup>1</sup> arrived. He had been

<sup>1</sup> General Sir Gaspard Le Marchant, K.C.B., died 1874.

Governor and Commander-in-Chief at Malta, and was evidently much annoyed that no fine mansion was available for his abode. In fact, he showed his general dissatisfaction very unmistakably.

We were very sorry to leave Madras and the many charming people we had known there, yet our return home was most desirable for us, for the health of both of us had become shaky, and we needed a change to our native air.

[Before Sir Hope's departure, a large and representative deputation, selected from amongst all classes in the Presidency, attended on Sir Hope Grant and Lady Grant to present them with an address. The written address expressed the great regret of the European inhabitants at their departure. They laid stress upon the courtesy and kindness with which he had discharged his duties, and upon "the benevolence, activity, and liberality in instituting, promoting, and supporting whatever could benefit the souls and bodies of those who are unable or reluctant to provide for themselves." They gratefully acknowledged his assistance in promoting

The introduction of reading-rooms, games, handicrafts, gardening, and women's working-classes, whereby so much has been done to advance the physical and moral improvements both of Europeans and East Indians, and to increase their personal, domestic, and social happiness. . . .

As you have taken a very lively interest in the education of the children, and especially the orphan children, of soldiers, both European and Eurasian, we should be glad to preserve

a memorial in the Lawrence Asylum, now in process of erection in the Neilgherry hills. We therefore request that you will oblige your friends of the Madras Presidency by sitting for your portraits after your arrival in England, allowing us to place the likeness of you, Sir Hope Grant, in the building to be set apart for the boys in that institution; and yours, Lady Grant, in that for the girls. We now bid you farewell. We shall remember you long. We shall feel your loss. We wish you the blessings, wherever you go, of many who have experienced your kindness, and, above all, the peace and blessing of God for ever.

The likenesses to which allusion was made were subsequently painted, and are now in the Lawrence Asylum. Sir Hope Grant reached England in July 1865.]

## CHAPTER XXII.

1865-1870.

## QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL—HORSE-GUARDS.

WORK AS QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL—HYDE PARK RAILINGS RIOTS—  
 VISIT TO CHALONS—JERVIS COURT-MARTIAL AND SIR WILLIAM  
 MANSFIELD—SELECT COMMITTEES—THE WYMERING SISTERHOOD—  
 MR GLEIG ON RITUALISM—MR DISRAELI—SPEAKS OF HIS WORK AS  
 PRIME MINISTER—LORD STANLEY—REPUDIATES WORRY—MR DIS-  
 RAELI'S LETTER ON SIR HOPE'S INADEQUATE HONOURS—CZAR AT  
 KISSINGEN—VOLUNTEERS—PETULANCE OF AN M.P.—FENIAN DEMON-  
 STRATION—CABMEN—INVITES THEM TO HIS HOUSE—MENDICANT  
 IMPOSTOR—MR LEVI OF 'DAILY TELEGRAPH'—OPPOSITION TO SIR  
 HOPE'S APPOINTMENT TO ALDERSHOT—ULTIMATELY FAILS.

*Journal.*—On arriving in England I at once reported myself at the Horse - Guards. The Commander-in-Chief treated me with the greatest kindness, and told me it was not his fault I had not been appointed to the chief command in India. Sir Charles Wood (Lord Halifax) had decided upon Sir William Mansfield as the officer who, in his opinion, was best adapted for the post. Mansfield and I had of late been rivals, certainly unintentionally. I had been sent out in command of the China force, a post



which he no doubt expected, and which Lord Halifax had wished to assign to him. The Duke appointed him second in command to me, a position which he would not accept, though the refusal of such an offer was a strong measure. Although the China war had been a complete success, yet when India became vacant Lord Halifax was so impressed with Mansfield's great ability that he selected him for the chief command. Sir William Mansfield's appointment was apparently a good one, for he was very talented. But in my opinion he would have made a better Governor-General than Commander-in-Chief.

I felt that the post of Quartermaster-General was somewhat out of my way. Pen, ink, and paper, and sitting over a desk, rather went against the grain. Galloping about the country, and inspecting regiments as a soldier, seemed to be more in my line. In November 1865 I began to wield my pen under great tribulation and fear of committing myself. But the Commander-in-Chief knew his work so well, had such an admirable memory, like all the Royal family, and was so kind and considerate, that I soon felt quite at home, and continued so to the end.<sup>1</sup> My duties were very agreeable. Every day I had to take in a number of letters for his decision, and afterwards to minute on the back of them the required reply, which were subsequently embodied in

<sup>1</sup> It is manifest this passage was revised up to 1870: Sir Hope died in 1875.—H. K.

letters written by clerks. So I had none of the trouble of composing them myself.

Various other matters of foremost importance were also sent to me for my opinion—such as troops for our colonies, formation of army reserves, and in some cases even courts-martial. Then the Duke was impressed with the necessity of his visiting various stations, forts, and regiments. All this gave me plenty of active occupation, and enabled me to see much that was new. I usually went to my office at about one o'clock, and when the Duke was there I often did not get away till past seven. Moreover, I served on numerous Committees. I was President of the Sanitary Commission, and the composition of the members used to amuse me much. My right-hand man was an old doctor so deaf that he could not hear unless one put one's mouth to his ear and gave a halloa as if one had viewed the fox away; there were two other very superannuated gentlemen, and an elderly civil engineer who clipped the Queen's English. I was also on the Army Transport Committee, on the Chelsea Board, and on the Defence Committee.

In the summer of 1866 several political "Indignation Meetings" were held throughout Great Britain, and on the twenty-third of July an attempt was made to assemble a very large gathering of the same nature in Hyde Park. Mr Walpole, Secretary for Home Affairs, had declared the determination of

the Ministry to prevent the parks being used for such demonstrations. Accordingly the gates were locked, and a few police were stationed at each entrance. In the evening large processions, headed by Mr Beales and various members of the Reform League, endeavoured to effect an entrance into Hyde Park, but were refused. The roughs, of whom there were an immense number, began to pull down the railings in Park Lane; and though the small available force of military was called out, there were too few for any useful purpose beyond clearing special localities where the mob had become too numerous. I went out on duty that I might bring back a report to the Duke, and found a portion of the ground cleared round the Marble Arch, and about 100 police keeping the mob back. I made my way inside, and while conferring with Major-General Lord Frederick Paulet,<sup>1</sup> who was on duty, and with Sir Richard Mayne, head of the police, I was struck by a stone. Sir Richard Mayne, too, received a blow in his face, which nearly put his eye out. The aspect of affairs was becoming serious; the police were directed to charge, and they carried out this order with the most praiseworthy determination. They used their batons freely, and sent the mob flying. It was pleasant to behold.

[How Mr Walpole ultimately gave way is now a matter of history.]

<sup>1</sup> Died 1871.

This autumn (1866) the Duke sent me on an official visit to the camp at Chalons. Our military attaché in Paris did not take the slightest trouble on my behalf, and consequently when I arrived at the crowded town of Chalons, I was unable to obtain a quarter of any description. I called on Marshal de St Jean d'Angely, a worthy old gentleman, who exerted his utmost to help me, and having telegraphed to General Fleury, the Emperor's Master of the Horse, received orders to put me up in the Imperial Pavilion. I was also mounted from the splendid stud, every horse of which had cost about £500. The stud-groom proved to be a Scotchman of the name of Gamble. He was a very swell gentleman, and had been formerly groom to Lord Gray<sup>1</sup> at Kinfauns; so he knew all about me and my family, and was civil in the extreme. I found several of my old China friends at the camp.

[Extracts from Sir Hope Grant's official report :—]

“The force consisted of about 22,000 men of all arms, under command of Marshal de St Jean d'Angely, who treated me and my staff with the greatest kindness. The corps was composed of ten batteries of artillery, six regiments of cavalry of four squadrons, each numbering about 100 men, of twenty-seven battalions, each of which did not in the field much exceed 300 men, two companies of engineers, and some of the train.

<sup>1</sup> A connection of the Grant family.

“On the 15th August, the Emperor’s *fête* day, there was a general full-dress parade. The troops displayed the greatest enthusiasm, and every regiment decorated its lines with statues of the Emperor and of his family. On another occasion the Marshal ordered the whole of the cavalry to parade for my inspection.”

[Then follow various details of their equipment and drill, concerning both of which Sir Hope Grant expressed himself in terms of emphatic approval. “Nothing,” he writes, “can be more perfect than the way the troops moved.” He also reported on the new breech-loading rifle, the Chassepot, which the French Government was on the point of introducing into their army. He declares his heartiest approval of the new weapon. The following paragraph is likewise found:—]

“The French officers appear to be very bitter at the success of the Prussians in the war of 1866, and think the preponderance of power they have gained will be very detrimental to the peace of Europe. One general officer told me he had no doubt the French would go to war with the Prussians within two years. They consider the increase of power Italy has acquired will be detrimental to France, and anticipate the French Emperor will interpose to prevent the capture of Rome.”

[Sir Hope Grant, from his official position, was necessarily called into frequent consultation at the

Horse-Guards concerning the court-martial which Sir William Mansfield had caused to be held on one of his aides-de-camp, Captain Jervis, on charges of embezzlement and insubordination.]

*Journal continued.*—This was unwise. Mansfield ought to have seen the officer, heard his explanation, and if it had not appeared satisfactory, should have instructed him to resign his staff post and rejoin his regiment. There would have been an end to the matter.

After a very protracted trial, the court came to the conclusion that Captain Jervis was innocent on the two charges of embezzlement, but guilty of insubordination, and sentenced him to be cashiered; but in consideration of the severe ordeal to which he had been subjected, the court recommended him to mercy. Sir William Mansfield sent back the proceedings for revision; but the court adhered to its decision.

This court-martial made a tremendous outcry through all India, and the press, both there and in England, took it up most strongly. Mansfield was very much annoyed at the decision of the court-martial, and censured the members severely for their finding; but when the proceedings were submitted to the Judge Advocate-General in London, the latter gave the court the greatest credit for having come to a fair and just decision under very trying circumstances. The Duke, however, reserved the expres-

sion of his opinion until he had further weighed the matter some months after. Very wisely, he did not recall Mansfield, but directed his military secretary<sup>1</sup> to write a letter, which animadverted severely on his conduct throughout.

[The entire correspondence was published in the 'Army and Navy Gazette' at the time. It is far too long for reproduction, and a few passages only from the Horse-Guards letter can here be quoted :—

With a very decided wish to uphold to the fullest extent the high office and authority of the Commander-in-Chief in India, H.R.H. with great reluctance feels himself compelled to dissent from your Excellency as to the advisability of the measure, the court-martial, and to inform you that the course you adopted was not one of which he can approve.

The Duke of Cambridge is unable to concur in the propriety of the instructions contained in your Excellency's memorandum, drawn up for the guidance of the officers of your personal staff.

The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief greatly deploras that the first steps taken by you in reference to Captain Jervis should have been of a nature so calculated to lead to opposition to your authority, and eventually to the necessity for bringing him to trial.

It becomes the duty of the Field-Marshal Commander-in-Chief, under these circumstances, to inform your Excellency that he cannot approve the remarks which you thought fit to

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<sup>1</sup> Popular rumour at the time attributed the credit of this very able document to the Assistant Military Secretary, Colonel E. B. Johnson, R.A.

publish in your general orders on the court-martial. For his Royal Highness cannot ignore the fact that these remarks have a practical tendency to weaken the independence of courts-martial, to bring contempt on military tribunals in the eyes of the public, and to affect the discipline of the army in a very material degree.

In regretting the recommendation of the court in the prisoner's favour, H.R.H. considers your Excellency to have allowed yourself to have entered into observations which he extremely regrets with reference to their probable effect on the army at large.

The Judge Advocate-General considers the court to have performed their difficult functions "with marked impartiality and sound judgment." H.R.H. entirely concurs in this opinion; and as he considers it only right, and an act of justice to the officers composing the court, that this opinion should be made known to them, H.R.H. requests you will take measures for giving effect to his wishes in this respect, leaving it to your Excellency to do so in such manner as may appear called for under the circumstances.

[The above scarcely comprises even the sharpest of the animadversions passed on the Commander-in-Chief in India.—H. K.]—I have the honour to be, &c. &c.,

W. F. FORSTER, Lieut.-General,  
*Military Secretary.*

Thereupon Sir William Mansfield wrote a reply of very great length, practically contesting every single one of the Duke's representations.]

*Journal continued.*—The letter written by order of the Duke was a severe blow to Sir William Mansfield. The Duke did not consider it advisable to recall him; but it seemed singular that after such a



rebuke he could feel himself justified in remaining as Commander-in-Chief in India. He did not resign. Jervis returned to England, and came to the Horse-Guards to report himself to the Military Secretary, when the Adjutant-General, Lord William Paulet,<sup>1</sup> and I happened to be present. We were both prepossessed by his appearance and manner. Of course no conversation took place concerning his dismissal from Sir William's staff; but it appeared he was not satisfied with the result of the court-martial, and determined to bring his case before Parliament through the agency of a relative, Mr Brett, M.P. Mr Brett asked for the production of all the correspondence connected with the case. The last letter from the Military Secretary, as well as Sir William's answer, were, of course, in the first instance, confidential; but the Secretary of State for War, Sir John Pakington, contrary to the opinion of H.R.H., deemed the production of the whole correspondence advisable, and it was all published in the newspapers. The House very properly would not alter the decision of the Duke of Cambridge,<sup>2</sup> and the disagreeable affair was then brought to a conclusion.

This year the Duke of Cambridge invited me to dinner, and I had the honour of meeting, amongst others, the Princess of Wales. Shortly after, the

<sup>1</sup> Field-Marshal Lord William Paulet, G.C.B., died 1893.

<sup>2</sup> The case was, however, the subject of a long debate in the House, and Captain Jervis was ultimately awarded £800 compensation.

charming, gentle lady was attacked by a severe rheumatic fever, and was at death's door. Great fears were entertained for her, but youth and a healthy constitution carried her through, and she is now quite recovered.

In March 1867 I was required to give my evidence before a Select Committee of the House of Commons relative to a motion raised by my friend and former aide-de-camp, Augustus Anson, recommending that all British troops should be withdrawn from the colonies in the East, and that their places should be supplied by Indian troops. Lord Cranbourne<sup>1</sup> was President, and he asked me to state my opinion as to the expediency of the measure. I said, "It will be necessary to take the regiments by roster, and it will be impossible to depend upon good troops being always sent—such, for example, as Sikhs." He asked why Sikhs alone should not be sent. I answered: "Because much jealousy would thereby be caused. Hindostanees would feel aggrieved if they were not supposed to be as good as Sikhs; and, on the other hand, Sikh troops, who would inevitably find the duty irksome, since their wives and families could not accompany them, would become disaffected, especially if they alone were sent to certain regions which often were not healthy." I added that the colonists would complain if native troops were sent; and especially if they were

<sup>1</sup> Now Marquis of Salisbury.

Hindoos, as they would have no confidence in them, and in all probability would object to pay the subsidy for troops on which they could not depend. Our colonies were the bone and sinew of the British empire—one of the great sources of the wealth of England—and great attention ought to be paid to their welfare and support.

I was kept two hours in this examination, questioned and badgered by every one, and I can safely say I was uncommonly glad when I was relieved from such an onerous duty.

[We now come to the initiatory stages of that persevering and consistent action which Sir Hope Grant took, solely in his official capacity, with reference to the High Church aspirations of the Ritualistic chaplains in the British army. It is quite manifest that duty alone impelled him, as Quartermaster-General, and subsequently as commanding the troops at Aldershot, to the course which he pursued, and which proved so detrimental to his military prosperity. The details and points of contention may appear of very trivial importance, but in reality they vitally affected the religious interests and the consciences of the entire British army.]

*Journal continued.*—It came to my notice that the Ritualistic Sisters of Mercy at Wymering, near Portsmouth, under the superintendence of Mrs Latouche, sister of the Rev. Mr Nugee, who was thoroughly imbued with Roman Catholic doctrines, wished to obtain

charge of all our Military Hospitals. One of the Sisters,<sup>1</sup> who was a most attentive nurse, had served for five years in the Female Hospital at Portsmouth, but did not wish to re-engage under the sisterhood. She had given general satisfaction in the hospital, and the doctor had recommended strongly that she should be retained independently—a request which was backed up in a letter which Sir George Buller sent to the Horse-Guards to that effect. H.R.H. at once acceded to the request, whereupon Mrs Latouche wrote a strong letter, stating her determination that if this nurse were retained all the others should be withdrawn. Sir George Buller replied that this would give him great pleasure, for that he could find plenty of other nurses equally useful. So the Duke adhered to his decision. Then Mr Nugee wrote in a most impertinent manner, that Mrs Latouche had been treated most unbecomingly, that the Sisters should be at once removed from the hospital, and that this was not the last that should be heard of the matter—meaning, I presume, that it should be brought before Parliament. General M'Cleverty at Shorncliffe, and Sir Augustus Spencer at Devonport, found that their military chaplains were carrying on the church services in the most ultra-High-Church fashion. The

<sup>1</sup> "Sister Faith,"—to the best of my recollection,—and who, for upwards of twenty subsequent years, so faithfully filled the post of nurse in charge of the Female Hospital, Aldershot. Some of my military readers may recollect how highly she was respected by her superiors, and how warmly beloved by the patients.

Duke sent for the Rev. Mr Gleig, Chaplain-General, to confer upon the above matters; and I, having been called on to speak, stated my opinion that the innovations in question had been due to a code of instructions issued by Mr Gleig, in which it was notified that voluntary services would be carried on "in an attractive manner." Mr Gleig differed with my objections, and stated that "attractive services" were highly calculated to fix the attention of the hearers, and would not be detrimental to the soldiers. After an angry discussion between us, he ended by saying, in a bland manner, "he trusted I should become more liberal in my views," to which I answered that "I was very sorry to find him in the situation of Chaplain-General." H.R.H., however, I am happy to say, did not approve of the views of Mr Gleig, who consequently stopped the chaplains from using Roman Catholic forms, and as a punishment sent one of them away to Dublin.

Some days afterwards a printed circular was put into my hands, issued under the direction of Mr Gleig himself, and containing the names of sundry clergymen who were to preach in the military chapel at Chatham. Amongst them was Mr —, a curate who belonged to the most Ritualistic Church in all London. Mr Gleig, on being questioned by the Duke, answered that he considered this curate such an excellent clergyman that he wished to appoint

him a chaplain. The Duke thought Mr Gleig's conduct very extraordinary, and forwarded to him a little book written by this curate, upon which the Chaplain-General wrote to me the following letter:—

WAR OFFICE, *May 18, 1867.*

MY DEAR SIR HOPE,—No man can be more opposed than I to what is called Ritualism, and to extreme views in matters of doctrine such as the Church of England abhors; and whenever complaints are made as to the proceedings of chaplains, I am always ready to listen to, and inquire into, each case as it is brought before me. But I object to the mode of action which, if adopted in any other department of the service than my own, would immediately be put a stop to. What would you say of me if I, discovering, or supposing that I discovered, irregularities in the professional conduct of officers on the Quartermaster-General's staff, were to carry my tale direct to H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief, or to the Secretary of State for War, without communicating with yourself?

I have seen the little book which you denounce, and censured the chaplain at Chatham for circulating these, or any others not authorised, without obtaining my consent. But why did you not send it to me, with or without your pencil marks on the margin, instead of handing them to H.R.H. or Sir Edward Lugard?

It is my duty to see that false doctrines and sheer nonsense are not taught as religious truths to soldiers. I don't think that any such duty devolves upon the Quartermaster-General of the army, or upon any other belligerent officer, and I would therefore request for the future, when it seems to you that mischief of this sort is brewing, you will be so good as to draw my attention to the particular case. You may depend upon my receiving your communication thank-

fully, and remedying the evil if I can. This case under consideration I believe to be an evil; but I claim the right of judging on that matter for myself—a mental process for which—don't be offended by the expression—it appears to me that my education and habits of thought better qualify me than yours can possibly qualify you.—Believe me, very sincerely yours,

G. R. GLEIG.

To Lieut.-General Sir HOPE GRANT.

I did not, however, agree with Mr Gleig, and with H.R.H.'s permission I at once wrote the following reply:—

HORSE-GUARDS, 20th May 1867.

MY DEAR MR GLEIG,—In answer to your letter of the 18th May, I beg to state I cannot conceive that I have erred in the course I pursued in informing H.R.H. of the practices now carried on by several of the chaplains in the army, which I consider to be a source of increasing danger to both the Church and the army. You object to my not communicating in the first instance with yourself; but what I stated to H.R.H. was done openly, and with no intention of keeping it secret; nor should I feel myself in a position to bring facts to the notice of the Chaplain-General without the sanction of H.R.H.

You must be aware I was called in on the first occasion when H.R.H. spoke to you after my bringing the subject to his notice. On that occasion, you will remember, I stated that I considered these evils had arisen from the paragraph in the instructions,

drawn up by yourself, to the chaplains regarding the voluntary service to the troops, which gives the power to conduct it according to their individual wishes; and should this clause be omitted, it would in a great measure remedy the evils which are now felt to exist.

The clause, however, is worded in such a manner that it would not lead me to suppose it would be open to the erroneous doctrine which has taken place. H.R.H. gave his sanction to it, and I confess I should have done the same if I had been called upon to do so. I regretted, however, to find you felt great objections to alter it.

[Sir Hope then deals with the announcement that a certain Ritualist curate would preach in the military church at Chatham, and continues:—]

H.R.H. told me that you considered Mr — such an excellent clergyman, that you proposed or wished to make him an army chaplain. I confess I was astounded at this, and then laid before H.R.H. the book, so full of Romish errors, to which you allude, and which had been distributed by Mr — amongst the troops, of which I have proof.

I trust, therefore, you will not think that I have trespassed beyond my province in making these facts known to H.R.H., as it seems to me, unless some remedy can be found, the evil will increase more and more rapidly.—I remain, faithfully yours,

J. HOPE GRANT.



Mr Gleig shortly after answered my letter in a bitter spirit, and without dealing with a single one of my representations. However, my action was attended with a good effect, of causing the Chaplain-General to warn his clergy against the practices in question, and to promulgate another code of regulations which materially mended the evils.

In December 1867 the Duke of Cambridge invited me to a dinner, where the guests were principally ministerial magnates. I sat next to Mr Disraeli, and thought I might utilise the occasion of being beside so great a man by pumping him as much as he would allow. I started by asking him whether his duties knocked him up, when he went to bed, when he got up, and if there was not a great deal of excitement in his political career? He replied that there was a great charm in the position he held. It was like that of a general officer commanding a large army; that he had to rule and command those under him, and form his line of battle for attack. He admitted that his work was severe during the session of Parliament, and that often he did not get to bed till four o'clock in the morning; but he never allowed himself to be wakened, and he never got up till he found himself refreshed and fit for work. He added that when the session was over his work was easy, and he found no difficulty in making arrangements for the next session.

Afterwards I had an interesting conversation with

Lord Stanley,<sup>1</sup> and asked him, too, if he did not find his duties in Parliament very hard work. He answered: "Not in the least. I make up my mind what I am to say and do; I do it all to the best of my conscience and ability; and I care not what people may say or think. I do what, in my opinion, is for the best, and it never costs me any trouble. My rest is never disturbed, and when I lie down I at once go to sleep." I admired his conscientious motives, but I told him I thought that his health and comparative youth accounted to a great extent for his immunity from anxiety. He rejoined: "Well, it may be the case; and I daresay if I had been as many years as you under a hot sun in India, I might be more troubled with the result of affairs, and more anxious that matters should go on smoothly in my department."

[In 1868 the successful conclusion of the campaign in Abyssinia, and the honours which were so freely bestowed upon those engaged in it, prompted the Duke of Cambridge to write an urgent letter to the Queen, representing that Sir Hope Grant had been inadequately rewarded for his success in the China war. This letter the Queen handed over to the Prime Minister, Mr Disraeli, who replied in a letter to the Duke, couched, as Sir Hope observes,

<sup>1</sup> Son of Lord Derby, and at the time Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He died 1893.

“in a truly diplomatic style.” The following are extracts :—

*Confidential.*

DOWNING STREET, 10th July 1868.

SIR AND DEAR PRINCE,—The Queen in audience on Friday directed me to consider and reply to the letter of your Royal Highness to her Majesty on the alleged inadequate recognition of the services of Sir Hope Grant by Lord Palmerston's Government in 1860. If the recognition of these services at the time were inadequate, which her Majesty's Government are not prepared to contest, they were undoubtedly settled; they were considered by Lord Palmerston; and the letter of Lord Herbert, a copy of which has been forwarded to me, however satisfactory it may prove to Sir Hope Grant in its general expressions, clearly shows that a G.C.B. was deemed by the existing Government as a not insufficient acknowledgment of his claims.

I am sure I need not point out to your Royal Highness that if succeeding Administrations undertake to revise the decisions of their predecessors in such points, it is impossible not to foresee that great, not to say incalculable, inconvenience may occur. The degree of public rewards for public services is a subject on which difference of opinion may easily exist, and as easily may become involved in all the passions of party.

It is desirable that the honours conferred by the Crown should be kept as free as possible from such influences. Under these circumstances I regret that I cannot advise her Majesty to comply with the request urged at this time by your Royal Highness in favour of Sir Hope Grant. But such an appeal, preferred in favour of so distinguished an officer by a personage of your Royal Highness's exalted position and great public repute, cannot be without effect; and I venture to express my belief that the time may come when

such an appeal may be remembered.—I have the honour to remain, sir and dear Prince, your most obliged and devoted servant,  
 B. DISRAELI.

For a full consideration of this question, see *ante* vol. ii., p. 4.

This autumn Sir Hope Grant paid a visit to the field of Waterloo, and afterwards went to Berlin where he again met his old missionary friend in India, Mr Procknow, now pastor at one of the principal churches in Berlin.]

*Journal resumed.*—Mr Procknow is an excellent clergyman, and has done great good in the city. But the Germans have apparently little heart for religion. Their clergy generally have a tendency towards the philosophy which leads them away from the pure faith, and the people are sceptical and have little love for church-going.

We afterwards stayed at Kissingen, where the Emperor<sup>1</sup> and Empress of Russia and several other grandees were then residing. He used to walk out every morning, unaccompanied except by a large handsome Newfoundland dog, to which he appeared much attached. He was a fine-looking man, about 6 feet 2 inches in height, and with an imposing demeanour; but there was an unsettled look in his eye, as though he were dreading some attempt on his life. The Empress was very interesting looking, with

<sup>1</sup> Father of the present Czar; afterwards assassinated.

a kind, thoughtful, but anxious expression of countenance. His departure from Kissingen in his roomy carriage amused me. Beside him sat the Empress, and opposite, their daughter and the big dog.

At this period I was able to devote some of my spare time to music, and in composing little pieces for piano and violoncello, which on my return home I published.

In December 1868 the Chinese Ambassadors dined with us. They were accompanied by Mr Burlingham, who was formerly American Ambassador at Peking, and had been prevailed upon by the Chinese Government to accompany their plenipotentiaries in their visit to the Western nations. The chief ambassador was very talented, and extremely gentlemanlike in his demeanour. He expressed his perfect willingness to hand a lady down to table, though such a condescension in his own country would have been highly derogatory to his dignity. At dinner the Chinese party behaved with great decorum, but were greatly put out by the absence of chop-sticks, which, unfortunately, we had not provided. After dinner, when the ladies left the dining-room, the Chinese wished to accompany them, and when told that this was not our custom, one of them said in very good English, "that as they wore petticoats like the ladies, they had supposed it was intended they should retire with them." We had a very pleasant evening: they admired my Chinese curiosities, and told me some of

my china was about four hundred years old. They informed me that the fine green jade is found in rocks in the province of Gu-Chu, and the white stone in a river near the Amoor.

[It would appear that a small Chinese imperial flag, captured by Sir Hope at Pa-le-chiao, had been inadvertently left among the collection, and that the ambassador at once picked it out. Sir Hope writes : “The nice old man exclaimed, ‘It makes my heart bleed to see this ;’ but he recovered himself, and then asked, ‘I have no doubt you have also captured flags from other nations?’ and when answered in the affirmative he was greatly comforted.”]

In 1869 Field-Marshal Lord Gough, under whom I had served in India and China, died, aged eighty-six. He was respected and beloved by all who knew him.

This year I was ordered, almost at a moment’s notice, to take command of the Volunteers at Dover on the occasion of their annual Easter Monday review. The weather in the early morning was so desperately bad that I counter-ordered the parade, and the Volunteers were dismissed. However, by mid-day the weather became suddenly more moderate, and when the Duke rode on the ground from Walmer Castle, he required, with some warmth, that the field-day should be instantly carried out, and that the assembly should be sounded all over the place. The weather, by a happy coincidence, at that moment

suddenly cleared, and the Volunteers assembled in an extraordinarily short space of time, and went through the field-day in a very creditable manner.

[Sir Hope, in his official report, awards approval to the Volunteers. But I find the following remark, which was a forerunner to his clear and unrestricted criticism which he applied to them two years later : "As far as I was able to judge, they [the Volunteers] evinced great willingness and promptitude in carrying out all the orders I had occasion to give. I must state, however, that in my opinion this force cannot be really serviceable if it is not placed, while under arms, under some more stringent military control. Such a large body of armed men, not amenable to any military discipline, might be the cause of a very serious embarrassment."

The writer of the following letter was a brother of Sir Hope's friend, Sir William Denison, Governor of the Madras Presidency. The touchy M.P. was an ex-soldier, whose military common-sense seems to have become deteriorated by the unworthy trivialities which sometimes accompany a parliamentary life.

*From the SPEAKER of the House of Commons.*

PALACE YARD, July 1, 1869.

DEAR SIR HOPE GRANT,—Yesterday morning ——— came to me in the House of Commons to consult me about something which had passed between the Horse-Guards and himself on the subject of a speech, or rather I should say

some observations, of his on the subject of the late review. He seemed to think his dignity and his privilege as a member had been in some degree invaded. After listening to his story, I took up my parable in turn, and asked him if he would permit me to tell him what had been said to me by several members, and what I thought myself of the observations he had made about the review.

“That nothing could have been more injudicious and unbecoming. That it was quite unfitted for the dignity of the House of Commons for members to make whining complaints that they had not received tickets to attend the review. That nothing during the whole session had given me more pain than his speech, and I thought it quite unworthy of him to bring in a side-attack against the Horse-Guards on the subject of the escort. That, moreover, the tone and manner of his speech was very needlessly offensive. That an inquiry through a friend as to certain words in his speech could not be distorted into an invasion of privilege.”  
 — — — was rather astonished at my very strong observations.

He may have told you that he had spoken to me. But perhaps he did not tell you all I had said. I endeavoured to turn such occasions to account, and to sustain as far as I can the tone and dignity of the House.—Believe me, yours sincerely,  
 J. G. DENISON.

On 24th October a Fenian demonstration in Hyde Park once more required Sir Hope's presence among a London mob, in order that he might judge of the contingent necessity of the military to preserve order. He was accompanied by Colonel Egerton,<sup>1</sup> Deputy

<sup>1</sup> Major-General Egerton, Military Secretary, died 1874.



Adjutant-General Horse-Guards, and the two were, of course, in plain clothes. "We shoved our way through the crowd near to a man who was vociferating loudly about justice to Ireland. A clodhopper standing close to me turned round and addressed me: 'I say, measter, he's a clever man, that. He's a sight more brains than either you or I have!'"

Sir Hope and Lady Grant during their residence in London spent much of their time and money in furthering the interests of undertakings the objects of which were to alleviate sorrow, suffering, and poverty. He observes:—]

*Journal.*—We are much interested in the cabmen in London, whose lot as a class is often very hard. A short time ago a gentleman offered three prizes, of respective values of £20, £10, and £5, to the cabman writing the best essay upon the question of six or seven days' cab-driving. About 5000 of these conveyances retain the privilege of rest on Sunday, and it appears to me singular that cab-proprietors in general do not see the advantage from a worldly point of view of this relief. The man who gained the first prize was called Cockram. His essay, written chiefly on the back of his cab, was full of wisdom and common-sense. We sent for him, and found that he was intelligent, clever, a teetotaller, and a good Christian. We were so pleased with the good feeling evinced in his essay that we asked him how we could be of any service

to the cabmen. He stated that what they would like best would be the invitation of a certain number of them to supper at our house, for that they would be grateful for this little manifestation of interest in their welfare. We therefore invited several cab-drivers, and asked them to bring their wives and children. About 100 appeared, amongst them Cockram and his nice, pretty little wife; and, after they had had a good meal, at his instigation I called on one of them for a speech. The speaker displayed great good sense and good feeling, and I could not but think that there was more good amongst these poor fellows than is usually attributed to them. I asked many of them whether they preferred the six or the seven days' driving, and they were unanimous in declaring that they would much prefer the Sunday rest, but that in many instances the masters would turn away those who might propose an adherence to six days. They informed me that if they worked uninterruptedly all the week, they never, as a rule, saw their children awake; for they were out early in the morning, and did not get home till late at night. Some of them told me they have had to pay 13s. and even 16s. 8d. a-day to the proprietors for the use of the cabs before they could gain anything for themselves, and that they could only earn their livelihood by the extra sixpences over their fares given to them by gentlemen. I asked one man what he had made that day, and he said,

"I have been very fortunate, and I have cleared 10s. over what I have to pay to the proprietor; but taking the week round, I just manage to keep my family upon what I earn." In the event of sickness the poor fellows suffer terribly. They are compelled to pawn everything, and are driven ultimately into the workhouse. Many of them have too much pride to ask for assistance, and then starvation stares them in the face. One day I was driven to my house by a nice, civil fellow, and I asked him whether he was a six or a seven days' man. "I am a night cabman," he said, "and have been at it for nine years, and have never had a day's bad health." I inquired, "Would you not like to change?" "No, sir," he answered. "You must know that one of the two rooms we have got we let to a lodger to enable us to pay the rent. I have a daughter, a real good girl, and you see, sir, if I worked in the day, there would be no place for her to sleep at night; so I work all night while she and my wife go to bed, and when I come home in the morning they are up and I go to bed."

Truly, these poor cab-drivers have hard work to gain a livelihood; and yet with good health and steadiness they can get on very comfortably, and even make money. The gin-palaces are the great drawbacks, for close to every cab-stand there is usually one of these sinks of iniquity. The poor fellows, cold and wretched, cannot resist the enticing dram, avail-

able under their eyes, and many a hard-earned shilling is thus taken away from the support of the family. Cockram, as I have before mentioned, was a teetotaller, and from commencing with little or nothing, he had now saved about £1500. Each driver is allowed a cab, harness, and two horses for the day. The latter are bought young, but they seldom last more than four or five years, and then end at the knacker's. I commissioned Cockram to buy me a cheap horse to knock about in my private hansom, and I promised him £5 for his trouble. He obtained what I required for £38; but he positively refused to accept more than £2, that being his charge for such transactions.

Colonel Clifford,<sup>1</sup> one of the officers under me at the Horse-Guards, has told me a singular story. A man in his regiment, the Rifle Brigade, after returning from the Crimea, deserted, and a body was found a fortnight afterwards in a canal, corresponding in all respects to the man who had disappeared. The uniform was marked with the same number, and the shoes and stockings were identified. The face was so decomposed that it could not be recognised; but there appeared no doubt of the identity of the deceased, and he was buried by the company of his regiment. Three weeks after, the London police sent back a deserter, who turned out to be the man whom they supposed they had buried. He could give no account

<sup>1</sup> Major-General Hon. Sir H. Clifford, K.C.B., died 1883.

of what he had done with his clothes after desertion, as after leaving his battalion he had immediately got drunk at a public-house, and lost all recollection of what had subsequently occurred. The mystery was never cleared up.

[Sir Hope Grant's expenditure in charity was considerable and incessant; and I am bound to admit that he was constantly taken in.]

One day, walking through the Green Park, I entered into conversation, casually, with a respectable, pleasant-looking young man. He informed me that he had come up to London to seek work, and that he had employment in view provided he could bring his tools up from Norwich. I lent him 2s. 6d., and he promised to repay me on a specified day. He came on the date named, and begged me to advance him £2 for the journey of his wife and family. I consented. For the third time he made his appearance, and asked me to lend him £20. My only reply was, "I see how it is. You are a precious blackguard, and I shall give you in charge." I followed up the case at Scotland Yard, and found that the man was only one of the numerous class of "cadgers," as they are called, who infest the country. Certainly I proved myself to be an unwary individual, and yet the anecdote may go hand in hand with another which I heard shortly after. Mr Marshman, Manager of the Agra Bank, which at the time in question was in a prosperous condition, was one day asked by a respectable country

toll-keeper to become security for £100. Mr Marshman refused, but consented to lend him the £100 on a promise to repay it within a specified time. The man fulfilled his pledge, repaid the money, borrowed another £200, and repaid that also. Years after the bank got into difficulties and credit began to fail, when one day a man called and said he wished to lodge some money. Mr Marshman, rather embarrassed, told the man he was perhaps not aware that the bank was not supposed to be in a solvent condition. The applicant answered, "It makes no difference; I am prepared to lodge £30,000 with you, and to take my chance." The bank was thus saved, and he who rescued it was the old toll-keeper, now possessed of a handsome house and fortune, and the proprietor of a leading London newspaper.<sup>1</sup>

My five years' tenure of office as Quartermaster-General was now very nearly completed, and H.R.H. offered me the command at Aldershot—in fact, he had twice before intimated to me his wish to place me there.

[Sir Hope Grant was never fully aware that a strong military party had strenuously opposed his appointment to Aldershot, urging as an objection, his religion. For a time it seemed probable they would prevail, until his fitness was strongly advocated by two general officers—General Forster, Military Secretary, and General Sir William Knollys, whose opinion

<sup>1</sup> Mr Levi, 'Daily Telegraph.'

as that of the successful organiser under the Prince Consort, and first commander of the camp, necessarily carried great weight. These officers emphatically represented that Sir Hope's exceptionally military capacities were universally recognised, and that his religion was of a genuine and benevolent nature, which afforded the best guarantee not only that he would do his duty, but that he would perform it "without partiality, favour, or affection."

Sir Hope was appointed. Afterwards, when a clerical and chaplain clique endeavoured to ride rough-shod over the susceptibilities of their military congregations,<sup>1</sup> Sir Hope was careful for the lawful objections of those whom he commanded, enforced the Queen's Regulations, and checked the flaunting of the ribbons of ritualistic decorations. "I told you so," was the cry of those who had opposed his appointment. "I told you so," was the retort of those who had foretold that Sir Hope Grant would always do his duty.]

It is the most important command in England; but it is one of great responsibility, and I trust I may be enabled to carry out with success the duties which will devolve upon me. The force there assembled is, for England, very considerable; but to make Aldershot a good school for the army, great changes will be necessary. I should like to take out the force for a few days' bivouac. In the summer season this would not be disadvantageous to the men, but there

<sup>1</sup> See *post*, p. 318 *et seq.*

will no doubt be a great outcry against it. However we must see to this and many other changes, as our officers and soldiers are too much pampered and fed up. I succeeded Lieutenant-General Sir James Scarlett, and began my new duties on the 1st November 1870.

[I observe the following entry in Sir Hope Grant's Journal for 1870 :—]

The Emperor directed my old ally, General de Montauban, Count Palikao, to take up the reins of Government as Prime Minister. The selection seemed to me marvellous. He was not in the least qualified for such a high office. He was a fine, tall, handsome old man, and had been of great service to the Emperor at the time of the *coup d'état*; but his talent was very moderate, and he had seen his best days.



## CHAPTER XXIII.

1870-1873.

## ALDERSHOT.

BRIGHTON VOLUNTEER REVIEW—SIR HOPE'S REPORT—SIR JOHN BURG-  
 GOYNE'S LETTERS—PUBLIC STIR—SUBSCRIPTIONS FOR PALACE OF  
 LEGION OF HONOUR—AUTUMN MANŒUVRES—ORIGINAL INCEPTION  
 FROM PRINCE CONSORT—ALDERSHOT IN THE OLD DAYS—SIR HOPE  
 PERMANENTLY REVIVES MANŒUVRES—PROJECTS FOR BERKSHIRE—  
 ABANDONED—TAKE PLACE AT ALDERSHOT—FOREIGN OFFICERS—SIR  
 HOPE'S INCAPACITY TO EXPLAIN—DECISION IN HIS FAVOUR—VON  
 BLUMENTHAL—GENERAL SHERMAN—VISITS BERLIN—VON MOLTKE  
 —EMPEROR WILLIAM—CROWN PRINCESS—SEDAN—HORSE-FLESH—  
 THE TRIBE CASE—WILTSHIRE MANŒUVRES—SIR FRANCIS GRANT'S  
 CAREER—FUNERAL OF EMPEROR NAPOLEON—THE PRINCE IMPERIAL.

In 1871 I was ordered to take command of the Volunteer force assembled at Brighton on the 10th April. I rode all over the ground, saw as many of the officers as I could get together, and explained all that I wished carried out. But these reviews are utter absurdities. Much time is taken up in marching past, and the Volunteers have to start at a comparatively early hour to enable them to return home the same evening, so that universal hurry is

prevalent. The errors were grave, and I was determined to tell my mind to the authorities in my report.

[*Extracts.*]

With so large a body of Volunteers so little drilled in brigade, and with so many officers quite unaccustomed to field-movements on a large scale, it will be easily understood how difficult it is to carry out manœuvres correctly. I was also compelled to have the movements finished by a certain time, in order to enable the men to return home at the hour appointed. It is therefore obvious that a force consisting of about 24,000 men cannot, even in a military point of view, be handled in a satisfactory manner in so short a space of time. I therefore, in my humble opinion, consider these large reviews are very detrimental to the force, and are calculated to do more harm than good, as there is neither time nor opportunity to correct any fault that takes place. The mistakes were made is not to be wondered at, as it is impossible to expect commanding officers of battalions to take charge of large brigades without any previous practice, except where the knowledge has been previously acquired; or general officers to handle with ease and precision large divisions composed of brigade so constituted. The men individually showed great intelligence. They were orderly in their behaviour

appeared willing to obey any order given, and seemed desirous to learn their work. The officers, too, appeared zealous and anxious to perform their duty. But this is not sufficient without experience.

I have written thus strongly as, notwithstanding a very simple field-day which was fully explained on the previous Saturday to as many commanding officers as could be assembled, there were grave errors in the positions taken up; and had it been in actual warfare, whole brigades would have been utterly annihilated in a few minutes. If time had permitted, all these errors would have been remedied, but under the circumstances this was quite impossible.

I would therefore suggest, with due deference to H.R.H., that reviews on so extensive a scale be discontinued.

At present they are simply pleasant sources of amusement to the numerous spectators who attend, but where no military duty of any importance is to be learnt. I would also state I consider the Volunteer Artillery should be solely confined to garrison duties, for which they are admirably adapted; but as field-artillery, they are neither manned nor horsed in sufficient numbers for service, and would necessarily run great risk of capture by an enemy if brought into action. In my opinion, two or three Volunteer battalions should be brigaded with troops of the Line in a district, and should be commanded by an officer

well qualified to correct each movement and to instruct the officers in their duties.

But the Volunteers will, I fear, never become totally efficient till they have a longer period of drill, and, when under arms or in uniform, should be under military control. I am convinced the greater number of Volunteers would not object to but would even prefer, this discipline; and those who would not, would be better out of the Volunteer force. The numbers might diminish, but the efficiency would increase.

—I have the honour to be, &c.,

J. HOPE GRANT, Lieut.-General.

H.R.H. received this report favourably, and forwarded it to the Secretary of State for War. M. Cardwell, on the other hand, thought it was too strongly expressed, and that, though just, it would displease the commanding officers of Volunteer battalions. He therefore objected to publish it; but the Duke having pressed his strong opinion that the report ought to be made known, it appeared about a month afterwards in the 'Times.' It caused some excitement in the newspapers and in the country generally. I also received letters from Field-Marshal Sir John Burgoyne,<sup>1</sup> and I consider this as one of the highest compliments ever paid me

<sup>1</sup> Died October 1871.

He is an officer of very high talent, honest, true, and noble, and his opinion is very valuable:—

5 PEMBRIDGE SQUARE, BAYSWATER,  
LONDON, 20th May 1871.

MY DEAR SIR HOPE,—I trust I am not intruding too far in venturing to express to you my humble opinion of the good sense contained in your report on the late Easter Volunteer Review, notwithstanding the sensitiveness shown by some of that body on what they consider as censures on some of their proceedings. The Volunteers are a patriotic force, deserving great credit and encouragement, and may be of immense value among the measures for the military protection of the country. But it is, no doubt, a matter for deep consideration to study the principles and system which will turn their special organisation to best advantage. But you have not said a word that was indicative of any wilful, unworthy action on their part. On the contrary, you give them credit for everything they could be possibly expected to acquire.

When we consider that it is admitted that it requires two or three years in camp or barracks, constantly and exclusively occupied in military duties, to make a good soldier; and to make an efficient officer, a preliminary long study and education adapted to the profession, to be tested by rigid examination, it may be understood how very inferior must be the efficiency of bodies like the Volunteers, who take it up as a new pursuit to which they can only give a few hours occasionally from their habitual more important avocations.

The service demanded of them should therefore be of the simplest nature; and though they would be quite unequal to form part of any considerable force to compete in a campaign with the highly organised armies of the leading military nations, they would form admirable garrisons for fortifications, and for the protection of detached positions, such as

mercantile harbours, from desultory attacks of the enemy ; and thus relieve the Regulars from all such extraneous duties.

The same disadvantage under which the Volunteers [labour], in the imperfect degree in which they can become accomplished in the military profession, renders it desirable that they should only attempt what is of the most simple character, and therefore they should not venture on services that require peculiar study and practice—such as field-artillery with all its complicated arrangements—though they might readily undertake a great portion of the work of garrison artillery.

The only exception to this principle would be in the Volunteer Engineers, who, being composed, as is usual, of professional engineers and mechanics, would, on their very entering the service, be thoroughly versed in the most important duties which in their military capacity they would be called upon to perform.

The objections you raised to the system of such a review as that at Brighton appear to me to be well founded, and on which it was your duty to give an opinion. Nor do I perceive that it contains, as seems to be imputed, any reflections peculiarly on the Volunteers.

The assemblage of a body of some 20,000 Volunteers, or even of other troops, from forty to fifty miles distant, on a morning, to return home in the evening, may be a worthy effort as a display of their appearance and primary organisation, on which occasion they might go through some few evolutions of an ordinary field-day, but is ill calculated for the trial and practice of extemporised elaborate strategical exercises and contests, which should have a more varied and extended field of action, and a more systematic basis of operations, including, as much as may be, the application of all the accessories of an army in the field, in addition to the simple parade of bodies of men for an action.

It may be hoped that all this may eventually be established, commencing with the Regulars, and introducing

Militia and Volunteers as occasion may offer.—My dear  
 Sir Hope, yours faithfully, J. F. BURGONE.

[Sir Hope Grant wrote to thank Sir John for his valuable letter, and thus elicited a further reply, from which the following are extracts:—

As a military force against the foreign enemy, they will be morally and physically of much value, if not put forward to positions which it is impossible they can be competent for—that is, as an efficient available force for field operations on a great scale against such armies as many of the European countries have now. . . . Still, the Volunteers may form a most valuable ingredient in the defence of the country—for local forces against desultory attacks, for manning fortifications, for working garrison artillery and that of shore batteries, and for engineers, and especially the working, maintenance, and regulation of railways in our home cause.

Morally, on their first institution, I certainly did entertain a fear that it might prove dangerous to the liberty of the country by adding a power for enforcing ultra-Liberal revolutionary principles. But I have since very much lost that impression, and am rather inclined to believe that, as organised bodies, they would hardly be employed otherwise than for the support of order. They would be very much divided in political feelings, the far greater proportion consisting of the middle class, having more or less of amount of property and social interests at stake, and who would be inclined to oppose the action of violent demagogues and of red republicans, consisting generally of the lowest of the working-classes, and from whom the greatest danger of commotions exists.

Lieutenant-General Sir Sidney Cotton<sup>1</sup> also wrote a

<sup>1</sup> Died 1874.

private letter emphatically corroborating Sir Hope's statements. He remarks :—

The miserable system they [*i.e.*, the military authorities] have of buttering these sort of troops by speechifying is the curse of the whole concern, and so hurtful to one's feelings that I can't bear to listen to them. The honest truth is rarely told, and I think your remarks on the Brighton Review are the only honest remarks ever heard or read, and I am convinced they will do great good.

Sir Hope Grant also received the following anonymous letter :—

LONDON, *May* 13, 1871.

Lieut.-General Sir HOPE GRANT, G.C.B.

SIR,—I beg to express my delight at your report of the Volunteer Review.

I speak in the name of many Volunteers, and assure you we wish for no more displays, but are anxious for real work—for as strict military discipline as the authorities will please to render; and we desire to take our proper place in the Reserves of our country intelligently, and so as to secure the full confidence of everybody.

We must have more drill and more discipline. Stricter rules will cause a loss numerically, no doubt; but we shall as you state, gain in power and efficiency. Pray, sir, urge the authorities to carry out your recommendations, and let us work properly with the Regulars. The best of us are losing heart at being played with. We shall grudge no sacrifices to make ourselves as effective as possible.—I am yours, &c.,  
A VOLUNTEER OFFICER.

Mr Cardwell, at all events, firmly suppressed the tendency towards indiscipline of certain Volunteers, who apparently claimed the rights simultaneously of soldiers and civilians—who, in fact, desired to run



with the hare and hunt with the hounds. The offending officer was of prominent social status, and held high rank in the Volunteers.

WAR OFFICE, 24th June 1871.

I am directed [by the Secretary of State] to point out to you the grave impropriety of discussing in the public press the reports of your superior officer upon the conduct of the troops under his command, and to add that some portions of your remarks were open to this objection, and, moreover, were not couched in respectful language, or language proper to be addressed by you to the general officer who commanded the force, and under whom you were serving.—I have the honour to be, my Lord, &c.,

NORTHBROOK.

Long and strong leading articles appeared in almost every daily paper, generally commenting favourably on Sir Hope's report. The concluding remarks of the 'Times' were :—

The least reflection on Sir Hope Grant's advice will convince them [the Volunteers] of its wisdom. The General's professional conclusions do, in fact, simply correspond to the dictates of common-sense.

Sir Hope Grant's report marks the beginning of a new era in the Easter Monday Volunteer Reviews. The accuracy of his verdict was often disputed, but its justice was tacitly admitted by the fact that for some subsequent years the annual military holiday was marked by operations of a less pretentious nature, and a modification which has been more or less maintained up to the present day. I have con-

stantly observed the Volunteers themselves quote the General's unfavourable criticism when operations on an inflated scale have been under consideration.

This year Sir Hope and eight other officers of the Aldershot Division sent a joint subscription to General Vinoy in aid of the rebuilding of the Palace of the Legion of Honour, recently burned down by the Communists. The following letter was received in reply :—

CABINET DU GRAND CHANCELIER,  
PARIS, le 30 Août 1871.

MON CHER GÉNÉRAL,—J'ai reçu avec l'aimable lettre que vous m'avez écrite le 24 de ce mois la somme de quatorze livres sterlings montant de votre souscription personnelle et de celle de divers officiers de votre Division pour la reconstruction du Palais et des bureaux de la Légion d'Honneur incendiés le 23 Mars dernier.

Je vous remercie très vivement de cette généreuse offrande, et je vous prie de faire agréer à messieurs les officiers dont les noms sont cités dans votre lettre l'expression de ma très chaleureuse gratitude. J'ai trouvé en cette triste occasion chez le peuple Anglais, et surtout dans l'armée Anglaise, le concours le plus précieux et le plus efficace. Ah ! mon cher Général, nous nous souviendrons toujours des champs de bataille où nous avons combattu côte à côte en des temps plus heureux, et où, de concert avec votre vaillante armée, nous avons terminé, à la gloire commune de nos deux nations, la campagne la plus longue et la plus difficile des temps modernes.

Soyez assuré, mon cher Général, des sentiments affectueux et dévoués que je vous conserve.—Le Grand Chancelier,

VINOY.

Monsieur le Général HOPE GRANT, G.C.B.,  
Membre de la Légion d'Honneur.

Sir Hope Grant—practically Sir Hope Grant alone—permanently established the system originally designated “Autumn Manœuvres.” Truly he had a desperate contention ere their expediency was recognised and their practice sanctioned. It is, however, also true that long previously there had been one who perceived the necessity of this instruction—the Prince Consort: and here the interest of the subject will, I trust, justify a short digression.

When Aldershot was first established as a large training camp under General Knollys, regiments which had worked during a period of forty years in every respect as isolated units—saving when on active service or in Dublin—were organised into brigades, and were taught the rudiments of a soldier’s life in the field, of which many of them were as ignorant as though they had never been out of the sound of Bow Bells. The camp had from its very outset been the subject of the Prince Consort’s initiative, and the object of his solicitude: his visits were continual, and his conferences with the General on the administration of the command were unwearied. Chobham had been a useful temporary experiment; but otherwise, prior to 1855, the principles of route-marching, encamping, bivouacking, field-cooking, early-dawn attacks, and rapid construction of earthworks, now the matter-of-course A B C of military training, were by many regarded as the pedantic arcana of a secret guild. I recollect seeing one

battalion standing despondingly shelterless, with unrolled tents in front of them, and another battalion fasting, with uncooked rations in their pots, until General Knollys personally showed them the purposes of tent-pegs and guy-ropes, and taught them how to dig a cooking-trench. Hand in hand, with the instigation, and often in the presence, of the Prince, our valuable but hitherto untrained *vieilles moustaches* were quickly indoctrinated into the above details of military handicraft; and the interest and enthusiasm in the teaching were greatly enhanced by the presence of the Queen, who, in a military habit bearing the insignia of a Field-Marshal's rank, and wearing a hat with regulation plume, would sometimes ride with the Prince from spot to spot inspecting the various operations.

But in course of time the Prince, with a perception considerably in advance of public opinion, came to the conclusion that instruction should be pushed a step further, and that bodies of troops should be exercised against each other as opposing forces. The scheme was carried out in its incipient stages; an enemy was represented by a battalion, and even by a brigade—and some future antiquarian “Jonathan Oldbuck” may puzzle over tumuli and trenches in the vicinity of Cæsar's Camp and Hungry Hill, which still mark the scene of operations where, about 1858, our regular soldiers, representing invaders, threw up a miniature Torres Vedras under the fire of Militia battalions filling the *rôle* of a home army.

Thus we owe the nucleus of English Autumn Manœuvres to the Prince Consort. Through reasons concerning which I need not now be further particular, the practice was destined to falter and then to remain comatose. But thirteen years afterwards it was revived by Sir Hope Grant, and is now considered by all whose opinion is worth consideration the most valuable feature in our field training.

How laborious in 1855 was the organisation of administrative departments which had barely existed even on paper since the Waterloo campaign, and how much every soldier—officer and private—had to learn, must be manifest. The task fully engrossed the activity of the active generals<sup>1</sup> who successively held the chief command for fifteen years; but at the end of that time, when, relatively, we had made great progress, and when, absolutely, we had learnt somewhat, we began to take stock of our system and acquirements compared with those of foreign nations.

Without an instant's hesitation, those of our officers who combined previous professional knowledge with a readiness to learn more, declared that our instructional system was defective in one important essential—that of teaching our troops to work against each

<sup>1</sup> It is interesting to note the names of the officers successively selected for this post, which in importance transcends perhaps every other appointment in England: Sir William Knollys, Sir John Pennefather, Sir James Scarlett, Sir Hope Grant, Sir Thomas Steele, Sir Daniel Lysons, Sir Archibald Alison, Sir Evelyn Wood, and the Duke of Connaught.

other in the field, divided into two opposing forces, and with the conditions of warfare reproduced as far as practicable in peace time. This had been the method of teaching adopted by Prussia, and imitated to a certain extent by some other Continental nations.

The present generation of soldiers will hardly realise the surprised indignation with which the suggestion was received even by some of our most trusted and honoured general officers. "It will be childish;" "it will be theatrical;" "it will ruin the drill of the men;" "it will impair the discipline of the officers;" "it is a foolish, futile, foreign innovation." Such was the general cry which, substantially, was supported by many in high military authority. It is difficult to suppress a suspicion that the cause of this animadversion may be explained by the simple sincerity with which that fine and honoured old soldier, Sir James Scarlett, spoke on the subject. "Perhaps these manœuvres may be useful," he said, "but they represent an entirely new system. I am too old to learn it; and if it has to be carried out, it will be best to intrust it to new and younger generals."

I may here observe that about the first occasion when Sir James Scarlett found it necessary to take command of a force acting against a tangible enemy, his indignation at finding that his opponent, junior in rank to himself, was getting the best of the day was great. He hotly sent a message ordering his

enemy to halt until his force had recovered their lost ground, and were ready for further operations.

Finally, in order to throw complete light on the subject, I may state that prior to 1871 the military exercises throughout the British army in England were practically restricted to a change of front on a bare plain, such as the Long Valley, with skirmishers thrown out, and batteries at carefully calculated intervals, cannonading an imaginary enemy, who, very frequently, was assailing us from all the four points of the compass. Next came a charge of cavalry, with horse-artillery galloping furiously on the flanks with a recklessness characteristic of Mazeppa. Operations were concluded with a very lengthy march past, and the proceedings were carried out with the undeviating regularity, and even the harmony, of a musical snuff-box, not materially impaired on certain occasions by a never-failing regulation allowance of expletives.

And now the reader will understand how great was Sir Hope's task in endeavouring to combat the prejudices of those who would not see, and the head-splitting stupidity of those who could not see, that innovation does not necessarily entail deterioration. But at last he gained over Mr Cardwell—Mr Cardwell, who, notwithstanding that he was opposed by open foes, and hampered by concealed enemies, and baffled by ostensible friends, to an extent of which not every one is aware, swept away many old abuses, started our army with a new life, and, in spite of some inevitable

defects in constitution, with a vigour, a capacity, and a prosperity which we ungratefully ignore. At last Mr Cardwell and Sir Hope got their own way respecting the autumn manœuvres, and I will now leave the General to speak for himself.—H. K.]

*Journal continued.*—I laid a proposal before H.R.H. that I should take out a large force to a part of the country where manœuvres could be carried out on a large scale, according to the Prussian system. My suggestion was favourably received, and at a meeting held at the War Office it was decided that a force of 30,000 men, including Militia, Volunteers, and Yeomanry, should be assembled for that purpose. The New Forest was the site I first suggested, but this was opposed, and Berkshire was finally selected. The scheme was heartily supported by Lord Overstone, Colonel Lloyd Lindsay,<sup>1</sup> Sir Paul Hunter, and other large landed proprietors, who exercised influence in that part of the country where I proposed to manœuvre, and which I caused to be carefully surveyed. All, farmers included, entered most heartily into the project. But, unfortunately, exceptionally bad weather had caused the harvest to be exceptionally late, and of course we could not move over standing corn, so that at last the Secretary of State for War, Mr Cardwell, began to wince at the accumulating difficulties and expense if my proposal for this year were carried out in its integrity. He sent for

<sup>1</sup> His son-in-law, now Lord Wantage.



me to the War Office, and observed: "I am sorry to say I fear the Berkshire expedition will have to be given up in consequence of the delay in getting in the harvest. It will be so late before the troops can commence operations, that the equinoctial gales will have set in, when it would be unwise to expose the men to such inclement weather." I answered: "I am very sorry to hear you say so, as the country has taken up the matter so warmly, and looks upon it with so much interest, that you may depend upon it they will say the cause is the want of transport which the War Office have not been able to obtain." Mr Cardwell appeared rather nettled at my statement, and said right-minded people would never put such a construction upon his actions. He however asked, "Are you willing to carry out these manœuvres in the neighbourhood of Aldershot?" I instantly answered in the affirmative.

When it was generally known that the proposed extensive manœuvres in Berkshire had been abandoned, such a torrent of reproach and contumely was showered upon the unfortunate Secretary of State for War by almost every newspaper, that I have no doubt he was sorry he had not adhered to his original intention. Consequently, orders were issued to purchase transport horses wherever they could be obtained. Waggons and draught animals were hired from Messrs Pickford, the great carriers, and thus with the horses of the Army Service Corps, 600 in number, we

managed to muster sufficient transport<sup>1</sup> for our requirements.

That year, 1871, we mustered a force of 30,000 men in the neighbourhood of Aldershot. The principal generals in command were myself, Major-General Carey,<sup>2</sup> and Major-General Sir Charles Staveley.<sup>3</sup>

Our first experience was characterised by a terrible stampede of the horses of the 1st Life Guards. The regiment was under the command of Colonel Dudley de Ros,<sup>4</sup> and was picketed in the open. One very dark night, from some unexplained cause, these large black horses became suddenly terrified; and in two minutes every one of them, with the exception of fourteen, were simultaneously panic-stricken, dragged up the picket lines, broke loose, and galloped away in wild disorder. Still further maddened by the picket chains and pegs banging against their legs, in the extreme darkness of the night they galloped headlong into a deep adjacent ditch. The consequences were broken legs, broken backs, and even some were brained by dashing themselves against houses and walls. Seven were killed and thirty-eight wounded. Two days afterwards the 2d Dragoon Guards were subjected to a similar stampede, and the 10th Hussars followed suit. But in these instances no particular damage ensued.

<sup>1</sup> Flippantly dubbed "Pickford's Irregulars."

<sup>2</sup> Died when in command of the Northern District, 1872.

<sup>3</sup> Now General Sir Charles Staveley, G.C.B.

<sup>4</sup> Now Lieutenant-General Lord de Ros.

Several foreign officers came over to witness the manœuvres: they were put up at the expense of Government at the Queen's Hotel, and were entertained with turtle and venison, champagne and claret, and every sort of good living. These officers comprised Austrians, Prussians, French, Belgian, Portuguese, and representatives of several other countries. But the most distinguished of all was General Von Blumenthal,<sup>1</sup> who was Chief of the Staff to the Crown Prince in the late war, and was a highly distinguished, talented, and most amiable officer. He has a great respect for our country.<sup>2</sup>

Among the militia were two London battalions. They were largely made up of thieves, tramps, and vagabonds; they were badly drilled and worse disciplined. Once, when I was passing one of their guards, the awkward-looking sentry was preparing to salute me, when one of his comrades perceiving his inability to perform the honour satisfactorily, rushed up, took the rifle out of the sentry's hand, and presented arms for him. It was also stated that some of the metropolitan police were sent down to look after bad characters, and that on one occasion the inspector, after attentively scrutinising the features of one of the men in the ranks, gently smiled. It was surmised that he had recognised the man as a thief or a bad character, but the inspector quietly replied:

<sup>1</sup> Now Field-Marshal.

<sup>2</sup> He was married to an English lady, Miss Vyner.

“No; he is the only man amongst them I do not recognise.”

[Sir Hope Grant narrates in considerable detail the proceedings of one day's manœuvres, which so vividly represented his capacity as a general and his incapacity as a speaker, that a brief record of the circumstance may be deemed both useful and interesting. Sir Hope, in command of a defending force, was ordered to cover the approaches to London against an attacking force under Sir Charles Staveley. He stationed some troops on the range of the Hog's Back, and after a defence which was intentionally superficial and feigned, he withdrew all his troops to a position in rear on the Fox Hills, naturally very strong and previously entrenched and armed. The retreat was carried out with singular speed, order, and precision, and the main body of Sir Hope, perfectly secure within their parapets, leisurely played upon the advancing enemy under such advantages that in actual warfare his opponents would have been annihilated. However, in those days we were new to “autumn manœuvres,” and the probability that under circumstances of warfare a single soldier could be killed, wounded, or missing, was entirely ignored. Consequently, Sir Charles Staveley's force triumphantly topped the Hog's Back, descended the dangerous valley on the other side, and leisurely and heroically marched up almost to the foot of Sir Hope's entrenchments, scarcely deterred by the umpires, and not at

all disconcerted by the terrible pounding to which he had been subjected. "Cease firing" is sounded; up rides the chief umpire with a vast concourse of chief umpire's staff, and announces: "O, Sir Hope, you are utterly beaten: you have been driven from your first position; your entrenchments are captured; you are entirely surrounded; you have quite lost the day." "No, no, no, no, sir," said the General, in his peculiar, jerky Scotch intonation,—“no such thing; because don't you see that if . . .” and then followed a series of broken explanations which I must needs confess were somewhat obscure, and which the umpires were almost unanimous in pooh-poohing because they did not understand them. But Sir Hope, confident in the justice of his argument, insisted on having his say all over again from beginning to end. The main obscurity remained; but a ray of light seemed to dawn on the mind of the chief umpire, and the General was allowed an explanation for the third time. On this occasion he succeeded in making his reasoning as clear as daylight. He showed that he had retreated with perfect impunity and without any loss to a position of the utmost strength. That meanwhile his enemy would have been crushed by the fire poured on him, and that in fact Sir Charles Staveley could not have captured the entrenchment, because Sir Charles Staveley could not possibly have reached the entrenchment. A moment's pause and numerous mutterings, "By Jove! he's right." "Yes, you are perfectly

right," said the chief umpire; "I see that you made good your retreat, and that your opponent could never have reached his present situation. Therefore, Sir Charles Staveley, I must decide that you are defeated."<sup>1</sup>

Sir Hope afterwards illustrated his tactical abilities as a General in three days' operations in the vicinity of Chobham. On the 22d of August 1871 the total force, consisting of 30,300 men with ninety guns, paraded for a march past. The force was certainly composed of the most splendid troops and turned out in beautiful order. The cavalrymen resembled gentlemen, and the infantry looked like first-rate soldiers. General Von Blumenthal spoke in the highest strain of the troops; and another Prussian, whose opinion carried with it considerable weight, observed, "Your artillery is admirable, your cavalry magnificent—we have nothing like it in our country; but our infantry is as good as yours."

[That eminent tactician, now Field-Marshal von Blumenthal, in reply to the wonted English depreciation of English manœuvres, expressed himself to Sir Hope Grant in the following words: "Depend

<sup>1</sup> The discussion had been listened to with breathless eagerness by the respective staffs, to whom in those days autumn manœuvres possessed the surpassing charm not only of interest but of novelty; and when a verdict was given in Sir Hope's favour, one of his aides-de-camp, Barton—he who so nobly lost his life in 1879, whilst trying to rescue a wounded soldier at Zlobane, South Africa—forgetful for the moment of the restraints of discipline, tossed his forage-cap into the air with a loud hurrah.

upon it, we commit just as many tactical errors in our manœuvres in Prussia as you do in England. I have carefully watched the course of your operations, and I have undoubtedly observed many faults and some absurdities, but they are by no means in excess of those which habitually occur in our own country. Year after year they are repeated, but the object of these exercises is to prevent the errors from getting too much ahead." (From some notes I took at the time.—H. K.)

One of this year's foreign visitors to the camp was the celebrated and honoured American General Sherman. His intimation of his arrival was contained in the following characteristic telegram to Sir Hope :—

Please let me come to-morrow in civil dress, rather to see the general arrangement of your camp than special details. I have been so on the jump that I confess to be tired, and now am starting for Woolwich. Between your kind countrymen and my own, both days and nights are employed, giving no rest even on Sundays or Bank holidays.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*General, U.S. Army.*

The visit was duly paid, and great was the admiration and amusement which the fine and simple, quaint and kindly old General elicited. He was as vivacious and active as a young man of twenty-five, and in the most business-like way peered into every corner of the camp. When inspecting the refuse-receptacles and other unsavoury spots, his A.D.C.

was missing. "Oh, sir, don't trouble about him," was General Sherman's remark. "I guess that just now he is a civilian, and is afraid of spoiling his pants." At the conclusion of his visit he was entertained at luncheon by the Queen's Bays, and conducted to the railway station in their splendidly turned out drag and team. He wrote a letter warmly thanking them for driving him about in their fine "truck."

In 1871 Sir Hope Grant went abroad on leave.]

*Journal continued.*—At Berlin I had letters for General Von Moltke and General Von Roon, which I left at their houses. General Von Roon's aide-de-camp immediately called upon me, and informed me he had been instructed by his chief to facilitate my inspection of anything I might wish to examine connected with the Prussian army. To my great delight, Field-Marshal Von Moltke himself paid me a visit at the hotel. He had a most gentle, pleasant expression, with a very intellectual countenance. In his own country he has a reputation of being extremely silent. However, he made himself very agreeable to us, and spoke English with great fluency.

[Sir Hope expresses himself to the following effect concerning the Prussian troops :—]

In the cavalry there are no riding-masters—the squadron leader superintends the instruction. I do not approve of this system, as few officers, even in our own country, have a thorough knowledge of



horsemanship, and still fewer have the power of imparting that knowledge to others, however proficient they may be themselves. [Elsewhere Sir Hope remarks, "I must again say I do not think the German cavalry equal to ours in appearance."] The men have such short service that it is most difficult to shake them into proper form, and nearly impossible to give them good hands upon a horse. The appointments, too, were not well fitted and not well cleaned. Their horses appeared well bred but rather under size. The men seemed very intelligent and very efficient. Neither was their artillery in the same form as ours. But their infantry was admirable,—fine strong men, well set up, well drilled, and well kept at their work. Their step in marching past is singular. They strut like proud Turkey-cocks.

I was invited to dine with the Emperor at half-past four. The invitation was written on an unfolded scrap of paper, to which was added the remark, "If you come, no answer is required." I had no uniform with me, but I ascertained that I might appear in plain clothes, provided I wore riband and star of the Bath. I was, moreover, enjoined to carry my hat in my hand, to wear gloves, and not to ring the Palace door-bell, as the Crown Prince alone was allowed this privilege. On arrival I was informed by the chamberlain that I was to sit opposite the Emperor. The company numbered about

thirty. The Emperor on first entrance proceeded to speak a few words to every person in the room, an honour in which I was included. I found it was not easy to reply to royalty in German, but I thanked him for the manner in which his officers had spoken of the English on the occasion of their recent visit to our autumn manoeuvres. We sat down to what I should call a comfortable dinner, after which the Emperor chaffed away very pleasantly with the company, and then withdrew.

At the Reichstag I saw Prince Bismarck. He was dressed in cuirassier uniform, and, in my opinion, bore a look of determination which would brook no denial. On one occasion when our ambassador, Lord Odo Russell, was paying him a visit, Bismarck suddenly fixed his eye on a special corner of the room. He got up, rang the bell furiously, and when the servant came, he set to work to abuse him in very unparliamentary language, concluding: "I see a cobweb in that corner, and if anything of the sort ever appears again" (taking up an inkstand in his hand), "I will break your head with this inkstand." Lord Odo Russell could not make out whether Bismarck acted in earnest or merely to produce an effect. I was told that the first time Lord Odo Russell, our ambassador at Berlin, dined with Bismarck, a bottle of champagne and a bottle of beer were placed before the latter, which he mixed together and drank. When cheese was

handed round, he said to Lord Odo, "I know you English like a glass of port after cheese," and desired the servant to put a bottle on the table. Lord Odo drank one glass and had quite enough of it, but Bismarck finished the whole bottle.

My next destination was Wilhelmshöhe in Cassel, the residence of the Crown Prince, and in which beautiful spot the Emperor Napoleon resided as a prisoner after Sedan. When I went to leave my name at the Palace, I was informed that he was absent on inspection duty. The footman then inquired whether I were "the English General," and he then told me the Crown Princess desired I would dine at the Palace that evening at half-past seven. She received me in a most kind manner, and expressed her regret that the Prince was absent, as he would have been so pleased to have met me. The party was very quiet, homely, and agreeable, and consisted of two ladies-in-waiting, two governesses, an A.D.C., a tutor, and myself. I sat next to the Princess, and had a great deal of interesting conversation with her; but the rest of the party scarcely opened their lips. After dinner she showed me the piece of a shell which she had picked up on the field of Wörth when riding over it with her husband some time after the battle. She added, "Will you accept it in remembrance of your visit to Wilhelmshöhe?" Dinner, and after-dinner talk, did not extend over an hour and a half.

With all the simplicity and quiet bearing of the Princess, who was very simply dressed, she possessed a dignity of manner and a noble demeanour of appearance which stamped the high-born lady.

I afterwards went to Strasburg, and visited the barracks of Colonel von Albensleben's lancer regiment. . . . I must say I do not think the German cavalry is equal to ours in appearance. Their lance is a long clumsy pole,<sup>1</sup> and their exercise is antiquated; but I approve of the practice of carrying the pistol slung to the body, as, in the event of the soldier being separated from his horse, the pistol is very useful for defence.

[Sir Hope Grant proceeded to visit the battle-fields of 1870. At Wörth he observed an evergreen wreath twined round the tree where MacMahon had stood during the battle. This was a tribute of admiration from the ladies of the place. On reaching Metz, he found that the Crown Princess had, in anticipation of his arrival, telegraphed an order to the Prussian General to facilitate the object of his visit. He finally arrived at Sedan. There he made the acquaintance of the excellent French Protestant pastor, Mr Gulden, and of his sisters, who had been present in Sedan during the battle.]

They told us that the entry of MacMahon's army into the town prior to the great action was of itself

<sup>1</sup> Owing to Sir Hope's personal exertions, the light graceful bamboo lance had been introduced into the British service.

a fearful sight. Men were rushing in from Beaumont; horses without riders, many of them wounded, galloped through the streets; the regiments were inextricably mixed up, and discipline was at an end. The normal population scarcely exceeded 14,000 inhabitants, but now 110,000 were added thereto. Then the accounts given us of the French officers were lamentable. One general,<sup>1</sup> instead of being with his troops, was occupied during a considerable part of the action with some treasure he had abstracted from a chest. Another general was shot accidentally in a *café* drinking. Another, with his staff, lingered long at his breakfast after the battle had begun, and could with difficulty be persuaded to betake himself to the ground. When informed that the day was going badly for the French, he replied, "It is of no consequence; it will come all right." At last a shell burst in the house, and then he and his staff decamped.

Mr Gulden's sisters attended the sick and wounded of both armies, and they said that the Germans were not nearly such pleasant patients as the French. The latter were always civil; the former were rather the reverse, but when warned that recovery was hopeless they became quite altered, and called on the Saviour for mercy. The French, on the other hand, as a rule, seemed to have no belief in an after-life, and considered death would finish their existence. One poor

<sup>1</sup> Name given.

wounded fellow, however, was continually in his last agony calling upon the *bonne Mère* and the *bon Dieu*, and finally said, "But the *bonne Mère* will not listen, and the *bon Dieu* does not hear." A Turco with a shattered leg caused a flower which had been given him to be stuck on an apple and placed close to his side, keeping his eyes steadfastly and constantly fixed on it. Miss Gulden urged him to try and sleep, but he answered, "I cannot sleep in Europe. I can only find rest in Algeria. There my mother comes to me if I am ill and speaks tenderly, and friends help and comfort me; but here I have no one who cares for me. If I recover, I shall be sent to prison in Germany, and there I shall die." The poor fellow did recover and was sent to Germany, but Miss Gulden could not trace his after-fate.

We visited the orphan girls who are under the supervision of Miss Gulden, and were informed that twice a-week they have horse-flesh for dinner. The ladies assured me that they themselves found it excellent; but the idea was rather repugnant to me, and I could not forbear blandly asking, "Shall we have any horse-flesh at your dinner?" They reassured me, but represented that at the hotel where I was then residing I had probably frequently eaten the flesh of that animal. Some time afterwards I took Miss Gulden over our instructional kitchen at Aldershot. A fine burly old sergeant explained the system to her with much satisfaction to himself,

until she asked him how often horse-flesh was given to the men. Upon which the old sergeant turned round, and looked at her aghast and with amazement. I have no doubt he regarded her as a cannibal.

[The "Tribe case," as it was called at the time of its occurrence in 1871, aroused no little attention, and is even now of some interest, as indicating the possible limit, in some respects, of the power of military authority. It showed that even discipline is powerless to compel officers to entertain a high opinion of, or goodwill towards, any one whom they may consider unworthy of either. A certain Mr Tribe had been appointed to the 9th Lancers. His previous career at Sandhurst had not been such as to prepossess his future brother officers in his behalf. His character for veracity was remarkably low; his capacity for riding was poor, in so far that he habitually threw himself off his horse whenever embarrassed at riding drill; and, last of all, he obtained leave for an unusual period prior to joining, to the not unnatural discomfiture of the senior hunting subalterns. These latter were so injudicious as to write to Tribe, through the medium of the senior lieutenant, inquiring whether "he would have any objection to be transferred to another regiment, as there are so few officers for orderly duty, and there are several gentlemen personally acquainted with the officers who are anxious to join and do duty at once."

Tribe replied, in a somewhat bearish manner, that he would neither exchange nor join. So when, at the end of his leave, he made his appearance, he was not regarded in a very cordial manner by his brother officers. On duty he adhered to his former imperfections of veracity, and to his practice of habitually hurling himself off his horse at riding drill. At last his commanding officer, at the instance of Sir Hope, and with the approval of the Horse-Guards, advised him to resign, a suggestion which Tribe adopted. Sir Hope observes :—]

*Journal.*—Unfortunately, it was some time before he could be gazetted out, and meanwhile Tribe's solicitor, a Mr Tomkins, demanded redress from the Secretary of State for War for the treatment which his client had received from the commanding officer, the adjutant, and all the other officers of the regiment. At the same time permission was requested for Tribe to withdraw his resignation. A court of inquiry was also convened. The result was that the Duke ordered me to administer a severe wiggling to the subalterns of the 9th Lancers for having written the letter to Mr Tribe already mentioned, and I was to add that the Commander-in-Chief would hold the commanding officer responsible for Tribe being treated with cordiality and civility; but, at the same time, the Duke's letter admitted that "Mr Tribe had not conducted himself in a way usually expected from officers of her Majesty's army." Now the subalterns



felt that they had done wrong in writing the letter to Mr Tribe, but they could not understand how they could be expected to treat with "cordiality" an officer whose conduct had been so characterised by the Commander-in-Chief. The next stage was another letter from the solicitor to the Adjutant-General, stating that one of Tribe's guests had not been received in a friendly manner by the officers of the regiment. I ordered the Cavalry Brigadier, Sir Thomas M'Mahon,<sup>1</sup> to investigate this further complaint, and the result was that he entirely exonerated the regiment from all the charges brought against it.

I forwarded his letter to the Adjutant-General, and, at the same time, expressed my complete concurrence with Sir Thomas's opinions. Nevertheless, H.R.H. directed the Adjutant-General, Sir Richard Airey, to address the officers in their mess-room; to tell them that they must receive Mr Tribe in a becoming manner, or that, otherwise, Mr Cardwell had determined, to mark his displeasure, to turn out of the regiment any officer showing an unkindly feeling to Mr Tribe. Sir Richard Airey also requested Colonel Fiennes (the commanding officer) to write a letter to him, in the name of the officers, stating that they would receive Mr Tribe as a brother officer, and would not treat him with such a high hand. Colonel Fiennes felt that he had received an order which it was impossible he could carry out. How could he compel

<sup>1</sup> General Sir Thomas M'Mahon died 1892.

his officers to treat in a friendly manner one of their number who had so misconducted himself? He accordingly forwarded to the Adjutant-General, through me, a letter expressed with great deference, but also with great decision. He represented that after the manner in which the Commander-in-Chief had censured Mr Tribe's conduct as not consistent with the attributes of an officer of her Majesty's service, the 9th Lancers felt themselves unable to alter their behaviour towards him socially, though in all matters of duty they would treat him with due civility. Here for the present the matter was allowed to drop. Mr Cardwell's unjust threat could not be carried out. He could not publicly support a low blackguard who had so little regard for truth.

After a time the regiment moved to York, and there Tribe decamped, having previously uttered a forged cheque for £25. To the delight of his regiment he was now gazetted out. Not long after, his solicitor made fresh denunciations against the regiment for brutal tyranny and injustice. The case was even brought before the House, but was so essentially rotten that it could not be sustained.

This year Sir John Pennefather, Governor of Chelsea Hospital, died, and I was thus promoted to the rank of full General. Thereupon I was offered the governorship of the Hospital. This was a great compliment, but I greatly preferred my command at Aldershot, and asked to be allowed to decline the offer. H.R.H. was pleased to approve.

Since the formation of the camp, the civil population of Aldershot parish had risen from 500 inhabitants to 9000, and was steadily increasing. The only non-military church was totally inadequate for the requirements, and in order to raise a fund for an additional edifice, private subscriptions were requested, and a camp bazaar was organised. The sum cleared by three days' sale amounted to £713.

[This incident ought to be considered in conjunction with subsequent clerical disputes on which Sir Hope Grant was called to adjudicate. It proves that practically he was a warm supporter of the interests of the Church of England.

In 1872 autumn manœuvres on a far larger scale than had been previously, or have been subsequently, ever attempted in England, were carried out in the neighbourhood of Salisbury. The total force there finally assembled was about 30,000 men.]

*Journal.*—Prior to the date fixed for the assembly, I examined the Wiltshire Downs, accompanied by my three A.D.C.'s, Colonel Oakes,<sup>1</sup> an assistant umpire, and Major Wood,<sup>2</sup> D.A.A.G. I was appointed one of the chief umpires. The other umpire was General Sir William Knollys,<sup>3</sup> a charming person, who stayed with me near Salisbury during the greater part of

<sup>1</sup> Died 1877.

<sup>2</sup> Now Lieut.-General Sir Evelyn Wood, G.C.B., Quartermaster-General, Horse-Guards. He was an intimate friend of Sir Hope Grant, who entertained for him the highest respect, both for his character and abilities.

<sup>3</sup> The first Commander of Aldershot.

the manœuvres. The lieutenant-generals selected to command the two opposing forces were Sir John Mitchell, who had served under me in China, and Sir Robert Walpole. Mitchell was a clever, sharp officer, well adapted to command. After some preliminary manœuvres at Aldershot, the Army Corps commenced its march for Wiltshire on the 26th of August 1872.

[Extracts from Sir Hope Grant's report to the Horse-Guards concerning the manœuvres :—]

The principal error, in my opinion, was the extent of front covered by the Northern Army, Sir Robert Walpole, in almost every action. It covered so extended a portion of ground that it was weak at all points. . . . The attack [on one occasion specified] only consisted of a line of skirmishers, without supports, reserves, or even a single line behind them, and it must have been consequently unavailing. . . .

On the 6th September Sir Robert Walpole committed the same fault of taking up too extended a position for his force. His brigades were separated at too great intervals. So much so, that when Sir John Mitchell effected his crossing over the Wiley, which he easily accomplished, though the fords and bridges were in possession of the Northern Army, Sir Robert Walpole was unable to concentrate his brigades in sufficient time to withstand Sir John Mitchell's attack. . . . [Sir Hope adduces a third instance of an excessive extent of front:] "The cavalry of the Northern force again failed in reconnoitring the enemy's position."

The cavalry force of the Northern Army was not, as far as I could judge, advantageously or sufficiently made use of. . . .

Though I have ventured to remark on what I consider the errors, . . . I consider the manœuvres were of the greatest advantage to the troops, and a great improvement upon last year. Mistakes necessarily will occur, and general officers cannot be expected to move large bodies of men without experience. The manœuvres have already tended to encourage officers in the study of their profession, and will increasingly do so if they are allowed to be carried out annually. The regiments of Militia have this year been a great improvement upon those sent to Aldershot last year, but . . . I think the reserve of the army should be formed from the army itself. . . . Let the men serve with the line for twelve years, or longer; then place them in the Reserve upon 4d. a-day. . . .

As regards the umpire staff, I think employing junior officers should be avoided. It irritates commanding officers to be told they are wrong by junior officers, or of their own rank; or to have their regiments put out of action by them.

[Sir Hope Grant's family illustrated the diversity of abilities in a diversity of departments, one member possessing a talent in which another member was singularly deficient. For instance, there were probably very few amateur musicians superior to Sir Hope, but he had scarcely more power of representing on paper

the most simple imaginable object than if he had been destitute of hands. On the other hand, his brother, Sir Francis Grant, could not whistle "God save the Queen" to save his life; but at all events he ultimately became President of the Royal Academy. Sir Hope writes:—]

*Journal.*—My brother Francis in his youth had always a great love for painting, and used constantly to attend at the studios of the celebrated artists of the day. Shortly after I joined the army, he painted a picture of me in full uniform and mounted. This picture was claimed both by my mother and by my brother John, and they agreed to put it up to a friendly auction. It was knocked down for £10 to John. Francis considered the whole proceeding a joke, when, to his surprise, next day John insisted upon his taking the £10, and added that he would rather have paid £40 than have missed becoming the possessor of the picture. Francis was at the time studying for the law, which he detested, and an instructor used to coach him daily in Greek and Latin. But the money he had received for his picture, as well as the attendant compliments, completely changed his views for the future, and to be a painter was the sole object of his ambition. When his tutor next appeared, he informed him of his intention of abandoning the law and of becoming an artist. His preceptor was highly amused at what he considered as little more than chaff, and opened the books to begin instruction. But my brother

coolly took up books and papers, tore them to pieces, and threw them into the fire, to the amazement and consternation of the worthy tutor, who walked out of the house in pitying indignation, and who was paid off the next day. Lord Elgin, a great lover of the fine arts, was so pleased with Frank's bold determination, that he wrote a letter to him offering to send him one of his best pictures to copy—a loan which my brother accepted with delight.

On the 15th January 1873 the Emperor Napoleon was buried at Chiselhurst; and as I had taken part with his troops during the war in China, and he had given me the Order of the Legion of Honour, I thought it was fitting I should attend his funeral. On arriving at Camden House, I was presented to the Duke de Cambacères, the late Emperor's chamberlain. A profusion of violets and camellias was strewn over the top of the hearse. The young Prince Imperial, as chief mourner, followed in rear, together with several of the Buonaparte family, both ladies and gentlemen; there were also many French generals and officers of the household who took part in the procession. Amongst them was Field-Marshal Canrobert and my old friend General Montauban. Poor old Montauban looked aged and much broken, and Canrobert had his left arm in a sling. I was standing speaking to Sir Lintorn Simmons,<sup>1</sup> Governor of Woolwich Academy, who had brought over some cadet friends of the young Prince studying at

<sup>1</sup> Now Field-Marshal Sir Lintorn Simmons, G.C.B.

that Institution, when a well-dressed French official asked me whether I belonged to the same party, and when I told him my name he took off his hat and said, "I am proud to have the honour of seeing you. I was formerly your brother's, Mr Grant's, whipper-in when he kept the hounds in Perthshire." For the last seventeen years he had been stud-groom to the late Emperor Napoleon. I then recognised him as Mr Gamble, a person of great importance at Chalons when I there attended the French manoeuvres professionally.<sup>1</sup> I inquired whether I could obtain admission into the chapel, and he replied that probably this would be very difficult, as there were a large number of followers who would have the first right of entry. At the same time he begged me to accept his card of admission, of which I gladly availed myself. We followed in the procession to the Roman Catholic chapel, and the number of people who had assembled to witness the ceremony was marvellous. The greatest respect and solemnity were manifested throughout. On arriving at the chapel the coffin was taken out of the hearse, and covered with a purple velvet pall, on which were emblazoned the imperial crown and numerous bees; it was then carried into the chapel and surrounded by priests. Next began the ceremonies of the Roman Catholic Church, the reading of prayers in Latin, the continually putting the mitre on the head of Monseignor

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, vol. ii., p. 244.



Goddard, the principal priest, and taking it off again, the procession of priests round the coffin, sprinkling it with what is called holy water, and enveloping it in a mist of incense, as though to waft the spirit of the dead into Paradise. After these ceremonies the coffin was borne into a small adjacent vault with grated doors. Every Roman Catholic present then sprinkled holy water upon it.

On leaving the chapel the Duke de Cambacères requested me to be present at the *levée* which the Prince Imperial was about to hold at Camden House. There I was presented by De Montauban to the young Prince, and also to his cousin Prince Napoleon, who bears a great resemblance to the late Emperor, and who will no doubt try to gain imperial power for himself. The young Prince, who is a nice-looking lad, and who is much liked by the cadets at Woolwich, after this went out to receive a deputation of French peasants and artisans who had come over to attend the funeral. They appeared carrying a tricolor on the branch of a tree; and one of them made an oration, which was followed by vociferous cries of "*Vive Napoléon IV.!*" "*Vive l'Empereur!*" "*Vive l'Angleterre!*" At last the crowd broke through, and the Prince's friends were so apprehensive lest the poor young boy should be assassinated, or that some evil should befall him, that they hurried him out of the crowd into the house.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

1873-1875.

## ALDERSHOT—DEATH.

VAGARIES OF CHAPLAINS—SIR HOPE'S TOLERANCES IN DIVERGENCIES OF RELIGIOUS OPINIONS—RITUALISTIC FOLLIES—THE IMMODEST SERMON—FAILURE AT CONCILIATION—DECISION OF HORSE-GUARDS INVOKED—INSUBORDINATION OF CHAPLAINS—LINE TAKEN BY DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE—SIR HOPE RESIGNS—MR CARDWELL INTERPOSES—SUPPORTS SIR HOPE GRANT—HIS ULTIMATE TRIUMPH—ASTONISHING LETTERS FROM CHAPLAIN—REVIEW FOR CZAR—SIR GARNET WOLSELEY—MORE AUTUMN MANŒUVRES—FAILING HEALTH—DEATH.

[SIR HOPE GRANT'S Journal now contains a record of the difficulties he experienced in his administration of the clerical department under his command at Aldershot. We have seen that when he was at the Horse-Guards, his duty required him to take somewhat decided action for keeping the chaplains in order.<sup>1</sup> But his course of straightforward action was not invariably continued by those then in office. "Expediency" is the favourite pretext for those who seek to gain their ends by chicane, and this was a

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, vol. ii., p. 251 *et seq.*

poisonous weapon employed against an old soldier who, in his simplicity, scarcely realised that any one could act with duplicity;—against him who, after Chillianwallah, spoke “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,” without one thought of evasion, even though that truth involved a confession the most bitter that can be imagined for a commanding officer, and entailed, as he then supposed, the utter destruction of his military prospects. I continue to forbear expressing any personal opinion concerning those transactions with which Sir Hope Grant was concerned; but it is clearly within my province to make the reader fully acquainted with facts. I cannot begin better than by transcribing the following passage from the Queen’s Regulations, which I find copied out in Sir Hope’s own handwriting.

*Section B. Divine Service. Para. 721, Queen’s Regulations (in force in 1873):—*

General or other officers commanding at home or abroad are to take care that divine service is regularly performed for the troops under their orders. They are to see that the conduct of the chaplains is such as becomes their office, and to report to the Adjutant-General, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief and Secretary of State for War, any irregularities that may occur in this respect, or any deviation from the mode of conducting public worship as laid down in the instructions issued on that head. They are not to alter or allow to be altered the interior arrangements of chapels or chapel schools without express sanction having been first obtained.

To this is added a note :—

With a view to establish uniformity for the performance of their public duties by the chaplains of the army, and in order to avert the possibility of misunderstanding on that head, detailed instructions for the guidance of military chaplains were issued to them by the Chaplain-General in March 1865, and a copy of these instructions, or any subsequent revise of them, will be furnished for the information of officers commanding.

For the information of the non-military reader I explain that Military Chaplains' Department is included, with Pay, Commissariat, and Medical Departments, in being under the jurisdiction of the general officer commanding, who, consequently, is required to deal with appeals for redress from members of the different persuasions who may consider themselves aggrieved in their consciences. This principle and the difficulties connected therewith are of long standing. As far back as 1857, General Knollys, who then commanded the camp, felt himself compelled to take stringent action to repress the encroachments of certain High Church chaplains; and his task, even with a less in-subordinate set of chaplains, required the exercise of all the tact and all the patience by which that officer was distinguished.

It used to be urged against Sir Hope, "Oh, he is extremely Low Church—in fact, a Presbyterian; and as such, is narrow-minded, and opposed to all who differ in opinion from him." Now I have

the surest possible proofs that he was marked by none of these characteristics. True, his proclivities may be termed "Low Church"; true, he was disgusted with those who ate the bread of one faith and preached the doctrines of another: but he was a staunch member of the Church of England in the fullest sense, and it was during the Church of England service that he was wont to receive the communion. If I may be pardoned my egotism, I would mention that during the time I was on Sir Hope's personal staff, living with him absolutely as one of his family, he was frequently wont to encourage by his presence semi-religious meetings in aid of temperance,<sup>1</sup> thrift, and, above all, the diffusion of the precepts of the Bible among the soldiers throughout the army. Personally, I was averse to accompanying him at these meetings, unless my presence were required as a matter of duty, and he acquiesced in my non-attendance with perfect good humour. Once, when I was stammering out my excuses, he answered, with a kindly smile, "Don't come, my dear fellow, don't come. You are perfectly right to keep away if you do not like it."

It goes sorely against the grain to turn from the records of Sobraon and Chillianwallah, from Delhi and Lucknow, from Madras, and important questions of administration, to the despicable trivialities that now vexed Sir Hope Grant's soul, and

<sup>1</sup> He himself was not a total abstainer.

which caused him to finish his life with that mortification which arises from the discountenance of those who, had they been true soldiers, would have supported him. In transcribing, therefore, I purpose to curtail to a very considerable extent the contemptible details. I should not be justified in altogether passing them over, because they gave rise to a permanently illusory conception concerning Sir Hope's alleged narrow-mindedness, and clouded the closing days of his life with a mortification which could not be otherwise than severe, however patiently endured.<sup>1]</sup>

*Journal resumed.*—This year, 1873, the Presbyterian chaplain, Mr Beaton,<sup>2</sup> appealed to me against the action of the Episcopalian chaplain, Mr Edghill,<sup>3</sup> who had decorated the church with such Ritualistic insignia that his congregation greatly objected to attend the service. I took the action which I considered necessary, and at the same time addressed the following letter to the Adjutant-General:—

ALDERSHOT, 30th May 1873.

SIR,—I have the honour to report for the information of H.R.H. the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, that a short time ago the Presbyterian chaplain, the Rev. Mr Beaton, complained of the way the church he officiated at was decorated for the Easter

<sup>1</sup> See letter from Lord Airey, *post*, p. 337.

<sup>2</sup> Now retired.

<sup>3</sup> Now Chaplain-General.

service by the Rev. Mr Edghill, Episcopalian chaplain.

The iron church is in the South Camp, and is used for both Episcopalian and Presbyterian services,<sup>1</sup> and Mr Beaton, in consequence of such decorations, stated his congregation strongly objected to attend at the church, and also he himself did not feel justified in holding service in a place of worship so ornamented. I myself visited the building, and it certainly appeared to me much more resembling a Roman Catholic than a Protestant church. [Then follows a description of the innovations.]

In an excellent address to the chaplains of the army, delivered by the Chaplain-General in June 1866, he stated :—

Not less unreasonable are we if, in addition to what the Government provides, we insist on adorning those common places of worship with signs and emblems against which the Presbyterians certainly, perhaps the Roman Catholics also, would be justified in protesting. I must therefore impress upon you as strongly as I can the necessity, indeed the duty, not in any single instance to innovate upon the arrangements which the Government may have made for these places until the subject has been considered and decided upon at the War Office. Even the customary and graceful practice of hanging flowers and evergreens at Easter and Christmas must either not be adopted at all, or only with the entire concurrence of

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<sup>1</sup> I would impress on the non-military reader that the gist of the case consisted in the compulsion on the Presbyterian soldiers to attend divine service in a building characterised by insignia antagonistic to their religious persuasion.

the officer commanding on the spot, on whom devolves the responsibility of seeing that nothing is done calculated to offend the religious prejudices of any portion of the garrison which worships in these common chapels.

And again he says :—

Or to surmount the same, the dress of the clergymen, with any sign or emblem, such as a cross, whether it be in gold or any other embroidery.

I am anxious to obtain the views of H.R.H. and the Secretary of State for War upon this subject, as it is very difficult, without sufficient instructions, to settle such unpleasant differences.

I consider that these innovations are especially to be avoided in a camp where all are obliged to attend church services, as a camp is differently constituted to a parish. And even amidst many Episcopalians, these innovations being painful, I am of opinion it would be better to keep to the simple form of worship by which all these disagreements would be avoided.

I have at present in camp the 93d Highlanders, who are almost to a man strict Presbyterians, and the Scots Greys are shortly expected. It is therefore obvious that much annoyance may occur if such proceedings are not put a stop to.

An order from the Government would prevent a recurrence of such disagreement.—I have the honour to be, &c.,

J. HOPE GRANT, Lt.-General.

To the ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Horse-Guards.



The difficulties between the Presbyterian and the Church of England chaplains continued to increase almost every week, and with a view to adjusting them, I caused them to come to my office for consultation. I found that there was very strong feeling existing on both sides, and I failed in my endeavours at conciliation. I read out that part of the Chaplain-General's address<sup>1</sup> regarding church decorations. Mr Edghill replied that he did not consider these instructions an order, but only a recommendation. Now, the address in question had been sent to the chaplains and officers in command of stations by the direct authority of the Secretary of State for War and the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, and the manner in which it was expressed from beginning to end did not for one instant admit of any such interpretation as Mr Edghill put upon it.

In minor matters concerning church arrangements, I found that my orders had been flagrantly disobeyed, and I certainly felt very much incensed thereat, and required my Assistant Adjutant-General, Sir Archibald Alison,<sup>2</sup> to take the necessary steps to enforce them. Then I received official letters from General Parke,<sup>3</sup> one of the very best officers I had under me; from Colonel Waller,<sup>4</sup> commanding 7th Fusiliers; and from another officer, all appealing against certain pro-

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 319.      <sup>2</sup> Now General Sir Archibald Alison, G.C.B.

<sup>3</sup> Now General Sir William Parke, K.C.B.

<sup>4</sup> Colonel Sir Thomas Waller, Bart., died 1892.

ceedings which had taken place during the Church of England services.

[The first named explained that he wrote as a churchwarden who was representing the objections of the congregations. The other two wrote to corroborate and to explain in detail the charges. These comprised the introduction of emblems, adornments, vestments, postures, and prostrations, which were described as producing a "giggle" among the men; but they involved also a matter on which, through considerations of ordinary decency, I can touch but lightly. A certain Rev. Thomas Belcher, incumbent of Saint Faith's, London, had been asked by the principal Episcopalian chaplain, Mr Wheeler, to officiate during the absence of the regular chaplain. Officers indignantly declared that the sermon was one which should not have been delivered in the presence of a congregation which included young single as well as married women; that it was not fit for ladies to listen to; that one officer took his wife out of church during the service; and that, in fact, the whole discourse was unnecessarily offensive.

The subject was that of Bathsheba, and the suggested amplification of the Bible record was extremely realistic.—H. K.]

*Journal resumed.*—I at once directed Mr Wheeler to suspend this clergyman from officiating any more at Aldershot, and I referred the case to the Adjutant-

General for orders. But this communication, like my previous one, remained unanswered. Mr Belcher himself wrote me a very severe letter, signing himself "T. W. Belcher, Clerk, M.A., M.D., Trinity College, Dublin; Fellow of Royal College of Physicians of Ireland; and Vicar of St Faith's, Stoke-Newington." I informed him that I had laid the whole matter before H.R.H. and could not give him any further answer. The case was complicated by the fact that the War Office would pay Mr Belcher during such time only while he officiated, and a month remained unexpired according to the agreed period.

Mr Wheeler wrote to me three strong appeals, with a request that they might be forwarded to H.R.H. [They are really so trumpery, as well as so preposterous, as to be unworthy of insertion.—H. K.]

My letters to the Horse-Guards still remained unanswered; but the Chaplain-General, Mr Gleig, was directed to proceed to Aldershot to investigate, and a meeting, at which the Episcopalian chaplains were present, took place at my hut. Mr Gleig commenced in the most bland manner by saying he much feared I should get into great trouble in consequence of having stopped Mr Belcher from preaching to the military. He afterwards went on to justify the clergyman, and to object to my proceedings, and at length said, "I trust you will consider everything that takes place here to be strictly confidential." I

answered, "Certainly not, Mr Gleig; everything you say and that I say shall be made public." Towards the end of our conversation he said to me, again in the blindest manner, "I am convinced you have done everything in a most conscientious manner, and according to what you considered right." This was too much to bear. I could not stand such duplicity and craftiness, and in plain words told him I did not wish for any of his humbug.

[Still the chaplains persisted in their miserable insubordination, and still Sir Hope's letters to the Horse-Guards remained unanswered, although I find a record concerning another point of resistance by the chaplains: "I forwarded a letter to the W.O.,<sup>1</sup> and received for answer that my authority was supreme." At last he was requested to come up to London to receive the Duke's instructions.]

H.R.H. and the Adjutant-General, Sir Richard Airey, were in the room together. To my astonishment, I found the Duke took the part of Mr Gleig,

and told me I had promised him not to have any disagreements with the chaplains on church matters. This put my blood up, and I answered that as long as I was called upon to continue in my present position, I should take care that my orders were implicitly obeyed; that the question had been forced upon me by the Presbyterian chaplain in the first

<sup>1</sup> *I.e.*, to the Secretary for War.

instance ; and that if H.R.H. did not support me in this case of discipline, I should request to be relieved from my command. All this rather quieted H.R.H., who apparently did not wish such outrageous want of discipline on the part of the chaplains to be made public.

The Duke also declared that he should cause all<sup>1</sup>

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 . . . . .

To this I could not assent. I said that the Presbyterians had as much right to hold service there as the Episcopalians, and that both the Presbyterian and Roman Catholic religions were acknowledged in this country.

The Duke had arranged for a further meeting, at which Mr Gleig was to be present ; but I wrote the following letter :—

August 6, 1873.

MY DEAR AIREY,—I have since been thinking that if H.R.H. will not object, I should prefer not appearing when the Chaplain - General is present at the meeting which is to take place.

I candidly confess I cannot keep my temper when the rev. gentleman commences his *pleasant conversation*, and I may say what I ought not to say. Will

<sup>1</sup> Although I decide to omit the verbatim statements, the reader will probably be able to deduce their general purport from the context.—H. K.

you therefore kindly ask the Duke to excuse my appearing on Friday?

I was sadly grieved at what H.R.H. stated to me.

—Most truly yours, &c., J. HOPE GRANT.

[The next day Sir Hope wrote a second letter to the Adjutant-General, appealing to the Duke to support him in the enforcement of discipline; pointing out that “if chaplains, or any other military persons, do not submit to my authority, it would be much better I should be removed from this command. It will be impossible for me to hold my position if want of discipline is allowed to go on unchecked.”

Another interview took place at the Horse-Guards with indecisive and unsatisfactory results. In an official letter Sir Hope wrote on the subject to the Adjutant-General he observes: “I trust H.R.H. will perceive that from this and the previous correspondence which has taken place relative to the chaplains, a spirit of insubordination is evinced which is entirely at variance with the regulations laid down for military chaplains. I have always endeavoured during the forty-seven years I have served (in her Majesty’s army to support discipline, and I trust H.R.H. will not allow my authority to be thus set aside; otherwise it will be impossible for me to remain in command at Aldershot.”]

To this again I received no answer, and I wrote

the accompanying letter, being thoroughly disgusted with the whole proceedings.

[In this letter Sir Hope reviews the whole case, and concludes with the following paragraph: "I feel it impossible to continue in command of the force at Aldershot; and though I deeply regret the step I feel bound to take, I have the honour to request H.R.H. may be pleased to submit this, my resignation, to the Queen for her Majesty's gracious approval."

The Duke of Cambridge in reply requested Sir Hope Grant to withdraw his resignation. Sir Hope answered in the most conciliatory terms, and in that tone of respect which lifelong habits of discipline caused to become a second nature, that he could not withdraw his resignation unless the Duke would support him. He "trusts H.R.H. will not consider this as a matter of *my views*, but solely as a matter of discipline;" that he would strictly carry out any fresh orders concerning chaplains which might be issued by authority, but that in the meantime he could not consent to his orders being set aside, and that he felt bound to obey the Queen's Regulations, "in support of which he claimed H.R.H.'s support."]

In the course of the dispute, Mr Gleig had drawn up a new set of instructions for the chaplains; but the Duke refused to allow them to be issued, and Sir Richard Airey wrote, 18th October 1873:—

I think your letter to H.R.H. is an excellent one, and, as you said before, your authority ought to be entirely vindi-

cated in your command, and nothing less. When we meet I hope what you consider satisfactory may be arranged.

[Accordingly Sir Hope had an interview with the Adjutant-General at the Horse-Guards, as a result of which a long letter was written to him on the subject by direction of the Duke. It dealt with the question of the discipline, or rather indiscipline, of the chaplains, in terms so general and so studiously guarded that their full purport does not invariably appear to be perfectly clear; but the offending chaplains were let off easily, and the General considered that his authority was inadequately vindicated. No notice, however, was taken of his resignation. He immediately wrote again to Sir Richard Airey, returning the Horse-Guards letter which he had just received, and observing: "If H.R.H. is determined that this letter shall be sent to me officially, there is no help for it—my soldiering days are finished. I wish very much you would send me an answer to this letter." The Adjutant-General wrote in reply, "I pray you to have patience till I write again."]

On the 3d of December I went to shoot with Lord Eversley<sup>1</sup> at Heckfield, near Aldershot, and there I met Mr Cardwell, who discussed with me the chaplain question. Nothing could be more pleasant and gentlemanlike than his conversation. He produced the Horse-Guards letter to me to which I had taken exception, and altered it in every respect according

<sup>1</sup> The former Speaker of the House of Commons.



to my wishes. Moreover, he gave me to understand that he did not approve of the chaplains' proceedings. I observed to him, "I hope there will be no change in what you have now taken down," and he assured me there should be none.

[On the 12th December 1873 a modified letter was written to Sir Hope Grant from the Horse-Guards, in which was embodied a practical concession of all the points of discipline for which he had for so long been striving. And above all, the whole tone of the letter differed materially from the previous correspondence which had been addressed to him.]

*Journal resumed.*—Nothing could be more satisfactory than this letter. I had been fighting with the authorities for the last seven months; I had been . . . by H.R.H. and by the crafty Chaplain-General; I had refused to withdraw my resignation unless my authority were maintained; and I returned the first official letter as quite unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, with all this I have been supported in a most marvellous manner, and by the guidance of that great Hand from above who rules all things.

I read the last Horse-Guards orders to Mr Wheeler, Mr Edghill, and chaplains of the Presbyterian and Roman Catholic persuasions. I told them in plain words that I was their commanding officer, and that they were as much under my command as any

officers in garrison, and that I trusted I should be obeyed.

[At the same time Sir Hope received a friendly private letter from the Duke of Cambridge, and no one was more rejoiced than the General himself that a dispute fraught with such evil possibilities should have been brought to a peaceful conclusion. I cannot, however, better convey to the reader an idea of the spirit which actuated the clerical side, nor can I find a better finale to the whole wretched business, than by reproducing the following letters.

From General Sir William Knollys, in answer to Sir Hope's reference to him for an opinion :—

*Jan. 31, 1873.*

MY DEAR SIR HOPE,—I never read a more outrageous case of insubordination. . . . These mischievous practices might be productive of serious results when applied to the three forms of worship of which you are the guardian in camp, and are responsible that nothing shall be done by one Church to offend the feelings of the other two. I took the greatest trouble, when I first accomplished (though with difficulty) having the three forms of Roman Catholic, Church of England, and Presbyterian celebrated in the same building, to have nothing in the church that would offend any one of the three. [Here follow some remarks about Mr Gleig.]

As for the clergyman in the fantastical dress, and who preaches immodest sermons, I would prevent him if possible performing again. It is really too bad, and I trust the Duke will support you in any steps you may take. I propose, should I see H.R.H., urging him to strengthen your hands.

—Yours very sincerely,

W. KNOLLYS.

ST FAITH'S, STOKE NEWINGTON,  
*December 22, 1873.*

SIR,—I presume that you are aware of the decisions of the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for War, and of H.R.H. the F.M. Commanding-in-Chief, in regard to your official censure of me, published on July 1, 1873, and that my position as against you has been unequivocally justified by these decisions. There having been then no justification for your official act towards me, there is, of course, still less for your prohibition or censure uncanceled. Under these circumstances I have to request that you will be so good as to officially withdraw your order or memorandum of July 1st.

It must now be obvious to you that no clergyman could submit to your inhibition in regard to his sacred office, more especially under the circumstances above referred to; and therefore I trust you will see that in offering you this opportunity of doing what is just, I show every disposition to avoid involving you in a position which you cannot defend, and from which you cannot escape.

Important issues in ecclesiastical and civil law are concerned in this case, and before I take any final step I must ask you to let me have a categorical answer to my request within a week.—I have, &c.,

T. W. BELCHER.

*Vicar of St Faith's.*

To General Sir HOPE GRANT, G.C.B.,  
 Commanding Division, Aldershot.

*Reply.*

ALDERSHOT, 23d December 1873.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 22d instant, and in answer to your request beg to state that I feel myself unable to comply with it.—I have, &c.,

J. HOPE GRANT, Lieut.-General.

To the Rev. T. BELCHER.

For a due estimate of the following composition, it is advisable to remind the reader that it was addressed by one who, at the time of the incident in question, occupied the temporary and relative rank of captain, to his general.

ST FAITH'S, STOKE NEWINGTON,  
March 3, 1874.

SIR,—With reference to your suspension of me on the 1st July 1873, and your refusal to withdraw the same after you had received a severe censure for your illegal and unbecoming conduct from the military authorities, I have the honour to send you herewith copies of a letter from me to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for War, and of his reply thereto. From this you will perceive that he has done me the justice which you refused, and that your arbitrary and improper order has been overruled by your superior.<sup>1</sup>

As I have been paid in full — mostly at your cost, as I have reason to believe — and as the Secretary of State for War has vindicated my character in the clearest and most substantial manner, notwithstanding your underhand attack on it, it now only remains for me to inform you that I shall regard all correspondence on this subject as public, and that I purpose to publish an account of it for the benefit of the service and the public generally.

I regret that your obstinate refusal to acknowledge your error, and apologise for it like a gentleman, obliges me to do this even with so eminent a soldier as yourself.

The general result of your interference in matters which you neither did nor could understand has been this:—

1. The establishment of the position of the Chaplain-

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<sup>1</sup> Mr Cardwell did nothing of the sort: the reply was couched, very guardedly, in official terms which were utterly colourless.

General as Ordinary over the military chaplains, and the rejection of your usurped authority in spiritual matters.

2. The teaching that you must mind your own business in future, and that unwarrantable attacks on a clergyman's character behind his back are sure to recoil on him who commits himself to them.

I have never said or done anything to injure you, but you have endeavoured to injure my personal and professional character, without any justification for so doing. You have not had the moral courage to admit your error and ask forgiveness for it; but let me, as a clergyman, remind you that for this transaction, whereby you intruded into God's heritage and assailed the character of an innocent man, you will have to give account to Almighty God. Your plain duty is to ask *His* forgiveness, and then to ask mine, which on your repentance shall be freely given to you by your obedient servant,

T. W. BELCHER,

*Vicar of St Faith, Stoke Newington.*

To General Sir HOPE GRANT, G.C.B.,  
Commanding Division, Aldershot.

Shortly afterwards Sir Hope remarks: "I showed these letters to Mr Gathorne Hardy,<sup>1</sup> the new Secretary of State for War, and his answer was: 'Thank goodness this happened before I came into office, and I have nothing to do with it. If I were to communicate with this clergyman, I should also receive a similar letter, which would not be pleasant.'"

The Horse - Guards decision is explained in the following extract from a letter from Sir Richard Airey:—

"Having consulted the Chaplain-General with reference

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<sup>1</sup> Now Lord Cranbrook.

to the papers you left with me last week, H.R.H. considers that the course for you to pursue is to return no answer to Mr Belcher's letter, nor to take any notice of it whatever."

It does not appear that the Adjutant-General was writing in jest.]

*Journal continued.*—In July 1873 the Czarowitch, the present Czar, the Czarevna, and the Prince and Princess of Wales came to Aldershot for a review. My force—consisting of fifteen battalions, four cavalry regiments, eight batteries, and engineer train, making a total of 9000 men—marched past in the Long Valley, and afterwards the Royal party witnessed a field-day from the top of Cæsar's Camp. I showed them a very pretty sham-fight, and it was interesting and pleasing to see the two charming Princesses, who had left their carriage, rushing about in the heather, full of spirits and glee. I was afterwards invited to lunch at the Pavilion, and sat next to the Czarowitch, who seemed a jovial, good-natured person, and talked English pretty well. The Czarevna was pleasing, and dressed exactly like the Princess of Wales. She too spoke English.

[In 1874 Sir Hope records in his Journal his exultation at the success of "my former and excellent Quartermaster-General, Sir Garnet Wolseley, who had served under me in India and China. . . . Though he has all these difficulties to contend with, I feel convinced he will succeed. I cannot help thinking it is willed by the all-powerful Ruler above that Africa shall be opened, and that these savage

inhuman tribes will be brought to reason, and their horrible iniquities put a stop to. The poor wretched creatures at present know no better, but the time is approaching when all eyes will be opened and the Gospel spread among all nations. We have been called upon to open up India, China, Persia, and Abyssinia, and I feel convinced we shall also eventually bring Africa out of its barbarism."

Extracts of letter from Sir Garnet Wolseley :—

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, CAPE COAST,  
24th December 1873.

MY DEAR SIR HOPE,— . . . In making my arrangements for crossing it [the river Prah], . . . I often think of your passage of the Goomtee near Sultanpore, and the slender means at your disposal for doing so. That operation was one of the prettiest I have ever seen. It taught me much, and I hope to profit now by what I learned then. . . . The selected officers I brought out work like slaves. They never go sick as long as they are able to crawl about. . . .

He afterwards went to meet Sir Garnet at the London railway station on his arrival from Ashantee, and he dwells with great satisfaction at the honours which were bestowed on him.]

*Journal.*—Wolseley was offered a G.C.B., but would only accept the K.C.B., most modestly considering that it would not be decorous in him to accept so high an honour.

A most wonderful change has now [1873] come over the politics of the country, and the consequence of the recent elections has been a majority of forty-

nine for the Conservatives. This was unexpected by them; for, while the polling was proceeding, I happened to meet Mr Gathorne Hardy, and mentioned to him the anticipation that his side would have a majority of about twelve. He answered: "I don't expect we shall have any majority. I should think the two parties would be about equal."

Some time ago I had given my Journal of the terrible Mutiny in India to one of my A.D.C.'s, Captain Knollys. He seemed to peruse it with much interest, and asked me to publish it. Now, that I should appear before the public in the light of an author appeared to me so preposterous that I felt very much inclined to say to Knollys, "Bosh!" Still he urged on me that little was either known or understood concerning the Mutiny,<sup>1</sup> and that any one who had been so intimately concerned with the campaign must be able to afford much interest. I therefore consented that it should be published, provided he would edit it. He added several . . . chapters written by himself, which were necessary, and explained many points which a simple journal could not be expected to embody.<sup>2</sup> Mr John Blackwood of Edinburgh wrote to me a very pleasant letter, and brought out the work in a most satisfactory manner. It received numerous favourable notices

<sup>1</sup> Written in 1873. Numerous excellent works on the subject have since been published.

<sup>2</sup> My justification for my interpolations in the present work.—H. K.



from the press. Marvels certainly will never cease, and it is a mystery to me that I should have been capable of producing a book which has attracted this attention.

[Letter from Sir Richard Airey, Adjutant-General, Horse-Guards :—

MY DEAR GRANT,—I am most obliged to you for your book [Sepoy War], which I read after dinner with the *greatest possible interest*; in fact, the only fault I find in it is that it absorbs me so much that I do not get to bed when I should, so that I am weary next morning.

*Entre nous*, I feel indignant that an officer of your reputation, who had seen so much and done so much good service, was to be . . . suffered to resign his command on a question of discipline. . . . —Yours ever truly,

RICHARD AIREY.]

In May 1874 I was invited to a great banquet at Windsor Castle in honour of the Czar, who, in consequence of the marriage of the Duke of Edinburgh with his daughter, was paying a visit to the Queen. The Prince of Wales presented me to the Czar, a very tall man with a pleasing countenance. He spoke English very fairly, and was kind and affable in his manner. At a later date the Duke of Cambridge invited me to dine at Gloucester House, where the Czar was again the guest. The next day he came to Aldershot to witness a review. My force consisted of twenty-four battalions, six regiments of cavalry, eight batteries, engineer train, &c. The troops

marched past admirably, and subsequently went through a very effective field-day. The advance of the Guards and Highlanders in line up the Long Valley had an imposing effect. I afterwards was invited to luncheon at the Pavilion, when the Czar asked me to drink wine with him, shook hands with me, and requested me to inform the officers under my command how pleased he had been with the appearance and movements of the troops. General Fleury Master of the Household of the late French Emperor was also present, and he especially remarked on the beautiful appearance of my little chestnut horse. This was all no doubt very gratifying.

[Sir Hope Grant had occasion to report to the Horse-Guards an officer of high rank<sup>1</sup> serving under his command. Of course he obtained instant and complete satisfaction; but although the offender had shown himself hostile to Sir Hope, persistently both in word and deed, the sole verdict in the Journal is "He is a good officer and performs his duty well, but he is very proud and has a strong temper."

The autumn manœuvres of 1874 marked the last occasion when Sir Hope Grant was able to perform any military duty in the field. The operation resembled in their general nature those of previous occasions, and were not less successful. The result of this practice, which Sir Hope had, with such difficulty, introduced throughout our army, could

<sup>1</sup> Not the same officer alluded to *post*, p. 347.

not be ignored by the most superficial judges, and could no longer be depreciated by the most persistent adversaries. Rank and file, subalterns, field-officers, and brigadiers, all entered into these exercises with a keenness and a pleasure altogether novel to those who had become satiated and nauseated with "change front, half right," and a march past in the Long Valley. On one occasion the Crown Prince of Prussia was present at a field-day on the Fox Hills. Sir Hope remarks: "He was very charming, and entered into everything with the greatest interest. He visited the outposts, and evinced a thorough appreciation of all military details. He afterwards observed that 'our army had made great improvements in military tactics and movements.' He has a soldier-like, noble appearance."

Extract from a letter from Major Roerdanz, Military Prussian *Attaché*:—

The Crown Prince has been highly pleased with what he saw, and said he was quite struck with the great improvement of your infantry in position drill, in marching, &c., since he last saw it—namely, three years ago. The cavalry has always been very good, and the artillery excellent—so he remarked. He is particularly struck with the splendid march of the 42d; next to this, of the 9th.<sup>1</sup> One regiment of hussars did not appear to be as the others; but the Prince is well aware that this regiment very lately returned from India, and is almost newly formed. . . . I assure you the

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<sup>1</sup> 9th Lancers.

Prince (and his suite) has been very much pleased, and you would oblige me if you would communicate the contents of this to Sir Hope Grant, who, I have no doubt, will be very much pleased to hear the opinion of so splendid a soldier as our Crown Prince.

At the conclusion of the manœuvres it became manifest that Sir Hope's health was failing. He obtained leave of absence, and sought for strength in Scotland and elsewhere, especially delighting in golf at St Andrews. In vain! When he returned he grew rapidly worse, and the last date in his Journal is a reference to the 14th November 1874. He moved up to London for medical treatment, and then it was found that an organic disease, attributable to the privations of campaigns and to prolonged service in the tropics, was rapidly bringing his life to a conclusion. During the last few weeks of his life he was continually occupied in revising with his former A.D.C. the proof-sheets of the 'China War.' When he realised his condition, he said, "I should like to live, but I am quite willing to bow to God's decree that I must die." He patiently endured much pain, and when the Prince of Wales and the Duke of Cambridge separately intimated a wish to see him, the weary sufferer at first declined, but afterwards altering his mind, said, "Yes, let them come. It will do them no harm to visit a dying man, and perhaps I may be able to say something to them which will do them good." Accordingly the interviews took place.

An hour before he died, a clergyman of the Church of England read to him some of the ministrations for the sick, at the conclusion of which Sir Hope asked for a prayer. Then his mind wandered, and he was once more in India in desperate combat with the sepoys. "Is there any difficulty in clearing them out?" he frequently and anxiously asked, and was only appeased when his delusion was humoured, and he was assured that all the enemy had been driven away. "Three times in one day!" he exclaimed, manifestly dwelling on the conflicts of the 19th June 1857 before Delhi, of which he was wont to speak as constituting the hardest personal fighting in which he had ever been engaged. "That position is inaccessible," was his last audible utterance. Shortly after he died—7th March 1875.

Sir Hope Grant was buried in the Grange Cemetery, Edinburgh. The pall-bearers at the military funeral were his old companions in arms, Generals Sir Frederick Stephenson,<sup>1</sup> Sir John Douglas,<sup>2</sup> Sir Archibald Little,<sup>3</sup> and Generals M'Cleverty, Primrose,<sup>4</sup> and Anderson.<sup>5</sup> On his tombstone is inscribed the text—

*"A good Soldier of Jesus Christ."*

<sup>1</sup> Now General Sir F. Stephenson, G.C.B., Colonel of the Coldstream Guards.

<sup>2</sup> Commanding the troops in Scotland; died 1878.

<sup>3</sup> Died 1891.

<sup>4</sup> Died 1891.

<sup>5</sup> Died 1893.

## RETROSPECT.

THE practice of utilising every incident in the record of a life for a gush of adulation, which is only half meant by the writer and only half believed by the reader, must be repugnant to everybody, — fools and biographers excepted. Nevertheless, there are certain characteristics of Sir Hope Grant's career which are scarcely to be gathered from his Journal, but which throw so strong a light on his disposition, that I may be held justified in departing at the conclusion of my work from the rule of cold silence I have hitherto prescribed to myself.

The patent fact that other generals who had rendered services to which his own were by no means inferior had been freely rewarded with peerage, pension, promotion, and decoration, must be conceded without wasting time in superfluous argument. Sir Hope, for arduous and successful exploits which materially contributed to save our imperilled Indian empire, was granted a step, which cost the straitened soldier £5000,<sup>1</sup> and the addition of a "K." to his

<sup>1</sup> £5000 directly, plus an indirect loss of about £7000. See *ante*, vol. ii. p. 3.

previous C.B. For the subjugation of the Chinese Empire—not merely a dazzling but an enduringly substantial success—he was permitted to change his “K.” of the Bath into a “G.” It has been remarked by many as an absurdity that he was never awarded any grade of the Order of the Star of India. It is, however, almost entertaining to note that at his death our Government, after much importunity, conceded to his widow a pension of £150 a-year, expressly excluding her husband’s military services as a ground for the grant, and basing it upon his diplomatic services. Now the General could not possibly shut his eyes to the fact that he had received far less than others; but this did not engender in him the slightest tinge of bitterness or the faintest sensation of jealousy. The military jealousy, which is even more jealous in pulling down others than in hoisting up self, was non-existent in his mind. He never lost an opportunity of advocating the merits of those with whom he served, and he exulted in their success. He was one of the first to recognise the abilities of Lord Wolseley, whom in early days he, more than any one, contributed to bring under public notice, and subsequently he was foremost in enlarging on the military worth of his former staff-officer. Lord Wolseley has always unreservedly expressed his warm gratitude. “If I have attained any measure of military prosperity,” said Lord Wolseley in 1872, when delivering a lecture at Aldershot

on railway transport, "my gratitude is due to one man, and that man is Sir Hope Grant."

To what, then, was the limited recognition of his services due? Partly to the fact that while Nature had endowed him with considerable military ability, quick perception, and sound judgment, she had inflicted on him an absolute dumbness as regards the power of giving them utterance. He could never, either verbally or in writing, ably state his case, far less plead his own cause. He stammered over his why and his wherefore; he was an easy mark for "brow-beating," to use his own expression; he was readily shoved aside by the eloquent, the jealous, and the unprincipled.

For example, his military perception assured him he was right in insisting on attacking the north Taku forts instead of those on the south; in defying, with prudent temerity, the urgent remonstrances of his French ally, De Montauban, whom he had been strictly enjoined to conciliate. But the ability of his explanation fell far short of the ability of his resolution: similarly in his dealings with insubordinate subordinates; similarly at autumn manœuvres; similarly, conspicuously, when instructing in his special forte, outpost duties. Herein he was so skilled in his dispositions that during the Indian Mutiny Lord Clyde, who, as a rule, was wont to assure himself personally of the arrangements, never thought it necessary to trouble himself when Sir



Hope Grant was in command. "We are quite safe with him," he was accustomed to remark. At Aldershot he reformed our entire system of outpost work, and herein succeeded in imparting to the force a knowledge and an aptitude they had never before possessed. But he always broke down in his explanations, and was compelled to gallop to each picket and each support, thus teaching his officers by "object lessons."

On one occasion he had assembled his brigadiers and his staff in order to communicate to them his plan for some rather extensive and diversified manœuvres. After a harangue which, I must admit, was extremely obscure, he wound up, "And now, gentlemen, do ye all understand me?" Whereupon a rather crusty brigadier replied, "Sir Hope, I do not understand one single word you have been saying for the last half hour." "Very well," said Sir Hope, perfectly unruffled, "I will go over it again." Repetition with the same result of universal bewilderment. Shortly after, therefore, in response to some prompting and trembling at my own audacity, I, as his A.D.C., ventured to represent to the General that his plan had not been understood, and would he permit me to take his instructions in writing? "Certainly, my dear fellow: I know I am a terribly bad hand at explaining;" and there followed a recapitulation which left me in the same state of despairing muddle as that evinced by the irritable old

brigadier. But after a little further pondering, light suddenly began to dawn; the plan unfolded itself; it was reduced to writing; it was promulgated; it was carried out; and those who had been the first to denounce its obscurity became foremost in their admiration of the most sound, instructive, and brilliant field-day of the season.

Sir Hope's advancement was, however, most materially and undoubtedly impeded by his integrity. Not merely would he neither say nor act that which was false, but, though far from addicted to odious and unnecessary candour, he was resolute in speaking "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." His unconscious *naïveté* sometimes produced shouts of laughter among his family circle. "O Hope, what made you say that?" was Lady Grant's occasional remonstrance at his impolitic honesty. "Why?" in a surprised tone; "how could I help it? He asked me." If addressed, "Sir Hope, I am sure you agree with me, do you not?" — a thin veil for implying, "You had better agree with me, or I'll know the reason why"<sup>1</sup>—he would answer, if so prompted by conscience, "No; I am very sorry, I cannot agree with you at all." Thus he aroused vexation in those whom, from motives of expediency, it would have been well had he not vexed. But it

<sup>1</sup> Might not those who occupy any position of authority with advantage substitute the formula, "Do you agree with me? Perhaps not; if not, say so"?

was utterly outside the scope of Sir Hope's instinct to consider for one instant the truckling plea of "expediency" for doing amiss—the accursed excuse which was once urged in support of the greatest crime ever perpetrated by the human race.

When Sir Hope was once convinced of the rightness of a course he would pursue it with unflinching resolution, whether it involved the point of attack of the Taku forts or the mastery of a horse refusing to take a fence. He would act and speak in a most peremptory manner, but he was never angry in the sense of being ill-tempered or crusty.

On one occasion an officer, who, I may observe, was admired and beloved by his subordinates, in the eagerness of some manoeuvres expressed himself to the General in a manner which caused the bystanders to stand aghast. "I do not see why you should be so angry," was all Sir Hope said, and rode quietly away. Half-an-hour afterwards he who had spoken with such warmth attended at the headquarter office, and, full of generous repentance, expressed in the most unmeasured terms his exceeding contrition, which was received in such a kindly spirit by Sir Hope, that he who had been carried away by his impetuosity, greatly touched, could only reply, "You may forgive me, sir, but I can never forgive myself." Subsequently there was more than an ordinary friendship between these two noble minds.

Sir Hope, though the reverse of a book-worm, read

a good deal, was well informed and well educated, and appreciated the hand-in-hand walk of theory and practice. He was keen in picking the brains of notable persons. He was a warm adherent of the Staff College; introduced at Aldershot military lectures and the then somewhat unpopular exotic, the "war game"; and encouraged the study of the principles of tactics and strategy. "*Rien si bête qu'un vieux militaire*" in nowise applied to him; for he ever fostered the ventilation of suggested innovations which bore any semblance of reason, and thereby often annoyed military pedants too dull to see, too proud to admit, and too old to learn. During the China campaign some of the older officers used to express to him their vexation at the way in which Lieut.-Colonel Wolseley sometimes propounded advanced views; but Sir Hope often tacitly supported, and even openly advocated, them. "Nonsense," was his laughing reply to remonstrants; "that is Wolseley's way of talking, and he is a very able officer and a very good fellow."

Thus far I have only dealt with the outworks of his character; but it is impossible to make a retrospect of his life without mentioning his religion, which, far above every other motive, influenced his every act and word. His piety, indeed, was of a singularly cheerful nature, and was not of that description which has no root in reason, and bears no fruit of charity. In conjunction with Lady Grant, he was a foremost supporter of every object for the purpose

of promoting the social as well as the religious welfare of those under his command ; and in their behalf he lavishly bestowed time, trouble, and money. He was a frequent attendant at those meetings ; but he spoke seldom and little. The staunchness of his Protestantism prompted a recollection of Cromwell's Ironsides ; but he was kindly and respectful to all who were sincere in their religion, however much he might differ with their theories. On the other hand, any appearance of unreality and exaggeration caused him instant disgust. "*Nasty* fellow ! I don't like him," was his impulsive comment on one who had been loud and unctuous in his professions. "Oh, you must not say that," was the reply ; "he is a very good man." "H'm, well, perhaps," he rejoined ; "but I tell you I don't like him, for he is a *nasty* fellow."

My personal experience was that he was very shy in speaking of religious considerations, and rarely entered on them ; the experience of all was that in practice he exercised a powerful tacit influence on every one about him. Swearing, even by habitual swearers, was in his presence involuntarily tabooed ; *risqués* jokes found no expression ; and conversation which was immoral, or coarse, or in bad taste, died away, and was replaced by a high standard of refinement and honour, which found an after-reflex in action. A distinguished English general has written to me : "Sir Hope's example is always in my mind whenever I am tempted to do anything ignoble or unworthy."

But the religious feelings which predominated in Sir Hope Grant's mind were those of gratitude and trust—not of an abstract, but of a most vivid, personal, realistic nature. In the fly-leaf of his Bible I find the text, "Promotion cometh neither from the east, nor from the west, nor yet from the south." His first impulse had been to take up his pen and record the above words when, at Shanghai, he had finished reading Lord Herbert's letter intimating to him his promotion in the Order of the Bath. God was to him the exceeding kind, wise, and powerful Father who had not only shielded him from the constant imminence of wounds and death in numerous battle-fields, and who had averted from him suffering and disease in deadly climates, but who had directly bestowed on him every blessing and every detail of blessing which he enjoyed. "It does not matter; it will all come right; He is taking care of me," almost involuntarily escaped from his lips when threatened with evil, great or small. In similar words he would express his trust and his thankfulness when the clouds had rolled by, and it was that trust which elicited his observation to me two or three days before his death: "No, indeed; I do not mind dying. I look upon it as if I were going from one room to another. There will be a little painful interval, and then it will be nothing more than if I were passing under an archway."

EDITOR'S REASONS FOR PUBLISHING  
THIS BOOK.

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THIS might be more appropriately inserted in the preface; but a preface is seldom read. "*Qui s'excuse, s'accuse.*" Whatever the truth—or fallacy—of this proverb, the evil must sometimes be faced in literary work, because it is the practice of the public first to execute an irreversible sentence, and then to review justifying evidence. By presenting my evidence before the verdict is passed, I may perhaps succeed in modifying the above process.

*First objection.* It is not justifiable to publish private diaries.

*Answer.* Extract from the will of the late Lady Grant, dated 23d June 1891: "I bequeath to the said Henry Knollys all my letters, papers, memoranda, journals, and manuscripts. . . . And I declare it shall be in his entire discretion whether he show or disclose the same or the contents thereof to any other person."

Sir Hope was an indefatigable journal writer, and,

unlike most who follow this practice, he was constantly reperusing and verifying his statements. "Dear me, it is very interesting," I have often heard him exclaim when thus occupied. "It will all be very interesting some day when ye are dead and gone," was his comment to me on some MS. I showed him, not intended for immediate publication. Various additional circumstances amply justify the belief that he contemplated the publication of his journals, —as was the case with his diaries of the Sepoy and China Wars, —at least "when he was dead and gone."

*Second objection.* Passages implying censure or discredit should be omitted.

*Answer.* In other words, approval of good, which is inseparable from condemnation of evil, should be ignored; the eminences should be sloped down, and the depressions levelled up; sweet should be put for bitter, and light for darkness; the features which materially contribute to render the journals instructive irrespectively of their interest should be left out. Would Sir Hope Grant, would any of the modern few who hold that public veracity cannot be disassociated from private principle, have approved of such a course?

*Third objection.* At all events, the publication should have been delayed until after the death of the persons inculpated and of their families.

*Answer.* I.e., until the records shall have lost their



chief interest. Sir Hope has already been dead upwards of nineteen years. And does the word "families" comprise grandsons?—does it comprise great-grandsons? With this delay any such work, however good otherwise, would undoubtedly instantly find its way to the trunk-makers and the *papier-mâché* manufacturers. It is really difficult to refute such an argument except by stating it.

*Fourth objection* (according to the frequent expression of Lord Melbourne). "Why can't you let it alone?"

*Answer.* Because Sir Hope Grant's disposition was of such a nature that the memory of him is still singularly fresh; because his example is strangely powerful and enduring on many of those who served under him, and has by them been transmitted to their successors in the army; because, in fine, the world must be the richer for possessing the permanent record of a good soldier's duties and a good man's feelings.

HENRY KNOLLYS,  
*Colonel h.p. Royal Artillery.*



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