THE PROBLEM OF THE PACIFIC

BY

C. BRUNSDON FLETCHER

AUTHOR OF "THE NEW PACIFIC"

PREFACE BY THE

RIGHT HON. SIR WILLIAM MACGREGOR

P.C., G.C.M.G., C.B., ETC.

WITH A MAP

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TO

MY WIFE

WHOSE PATIENCE

HAS NEVER FAILED ME

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THIS book is not an ordered history of the Pacific. Its main object is to show how four Powers during a century have been reaching towards a mastery of half the world—the Pacific Ocean covers a whole hemisphere—and only as the main facts of this mastery are kept in mind will a Peace Conference be able to do justice to the interests now dominant. Critics, however, may fairly urge that a better plan could have been made, and a more satisfactory result produced, from the mass of information actually in my possession. But the book has been written in the midst of other work, with the strain of a journalist's life never relaxed; and while leisure would have enabled me to rearrange and rewrite many of the chapters, I have been obliged to offer what has been done as it stands.

It may be contended, perhaps, that "The New Pacific" has already covered most of the ground, and that otherwise some of the questions raised are premature. But the former book touches only a small part of the Pacific, and leaves Japan entirely outside its discussion of prominent problems. The whole Pacific is now taken for a short study, because sooner or later it must be considered as a

whole. It is imperative that the truth about the largest ocean on the earth's surface should be available in some form, however faulty; and thus I must plead guilty of temerity for the sake of peace.

The immediate prompting to give this larger view of the Pacific has come from certain references to Australasia and Canada by writers like Professor Keith, who is an authority upon their history and constitutions. Professor Keith says, in effect, that Australia and Canada feel for Japan contempt merging into fear; and the visit of the American Fleet in 1908 is used in this connexion to point a moral. Contempt is said to cover "a considerable amount of uneasiness, especially in connexion with the development of the Empire of Japan, which manifested itself in the almost ludicrous affection of the greeting shown in both Dominions [Australia and New Zealand] to the fleet of the United States in its famous voyage of intimidation to Japan." * The "ludicrous affection" shown by English-speaking communities in the Pacific to visiting kinsfolk is supposed to represent a fear, perhaps better expressed as faith, in the might of a big brother, as though the British Navy had been lost sight of and a strong Mother Country forgotten. But if British battleships had visited Australasian waters the welcome would have been so warm that words would have failed to express it. The element of kinship would only have been stronger in that

* "Imperial Unity and the Dominions," by Arthur Berriedale Keith, D.C.L., D.Litt., p. 191.

case. British battleships have never visited Australia; but if Welsh miners recently could be so impressed by a mere moving picture of the great Navy, what would have happened in the Antipodes if the actual fleet had come? Only as the influence of the United States upon the British Dominions in that ocean is understood can the attitude and mental disposition of the latter be appreciated. It is my excuse, therefore, for writing another book that factors like these in the Problem of the Pacific must be remembered and studied if a satisfactory solution is to be found.

C. BRUNSDON FLETCHER

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PREFACE

BY SIR WILLIAM MACGREGOR

THE author of "The Problem of the Pacific," a real son of the great ocean, has in this volume so thoroughly sifted what has been written in recent years on the political aspects of it that the present writer would have declined from paucity of knowledge to respond to the request to write a foreword to this very useful book had it not been that he has spent twenty-eight years of his life in the Pacific, and consequently is deeply interested in that part of the world, where he has many thousands of friends of different races to whose welfare he can never be indifferent.

It is the case that on the other side of the globe there has been the impression that, in the past, political questions connected with the Pacific have always been unwelcome to the British Government, have not been fully considered, and have been disposed of temporarily with little or no vision of the future. Perhaps it followed naturally from this that the British Government has hitherto refrained from extending its responsibilities there, as a rule, until its hand has been forced. From public statements by British Ministers since the war began—most recently by Mr. Long

and Mr. Balfour—it is manifest that the present great Problem of the Pacific has already been well considered by those who will be directly concerned in representing British interests in its solution. Hitherto the Pacific as a whole has hardly been considered by any European nation except by Germany, who at very little trouble or expense has come in to reap the fruits of the labour of Russian, American, French, and British navigators and explorers. That the question was better understood in the United States is evidenced by the Panama Canal.

The time was when Great Britain could without protest have made extensive annexations in the Pacific, but that day is past, and now a settlement to be satisfactory and permanent must be the joint concern of at least the United States, France, Japan, and the British Empire.

Already the interests involved are very great, and it may safely be predicted that they will increase very fast in the future, until perhaps the Pacific may be as much frequented as any other of the great oceans of the globe. In this growth it is manifest that the English-speaking people will have by far the principal share in traffic and production.

One of the chief questions that occupy the minds of statesmen and politicians at the present moment is the supply of raw materials. Hawaii, Fiji, New Caledonia, Nauru, and Ocean Island may be mentioned here as examples to show that such materials can be produced in the Pacific Islands in considerable quantities. Many of

the islands will be very useful as telegraph, aviation, and coaling stations.

The warm and moist forcing climate of the South-West Pacific, with large areas of rich alluvial or volcanic soil, is highly favourable to luxuriant vegetation, a matter that as time goes on will be of great permanent value when the minerals they possess are worked out.

The most precious asset in those islands is, however, the Pacific Islander. In days gone by he has not had fair treatment. He has been exposed practically without protection to the diseases of the white man. He has, sometimes against his will, been taken away from his home and family to systematic work for years in some distant land; and he has often been sent back in the condition of a carrier of contagious disease, and very frequently provided with firearms as part payment of his labour. When, human-like, he paid off on the white man in vendetta fashion some injury to his family or tribe, then he and his neighbours have been punished, often as a tribe or village, in either case probably without touching the guilty party.

Much has been written as to the harsh treatment of the native owners of the soil by the Germans in their different colonies, and this charge is supported by the frequent "risings," and by the murder by natives of their German masters, in their Pacific territories. The Pacific Islander, if fairly treated, is an affectionate man, docile, loyal, and faithful to the last extremity to his white master; and is capable of learning to do many things. He speedily learns

to use tools, as in carpentry. There is no finer cultivation in the world than the best yam gardens in Fiji and Papua. Physically the natives compare favourably with Europeans.

Dysentery and venereal infection have unfortunately decimated many of the islands, and with these have been introduced other less lethal diseases. The research work in tropical medicine now going on at Townsville, and by American officers at the Philippines, will undoubtedly greatly benefit the Pacific Islanders, and at the same time make life to the white man more tolerable in the South Seas, thus adding to the value of the Pacific Islands.

It is a great pleasure to one interested in the Pacific to be able to say that the Commonwealth has fully realized its responsibility towards the natives of those islands that have come under its jurisdiction; and to know that such has been the case whatever shade of politicians has been in power. In addition to the knowledge that the islander adds greatly to the value of the island from the economic point of view, it is strongly held by many people of influence in Australia and New Zealand that the natives shall and must be fairly treated. Those Dominions now possess a considerable number of officers acquainted with native life in the Pacific, some of them, like Mr. Murray, Lieutenant-Governor of Papua, of great experience. On behalf of New Zealand it can be said that the treatment of Pacific natives under her rule may be judged of by the fact that so many of the islanders have volunteered for service,

and have loyally done their fair share in the European War.

What the United States has already done for the Pacific Islanders under her flag makes it a source of deep regret that her advent there came so late, almost too late to save the Hawaiian race. Hitherto the question of the annexation of this or that island in the Pacific has been dealt with in most cases without much thought of the welfare of the natives, but in the coming settlement, there is reason to believe, the treatment of the natives will be considered and be taken into account in determining the future overlordship of the German Pacific colonies.

The Right Honourable Sir Joseph Cook has recently informed us, as reported in the Press, that Australia does not desire to retain the German colonies from any lust for new and additional territory, but as a security against bad neighbours.

The disparity between the area of the Commonwealth and the number of its inhabitants is so great that Australia may excuse herself from adding to her Dependencies beyond New Guinea. A few years ago one not infrequently saw the question raised whether the northern part of Australia was in "effective occupation"; at the time when that doctrine was fashionable in certain quarters. That question is not likely to be asked again; nor can the deliberately expressed wishes of Australia and New Zealand with respect to the German colonies in the Pacific be regarded lightly in the face of their share in the war.

We have been informed by the Commonwealth Premier, the patriotic and energetic Mr. Hughes, that Australia has sent overseas 380,000 men, of whom 57,000 have lost their lives; and that the Commonwealth Government has incurred a debt of over £250,000,000.

And Sir Thomas Mackenzie has stated that New Zealand has sent to the Front 100,000 troops, and that the Dominion has to mourn the loss of some 15,000 of her sons in this was; and has incurred an expenditure that will amount to about £50,000,000. The two Dominions have also captured and now garrison the German possessions in the Pacific. Before the great development of Prussian militarism these forces would have been considered enormous armies. Under the organization founded by Lord Kitchener and the far-seeing Sir Joseph Cook, Australia will before long be able to put into the field in an emergency half a million trained men.

The position of the United States in the Pacific is now of very great importance. The completion of that greatest of all industrial undertakings, the Panama Canal, has changed the whole problem of the Pacific in a way and to a degree that does not appear to be as yet realized in Europe. The United States has at the same time made a permanent way for herself across that ocean, with stations of first-class strategic and trade importance, at Samoa, Honolulu, Midway, Wake, Guam, and other islands; and she has the great possession of the Philippine Islands on the Asiatic side. The Panama Canal is an eloquent expo-

nent of the present advanced condition of the sciences of engineering and of sanitation. The Canal makes the islands of the Pacific, whatever flag they may be under, of much greater value than they were before its existence. It will doubtless be of greater use to American and to British vessels than to those of any other nation. Happily American and British interests run on parallel lines in the Pacific, without colliding and with the prospect of much mutual advantage. But the Panama Canal is a work that will indirectly benefit all nations through the facilities it offers to the trade and commerce of the world, and all must recognize that the United States has been a good second to the British Empire in opening up the Pacific.

The French possessions in the Pacific are not, and cannot be, of much value as colonies of settlement, with the exception of New Caledonia, and even that colony on quite a limited scale. The islands of Oceania will no doubt benefit by the Panama Canal, lying as they do on the route from New Zealand to Panama.

It is greatly to be desired that the more domestic question between France and Great Britain with regard to the New Hebrides Group should be finally settled at the coming Conference. The condominium existing there is unfair to the natives, and to the civilizing genius of both French and British. It has brought the natives an evil reputation. An intimate knowledge of many of them from practically every island in the group enables one to say positively that, under an administration like that of

Fiji or Papua, the natives of the New Hebrides would soon become peaceful and orderly communities. In this volume the great service rendered to those natives, and to Australia, by the Presbyterian mission has been recorded. The present happy relations between France and the British Empire will, perhaps, be an obstacle to pressing on the great and generous French nation a settlement of the New Hebrides question in a way that would be entirely satisfactory to Australia, for to that group, owing to its position and to its good harbours, Australia cannot be indifferent.

New Caledonia is in a different category. It may have come into French hands by somewhat sharp practice; and it is true that as a convict station it was a thorn in the side of Australia by letting loose some hundreds of men that were the refuse and rejectamenta of their own country. But it has to be remembered that the nickel, chrome, and cobalt of the mines of New Caledonia are in the present condition of metallurgy indispensable to France as a great nation. The probabilities are that had Germany won the war, she would have rounded off her territories in the Pacific by demanding New Caledonia to convert the iron of the French Lorraine mines into German super-steel.

Perhaps at the Peace Conference all the nations holding possessions in the Pacific may by mutual agreement determine that none of them shall in future establish any convict station for deported felons on any island of that ocean.

The awakening of Japan to assume her right and proper place among the great nations of the world, and her splendid and loyal assistance to her Allies, given with such effect in the Far East, and particularly in the Pacific, constitute an important factor in solving the Problem of the Pacific.

Bearing in mind the energy and activity of their race one can feel sure that their occupation of the German colonies north of the Equator has before this time been made thoroughly effective. No doubt the same may be said of their presence at Kiao-chou, the loss of which was felt very acutely in Berlin. The trade of Japan in the waters of the Pacific is increasing by leaps and bounds, and her interests there are already great.

The kernel of the Problem of the Pacific seems to be: Shall any of the possessions held by Germany in the Pacific be restored to that Power?

Australia and New Zealand have, as far as they are concerned, clearly and distinctly answered that question through Parliament and Ministers in the negative. Their distrust of Germany as a neighbour is well founded.

Under the British flag, which, outside the "Fatherland," he prefers to his own, the German, taken as an individual, has been a good colonist in the Pacific, a close second to the Dane and the Scandinavian. The German merchant is a well-educated and pleasant man, and can be thoroughly trusted in business. The German scientist is thorough and methodical, and has contributed

his fair share to our stock of knowledge of the Pacific and of the world; in certain well-known instances, however, though not neglecting his scientific work, he has debased it by at the same time spying out the land for the German politician or Minister, a being of a character different from any of the preceding categories.

In one characteristic they are, however, all alike: they are all ready for a military expedition against their neighbours, and for booty. Such they were according to the great Roman historian in the first century of our era, and such they have been in our own day in the last and present centuries.

Could Germany be kept in hand in the Pacific or elsewhere if enrolled in the proposed League of Nations?

A League of Nations may well serve a temporary purpose; but the natural history of man, especially of the German, makes one doubt that such a combination can be permanent. Faith in the much-vaunted *Deutsche Treue* has been so sadly shaken that it will take some generations of good behaviour to restore confidence in political Germany. We have now to remember such matters as how Scharnhorst got round the provisions of the Treaty of Tilsit.

We should not forget how a politician of the standing of Prince Hohenlohe, when he had a British gunboat put at his disposal to take him round the shores of the Levant, studied how Germany should acquire Cyprus, Rhodes, and what else, and wrote, while the guest of the British nation,

"Nor must Syria and Asia Minor be forgotten. We must do all we can to check the Russians and English there." The same Prince quotes with approval the precept of the Great Elector, "Remember that you are a German." That injunction deserves in principle our admiration rather than our condemnation, but at the same time should put us on our guard against having too many Germans in our midst to whatever class they may belong, for as Prince Hohenlohe says, "These words are a legacy."

Many of us must have a clear recollection of how Prince Bismarck in an access of wrath tried to belittle his successor by disclosing his own Russian *Rückversicherung*, entered into behind the back of his unsuspecting Austrian ally.

The "scrap of paper" of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg is still fresh in our memories. And yet it is believed that outside of high politics he is a worthy and honourable man.

There is only one remedy, it seems, against the adventures of the German in war and booty, the remedy prescribed by President Wilson: deprive him of the power to gratify this tendency. But power and opportunity are not constant, and the best, the only way, to make the Pacific safe and peaceful will be to keep political Germany out of it.

A few words may now be said as to what might be done with the German Pacific colonies if not returned to Germany. So far as the British Empire is concerned it

would be somewhat difficult to have anything new in the nature of administration in that ocean. On certain islands only a small fraction of the population—British subjects—have been under our control. In others there has been a protectorate with parts of the island in a condition of incipient administration; and others wholly reduced to a kind of order. Then we reach a Crown Colony either indirectly or directly under the Crown; and then follows a colony in the first stage of transition into representative government. Thence we pass to the great self-governing Dominions of Australia and New Zealand, with their dependencies. And we have the kingdom of Tonga governing itself under the umbrella of the Imperial Government.

Finally, we have the German Pacific colonies under provisional administration by the Dominions. It may indeed be said with some truth that the Pacific is a nursery for administrators. Whatever form of administration may be adopted there are British officers there fit to carry it out. If one may judge from the past, the determining factor in establishing an administration in any of the German colonies that may become permanently British will be the financial one, if the question is between the Imperial Government and Australia. New Zealand, it appears, is always ready to shoulder her financial liability in respect of any annexation she desires, but it has not always been so with the Sister Dominion. It is to be hoped that in the approaching settlement the expenditure of a few

thousand pounds annually will be no deterrent to the adoption of such forms of administration as may be deemed most advantageous to the future of all concerned in governing the Pacific Islands. There can be no doubt that the establishment there of sound and efficient administration will in the long run be a good investment.

WM. MACGREGOR

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

A century completed with war : Its history in the Pacific marked by chapters of special importance : Each decade from 1814 begins with some notable event : The Monroe Doctrine in 1824 and Alaska : Australia conquered in 1814, 1824, 1884 : France and Tahiti in 1844, and Britain's settlement with America : The year 1854 and Japan's beginning as a Power : Germany also enters the Pacific in that year : Effect upon the Pacific of Prussia's attack upon Denmark in 1864 : Fiji annexed in 1874 : Germany's annexations in 1884 : War between China and Japan in 1894 : War between Japan and Russia in 1904 : Opening of Kiel and Panama Canals in 1914

I

FOUR Empires have met in the mastery of the Pacific; and no true idea of the ocean or of the people living upon its wide waters can be given without some study of their history in that relation. These Empires are represented by Great Britain, the United States, Japan, and Germany. At once objection may be taken that there has been no real mastery by any Empire, and that the United States is not an Empire. Moreover, recent controversy has shown that the British Empire is a Commonwealth, and that the original idea of Empire does not apply. If the word "mastery" is to stand for final victory, or even for a general assertion of authority by one Empire or by four,

it must be dismissed as inappropriate. But there is the later thought of four forces moving upon the Pacific, sometimes in co-operation, but at other times in opposition. The true Pacific in the present writer's mind is the resultant of these forces. Great Britain represents the central and dominant force, holding positions of vantage throughout the ocean and upon three main coasts; and with her now is the United States, also possessing points in, and coastlines on, the Pacific of special importance. Both the English-speaking races stand together against Germany, driving and being driven in the maelstrom of war; and yet America represents a second force, for a hundred years developing with aims and ambitions of her own. American Imperialism, like British Imperialism, may have little thought of aggression in it, but it stands for widening influence and increasing possession. It has shown the same ability to govern, and an equal readiness to entertain and realize high ideals. Both great nations have been striving to carry the lessons of liberty into the Pacific, and to make freedom bear full fruit by means of education and self-government.

Japan also is showing a power and an individuality of her own, and the three forces have wrought together in the Pacific modifying the original path of each. Germany has been an evil force, demanding and obtaining recognition. Much of the earlier German activity was legitimate and praiseworthy; and had not "world power" obsessed the nation as a prize almost within reach, the Pacific would have given Germany endless scope for her abilities. Yet as the fourth force she has been a barrier to liberty and the larger life, and she must be overcome and conquered if the world is to be worth living in. Power in the Pacific,

therefore, is one's thought of an ocean with four forces working out a mastery which is still incomplete, though in certain areas, and under some conditions of control, each Empire was supreme before war was declared in 1914.

Oliver Wendell Holmes has said in his inimitable way that a great calamity is as old as the trilobites an hour after it has happened. "It stains backward through all the leaves we have turned in the book of life." Thus one looks back from 1914 and finds a hundred years which seem to be a preparation for the great catastrophe through which we are moving to-day. We read its history now from a new standpoint; everything seems to have been leading up to the final crash. The century which began by Napoleon's retirement to Elba in 1814, with his final defeat at Waterloo, may be said to have closed one great war and prepared the way for another. The same Prussia was in evidence then as now. "To what lengths the Prussian leaders were prepared to go, the memoirs of Gneisenau, who was the head of Blücher's staff, show. . . . Saxony would have ceased to exist, Belgium would have been a Prussian province, and France would in 1815 have been deprived of Alsace and Lorraine, and enfeebled for ever." * While the victories of the century behind us appeared to be those of peace, the sense of war in our latest experience seems to run right back through the hundred years. In Europe this may be accepted as a reasonable presentation of the truth, but how can it be true of the Pacific? The greatest ocean on the world's surface has been to Europeans like the dark side of the moon, and many travellers who have ventured upon its

* "The Three European Settlements," *Contemporary Review*, September 1917.

surface or have explored its fastnesses have found little or nothing of cataclysmal interest to report. In the world's history the Pacific has been true to name, except as the Powers have squabbled over Samoa, or as Germany has lied and prevaricated a way into New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the Solomons. Japan has fought China and Russia in turn, no doubt, coming out of the fray a Power with undreamed-of possibilities in strength and purpose. America and Germany, a quarter of a century back, faced one another in Apia Harbour with their guns trained for actual fighting until the hurricane smote their war vessels and cast them as scrap-iron on the reef; and out of the experience came the present American Navy. But that is typical of so much else in the Pacific, though most preparations for and participations in war have been found among the natives in various groups. White men, from Captain Cook onward, have been murdered upon their beaches; but European Powers have hesitated before coming to blows with each other, and their disinclination to fight over interests seemingly so trivial and so far away has resulted in strange settlements of differences, when Nature has not solved their problems for them. Who among the nations of the earth has cared about the Pacific Ocean as a field for military or naval enterprise? And how can the century behind 1914 be set down in the history of that vast stretch of waters as anything but a story of unessential details?

The reply, of course, is that every European event of importance has found a reverberation in the Pacific; and from 1814 onward the century is marked by events connected with decisions made by the Great European Powers or by States connected with them. One finds France and

Germany constantly in evidence, first the former and then the latter, stimulating or suppressing enterprise in the Pacific and making Great Britain a constant enigma for her colonists as she has acted or given way under their pressure. The United States and Japan in their turn have added new complications to the turn of events; and Russia and China have touched the puzzle of continuing peace with unexpected results.

But the British Empire is in the foreground all the time. It will be seen that the century contains for Great Britain, the United States, Japan, and Germany years of anxiety and conflict; and Great Britain and the Empire only complete an idea of mastery. Now 1814 is in itself a remarkable year. It is true that Waterloo was fought in 1815; but to all intents and purposes Napoleon's career was finished when he went to Elba in 1814. From that island he watched the sovereigns of Europe or their plenipotentiaries quarrelling round the Council table at Vienna, and he smiled cynically as Prussia made insistent demands for Saxony, and as Russia was no less emphatic about possessing Poland. A war of two Leagues seemed to be imminent, but with these Powers hand in hand. For the moment the Congress of Vienna was settling the differences of Europe successfully enough when Talleyrand, who hated Napoleon, announced his escape from Elba. After twenty years of war a breathing space was apparently assured; and here was the disturber of the world's peace let loose again. The anticlimax was tragic yet ludicrous in its surprise. Sir Walter Scott in his "Life of Napoleon" records that its first effect was to excite a loud burst of laughter from nearly every member of the Congress. We are told otherwise, that the Emperor Alexander, when the

truth was at last realized, kept cool and turned to Wellington: "Eh bien, Wellington, c'est à vous encore une fois sauver le monde." * Dissent ending in disruption was what Napoleon counted on; and, instead, the fear of his name and fame bound the Powers to united action again until the arch-enemy was defeated at Waterloo, four months after his escape.

The work was done in 1814, as the event proved; for even Prussia became reasonable at the word and helped to make Waterloo the great victory of the century. Since this is the story of power in the Pacific one remembers that far more Australians were engaged against the Germans at Pozières in the present war than there were British soldiers under Wellington at Waterloo. But one also recalls the fact that 1814 was Canada's year of deliverance, after the struggle with the United States, in the war which began in 1812. Her existence was threatened, even with Great Britain as principal in the struggle, but the scale was turned at last by the use of veterans freed at the close of the Peninsular War; and Napoleon's defeat at the hands of Wellington and Blücher in 1815 was only the completion of something already settled past peradventure. Canada was really saved by the courage and resource of Major-General Brock in 1812, yet for two years the fighting continued with varying success until a treaty was signed at Ghent on Christmas Eve 1814, with the Congress of Vienna still engaging everybody's attention.

The history of the hundred years must be read from more than one angle. From the Pacific angle Napoleon looms large still; and at the end of his career, which was coinci-

* "The History of Napoleon Buonaparte," by John Gibson Lockhart, p. 446 (Everyman's Library).

dent with the new birth of the British Empire, he was a sinister figure at the Antipodes. His shadow was upon Australia for several years after he disappeared. His purpose was never misunderstood, though he sought to justify aggression by explorations and by plausible assumptions of right in naming part of the Continent for France. Baudin's expedition, which resulted in the effort to give the title "Terre Napoléon" to Southern Australia, was responsible for some fine scientific work; and in that respect it was in the true succession of French exploring expeditions; but it also sounded a note of challenge which urged the authorities in Australia to serious thinking. At the time when Napoleon went to Elba, the continent of Australia as then known was only just conquered by the handful of settlers at Port Jackson. The insignificant area of settlement around and beyond Sydney satisfied nobody. It was promise and not fulfilment. A few miles up and down the coast, and something more inland, gave an area no larger and not unlike many an empty island in the Pacific; and the Blue Mountains hemming them in made the settlers realize that they would be no better off eventually than a shipwrecked crew unless they could find a way through to the illimitable lands beyond. The whole future of Australia just then depended upon bursting the barrier of the Blue Mountains: for a fine harbour was waiting to serve nearly half a continent; and without the help of a good port settlement would be long delayed. Search for a pass continued, always to fail, but at last effective occupation became possible as three intrepid men, Blaxland, Wentworth, and Lawson, discovered an opening, which in 1814 was officially accepted as the line for a road into the plains beyond.

The years 1814, 1824, and 1834 are connected in Australian history by the determined efforts of the governors and settlers to obtain possession of the great land. After the Blue Mountains had been crossed and the West penetrated, Governor Brisbane began to move so that the south of the continent on the eastward side should be effectively occupied; and 1824 is a year of mark because exploration opened up the country towards Port Philip. Hume and Hovell's expedition overland, in Dr. Fitchett's words, "gave a new horizon, not only to Australian geography, but to Australian history." It not only explored the country, but proved that occupation was exceedingly worth while. Instead of a great desert, as Oxley described it to be, it was found to be a region full of fertility; and to-day Melbourne, a great city and provisional capital of the Commonwealth, is the evidence of work so well done from the landward side in the exploration of 1824. The immediate results were small. No settlement was attempted then. Yet the way was open; and, as the thought of France again gave trouble, an effort at settlement was made in 1826, only to fail.* Still the thought persisted. Still the pressure of France drove men afield. The country near Port Philip was occupied in 1834, and the southern end of half the continent was at last held securely for the British Empire. In this regard the passage of the Blue Mountains in 1814 was well seconded by the opening of South-Eastern Australia in 1824, and by the occupation of Portland Bay in 1834.

Again one looks across the Pacific to the American side to recall that in 1824 the Monroe Doctrine was promulgated, and it was applied to the Pacific in response to

* "Growth of the Empire," by A. W. Jose, p. 255.

Russian claims upon the coasts south of Alaska. Actually President Monroe's message was announced in December 1823. But its firstfruits were gathered in 1824 in settling the northern boundary of what is now known as British Columbia; and the whole history of America and the Pacific has been affected by the fact. That it was a British statesman, George Canning, who prompted the new move is worth remembering at the present moment when Japan is proposing that the Monroe Doctrine shall make a great leap, from America to Asia, no less.

The year 1834 is connected with Charles Darwin's visit to Australia, which covered his first enthusiasm over it, and his final pessimism. At the outset he compared it with South America to the latter's disadvantage. Sydney was a city built in a generation, while South American cities could not show as much in a century. But Australia's distance from Europe and the cost of transporting its products discouraged the great naturalist, and he could see no great future ahead. He could not realize that the science of which he was to be so distinguished a master would provide cold storage, giant steamships, cable and telegraphic communication, and a thousand short cuts to serve the distant continent; and he went home not to prophesy, as his grandfather, Dr. Erasmus Darwin, had done without actually seeing Australia, but to develop the theory of evolution which has made him famous, so that even his visit to Australia is a notable fact in its history. But 1834 was the year of the firstfruits of Britain's emancipation of the slaves. It was also the year in which Gibbon Wakefield and his colleagues founded the South Australian Association, and so began their work of colonization in Australia on the new plan of carefully

selecting emigrants and providing them with land. Sir George Grey intervened, no doubt, but it was a beginning. Out of this double event may be said to have sprung Sir William Molesworth's determined attacks upon the transportation system. It was doomed, and was slowly but surely strangled. In 1854 (another of the special years) Van Dieman's Land changed its name to Tasmania; and Eastern Australia bade farewell to the evil business in so doing. With 1864 the West was also free.

Now 1844 is a year with the fear of France still upon it for Australia. It was the year following France's claim to New Caledonia, and actually the year of the reported annexation of Tahiti. A search through Australian newspaper files for that year reveals a spirit of protest against British indifference; and yet Britain moved so that France disclaimed. But on the other side of the Pacific again the United States had come West with the annexation of Texas; and war with Great Britain was discussed because she made claim to part of the so-called "Oregon country" right upon the Pacific coast. War was avoided by an agreement as to boundaries which left Puget Sound outside of British Columbia; but the surrender of Great Britain was through a blunder, or worse, as will be shown later on. The annexation of Texas resulted in a declaration of war by Mexico upon the United States, and it eventually led to the American Civil War. With 1854 we have legislation by Congress dealing with slavery in the new States of the Union, and it made a profound difference in the outlook for internal peace. The Civil War became inevitable with the fires of strife so lighted.

II

The year 1854 marks a critical point in the history of the four Empires. In the history of Japan especially is this the case, because she then made her first treaties with the United States and Great Britain. She was forced to be friendly by the persistence of the American Fleet's attentions, and at last consented to give the Western nations some place in her thoughts. But by a curious coincidence 1854 is the year in which de Lesseps obtained his concession from Said Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt, which authorized the constitution of the Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez for building a ship-canal through the isthmus.* Great Britain must be associated with this great enterprise at last, though France led the way and has been concerned so intimately in both Suez and Panama —the latter, in the words of Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, "a triumph of French initiative and American organization." † It is in the fitness of things that France should be distinguished through the century, as at the beginning and end, for her work in the Pacific; but Suez is the British Empire's key to India and the East, as Panama is America's gate to the wealth of Asia from the other side, and as Kiel and its canal may be marked as Germany's great project for holding the Pacific and the rest of the world in possession. The Kiel Canal becomes a real link in the events of the Pacific in this regard. But 1854 was the year of the Crimean War, when Bismarck first began to play the great game of diplomacy in his own fashion. He was then at Frankfort representing Prussia

* "Encyclopædia Britannica," article "Suez Canal," p. 23.
† "America and her Problems," p. 241.

in the Diet, and among his close friends were the Godeffroys of Hamburg, who about 1854 made their start at Samoa in the Pacific trade venture which gave Great Britain and the United States so much trouble. Sir J. B. Thurston has quoted 1857 in this connexion, but Mr. Thomas Trood says that he himself reached Samoa in December 1857 to find a German named Unselm already in charge of Godeffroy's business. Unselm, it seems, had come from Valparaiso "about four years before." * This would place the beginnings of Godeffroy's venture early in 1854, or perhaps at the end of 1853. The Kiel Canal was in Bismarck's mind then, as it was in the minds of Hamburg merchants; and its whole history goes to show that it was intended for conquest—first the Navy, and finally the smashing of the British Empire. Even in 1851 an English writer emphasized the value of Kiel to Prussia if Denmark were dismembered.† The Godeffroys at Hamburg were under no misconception as to Prussia's policy when they studied the maps of the Pacific Ocean with Herr von Bismarck in those years preceding the war with Denmark, the smashing of Austria, and the defeat of France in 1870. Yet Hamburg's idea of a united Germany was not Bismarck's or William II's, and Hermann Fernau in his latest book remarks: "It is strange that the song 'Deutschland über Alles' was first sung in Hamburg, on the occasion of a manifestation in favour of the liberty of the Press. Now, however, since the unity of the German races has been effected in a manner so utterly different from that which our democratic poets ever imagined, their words

* "Island Reminiscences," by Thomas Trood, p. 31.

† "Observations on the Social and Political Condition of Denmark," 1851, by Samuel Laing. Quoted in the *Spectator*, June 16, 1917.

have been given another, namely, an imperialistic meaning." * Suez has meant much to Asia in general and to the British Empire in particular by drawing Europe so much closer; and Panama may soon be vital to America and the Pacific now that a new chapter in world relations has been opened by the Great War. So Kiel was to be essential to Germany, but with far different motives. Bismarck tore Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark in 1864 and turned it into a Prussian province, not merely because the Danish Duchies were another Naboth's vineyard, but because they represented an indispensable weapon of offence through Kiel in the days to come. Kiel and the Canal held the world in promise if not in fee when the present German Emperor threw down his challenge in 1914; and Lord Salisbury saw its implications more than half a century before when he wrote his searching and scorching article on the Danish Duchies in 1863. Did the latter statesman keep his earlier vision of German conquest when he surrendered Heligoland? One notes with a curious catch of memory that he made his maiden speech as Lord Robert Cecil in the House of Commons in 1854!

The centre of the century comes with 1864, and this is the year from which everything seems directly to date in the present war, with the rape of the Danish Duchies. It is the year of consummation in Bismarck's plotting. Yet on the Pacific coasts interest was being quickened by French intervention in Mexico. A new development was advertised in 1864 by the arrival of Maximilian from Europe; and Mexico, already become a startling defiance of the Monroe Doctrine by the presence and activity of French troops there, was formally proclaimed an Empire.

* "The Coming Democracy," by Hermann Fernau, p. 193.

Napoleon III had yearned for some time to assert himself in South America and the Pacific. He had taken possession of New Caledonia in 1853 right in the teeth of British claims, and only just anticipating British annexation; and with the United States in the throes of civil war he proposed to get possession of the best part of Mexico and cut the Americas in two. It was as ruthless a piece of piracy in its way as anything Germany has since perpetrated; and when the United States were one again the pinchbeck Napoleon got his lesson. Poor Maximilian was shot by the Mexicans, and the Monroe Doctrine was vindicated. Napoleon had even proposed to Lord Palmerston that Great Britain should join France in recognizing the South if it seemed that the Northern States were likely to triumph, but the proposal was declined. France established in Mexico would have been a difficult problem for the United States and it might have altered the general outlook in the Pacific.*

But, for the Pacific, 1864 is also the year which may fairly be said to lead to Great Britain's later step forward in the annexation of Fiji and the assumption of control through an important area of the ocean. The cession did not actually come till 1874, but by the end of 1864 the boom bred of the American Civil War was seen to be breaking. Cotton planting had been rushed because of soaring prices. A company had been formed in Australia to exploit the fertile lands of Fiji and to take advantage of the coil into which Thakombau had been cast by the demands of the United States. The settlement of white people had increased amazingly, and then it was seen that the war would soon be over. Sherman's march to the

* "Historical Essays and Studies," by Lord Acton, pp. 157–162.

sea, and the capture of the forts at Mobile Bay among other things showed that the North was steadily passing from victory to victory. In the end the blockade was lifted and cotton prices ran down to normal. Fijian cotton became unprofitable, and everything threatened to go to pieces. At last through the fog the Fijian chiefs with Thakombau at their head found Great Britain beside them; and Germany was disgusted to learn that Fiji had been finally settled under the British flag. This brings in 1874, a year more important for the Pacific in many ways than any of the preceding years just dealt with; because, with Fiji in British control, Tonga eventually was drawn from Germany's fingers; and though Samoa was surrendered by Great Britain in exchange for a free hand elsewhere, she and America held the strategic points of the three groups. Apia as a harbour was worth nothing to Germany. She only turned to Samoa when her plans for world possession seemed to be complete; and then the three groups were to be taken. This was the original idea when Theodore Weber and the Godeffroys marked them off on the maps of the Pacific Ocean.

It was in 1884 that Germany's colonizing ambitions began to bear fruit. Possession was taken of the Bismarck Archipelago and of much beside; and Australia and New Zealand found that their worst fears were being realized. British statesmen had surrendered strategic positions in the Pacific almost for the asking, and New Guinea and the two great islands associated with the name of Carteret, who explored the Pacific before Captain Cook and took possession of New Britain and New Ireland for George III, were allowed to fly the German flag. Bismarck seemed to doubt the reality of Australia's exasperation

over these annexations. He had managed to secure these colonies by playing upon the fears of Mr. Gladstone about Egypt, where France was making trouble; and colonial irritation was ignored. But when he realized that there was intense feeling throughout Australasia about German activity in the Pacific he took the line that public opinion in Germany was entitled to just as much respect. His biographer says that "he denied the right of the Australians to apply the Monroe Doctrine to their Polynesian neighbourhood, and thus it was that he came to characterize the due regard of England for the cohesion of her great Empire as wanton obstruction to the colonial expansion of Germany." *

But the year 1894 is equally notable as being connected with an event of supreme importance in the Pacific. The war between Japan and China began then, and resulted in a startling demonstration of the power of the former. Another island nation had come to the front, but this time in the Far East; and all the international standards had to be readjusted in consequence. At its close Germany prompted, and joined with, Russia and France in depriving Japan of the main fruits of her victory; but Great Britain and Japan had seen their way in 1894 to make a treaty, which has since developed into one of the main safeguards of British interests in the Pacific. Japan became a Power, and as such was doubly suspect by William II, who took further steps to offset her apparent menace to civilization. "The Yellow Peril" was the German phrase for it, and in 1897 Kiao-chou was obtained from China and turned into a German naval station at Japan's front door. The

* "Prince Bismarck: an Historical Biography," by Charles Lowe, M.A., vol. ii, p. 238.

German Navy as we know it to-day then took shape and being. Bismarck had been following events with absorbed interest, and in an address delivered by him to a large gathering of people from Schleswig-Holstein in 1895, when a German Navy Bill was being discussed, he said: "I wished to acquire Schleswig-Holstein because unless we had that province we could not hope to have a German fleet. It was a question of national dignity that in case of need Germany should be able to hold her own against a second-rate navy. Formerly we had no fleet. I should consider it an exaggeration for Germany to compete with the French or English navies; however, we must be strong enough on the sea to be able to deal with those second-rate Powers which we cannot get at by land." * There was probably no thought of a navy inferior to that of France or Great Britain in the mind of the German Emperor, and Japan made a good excuse for the enlarged policy in the meantime. The challenge to the new Power issued in 1895 and 1897 was followed by the Emperor's order to his troops when in 1900 they were sent to China during the Boxer Rebellion. As the expeditionary force was ready to leave Kiel, William II bade farewell to it in the following terms: "When you meet the foe, you will defeat him. No quarter will be given, no prisoners taken. Let all who fall into your hands be at your mercy. Just as the Huns a thousand years ago, under the leadership of Etzel [Attila] gained a reputation in virtue of which they still live in historical tradition, so may the name of Germany become known in such a manner in China that no Chinaman will ever again even dare to look askance at a German." † Is it

* Quoted by Archibald Hurd in the *Fortnightly Review*, March 1917, p. 401.

† The *Times*, August 11, 1900.

any wonder that later on Chinese statesmen should have declared that the Germans left hardly a dog alive on the blood-strewn road between Tien-tsin and Peking! * Britons in the Pacific watched it all with strange feelings; and the other nations interested in that ocean made a note of this result of shaking the German mailed fist.

With so much in view one now realizes that Germany's finger may well have been traced through Russia's relations with Japan leading up to the war of 1904. Japan understands how truly Germany helped to precipitate the conflict, expecting to see it end with both combatants exhausted and unable to prevent the Teuton from carrying on his favourite pastime of fishing in troubled waters. But Russia, up to 1904, was a continual bugbear to the British because of India, on account of a Russian policy of adventure in Asia right through to the Pacific. In Germany the Bismarckian policy of stimulating apprehension and creating strife, by helping forward schemes of conquest or aggression which did not affect her, had been consistently pursued; and Russia in Central Asia was, no doubt, following a similar line of congenial adventure. She needed no prompting; but the idea of reaching through to the Far East and conquering China was pure madness, as we realize now in the revolution which has revealed so much weakness. Still it was easy for Germany, with the influence she could exert, to turn the Russian official mind upon Japan. The Russian nation never desired the arbitrament of battle, and when it came it was called "an officers' war"; but up to the inevitable opening of hostilities, Great Britain and Japan felt the

* Quoted in "Who's Who in Hunland," by Frederic William Wile, p. 79.

pressure of an autocratic coterie's mad ambition. The Alliance between them, however, secured Japan from German interference at critical moments; and this has been acknowledged. Viscount Motono, Japanese Foreign Minister, has written: "We must admit that had it not been for our British Alliance we should have encountered the greatest difficulties in the prosecution of our war with Russia. During that war Great Britain did us inestimable services, services still little known to the general public. Japan has likewise served her Ally in many and no less appreciable ways. Great Britain would probably not have been able to make the Agreements she signed with Russia had it not been for her Japanese Alliance. When I was closing our first political agreement with Russia in 1907, I had the distinct impression that she would not have held out her hand to Great Britain if the latter had not had her Alliance with Japan." * Thus out of Germany's intriguing and manœuvring in the Pacific came the first movement of threatened nations to a common centre. First, Great Britain and Japan joined hands in the Far East; then Great Britain and France reached an understanding in Europe for mutual assistance, and finally Russia, already in alliance with France, entered the circle. But, as far as the Pacific was concerned, Germany gave the impetus through her Emperor's threats and bullying when dealing with China and Japan; and 1894 and 1904 become years of the greatest significance in attempting a bird's-eye view of the situation.

* *The New East*, June 1917, p. 21.

III

Finally 1894, 1904, and 1914 as connected with the Panama Canal give an opportunity for thought; and Panama, instead of being the last word in this introduction to a study of the true Pacific, might well have been made the first. The three years so mentioned represent two crises and a consummation; for France took up work again in Panama, after the reconstruction of de Lesseps's initial company, in 1894; and strangely enough in that year the great originator of the Suez and Panama Canals died. France must always be associated with the project which was completed by the United States and opened for traffic on August 15, 1914. But the decades between, marked as to their central year by 1904, were full of extraordinary unrest; and Germany was responsible for a good deal of the trouble which at last led to the surprise of a revolution in Panama itself. The Treaty of 1904 which gave the United States full power to proceed with the construction of the Canal was not signed until Mr. Roosevelt, who was then President, had done some masterful things; and probably when the time comes for him to tell the world what he knows about Germany and Central America during the period of negotiation for taking over French interests in the concessions covering the Canal zone, there will be further light thrown upon the dark web of Teutonic intrigue in the Pacific. Briefly, then, the concessions to the reconstructed French company, which, in 1894, attempted to carry on the work dropped by de Lesseps, were due to mature in 1904; and Germany thought she might take the place of France in controlling the isthmus which promised, or threatened, so much to the

plans she was preparing for world empire. The State of Colombia, as principal and owner, expected to make a fine bargain over Panama out of the necessities of the United States. Washington was ready with a good offer to close the matter, and advanced upon that offer when progress was seen to be difficult. The Canal was to be an American enterprise; but the zone could only be taken over in due form and as the result of an amicable understanding with the State of Colombia. It was here that the German "Colonial party" became active; and one subterfuge after another was practised to prevent any arrangement being reached before the French company's concessions ran out by expiry of time. Colombia, with nothing done, or with a competing offer to use as a whip upon Mr. Roosevelt's shoulders, was apparently quite ready to play Germany's game; but the Central American State had overlooked, as Germany had done, the possibilities of an upset in Panama itself. That province of the State of Colombia added one more revolution to its long list, and declared its independence. With the United States a sympathetic onlooker, if not a prompting party to the disorder, everything suddenly became easy. The treaty of 1904 was signed with representatives of the new Republic of Panama, and the State of Colombia got nothing. It was just another of those intrigues which the war of 1914 has revealed in such plenty. Germany in the Pacific and elsewhere is a name for duplicity; and Germany in Panama tried hard to launch a torpedo at the United States which might have smashed a good deal more than a mere land concession. The whole Pacific was at stake. It is at least curious that Napoleon III should have attempted in Mexico what William II, probably through a German syndicate,

had in mind when thinking of Panama. But the latter missed his grab at French assets, and at much beside, in 1904, just as Napoleon did through Maximilian in 1864.

This reminder of the importance of Panama in the history of the Pacific provokes a backward glance at British activities since Francis Drake climbed his tree upon the isthmus. He was the first Englishman to set sail upon the vast ocean which then lay before him. Especially when Canada is celebrating her jubilee as a Dominion is there justification for giving Panama prominence; for two notable men, one a Frenchman and the other an Englishman, may be said first to have laid her foundations upon the Atlantic and the Pacific through its influence. But while Jacques Cartier's initial work rendered modern Canada possible, Francis Drake's voyaging through the Pacific at the word of Queen Elizabeth only advertised its possibilities on that ocean. Sir Charles Lucas has well called Canada the great bridge of Empire. To-day it is the alternative British route from Europe to Asia and Australia; and in it has been perfected what "Columbus set out to achieve." But because Columbus had made up his mind after discovering America that there must be a passage still westward—some strait for his vessels through the new lands which blocked him—explorers and navigators were upset for a generation. "The Holy Grail itself was not pursued with more persistence and devotion than this mystical, elusive strait by the navigators of the sixteenth century." * Thus it was that Jacques Cartier made a way for his countrymen in Canada, for his explora-

* "The Panama Canal," by J. Saxon Mills, p. 17 (Nelson's Library of Notable Books).

tion of the American coast in 1534 northward to Labrador at the behest of his King, who sent him out to find this road to India, settled more than one question for France. There was no strait westward through Panama, nor anywhere else for practical purposes north of the Horn. But there were good lands for colonization to the north of Panama, and Cartier, after exploring the St. Lawrence, took possession for Francis I. New France came into being, with the explorer's name written large upon it; and, broadly, modern Canada is the result.

Now Cartier did this before Drake was born, and therefore came first in the creation of Canada. Yet one thinks of Panama as associated with the name of the first Englishman who fared across; for Darien, and all it represents in the centuries since Balboa traversed the isthmus, is part of Panama. War was Drake's mission and master, but high adventure was his heart's desire whether in peace or war. He viewed the Pacific from "a goodly and great high tree" on the isthmus, and prayed to be allowed to go himself upon the water at his feet. "He besought Almighty God of His goodness to give him life and leave to sail once in a ship on that sea." He left Plymouth for the newly discovered ocean, and passed through the Straits of Magellan with a fleet of five vessels subsidized by Queen Elizabeth. After harrying the Spaniards he worked his way north and reached the 48th parallel of north latitude, somewhere in the regions of Puget Sound and within reach of Vancouver as we know it to-day. The country was called New Albion, and possession was taken in the name of the Queen.* Canada was thus New France on one

* "Encyclopædia Britannica," article "Drake, Sir Francis," p. 473.

side and New Albion on the other nearly four centuries ago.

The early explorers loved to give the name of their country to new lands; and Dampier followed Drake, when he found a channel to the east of New Guinea and called the land beyond "Nova Britannia" (the New Britain of our maps). Later again Carteret, worthy to rank among the most daring and adventurous of Englishmen, repeated Dampier's experience by discovering and naming New Ireland—taking possession of both islands and everything else thereabout in the name of George III. Germany, after she took possession by surprise in 1884, with characteristic effrontery changed the names from New Britain and New Ireland to Neu Pommern and Neu Mecklenburg; and British hydrographers have never ceased their protests.

But since the naming of lands in the Pacific for the Mother Country is being recalled, it should be noted that part of Panama itself was given a Scottish name, New Caledonia. This was done to denote the portion taken possession of under a scheme initiated by William Paterson and Fletcher of Saltoun, when they defied England, Holland, and Spain, more than a hundred years after Drake had placed New Albion on record. All Scotland was agog with excitement at Paterson's proposals, which aimed at concentrating the trade of the Pacific upon this possible New Caledonia. The present republic of Panama covers the country included in the Darien enterprise, and Caledonia Bay remains upon the maps to this day. One may legitimately wonder what would have happened if the shrewd Scotsman who projected the Bank of England, and failed of due recognition probably because he was a Scotsman, had made a success of "The Company of Scot-

land Trading to Africa and the Indies." Sir Walter Scott had a word for William Paterson in his "Tales of a Grandfather," and described his new project as aiming to bring to the Bay of Panama the produce of China, Japan, the Spice Islands, and Eastern India. Thence the wealth of the Pacific was to be transferred across the isthmus to the new settlement, where it would be exchanged for the commodities of Europe. It is not astonishing that the East India Company became hostile, that William III set his face against the scheme, and Spain and Holland made more than formal protest. Scotland, and not England, was setting the pace; and statesmanlike ideas under such conditions were at a discount. The Union had still to come; and it was practically forced by the failure of the Darien enterprise. A recent writer discussing the business says: "It is possible that if this attempt at colonization had been made after and not before the Union of Scotland and England it would have met with much less opposition in England, perhaps would have received Government sympathy and support. In that case the isthmus would have been added to the British dominions, and the waterway might have been constructed under the British flag. It should be added that Paterson, who had personally surveyed the isthmus, positively declared that the construction of a canal was a feasible undertaking." *

These reflections, arising out of the completion of the Panama Canal and its opening in 1914—within a month almost of the completion of the Kiel Canal, and less than a month after the declaration of war by Germany against Russia and France—may seem somewhat out of focus; and

* "The Panama Canal," by J. Saxon Mills, pp. 27–29 (Nelson's Library of Notable Books).

yet an excuse is hardly necessary. The Panama Canal is going to be a very important factor in the development of the Pacific; but its competition with Suez will be principally felt in the central groups of islands and as far over as Australia. Asia will still be drawn through Suez to Europe; while the territories over which the British flag flies in the Pacific itself will respond more and more to the American magnet. But it will be for good, not ill; and the present war will have cleared the way for an understanding that has been imperilled several times since the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was signed more than sixty years ago.

CHAPTER II

HALF THE WORLD

The Pacific Ocean covers a whole hemisphere : Fighting has been confined to the other half of the world : A map on the globular projection : Where degrees are longest : "Alarums and drums of cosmic war" : The true relation of the principal groups of islands to the continents : How the Western Pacific lies in East longitude : No such highway as the Pacific Ocean

THE Pacific has been true to name since the outbreak of war in 1914. Although there have been raids, and sinkings and fighting here and there, the real battlefields have been on the other side of the world; and the greatest ocean on the earth's surface has been a haven of rest by comparison. More than ever, therefore, is it essential that the Pacific shall be presented in something like reasonable shape. Pondering the subject, one despairs of giving the truth in some simple illustration, until the experience of the small girl with her lessons in astronomy comes to mind. She had been taught the main facts about the heavens and the earth until her head ached; and with a memory full of fairy stories, and with an imagination alight with extraordinary things done on a flat surface, she could not find room for the actual relations of the sun, the planets, the moon, and the stars. She seemed hopeless to the weary governess until the latter took an orange and explained

everything from another point of view. The child grasped the truth at once and exclaimed at the wonder of it. "But you learned all that," was the puzzled protest. "Yes, I learned it, but I never knew it before," was the reply. So one takes the familiar orange, with its stem to represent the North Pole, and the slightly flattened end opposite for the South Pole. For the purposes of illustration, it is an oblate spheroid, and one divides it equally with a knife to get two hemispheres, cutting through the poles and not round the equator. If the halves are then put upon a plate with the open fruit down and the skin sections up, the illustration will begin to apply. It is a representation of the world in peace and at war between certain meridians of longitude. The globular surface on one half contains Europe, nearly the whole of Asia, all Africa, and the greater part of South America, the Mediterranean Sea, the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans. This is the hemisphere in which all the fighting is taking place. The other globular surface is the Pacific. It covers half the surface of the earth, just including the rim of the South American coast, and contains practically the whole of North America, Japan, part of Siberia, Manchuria, a small part of China, half the East Indies, all of New Guinea, Australasia, and innumerable islands and island groups. As far as the war is concerned it is the Pacific, the ocean of peace; and although the great nations living upon its coasts or within its range are at war with Germany, it may be said without much exaggeration that throughout a whole hemisphere of this globe there is no actual fighting. German guns, at any rate, cannot wake the echoes of this half of the earth's surface. With the exception of the initial Australasian expeditionary work, odd German raids, and Japan's attack upon German

possessions, the Pacific has been quite true to its name.

No proper conception of the magnitude of the Pacific or of its problems and conflicting interests can be obtained without reference to a map constructed on the globular projection, or to a globe itself. One turns up the finest atlas for ideas obtainable in Australasia. It is a folio volume published by Edward Stanford, Geographer to His Majesty, and is complete in every particular. As the last word in modern cartography it is a delightful work for the enthusiastic student of the war, whose knowledge of geography has been expanding in all directions since 1914. But in this complete atlas the globular projection is only applied to what are called the Eastern and Western Hemispheres. The Eastern Hemisphere covers Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia, just touching the Pacific, and making the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea its principal water areas. The Atlantic Ocean is shown, too, but in fragmentary shape. In the Western Hemisphere the Atlantic appears again, with the two Americas and New Zealand. The Pacific Ocean is shown as far as the Solomon Islands, but no true idea of its magnitude is given. There are maps of the Pacific on Mercator's projection, but the relative positions of continents and islands in "a desert of ships," to use Stevenson's term, cannot be grasped from them. "Where degrees are longest"—another of Stevenson's descriptions for the Pacific through its tropical reaches—does not apply, because the Mercatorial projection smothers the converging lines of longitude. Who could tell, for instance, from a study of the ordinary maps, that Canada and China are comparatively so close, except as distances are given to save the situation? Instinctively

one thinks of the dark side of the moon. Europe compiles and prints all the maps of the world that the average Briton studies; and it is enough for him that the Eastern and Western Hemispheres on the globular projection give the old world and the new in their accepted form. Yet the Pacific is new and vast, with every prospect of becoming a world in itself. Science, no doubt, declares that it is the original old world. There are sober students of the Pacific who insist that civilization began within its confines, and that indeed the Garden of Eden will one day be located somewhere upon its wide breast. This idea seems very absurd as the waste of waters is scrutinized; but so much that is wonderful, and at present inexplicable, meets the searching eye that anything seems reasonable in the way of surmise.

Before the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science, not long ago, the President of an important section delivered an address upon "The Future of the Pacific." Mr. Lucas asked several questions: "Did the Pacific originate in a catastrophe? Is it the great healed-over scar of the wound made in Mother Earth in the days when the moon was torn from her? Or was it formed gradually as the planetesimal meteorites accumulated and settled down into the coherent globe? However formed, there it is, a monumental basin differing in type from the beds of all the other oceans. We have evidence that its surface was in the past less extensive and more broken by land. Long ago we have a dim vision of a greatly extended Antarctica, continent or archipelago, forming a bridge of connexion between Australia and New Zealand and South America. Later, there is evidence of a long peninsula stretching down from Papua to New Zealand. And this

is important, because along the line of the peninsula lay the old border of the ocean. For around the borders of the ocean runs a curved line of disquietude, of strain, of rupture of the earth's crust. Along this line the coasts are shaken by earthquakes and breached by volcanoes. In general, the signs point to subsidence of the whole ocean bed. The submergence of the old Antarctica, and the Papua to New Zealand peninsula, the numerous atolls kept just above water, the Great Barrier Reef, the drowning of the estuaries which gave us the deep harbours of Eastern Australia, the continuation of the Andes in a chain of islands to the south, finally sinking below the ocean level, indicate widespread subsidence on a grand scale. In antagonism to this secular sinking, and to the great agencies of sub-aerial denudation, which are striving to drag our lands under the sea, we have the upheaving activities of the vulcano-seismic girdle. This is the great fighting-line, where the mighty struggle of the opposing forces of Nature is taking place. Along this we hear the alarums and drums of cosmic war." * In this view, peace is the last word to associate with the conditions of existence on and around the Pacific Ocean, and the reminder is timely. But the quotation has been given at length to show how needful it is to have some map of the Pacific prepared so that an idea of the relations of its continents and islands may be given. For the cosmic war above indicated this would be immensely helpful to the student, but in the present war of nations it becomes imperative. Not in fragments or in halves, but as a whole the great ocean should be pre-

* *Proceedings of the Australasian Association for the Advancement of Science*, 1909, "The Future of the Pacific," by A. H. Lucas, M.A., B.Sc., pp. 385–386.

sented; and it then becomes for the multitude a great new world.

A map of the Pacific on the globular projection shows at a glance the true relation of the principal groups of islands to the continents, and the position of the latter with respect to the ocean itself. Such a map hangs in many Australasian public schools. It has been prepared by an Australian cartographer to illustrate the commercial potentialities and actual trade developments of the Pacific; and it may be said that Mr. H. E. C. Robinson's war and other maps have been a continual education to the people of the great South lands. But the idea is also to be found as an inset to the map published with the article on "The Pacific Ocean" in the eleventh edition of the "Encyclopædia Britannica." The map proper is constructed on Mercator's projection, and the distortion of the main features is there to be seen at its worst. For ordinary purposes nothing could be better, except that the area dealt with is insufficient. The inset, however, which may escape the eye of the casual reader, gives precisely what Mr. Robinson has so effectively developed, and it deserves to be studied, were it not so small that half its value disappears when details are desired. [In passing it may be mentioned that Mr. Robinson prepared the charts of the Funafuti expedition for Professor David, and made the maps dealing with the phosphate deposits on the islands which have become so valuable in recent years. Pleasant Island, for instance—or Nauru, as it is known—was taken from Germany early in the war by the Australian naval forces; and it is said to be worth at the present moment as much as all the various island groups put together.] Mr. Robinson's map of the Pacific is so important because it shows an entire hemisphere

with the central meridians crossing water almost without a break. The meridian of Greenwich is not in the centre of the map, it is true, but it was only displaced because the main South American coast on the west would otherwise have to be omitted in showing a complete hemisphere. With the 160th degree of west longitude made the centre, the lower South American coast on the west is just included, and the whole of Australia lies comfortably within the Western limits of the hemisphere. It has to be remembered that west longitude is simply longitude west of Greenwich, and that the 180th meridian runs through the Fijian group. The Western Pacific, therefore, lies in east longitude; and from Australia and New Zealand eastward only the degrees of longitude to Fiji are east. They are west thence till Greenwich is again reached.

One point of special interest may be given here in the fact that the North American continent is almost wholly within the hemisphere so projected. In a very real sense the Americas are part of the Pacific, but their position makes them a bridge between the great Western nations and the multimillions of the Far East—between the extended wings of the British Empire. The Pacific and its continents and islands are thus a new world, the ocean making a highway of approach to Asia and Australasia, and linking up Europe through the Americas. Opposite to North America upon our map appear a portion of Siberia, Manchuria, part of China proper, the whole of Japan, the Philippines, half of Borneo and Java (thus including the Dutch East Indies), Australasia, and Antarctica. But to mention the Antarctic is to find on looking northward that Alaska and the Arctic Ocean as legitimate extensions of the Pacific are equally within the hemi-

sphere. Indeed, a meridian close to the 170th degree of west longitude, as defined on the map, runs through the ice-barrier to the South Pole, touching no land in Antarctica as far as we know, and continuously avoiding land until it reaches the North Pole. It passes through Behring Strait, and thus reaches from pole to pole. A few small islands may be crossed, and the Samoan group is divided in passing, leaving Apia and Tutuila to the west; but this meridian of longitude marks a complete half-circle of the sphere without touching a single land area of any importance. Pago-Pago in the Samoan group, which belongs to the United States, is close enough to be noticeable, and an island across Behring Strait is just missed; but broadly it is true that the Pacific in its central stretch is an ocean without a break from pole to pole. Through the line of the equator it is almost the same, except that Borneo on the extreme west and Equador on the far east block the way. Through 180 degrees of longitude and nearly 180 degrees of latitude the ocean ranges, and it is in this view a veritable waste of water. Yet, in fact, it is the finest highway in the world, and the richest in possibilities of production and commercial power.

CHAPTER III

JAPAN'S ARRIVAL

Treaties with Japan forced upon her in 1854 : Germany accepted as a model for military organization in 1884 : Canada a bridge of Empire on one side : Japan entrenched and established on the other : Japan's distance from Australia : Her strategic position in the Pacific : Australia and China : Lafcadio Hearn's view of Japan : Sir Rabindranath Tagore's visit

EXCLUDING Germany for the moment there are three Empires vitally concerned in the control of the Pacific. They must find some basis of agreement for future action or co-operation, because the alternative will be friction ending in war again—which is unthinkable. Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, directly or through their possessions, hold a triangular relation in this ocean which occupies a whole hemisphere of the globe ; and it has been noted that the year 1854 marks their first approximation to an understanding in the Pacific. This may be called an exaggeration, no doubt, because the treaties concluded by Japan, first with the United States in that year, and then with Great Britain, were practically forced upon her. Her policy of exclusion was challenged with such effect that, when asked to open certain of her ports to European intercourse, she had to give way. But the trend of events took Japan so far onward that a treaty with Great Britain

was signed in 1892. This was the first recognition of Japan as a Power entitled to equality of treatment. Britain signed a treaty of alliance in 1902, and under the same agreement held the ring in 1904 when Japan and Russia fought. Then came the renewals in 1905 and 1911. All the time the United States was concerned, as in the first instance, to secure open trade doors into China, while working amicably, as far as possible, with Japan. Yet the original forcing of Japan's shut doors had to be paid for. Indeed, the awakening of the Land of the Rising Sun to the power of Europe and America, with modern science in their hands, has worked out into paradox all round. It was to Germany that Japan looked in 1884 when she determined to model an army on European lines. A Japanese general, after a visit to Europe, where he studied each of the great military Powers, reported in that year that the German model was the best; and in 1885 the work of organization under German supervision began.* German lessons to Japan in the art of war, therefore, were China's undoing. Japan, to the world's surprise, suddenly sprang forth, not only fully armed, but a conqueror indeed; and Germany, after China's defeat in 1894, had to meet this unexpected victory by a diplomatic counter-attack. Japan has never forgiven this intervention. Count Michimasa Soyeshima, writing in the *New East* for July 1917, voices the true Japanese feeling about Germany's action. He says: "In 1895 Kaiser Wilhelm robbed Japan of the legitimate fruits of her victory over China and took his first step towards his ambitious plan for the subjugation of the world." Russia and France may have been

* "Japan and the Japanese People," p. 85 ("Nations of the War" Series).

persuaded, as Count Soyeshima urges, that Japan's advent as a Great Power would endanger the peace of the world; but Germany was thinking of war, not peace, and could see that Japan would be in the way. The United States in a similar dilemma has found the problem of Japanese immigration a continual source of anxiety; and yet it was her own fleet in 1854 that finally forced Japan, quite in a friendly way, to be a Power. Commodore Perry said, in effect, "There is no coercion, only—you must." The treaty signed "pledged Japan to accord kind treatment to shipwrecked sailors, to permit foreign vessels to obtain stores and provisions within her territory, and to allow American ships to anchor in the ports at Shimoda and Hakodate." *

Not Japan as a nation, however, but Japan as a strategic point on the shoulder of China had, in the first instance, caught the American eye. Other people had essayed to break in before, but without success; and the East India Company for Britain had failed with the rest. Great Britain's position in Europe had been duplicated for Japan in Asia; but at the time the Japanese cared nothing for strategy or foreign trade. Only as she was compelled to study the meaning of sea-power, and to understand the advantage of position in trade competition, did Japan begin to return the teaching of her rivals with unexpected assimilations and quick answers. Her national pride was something that Europe and America did not understand at the time; though they realize now that it is as truly at the foundation of the Japanese character and moral code as is the readiness to fight for honour and for due recognition as a Great Power. Lord Bryce has recently emphasized

* "Encyclopædia Britannica," article "Japan," p 288.

this in his article in the *New East*: "The Japanese people have for centuries past been filled with a high sense of honour. In the idea of personal honour their national life stands rooted; and honour implies justice and good faith on the part of the State as well as of the individual. Japan, when she quitted her ancient civilization half a century ago, entered the society of nations as a civilized State, prepared to fulfil all her obligations, not abusing her strength, but respecting the rights of other States and the rules of international law." But the situation rather than the civilization of Japan was the first thought in the minds of her uninvited visitors when Germany, through Hamburg and the Godeffroys, decided to make a similar venture into the Pacific. In the case of Great Britain and the United States the triangular approach to the great ocean was settled by possession past peradventure. By 1844 nearly the whole of the Pacific coast of North America was divided between them for good, and on a basis of peace—not of war. In 1854 Australia and New Zealand to the south-west and beyond the equator were developing fast under the British flag; and responsible government had been granted after much controversy. In 1855 the constitution for New South Wales, conferring practical autonomy, became law; and "never again did the Imperial Parliament withhold the full measure of self-government from any colony fitted to exercise it."* Canada had already received autonomy along the same lines; and, moreover, 1854 had seen the signing, for what it was worth, of a reciprocity treaty with the United States on her behalf. The British Empire on both sides of the Pacific—Canada and Australia at opposite corners—

* "British Colonial Policy, 1783–1915," by C. H. Currey, p. 142.

joined or faced the Americas, and now Japan was found to hold the supreme position where access to China, and indeed to Asia, was most required.

Let this position, then, be studied on a map of the Pacific constructed on the globular projection as offered at the end of the present volume. If Canada is a bridge of vast importance to the British Empire on one side, Japan is certainly entrenched and established on the other side; and to-day she holds her vantage-ground in unrivalled strength. The strategic value of her position is beyond question; and her relation to Asia westward, and to the Pacific through the whole of its extent to the south and east, is one of increasing power. While geographically she is to half the world on one side what Britain herself is to the other half, she possesses this advantage, that her distances from Australia and from the vital points of the Pacific are less than her distance from Canada. Between Kobe and Townsville, via Rabaul in the Bismarck Archipelago and Samarai in New Guinea, is not 4000 miles; while from Hakodate to Victoria, so close to Vancouver, is 4280 miles. But Japan holds large areas of the mainland of Asia, since Korea and part of Manchuria are under her control. Moreover, as an island Power she has what Britain lacks—a great expanse of islands at home. One takes up a book published in 1902, which to-day makes good reading in the light of the war, and scans afresh some of the conclusions of able men like Dr. J. Holland Rose and Mr. Ian C. Hannah. It has been already noted that in 1902 a treaty with Great Britain had been concluded which gave Japan due recognition in the matter of judicial control of foreigners and tariff autonomy. Here, for instance, is Mr. Hannah's summing up of Japan's strategic

position, an appreciation of which, he declares, "is of extreme importance to an understanding of the part she is likely to play in the future history of the world." He says: "An unbroken chain of islands (the Kuriles, Japan proper, the Loochoo Archipelago, Formosa, and the Pescadores), extending from Kamchatka to the Tropics, completely dominates the maritime approaches to the northern provinces of China, to Corea, and to Asiatic Russia. The naval station of Tsushima commands the passage between Kiusiu and Corea, and cuts the communications between Port Arthur and Vladivostock. The Pescadores, which contain some very good harbours, control the Formosa Channel and the routes to Shanghai from Europe. The harbours and naval stations of Japan herself are among the finest in the world; her important seaside cities are situated on bays and fjords whose entrances can be fortified and mined; they are so well defended by Nature and design that in time of war almost the whole of the Japanese navy could be made available for offensive operations abroad without serious anxiety for the safety of her homeland." * Since this particular lecture was written, Russia and Japan have been at war, and the position in Manchuria has been affected to Japan's substantial advantage. In the present great struggle, which is to decide so much, Japan has again added to her trophies, and has taken Kiao-chou in China, and the Marshall and Caroline Islands in the Pacific, from Germany. The map under discussion shows clearly the vital value of it all when studying the future; and for those who are concerned in the British Empire every effort must be

* "Lectures on the History of the Nineteenth Century," "The Far East," by Ian C. Hannah, M.A., p. 382.

made to get this part of a great development in due proportion.

Up to the war with China in 1894 not much thought was given to Japan. China held the field. The Celestial Empire, in fact, loomed so large as to extent, and in imagination was so mighty as to power, that through the Pacific Asia was represented by her millions; and the possible danger of her resentment was never lightly discussed. In the United States and Australia, however, the practical side of her competition in industry, and the presence of increasing numbers of Chinese as immigrants, raised issues which became insistent and were certainly serious. For the British Empire, matters came to a head when Sir Henry Parkes found it necessary to take action in 1888, because of something approaching a riot in Sydney over the proposed landing of Chinese from a steamer then in Port Jackson. Parliament House was approached by "an angry mob"—to quote Parkes himself *—and public opinion was certainly aroused on the subject. This led to legislation and much controversy until at last the Chinese were absolutely excluded from the Australian colonies. This had involved some debate between the British Government and that of which Sir Henry Parkes was head. Lord Salisbury, at China's instance, and because of her protest, had made inquiry in reference to Chinese immigration; and the Premier of New South Wales had urged by cablegram that action should be taken to protect the mother colony. Sir Henry had put his case very forcibly: "As these colonies form an important part of the Empire, it is submitted that our cause of contention is of sufficient national concern to be taken up by the Empire; if we

* "Fifty Years of Australian History," p. 472.

have no voice in the making of treaties, it seems only just that our interests should be considered and protected by those who exercise that power. We learn by public report that the Government of the United States has entered into a treaty with the Government of China by which Chinese immigration into America is no longer permitted. We fail to see why Australia may not be similarly protected." * Then Sir Henry went into particulars. The Australian ports were within easy sail of the ports of China. The climate, soil, and mining activities attracted the Chinese; but British working men and women were directly opposed to Chinese as competitors. There was no sympathy between them, and it was to be feared there could be no peace between the two races. The Chinese were so numerous that other objections were intensified. There was a determination to keep Australia for the British type in the population. And, finally, Australians and Chinese could not intermarry or have social communion. Then came the urgent expression of a wish that immediate steps be taken to open negotiations with the Emperor of China to secure Australia from Chinese immigration in future.

It will be noted that this brought the proximity of Asia forward as a matter of serious moment to a white community pitifully small by comparison with the hundreds of millions in China, though inhabiting a continent comparable in area to the Chinese Empire. The disparity of power and population was recognized and emphasized; but Australians were conscious of their potential strength as part of the British Empire, and they found the British Navy an ever-present help in time of trouble. This was

* "Fifty Years of Australian History," p. 475.

all very well, of course, until Japan arose as the true champion of Asia. After 1904, when Russia, as well as China, had been defeated by her, the whole Pacific was stirred to take a new view of the possibilities, though the alliance between Great Britain and Japan had affected the outlook by giving a better basis for negotiation.

Now in the general connexion, Lord Bryce has made a very strong point. What was not realized at the time as it should have been, and is not understood even now, is that Japan is a civilized nation, and was civilized when her doors were forced in 1854. Nor, even when allowance is made for the main fact, has it been appreciated as it should be, that an enormous change has taken place since. People do not seem to perceive that change does not involve necessarily an alteration of levels; and the trouble with Japan has been that her development along European lines has tended to weaken her where her strength as a civilized nation was most apparent. Lafcadio Hearn, in one of his letters written in 1894, remarked that the Japanese of the new school did not keep to the Chinese wisdom. He said: "They show evidence now of a desire to put to death those who say anything older than yesterday. They are becoming infected with the Western moral poison. They are beginning to love their wives more than their fathers and mothers . . . it is much cheaper."* This last, as a gibe, was only meant to cover the writer's consciousness that Shintoism was devoted to the worship of ancestors—a State religion introduced to cover a tremendous change when it was decided to accept the new order. Western civilization was adopted for purposes of national protection. Treitschke said of the Americans that they

* "Lafcadio Hearn," vol. ii, p. 115.

had replaced the Established Church of England by setting up the worship of ancestors. Japan in 1868 was emerging from feudalism, and its leaders had to find some way of keeping the nation in hand. So Shintoism was made the national religion, and the worship of ancestors was given full play. Professor Chamberlain said it was all cut and dried. But Lafcadio Hearn saw the nation working out its destiny upon the spot; and after the war with China he wrote: "It is an ugly business this war. It may leave Japan absolutely independent, as in the days of Ieyasu. But will it be best for her? I am no longer sure. The people are still good. The upper classes are becoming corrupt. The old courtesy, the old faith, the old kindness, are vanishing like snow in the sun." * Hearn underlined the last sentence, and again one feels that he was unduly pessimistic. He was physically afflicted, and his love of the old Japan made him afraid of the new. He could see certain lines of weakness developing, and was able to compare the present with the past. This point is worth a little more emphasis because when Sir Rabindranath Tagore visited Japan recently, expecting to find there a well-tilled field for his seed-sowing, prepared to respond to his inner light as a thinker and a mystic, he was bitterly disappointed. Probably no outsider has been able to get so thoroughly into touch with all classes as he did. He went into the country districts far from the busy industrial centres, and studied Japan at its centre and source of power. Not that he neglected or misunderstood the new Japan—the Japan of expanding manufactures, of abounding and increasing wealth, and of a growing self-confidence which brooks little interference from outsiders as her ally,

* "Lafcadio Hearn," vol. ii, p. 186.

whether they are intent upon spiritual and diplomatic understandings or upon commercial and industrial conquests. Tagore was plastic to all the impressions of a wonderful nation developing under exceptional circumstances; but he was first and last concerned with the soul of Japan. After he had been through the country and spoken in public and private, delivering himself of his message, he wrote the poem which appears last but one in "Fruit-Gathering," "The Song of the Defeated":

> My Master has bid me while I stand at
> the roadside, to sing the song of Defeat,
> for that is the bride whom He woos in
> secret.
>
> . . . . .
>
> She is forsaken of the day, and God's
> night is waiting for her with its lamps
> lighted and flowers wet with dew.
>
> . . . . .
>
> But the stars are singing the love-song
> of the eternal to a face sweet with shame
> and suffering.

Tagore left Japan downcast and unhappy; and yet to discuss the visit, as the present writer was privileged to do with the companion of his travel, was to realize that there was hope of victory in the sense of defeat. The Indian sage, who thought to find congenial soil in Japan, recognized that he had to deal with three generations. What had hurt him most soon after landing was to find in a leading book-store his own works offered for sale on one side of the shop window and Nietzsche's on the other. It was like a blow in the face. Could it be possible that the preacher of insolence and defiance—the philosopher upon whom modern Germany had fed to her undoing—was being read and accepted in competition with, or in

denial of, himself? It must be one or the other. There could be no reconciliation of such opposites. Was Japan really thinking and moving along a path parallel with that of Germany? The question answered itself in one way, because Japan and Germany were implacable foes; but there surely was some measure of sympathy with a gospel of force, as against the imperative of love and the need of submission to the eternal verities of righteousness, justice, and self-sacrifice. Now the three generations of Japan seemed to explain the strange anomalies of the situation. Old Japan, though practically in power through the Elder Statesmen, was not dominant in thought. Its generation, passing fast, had accepted the new order in self-defence, and was strong-hearted and keen-brained. But it was fighting for existence and had no time for new spiritual messages. The middle generation was the section that read Nietzsche and had been brought up in admiration of Germany; and for it Tagore had no message. But his heart opened to the third generation—to young Japan, with its eyes upon the future, yet tremendously impressed with the present. Everything seemed to depend upon the rising manhood of Japan; and Tagore, though defeated, was not altogether without hope.

CHAPTER IV

JAPAN AND THE FUTURE

Japan's claim for recognition in the Pacific : Her record of honourable dealing : The true Japan in control : Canada's agreement for passports anticipated by Queensland : A White Australia and Chinese competition in Japan : Professor Keith and Australasia's attitude to Japan : Sir Henry Parkes and the Chinese Restriction Bill of 1888 : Lord Salisbury and China in relation to the Colonies : Mr. Price Collier's view

THERE is, of course, a practical side to this review of Japan's development, both as a Power in the Pacific and as an Empire in relation to other Empires. We may discuss her from the philosophical side and find a great deal that is impressive and exceedingly important in her spiritual adventures. But this war is raising issues—political, industrial, and commercial—which cannot be settled by philosophical discussion. What, for instance, is likely to be the outcome of Japan's claims for increased recognition in the Pacific? What is to be the future of China in the new world? How, with all the old marks removed or altered, are Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to order their course? The latter Dominions are finding it difficult to see their way, but they are studying the lesson of the war which is being set them at the present moment. Japan is undoubtedly an enigma to them. They see her virtues, but they

perceive also the possibility of ruthlessness in her developing strength. There are undoubtedly two Japans, and the one is often confounded with the other; yet principally it is the Japan of the new day that makes them hesitate. This Japan, however, has been guarding them in the Pacific almost since the war began. She has been patrolling, convoying, and fighting—playing the game as a true Ally of Great Britain and of the nations arrayed against Germany. Japanese statesmen have never faltered in their pursuance of a policy of honourable dealing with other nations, and Germany's duplicity has never found a fellow in their speeches or actions. Yet the expansion of the Japanese Empire has been accompanied by complications and cross-purposes; and Japan, when asked to modify or alter certain courses of conduct, has challenged American administration and Australasian claims. Thus British Dominions in the Pacific look abroad and see the difficulties of the United States, with Japanese in overwhelming numbers at Hawaii; and they study a situation giving much food for thought in California. Right through the ocean Japan is asserting herself; and yet the true Japan is believed to be in control—the Japan whose honour is at stake and who must be appealed to in any future crisis that may arise. Canada has recognized this by placing the question of the exclusion of Japanese from British Columbia on a treaty basis. It has been arranged that the Government of Japan shall issue passports to those of her subjects who wish to visit Canada or to enter for purposes of commerce as between the two countries. Japan is treated as one of the Great Powers, as she is entitled to be, and she has engaged not to permit any of her people to enter the Dominion who may compete in the

avenues of labour or industry. This is the way of reason and fair dealing, but Canada was not first in finding it. As early as 1897 Australia was concerned in the matter through Queensland's Agreement with Japan, which was covered by a protocol signed by Count Okuma, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Sir Ernest Satow, the British Ambassador at Tokyo. This protocol represented the adhesion of Queensland to the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce made by Great Britain with Japan in 1894, which expressly provided that it was not to apply to British colonies unless they accepted it. Japan later on stipulated that each colony should be treated separately when the point was raised. In Mr. Joseph Chamberlain's letter from Downing Street to the Governor of Queensland, dated June 18, 1897, notifying the signing of the protocol, is the following sentence: "Her Majesty's Minister at Tokyo assumed that the only condition stipulated for by your Government was full liberty to legislate in regard to the immigration of artisans and labourers." But when Japanese immigrants presented themselves for admission, a considerable correspondence turned upon this, because the Japanese Consul in Sydney insisted that passports were not wanted. In practice also serious difficulties arose. Japanese were entering who claimed to be entitled to do so as being neither artisans nor labourers, but who ultimately proved to be such. Passports all round were then required. Then it was discovered that a number of Japanese would leave their native country with passports and would buy several hundred dollars' worth of goods. As business men they would obtain admission at Thursday Island, hand the goods over to some compatriot, and engage in work which would have prevented their admission had it been

specified on their passports. Ultimately the question of Japanese Consuls issuing passports at all was raised by the Queensland Government; and the Japanese Government itself was asked to take the responsibility. But the moral of the whole thing lies in the nature and conduct of the correspondence. As between the Japanese Consuls in Sydney and Townsville and the Chief Secretary in Queensland there was perfect good temper; and yet plain truths were written by the latter when the question of the admission of Japanese on passports signed by careless Japanese Consuls was discussed. Japan on her part replied officially that the Government "had instructed all local authorities to severely deal with any immigrants who had received, or in future attempted to obtain, by false pretences passports for admission into Queensland, also greater care and precaution must in future be taken with issuing of passports." *

So the experiment continued with adjustments on both sides until in 1901 the Australian Commonwealth came into being. Queensland's far-seeing and wise Agreement with Japan was not continued (except as to tourists, traders, and students, by an Agreement made in 1904 †); a language test was provided which has the effect of totally excluding Asiatics, though without discriminating as between them and Europeans on the ground of colour. The Australian Labour Party had practically obtained control of the Government of the Commonwealth; and a policy was adopted which undoubtedly gave umbrage to Japan. This is an issue now being raised; and controversy in Japan has arisen in a form that must be recognized in the present

* Queensland Parliamentary Papers, A.5—1899.
† See Appendix.

instance. Mr. Matsuyama, editor of the *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, has recently written an article in the *New East* upon "The Anglo-Japanese Alliance," in which a grievance is made of "the principle of the White Man's Country in Australia." A White Australia has been advertised and insisted upon; and before the war no objection was made about immigrants and immigrant labour, whether Germans or Austrians applied for admission. Now that Japan is a friend, and Germans and Austrians are foes, the restrictions upon the Japanese still hold. "This," argues Mr. Matsuyama, "is a sign of the race prejudice lurking at the bottom of the hearts of the English, and it is not pleasant. We wish to see no distinction made with immigrants as to whether they be white or coloured, but rather as to whether they be relatives or aliens. If indeed this distinction be absolutely necessary, we wish to see the relatives cherished, even if their complexion be dark, rather than white aliens." This is sufficiently frank; and if it were only a question of admitting the Japanese to Australia without conditions, and refusing admission to Germans and Austrians, the way would be plain. Germans are foes who have proved themselves savages in warfare. The Japanese are Allies who have shown themselves to be loyal friends and comrades. In that sense they are "relatives," and Germans are "aliens." But the difficulty lies a good deal deeper, and the editor of the *New East*, in replying to Mr. Matsuyama, has used an argument that puts the whole thing in a nutshell. Mr. Matsuyama was asked whether he would be willing to allow an influx of Chinese to Japan. "We imagine," the *New East* says, "that Japanese manufacturers would find them cheaper than Japanese workmen, and if it be contended that there is

no room to spare in Japan, there is room, and to spare, in the Hokkaido. Mr. Matsuyama knows very well that neither he nor any other responsible Japanese is prepared to welcome the Chinese. Yet the racial relation between the Japanese and the Chinese is infinitely closer than between the Australians and the Japanese. The Japanese 'race prejudice' against Koreans and Chinese practically forbids intermarriage. As to the Australian attitude towards Japanese immigrants, we should say that the Australians take up the position at present that the experiment of Japanese immigration has been tried already in California and has been a failure, and that whoever was to blame, Australia cannot run the risk of the repetition of an experiment that may again be a failure." * This is well put; and the argument is clinched by the reminder that many Japanese who seek entrance into foreign countries "are persons of low character." This was Australia's experience with the Chinese, most of whom came from the treaty ports and were largely of the coolie class. In passing it may be remarked that not a great number of Japanese have entered the Commonwealth, certainly nothing like the number given in the article on "Japan" in the "Encyclopædia Britannica," where the totals are recorded as 71,129 in 1904 and 8274 in 1906. Such an immigration and reduction in two years is impossible, though the latter figure is probably correct. The number of full-blooded Asiatics in Australia is not more than 85,000, with Chinese largely preponderating. As compared with the experience of British Columbia and the States of the Pacific coast in America this is insignificant; and the trouble of the Commonwealth does not lie in a large Asiatic population,

* *The New East*, September 1917, p. 8.

but in the pressure of proximity and demands for entrance which are based upon certain claims of right which Australia cannot recognize. The doctrine of a White Australia is not based upon contempt for the Japanese and Chinese; nor, as Professor Keith has suggested, did " fear " of Japan and China prompt the welcome given to the American Fleet in 1908. Professor Keith, in his book " Imperial Unity and the Dominions," writes of the attitude of Australia and New Zealand to Japan as that of " contempt." He was at one time a permanent official of the British Colonial Office, and his writings carry undoubted weight for their inside knowledge of the administrative machinery of the Empire. But this alleged contempt for Japan is there considered to be fear—a fear of China transferred to Japan, and felt by Canada equally with Australasia. Professor Keith may be reminded that this so-called " fear " has been an accompaniment of British settlement in the Pacific from the earliest days. Not Japan, but France, was the original nation to rouse alarm in the breasts of Britons (not then Australians) who entered the ocean to settle there; and England herself was not unafraid of the great Corsican when he threatened invasion.* When the genesis of the Monroe Doctrine is examined and its history understood, neither contempt of Russia and Spain, nor fear of Europe, can be predicated of the attitude of the United States. And it must be remembered that in 1824 the States did not contain a very much greater population than Australia holds at the present moment; certainly the area of the Americas in relation to population at that time was not more out of pro-

* " Imperial Unity and the Dominions," by Arthur Berriedale Keith, D.C.L., D.Litt., p. 191.

portion than the area and population of Australasia to-day.

But the whole position was admirably put by Sir Henry Parkes in 1888 when making his speech in the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales on the second reading of the Chinese Restriction Bill. Great Britain's difficulties, and Australia's peculiar danger as an outpost of the Empire, must be recognized as fully now as they were evident to the Premier of the mother colony then. Sir Henry Parkes, however, was on the spot on the other side of the world with shiploads of Chinese demanding admission, and Lord Salisbury was in London with the Chinese Ambassador politely asking that New South Wales should be reprimanded for her childishness. It was China, claiming to be a Great Power, set against a small part of the British Empire; and Australians do not forget the British Government's attitude then, any more than they have forgotten the indifference which led to the Convention of the Colonies in Sydney in 1883. Germany was then preparing the way for possession in the Pacific, and Australasia only protested after the repudiation by Lord Derby of Queensland's initiative in annexing New Guinea. It was a great surprise for both Lord Derby and Mr. Gladstone. But Sir Henry Parkes's emphatic protest in 1888 also was equally a surprise to Lord Salisbury. Briefly, the following was the ground of his protest. In the previous year the Chinese Minister in London had called the attention of the British Government to the fact that the Australian colonies had been restricting the entrance of Chinese by a poll tax, and by regulating the number, even so, by the tonnage of the steamers bringing them to Australia. Such an agitation had arisen because of the continued influx, that at last it was decided

to prohibit immigration altogether; but the crisis did not come until after the Chinese Minister had presented his diplomatic paper, so astutely worded, and Lord Salisbury had asked the Colonial Office to obtain information from New South Wales. Sir Henry Parkes protested against this at the outset. He insisted that the Colonial Office was not concerned at all, since the Prime Minister, who was also Foreign Secretary, had been addressed directly by China's representative in London. Circumlocution, no doubt, caused the delays which led to some emphatic words later on. But the trouble arose because the reply of the Government of New South Wales, giving the required information, was allowed to lie unheeded for some months, and meanwhile a crisis was reached by the arrival of two steamers with six hundred Chinese on board. The riot already referred to was a result, and the Government decided to prohibit the immigration of Chinese under any conditions. Why did not Lord Salisbury act upon the information sent to him, or at any rate reply to the communication? The Chinese Minister in London had forwarded his Note early in December 1887, and it was received by the British Government on the 12th of that month. Nothing was asked of the colonies till January 28, 1888, and although the reply to it was cabled on March 31—the gist of it is given in the preceding chapter—nothing was heard for nearly a month, when the Governor of New South Wales sent a message reminding the British Government that no reply had been received. No answer came till May 12, when the crisis over the Chinese immigrants had become acute, and then the reply was non-committal. The whole business was inexplicable. Sir Henry Parkes went over the ground in his speech, and before he had finished

let it be clearly seen that neither contempt nor fear was in his mind. Foolish things, and ill-advised where not foolish, had been said in previous speeches, but he declined to endorse them. He did not regard China as an inferior Power with whom they could trifle. He said: "I neither despise the individual character of the Chinese nor underrate the majesty of the power of China; and it is for these very reasons, and because I believe that China is fast becoming a Great Power, because I believe her people are endowed with great though homely virtues—the virtues of industry, of provident care, of foresight, of unmatched patience, and vast powers of endurance—it is because I believe all these things that I do not wish to see the Chinese element increasing in our midst."

It might be argued, perhaps, that this was a confession of fear. Why hesitate to admit people endowed with such virtues? But Sir Henry Parkes had already stated the case for not allowing the Chinese to enter, in terms of British ideals and with the strongest possible plea for British liberty. He had, he said, at all times maintained that no class of persons should be admitted to whom the people of Australia were not prepared to grant all their franchises, privileges, and social rights, and with whom they were not ready to intermarry. "I maintain," he continued, "that no class of persons should be admitted here, so far as we can reasonably exclude them, who cannot come amongst us, take up all our rights, perform on the ground of equality all our duties, and share in our august and lofty work of founding a free nation." *

This, compressed into a sentence, is the great argument

* "Fifty Years in the Making of Australian History," by Sir Henry Parkes, G.C.M.G., p. 478.

for a White Australia. But why open the question in this way when China is no longer making claims upon the Pacific? The episode is worthy of prominence, it must be urged in reply, because Lord Salisbury gave Sir Henry Parkes an opportunity of placing on record the difficulty which must always arise when interests at opposite sides of the world have to be dealt with in Europe. In a possible controversy with Japan, Great Britain will rightly think of and treat her as an Ally; and the British Dominions can do no less. Great Britain's temptation, however, has been to overlook, or to decline to understand, the intense feeling, upon certain matters, of her kinsfolk who live on the distant frontiers of the Empire, and who in this instance are holding the marches close to Asia under conditions of peculiar difficulty. When Sir Henry Parkes, in the speech above quoted, protested against the delays and apparent indifference of the British Foreign Office, he grew warm and said: "I venture to say that a few other masterful displays of indifference like this on the part of the Secretary of State would do more than much more serious occurrences to sap the loyalty of these colonies." But in the midst of his indignation he still realized Great Britain's dilemma. He recognized China's right, from her point of view, to insist upon equality of treatment with other Powers. What he objected to was that the owners of ships which were being held up could obtain audience with the Secretary of State; "even merchants in China, who care nothing about these colonies, I presume, so long as their interests are served, had begun to complain of our action." During the time no communication was received from London, good, bad, or indifferent, until a message came in reply to the cablegram of the Governor, who had reminded

Lord Salisbury that New South Wales had become impatient. This message, if it had come from any other quarter, said Sir Henry, would have been set down as a mean method of "excusing procrastination, negligence, and unwarranted delay." But Lord Salisbury apparently had assumed that if nothing was said the trouble would blow over. Instead, his silence made things very much worse; and at last the facts had to be faced. In the end Australia's doctrine of a White Australia was accepted; but even then the principles upon which it was based did not seem to command full recognition, because Asia cannot be eliminated by an Act of Parliament, and the Pacific Ocean is far away.

Now, to all this controversy, up to the present moment, the United States has been a party; and British Columbia has given Canada much cause for anxiety, because of the burden of Asia in the Pacific. In one way Japan has taken China's place, but China herself has added difficulty to difficulty by going to pieces. In this community of interest Australasia naturally has been drawn to America; though Australia and New Zealand have been more in the shadow of possible coming events than under the weight of purposes in process of realization. But Germany, making mischief the while, has been a constant factor in the work of international adjustment. This must never be forgotten. Mr. Price Collier, in his book "The West to the East," gives the result of his inquiries and conversations in Japan just before the treaty of alliance with Great Britain was renewed in 1911. He declares that all the sober-minded Japanese were unanimous in telling him, an American, that Germany was at the bottom of the false alarms about war between the United States and Japan, and that she was

providing or suggesting the incentives to quarrels between her rivals and enemies. These shrewd Japanese said in 1910 that war between Japan and the United States was preposterous, insisting that Germany was then in a position to profit by friction leading to hostilities between two other countries, since some rival would be weakened and it would be to her commercial advantage.* Knowing what we do now of German world policy, and viewing the past in the light of present experiences, it does not require much acumen to find Germany's hand in Australia's alleged contempt of Japan on the one side, and in Japanese irritation against Australia on the other. There have been contemptuous words on both sides; and, while opinion in Japan may have been exasperated by speeches and articles quoted from extreme sections of the Australasian Press, it is certain that the fires have been kept burning by statements made in reply by the Japanese vernacular papers. If behind the fires on both sides could have been seen the sinister figure of Germany pouring oil upon the flames, the truth would have been revealed and some mitigation of the nuisance might have come with the vision. But what was certainly done before war broke out has been pursued with increased venom and doubled intensity since. Germany has spared nothing to embitter the relations between Japan and the British Dominions in the Pacific on one side, and between the same Power and the United States on the other. Her agents are everywhere. In Japan she has played upon a certain admiration for German thoroughness and organization, as also upon a general ignorance of the real cause and course of the war. Germany has been fighting the rest of the world; and her figure has

* "The West to the East," by Price Collier, p. 400.

loomed so large in the minds of many Japanese of the lower classes that it has been easy for them to believe her invincible and victorious. Given such a disposition, Germany's enemies became contemptible, and hard words were natural. But Mr. Price Collier's investigations before the war showed a steady current of opinion in Japan running the right way, and it is to that the English-speaking people in the Pacific will trust in the days when the problems of peace have to be solved.

CHAPTER V

AN AMERICAN SURVEY

Monroe Doctrine applied to China : Its genesis with Russia in the Pacific : Texas, and British claims, in 1844, " Fifty-four forty, or fight " : Great Britain and Puget Sound, Captain Gordon's test for salmon : Gold discoveries and settlement in the Pacific : Colonization in British Columbia : Influence of America upon Australasia : An American exploring expedition : Hawaii in 1854, and its Japanese population since : Fiji and American demands

JAPAN'S Imperial Commission sent to Washington in 1917 has proposed that the Monroe Doctrine shall be applied to China. Naturally the interest, already so keen, in a thorough understanding between Japan and the United States has been sensibly sharpened. Viscount Ishii, head of the Commission, was Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Government displaced by the Terauchi Cabinet; and he and his colleagues are all men of mark. The Commission indeed has been declared to be equal in personnel to that sent by Japan to America in 1905 to discuss terms of peace with Russia, which ended in the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth. The first delegation from Japan to the United States in 1860 was remarkable as indicating a genuine approach from the East to the West. It was a beginning in friendly understandings, and notes an important point in the history of the Pacific. Viscount Ishii,

speaking for the latest special Mission during his recent visit to Washington's tomb, said: "There is no gulf between the ancient East and the new-born West too deep and wide for the hearts and the understandings of our people to cross. It is fitting that men who love liberty and justice better than they love life, that men who know what honour is, should seek this shrine, and here, in the presence of these sacred ashes, rededicate themselves to the service of humanity. . . . Japan is proud to place herself beside her noble Allies in this high resolve, and here, in the presence of these deathless ashes, she reaffirms her devotion to the cause and the principles for which they wage battle, fully determined to do her whole part in securing for the world the blessings of liberty, justice, and lasting peace." Much came from the first Japanese approach to America; but results of equal importance have been forecast for this latest effort to reach finality in the affairs of the Pacific, as they affect the United States and Japan.

If this should prove to be true, Australasia will naturally be affected more closely than the rest of the world. But meanwhile there is something worth noting about the Monroe Doctrine in relation to the Pacific. Though promulgated in the first instance against interference by Europe with the Americas, and because Spain was broken in the early years of the nineteenth century, the doctrine had also a direct bearing upon the Pacific. Not Spain, but Russia was the source of trouble on this side. When George Canning, therefore, proposed to the American Ambassador in London that Great Britain and the United States should join in a declaration against European intervention in the affairs of those Spanish colonies which had shaken

themselves free, he was opening the way for action far in advance of his thoughts. He was the first to suggest what has since become known as the Monroe Doctrine; but he really set President Monroe a problem to be solved which is still before the nations of the world. "Hands off," as the Canning suggestion may be paraphrased, is being given the widest possible application as against Germany; but it began with Spain, when President Monroe had made up his mind about it, and in the dispute over Alaska was made to include Russia. The year 1824 may be said to be vital to the Pacific in this connexion. In April of that year the United States accepted and signed a convention which recognized the parallel of latitude north 54° 40′ as the boundary-line between Oregon and Alaska; and three principles were as a consequence laid down in the Monroe Doctrine. The first was that the United States would not interfere in the internal affairs of any European State. The second, roughly, was that if any European Power interfered in the affairs of North and South America the United States would fight. But the third was the outcome of an attempt by Russia to claim the North-Western Pacific coast; and the United States met it with prompt refusal. The Emperor Alexander had drafted an edict which would have had the effect of excluding foreign ships from Behring Strait right down to north latitude 51, not far above the island of Vancouver. The latter was then included in what was known as the Oregon country, under joint control of Great Britain and the United States. Finally 54° 40′ was agreed upon, but not until President Monroe had announced the doctrine associated with his name in a message delivered in December 1823. The third principle, enunciated because of Russia's claim, was: "In the dis-

cussions to which this interest has given rise, and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for ascertaining, as a principle in which the rights and interests of Russia are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Powers." *

While this promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine was hailed with acclamation in Great Britain and the United States, there was one outstanding difficulty between them it did not settle. The year 1844 becomes important because the question of the annexation of Texas (taken from Mexico, but not recognized as a State by the Union) was practically settled with the election of James K. Polk, the Democratic candidate, as President. The Convention which had nominated him had made annexation a plank in its platform, but had included Oregon ; and the retiring President Tyler, in his annual message in December 1844, insisted that immediate action was necessitated by Polk's election. Texas was annexed in 1845, and war was declared upon the United States by Mexico. One remembers the humorous story of a prize offered for the shortest essay on the cause and effect of the American Civil War. The story goes that the prize was given to the shrewd person whose essay was found to contain two words, "Texas" and "Taxes." Whether Texas may fairly be saddled with the whole responsibility of the Civil War of the sixties need not be debated here. It certainly had a great deal to do with that terrible struggle. But the Pacific again comes in through the association of ideas ; for had it not been for

* "Cambridge Modern History," vol. vii, p. 370.

the American Civil War the trend of events in Fiji, leading up to annexation by Great Britain, would have been materially altered. That point will be developed a little later. Meanwhile war between Great Britain and the United States was discussed and seemed to be imminent. As the Democratic Party had redeemed its pledge about the annexation of Texas, it was in 1845 called upon to do likewise with Oregon, which then included a great deal of what is to-day known as British Columbia. This great stretch of country had been in dispute for a long time, but by the treaty of 1827 joint control had been accepted. In 1846 notice, as required by its terms, was served on Great Britain that the treaty would be abrogated; and the extremists began to create friction with the battle-cry, "Fifty-four forty, or fight." This was claiming everything up to the parallel of north latitude which had been made a boundary with Russia in 1824. Great Britain was to have nothing. At last, however, a compromise was effected; and, in June 1846, 49 degrees was the parallel of latitude agreed upon. This gave the United States Puget Sound and the whole of the country southward, including the present States of Washington and Oregon.*

Before dealing with the issue on broader lines an incident may be given here which has a direct bearing upon the settlement just noted. It shows how a small thing may have great consequences. There is no doubt that had Great Britain realized the importance of Puget Sound as giving better access to the waters of the Pacific, and completing her outlet through Canada and British Columbia, she would have insisted upon a boundary further south. It is more than probable, too, that the United States rather

* "Cambridge Modern History," vol. vii, pp. 870–898.

than go to war with Great Britain, and with Mexico already upon her hands, would have agreed to a more southern boundary. The story of the incident is taken direct from a notebook, in which it was written after an interesting conversation with the late Sir Normand MacLaurin, who was Chancellor of the University of Sydney at the time. He was one of the shrewdest and best-informed men in the writer's circle of acquaintance, with a wonderful memory and a wide range of experience. He had been a surgeon in the British Navy in his early days, and could speak with authority on many things in connexion with the Pacific. The subject of conversation had been Sir Arthur Gordon (later Lord Stanmore), first Governor of Fiji; and it seems that a certain naval officer was in command of the *America*, a British war vessel. Captain Gordon was commissioned to report upon that part of the North American coast round Puget Sound and comprised within the Oregon country, as it was then known. The British Government wished to know its real value; and Dr. Hoggan, who was medical officer on board at the time, told Sir Normand that the captain went ashore to make a supreme test. He wanted to see if the salmon in those waters would rise to his flies! They declined the British flies; and because they would not rise he reported against the country. He lost for the Dominion and for Great Britain a magnificent harbour. At a critical moment in the negotiations with the United States he could have turned the scale by recognizing the enormous value of Puget Sound to British settlement and enterprise in days when the Pacific would come to its own. Thus the treaty of 1846 was signed, and the two Powers agreed to make a friendly understanding the basis of future relations.

Now that Great Britain and America are actually side by side fighting Germany, and when war broke out in 1914 had been at peace for a hundred years, there is little to grumble at; but Canada would have been much better off had the boundaries of British Columbia been pushed a little further south by an amicable arrangement.

This recalls the fact that within a couple of years after the treaty was signed in 1846 gold was discovered in California. In 1850, another two years on, gold was found in Australia; and before the decade was completed it was discovered once more in British Columbia and New Zealand. The four discoveries in succession came at an opportune time, for the action and reaction of gold-rushes meant settlement all round. Certainly the finding of gold in California made the colonization of British Columbia possible later on, because a reservoir of enterprising vigorous manhood there was waiting the call from the north. Mr. A. G. Bradley makes a good point when discussing this opening of British North America. He says that the beginnings of British Government on the Pacific coast did not come by way of Canada. The gold-rush to California in 1848 resulted in a separate settlement of British Columbia later on, so that the colony grew on a stock of its own.* Victoria, the capital, is on the island of Vancouver; and in those days it was the resort of representative men up and down the Pacific coast. The climate was neither too hot in summer nor too cold in winter; and British naval officers found it a delightful centre to work upon. British warships were continually entering the port; and British habits and manners were dominant there and throughout the province. The people

* "Canada," by A. G. Bradley, p. 213 (Home University Library).

were cut off from the Canadians to the eastward by the Rocky Mountains just as completely as if the Pacific Ocean itself rolled between. In 1871, when British Columbia was received into the Dominion, "people in old Canada knew little more of the British Columbians than they knew of the Australians."* Hence even to-day the difference between the Canadians to the east and the people to the west of the Rockies is noted, so that the Australian in Vancouver feels more at home on the Pacific coast than further inland. But it must be remembered that communication was practically confined to the long voyage either round the Horn or by the Cape of Good Hope. The Suez Canal was not opened till 1869; and the last spike in the Canadian Pacific Railway was not driven until 1885. When the latter venture was complete the Dominion was a union self-contained; for, while communication through the United States was possible, it was not the thing for which British Columbia had covenanted, when as a province the responsibilities of federation were accepted.

But too much stress can hardly be laid upon the value of the gold discoveries in those earlier years in bringing the English-speaking people of the world into direct relation with the Pacific. The influx of Americans to Australia and New Zealand was exceedingly helpful by adding energy and ideas to the stock of communities, become provincial; and the present writer can remember as a small boy being introduced to the wonder of Nathaniel Hawthorne's "Tanglewood Tales" through the instrumentality of an American miner on the Thames goldfield near Auckland. It is with a strange sense of sympathy, in manhood, that one recalls Henry James's note to the effect that he had

* "Canada," by A. G. Bradley, p. 214 (Home University Library).

never dared to read those stories as an adult lest their charm should be broken, for the experience has been duplicated in the writer's own case. Two Americans had certainly made a way for the wisdom of the third, in this special instance, far across the Pacific.

This influence of America upon Australasia has been constant, though not kept at anything like its original pressure. It had been prepared for to some extent by the voyage of Captain Wilkes, who was sent out by the Government of the United States with an exploring expedition to the Pacific in 1838, staying until 1842, and who reported of Sydney that it "was now much crowded with people." This was in March 1840, and the call was made on returning from the Antarctic. A previous call had been made not quite twelve months before, when the Governor of New South Wales, Sir George Gipps, had been exceedingly kind and hospitable, as Captain Wilkes acknowledges in his account of the expedition published some years after. It was on this first visit that he heard of the death of John Williams, the great missionary of the Pacific, whom he had met not long before at Samoa on the eve of his visit to the New Hebrides, where the murder took place. Of the second call at Sydney Captain Wilkes says: "I was struck with the beauty and general appearance of the ladies, though I was informed that many of the belles were absent. The style of the party was neither English nor American, but something between the two. I scarcely need remark that we were all much gratified and pleased." This note of the commander of an American squadron three-quarters of a century ago reminds one of similar comments after the visit of the American Fleet in 1908 under the same conditions of friendship and rejoicing. Had

Professor Keith been alive in 1889 he would probably have thought then, as he seems to think now, that the Australian welcome showed "an almost ludicrous affection."

The American expedition made an exhaustive investigation of the Pacific Ocean and its island groups, and took up the threads of French and British exploration; but it was also a naval court for pronouncing sentence upon natives who had murdered or maltreated American traders and adventurers. Samoa, for instance, was given a taste of American justice in the burning of several villages. In the light of subsequent events, when Apia Harbour almost became a battle-ground with Germany over the control of the group, Captain Wilkes's proceedings are full of interest. For the moment, however, Samoa may be left for Hawaii, because the year 1854 stands out as a date to be remembered in the general connexion. Although the Hawaian group was not properly annexed by the United States until 1898—the year of the settlement with Spain after the arbitrament of war, when the Philippines were taken from her—the first treaty of annexation was agreed upon in 1854 and America's predominant interest was placed on record.* But Hawaii has been a point of interest to Australasia for several reasons. Its central position in the Pacific makes it specially valuable to the United States, and it is one of the main ports of call between the North American coast and Australia and New Zealand. Moreover, its sugar plantations, and its methods of cultivating cane and manufacturing sugar, have given it prominence for Queensland, which produces nearly all the sugar consumed in the Commonwealth. Experts from Honolulu have been appointed from time to time to take charge of

* "Cambridge Modern History," vol. vii, p. 667.

Queensland experimental stations, or have been given administrative positions in the Queensland Civil Service, so that they may be able to advise and control the work of the plantations and mills, many of which are run by the aid of the Government as co-operative concerns. Still more, however, the experience of Hawaii and the United States with Japanese labour has been a constant source of interest. The numerical preponderance of Japanese in the group, and the problems arising out of Japanese immigration in California, have given the American controversy with Japan unusual prominence in Australia; and those who would understand why Australasia looks at things from a standpoint sometimes not entirely British must remember the forces which have been operating in the Pacific for more than half a century.

The agreement for a treaty of annexation in respect to Hawaii in 1854 was followed by general American activity in the Pacific, but through individuals supported by visiting gunboats rather than by direct Government stimulus. One of the results was to bring Fiji into the range of action and eventually to help in forcing the annexation of that group by Great Britain. Thakombau, the ruling chief, found himself in a serious quandary in consequence of American pressure for outrages committed by the natives; and in the early sixties he had to discuss with American naval officers a monetary liability, which was as burdensome and unexpected as in the main it was unfair. Certain American residents had suffered loss, and the Government at Washington decided that some one must be held responsible. So Thakombau was persuaded that he was King of Fiji, and then to his consternation he was told that he must pay so many thousand dollars compensation. The

inequity and absurdity of the whole thing were revealed as cases arose in which he could not possibly be held responsible, but the formula was held to be good and warships were sent periodically to demand payment. At last the position became acute. It should be explained that the American Civil War had caused a dearth in the world's supply of cotton, through the blockade of the Southern States, and Fiji was proved capable of producing the finest variety. Prices soared, and cotton-growing became exceedingly profitable. Then was the chance of the speculator, as white people looked that way and began to flock in. A company was formed in Melbourne which offered to pay Thakombau's accumulating fines if a certain area of land was provided as consideration; and at last the American debt was settled. But the dreams of wealth dependent upon high prices for Sea Island cotton disappeared with the end of the war in the United States, and out of the mess into which things drifted in Fiji, Great Britain eventually drew her Crown colony—much against her will. Dr. Lorimer Fison, when discussing the position later on, was emphatic that the American Civil War had forced Britain's hand, but he also insisted that the American method of coercing Thakombau was grossly unfair. So strongly did he feel about it that he wrote to Professor Goldwin Smith, who was related to his family and was living in America, setting the case before him for reference to the President of the United States. Not long after this an inquiry was held by an American naval officer, and part of the claim made upon Thakombau was remitted; but enough was collected to force him to find lands for another set of creditors. Abuses had sprung up through the native labour brought to Fiji from other groups; Germany

was ready to interfere and was acquiring land in considerable areas; and at last in desperation Thakombau and the other principal chiefs offered to cede the group to Great Britain under certain definite conditions. They were accepted, and annexation took place formally in 1874, Sir Arthur Gordon and his staff arriving in 1875. Since then British administration has followed a novel course. It was natural again that Australasia should watch developments with the keenest solicitude. The action of the United States was discussed in the Australian Press; and Lorimer Fison, under the *nom de plume* of "Hardy Lee," contributed a long series of articles to the *Sydney Morning Herald*, giving the history of Fiji in the years immediately preceding the final act of cession. An extraordinary attempt had been made in Fiji by some of the white men, co-operating with Thakombau, to form a Government and carry on with the full machinery of European administration. It was apparently thought that relations with the United States over the debt forced upon Fiji by Washington could be eased thereby; but the whole business became a farce. Writing to a Melbourne paper (upon the position in 1873) of a proposed reform by which the natives were to have voting power with the whites, and so curtail the power of the House of Representatives, Dr. Fison said: "In order to give it fair play, we would strongly advise the King's advisers not to send Mr. Woods on any more costly missions to the colonies, not to fool away the money of their adopted country in the purchase of pearl-embroidered flags, gem-set sceptres, absurd palanquins, and other baubles, not to sacrifice utility to ostentation, and not to make themselves the laughing-stock of the world by their ridiculous assumption of the titles and

forms of old-established kingdoms. We should be glad to see the Chief Justice show a good example in this matter by stuffing the judicial cushion with the horsehair of his wig, devoting his robe to the manufacture of red petticoats, converting its ermine into shaving-brushes, and sending his title of 'Sir Charles' back to Hawaii whence it came." After that the end was reached quickly enough, for German gunboats had appeared at Suva, and British interests in the Pacific demanded an early settlement of the trouble in Fiji if Australasian sentiment was not to be expressed in terms of increasing disgust.

CHAPTER VI

AMERICAN POLICY AND PROGRESS

American railway enterprise as a warning : A land-grant railway proposed for Queensland : Samoa and President Grant's Administration : Steinberger, American Commissioner and German ágent : Dr. George Brown and Steinberger : Experience of the United States in Samoa and the present American Navy : Philippine Islands and Samoa entered a new era together : A wonderful record in the Philippines : Education and self-government the purpose of the American people : The Seventeenth Annual Report on Education in the group

No one who has followed the development of public opinion among British communities in the Pacific can forget the impact of American progress upon them. American policy, as accounting for a definite attitude to the various groups, has not been inconsistent; but there have been aberrations, due to personal intrigues, which have caused much comment from time to time. In Australia and New Zealand, for instance, the astonishing extension of American railway enterprise has been watched, but never to affect the principle that the State—using the term in its broadest sense—must be supreme owner. If the war has done nothing else it certainly has given the Australasian policy of State ownership of railways substantial backing. In Europe and America the Governments have stepped in to co-ordinate railway control; and in the United States

the railway companies have been ordered to co-operate for the purpose of regulating transport throughout the universal area of operations. But while American railways were building and great trusts were growing, warnings were continually being given to the people on the other side of the Pacific. Archibald Forbes, for instance, when in Australia on a lecturing tour in the eighties, made an attack upon Sir Thomas McIlwraith's proposals for a transcontinental line on the Canadian plan of a land-grant system. The great war correspondent stormed at the Canadian Pacific Railway and at the Gould control in the United States.

In an article which appeared in the *Sydney Morning Herald* on May 1, 1888, he said: "To whom belongs all the Great North-West of British America from Thunder Bay on Lake Superior to the canyon of the Peace River in the Rocky Mountains? . . . The Kings of the Great North-West are the Canadian Pacific Syndicate. Who 'runs' the South-West of the United States . . . makes Mississippi dance while he pipes and owns Texas to the nails in its boots? A swarthy, little, Jewish-looking, silent, unpretentious person whose name is Jay Gould." The McIlwraith proposals would have opened an immense area of the hinterland of Eastern Australia. The scheme would have carried a railway five hundred miles from the Queensland coast and linked up the terminal points of three main lines, beginning at Brisbane, Rockhampton, and Townsville; and Port Darwin, the strategic point in the vast Northern Territory, would have been connected through Camooweal with Sydney and Melbourne. It was a project worthy of the statesman who tried to annex New Guinea for the Empire to forestall Germany, and

whose vigorous protest at Great Britain's slackness led to the Convention of the Colonies in 1883, which ultimately brought Federation. But the scheme was killed by politics. Sir Samuel Griffith was head of the opposing party; and a "steel rails scandal" was made an issue, which resulted in Sir Thomas McIlwraith's defeat. Through it all, and later when the Labour Party came into prominence, the American trust and syndicate bogy was kept in front. The truth about it was strong enough for argument; but eventually it became the inevitable half-truth to turn sound debate into tergiversation and sheer lying. As one writes the great East and West Railway has just been completed in Australia; the last spike was driven on October 16, 1917. Its story is full of political folly and inexplicable delay. As a State-owned railway its moral is still that the Commonwealth must be the controller of such enterprises; but neither in the building of this link between the east and west—Sir Thomas McIlwraith would have joined the north to the south—nor in the construction of numerous other lines have Australian Governments recently shown themselves equal to American railway builders in speed, efficiency, or in ultimate economy. What has to be acknowledged is that the Canadian Pacific Railway, for instance, did what no Canadian Government could see its way to accomplish. It saved British Columbia for the Dominion.* The United States railway systems were steadily working upon the northern boundary line, and there was no disguise about their intentions or about the thought of the American nation on the subject. While Canada was not linked up from ocean to ocean, it was not

* "The Story of the Canadian Pacific Railway," by Keith Morris, p. 76.

truly a Dominion; and British Columbia would sooner or later have fallen into the swing of a purely American control.

This point is only made, however, to indicate another side of individual American enterprise in its influence upon the Pacific and in developing opinion in British communities. The attitude of the Government of the United States upon the question of Samoa and its future could not be misunderstood. More than once there was a definite refusal to annex the group, though the chiefs were only too anxious to cede it. Germany was always in the way, ready to promise anything, but letting it be clearly seen that, while she would not take responsibility herself, she would give every possible trouble to other Powers looking round or making claims. Unfortunately at one time President Grant allowed himself to be used in a scheme that created a very unfavourable impression in Australia and New Zealand. The story may be told here because it led to friction and misunderstanding between Samoans and white people. American claims upon King Thakombau in Fiji had resulted in the ultimate annexation of the group by Great Britain, as has already been shown; but with respect to Samoa the United States claimed nothing, and would accept nothing in the way of control or responsibility. Only an agreement was made by which Pago-Pago became an American coaling station; and in the settlement following the treaty of 1900, which divided the group between Germany and the United States, the islands of Tutuila and Manua, with other small ones, became American. But individual Americans in 1872 undoubtedly tried hard to persuade the Government at Washington to accept the group from the Samoan chiefs. These gentlemen were

connected with a line of mail-steamers, and, having formed a company for other purposes, they proceeded to exploit Samoan feeling in favour of annexation by Great Britain. Failing in that, since the British Government was unwilling to take Samoa, they turned the attention of the natives to the United States. But Washington proved as difficult as London. Nevertheless, though the Samoan request for annexation was not granted, a "Special Commissioner" was sent to Samoa to report upon the group. The Commissioner was an enterprising person named Steinberger, who carried credentials from the American Government and was received with every honour. White people and natives joined in giving him a good time, and he returned to Washington with a glowing report and a letter from the Samoan people asking again that a protectorate be proclaimed. This request was refused by Congress, which decided against Samoa by a great majority. Now this ending to the Special Commissioner's labours was never officially reported to the Samoans. Steinberger apparently had the ear of influential members of the Cabinet; and the next thing was his reappearance in Samoa, arriving on an American man-of-war and carrying valuable presents—a steam-launch, arms, and much ammunition—for the Samoans. He also held a letter from President Grant himself to the people of the group, asking them to receive Steinberger with every consideration. The Samoans, knowing nothing to the contrary, accepted the gentleman as accredited by the Government of the United States, and proceeded under his guidance to establish a Samoan Government with Steinberger as the beginning and the end of everything. Eventually the truth came out, that Steinberger was nobody in particular. The Samoans con-

sequently divided, until at last Steinberger was deported—carried off on a British warship, for which Great Britain had to pay the adventurer a certain sum for damages.

The Rev. S. J. Whitmee, a missionary of long standing in Samoa, wrote a circumstantial account of the whole business at the end of 1876. General Babcock, who seems to have persuaded the President to accept Steinberger at face value, was just as unscrupulous as the latter; and among Steinberger's papers was evidence of his duplicity.* But the Report made by the American Secretary of State in 1894 is interesting reading for its review of the situation. Emphasis is laid upon the fact that no promise of protection by the United States was ever made to the Samoans. Moreover, it appears that "the American Consul transmitted to the Department of State a copy of what purported to be an agreement between the German house of Godeffroy and Son, of Hamburg, and Steinberger, entered into before the latter's return to Samoa, by which, in consideration of a commission, he engaged to exercise all his influence in Samoa, in any position he might occupy, for the furtherance of the German firm's trade." †

Dr. George Brown was in Samoa when Steinberger was still a power in the land; and he was asked to accept office in the Samoan Government at a salary equal to £1200 per annum. But while Dr. Brown was attracted by Steinberger, and at first thought that he had the American Government behind him, there was no attraction in the new order for the missionary. Nobody knew the Samoans better than he did; and he realized that unless there were

* *Sydney Morning Herald*, Letter, S. J. Whitmee, December 14, 1876.

† Quoted in "Cyclopedia Samoa," pp. 16, 17.

real control by Great Britain or the United States, Samoa would simply become a laughing-stock, as Fiji was under a similar mockery of the white man's government. But the effect of it all upon the Samoans was decidedly bad, and Germany's plans were assisted by the general disappointment and failure. War broke out between the native factions again; and the United States could not leave Samoa out of its calculations with an "I told you so." Before the complications were resolved German and American warships were cleared for action in Apia Harbour in 1889, when the hurricane came to separate the nations. But only for a little more than a quarter of a century; to-day Germany and America are actually at grips in war. This may be upon another issue. But the experience of the United States in Samoa in 1889 undoubtedly resulted in the present American Navy. Is it astonishing that developments like these have impressed the people of Australia and New Zealand, especially as they felt for many years that their interests demanded British control of Samoa? New Zealand, especially, has claimed for a long time that she should be considered in this connexion, and has more than once asked to be given the responsibility of administering the group. But Great Britain was as loath to touch Samoa as to annex New Guinea; and Gladstone's complacency over Germany's colonial policy, with its glozing promises and lying explanations, irritated the New Zealanders on the one side as much as it vexed and disappointed Australians on the other.

As this chapter is being written the Seventeenth Annual Report of the Director of Education in the Philippine Islands has come to hand, and a question voices itself as one studies its pages. Here is the evidence of what the

United States means to the Pacific. It is an earnest of what the Americans can do, in that the Government recently established in this Island Protectorate represents the idea of self-help. The Filipinos, after seventeen years of doubt, anxiety, and almost despair, are learning to govern themselves; and while, even now, the critics in America may declare the futility of it all, and Democrats afraid of increasing the burdens of the United States may insist upon abandoning the group or selling it at the first favourable opportunity, here is evidence of a great capacity for understanding the natives and leading them into the higher paths of civilization. The Report is full of matter of the greatest value to the student of Pacific history; but to people living in Australia, with other island groups lying so near them, and with complex problems connected with native life and control so insistent upon solution, the story of progress in the Philippines is an absorbing one. Now, a period of seventeen years carries us back almost to 1899, when the group was taken from Spain as security for the costs of the war just ended. This, too, was the year when affairs in Samoa reached their final crisis, leading to the partition with Germany which was ratified by the treaty of 1900. Almost together the Philippine Islands and the Samoan Group entered a new era; and Great Britain, who had possessed and abandoned the one, and had refused possession of the other, was content to remain outside—receiving compensation elsewhere for retiring from the Samoan scene of conflict and endless discussion. But the question in one's mind, after reading the Report of the Director of Education in the Philippines, is: What would have happened had the United States annexed Samoa in the seventies, when implored do to so by the

Samoan people? Sir Arthur Gordon had almost made the plunge for Great Britain at that time. Dr. George Brown said, just before he died, that on his last visit to the first Governor of Fiji, Lord Stanmore took down a volume from his library shelves and handed it to his guest. It was an unpublished work on his administration, and in it were set forth the facts about the narrow escape Samoa had had from becoming a British possession.

In those days, before the Pacific cable and fast steamers, Sir Arthur Gordon could have committed Great Britain, and had almost done so; but at the last moment he held his hand. Had Washington cared to outface Germany, and so see the business of annexation through, certainly Great Britain could not have interfered. But the Secretary of State at Washington, reporting in 1894 upon Samoa, wrote: "In 1877 one Mamea was sent by the chiefs of Samoa to the United States as ambassador to conclude a treaty. In the same year a deputation of chiefs had proceeded to Fiji and made an unsuccessful application for annexation to Great Britain. The strifes and civil wars that had continually prevailed in the Islands for a number of years had led the people to fancy that they might find repose in annexation or protection by a foreign Power. It is well known that Mamea came to the United States with a view to obtain at least the protection of this Government. In this mission he was unsuccessful. No disposition seems to have existed on the part of the Government to assume such a relation. But if such a disposition had existed, the difficulty previously expressed still remained, of satisfying the people of the United States that their safety and prosperity required the assumption of control over islands which were practically unknown to them,

which were more than 4000 miles distant from their shores, and with the possession and control of which their safety and prosperity had not in any wise been connected."

Yet within less than a lustrum after these words were written the United States Government found itself with a group of islands upon its hands which would make a dozen Samoas, containing hundreds of thousands of people where Samoa held less than forty thousand, and half as far again from San Francisco. Samoa in the Report is quoted as being more than 4000 miles distant from American shores. The Philippines are 7000 miles away! Washington found Samoa impossible, because the Government did not care, certainly was not disposed to quarrel with Germany and Great Britain over it; but the war with Spain opened its eyes to the meaning of the Pacific and enabled it to read Germany's mind about that ocean in general and the Philippines in particular.

Put to the test, the United States has done wonderful work in the great group which Spain had held so lazily and served so badly. What could not American organization and conscience have done with Samoa? What an object-lesson would have been set for the whole world at the strategic centre of its greatest ocean. But the Philippines stand very well to the front as an indication that America looks upon the natives of the Pacific as a responsibility to be borne, and not as a prey to be torn and made spoil of in the German fashion. Moreover, the United States faced Germany, again fleet to fleet, in Manila Harbour during the war with Spain; and the great guns once more nearly spoke the mutual defiance of the two nations which represented such opposite ideals. At that critical moment Great Britain's word to Germany through

the Admiral of her China squadron was sufficient, and Admiral Dewey had not to fight the Teuton as well as the Spaniard. Germany knew that the Union Jack and the Stars and Stripes would float together, as they are flying now. The same foe took warning then; and he is realizing now what their close co-operation means in the war of the centuries; but in the meantime the victories of peace in the Philippines were never better advertised than in this fine Report printed in Manila, and representing the latest of a series which has been continuous since the United States took possession. Australia, with her trade interests in the Philippines and her people constantly travelling to and fro from China and Japan, knows a good deal about islands comparatively so close; but Australians hardly realize that the Philippines are self-supporting, that 15 per cent. of their revenue goes in education, and that the average daily attendance of scholars for December 1916 was not far from half a million, with a total enrolment for the year of 647,256. This is a great record, and the numbers are increasing. More and more, too, the Filipinos are showing themselves capable of taking up the work of education and of organization in agricultural knowledge. The Insular Government is itself an experiment in higher education; and the progress of self-control along such lines will be watched with the closest attention and with genuine sympathy. If, then, the same vigour and enterprise had been shown with Samoa, what a story one would have to tell! Germany has done something, no doubt, but her ideal of discipline is not compatible with liberty and a larger life; and the natives of the Pacific are on a lower plane altogether than the Europeans—so low that German Kultur could never be expected to reach them!

Japan, following the American precedent, has established schools for the native children in the Marshall and Caroline Islands, captured by her from Germany, which are apparently being held with little intention of returning them. This focusing of attention upon other things than trade or production in dealing with the islands of the Pacific is a good omen; but more than ever does it provide an argument for refusing to allow Germany to return to her old possessions, except under conditions which at the present moment seem absolutely impossible. She has to make an expiation for her crimes that will take generations to fulfil; and in the interval there is no reason why the British Empire, in hearty co-operation with the United States and Japan, should not control the Pacific to the advantage of everybody concerned.

CHAPTER VII

GERMANY'S AMBITIONS

Senator Pearce's warning : German espionage in Australia : Colonies as naval bases : Napoleon Buonaparte and Bismarck : Britain's sea-power : Bismarck accepts the teaching of history : His intriguing and a colonial policy : The three canals : A new world for Bismarck before he died : No German nation in the Pacific : Germany and Japan : The Godeffroy scheme for Samoa : Dr. Brown's protests : Dr. Solf and Samoa

SPEAKING at Castlemaine in Victoria recently the Australian Minister for Defence said that " during many years before the war German agents had been transmitting to Germany the fullest information about Australia, so that when the time came she would know where to find the open gate or the weak spot, how best to land, feed, and march her troops to vital points. The most damning evidence of these facts was found through the Post Office during the first fortnight of the war. Germany intended to bring to these shores armies which would crush us out of existence, and enable the German flag to fly over the Commonwealth. These statements could be substantiated by proofs which lay in the Defence Department." * This is authoritative. It is not a journalist's surmise grounded upon scraps of evidence, but the word of the Australian Government

* Summary of speech by Senator Pearce, Minister of Defence for the Commonwealth, *Sydney Morning Herald*, March 14, 1917

through the Minister responsible for carrying on the war on behalf of the Commonwealth; but it only crystallizes what has been a general conviction since the war began. For the student, however, Senator Pearce's statement completes the series of facts which begin with 1854, when it was decided in Hamburg by the Godeffroys to enter the Pacific for trading purposes, and when less than a decade later Theodor Weber pursued a policy of peaceful penetration throughout its long reaches with ultimate conquest in view. Weber became German Consul for the Pacific as soon as he arrived at Samoa in 1861; and by the time Sir Arthur Gordon went to Fiji as its first Governor in 1875 German trading stations were widely distributed.

If there had been nothing more in the German mind than trading, and if German policy had resulted in natural and legitimate colonizing efforts, no fault could be found with the Hamburg firm and its Bismarckian manager at Samoa. But the evidence is clear that soon the Godeffroys had conquest in view, for a Germany that was to build a great navy. Colonies were to become naval bases, and a Colonial Empire was to be the direct challenge to Britain's claim that Britannia rules the waves. This statement may be modified by the reminder that the old Democratic Party in Germany, largely represented by the Hanse cities, was not identical with the Nationalist Party, which has since absorbed everything else and has become the Pan-German Party with the world as its prize. The trading German was jealous of Great Britain and her Navy, but he was not actually insane. Bismarck was his prophet; and while the French Revolution may have been the cause of his dreams of a wider liberty, he would have repudiated the madness of the present German Emperor. This is only

offered as a reflection in passing, but it is worth developing later on. Let it be remembered also that Bismarck was at Frankfort from 1851 to 1859 as Member for Prussia in the representative Assembly of German Sovereigns. The Diet of Frankfort was "the Administrative Council, so to speak, of the Germanic Confederation founded by the Congress of Vienna in 1815." * Bismarck's biographer points out that "it was in no sense a Parliament. It made no laws." It talked, but could not enforce its decisions. Yet at Frankfort Bismarck began his diplomatic career on the grand scale by preparing the plans which eventually made Prussia the head of a united Germany. But as he and the elder Godeffroys were great friends it is not unreasonable to assume that they studied the scheme of entering the Pacific in pretty close proximity.

In approaching this question one is struck with the parallel between Napoleon Buonaparte's attitude to the hemisphere and a half lying between Suez and Panama, and the German policy as we now grasp it—with Bismarck midway. Professor Ernest Scott, in his illuminating discussion of the Napoleonic legend on this subject, gives a good idea of what may have been in Napoleon's mind, while insisting that nothing was in his immediate purpose, about Australia. "In recent years," he writes, "research has concentrated powerful rays of light on the intricacies of Napoleonic policy. Archives have been thrown open, ransacked, catalogued, and codified. Memoirs by the score, letters by the hundred, have been published. Documents by the thousand have been studied. A battalion of eager students has handled this vast mass of material. The piercing minds of eminent scholars have drilled into

* "Prince Bismarck," by Charles Lowe, M.A., vol. i, p. 117.

it to elucidate problems incidental to Napoleon's era. But nothing has been brought to light which indicates that Australia was within the radius of his designs." * Professor Scott sums up the argument under this head by pointing out that whatever Napoleon may have thought, or hoped, or possibly claimed, he was impotent without sea-power and that he was helpless against British supremacy on the wide waters of the world. But the interesting conclusion to the whole matter is reached in a statement made by the same writer just before the present war broke out. It is not inconsistent with what had already appeared, because it is admitted that as Napoleon's hatred of Britain became sharp he was probably ready to go to any extremes. "That Port Jackson was never attacked during these years of war was not due to its own capabilities of defence, which were pitifully weak; nor to reluctance on the part of Napoleon and Decaen; but simply to the fact that the British Navy secured and kept the command of the sea. In 1810 Napoleon directed the equipment of a squadron to 'take the English colony of Port Jackson, where considerable resources will be found.' But it was a futile order to give at that date. Trafalgar had been fought, and the defence of the colony of Australia was maintained effectively wherever British frigates sailed." † Dr. Holland Rose has shown also that in March 1811 Napoleon decided upon the seizure of the Cape of Good Hope and Egypt, as the strategic bases for an attack upon India, and squadrons were ordered to be equipped for that purpose.‡ Now

* "Terre Napoléon," pp. 272–273.

† "The Life of Matthew Flinders, Captain R.N.," p. 263.

‡ "Lectures on the History of the Nineteenth Century," "England's Commercial Struggle with Napoleon," by J. Holland Rose, M.A., p. 64.

between Napoleon's first thoughts of Asia and the Pacific, and the last futile orders to take Port Jackson and the Cape of Good Hope, there was a steady development of policy, which began with the determination to get command of the Channel for the invasion of England, and was continued, notwithstanding the failure to give Britain a desperate blow beyond the Mediterranean, by attempts to defy her sea-power. Trafalgar finally spoiled it all. Napoleon never got beyond an effort to come to conclusions with the mistress of the seas; and everything out of Europe had to wait upon that issue.

During those eight years of his diplomatic activity at Frankfort Bismarck accepted the teaching of history. He was under no delusions even after the German Empire was a dream come true; and he insisted soon after 1871, with the triumphs of Versailles fresh in his mind, that German colonies were impossible. But German chartered companies were distinctly in order, and conquest in consequence was never mentioned. As in the case of Napoleon there is nothing in Bismarck's memoirs or correspondence or in his speeches to show that he was thinking of attacking Great Britain for the sake of her colonies. He would imitate her commercial enterprise and follow where her East India Company had shown a way. His policy was apparently full of consistent friendliness towards Britain. Yet when discussing the Iron Chancellor in relation to Africa and the Pacific one grows cynical, even while keeping well in mind his change of front in 1884, when pressure at home made him an exponent and advocate of German colonial policy. He could disclaim so earnestly, and all the time be getting ready to grasp so much. Not long after France was crushed in 1871, he tried hard to buy

Formosa and obtain a base for Germany against Japan and China, to use in some future emergency upon the Pacific. It was like his attitude over Turkey in the Crimean War. As, later on, he declared that the Balkans were not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier, so even then he would not help to preserve the peace. The Crimean War served a sinister purpose. It was used by Bismarck to prevent any development of the movement towards peace; and, curiously enough, 1854 is again the year of importance in this connexion. His biographer says: "That peculiar institution called the European Concert—the offspring of steam and telegraphy, at once the germ and only possible full-growth of a millennial court of international arbitration—had not yet sprung into existence. Yet the Crimean War witnessed its birth throes and was all but obviated by its infant efforts. Hitherto the public enemies of Europe had been coerced by the armies of one Power, or by the united armies of several; but now a serious attempt was made to anticipate and achieve the work of war by substituting diplomatic concert for military coalition, or moral for physical force. And but for the backwardness of the German Powers, especially of Prussia, there is little doubt that the effort would have been successful. It is singular that the statesman, who may now be called the diplomatic bandmaster of Europe, was one of the chief creators of the discord which then prevailed among the Powers." *

The present war is the outcome of his intriguing and manœuvring from 1854 till he was dismissed by Wilhelm II. But the immediate point is that Bismarck was not a confessed Pan-German. He certainly realized the limits

* "Prince Bismarck," by C. Lowe, M.A., vol. i, p. 198.

of Empire even in 1884, when a colonial policy was forced upon him. He could see that Germany might lose all by grasping at everything—a terrible probability which the present Emperor may have suspected, but had not sufficient moral strength to force upon his military staff in 1914—and he was undoubtedly prepared to wait. When the Godeffroys of Hamburg unfolded the maps of the Pacific, and pointed to Samoa and the Solomons as important strategic centres, Bismarck doubtless assented. Moreover, later on he must have been impressed with Theodor Weber and his deep-laid schemes of aggression. Land had been cleverly taken from the Samoans in exchange for guns and ammunition made at the firm's factory in Liége; and tribal strife, sedulously fomented, bred war after war, greatly to the profit of Godeffroy and Son. The beginnings of Germany's Colonial Empire in the Pacific came by the same chicanery, treachery, and duplicity as her recent possessions in Africa; but it began a good deal further back. Germany's policy in the Pacific from the commencement has been one of peaceful penetration for military and naval purposes; and while this may not have been realized by individual Germans in the earlier years, it was applied without scruple by German leaders. In this view the Kiel Canal takes its place beside Panama and Suez. The three canals are therefore intimately associated in the history of the Pacific; and it was because German organization and intrigue in that ocean gathered head and gained impetus in later years, with the assurance of a war in the future to result in world dominion, that so much anxiety and uneasiness arose throughout Australasia. Kiel and its canal became the sign at last to Germans in the Pacific of a new world—a German world.

That it was a new world, even before Bismarck died, he recognized only too well. Prince von Bülow has an anecdote which showed the old warrior statesman's sense of it: "Prince Bismarck, who was the successful opponent and great antithesis of the leader of the Progressives, bore striking and direct testimony to the recognition of the dawn of a new era. A few years after the Prince's retirement the excellent general director, Herr Ballin, suggested that he should have a look at the Hamburg Harbour, which Bismarck, in spite of its nearness to Friedrichsruh, had not visited for a long time. After a tour round the harbour Herr Ballin took the eighty-year-old Prince on to one of the new transatlantic liners of the Hamburg-America Company. Prince Bismarck had never seen a ship of such dimensions. He stopped when he set foot on the giant steamboat, looked at the ship for a long time, at the many steamers lying in the vicinity, at the docks and huge cranes, at the mighty picture presented by the harbour, and said at last: 'I am stirred and moved. Yes, this is a new age—it is a new world.'" * And this appropriately sums up the German position in the Pacific. The British Empire, the United States, and Japan stood for nations settled and thriving either in or around that ocean, while Germany as an Imperial entity before the war was represented only by its flag upon trading and passenger steamers, upon war vessels visiting the various island groups, or flying from the staffs of administrative centres where officials thought of the Fatherland and long leave. In the Pacific, Germans were not to be found under the German flag in large numbers. To-day in Australia and the United States they keep quiet under the British and

* "Imperial Germany," by Prince von Bülow, p. 127.

American flags, or are locked up in internment camps; and yet there was never a more complete plan of campaign for obtaining possession of the whole ocean. At first when war was declared, and Britain joined France and Russia, Germany hoped and believed that Japan would become her ally. But when Great Britain called upon Japan to fulfil her treaty obligations, there was no hesitation on the part of the Japanese Government. Viscount Kato, Leader of the Opposition in the Japanese Parliament, when vindicating the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, said that "at first the Japanese Government desired that the conflict should not be extended to the Far East, and as Foreign Minister he made a statement to that effect; but when the British Government invoked the Alliance and called for Japan's co-operation the Tokyo Government at once assented." * Whatever Germany may have expected, her arrangements were quickly upset by Japan's declaration of war and by a prompt attack upon Kiao-chou. Germany might have been a nation actually settled in the Pacific that had laid its plans for war; and, as neither Great Britain nor the United States was supposed to be willing to save France and Russia at the outset, time was to be given for the maturing of the German scheme of ultimate conquest. But Bismarck and his Hamburg friends had realized long before that this must be the weak point in any extension or consolidation of German influence half the world away. There must be a German people settled somewhere in the Pacific under the German flag to give reason for further claims. "Effective occupation" might be a good phrase, turned into a diplomatic weapon of offence in Africa; but if Germany could only point to

* *The New East*, July 1917, p. 89.

subsidized lines of steamers, ineffective naval squadrons, and mere administrative centres in the Pacific, how could she expect to meet her critics or enemies in the world's great gateways? Before the Franco-Prussian War, therefore, an effort was made to deal with this manifest difficulty. Observant persons had asked why so much land—150,000 acres—had been acquired in Samoa. What did the Godeffroys propose to do with it? Ostensibly it was for cutting up at a profit and for the creation of numerous plantations for the settlement of Germany under the flag. But inquiry showed that there was something very much deeper in the purpose of the acquisition. Theodor Weber, with true Bismarckian craft and prevision, had been adding one block to another. The Godeffroys were anxious to make Samoa a great German settlement; and they would subdivide their lands, and lease them in small lots with the right of purchase. But there was more behind. The firm was to finance the immigrants and again make a double profit by supplying them with all they required in the new life in the islands, and Samoa was to become a military and naval station. Mr. Stonehewer Cooper, in his "Coral Lands," gives the *dénouement*: "The Franco-German War of 1870 prevented the realization of this scheme, as at the time intended. The results, there can be no doubt, would have been very beneficial to Messrs. Godeffroy, to the white settlers, and to the influence of the German Empire. The Government of the then North German Confederation regarded the matter with paternal interest, and several personal interviews and a voluminous correspondence passed between the senior partner of the house of Godeffroy and Herr, now Prince, von Bismarck, who had been a great friend of his, and

who did not hesitate to lend his aid in furthering this new field for German advancement. The matter had not long been under discussion when the approval of the Prussian authority took a practical shape. Plans prepared upon the ground by a surveyor of the locality, and intended for a settlement, were laid before the Government of Berlin. A programme of the course of colonization to be adopted was drawn up. Extraordinary powers were given to the German Consul at Samoa; grants of arms of precision from the royal arsenals were made for the protection of the settlements; the *Hertha*, the first, it is said, of the continental ironclads of Europe to pass through the Suez Canal, received orders to proceed from China to Samoa to settle all disputes between the Germans and the chiefs of that group, and by a judicious display of power to prepare the way for the first detachment of military settlers, who were to leave Hamburg as soon as her commander had submitted his report. This was a well-conceived project, but owing to the march of events in Europe it collapsed before it was put into operation. Messrs. Godeffroy, with their business knowledge and amateur statesmanship, severely felt the effects of the war and the blockade, from which not even the patronage of the man of blood and iron could extricate them." *

The hand of Theodor Weber is evident in all this; and as he was German Consul in Samoa between 1861 and 1870 it will be seen that the "extraordinary powers" entrusted to him would have made him a dictator indeed. With trade extending through the Pacific from end to end, and with German settlements springing up like mush-

* "Prince Bismarck," by Charles Lowe, M.A., foot-note, pp. 211–212.

rooms under Prussia's forcing in Samoa and elsewhere, the chartered company idea was to bear fine fruit. There were to be no colonies administered from Berlin. But no other Power was to have colonies in the Pacific either, and this was what Dr. George Brown drew attention to more than a decade later in his articles in the *Sydney Morning Herald*. He said that while there might be no immediate hoisting of the German flag, Germany was preparing to annex everything within reach simply by securing the trade and claiming predominant interests in the various groups. In the meantime Samoa had missed fire in more ways than one. The struggle with France, triumphant though Germany had been, left Godeffroy and Son bankrupt; so that by 1880 the firm had again to appeal to Bismarck, now Chancellor and Prince, for help. The Chancellor wanted the Reichstag to guarantee Godeffroy and Son's dividends for twenty years, but the Samoa Subsidy Bill was rejected by a narrow majority. It was a great disappointment, for the idea was to establish a South Sea Company of noble proportions. This came later in the "long-handled firm," the "D.H. & P.G.," which took over Godeffroy's business and under Theodor Weber's management prepared the way for the annexation of New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago. Still chartered companies kept the field, even after the German flag was flying over the islands where Dr. George Brown, as leader in a fine band of compatriots, had made life possible for white men by his missionary enterprise; but the German Government was behind them, if not actually a sleeping partner.

When Bismarck finally resigned in 1890 Dr. Solf was not quite thirty, so that his official career was probably

opening in the years of the Chancellor's greatest power and sudden fall. As a young man he watched the development of Germany's colonial policy with keen attention, sympathetic with Bismarck's idea of creating an Empire on broad lines, but possibly apprehensive of the dangers of collision with Great Britain in Africa and the Pacific. Bismarck defended himself in the Reichstag in 1885, the year following the annexation of New Guinea, by falling back upon history; and probably Dr. Solf had followed the story of Prussia's settlements on the African coast, which "in the period of periwigs and gaiters had again been given up and sold." * The Brandenburg Guinea Company was not a success; and though the Great Elector's expedition to the Gold Coast so long ago may have built a fort and called it Friedrichsburg, there was no real business in it. Dutch colonial enterprise had made the Prussian ruler jealous, but his successor was not given to illusions; and the settlement was abandoned in the terms quoted by Bismarck. As an incident in Prussian history it served its purpose in 1885, when Bismarck wanted an argument. But though his hand had been forced by the Colonial Party in Germany, the idea of letting the trader lead appealed to the Iron Chancellor; and Dr. Solf went abroad as part of the general machinery to make colonies real and effective. At that time the relations of Germany with Asia were not causing anxiety. As already shown, Japan had taken Bismarck as the summit of Western statesmanship, and was modelling her army on German lines. Prince Bülow in "Imperial Germany" noted this fact with regret as he reviewed subsequent events. Bismarck realized that Japan was wide awake, and that in the

* "Prince Bismarck," by W. Lowe, M.A., vol. ii, p. 200.

complications of world-politics Asia as a whole was better left alone. Prince Bülow wrote: "Our relations with Japan, as with the United States of America, passed through a period of strain towards the end of the nineteenth century. Up to the beginning of the nineties we had served as a model for the Japanese, and had been their friend. This warlike nation of the Far East warmly admired our military organization and our warlike history; and after the defeat of China the Japanese boasted that they were the Prussians of the East." This was in 1895. Two years afterwards the jump upon Kiao-chou was made; and the animosity aroused in Japan against Germany, over her action in helping to rob victory of its fruits when China was defeated, became greater. Dr. Solf, a resident in Asia at the time, must have watched it all with growing solicitude. He was the Emperor's servant, and later on became Governor of Samoa and Germany's representative in the Pacific; but he realized how truly Bismarck had gauged the possibilities of an exceedingly difficult situation in the Far East. It must be admitted that the puzzle of his appointment to Samoa as its first German Governor is not explained by this recital; but the two Germanys are better understood by his aid. A trading Germany attempting to realize herself, and the Germany of Bismarck bending to a policy of blood and iron—the German trader and the Prussian junker—are both represented in Dr. Solf. Does he stand for the real Germany? This is the ruthless Power responsible for the war of 1914; and the monarch who approved of his appointment to Samoa also accepted his nomination as Secretary of State for the German Colonial Office in 1911, when some one quite different, one would think, would have been appointed.

CHAPTER VIII

DR. SOLF'S APPOINTMENT

Dr. Solf as Secretary of State for the Colonies : Surprise at his appointment : His record in Samoa : "Vailima" as Government House : German care of Stevenson's tomb : Had German policy taken a new turn ? Dr. Solf's term as Governor of Samoa a possible blind : In 1912 a Prussian official invasion : Samoa a pivotal point in the Pacific : The Panama Canal a new factor : The Pan-German goal : Two policies and Dr. Solf's place in German administration

WHEN Dr. Solf became Secretary of State for the German Imperial Colonial Office in 1911 there was much heart-burning among extremists in the Fatherland. The *Agadir* incident had ended with a settlement which satisfied neither the French nor the German Chauvinists, and in the German Colonial Office itself there was much expressed disgust, followed by the resignation of important officials. Herr von Lindequist had been Secretary of State and had succeeded Herr Dernburg, since notorious for his indiscretions and treacheries in the United States. The permanent head of the Colonial Office in Berlin was Herr von Danckelmann, who resigned at the same time as his Ministerial chief because they both thought that France had outwitted or outmanœuvred Germany. Conflict with the Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, had resulted in this step as a public protest; and Pan-German opinion was much

exercised over it. But Dr. Solf's appointment came like a modern high-explosive shell in their midst. The *Berliner Tageblatt* had made a journalistic "scoop" by announcing the resignations aforesaid, while negotiations with France were still incomplete, and they had to be denied, because recalled, until the Congo Agreement was ratified. Then the journal in question made another attempt at prophecy or prevision by tipping the Governor of East Africa, Herr von Rechenberg, as successor to Herr von Lindequist; and instead Dr. Solf was appointed.* It was a most extraordinary business. To-day as one recalls the Agadir incident, first heard of when crossing the Atlantic in the White Star steamer *Baltic*, the whole thing is still full of surprise. The daily wireless bulletin had been issued; and war seemed quite possible even so soon after the King's coronation. One's thought recalled the long but magnificent ceremony in Westminster Abbey, as we watched the crowning first of the King and then of the Queen; and in the extraordinary experiences of a crowded two months in London war seemed the last thing possible. With much relief, expressed by a prominent Australian Parliamentary representative in London to the present writer, the treaty with Japan had been renewed; and the great naval review at Spithead had made a profound impression upon us, though the latest German battle-cruisers were noted as remarkable additions to the Teuton's naval power. What could be better than the British Dreadnoughts in their far-reaching completeness as one followed the lines of their might? It was war, but who would dare to evoke it? Had not the German Emperor himself been in London for the unveiling of the Queen's memorial, not so long before

* London *Times*, November 4, 1916.

the Coronation, and was not the Crown Prince present in the Abbey? But Agadir in that month of July looked an ugly word as one saw it day by day on the wireless news given to us on the *Baltic*; and then, not long after we reached Australia, came the announcement of disagreements in the German Colonial Office and of Dr. Solf's appointment as Secretary of State.

It would be absurd to say that one then associated Dr. Solf's name with an assured peace because of the settlement following the German jump upon Agadir finishing with his appearance in a new rôle. Yet Dr. Solf had left Samoa with a fine record. He was not apparently the aggressive German. His administration had been consistently tactful and helpful for British interests in the group, and those who were associated with him spoke in high terms of his ability. He was physically a man to appeal to the heroic in Australasian imaginations. Standing four inches over six feet he was proportionately broad and large. Nor had he disguised his warm admiration for British ways and methods in handling a great Colonial Empire. And as imitation is the sincerest form of flattery Dr. Solf was credited with believing all he said. Moreover, Samoa was Robert Louis Stevenson's home and last resting-place, and the house at Vailima had become the residence of the Governor. A wealthy German citizen, Herr Gustav Kunst, had bought Vailima, which had been emptied of its contents after Stevenson died in 1894, and turned over to a caretaker to remain for a long time unoccupied. Herr Kunst was moved to buy, but thought to drive a bargain, until an American friend remonstrated with him. He had offered a thousand pounds for the place, which was worth far more than twice as much, though actually

a white elephant for anybody except a wealthy man. Then he gave way and made an offer more in consonance with its value. Herr Kunst, it seems, had accumulated his great fortune by shrewd banking and sound business at Vladivostock, and, as an old man, had reached Samoa the year before Stevenson died, searching for a place in warmer latitudes in which to spend the remainder of his life. He had told his American friend that he had made a serious mistake in not retiring ten years earlier; but his partners had persuaded him to remain in harness for another decade, and there he was with so much money that he hardly knew how to get rid of the interest upon it; and he had no wife or child—no relations to help him spend. When Vailima attracted him his business instincts overcame his sentiment for the beautiful place; and Stevenson counted for nothing in the final sum of advantages if the world-famous home could be bought cheaply enough. But his friend put the other side so forcibly that a little correspondence with Mrs. Stevenson at the Azores soon brought negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion.*

This thought of Vailima in connexion with Dr. Solf is developed here because Samoa at that time was still under tripartite control. Germany, Great Britain, and the United States were trustees for the group, or rather watchful competitors with their hands tied; and Dr. Solf did not arrive until May 1899, after the outbreak of hostilities among the Samoans under Mataafa and Malietoa, the latter aided by the naval forces of the Powers. This was all consequent upon the choice of Malietoa Tanu as king.† The treaty which gave the main islands to Germany was

* "With Stevenson in Samoa," by H. J. Moors, pp. 214–216.

† "Island Reminiscences," by Thomas Trood, pp. 110–113.

under consideration, though reported as certain to be signed; and not till 1900 did Dr. Solf enter into office as Governor. Vailima meanwhile had been sold to Herr Kunst. But before he could complete the improvements he had projected, war put a stop to everything, and the place was left to the combatants. "Then Mataafa's forces descended and built a great line of entrenchments along the lower portion of the property, extending perhaps half a mile to the eastward, so that one flank rested on an inaccessible ravine, and the other abutted on the precipitous mountain-side. These natives were heavily bombarded by the warships lying in Apia harbour, and after it was thought they were cut to pieces and flying for their lives, the Tanu forces and the foreign sailors rushed forward to take the position. Their calculations were far astray, and they were met with such dogged resolution that, notwithstanding their extensive supplies of ammunition, and the dearth of cartridges on the side of the Mataafans, they were driven down the hill-side, well towards Apia, with severe losses. Simultaneously the Mataafans, knowing well that the warships would resume the bombardment, came lower down the hill after the attacking forces had withdrawn, and the result was that the shells flew harmlessly over their heads. During this struggle the main building at Vailima was pierced in many places by fragments of the exploding shells, and its owner later collected good damages from the United States and Great Britain, in accordance with the arbitration award made by King Oscar of Sweden. It was not until about 1908 that Vailima was brought to its present state of perfection." * One can imagine the spirit of Stevenson stirring as the fighting

* "With Stevenson in Samoa," by H. J. Moors, p. 217.

grew fiercer where he had wandered so often and written stories that make the blood still run fast as the claymores swing. It seems quite in keeping with the warrior mind and mood of Stevenson that shells should have burst upon Vailima, that later on the stables should be filled with fine horses, and the tables should be loaded with silver plate. But, that German money should have paid for the latter, and that British and American money should have been provided by way of indemnity for the former, must have made Germany's strongest antagonist in Samoa turn in his tomb upon the mountain-top behind. Then the end of it all, in Germany's possession of the main part of the group, would surely have brought some bitter words from Stevenson's pen, if only to friends in guarded phrases, had he lived; for Vailima as German territory would either have forced Tusitala out, or the event would have made him a hostage in the hands of the enemy.

Yet the whole has hardly been told, for not only was Vailima purchased by Germany, when Herr Kunst died in 1905, for a Government House with Dr. Solf installed therein, but it was another German who ordered that Stevenson's grave should be cared for. It had been sadly neglected. "Some time ago," writes Mr. Moors, "the subject of this neglect was laid before Dr. Schultz, then Acting Governor of German Samoa, by Mr. Whyte, of whom I have previously spoken; and with a generosity that will be keenly appreciated by lovers of Stevenson the world over, he at once took steps on behalf of the German Government to open up the pathway and to clear the sepulchre from encroachments." Mr. Moors adds something else, with a sarcasm intended as much for his countrymen in the United States—for Mrs. Stevenson was an

American, and her husband had done some fine work in America—as for Britons the world over. He says: "It does not redound to the credit of the English-speaking people that it should be left to Germany to preserve this historic spot from utter neglect."

Now the puzzle of this position came up again long after the Agadir incident was closed, for Dr. Solf's appointment as Secretary to the German Colonial Office only moved at the time one's somewhat idle curiosity. The question uppermost then, no doubt, was whether Germany's colonial policy had taken a new turn. Was the apparent repentance displayed over Samoa to find a fresh illustration? Bismarck had abandoned war for peace; was Dr. Solf the final word on the subject? The unexpected emulation of British policy in dealing with the Samoans, and with British settlers, and with problems of administration affecting both the white and the coloured races, is on record; but Dr. Solf, though a Berliner, was not appointed by Bismarck. The Iron Chancellor had been forced to resign in 1890—the year following the hurricane which hurled German warships upon the reefs at Apia, when warlike and victorious Samoans had swarmed down from their lines to rescue drowning German sailors. War with the United States had been stopped just in time by the roaring winds which seemed to catch Germany and America by the throats and hurl them apart; and Bismarck had withdrawn from the extreme position he had taken up, to accept the peaceful settlement of a tripartite control of Samoa. But his day was done, and Dr. Solf reached Apia in 1899, in the year following Bismarck's death, with the Emperor master in Germany. Is it fair to assume that Samoa was put aside as practically worthless in a possible

struggle for supremacy in the Pacific? Or was Dr. Solf appointed as a blind, and allowed to follow his bent? In passing it may be noted that the late Mr. Trood, who lived for so many years in Tonga and Samoa, and was British Vice-Consul at Apia, speaks in the highest terms of the German Governor in his book of reminiscences already quoted. Mr. Trood, it must be remembered, had been watching the development of German plans with sharpened vision because at one time he was associated with Theodor Weber as an employee of Godeffroy and Son. When in 1879 an effort was made to practically hand over the Tongan group to Germany he resigned his position as manager there rather than be a party to the deal; and he probably assisted materially in preventing its completion. Mr. Trood, therefore, must be accepted as a good witness when he pays a tribute to Dr. Solf's firmness and tact; and he specially mentions "the admirable way in which he has gained the affections of the thirty-two thousand natives under his control, sparing no pains or trouble to accomplish this end." More than that, Mr. Trood said that "in his impartial and generous treatment of all nationalities and creeds, in the easy access at all times permitted to his presence . . . he has ever won the confidence of all unprejudiced persons."

This is very interesting, but we know that about two years before war broke out in 1914 a new Germany was disclosed in her dealings with Samoa. Prussian officials, true to type, appeared, who let it be understood that the days of co-operation and amicable understandings had passed away, never to return. There was to be no more of Dr. Solf's kindly rule, easy accessibility, and friendly acceptance of British nominees on the Council of Advice.

For more than a decade since the settlement of 1900 was made, with a treaty ratified by the three Powers concerned, there had been pleasant relations all round. British planters and traders were treated with the same courtesy and consideration in German Samoa as Germans received in Australasia and throughout the British Empire. British subjects were allowed to plead in German courts in their own tongue, and nothing seems to have been done to arouse suspicion or ill-feeling. So genuine seemed this desire for Germans and Britons to work amicably together that the opinion was gradually formed that Germany no longer took any interest in Samoa except as a possible piece of exchange in some development of the game of world-politics later on. The conviction of shrewd men for several years following 1900 was that Great Britain would come into possession, and that Dr. Solf was simply preparing the way for the new order. But Dr. Solf became Secretary to the German Colonial Office in 1911; and as he was responsible thereafter for the general control of German Samoa he must either have been a party to the tightening of the administrative machine in the hands of Philistine Prussians, or he was aware of their action. There was no overt declaration of hostilities. Things seemed to be going on as usual; but the Prussian officials had no time for friendliness. No more nominations of British residents to the Council were accepted, or, rather, nominations were found to be useless because unacceptable, and none were forthcoming. It was realized that a change was being made, which ran through most of the relations between the two nationalities, though specially demonstrated in many quiet ways by the new staff. Samoa had swung into the Prussian orbit again. Was the approaching completion of the Panama Canal

responsible? Had the Emperor and his admirers, now aware that the Pacific through all its reaches was sure to be a prize of extraordinary value in the near future, suddenly decided that the old Hamburg thought of Samoa was the true one? Samoa is a pivotal point in the Pacific at any time, but the Godeffroy activities under Theodor Weber showed how extraordinarily useful the group could be under proper management. In those far-off days, however, Theodor Weber was developing German trade with islands not under German control, though he was practically free to work his will therein. He sent his vessels north, south, east, and west in the widest and longest ocean on the earth's surface and proved Samoa's exceeding worth. "From Cochin China to Valparaiso, with Samoa midway" (as Miss Gordon Cumming put it when describing the range of interests of the house of Godeffroy of Hamburg), the Graballs of the Pacific had stretched their hands in the years immediately following the war with France which gave the German Empire being.

What really does Samoa's position in the Pacific represent in this connexion? Roughly, Valparaiso is something over 5500 miles from Apia, the principal port in Samoa; and Cochin-China may be put down in a repetition of that estimate. Five thousand miles may be said to represent the distance to Panama, and something less than that to San Francisco and Vancouver. New Zealand is only 1600 miles away, and Australia less than 3000. On every showing Samoa is a central group. Is it conceivable that shrewd people who studied distances in Hamburg forty years ago and discussed them with, say, Bismarck in Frankfort and Berlin, ever forget its strategic possi-

bilities? Witnesses giving evidence in Australia recently before the Inter-State Commission, on the question of Pacific trade, emphasized the fact that Germany was a far-seeing Power and had laid her plans in the Pacific with singular astuteness. Moreover, all that has transpired since this war began has shown that German plans take in the Pacific with a wider range and a more comprehensive thought than ever. Samoa repossessed or not, there will doubtless be a great future German trade activity; and the Panama Canal is going to count in ways little dreamed of by unimaginative folk to-day. But certainly for Germany before the war Samoa was never forgotten, nor were its possibilities ever lost sight of in the general scheme of world-power. It may have suited the German Emperor to let the world think that the group had passed out of sight, or perhaps that German colonizing policy could be as broad-minded and successful as Great Britain's, when it pleased His Imperial Majesty. In that view Dr. Solf may have been selected because he had a theory to put into practice. Certainly as a Prussian he has demonstrated that all things are possible to the German mind, and that the North German is as capable of kindly ways, with broad statesmanlike views, as the South German. But while Governor of Samoa he could never have misunderstood the trend of modern German policy. He must have been just as much aware of the Pan-German goal, even if he did not approve of it, as the greatest Chauvinist in the Empire; and as Secretary to the German Colonial Office he has spoken in sufficiently plain words of a colonial policy to be expressed in terms of war, and making Africa a base for some future great offensive. Which, then, of the two

Solfs are we to take in attempting a bird's-eye view of the true Pacific? The Pan-Germans seemingly love neither of them; but is the Dr. Solf of Samoa before the war to be accepted as representing anything particular in German world-policy?

CHAPTER IX

GERMANY'S THREE PHASES

A Minister of the German Colonial Office—without colonies: Dr. Solf a student of Asia and the Pacific : His alleged British sympathies and Germany's three phases : The trading Germany : The Germany of Bismarck : William II (and *Weltpolitik*) as the third Germany : Samoa after the hurricane of 1889 : Great Britain always the enemy : British Navy all-powerful : The Pan-German gospel : Dr. Solf the Emperor's trusted Minister, while it suits : Australasian suspicion and dislike

OUTSIDE of the Pacific Dr. Solf seems to stand for nothing, except as he may be taken for a better Germany waiting to be delivered from the Emperor and his myrmidons. Within the Pacific he represents to-day the puzzle of the century. He seems to be nobody and to have charge of nothing. As Minister of the German Colonial Office he has no colonies to administer, and, while he makes speeches insisting that these possessions must be returned, the whole question rests upon a basis so different from mere demands or exclamations that the Briton in the Pacific, who is watching developments so anxiously, is inclined to laugh in the midst of his perplexities. Before Dr. Solf left Samoa his name could be found in the German "Who's Who," but with no particulars. He was just Governor of Samoa. No dates or triumphs marked the line and a half of the announcement; and perhaps this might be counted to

him for righteousness or natural modesty. When the "Who's Who" of the world is being compiled a great deal depends upon the willingness of those who appear therein to supply details; and if the details are not forthcoming the name does not figure at all, or else with the barest notice. When inquiring people, who have heard of some special deed or event connected with lives of astonishing activity, demand the usual information about great men, their names are usually absent. Dr. George Brown, for instance, never reached the British "Who's Who" before he died; yet probably few names were looked up more often than his, especially after his last visit to England just before the war broke out in 1914. But Dr. Solf had lived a quiet life; and even in Samoa he was not in the limelight. He was Bismarck's counterpart in size and girth, but not the Iron Chancellor's fellow in stride or strenuousness. If one wanted to compare him as Governor of Samoa with some man of singular worth in the Pacific itself, Sir William MacGregor might serve, but there again comparisons would fail because one never heard of Dr. Solf as a pioneer, a breaker of new ground, a winner of victories over the natives by the might of his own right arm, or indeed as the lord of any sensational emergency. He has been merely an official all his life; though he is an expert in Eastern languages, and still a student of the world of Asia and Polynesia—he was a resident for many years in British territory, and before he went to Samoa he held a consular appointment in India. It is easy to think of him as the man of great possibilities, though never, like Sir William MacGregor, given a real chance. When he reached Samoa in 1899 he was nearly forty years of age, while Sir William was not thirty when he accompanied

Sir Arthur Gordon to Fiji in 1875. In practically the same field the one entered a man in middle life with set ideas, while the other was a young man with a new world before him.

How, then, can Dr. Solf be connected with a third Germany—with that third phase of German activity in the Pacific which must be connected with the Emperor himself? The first was the purely trading phase, and the second the Bismarckian—forced by home pressure into annexation and Empire. The third is undoubtedly the Germany of *Weltpolitik*. The very word is the Emperor's. When Dr. Solf hoisted the German flag at Mulinuu on March 1, 1900, "in the presence of a great concourse of people," to quote Mr. Trood, he did it under special authority as the Emperor's representative; and practically at the same moment the Emperor announced himself an autocrat—"one only is master within the Empire, and I will tolerate no other." On March 5, four days after the Imperial flag had been broken at the great staff planted in the old chiefly centre of authority and power in Samoa, the Emperor said: "Those who oppose me in my work I will crush." * Almost four months afterwards William II in Europe made the speech which threw *Weltpolitik*—world-policy—to the universe as a German battle-cry. The Emperor said: "The wave-beat knocks powerfully at our gates and calls us as a great nation to maintain our place in the world—in other words, to pursue world-policy. The ocean is indispensable for Germany's greatness; but the ocean also reminds us that neither on it nor across it in the distance can any great decision be again arrived

* Quoted in "The Origins of the War," by J. Holland Rose, Litt.D., p. 89.

at without Germany and the German Emperor." * Dr. Solf was in Samoa by the Emperor's will, and all that he achieved afterwards was along lines laid down or accepted at Potsdam. Maximilian Harden had said of the all-pervading energy of William II that he wants to settle every detail, and he "orders the Secretary of State, who has spent half the night at his desk, to submit the latest telegrams and advices to him in the early morning and then directs how everything must be arranged."

As one ponders the history of Samoa after the hurricane in 1889 the thought creeps in that perhaps Bismarck may not have ordered the surrender which led to tripartite control and preserved the peace of the world at a difficult juncture. Before the hurricane blew, had the German and American war vessels, then cleared for action, come to final grips, it meant war with the United States. After the vessels were lying at Apia, and the Samoans had proved themselves to be warriors beyond reproach in their succour of the German foes, it may have seemed to Bismarck that Samoa was not worth fighting over. But the Emperor, who became ruler in 1888, had begun to assert himself. Bismarck retired in the following year; and between whiles the question of the Pacific had become a serious one for Germany. Is it not possible that the readiness to make an agreement with Great Britain and the United States represented the younger man's determination to prepare for a settlement overriding mere treaties or amicable arrangements? With the war between Japan and Russia in 1894 came the opportunity for asserting himself, and Japan lost a substantial part of the fruit of her victory.

* Quoted in "The Origins of the War," by J. Holland Rose, Litt.D., pp. 65, 66.

In 1897 Kiao-chou was forced from China, and Shantung became German property by virtue of a hundred years' lease. Meanwhile the Boxer outbreak led to the War Lord's apostrophe to the shades of Attila; and the German forces played the Hun to such purpose that the horrors of their reprisals made the world shudder. Within two years Dr. Solf was in Samoa studying the position for himself and reporting to his august master. This was in 1899, and in 1900 he hoisted the German flag. Why was the extraordinary paradox permitted which showed a Prussian in Samoa to be the mildest of administrators, British rather than German in mind and method, while not so long before the German in China had at the word of the Emperor become a brutal bully—a savage and a beast? There was shrewdness in the whole business, if one conceives it as part of a great plan. Though *Weltpolitik* was not thrown to the world as a German word of power till 1900, it was in the Emperor's thought when he ascended the throne, and soon after forced the Iron Chancellor's retirement. The Pacific was to become part of the German sphere of possession; but Samoa as its strategic centre need not be made a challenge to other Powers until Germany was ready. Besides, the British way of dealing with restless Polynesians was undoubtedly sound. Tonga and Fiji were under chiefly control; and, once the rival chiefs were forced to acknowledge the paramountcy of some one stronger than themselves, they became tractable and helpful. Why should not Samoa under Dr. Solf be as Fiji under British governors? This raises a special issue in the difference between the control of Samoa and German New Guinea. Under British rule the chiefs of Fiji became trusted servants of the Crown. With the

hoisting of the British flag they abandoned their quarrels; and automatically the people looked to the Governor as their supreme head, because their chiefs had surrendered to him by ceding the group. It was the only way to success in dealing with natives sufficiently civilized to appreciate the reality of chiefly rule and the need for some powerful control over everything. In Tonga the quarrels of the chiefs had been overcome by the dominating personality of King George Tubou I; and had Germany left that group alone nothing would have been needed to secure peace. Quasi-independence was granted by Great Britain, in the shape of a protectorate proclaimed under the provisions of the treaty of 1900; and Tonga ever since has only been a source of difficulty as its kings and premiers have played too hard at the game of governing themselves. In Samoa it was clear to the meanest intelligence that as soon as one Power could obtain supreme control, order would be restored, and the group would become like Fiji and Tonga. It only required a governor who was in sympathy with the natives, instead of trampling on them with heavy boots of authority as in New Guinea; and Dr. Solf showed that he quite understood what was required of him. But the Emperor must have realized the truth ten years before; though possibly Bismarck after the hurricane of 1889 could not see his way to deal with this part of the situation in the Pacific except at the cost of a general war. In 1899 Dr. Solf went to Samoa to be ready for the new departure in control and to show the world how kind a Prussian governor could be. The Emperor evidently knew his man; and when tripartite control was abandoned the new order was introduced. Samoa in German hands became a model of capable administration; and it was

proved, for all who cared to study the facts, that Samoans could be as amenable to discipline under the German flag as Fijians under the British.

But always Great Britain was the enemy. Since the war began in 1914 Dr. Solf, as Minister of the German Colonial Office, has never ceased to lift his voice against her or against her statesmen. When Samoa was captured he cried: "Must Samoa pass into the hands of the vile invader?" Then he replied that "fortunately the fate of the German colonies will not be decided in Africa or in the Pacific . . . but on European battlefields." The loss of Samoa was a bitter draught of war medicine for its erstwhile Governor. That group was "the pearl of the Pacific"; and then Dr. Solf groaned to an interviewer in Berlin: "Our worst enemies are the English." The British Army was a negligible quantity, but the British Navy was all-powerful and ubiquitous. It was an extraordinary thought to express at such a time, and yet Dr. Solf actually reassured himself by recalling Trafalgar and British naval victories against great odds. What Britain had done under Nelson, should not Germany accomplish sooner or later under a coming naval commander of genius —given the necessary instrument of vengeance? Was he thinking of "The Day" as still to arrive for the existing German Navy? Who knows? But he certainly recognized at the time that Samoa had been lost because Britannia ruled the waves.* Next year representatives of Hamburg, Berlin, and Bremen firms interested in South Sea trade held a meeting at Hamburg and sent a telegram to the German Colonial Secretary, expressing the hope that he would see to the recovery of Germany's valuable South

* London *Times*, September 29, 1914.

Sea colonies. Dr. Solf replied that he would work for the recovery of all.* Incidentally it may be mentioned that the Pan-Germans have consistently attacked him when he has given such replies, or has made speeches, or delivered lectures and addresses in his official capacity, insisting upon the return of Germany's Colonial Empire. Count Reventlow at about this time found fault with the terms of his rejoinders. It seemed as if the Secretary for the Colonies was willing to surrender gains in Europe to achieve the repossession of valuable territory in Africa and the Pacific. This would never do. Count Reventlow declared that the home lands and trophies must become the impregnable base for extending the might of German arms; and the colonies would be forced from the enemy by an automatic development of power.

It would be unwise to assume from this that Dr. Solf is anybody, apart from the Emperor. Even Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg after long years in office as Chancellor was thrown over at last, and Dr. Sarolea in the *Scotsman*, when he fell, could say of him: "A rich man, and the scion of an historic house, he had led the life of a galley-slave; an honest man, he has been doomed to perpetual prevarication; a humane man, he has had to condone every atrocity; an independent man, he must cringe before his master; a peaceful man, he must submit to the continuation of insensate slaughter; a highly gifted intellectual, he has had to pursue a policy of insane stupidity." This might be repeated largely as the truth about Dr. Solf, except that in Samoa he was doing congenial work, too far away from the Wilhelmstrasse to be constantly nagged at, and able by results to prove successful the policy

* *Times*, November 13, 1915.

pursued and accepted as the right one. But to-day he must be of all men most miserable, because he knows Great Britain abroad so well, and because apart from a complete German victory the future is hopeless. Yet, though he is a target for the Pan-Germans, the Pan-German gospel has been preached and promulgated because of the Emperor's policy. Thus we come to the point that Germany's latest thought of the Pacific was comprehensive. In 1911, the year that saw Dr. Solf placed in charge of the German Colonial Office, Tannenberg's book, "Gross-Deutschland," was published, and there was no mistake about its demands. "For us," said the author, "it is a vital question to acquire colonial empires"; and he explained that "whether it be at the cost of England or of France, it is only a question of power, and perhaps also of a little risk." He complained that it was unjust for Belgium and Holland to possess rich colonies and enjoy nearly double the *per capita* wealth of Germans, "only because these two countries do not bear arms as we do." Mr. David Jayne Hill, formerly United States Ambassador to Germany, brought this all out in the July number of the *Century Magazine* (1917). He emphasized the fact that Tannenberg wanted Cuba, and insisted upon an African Germany, an Oceanic Germany, including all the islands of the Pacific, and an American Germany! In this book, says Mr. Hill, "is recited and interpreted ethnologically, statistically, chartographically, and prophetically the German dream of *Weltpolitik*. With erudition that has involved years of research, and with a definiteness and perspicacity that leave nothing unexplained, even down to the definitive treaties of peace after the Great War shall have accomplished its purposes, we have in this

elaborate work a complete exposition of economic Imperialism as contemplated by the Pan-Germanists—an exposition sown broadcast among the nation." It is not astonishing that M. André Chéradame, after several years of warning, should have written his book, "The Pan-German Plot Unmasked," in terms of such definite emphasis. He had the Pan-German gospel in his grasp before Tannenberg's work appeared; and both that work, and the pamphlet published under the auspices of the *Alldeutscher Verband* in 1895, justify his claim that the plot to join Hamburg to the Persian Gulf has simply been developed by war. The German Emperor has stage-managed the plot since 1914; and country after country has been invaded and annexed according to programme. However William II may have tried to appear as the governor of the Imperial machine, regulating and guarding its steam-power, he is heart and soul a Pan-German, and its policy and programme have been largely inspired by his restless ambition.

This, then, is the conclusion of the whole matter as far as Dr. Solf is concerned. He represents a Germany that has gone through three phases in the last half-century; and he is now the Emperor's trusted Minister for the Colonies, with ambitions to be Foreign Secretary and even Chancellor. In the Pacific he carried out the policy of sweet reasonableness as Governor of Samoa, placating British planters and soothing British opinion by his choice of British methods in dealing with the Samoans. It was the Emperor in his most Machiavellian rôle. The old German democratic ideal was revised for a definite purpose, but it was true to a fine type while it lasted. Within the velvet glove was the Prussian hand of steel. The Bis-

marckian theory of possession by force was ever uppermost. While the Emperor was playing down to British prejudices, never for a moment was the hatred of British power allowed to sink. No more scathing indictment of William II can be found than in the words of Professor Lugaro, who deals with William II's strength and weakness in his book, "An Emperor's Madness or National Aberration." It is pointed out that "in 1911, when visiting King George, he brought in his suite to England, under false colours, the Chief of the Service of Espionage." Even when he sent the telegram to President Kruger, which caused so much trouble in the South African War, he was discussing with Queen Victoria ways of defeating the Boers. Finally, as Professor Lugaro sums up, "the policy of double dealing of Germany, from Frederick II to Bismarck and to Bethmann-Hollweg, has always chosen for its motto some maxim which exalts force and fraud, and disowns right and honour in international relations." * Probably Dr. Solf began with sincere admiration of British success in colonization, and he could see its points of strength; but the trail of the serpent was over everything. Bismarck's unscrupulous policy in the Pacific roused Australasian suspicion and dislike; and while the Governor of Samoa was seeking to meet everybody half-way, the Jaluit Company in the Marshall Islands was tearing up the treaty of 1886 and making desperate efforts to penalize Australian traders out of the field of competition with Germany. British methods and British company enterprise were good to copy, but they were hated, and were fought wherever possible. Meanwhile again the German navy was growing. It began its new progress with Kiao-

* "An Emperor's Madness," by Professor Lugaro, p. 34.

chou in the Emperor's era of *Weltpolitik*, just as the American navy began as a result of the experiences in Samoa up to the hurricane of 1889. The Pacific in each case gave naval expansion a great lift. Europe was profoundly affected by this competition, begun and extended on the other side of the world; and Kiao-chou in China as the one incentive, and Apia in Samoa as the other, simply carried into new directions a struggle which is now culminating in the war of the world's history. One thinks of Dr. Solf giving his lecture in Berlin in 1916 before the German Church authorities upon missionary enterprise. The German missionary, he said, had a special mission. Natives were the best asset of the colonies, but they must be brought under proper control by mission work. Christianity and Kultur—German Kultur—were to go hand in hand. Looking back to 1897, it was the Christian gospel which gave the Emperor his excuse for taking China by the throat and tearing the Shantung Peninsula from her; and because German missionaries had been murdered, *Weltpolitik* was to make its most effective beginning in the Pacific. Prince von Bülow admits in "Imperial Germany" that it was Kiao-chou which made the new German navy, and he is quite cynically pleased about the whole business. It is the Prussian gospel that necessity knows no law, and hatred of Great Britain had become the justification for forging a weapon to annihilate her.

CHAPTER X

TWO IDEAS OF EMPIRE

Conflict between two ideas of Empire : The German idea of possession and control in the Pacific : British instincts for freedom : Co-operation as a factor in evolution : Could a new Germany arise with men like Dr. Solf? Mr. Patten's address and its application : Dr. Solf exasperates the Pan-Germans but attacks Great Britain : His object-lesson in British methods in the Pacific : Lord Salisbury and the Danish Duchies : Germany's policy after the war

In the Pacific the position may be said to resolve itself into a conflict between two ideas of Empire. Germany thinks of her colonies as possessions, and not as possible autonomous bodies integral with her; and Empire for her is an autocracy abroad. Great Britain knows that the British Empire is really a Commonwealth; and the question she has to answer, when peace is proclaimed, is whether the Britains beyond the seas are to march more closely by her side under some formal agreement, or are to grow in stature in what may be called loose order. Inside this, however, is the further question of development within the British Empire itself, with possibilities of trouble based upon misunderstanding. Of the main question it may be said at once that Germany and Great Britain are, and are likely always to be, antagonists. For the moment nothing else matters. Japan, no doubt, is a Power with large

interests and with an assured position, as actually upon the spot and in her native sphere of activity. The United States also is concerned most vitally in an approaching settlement, or lack of settlement, with Germany in the Pacific; and between these two, otherwise, are outstanding questions that must be dealt with sooner or later. But when all has been said the Pacific for another century after peace is proclaimed must be worthy of its name, as Germany is eliminated, and British ideas of civilization are allowed to control the situation. As a generalization this is perhaps too sweeping, because America and Great Britain stand practically for the same thing; and Japan has accepted the European standards of national intercourse and treaty powers, without surrendering her own code of honour, which is founded upon a very sensitive national pride. But, broadly, the German idea of possession and control in the Pacific is impossible unless the British instinct for freedom is suppressed.

This again, as a generalization, must be modified by the admission that Germany has shown two minds in the Pacific, the one expressed by the work of Theodor Weber, and the second shown through Dr. Solf's administration of Samoa. It has already been explained that the Secretary of State for the Colonies in Germany, though a Prussian, is not accepted by the Pan-Germans as a true exponent of German ideals. He is indeed suspect, and has been repudiated by them. He does represent also something quite different from the ruthless Prussian who shook the mailed fist in the world's face before the war, and after rattling his sabre and talking of his shining armour, plunged head first into the maelstrom of the present awful conflict. Is it possible that a future Germany can arise with the

moderate mind of men like Dr. Solf in control; and if so, would there be room for Germany and Great Britain in the Pacific on an entirely new basis? Unfortunately the history of the last three-quarters of a century, as far as official and commercial Germany in the Pacific are concerned, has to be read from the standpoint of intrigue and ruthlessness. It would be an extraordinary departure from an established position if Dr. Solf and his sympathizers were to take charge and begin to interpret Germany from the side of friendly co-operation and amicable understanding.

Just what is involved may be better understood, perhaps, by a reference to something distinct from world-politics. Recently an article appeared in the United States entitled "Co-operation as a Factor in Evolution," by William Patten.* The author is not directly concerned about society, or the evolution of nations after tremendous conflict, but with a great biological truth. One sentence may be quoted to show the trend of the argument. Mr. Patten says: "The familiar terms 'evolution,' the 'struggle for existence,' and the 'survival of the fittest,' are essentially meaningless and unsatisfactory terms because they fail to indicate what is good and what is evil, or to give any comprehensive explanation of how things come into being, why they endure, why they increase in power. These questions lie at the root of all organic or inorganic products; they are the fundamental questions which all societies and all religions seek to answer." Everything that makes for progress is the result of co-operation; because the so-called "good" is simply that which perpetuates or improves

* *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, vol. lv, 1916, No. 7.

co-operation, and the so-called " evil " prevents or destroys it. But Mr. Patten makes it clear that this principle of co-operation covers all the ground of advance. He says: " That co-operation is an important agent in human and in animal societies has often been recognized, but, so far as the author is aware, it has always been considered as something unusual or exceptional in nature, and has been chiefly or solely attributed to the instinctive or intelligent actions of social organisms. We maintain, however, that co-operation is a universal creative and preservative agent. Its sphere of activity includes cosmic as well as organic, social, and mental processes." Then the biological implications of this position are unfolded in an exhaustive series of illustrations, which do not concern us here.

Now apply this argument to the Germany we have studied so well in the light of nearly four years of the most brutal warfare ever known. Her history in the Pacific shows that co-operation has never been a part of her plan. An individual administrator like Dr. Solf could work wonders in Samoa when left to himself; but, once the authorities in Berlin (two years before war was declared in 1914) turned their eyes again upon Panama, and began to discuss " The Day," with the Pacific as part of a great battlefield, the development of the Prussian spirit was maintained. The old lines were extended to include Samoa. Co-operation between Germans and Britons in Samoa was stopped. Prussian officials stamped about Apia, and British settlers found an atmosphere of cold dislike and suspicion surrounding them instead of the friendliness of the past. This was the true German spirit asserting itself; for Samoa had been left as in a backwater. It has been argued that Dr. Solf must always be taken into account

when discussing Germany in the Pacific, as though he represented another, and probably the real Germany. The question arises whether under the circumstances a new Germany with men like Dr. Solf could possibly appear as the result of the war. Dare we believe in such a cataclysmic conversion? Could a nation working evil through long years in Europe, and in the greatest ocean in the world, suddenly turn to ways of righteousness and at last determine that honesty is the best policy and co-operation the only principle of progress? Mr. Patten, no doubt, would reply that even Germany must recognize fundamental truth. If she does not she will disappear, and neither the Pacific nor any other ocean will know her flag or her people again. If by an arrangement at the Peace Conference she is permitted to assert her claims in Africa, and through the ocean which covers a whole hemisphere between Australasia and the Americas, and if she then proceeds to carry out a programme of undeclared, but very real war upon other nations, she will find the world and all the heavens against her. This may be true, and philosophically one must accept the general conclusion. But will the world dare to face a future filled with possibilities of eternal strife because German ideas and ambitions have not changed? We cannot believe anything of the sort, except as Germany has been victorious or has forced a stalemate in the present conflict.

Very well, then comes the alternative. Will a beaten Germany be a converted Germany? Will those represented by Dr. Solf reach power and be maintained therein? We fear not, though, no doubt, a revolution in Germany would alter values and ideals considerably, leading to a new era. The Germany we know has been bred into a

bully and a world-pirate through generations of successful buccaneering, and it will take generations for the new Germany to unlearn the lessons of its failure. This may be challenged again, for conversion is a very wonderful thing. In the real Germany there are moderate-minded men and women, and Dr. Solf in Samoa still remains as an example of what they can be and do. But there will have to be growth in righteousness. The Germany of this war's horrors will have to be for years a Germany on probation. Can we trust her, in the immediate future after peace has been proclaimed, to take up the burdens of a Colonial Empire on an entirely new basis? Dr. Solf himself has been proclaiming what the German Colonial Empire of the future is to be. He has been careful in his language and moderate in his demands, but still the militant note has been dominant. He has attacked General Smuts, because the latter has formulated a doctrine which makes the future for the Germany we know look exceedingly doubtful; and Dr. Solf has been associated in speech with men who have not hesitated to say what is intended to be done by a still warlike Germany.* The *Mitteleuropa* movement has been based upon the idea that colonies are to find the Fatherland in unlimited raw materials, but are also to be great bases for a "world-policy" to be worked out in world-possession. One prominent German writer, for instance, thinks of the *Mittelafrica* movement in terms of aggression. If the *Emden*, without naval bases to fly to, could do so much damage to British shipping, what would happen with a great part of the African coast made ready for naval expeditions on the largest scale? Dr. Solf, Secretary of State to the Colonial Office, did not go so far,

* Article *Edinburgh Review*, July 1917, pp. 154–5.

and his moderation has brought the Pan-Germans down upon him; but he wrote recently: "The history of our colonies in the world-war has shown that the German Colonial Empire . . . was no proper 'Empire' at all, but just a number of possessions without geographical and political connexion or established communications. . . . This shows the direction our aims must take."*

The latter sentence is significant. Dr. Solf's speech at Leipzig in June 1917 was undoubtedly couched in terms of peace and exasperated the Pan-Germans, but he said, as has already been pointed out, "Our colonial programme is clear and simple. We desire to recover our colonial possessions, and we desire, to the utmost possible extent, to shape these possessions into a territory which will be capable of resistance and economically efficient. At the same time we desire to counteract the future menace to European peace which threatens us in the militarization of Africa which has been planned on the grand scale by our enemies." War, and not peace, is the thought behind this pronouncement. All Germany contemplates a re-organized colonial Empire bristling with guns, manned with soldiers, and ready with a series of great naval stations to carry on the struggle for world-supremacy. How, then, can Britons in the Pacific contemplate Germany as a neighbour again with complacency or sympathy? Her ideals are fundamentally different from those of the British Empire, so called, which is not an Empire in the sense in which Dr. Solf regards Germany when restored to power abroad through her colonies. Her freedom must become the world's slavery. Co-operation is the last thought in her mind. Moreover, the individual German has not been

* Quoted in *Edinburgh Review*, July 1917, pp. 154–5.

bred, in the last or in the present generation, to think of his or her life in terms of service through freedom—which is another form of expressing what is meant by co-operation. Mr. Patten, in the article already quoted, says: "Co-operation in the inner life of the individual is a prerequisite to co-operation in the outer life. It is the means by which it attains greater power and that larger physical volume that inevitably goes with larger power; and this larger organic power of the individual is the instrument by which it finds the larger sources of supplies, and the better ways of cosmic and social co-operation; it is the instrument by which it attains that which is good for itself, and avoids that which is evil. . . . And the demand of its larger volume is an added obligation for better internal and external co-operation." This is part of the argument turned upon biological ground and is applied to the world of life as seen through the microscope or under the conditions of the laboratory. But it is as true for the individual German, Briton, American, and Japanese as for the organism establishing itself in nature.

The retort may be made that Germans have proved their strength and their fitness to survive in the fighting of this war. They have faced a world in arms, and under the direction of their leaders have shown a courage and resource which have been immensely impressive. They may claim that co-operation has had its perfect work in them, and that the world may well learn of Germany. But the reply to this may be found in Dr. Solf himself when Governor of Samoa. He did not fail Germany. He commended her among the nations by developing a group of islands in the Pacific along lines of peace within and

harmony without. While serving her to the fullest possible extent he looked beyond Germany. Tact, wisdom, good temper, and a broad charity seemed to inspire his administration for more than a decade; and Samoa returned his gifts with profits pressed down and running over. Would not an Imperial Germany administered on such lines have held the world in fee? Even before the war she was practically mistress had she dared to wait; but it was because the world believed her to be peace-loving at heart, and not the brutal, lustful demon that was behind her Emperor's rattled sabre and shining armour.

In the Pacific, then, there has been an object-lesson through Dr. Solf; but it was not set by the true Germany. Theodor Weber and Bismarck were the exponents of Germany's policy in the Pacific; and Dr. Solf to-day, with moderate words but in militant mien, is taking up their mantle for a future struggle. To argue that the German people must be dissociated from the German Government, and from Prussian overlords like Bismarck and the rest, is to forget the whole course of history since Frederick the Great justified the most shameless treachery by insisting with Machiavelli that might is right, and with the Jesuits that the end justifies the means. In the Pacific, at any rate, the German people have been found out through their traders and great houses, through the free city of Hamburg which sent the Godeffroys out in 1854, and through the Colonial Association which forced Bismarck's hands after the Franco-Prussian War. The movement towards Empire abroad, supported by a mighty navy at home, has been a popular one. It has suited the present Emperor to put his weight behind it and develop the

programme of consistent aggression; but one must never forget that before Schleswig and Holstein were torn from Denmark, and the Duchies turned into a Prussian province, collections were being taken in German centres to make the fleet a powerful weapon of offence. Lord Salisbury, in his article upon the Danish Duchies, which was published in 1863, just before the war with Denmark, noted that this curious exhibition of patriotic zeal was being carried out with great industry, and that there were few towns in Germany (except where the Government had not interfered) in which collections were not made for the German fleet. "As a specimen of the mode in which the canvass had been conducted," wrote Lord Salisbury more than half a century ago, "and of the strange sort of people who have been induced to join it, we may take the case of Dr. Strauss, who has published during the present year [1864] a vigorous lecture directed against 'historical' Christianity, which he recommends to his countrymen by telling them that it was delivered at Heilbronn, a small town in Würtemburg, 'to raise money for the German fleet.'" The individual German at home, and the German in exile abroad, had become not only familiarized with the thought of aggression, but were parties to it before the war with France; and since the victories which brought a united Germany to birth in a storm of blood and iron, "Deutschland über Alles" has been sung by Germans all over the world with a thorough understanding of its inner meaning. The gospel of piracy has not been forced upon a reluctant people. It has been preached to congregations prepared not by official pressure so much as by a responsive and active spirit within. This is the fundamental fact for the Britains oversea as a return of the German colonies

is discussed. In the Pacific, earlier than elsewhere, the beginnings of possession were made by individual Germans, and were pursued despite official coldness and notwithstanding Bismarck's assertions that Germany could not be hampered with colonies. Samoa and Dr. Solf may be used against this argument, no doubt, if only the decade between 1900 and 1911 be discussed; but for half a century before the treaty was signed which gave most of the Samoan group to Germany, the story is one of genuine intrigue, and of strife among the Powers fomented by individual Germans who were able at last to force their Government into the arena. Not co-operation in the best sense, but its opposite, has been the characteristic of German policy in the Pacific. Only because British Governments would persist in believing the contrary—having faith in Germany's honesty of purpose and in her readiness to co-operate—has opinion in Australasia surprised and irritated Downing Street. But co-operation, except between Germans, has never found suitable soil as a thought or dominating principle, and consequently the larger co-operation has been impossible. Mr. Patten puts it forcibly in his summing up of the biological argument: "The same laws which prevail in the inner and outer life of animals and plants prevail in the social life of man. Man's social progress is measured by the degree to which he has extended the mutually profitable give and take of co-operative action beyond himself, into the family, tribe, and State, and into the world of life at large. The chief agents of civilization—language, commerce, science, literature, art, and religion—are the larger and more enduring instruments of conveyance which better enable the part and the whole to avoid that which is evil and to find that

which is good, and which yield a larger surplus for freedom." *

A business man's reply to this, even in Australasia, probably would be that competition is the soul of trade, and that when the war is over Germany, Japan, America, and the British Empire in the Pacific will soon be fighting one another with the peaceful weapons of commerce for supremacy. It is an open secret that Germany has made all her arrangements for picking up the threads of her trade there, even if her colonies are not returned to her. Her Pacific interests will still be represented by German property in German hands; for it is assumed that, whatever happens, German lands, plantations, and the machinery of exchange will not be altered. Subsidized German steamship lines are to run; and a far-reaching organization of buying and selling is gradually to force the business of the Pacific, wherever German planters and business men remain, into the old channels. The change of flag is not to count. Great Britain and her Dominions are to be the same as before, ready to treat everybody alike and willing to believe the best rather than the worst of a repentant Germany. Australasia, however, is to be cut out of other trade by Japanese and American competition. A new world is to place new burdens upon the backs of people who are seemingly determined to make costs of production increasingly heavy; and the problems of peace are to be infinitely more complex than the problems of war. But, after all, there is in the British character, whether in the old country or at the confines of Empire, a solid foundation of truth-loving and fair dealing. The idea of co-operation

* *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, vol. lv, 1916, No. 7, p. 511.

with other nations is not foreign to it, as is the case with Germany. Peace is the British hope and object, while war to the knife even after the greatest war in the world's history is a German obsession. How can the old German hostility be allowed free course by granting a return of German colonies? And if the German colonies are retained by their present holders, why should German competition be given a new start under a return to the old system of subsidies and of special attacks upon other nations? Australia knows too much already what the latter mean; and she for one will insist that Germany shall be watched very carefully when peace is proclaimed.

CHAPTER XI

GOVERNMENT BY GUNBOAT

The British Navy in the Pacific and the Empire : Sir William MacGregor's experience : Dr. George Brown's eulogies of British naval officers : Modes of control alien to British ideas of justice : Early Australian Governors were usually naval or military officers : The broad vision at last of a world-wide Commonwealth : High Commissioners of the Pacific : Their arbitrary powers and protests against their exercise : What is to be the form of future control ?

THE British idea of Empire in the Pacific has been better expressed through the Navy than in any other way. But Great Britain's thought of that wide ocean was undoubtedly one of peace, not war, even when she governed by her gunboats ; though, otherwise, " government by gunboat " may stand as a formula for the British Navy's undoubted achievement in making the Empire fruitful there on the larger side. Existing by discipline and trained to obey orders, the Navy has proved more than once that prompt action is possible in the face of circumlocution, red tape, and sealing-wax. At one time no doubt a large latitude was allowed, necessarily, in far-away stations ; and the Pacific has probably afforded more opportunities for original and unexpected solutions of difficult problems than any other ocean. Its reaches are full of fine material for a chapter on the Navy's activities, from the days of

Dampier, Cook, and Flinders onward, in some book waiting to be written; and trader and missionary join hands in telling stories of the energy, courage, and fine spirit shown by naval officers under the greatest difficulty and discouragement. The magnificent fight with the cyclone at Apia in 1889 made by the *Calliope* under Captain Kane, who put his vessel to the sternest test ever asked even of a British man-of-war, is an inspiring incident and is on permanent record, but it only stands out because the elements did their worst upon him.

It was the sea in its fury, not bloodthirsty cannibals, crafty Germans, or derelict white men in their devil's games, which had then for the moment to be overcome; and the manhood needed for the former struggle was the best of which our nature is capable. But the latter form of conflict surely has tried the resources of the British Navy to the uttermost. If it had been left to naval officers, more than half the present difficulty over Germany's intrigues in the Pacific would have been avoided. This reminder is due, because the British Empire in that ocean owes so much already to their presence and versatility. It was Sir William MacGregor's greatest comfort in 1888 that his landing at New Guinea as first Administrator was accompanied by words, not in Admiralty orders, from the naval officer who took him there. He tells the story in his Introduction to Judge Murray's history, "Papua, or British New Guinea," as follows: "The position of the Administrator was not unlike that of a man dropped into deep water with his hands tied behind his back, and is worth recalling on account of some winged words of Captain Bosanquet [then in command of H.M.S. *Opal*, and ordered by Admiral Fairfax to transport the Administrator to

New Guinea], who frankly informed me he was specially instructed not to land any men for police or similar duty in the possession; 'but,' he added, 'if I see you fellows beset anywhere with your back to a wall, I shall not look on with indifference.' I shall always remember those words with sincere gratitude, and treasure them as worthy of a British sailor."

Sir William had known something of the value of what Marion Crawford has called "that glorious British common sense" in gunboat government in Fiji, not because things had to be done in disobedience to orders, but because there was something of Nelson's lift of the telescope to a blind eye. In 1878 he was in Fiji as Medical Officer, and much beside, when Sir Arthur Gordon was still High Commissioner of the Western Pacific. The Chief Judicial Commissioner was Sir John Gorrie, who had very strong opinions upon the question of the white man's rights and privileges in the presence of natives, whether in overwhelming numbers or not. Word had come of an abominable outrage by natives in New Britain, where the Rev. George Brown had gone two or three years before, alone, as a white man, and into islands never before touched by missionary enterprise. He had taken some Fijian and Samoan teachers with him, and two of these had been brutally murdered, to be cooked and eaten by the cannibals guilty of the unprovoked attack. But the chief responsible for this business had sent Mr. Brown a message that he would come directly to kill and eat him, and the rest of the white men and native teachers on the island. There were a few German traders and other Europeans in the savage's eye, and he meant business. But Sir John Gorrie was incensed to learn that George Brown had taken the law into his

own hands. He considered it an outrage that the missionary had become a man of war to teach the chief Taleli a lesson and save the lives of the people with him.

It was terrible news. The missionary must certainly be tried and perhaps severely punished for his irregularity. So the judicial Chief went to the naval officer on the station and asked—probably demanded—a passage by man-of-war to New Britain. He would go himself and deal with the matter on the spot. Dr. Brown long afterwards told the story of the refusal of this demand. It had been related to him at first hand, and he knew exactly what had happened. The naval officer listened quietly to the Chief, who was not High Commissioner though head of the Judicial Commission, and shook his head. The thing was impossible. His orders would not permit, as urgent business took him in another direction. The truth was that the officer in question knew a good deal more about what George Brown had done than this high official; but he realized that the Commissioner, even with all the facts before him, would not take the same view of the situation as he did. Germany had sent her war vessel to make special inquiry, and Captain von Werner had eulogized the missionary for his courage and resource under exceptionally difficult conditions. Representations, indeed, had been made through Berlin to London, and the official naval mind was likely to carry its conclusions against the missionary's critics, who were very angry. Good people, whose honesty and sound sense could be trusted under ordinary circumstances, were eager to see him punished for not turning his cheek to the smiter on this occasion, or rather for not giving his body to be burned. But the naval officer, speaking as one in command at sea, would not help Sir

John Gorrie to reach New Britain; and the would-be vindicator of the law could not find a way to immortalize himself at George Brown's expense. The British Navy had thrown its ægis over the latter, just as the German navy, when the *Ariadne* steamed away with yards manned and band playing, had saluted him as a brave man.

But the work was not finished. The missionary had heard from Captain von Werner that he was to be tried in Fiji if he went there, or that he would be arrested whenever Commissioner Gorrie could lay hands upon him, and he decided to face the new music. He told Commodore Wilson that he intended to go to Fiji, and again the British Navy was ready to help him. "Do not go," the Commodore urged. "Sir John Gorrie will show no mercy, and he is determined to make an example of you. Why put yourself in his power? Listen to me and be sensible." But the missionary was obdurate and went to Fiji, to be served with a writ at once and ordered to appear before the judicial Chief. The High Commissioner, however, was now back from England, and through his influence common sense and equity were at last triumphant. Sir John Gorrie had to be content with the service of the writ, for the matter went no further, and George Brown left Fiji not only without a stain upon his character but respected and admired by the Imperial officials on the spot, who had become acquainted with the prompt and effective action he had taken.

Dr. Brown could never speak in warm enough terms about the British Navy and its work in the Pacific; but this particular incident prompted him to the highest eulogy of naval men, from whom he continually received assistance or recognition. No pioneer in the Pacific had less of the

official mind than this great missionary. He was a Radical to his finger-tips, and could take occasion by the hand without thought of what the rules might be or of public opinion upon it. His praise of the British Navy, therefore, becomes a warrant which the present writer, at any rate, does not propose to impugn; and to that extent the critic may find room for attack, because the Navy was introduced in the preceding chapter to show something of the British mind and character when dealing with colonists fighting the battle of Empire in distant seas. Nevertheless, there is solid ground for the argument that the Empire in the Pacific has been under continual strain through modes of control alien to the genius of the race. Settlement in Australia was begun and continued under what may be called naval or martial law; and even when the free immigrants began to feel their feet, and representative government was granted, they were in the grip of an officialdom that resented their struggles to control their own destiny. The Colonial Office in the earlier days, as has well been said, "was adamant in its opposition to any enlargement of the self-governing powers of various colonies." In America freedom had been a special gift, for when Britons crossed the Atlantic the King gave charters and patents to guard their rights as well as to assert the Royal prerogative. "The patent granted to Sir Humphrey Gilbert allowed those who settled in America under his auspices 'the privileges of free denizens and persons native of England in such ample manner as if they were born and personally resident in the said realm of England.' Moreover, they might be governed by their own laws, provided that such statutes 'conformed, as near as conveniently might be, with those of England,' and did

'not oppugn the Christian faith, or in any way withdraw the people of those lands from their allegiance.' No such charter of freedom was conferred upon the Canadians, Australians, or the South Africans at the inception of their colonial life."*

The policy of the British Government was to concentrate everything upon Downing Street, and good reasons were given for such a direction of affairs. Canada at the time was more French than British, Australia was a penal settlement, and South Africa with its Dutch was only occupied through the Cape of Good Hope for strategical reasons. There was no idea of Empire in the modern sense. The official mind controlled everything, and the Governors were the local centres of power. "These early Governors were usually distinguished military or naval officers, frequently destitute of the slightest knowledge of the resources of the country and of the feelings, interests, and aspirations of the people over whom they were to govern. . . . When they reached their destination they found no responsible Ministers of the Crown who could give them an impartial account of the exact state of affairs. . . . From time to time their downfall and disgrace were deliberately engineered by a powerful colonial clique which had influence in Downing Street, with which they had clashed. Many of the ablest Governors the oversea Dominions ever had—among them Lord Durham, Governor Macquarie, Governor Bourke, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and Sir George Grey might be cited as notable instances—were thus humiliated by dull, ungrateful superiors." † This is, no doubt, so much ancient history, but it is well to keep it in mind when trying to understand why Canadians, Australians, and South

* "British Colonial Policy, 1783–1915," by C. H. Curry, pp. 23–24.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 26–27.

Africans are so "difficult" when asked to co-operate in some large scheme for consolidating the Empire. It is not that they are doubtful about the Empire. Their history and actions have proved their loyalty. But they are perhaps more conscious of a principle of growth in Imperial relations than their kinsfolk in Great Britain, who look at everything from a standpoint of completion.

Canada has just celebrated the jubilee of the Dominion, which came to birth on July 1, 1867. Only in that year was Australia relieved of the unbearable burdens of transportation, though in 1855 responsible government had been granted to New South Wales. For some time, in stubborn unwillingness, the Colonial Office had grudgingly conceded the latter privilege in other places, but without allowing anything to appear in rigid legal documents to vouch for the fact; but, when New South Wales at last won through, Great Britain gave in fullest measure. This is where the mother of nations asserted herself against the official mind. A Constitution was granted, and much beside. "One provision of this Act might well be quoted, since it marks the happy termination of a long and lively controversy. 'The entire management and control of the waste lands belonging to the Crown in the colony of New South Wales, and also the appropriation of the gross proceeds of the sales of any such lands; and of all other proceeds and revenues of the same from whatever source arising, including all royalties, mines, and minerals, shall be vested in the Legislature of the colony.' Under the circumstances such generosity was inevitable if peace were to prevail, yet it was magnificent. If we look back now over the record of our connexion with Great Britain, reminding ourselves of the size of this Continent [Australia], of the story of its

early days, of the mere handful who now inhabit it, of the liberties and privileges they enjoy, we must gratefully acknowledge that she has done well by us." * This witness, by a Frazer Scholar and Nathan Prizeman of the University of Sydney, is true, and it is quoted with the greater satisfaction because it brings in the new era upon which everything else depends. The Dominions have been guarded by the British Navy, and have been made possible as self-governing Britains beyond the seas by a Mother Country converted from narrow views of Empire to the broad vision of a world-wide Commonwealth; and in the Pacific especially have the young nations been well treated. Much has been done for them of which little enough has been said—with acknowledgments never apparently expected and certainly never made. It has been quite in the British way. Even Germany's wiles were understood and countered, where the Navy was allowed to press its views, and to become head and hands for a wakeful or awakened Colonial Office in London. When Fiji was ceded to and annexed by Great Britain Germany was disappointed, but sought to "get even" through Tonga by obtaining Vavau as a naval station. Sir J. B. Thurston, as High Commissioner of the Western Pacific, reached forth his hand and quietly removed the offending Premier of Tonga, a certain Rev. Shirley Baker, and Tonga became a British Protectorate, though still nominally independent. It was done from a British warship, and once more the Navy's presence emphasizes the fact of a form of control in the Pacific, and of activities otherwise inimical to the Empire, which must be remembered when discussing the future.

The British mind in the Pacific has thus been moulded

* "British Colonial Policy, 1783–1915," by C. H. Curry, p. 142.

through a strange process. People living on its shores have begun their life in communities, under the flag truly, but also under a cloud; and the communities have developed doubt of an authority, which has given them autonomy, but retained full control through wide reaches of the ocean itself. Sir Everard im Thurn, another High Commissioner of the Western Pacific, also laid hands upon Tonga for disciplinary purposes, and the question was raised whether he was not arbitrary and exacting. If Sir J. B. Thurston had ordered the deportation of Robert Louis Stevenson, as he was very much inclined to do at one time, the same perplexity of an almost unlimited power would have been presented, and some bitter things would have been said. Thus it is interesting to turn up actual comment upon the point in this connexion. In 1906, when Sir Everard im Thurn was Governor of Fiji and High Commissioner of the Western Pacific, a dispassionate observer and capable critic, after making an extended tour of the islands, wrote vigorously upon the anomalies of the position. He admitted that one controlling nationality in the Pacific was desirable on political, commercial, and religious grounds; but, while allowing that a High Commissioner was necessary, he objected to the exercise of a power that could be very arbitrary and from which there was no appeal. "All provisional government," he wrote, "is open to the same objection, and presumably must be tolerated until the way has been prepared for a more settled order of things. It is a common matter of complaint that the high-handed and arbitrary exercise of power inherent in the conception of a High Commissionership involves an outrage on British ideas of justice. There is such a large margin of personal liberty allowed to the

occupant of the position as should only be sanctioned under exceptional conditions, and dispensed with at the earliest convenient opportunity."* This exaggerates the authority of the High Commissioner somewhat, but it serves to raise the whole issue of future control in the Pacific and the form of that control. If the German colonies are not returned, how shall they be governed and administered? What relation will Australia and New Zealand hold towards them? On what terms are the Dominions likely to be included in a far-reaching responsibility? Does the Mother Country really understand the Australasian character and temper; and can she sympathize with people who have been under continual pressure, not only from her own uncertainties in statecraft, but from the attitude of permanent officials who dislike change and resent even suggestions for a better order?

The best reply to these questions is to indicate briefly the evolution of authority in the Pacific under the British flag, and to show how of necessity the Navy became the dispenser of justice and the sign of a power which neither native nor fugitive white man could dispute. If British gunboats had not been ready at the outset to stand by the European trader or missionary, while protecting the natives, Theodor Weber would never have been able to originate his plans for a monopoly of trade and control for Germany. But this, and so much else arising out of it, must be given another chapter, since black labour is a prominent feature in it.

* Rev. M. Madden in *Review of Reviews*, Australian edition, December 1906. Quoted in "Cyclopedia of Tonga," p. 7.

CHAPTER XII

POLICIES OF DISAVOWAL

Law is forced into recognition by being ignored : Government by gunboat became necessary as police duty : Germany's appearance on the scene : Bismarck's speech in the Reichstag : Advantage taken of Great Britain's unwillingness to force possession : A great German scheme of colonization : The black labour traffic : Hopeless position in the New Hebrides : New Zealand snubbed over Samoa : British inaction and the present extraordinary mixture of possession : The opposition of British companies to colonization and exploration

As already indicated, in the days before annexations had been made in the Pacific by the Governments of the four Empires, the white man exercised authority by gunboat. It was an arbitrary proceeding, in that neither the natives of the various groups nor the white traders and missionaries dwelling therein were legally subject to control; but as in most cases, where national interests are developing, the law only becomes a factor by being at first ignored. Where there is no law the will of the stronger is supreme. Might is right. Hence as British and French exploring expeditions followed one another in the Pacific, and when the United States through Captain Wilkes was officially represented, police duty came as a matter of course. Where outrages were committed by natives upon white men, landing with or without peaceable intent, reprisals followed;

and in the case of Captain Wilkes his commission covered the searching out and punishing of natives said to have murdered American citizens. This was before the reported annexation of New Caledonia and Tahiti by France in 1848 and 1844. After those events, and when the repudiated acts had been confirmed by final French possession, British war vessels were more in evidence. Government by gunboat became a very real and necessary business, and British naval officers were recognized as dispensers of justice, not as forerunners of aggression or spoliation. The white man on the beaches, and the white trader established in regular business, perceived that they were as certain to be punished for misdoing as the natives who attempted or committed murder. Dr. George Brown has testified to the reality of this supervision and control. In one of his articles, written soon after the constitution of a Judicial Commission in Fiji, following upon the appointment of a High Commissioner for the Western Pacific, he urged strongly the inequity and ineffectiveness of the new as against the old order. He had been a witness in his own person to the inability of the High Commissioner to protect him from the cannibals of New Britain; but he had known only too well the terrors of the Judicial Court under a man like Chief Commissioner Gorrie. When it was argued that in no way could Great Britain justify her policy in the Pacific, as a Power without ulterior motives, except as she kept strictly within her legal rights, Dr. Brown protested. A policy of disavowal was not the way to preserve the peace and protect legitimate British interests. Though Great Britain had no intention of assuming control over natives in distant groups, and only desired to keep her hands upon British subjects who might attempt

to take advantage of them, she had a moral responsibility. No doubt policing the Pacific would be an enormously expensive business, and to assume even temporary jurisdiction over savages was practically impossible. But Dr. Brown put the case, as against the new form of control, in one of his articles in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, under the *nom de plume* "Justitia," as follows: "From the earliest days of our South Sea trade until the appointment of the High Commissioner jurisdiction has been practically assumed over those natives by all foreign Powers whose interests were concerned. Not simply magisterial power for the punishment of petty offences, but also every judicial act which can be exercised by a British judge, from the inflicting of a money fine, or a few hours' imprisonment, to the sentence and carrying out of the death penalty by hanging, has been exercised by Her Majesty's officers—both consular and naval—in the South Seas over natives of the different islands in regularly constituted courts both on shore and on board. . . . Any one who could search the consular records of Fiji and Samoa, and the records of the Australian stations, would find a great number of instances which would confirm what we have stated, and which would also prove that Her Majesty's Consuls and captains have been amongst the best friends of the natives, and have in numerous instances protected them from the unjust and overbearing conduct of those attempting to injure them or break their laws." *

This was the condition of affairs when Germany came upon the scene, through Godeffroy and Son, in the fifties, and for long after. It has already been shown how far ahead the Hamburg merchants had planned, and how they

* *Sydney Morning Herald*, April 2, 1881.

desired to establish German settlements upon a military basis in Samoa. Bismarck was entirely favourable; but his idea at the time, and also after the war with France had resulted in a United Germany, was not to involve the German Government. The Franco-Prussian War killed the Godeffroy scheme and practically ruined the firm; but with Theodor Weber's and Bismarck's help it arose from the ashes to become the "D.H. & P.G.," the "Long-handled Firm" (called for short), with Imperial backing. With reference to the question of German colonies in the Pacific, before things had come to a head with the annexation of New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago, Bismarck made a notable speech in the Reichstag, from which the following may be given: "My purpose, which is approved by His Majesty the Emperor, is to leave the responsibility of the development of the colony, as well as its establishment, to the activity and enterprise of our maritime and commercial fellow-citizens, and to proceed, not so much by annexing provinces beyond the seas, as by making free grants after the manner of English Royal Charters, treading in the footsteps of the famous English merchants who founded the East India Company. We shall leave to those fellow-citizens the interests and the good of the colony, only granting them the possibility of European jurisdiction for Europeans, promising them such protection as we can give them without placing a permanent garrison. . . . Our aim is not to found provinces, but to further commercial enterprise, and to protect those who acquire sovereignty and still remain attached to German interests against attacks resulting from unavoidable proximity, and against oppression and injury from other European Powers." *

* *Sydney Morning Herald*, September 26, 1884.

Before the year was out Germany had annexed provinces beyond the seas, but the company idea held good.

Thus the purpose pursued consistently, in the years before Germany actually acquired colonies in the Pacific, was that of peaceful penetration by traders; but the plan was so arranged that every advantage was taken of Britain's unwillingness to force possession of anything. Interests were steadily developed in various groups and islands; and when German traders got into difficulties or called for help there was always a German gunboat ready, or some demonstration would be made by other means to assert Germany's claim to precedence, if not to recognition, in actual possession. In this way all through the Western Pacific it was a case of "hands off," but there was no acceptance of responsibility. Nobody was to annex anything, but Germany was to be considered as in the field with certain rights of precedence. Before Fiji was annexed and Samoa divided, German firms were buying land, and German business men were a large factor in the everyday life of the groups. So far had the general purpose succeeded that a German syndicate was formed to extend the radius of action. The *Auckland Weekly News*, at the time Dr. Brown was writing his articles of warning, published a letter from a correspondent in London, who said that a bold policy of Pacific colonization found favour in Germany, not only among the public, but in financial circles where money was to be found to carry the business through. "An influential syndicate of Berlin and Hamburg financiers are prepared," the correspondent continued, "to establish a colonial bank to facilitate colonial enterprises, and it was alleged in the Reichstag a few days since that German bankers had purchased the Samoan Planta-

tion Company's shares and also intended to establish 'several grand colonies in New Guinea.' The group of capitalists included Baron Hausemann of Berlin, and Messrs. Ohlendorff and Godeffroy of Hamburg. Negotiations were opened with the firm of Herren Hernsheim, who own extensive properties in the South Seas. They submitted a scheme of operations to the syndicate, who thereupon announced their determination to act independently. The Messrs. Hernsheim, irritated at these tactics, exposed the whole scheme, which the other parties to it now seem inclined to repudiate altogether." *

When Fiji was annexed in 1875, however, a complicated situation arose which culminated in Germany's final activities in annexing New Guinea. Sir Arthur Gordon, soon after his arrival as Governor of Fiji, was appointed High Commissioner for the Western Pacific as well; and the old undivided control by British war vessels ceased. Yet things seemed to drift into confusion with the new order, and the evils of the recruiting system became accentuated. It should be pointed out that the so-called black labour traffic has a fairly long history in the Pacific. It goes back to the days of lawlessness when men and women were taken from the island groups further afield and brought in shiploads to Fiji, Samoa, and elsewhere to work in the plantations. There was no European Power in possession; and while Fiji, Tonga, and Samoa were under chiefly control, and the natives could not be forced to work for the white man, in the New Hebrides and the Solomon Islands the chiefs were comparatively weak and were certainly divided. No such concentration of control was possible as was attempted by Thakombau in Fiji with

* *Sydney Morning Herald*, September 18, 1884.

substantial success, or in Tonga by King George Tubou I. Hence, in the outlying groups of the Western Pacific, recruiting vessels would frequently take natives against the protests of their chiefs; and British gunboats could not be everywhere. A most abominable abuse arose in this way, and out of it came many murders. Bishop Patteson was killed, to avenge the actions of white men who, it was said, had put on white coats in imitation of the great missionary —decamping at last with their cargoes of captured natives. But the British naval officers were always on the watch. A story is told of the master of one of these recruiting schooners entering Suva with an empty ship and hurrying out in a panic because he saw a gunboat in the harbour. On being overhauled there was nothing to show that he was guilty of any crime. It was just another illustration of the Biblical proverb, "The wicked flee when no man pursueth"; and though there was moral certainty that the captain in this case was a villain he could not be dealt with in the absence of proof. Then came the cession of Fiji to Great Britain; and later on it was sought to check the abuses in the ocean by the appointment of a High Commissioner for the Western Pacific, with a court to give the machinery of jurisdiction. But now apparently it was decided that only British subjects could be dealt with. They were compelled to observe certain regulations. They could not sell arms and spirits to the natives, nor recruit the latter except under stringent rule and control. In theory the law was thoroughly sound, and it was vindicated wherever the flag was carried by British war vessels. But in practice a handicap was placed upon everything British, simply because neither France nor Germany was willing to follow suit. British

traders could not sell arms or ammunition, but the natives obtained what they wanted from German traders and sometimes shot British subjects with their German weapons. Moreover, the practical common sense of the naval officer brought him into opposition to the theoretical assumptions of men like Chief Justice Gorrie, and even of the High Commissioner himself. Meanwhile the number of outrages and murders increased. Instead of the new order proving successful it was becoming discredited, and largely because Great Britain's disinclination to recognize facts was Germany's opportunity. The latter allowed her nationals to recruit where they could find natives; and the range and detail of German trade knew no limits. The alternative, of course, was to take control of groups specially open to abuse and administer them under the flag, but here Germany presented her caveat.

In the New Hebrides a position developed which has become hopeless to-day, in its failure as an attempted compromise with France. Pacific history has been full of these compromises, which have either ended in Britain giving way, as in the Oregon country along the North American coast, and in Samoa; or in abandonment altogether, as was the case with New Guinea, New Britain, New Ireland, and the islands contiguous to them. It may be objected, no doubt, that British Columbia was a fair slice of the Oregon country, and that Samoa was balanced by something as good. But the principle of possession in the Pacific has always been a bugbear to Great Britain. She could not see that sooner or later her interests would demand much greater sacrifices than mere possession must entail, if she surrendered her immediate advantages. Thus France managed to take New Caledonia from her very grasp in

1853; and the New Hebrides are still a surviving compromise satisfactory neither to her nor to France, and assuredly a source of continual disquietude to Australia. It has not been for lack of Australasian protests that the chance of Samoa was given up to Germany and the United States. New Zealand, in particular, as far back as 1871, was emphatic over the need for action, and was snubbed for her pains. In that year the Governor, Sir George Bowen, wrote a memorandum on Samoa which was forwarded to the Colonial Office; in it the importance of settling the vexed question of possession was emphasized. The Australasian colonies, it was pointed out, were open to attack by any Power that, in time of war, chose to make a base of the group. The Legislative Council of New Zealand pressed the matter in an address to the Queen in which the argument was elaborated; and Lord Kimberley curtly replied in 1872 that the British Government was not prepared "to advise Her Majesty to take upon herself further direct responsibilities, such as would be entailed upon her by the assumption of sovereignty or a protectorate" over the Samoan group. Then came news of the negotiations between the United States and the Samoan chiefs for the harbour of Pago-Pago as a naval station; and Sir Julius Vogel wrote a memorandum which the Governor transmitted to London. In this, emphasis was again laid upon the point that any treaty granting a footing to other Powers in Samoa would be "very detrimental to the Australian colonies generally and to New Zealand in particular." A direct request was made on behalf of the New Zealand Government that if Great Britain decided to do nothing herself, the colony might be allowed to enter into negotiations with the Samoan chiefs to prevent

the group being annexed by anybody else, so that New Zealand interests might be protected. But again the answer was in effect that the British Government would do nothing nor allow any British colony to take action.*

This has been the key-note of British action, or inaction; more or less throughout the Pacific, until enterprising persons in the shape of British companies, individual traders, or missionary societies prepared the way and forced the Government's hands. Miss Grimshaw, writing of her visit to the New Hebrides in 1907, asked: "When did the stay-at-home English accord to their far-off colonial interests more than a stepdame's grudging share of interest and help?" This was added to the note that, while Australia was well aware of the importance of the New Hebrides as a possible foreign naval base upon her flank, she knew as little about the group as the Mother Country herself. But Great Britain has known a great deal, and, knowing, has preferred to surrender rather than create friction. Thus Gladstone, just before New Guinea was taken by Germany, listened to a plausible appeal by Count Herbert Bismarck, who had been sent over by his father, and deliberately chose to ignore the colonies. "Bismarck found in Gladstone a British statesman who was willing to conciliate Germany if he could thereby buttress peace in Europe, and he was willing even to flout colonial sentiment. Germany had her eye on colonies in the Pacific, and Mr. Gladstone was not prepared to deny her." † But it is true that one difficulty after another has arisen because

* *Sydney Morning Herald*, September 18, 1884.

† "The Two Germanies," by A. Hurd, *Fortnightly Review*, March 1917, p. 397.

neither in London nor in colonial capitals has there been true co-ordination of interest. Great Britain has been asked to shoulder fresh burdens—and carry all the additional expense—and when at last some compromise has been effected it has been too long delayed and has left unpleasant memories on both sides. Thus it was that, before Fiji was annexed, gunboat government became the only way of administering justice in the Pacific, and that after annexation the establishment of the High Commission, with its head and its court at Fiji, seemed to make confusion worse confounded. Out of it all has come the present extraordinary mixture of possession and administration which makes the British Colonial Office so weary, and which gives Australasia so many misgivings when the future is discussed, with or without Germany as a prominent factor in any new solution of a very intricate problem.

It only needs to be remarked in the general connexion, perhaps, that company enterprise in the Pacific has done wonders for the Empire, but it has also made additional difficulty. From the days when the policy of disavowal was in full feather, and Great Britain could not be persuaded to assume authority through annexation, but was obliged to exercise it by the hands of her naval officers, down to the present moment, the work of development has been done very largely through companies. Individual Britons, of course, have been everywhere and have made the gunboat necessary in the first instance; but the company has been ubiquitous too. Some day, no doubt, a book will be written upon this phase of a great question; because controversy upon it has affected the development of the British Empire. The dread of monopolies in some British communities has turned to a determination to end them wherever it can

be done. One does not forget the early history of the East India Company in its relation to Australia, or the Hudson Bay Company and its opposition to settlement in British Columbia. This point is worth developing a little before closing the chapter.

Sir Charles Lucas rightly credits the great chartered companies with making the Dominion of Canada an important part of the British Empire. The Hudson Bay Company and the Canadian Pacific Railway Company have been largely responsible for its position and progress, just as the East India Company prepared the way for Imperial control in India. But neither company helped Australia or Canada at the outset. Writing of the East India Company Prof. Ernest Scott says: "The Company's charter gave to it a complete monopoly of trade with the East and the Pacific, and it was, therefore, interested in the finding of fresh harbours for its vessels in the South Seas. But, despite this display of concern [for Flinders's expedition], the East India Company had been no friend to Australian discovery and exploration. In the early years of the settlement at Port Jackson it resisted the opening of direct trade between Great Britain and New South Wales, with as jealous a dislike as ever the Spanish monopolists at Seville displayed in the sixteenth century concerning all trade with America that did not flow through their hands. Even so recently as 1806 the Company opposed—and, strangely enough, successfully—the sale of a cargo of sealskins and whale oil from Sydney, on the ground 'that the charter of the colony gave the colonist no right to trade, and that the transaction was a violation of Company's charter and against its welfare.'" * Aus-

* "Life of Matthew Flinders," by Ernest Scott, p. 181.

tralia certainly has an ingrained objection to monopolies of all kinds; and her railways, owned by the States and the Commonwealth everywhere, are a standing evidence of public feeling. But Canada has not felt the same way, because the Canadian Pacific Railway Company was permitted to give her a backbone in the first great transcontinental line. Yet the Hudson Bay Company for a long time stood in the way of settlement in the North-West and in British Columbia. Mr. A. G. Bradley says that it was always anxious to get full control of those wild Western territories, and that it kept settlers out rather than brought them in. The directors and their associates "had thwarted for fifty years every attempt of outsiders to settle in Manitoba, and to the last depreciated the country's agricultural possibilities with all the weighty authority of experience. In 1847 they were granted the sole possession and government of the island of Vancouver, on condition of colonizing it and supporting a British Governor, but they did neither the one nor the other." Then, with the gold rush of 1858, the Company was turned out and a British colony was created under a British Governor.* The Canadian Pacific Railway Company has been wise in its generation; and it has been the greatest colonizer the Empire has known along the lines of private enterprise. Broadly this is true of the Pacific, in that company activity has opened the way through its wide waters and held group after group while administration was finding its feet. But Bismarck was hardly thinking in this connexion of a trading enterprise forcing its way or blocking progress. He had an eye on trade

* "Canada," by A. G. Bradley, pp. 213, 214 (Home University Library).

developed, not in spite of the Government, but with its knowledge, sympathy, and constant help. The British Empire in the Pacific has come largely against Government wish or effort, and one feels it must have true roots which are going deeper and growing stronger. Yet the principle of a growth only just begun must be recognized and accepted. Even to realize an urgent purpose for creating an Imperial Federation, we cannot think of the Empire as a machine.

CHAPTER XIII

FRANCE AND AUSTRALIA

Three principles of British policy : The British Navy and the Monroe Doctrine : France and Great Britain in the New Hebrides : Condominium not a success : Summary of history of New Hebrides : New Caledonia and the New Hebrides must be taken together : The Presbyterian Mission : Its service for the Empire : The natives still at a cruel disadvantage : France our comrade and friend

LEST the preceding criticism of Great Britain should be misunderstood it must be said that three principles of control have been in the minds of British statesmen. If only the other Powers concerned had been willing to work out the destinies of the Pacific along the lines sought to be laid down everything might have been well, up to a point; but there must have come a moment at which the inability of the natives to govern themselves would have to be recognized. The first principle was expressed in Britain's use of her Navy. It was intended and applied to keep the peace; and throughout the world for a century it has undoubtedly made peaceful progress possible for British dominions and for North and South America. A recent American writer, Mr. George Louis Beer, in his book, "The English-Speaking Peoples," has dealt with this phase of a great subject. He admits that every nation has profited by Britain's control of the sea. The British

Navy, and not the Monroe Doctrine, has kept the Americas inviolable, and with it all Great Britain has given way, instead of shaking a mailed fist, to preserve the peace. Mr. Beer reminds us that the late John Hay when American Ambassador had to confess that all he had ever done with England was "to wring great concessions out of her with no compensation." Thus the British thought was to keep the Pacific a free trading-ground, open to all nations, and true to its name. Hence came the second principle of no annexations; and the third principle, that native rights and needs as to lands everywhere should be given paramount consideration, may be said to sum up and include the other two. Any review of British dealings with native races, in this matter of keeping their lands for them, will confirm the general statement. It has been done in Canada and Australia by special reserves, in New Zealand under the Treaty of Waitangi signed in 1840, in Fiji under the Deed of Cession of 1874, in Papua by provisions promulgated in 1888 which confirm the natives in the possession of their tribal lands, and in Africa by various careful regulations. This is the conclusion of Mr. Edward Jacomb, Barrister-at-Law, writing from Vila in the New Hebrides. He has well said: "Despite differences in origin, and despite difference of climate and area of country, one constant underlying principle of policy may be deduced. It has been the policy of the English race to make an *ample* provision for the needs of the native races of the colonies where it has settled. The question of the area of the country is not considered at all. Large areas are not awarded because they can be given on a continent, and smaller ones because the native lives on a small island. The only question is, 'What does the native require?'

He comes first, and when he has been amply provided for, both for present needs and future contingencies, then the question of the white settler is dealt with." *

The point of this statement, however, lies in the argument it initiates. Mr. Jacomb proceeds to show that in the New Hebrides, where France and Great Britain are in possession and exercise control through a Condominium and a Joint Court, the unfortunate native is by no means being placed first in the possession of his lands. There are regulations and rulings, no doubt, but the Condominium is not a success. It is supposed to represent the final application of a policy of British and French non-annexation and of peaceful progress. The natives might seem to be their own masters, because neither Power will allow the other to assume either the totality or the reality of masterhood; but, in fact, they are at the mercy of wind and weather—derelict and forlorn except for the wonderful work of the missionaries. The Presbyterian Mission has acquired land in considerable areas, so that the natives may be taught its value, and in order that the Christianizing and civilizing process may bear its proper fruit. But the Condominium is only concerned to investigate titles, register them, and generally to see that justice is done between natives and non-natives. In theory the land belongs to the natives until they sell it. In practice, according to Mr. Jacomb, it is available for the first white man who comes along and is not afraid of the Joint Court. "The principle underlying the Convention is that the land remains native land until such time as the white settler proves his title thereto in one of the ways

* "France and England in the New Hebrides," by Edward Jacomb, p. 48.

set forth in Article 22 of the Convention. . . . The position of a native when his land is taken from him by a non-native may be described as follows: He cannot himself apply for a Government title to his land, unless he first sells and then repurchases it. If a non-native chooses to help himself to land claimed and occupied by natives, whether such taking be supported by concession or not—the native cannot apply to the Administration for help, for the Administration has special orders not to interfere in land matters; nor can he apply to the Joint Court, for the Court refuses to grant interim injunctions or to hear ejectment actions save when such shall be brought later on after the lodgment of an application and the filing of a caveat. Consequently there is nothing whatever to prevent a European from installing himself on native lands whether he has purchased them or not, and remaining there indefinitely, for there is nothing to compel him to go to the Court with an application. As long as some one else does not put in an application his position is unassailable. In short, if a white man wishes to take a native's land he can do so with impunity." * Now these quotations have been given from Mr. Jacomb's book because the author has been long resident in the New Hebrides and has been a witness of the working of the Condominium since its inception. He may be charged, no doubt, with writing from a brief, as he certainly gives the French side of the case in sufficiently dark colours. But he insists that the British and French residents look at the Condominium from opposite points of view, and this seems a reasonable statement from the facts. "The British residency has

* "France and England in the New Hebrides," by Edward Jacomb, pp. 129–186.

always pursued a policy of unswerving loyalty to the spirit of the Condominium. No attempt has ever been made to advance the British interests at the expense of French, either by encouragement of the British settler or by endeavouring to secure a preponderance of influence over the natives. . . . The theory of the French residency is quite another matter. It has frankly regarded the group as French, and has with difficulty tolerated the presence of the British Administration at all. Its object has been to push French interests." * Yet the Condominium as covered by the Convention respecting the New Hebrides, signed in London, February 27, 1906, has large powers. The Convention is a formidable document, and goes fully into the procedure for dealing with land and labour, and the natives ought to be guarded against the greedy white man whether the latter wants to buy real property or to engage boys to help him cultivate it. In theory everything is all right. In practice things are nearly all wrong, and Mr. Jacomb, whose book was published just as the present war broke out, shows how hopeless the prospects are unless France and Great Britain can agree to radical alterations in their joint administration. Even so Australia, at any rate, will feel that nothing can be satisfactory that does not recognize her special disadvantages. Here is a group of islands near her coast under a control which is apparently impossible and must remain so; and it is conceivably more important to her that the future of the New Hebrides should be assured than that even New Guinea and Samoa should be permanently British.

A brief summary of the history of this group may be

* "France and England in the New Hebrides," by Edward Jacomb, p. 77.

offered to illustrate the hopelessness of British compromises in the past when opposing principles have been tacit or declared. First, let it be once more acknowledged that French enterprise in the Pacific has been a fairly constant activity, largely legitimate, and full of fine achievement. French exploring expeditions have done remarkably good work, from that of Bougainville, who left France in 1766, to the voyage of La Place, which lasted through 1830, 1831, and 1832. The Napoleons undoubtedly added a spice of piracy to the scientific completeness of French investigations, but, broadly, too much praise cannot be given to the thoroughness and unselfishness of the best of the nation's navigators. Bougainville sailed round the New Hebrides in 1768, about the time that Carteret in his determined British way was taking possession of New Britain and New Ireland for George III, but it was Captain Cook who in 1774 really discovered and named the group and made the survey of its islands. He, too, named New Caledonia, and was very much impressed with the whole. It is difficult to think of New Caledonia and the New Hebrides apart. They form a whole, because the latter supplies what the former lacks. They are related as to position; and whoever controls the New Hebrides will undoubtedly hold New Caledonia in practical possession. This is a very important point, and gives the clue to much of the difficulty that has arisen in recent years. But for Australia the position is made more awkward because New Caledonia has been too close for comfort at any time; and while France sent her convicts there it was a deliberate menace to her. With the New Hebrides added, for Vila and Havannah are fine harbours, the group must become one of the important positions in the Pacific. Now, at

the outset, Great Britain seemed to recognize the vital necessity of keeping her hands upon both New Caledonia and the New Hebrides, while France just as keenly appreciated their strategic and commercial value. In 1848 French missionaries landed in New Caledonia and claimed it for France, "but on British representations the claim was renounced." * Ten years later Napoleon III managed to annex it, and one reads with mixed feelings of a possible attack upon Australia. Lord John Russell's biographer says: "There is still among Lord John's papers a simple document which purports to be a translation of a series of confidential questions issued by Napoleon III on the possibility of a French expedition, secretly collected in different ports, invading, conquering, and holding Australia." † Nor does one forget that it was Lord John Russell who, when asked by a French agent how much of Australia Great Britain claimed, replied, "The whole of it." Nor again can it be forgotten that Napoleon III's designs upon Mexico in the sixties of the last century, though primarily directed against the Monroe Doctrine, had a Pacific side to them. No doubt the movement of the French in 1848 aroused the British, not only on the diplomatic, but on the commercial and colonizing side. In the Mitchell Library in Sydney is a pamphlet issued by the New Hebrides Company, published in London in 1846, in which the possibilities of the group are explained. Read in conjunction with the history of the islands, as it may be scanned to-day, one marvels at Great Britain's refusal to take New Caledonia and the New Hebrides when they were in her hands. The Dutch were laying hands upon

* "Encyclopædia Britannica," article "New Caledonia."

† Quoted in "Terre Napoléon," by Ernest Scott, p. 279.

important lands, or securing their monopolies by unscrupulous means. It had been Holland's policy to maintain her monopoly of the spice trade by destroying everywhere the trees from which nutmegs and cloves were obtained, outside of her own range of possession. The pamphlet quotes from a work on the Indian Archipelago, which gives chapter and verse. "The entire monopoly of the spice trade is insured," says the author, "as far as regards the production of the nutmeg as well as the clove-tree, to the Banda Islands, and the latter to Amboyna, by paying little stipends to the petty princes of the other native countries of spices for the extermination of the plants." This vandalism was certainly practised in the New Hebrides, not at Dutch instigation we may suppose, but because Great Britain would not control the group nor allow anybody else to do so. The sandalwood traders made terrible havoc in the islands, until to-day there are practically no trees left. Such a gross disregard of common sense might be natural under the circumstances, for it was nobody's business to think of the future, and the immediate need was sandalwood. But it was of a piece with everything else. The New Hebrides became identified with the abominable abuses of the black labour traffic. The natives were regarded by the recruiters as the sandalwood-trees were looked upon by the traders; and nothing could have been more cruel and callous than the earlier years of this business in human flesh. Indeed the New Hebrides stand out as an illustration of the extremes of mischief involved in a policy of disavowals, compromises, and no annexations. Yet no group was more visited by British and other gunboats. The one was, of course, the corollary of the other; and it cannot have been from lack of knowledge that action

was declined or deferred until too late. It is true that the natives are low in the scale of Pacific island life. They have always been bloodthirsty and degraded; but when the story of the early days is studied, the marvel is that the white man's greed and crimes did not produce worse fruit.

Into this hell went John Williams for the London Missionary Society, only to be murdered at Erromanga in 1839. Native teachers from Samoa and Rarotonga, however, kept the gates for the white missionary, and, indeed, by their steady persistent labours made it possible for him at first to do the great work now on record. John Geddie, the first Presbyterian missionary, reached the New Hebrides in 1847, though Bishop Selwyn had already been there from New Zealand and returned with Bishop Patteson in 1852. The Presbyterian and Melanesian Missions eventually divided the group between them; and the Roman Catholic Church and the Salvation Army have also been in evidence. The Roman Catholics had many priests throughout the group; and their adherents are now more numerous than the rest, though the second attempt to gain a footing was not made until about the time of the Joint Naval Convention in 1888. It is the Presbyterian Mission, however, which has practically prevented the abandonment of the New Hebrides by Great Britain. Australia in this respect has moved to some effect, for it is by Australian service and self-denial that the Mission has been made a power in the group. From the beginning the colony of Victoria has been specially concerned in this matter. When the Convention of 1883 met in Sydney to consider the whole question of Pacific control, after the British Government through Lord Derby had refused to

ratify Sir Thomas McIlwraith's annexation of New Guinea, the Victorian representatives put the New Hebrides in a prominent position in the general protest. In 1880 everything was in Great Britain's favour. Residents in the group were all British subjects, and nearly the whole of the trade was Australian.

Then France made a steady effort to acquire control; and in 1904, twenty years after Mr. Gladstone had decided to give Germany her way in the Pacific, and to disregard Australian sentiment, French settlers were in the majority, and two-thirds of the area and the best islands were in French possession. But the Presbyterian Mission has held on with grim tenacity, not only to save the group for the Empire, but to preserve its own footing for the sake of the natives. French annexations elsewhere resulted in the turning out of missions not French; but the Presbyterians had suffered and spent in the New Hebrides until their claims could not be ignored. From the commencement they have done the detailed work of protecting the natives. To-day, under the extraordinary conditions of a dual European occupation, the medical side of their Mission is the mainstay of native health; and while the Condominium should be considering many things to save and serve the natives, in practice the Administrations seem to be impotent. There has been no real co-operation between the residents, because they represent different principles and ideals; and the Joint Court is made up of three judges, the third being a Spaniard, who cannot get beyond the limits of red tape and sealing-wax. The language difficulty is a never-ending source of trouble, and the unfortunate natives in the end are still largely at the mercy of the white man. But the Presbyterian Mission has been the

individual Briton's protest against British inaction; and what Great Britain has not done, because of a policy of disavowal in the first instance, and of a wish to live peaceably with Germany and France in Europe later on, the Australians have been obliged to accomplish by indirect means.

Again it must be urged that the object of this chapter is not to blame, but to explain. Dr. Felix Speiser, of Basle in Switzerland, made the New Hebrides his special study in 1911 and 1912, and his verdict was quite clear. He said that the Condominium Government had practically no influence on the lives of the people, and did not carry any further inland than the reports of its guns. "Only in the matter of recruiting can it be said that the natives are protected, and this only applies to the British Government." Dr. Speiser declared that the native was unknown to the Administrations and the Joint Court except as a recruit or a malefactor; and as a consequence the missionaries have a double burden thrown upon them. They have been condemned as ubiquitous nuisances by traders, travellers, and Government officials; and yet, although the Pacific Ocean is still a mighty problem from end to end, they have done more for the white man and the native in it than the three others put together. But the tragedy of the New Hebrides and of other groups has been that Great Britain's theory of freedom and fair play all round has proved hopeless because other Powers have refused to recognize it. They have looked at the purely practical side, upon which their own interests were naturally most prominent. She has tried to keep her eyes upon native interests and on an open highway, forgetting that the Polynesian and the Melanesian have to learn the lessons

of civilization under special strain. When the outlying parts of the Empire in the Pacific made their own representations and found their own difficulties, the Mother Country was freshly perplexed; and in attempting to meet their views, while resolving her own complications in Europe, she has pleased nobody. This may be met with the retort that, while Great Britain has been hampered, the Dominions have not been reasonable. The problem of the New Hebrides might have been solved long ago had Australia, for instance, been as willing to pay for looking after the group as she has proved herself ready to carry Papua. A suggestion was made just before the war that the Condominium could be ended by adjustments elsewhere if Australia would find two or three millions sterling for compensation to British private interests in a part of Africa where France and Great Britain might make a deal. There have been endless rumours of French restlessness in New Caledonia in respect to France herself, and of possible petitions for a transfer to Australia. But nobody in Australia has given much thought to rumour or suggestion. Quite clearly the New Hebrides, important as the group is to Australian interests and safety, must now wait upon the settlements of peace; and meanwhile the only concern is to get the facts into focus. One arrangement after another has been tried by Great Britain and France to reach a compromise, though the one was unwilling to annex, and the other was determined to do so. When France in the eighties began to land troops on the island of Sandwich, apparently as a preliminary to annexation, something had to be done; and the Convention of 1888 was the result, owing principally to the Presbyterian Mission moving the Australian colonies to protest.

The group was then entrusted to a Joint Naval Commission, which was only a sign that neither Power was in possession. The impossibility of continuing such a negation of responsibility led to the Condominium, and a Convention was signed in London in February 1906. The two flags were then hoisted as against the world. Australia has subsidized a steamship service to the group, and while refusing to allow the produce of British settlers to enter the Commonwealth, except under the usual heavy customs tariff, has returned them a sum of money each year by way of rebate and bonus. Mr. Jacomb says that even the £750 given in 1906, divided among a hundred families, was too small to be helpful. It was like offering a match to a drowning man instead of a lifebuoy. So the story has to be told, and while the future of the German colonies is in suspense the prospects of a satisfactory settlement of the New Hebrides must also wait. Meanwhile France is our comrade and close friend. She has no Empire in the Pacific, and New Caledonia and the New Hebrides have possessed for her a sentimental value rather than a definite financial and commercial worth. They have cost much money to keep going, and are not likely to cost less in future. The strategic question probably will not arise in any further discussion of their development or control, but a great deal will still depend upon the final details of disposal.

CHAPTER XIV

AUSTRALIAN DEVELOPMENT

Australians' interest in the Pacific : Labour in politics : The Commonwealth not popular in the island groups : Cross-purposes and a paradox : Australia and tropical problems : She still has a case of her own : Education of Labour leaders : Federation and the future : Australian unionism and class warfare : Mr. Hughes's difficult position : His failure to throw responsibility on Parliament : Australians are 98 per cent. of British stock : The Empire must come first

A DIFFICULTY arises, at the close of this discussion of the Pacific, in the relation of Australia to the great ocean itself and to the island groups comparatively so close to her shores. It must not be assumed that Australians are so profoundly concerned to-day about the fate of the Pacific that they are abandoning local politics to discuss it, or that they have done so much to help in developing British interests that their opinion must be given extraordinary weight. While it is undoubtedly true that in the past intense interest was aroused and was maintained as Germany asserted herself, and that it increased as France became a problem of greater complexity in the New Hebrides, the tendency in later years has been for the new nation, occupying a great empty island continent, to become absorbed in its own internal troubles and responsibilities. An insular, call it a provincial, spirit has become

noticeable among the people; and Labour in politics has added a factor to the general Australian development which has tended to crowd the larger thought of Empire into the background. This thought, however, has never been suppressed. It has asserted itself in the urgency of questions concerning the Pacific and the proximity of Asia; and even Labour when in power, either through the pressure of public opinion or because of the strain of direct responsibility, has been obliged to look up occasionally from the game of politics—from the demands of "spoils to the victors"—and consider the world outside Australia altogether. But the result has not been helpful. Australian statesmanship has not been vindicated by any large and successful policy, either in dealing with Asia or with the island groups of the Pacific, upon which so much may depend in the near future. Neither with tropical problems nor with the urgent needs of immigration in the temperate regions of Australia has there been inspiring leadership or impressive administration. As one looks abroad one realizes that our kinsfolk in the Pacific have no apparent wish to be drawn into closer relationships with the Commonwealth, and that any suggestion of an arrangement after the war is over which shall extend Australian jurisdiction is received with more than doubt—with direct hostility. Neither Fiji nor the Solomons have a desire for Australian control on the lines of Papua; and Australian labour crises have been such a constant source of trouble and disappointment in the general trade and industry of the islands that it is hard to imagine a method of extended control which would work satisfactorily. It is argued by planters, traders, business men, and others in the Pacific that Australia has too much to do in looking

after her own affairs to find time for the difficulties of other people.

Reference has already been made to the actual experience of one group and another in these respects. Papua may be mentioned again, though within the radius of Commonwealth control and not a mere island group at all, because it shows so clearly what is involved. Its products have no preference in the Commonwealth tariff. Tropical products like bananas, which are urgently required in Australia for food, have to pay the same duty as Fijian bananas, although Fiji is a Crown colony administered through the Colonial Office while Papua has to look to Melbourne for its orders and initiative. This is due to the fact that Northern Queensland grows bananas, principally with Chinese enterprise, and claims protection against all comers. A few white men draw large rents from rich scrublands, which the Chinese cultivate until they are exhausted; and the people of Australia have to pay exorbitant prices for bananas to keep the local Chinaman and his European landlord satisfied. It is a most extraordinary paradox. But in this respect the whole of Northern Australia is a problem. With the best of intentions Labour Governments have poured out money like water, to prove that the white man can develop its million square miles of country so close to the hundreds of millions of people in India and China; and the only result has been that with Government control of many things, including public-houses and the payment of wages on the highest possible scale, the Northern Territory is still an insoluble problem. When one is asked whether the Commonwealth is capable of doing much with further responsibility in the Pacific, seeing that it cannot apparently even begin

to unravel its own tropical complications, a reply is not easy to find. The dilemma is not removed by references to the New Hebrides, where Australia has really interposed to some effect to prevent France from taking possession. This has been due not so much to the interference of the Commonwealth Government as to its protests, which have been prompted by the fears and foresight of Australians working as mission pioneers or as business men with money invested under Government encouragement. Australian planters in the New Hebrides may receive a bonus from the Commonwealth, as Mr. Jacomb explains, but it does not carry them very far. They have gone to the group imagining themselves to be extending the frontiers of Australia, only to find that Australian producers look upon them as competitors against whom barriers must be erected, not as compatriots due to receive a helping hand instead of an odd finger. Australian trade with the Pacific has, no doubt, been steadily growing, and white men in the various groups have learned to look to Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane for their supplies. Their copra and other raw products are taken to Australia in exchange, and the possibilities in this direction are infinite. But strike after strike on the mainland has dislocated island traffic, held up island supplies, and threatened island settlement at many points, so that traders, missionaries, business men, and the natives themselves have begun to think of the Commonwealth in terms of Australian instability and restlessness. Instead of finding Australia a friend in need, or a present help in the ordinary emergencies of life upon the greatest ocean in the world, they have been moved to denounce Australia as a nuisance, if not as an enemy. With war now adding a terrible complica-

tion to everything the feeling of insecurity has sensibly increased; and it is not astonishing that the future of the island groups is being discussed with the Empire first and Australia a bad second.

While admitting the facts in these relations it must be confessed that Australia still has a case of her own. The development of a great continent, in the hands of comparatively so few people, would present many difficulties if primary production and all that it involves were the only business pursued; but with nearly half the population clotted into six capital cities, and the great majority of that half divided between Sydney and Melbourne, things are topsy-turvy. This means that a purely urban and industrial problem has been created in a country whose very life-blood depends upon settlement throughout its empty spaces and whose existence as a Commonwealth is wrapped up in the disposal of vast quantities of raw material. Thus the emergence of a so-called Labour Party thirty years ago was the signal for a new division of forces in the body politic; and old-world cries and complications became the mark of a new-world order, to the confusion of statesmanship and the despair of liberal-minded leaders in all branches of enterprise. But this generalization must be qualified by the reminder that out of such trouble has emerged the Commonwealth. There was enough idealism and foresight in the four millions of people, divided into new camps, to bring federation to fruit, though from the commencement Labour leaders thought of unification simply as their best weapon against the old order and as the only effective lever to place under capitalism and all that it represents. Socialism, in every form of its gospel from the extreme of anarchy as preached in Queensland to the mild type accepted in

South Australia, which can hardly be distinguished from honest Radicalism, has been the dominating question since Australian politics entered upon its new course; and the cities have practically ruled the roost for a quarter of a century, to the discomfiture of the country. Forces that should have worked in co-operation have thus been in opposition; and the friction generated within the Commonwealth has made it extremely difficult for Australians as a people to grasp the significance of events outside. Federation, no doubt, may fairly be said to have come as the end of a great movement originating in world-politics; because the Sydney Convention of 1883, following Sir Thomas McIlwraith's vain attempt to hold New Guinea for the Empire, was the true progenitor of the Commonwealth which began its existence in 1901. Since the opening year of the present century there has undoubtedly been great progress, and federation in the main has been justified by results. But, as compared with the possibilities of union, it has been an expensive experiment, largely devoted to proving Socialism and Labour politics to be the undoing of nationhood and not its salvation.

Here, again, one must revise an estimate which may be misunderstood by asking the reader to remember that probably in no other way could Australian unionism be tested or its exponents and advocates be educated. Labour in politics has been steadily disciplined by failure. Labour Members of Parliament in each of the colonies before, and in every State after federation, have been distinguished by their application to business and by an intense desire to prove their faith by their works. The present writer remembers as though it were yesterday the election of the first Labour Party, twenty-six strong, in Queensland more

than a quarter of a century ago; and the way in which the newly elected members buried themselves in the library of the local Parliament was a lesson in itself. The late Speaker of the House of Representatives in the Commonwealth Parliament, Mr. C. McDonald, a watchmaker from Northern Queensland, was not long in showing his quality as a critic; and before he had finished he became an authority on the Standing Orders, eventually proving a capable successor to Sir Frederick Holder in Melbourne after union had been consummated. Mr. Fisher, now High Commissioner of Australia in London, was among that knot of earnest inquiring members who read and thought as hard as they had once wrought in their several trades; he had not long arrived from Scotland to become a working miner on the Gympie Goldfield in Southern Queensland. If for no other reason one must admit that the quarter of a century of expensive disappointment in Australian politics has not been all loss, since a whole section of the community has been to school and has not yet been let out for play. Its discipline has been increased through war, and it will be augmented when peace is proclaimed and probably for many long days after; but the training in statecraft had to come at some time, and better a beginning thirty years back than with the declaration of war by Germany in 1914. The breaking up of old party divisions has, no doubt, been a cause of serious trouble, for something like a class war has taken the place of the controversies and disputes of Liberalism and Conservatism. Labour and Capital have faced one another with growing hostility for many years; and Labour in power has shown itself as ruthless as it has been spendthrift. But many of the best minds in the Labour Party have been forced

to admit that the millennium can never be realized by legislation or rushed in with mere class aggrandizement. There must be co-operation if progress and prosperity are to be general and their fruits widely distributed. This return to common sense has, no doubt, been hastened and made definite by the war. Labour has been in travail; and the need for a National Party to combine the strength and ability of all classes against a common enemy has brought the extremists into conflict with the moderates. The birth of a strong united body, neither Liberal nor Labour, but compact of both, has created a serious division in the Labour Party, and the irreconcilable elements have now become an Opposition in the Federal Parliament and in most of the State Parliaments of Australia.

All this must be kept in mind when attacks are made upon Australian politicians, and when hard words are hurled at public men in the Commonwealth who may have seemed to be marking time instead of marching in the van as leaders of the young democracy. Mr. Hughes has probably received more bitter words in Australia during the last year or so than any man of eminence during its political history, and that is saying a great deal. Australians are as vigorous fighters in the sphere of thought and speech as in the battlefields of action, whether in subduing the wildernesses of a great continent or in fighting Germans and Turks in Europe and Asia Minor. Mr. Hughes was so long the brain of the Labour Party, and its mouthpiece against capitalism and the old order of things, that when he put the Empire first and forced the conscription issue through the first referendum in 1916 his supporters and associates, and indeed all Australia, were caught like a ship thrown on her beam-ends in a gale. Soon the

issues were defined; and the National Party arose triumphant, but only after the most bitter controversy. Mr. Hughes found his Cabinet in pieces under him as soon as he let it be seen that unionism and its future were not the main thing in a war that threatened the very existence of the Commonwealth through the Empire. He had been to England to electrify the people there, and to obtain the last word upon the Empire's needs and prospects in a life-and-death struggle with Germany; and the Labour Party in Australia which had bidden him farewell with so much fervour greeted him again with renewed applause. But his speeches throughout the Commonwealth showed that a new turn had been taken in the leader's thought and policy. He was evidently determined that the Australian Army should be kept up to strength at whatever cost; and compulsion was on the tip of his tongue though never allowed to get past his lips. As a matter of fact, the missing word was never given. That is to say, the Prime Minister of Australia did not take the issue to Parliament and throw down the gauntlet to Labour majorities in both Houses with a Bill that must be either passed or rejected—involving in the latter event the fate of the Government, the Labour Party, and the whole future of unionism as a body ruling the Commonwealth through its leaders, most of whom were Ministers. Instead, a referendum was called for, but this was enough to let loose the forces of disaffection and disloyalty. Why did not Mr. Hughes make Parliament face the responsibility of accepting or rejecting compulsory service, as the only way of honouring his predecessor's pledge that Australia would give her last man and her last shilling in seeing the war through? Mr. Fisher as Prime Minister had said: "The unchangeable

policy of the Government is to train, equip, and transport to the seat of war every available man fit to help to defeat our enemies." This had been accepted by the Labour Party at the time without cavil; but when it came to the actual test in applying compulsion Mr. Hughes could not see his way. Not only was his Cabinet breaking, but a general strike was threatened throughout Australia. Probably nobody knew better than he the possibilities of such a condition of things. Martial law and civil war were so near that he could see their full significance; and at the final cast he would not face the future as the man to precipitate internal strife in this fashion. The missing word, therefore, was never uttered or offered as a signal or suggestion; and upon the people was thrown a responsibility that should have been taken by the Government, or that should have forced its immediate resignation failing the decision to take it to Parliament. It is, no doubt, easy to write in this fashion after the event; and his critics urge that Mr. Hughes would have been wise to trust the people through Parliament. They say he could have carried a compulsion Bill through the House of Representatives, for the Liberals would have supported him; and enough Members from his own side would have joined them to assure a majority. It has been urged that the Senate, dominated though it was by Labour extremists, would have hesitated to throw out the measure and so be landed eventually in a struggle for seats through a General Election. Public opinion had been roused by Mr. Hughes's eloquent speeches since his return from England; and anything might happen with an appeal to the country. But the Prime Minister failed to make the great trial of the people's heart and conscience, and Australia for another

twelve months had to travel into the wilderness and go through the exasperation of another referendum before finality was reached. The result is before the world. Much difference of opinion still exists; and one of the ablest and wisest of Australian publicists thinks that Mr. Hughes saved the Commonwealth from revolution by turning to the referendum. Others insist that the referendum was bound to fail, that it would have failed in Great Britain and the United States had compulsory service been the issue, because the Anglo-Saxon public asks only a strong lead and a courageous Parliament. And so the controversy has continued. All that this review would indicate is an Australia that may easily be misunderstood. It is occupied by a people 98 per cent. of whom are of British stock or direct birth; and there is no question to give trouble, such as Canada and South Africa have to consider in the French Canadians and the Boers. England, Scotland, and Ireland might be next door instead of half a world away, so decisively are our people of the blood of those countries; and in the very strikes which have made Australia a byword in the Empire and throughout the world most of the trouble has come with agitators and leaders almost new from the Motherland. The native-born Australian is not quarrelsome or difficult, but he is easily led; yet once in a quarrel he will fight to the last. English, Scottish, and Irish immigrants have landed on his shores and sprung to the head of his unions by virtue of glib tongues and glozing promises, and then the worst has quickly come with strikes or demands that have spelt loss upon loss. This is a community, then, which has grown under a forcing sun, with imported grievances planted to grow like weeds in congenial soil, and with European socialism brought in to develop

root and branch in abnormal proportion, without the saving balance of common sense as seen in British unionism at its best. In the great confusion Imperial questions have not found much chance for discussion or decision; and the Pacific as an Australian field for enterprise has been taken as a matter of course. Yet the history of Australia shows that the proximity of Asia, and the influence of the ocean washing Australian shores, have been as potent as the sun itself in affecting a developing nationhood. In the consciousness of every Australian, though unexpressed or unrealized, is the assurance of a great destiny; and now and again the writer, the public speaker, the political leader, and the inquiring visitor are startled to find how strong is the grip of Empire upon the people, so truly British in sentiment and outlook, who hold its marches on the Pacific. When the time comes Australia will prove herself quite capable of large responsibilities and serious sacrifices, but she will require the patience given to strong-limbed, vigorous youngsters intent upon reading the world their own way. Her main, probably her immediate, difficulty will be to evolve another constitution. Imperial Federation as machinery does not appeal to her, but the sense of unity is strong enough to enable her to prepare the ground for it as a grander growth of the present Empire. Therefore give her that time and patience with which the mulberry leaf becomes satin; and she will show the world how wonderfully the quicksilver in her blood will turn to light and power and heat for the service of the Empire.

CHAPTER XV

AUSTRALASIA AND THE PACIFIC

The Empire and the Dominions : A Coronation pilgrimage : An education in Imperial perplexities : The Australian Labour Party in power : Australasia full of adventurous spirits : Dr. Morrison's return to his native land : China and its position in the Pacific : Japanese administration in Korea : Dr. Morrison's appeal for China : Chinese grievances : The United States and China as a great object-lesson : Australia's argument against China : Japan and Jaluit—a new naval base

WHEN the R.M.S. *Otway* left Fremantle in March 1911 she carried a distinguished company of Australasian passengers. The adjectives are used with discrimination, because she was a full ship, there was a genuine representation of the democracy of the Pacific on board, and New Zealanders were almost as much in evidence as Australians. The Coronation of King George V was drawing the Dominions to London. Three Ministers of the Commonwealth Government were on board; and Messrs. Fisher, Pearce, and Batchelor were accompanied by Members of Parliament, prominent permanent officials, and citizens drawn from all classes of the community. One of the most notable facts in this connexion was the way in which the steerage accommodation had been filled by Australian working men and their wives, most of whom were going to the old land for a holiday, but were specially intent upon taking part

in the celebrations of the Coronation. It was a revelation to more than one observant person that the democracy of Australasia was not only able to take the trip across the world in this way, but was evidently eager to do so. Dr. Fitchett made special note of this phenomenon when he travelled to England on Coronation business. On the *Otway*, indeed, it could be said that Mr. Fisher as Prime Minister of Australia was well escorted. The Labour Party, in power and presenting an unbroken front to the world, led the way to Europe; and in each of the three classes of the steamer's accommodation the life of the Commonwealth was well represented. But the trip was a memorable one for other reasons. Ministers were going to London with minds full of other things than the Coronation of the King. An Imperial Conference was to be held, the renewal of the alliance between Great Britain and Japan, though undiscussed in public, was a prominent question, and Labour, with responsibility as well as power to steady it, was looking across the oceans with mingled feelings. It was evident that the future contained many problems that could not be solved by the formulæ of socialism; and the Empire loomed larger as the miles were traversed to Suez, and as the Mediterranean and, finally, the Atlantic filled the journey's end. The Ministerial party, with a large number of passengers, were able to get off at Suez and go to Cairo, catching at Port Said the steamer which had been detained several hours to oblige them. Then the cut across Europe, for Ministers and another contingent of passengers, with visits to the principal cities in Italy, Switzerland, and France, gave a pleasant beginning to the two months' residence in London, with its round of engagements which led up to the Coronation itself. Through it

all, from the last sight of Australia in March to the completion of so much at the end of June in England, the discussion of Imperial and Australasian questions and problems was interminable. Even Germany and a possible war were talked over; and the dispatch of expeditionary forces in certain contingencies was mentioned in conversation. But it was Germany as aggressor that came into view and was dismissed at the time as hardly a reasonable proposition; though again and again the thought persisted in more than one mind during the stay in London that a day of reckoning was surely coming. The last thing in any pondering of the subject was the Germany revealed in these years of war as cruel, ruthless, and treacherous—an enemy who knew Australia better than Australians and had laid all his plans to possess it.

This is offered once more as a reminder that, even three years before the war, Australian political leaders and thoughtful citizens in various ranks of life were thinking of other matters than local squabbles and the squeakings of the parish pumps. Probably no travel abroad did as much in the time to impress and help Ministers as this Coronation tour; and when it is remembered that Senator Pearce and Mr. Batchelor travelled back from London by way of Siberia, China, and Japan, the end of it was as educative as the rest. Others of the great party returned through the United States and Canada; and all confessed that it had been a wonderful experience. Not alone the sight of other countries, but the constant intercourse together, and the never-ceasing interchange of view and opinion with leading men of the Empire gathered in London made the occasion memorable. But the war since has shaken the Labour Party in Australia to its foundations

so violently that the leaders most concerned in the well-being of the Empire have been thrown out; and a new era has been introduced, with the general determination that the Dominions must now combine for the larger life, and that mere party ends must be sunk in a common purpose to secure liberty for the world.

It would be easy to show how the ground has been prepared for this Imperial advance. Australasia is full of adventurous spirits. Its sons are to be found everywhere, until even China, in Dr. Morrison, has an Australian as adviser to the Chinese Government. A single family in the author's direct experience will indicate the range of this enterprise. Two families are represented in the marriage which links up both and gives a single outlook; and the original fathers and mothers—three born and bred in the Motherland and one in Australia—were all associated with the earlier development of New Zealand and the adjoining Commonwealth. Among the sons and daughters of these two families united by marriage there are to-day pioneers in Canada, South Africa, and the islands of the Pacific. One went over to the United States as a young man and helped in the development of the country round Puget Sound. Then he pushed north to the Yukon and Cape Nome, winning gold and making settlement possible, to return to Australia with a bagful of nuggets, worth a thousand pounds, for distribution among his numerous relatives. To-day he and his American wife are in the wilds of North-West Canada as British subjects; and they have never ceased to keep the fires of fraternity burning whether under the Stars and Stripes or the Union Jack. On the other side of the family tree is a Member of the present Parliament of the Union of South Africa.

He went from Australia during the Boer War and decided to stay when peace was proclaimed. He has fought again under Botha and Smuts in the present war, and has distinguished himself all through. A third has spent most of his life in Northern Queensland, with interludes in the Pacific, still carrying on pioneering work in making plantations and opening the country in the Solomon Islands. His brothers also have been in Papua, the Solomons, or further afield; and nephews have gone to Fiji to the sugar plantations and returned. There is nothing special in all this. It can be matched many times over in the experience of other families, whose sons as engineers have helped build the tube railway system in London, or who have "made good" in the United States among the best engineers there. Australian mining engineers are to be found in the Malay States at one end of the Pacific and in South American Republics at the other. The Empire, and all that it means, is in Australasian blood and sinew; and thousands of thoughts of sympathy have crossed and recrossed the Pacific month by month as the letters of innumerable wanderers and their home folk have kept the family ties taut. This must be remembered when Australia and New Zealand are being discussed in relation to the Empire and its destiny. The Commonwealth, concerned with internal politics, and anxious about industrial strife, may have appeared indifferent at times during the greater crises of this war, but the indifference has only been apparent, not real. Very genuine is the interest in the outer world as the soldiers return from the Front, and as reinforcements leave to keep the Australasian armies at fighting strength.

An Australian like Dr. Morrison, who has recently returned home for a holiday from China, has given the

Commonwealth much to think about and talk over. He may be quoted here because China has not been discussed at length in this book, although entitled to more space than can now be given to a country so close and so full of promise for trade with Australia. Dr. Morrison's return has, no doubt, awakened some of the old controversy among Australian working men who think of China as an enemy. When he landed in Sydney for a long holiday, after spending fifteen years in Peking, the second referendum campaign was in full swing; and the opponents of compulsory service raised the cry that he had reached Australia to discuss with Mr. Hughes, as Prime Minister, the best way of introducing Chinese to take the place of the white men who were to be sent out of the Commonwealth to fight for their country. Such a monstrous suggestion could only have been made under the conditions of bad temper then prevalent; but it served to advertise Dr. Morrison. It gave him an opportunity of showing what China represents in the Pacific. In his speech at a luncheon of the Journalists' Institute in Sydney the week before Christmas (1917) he said, among other things, that he was one who believed in the future of the Chinese people. China with its vast domain was the largest undeveloped, unexploited area on the earth's surface at the present day. Japan had realized this, and Japanese had travelled all over the Celestial Empire. They knew more about the resources of China than did the Chinese themselves. Dr. Morrison at this point expressed the opinion that Japan would use this knowledge for the good of the Chinese and not to their disadvantage; and his tribute of praise to the work done in Korea was quite clear and emphatic. He said: "In Korea the work done by the Japanese Govern-

ment is one of the most remarkable pieces of administration ever carried out in the world. Lord Curzon had in 1894 written of Korea that it was the worst governed portion of the world. But if he were to go there now he would say it was one of the most admirably governed sections of the whole earth's surface. Korea had developed to an extent that had passed all belief." When Dr. Morrison first entered Seoul many years ago there was hardly a tree to be seen. Now Japanese afforestation, with scientific principles and with sound business knowledge behind, has made the countryside a new land, by planting something like thirty million trees.

But Dr. Morrison's appeal to Australia was based, not only upon China's position, but upon the Commonwealth's needs. Then he showed what America was doing in China. The speech is worth quoting at this point because it undoubtedly impressed the assembled journalists in Sydney; and it indicates the lines which must be followed if Australia is to hold her own in the days following a declaration of peace. Dr. Morrison said: "China not only covers an enormous area, but is enormously fertile, yet Australia, situated though she is in a very favourable position, is doing nothing or hardly anything to develop her trade with that country. Americans now go to China, and are developing trade with that country along lines which are of enormous service to the workers in the United States. The knowledge of English has spread all over China and is being encouraged by the American Government. More than two million pounds have been devoted by the American Government to the education of students in American colleges. And every Chinese educated in America goes back to China an advocate of the purchase and the use of

American wares and materials. Here in Australia we have highly intelligent Chinese merchants. Some of them have returned to China, and have established in different centres emporiums built and stocked on the model of Anthony Hordern's. Behind those enterprises is a capital of two millions. Those stores in China are stocked from basement to attic with foreign goods. Surely," concluded Dr. Morrison, "we should try ourselves to do something that will enable us to sell our goods in that great market." * This was clear enough, but it did not as a statement go into particulars. The Chinese have their own grievances, though at the present moment they may not be able to present them with the same cogency as the Japanese. It is known, however, that China has many more of her nationals in Australia than Japan—the proportion roughly is ten to one. Thirty thousand Chinese, therefore, have some ground for dissatisfaction if they find themselves at any particular disadvantage under the immigration laws of the Commonwealth; and this opens up afresh the question of developing the Pacific by the aid of Asia.

Already it has been explained that India's fundamental objection to the indenture system, as applied to Indians in Fiji, is the lack of women among so many thousands of men, sent away from the home life to which they have been accustomed. The Chinese in Australia complain that they are not allowed to bring in women of their own race, and they urge that it is bad all round. Chinese in any number, without wives or women of their own nationality, cannot be expected to live a natural life among white people, except as they intermarry with them. This is precisely what Australians object to, and yet they do not help

* *Sydney Morning Herald*, December 18, 1917.

with the obvious remedy. Moreover, thoughtful Chinese point out that they also are intense lovers of their own country. They all long for the time when they can return to China; and any menace that may lie in their presence as aliens among a European community must be a diminishing factor. But here again Australians make objection. In the past much Australian gold has left the Commonwealth as the result of Chinese savings; and it is because the hard-working, thrifty Asiatic does not want to stay, or to leave his money in Australia, that he has been declared impossible as colonist or citizen. This incompatibility of ideals and temperaments goes deeper, no doubt; but it is because Chinese want to make use of Australia, and not to develop it, that so much criticism has been directed against them. Yet it is difficult to see how the argument for a sufficiency of Chinese women can be met if Chinese are to remain as a part, however small in proportion, of the Australian population. Australian immigration laws have been passed to limit, and finally to eliminate, the Asiatic. This is the charge laid by China and Japan against Australia; and it is difficult to meet it in view of the facts. Therefore another of the grievances expressed by representative Chinese is not easily countered. They point out that when one of their number goes to China, say the principal partner in a flourishing business, it is impossible to replace him. The business may go to pieces and disappear in consequence; but no means exist apparently by which a manifest injustice can be removed. So do we get to the heart of Dr. Morrison's appeal to Australia to think of China as a fruitful field for Australian enterprise. There is at present no reciprocity. Japan is pouring her goods into the Commonwealth in vast quantities,

much of which is manufactured from raw material obtained in China; and the effect is that the Japanese are making immense profits both ways. They are manufacturers and middlemen; and yet Australia should find it possible to do business direct from China, if only the existing barriers were lowered and something like a mutual understanding reached. Dr. Morrison's visit to his native land after so many years' absence is thus full of interest, and has already roused Australians to ask questions and to begin afresh the study of Asia in the new light of a great war.

Finally Japan's relation to China is being discussed with clearer vision. China is like a stranded whale, and Japan is near to the great prize and ready to take full advantage of her proximity. But both China and Japan are Allies of Great Britain, and America over the way in the Pacific itself is another Ally as keenly concerned about the ordered development of China as Britain and Japan. Australia is feeling that between them co-operation should bear good fruit, but how the new course is to be laid no one seems able to forecast. Japan's progress as a competitor for Pacific trade, and as a factor of increasing power in the world's markets, may be seen in the growth of Japanese shipping. The report of the Inter-State Commission of Australia on "British and Australian Trade in the South Pacific" (presented to Parliament, May 1918, p. 58) says that, under the bounties and subsidies granted, the gross tonnage of the Japanese Mercantile Marine advanced from 15,000 tons in 1896 to over 2,000,000 tons in March 1914. Since the war began the increase again must have been phenomenal. Meanwhile it is realized that Japan's possession of the Marshall Islands with a naval station at Jaluit brings her very much nearer to the

Commonwealth; and any study of distance shows what this involves. Thus, Jaluit is only 2400 miles from Japan, and about the same distance from New Zealand and the nearest large port in Australia. It is absolutely central for the Pacific on the Australasian side, and yet is only 2100 miles from Honolulu, and 4000 miles from San Francisco. Hong-Kong is but 3500 miles from Jaluit. So the position could be developed. But the single reference is enough to explain what is involved. Japan becomes a neighbour drawn nearer to Australasia by more than 2000 miles, while China remains at the old distance, torn by internal strife and waiting a national resurrection which Japan may or may not be the means of assuring. Meanwhile the English-speaking peoples of the Pacific are beginning to study the whole problem of China's future, and Australia will not be backward with her side of the new question when the time comes for the great debate.

CHAPTER XVI

CONCLUSIONS

Again the vastness of the Pacific : Canada a Dominion from sea to sea : India and the girdle of Empire : Areas of the Americas and Australasia : Proximity of Asia : China and the open door : Internal conflict in Japan : German Jingoism a Japanese danger : American influence : Great Britain's difficulties in the Pacific : The Colonial Office and its wide authority : The Tropics and the waste of war : Labour the crux of the difficulty : India to the rescue : A better understanding with Australia essential : Interchange through the Universities : Immigration and the future

I

In drawing the argument of this book to a close, emphasis must again be laid upon the vastness of the ocean under review, but with special reference now to the relative distances and positions of the important centres upon its surface. Australia and New Zealand are thinking very earnestly about the future; and as they study the map of the Pacific and wonder what a peace worth having may bring forth, they are profoundly impressed with their place at the Antipodes, facing a probable influx of population beside which their past experiences will count for little or nothing. Now a consideration of distances on the map at the end of this book reveals some interesting and important facts. The Pacific Ocean stretches through more than

10,000 miles from north to south, and through nearly that distance from east to west. But the approach of North America to Asia, where degrees are shortest, so affects the lines of communication that from Yokohama to San Francisco is only 4500 miles, and from Hakodate in the north of Japan to Vancouver Island is but 4280 miles. The Hawaian Islands occupy such a strategic position in the Pacific because they lie little more than 2000 miles from San Francisco, and are less than 5000 miles from the Philippines, making a natural base for the United States in the approach to its possessions in the Far East, but especially giving a central trading-station for business with Asia. Vancouver, however, as the main outlet for Canada eastward, is seen to hold an unrivalled position with British Columbia so close. One realizes how the complications of Asiatic immigration have arisen; but it is easy also to understand Sir Charles Lucas's references to the future when dealing recently with the Canadian Jubilee. He said: "To speak of Canada as a Dominion from sea to sea is no mere well-phrased expression of an existing and patent fact. The words have living meaning and significance. Canada is the one and only province of the Empire which has a seaboard on both the two main oceans of the world, and stretches continuously from the Atlantic to the Pacific. This means that Canada is the great bridge of Empire. Through Canada is the alternative British route to the East and to the South. We have perfected what in the beginning of modern history Columbus set out to achieve, a westward route to the Indies and Cathay. Suppose Canada to be eliminated from the Empire, two results would follow, over and above the fact of losing the greatest of self-governing Dominions. On the one hand,

it would be as though the keystone of an arch had dropped out, the continuity of the circle would be broken. On the other hand, the Empire would lose its balance, a prime factor in its strength. At present west, south, and east form an equipoise, each redressing the balance of the others; the three together provide an even basis, a strong, sure tripod of Empire. This, as already suggested, was the result of the War of American Independence. Before the severance of the United States, the British Empire was a lop-sided Empire, overweighted in one direction. It was the loss of the old North American colonies which took us into the Southern Seas and gave us Australia and New Zealand. It was the loss of the United States which made an opening and provided adequate space in the Empire for Canada. But Canada not only fills her own space, balancing and balanced by Australasia: Canada is also the one Dominion which is a highway to other parts of the Empire." *

But the outlook from Vancouver is still westward; and the road of Empire takes its sweep towards China and Japan, to Hong-Kong, thence to India, and home by way of the Suez Canal. The main girdle of Empire is buckled in the Northern Hemisphere upon India, and it was with India that British Columbia not so long ago had controversy over the entrance at Vancouver of proposing Indian immigrants. From the main girdle, however, is looped a chain which passes through British possessions in the Pacific to a mighty sword-handle in Australasia and a blade in South Africa, completing its circle through the Atlantic to the heart of the Empire. On the map of the

* *Cornhill*, July 1917, "The Jubilee of the Old Dominion," by Sir Charles P. Lucas, K.C.M.G.

Pacific Hemisphere Australia's commanding position is clear, but rather in relation to the Americas and to Asia than to Great Britain herself. To obtain the larger grasp one has to turn to the maps of the Eastern and Western Hemispheres on the old basis; and then the balance of Australia and Canada in the Empire's sweep is better realized. From the map of the Pacific, however, one truth emerges, the triple grasp of Australia upon the old world through America. In passing it may be remarked that this map does not help us to appreciate at its full significance the land areas involved. Canada and the United States (with Alaska) are about equal in area, containing, say, roundly three and a half million square miles each. If South America were divided between two Governments, in the same way, there would still be that area to each. Australasia and the groups of islands under the British flag make up roughly another three and a quarter million square miles. Australia alone is equal in area to the whole of the United States without Alaska; and Canada and Australasia together approach very close in total area to South America or to twice the area of the United States. In the disparity of population, however, one is given furiously to think, because in the days of coming peace the probable set of migration from the old world of strife to the new world of the Pacific—of peace—will be a tremendous problem for the British Empire. The great empty desirable lands abut upon or are actually within the Pacific; and the United States with a hundred millions of people, and Australia with less than five millions, face one another across the ocean in astonishing contrast. Canada with between seven and eight millions is just as great a paradox when areas are compared upon the North

American continent itself; but the process of levelling-up there will continue and develop more quickly because of a common boundary and a new comradeship in war. Throughout the Pacific, indeed, the new spirit of understanding and co-operation will breed a better knowledge; and mutual help will guard the edge of competition. The map of the Pacific in this view gives a new meaning to the ocean highway.

Take now the relation of Australia to the Empire, through its southern position in the Pacific hemisphere. Canada provides a bridge, and the all-red route to Europe is assured; but the Panama Canal makes a supplement that offers food for reflection. Australasia and the island groups of the Pacific will find access to the American coasts on the Atlantic on the best possible terms by the gateway through Panama; and in addition the route round the Horn is always available. Then the Suez Canal joins up half a dozen lines to Asia and the East; while Asia itself is closer to Australia than it is to Canada. Let this point be sharpened again before passing on. The proximity of Australasia to the millions of Asia has already exerted a profound influence upon the development of opinion in this part of the Empire; but the announcement of an understanding between the United States and Japan by which the Monroe Doctrine is to receive a new application is specially important at the present juncture. China and "the open door" are to be included in its enlarged interpretation.

II

But there is evidence of conflict in Japan's internal development which must be recognized here. The people are beginning to demand the reality of self-government instead of its appearance, as covered by the Constitution of 1891. Sixty millions of Japanese are being educated, but less than two millions can vote at any election; and the rulers of the country are officials appointed from above, not Ministers selected from representatives of the democracy. It is in part the German system, though in a form capable of profound modification. Nevertheless German aims and ambitions are admired; and the paradox of a people wrestling for power, while thinking of the right of might as demonstrated by German ruthlessness, is set forth by capable writers and thinkers. In the first issue of *The New East* is a candid statement by Professor M. Anesaki of the Imperial University of Japan, who was for two years Professor at Harvard University in the United States. Professor Anesaki is quite straightforward in his admissions. He traces the rise of German influence by giving 1870 and the defeat of France by Germany as a starting-point, in that the way was prepared for the acceptance of German military methods. In the eighties again Prince Ito found the German Constitution and jurisprudence worth copying for Japan; and, later, education came under the same spell. "In the end, Japanese bureaucratic officialdom has become very German, and the schools have abandoned their original American models and adopted German methods and atmosphere. The consequence is that to-day Governmental and educational circles are strongly German, and the military system is as German as it can be. As

to the army, a curious incident may be cited. For several years after the inauguration of the volunteer system alongside universal conscription, the shoulders of the volunteers were marked by black and white, the Prussian colours, simply because the organizers of the system copied everything from Prussia!" * Professor Anesaki points out that the trouble of all this lies not so much in the admiration for things German as the importation of the German spirit into Japanese thoughts and aspirations. German Jingoism is a Japanese danger, according to this frank lover of his country; and one feels again that Tagore realized to the full how difficult it must be to get to the soul of Japan—the true Japan to whom honour and the simple life are still precious. How the new Japan is reflected in her treatment of Tagore may be seen in another article in *The New East*. This magazine has been founded with the desire "to establish the future of Japan," to sap prejudice and remove apprehension; and the writer of the article in question shows how difficult this may be. Tagore was welcomed as a species of advertising agent who would tell India how wonderfully Japan had grown in power and efficiency. He was to be like "a journalist on a lightning tour." But instead he was revealed as a prophet—not to foretell victories for Japan, but to warn her not to lose her soul. His two public lectures were given to crowded audiences, and then "the brief period of Tagore worship came to an abrupt end." † Is it wonderful that Australia is watching Japan with a puzzled frown, or that the United States should be asking whether the real Japan has yet been revealed? But it is a great step forward that Japan

* *The New East*, July 1917, p. 25.
† *Ibid.*, September 1917, pp. 79–80.

and America have reached an understanding. Open admissions have been made of Germany's evil influence and treacherous ways in moving opinion among the masses in Japan; and now we realize afresh that the real leaders are clear-sighted and determined in the new day. They will not allow Germany to continue in the Pacific what she has been so sedulously practising in Europe. The condition of Russia, and the efforts to stir up strife in every other Allied country, have impressed Japan; and certainly the English-speaking people in the Pacific who must work in harmony with her are watching the developments of German devilry with the keenest attention.

But America and Australasia, as the homes of the English-speaking peoples in the Pacific, have drawn perceptibly closer because of the war. A process of mutual appreciation has been hastened by the incoming of the United States; but before that the foundations had already been laid in a broadening, deepening sympathy. The impact of American thought and activity upon Australasia has been constant and powerful, and nothing could be more significant in this connexion than the references to the American Constitution in the debates and conversations which led to federation in Australia. China and Japan may then have been in evidence, but not to warrant any suggestion of craven fear as to their future in the Pacific. When the final decision upon the form of the Constitution for an Australian Commonwealth drew nearer, Alexander Hamilton's "Federalist" papers were read and quoted with almost as much insistence as in the days of the original American States for whom they had been written; and Lord Bryce's "American Commonwealth" was so genuinely in evidence that, at last, when any leading politician made

a specially strong appeal based upon American experience, it was usual, laughingly, to label it "Bryce." The United States may not have been much moved by Australian regard for American history, because Australia has never loomed large across the Pacific. But circumstances, and a specially well-informed Press, have made Australasia peculiarly susceptible to the import of lessons based upon the development of national life in the United States. Naturally, therefore, all controversies between Japan and America have been followed with earnest attention by thoughtful Australians and New Zealanders, yet never on the mental level noted by Professor Keith in his use of the words "contempt" and "fear." It simply becomes a question of the Mother Country's mind and attitude.

But Great Britain's difficulties in the Pacific are already very great, and administration itself is strangely divided and diversified in that illimitable stretch of waters. She appoints Governors-General for Canada, Australia, and New Zealand; Governors are sent to deal with the affairs of States in Australia, which still possess large powers not surrendered to the central Government; and a Crown colony like Fiji not only receives its Governor by appointment from the Colonial Office, but that august personage becomes High Commissioner of the Western Pacific, with a range of authority that in some respects makes the Governor-General of Australia look small. Administrators are appointed to protectorates, such as the Solomon Islands, and to various islands in the Pacific; though Australia, by the way, has a dependency in Papua for which a Lieutenant-Governor gives account to the Federal Government in Melbourne, and travels to and from the Commonwealth capital in the course of a somewhat trying

term of office. Even Fiji has its island responsibility in Rotuma, where a Commissioner is in residence. Tonga, again, though quasi-independent with a King and Government of its own, has to accept the nomination of important officers by the High Commissioner of the Western Pacific, acting for the Colonial Office in London. Indeed, the Colonial Office is the foundation of an authority so varied over the Pacific alone that one marvels at its continued existence without collapse. Dominions under autonomous governments, Crown colonies, protectorates, dependencies, and in the wide ocean itself an area of responsibility beyond and including them all, make a maze of the British Empire, at its furthest limits; and now the war, which has closed a wonderful chapter in its history, has added the German colonies, which are administered under German law by Australasian officials. Where can co-operation find a place in all this puzzle of power? A suggestion has been made in the Report of the Inter-State Commission of Australia on "British and Australian Trade in the South Pacific" which may be worth considering in the general connexion. The conclusions of immediate interest are to be found in pages 116 to 118, and the Commissioners continue: "The government of the islands controlled by the British Crown is at present lacking in cohesion and unity of policy. . . . The Commission is satisfied that the islands under the British Crown should be grouped under a more coherent system. . . . The Commission has suggested that, in order to ensure timely settlement of this paramount question of government, a joint inquiry by representatives of the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand should be undertaken."

In an interview with one of the British administrators in

the Western Pacific, which appeared in the *Sydney Morning Herald* of June 12, 1918, the following comment on the above was made, which deserves attention: "British interests at present are widely spread under many forms of control, and difficulties are constantly created by the lack of effective co-operation. Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand are carrying on the work of administration through officers who have no direct relation with each other. . . . It is a maze of control with centres of reference in London, Melbourne, and Wellington, and there is no present means by which the work carried on in one group may be quickly co-ordinated in case of emergency, even by way of obtaining or giving information. Pending peace, a board or commission to obtain information and, as far as possible, to simplify the existing administration, by bringing the difficulties of each point of control into the ken of all, could put the interests of Great Britain, of Australia, and of New Zealand into a common pool for the moment by a definite range of inquiry, and when the Peace Conference sits much valuable information should be available."

III

The true Pacific must be found and grasped, if the search is not to fail. Especially must we know where to clasp hands most effectively in the effort to direct streams of new life into the great vacant areas of Empire, in or upon the coasts of the ocean which fills a whole hemisphere of the globe. But the urgent reason for concerted action is to be found in the Empire's need. Thousands of millions sterling will have been consumed in the furnace of war, and these can be most quickly and surely replaced by

developing the virgin lands of the earth and by turning tropical possessions to full use. In the temperate regions not a great deal more is possible, on a scale commensurate with the world's requirements when war has ceased; but who has even begun to gauge the possibilities of the tropics? An object-lesson has been found in Fiji recently in the large profits made in the production of sugar and copra alone. These products have been steadily taken away to Vancouver and San Francisco by vessels of every class, from fleets of wooden schooners built on the American coast to the mail steamers which call periodically in the service to and from Australia and New Zealand; and shrewd observers have been struck not only with the possibilities of tropical agriculture as a hope for the future, but also with the strategic advantages of the island groups in the Pacific—especially of Fiji, Tonga, and Samoa. The ravages of war can be best covered by replenishing the world's wealth through the tropics, where the sun is always a magnificent asset in itself, but where fertility, beyond the wildest imaginings of people in the colder regions of the earth's surface, gives it such power that wealth is created almost at the word. It is only a question of sufficient labour. Now this question of population for Australia, with an area one-third subtropical or tropical, and all within the sun's realm of higher energy in productive power, is indeed urgent. But still more urgent is the need for a solution of the labour problem throughout the tropical reaches of the Pacific.

In Australia itself the trouble is rather one of divided control than of actual local indifference or ignorance. The Commonwealth has full power to deal with immigration, but the States retain control of Crown lands and of the

railways. Unless the two authorities pull together there is friction and at last a cessation of effort. Already before the war jealousy over immigration had developed; and even between the States themselves, when immigration was part of their policy, competition in Great Britain for desirable emigrants was tending to create mischief. Statements were being made, and advertisements published which were challenged as misleading or worse. They were the half truths which may become the worst form of untruth. And clearly Australia was not given fair play in the general scramble. When it was suggested to political leaders in the States and the Commonwealth that something like the Canadian system ought to be possible, objection was taken that Canada could control immigration, because the central Government had larger powers and also because she had a single port of entry. How could Australia, with the Commonwealth tied up by lack of control over lands and railways, and with half a dozen ports of entry of equal standing, obtain unity of enterprise and create an efficient organization? The present writer has suggested more than once that perhaps a port in Great Britain could be made a single port of entry to the Commonwealth. The central Government should be allowed to take full charge of the organization in Europe for drawing people to Australia, and accept responsibility for advertising her resources and for co-operating with organizations in the Mother Country whose aim is to strengthen the Empire by keeping its people within British bounds. If proposing emigrants were then drawn to the single centre declared to be the port of entry to the Commonwealth, the local Australian agents, like the Canadian provincial agents, could then select those most likely to suit their

respective States. After that the difficulties would not be those of competition, but of getting emigrants by sea to Australia, as they are taken to the provinces of Canada by land. It is only a suggestion, of course, and may be worth nothing. Incidentally, however, it raises the whole issue of the present Australian Constitution.

British critics abroad insist that when Australia copied the American model she made a profound mistake. The Canadian and South African Constitutions are declared to be alone possible in the British Commonwealth of nations, because the central authority is strengthened and exalted and the provinces are reduced to local governing bodies or to something equivalent. In Australia the States, in fact, have simply selected certain powers covered by the so-called " Thirty-nine Articles " in the Constitution, handing them over to the Commonwealth. Everything else is retained. The result is that State control in many respects is greater than Commonwealth jurisdiction. How can the British Government be expected to deal with two entities within a self-governing Dominion in this way ? In practice Great Britain never does more than recognize the States and often ignores them. In the Colonial Office procedure, the Governor-General is the true point of reference, and the consequence is that State Premiers and Agents-General in London find themselves at a discount. Now the effect of this is to create discord again. One has to admit the growing feeling in Australia that unification must come, because the States will not economize. In this war they have been competing more or less with the Commonwealth for loans in the London and local markets. Especially has New South Wales been a sinner in this respect ; and public opinion has grown increasingly open to the sugges-

tion that Australia in self-defence must get rid of a great deal of the States' top-hamper. But Commonwealth finance has not been a model of thrift and shrewd expenditure. It has been known for many years as in the same street, for recklessness, with the States; and since the war began there has been little or no real disposition to get down to fundamentals. Nevertheless it does represent the point upon which future reformation must find a centre and from which it must radiate. Yet those who would exploit this feeling for reform will make a great mistake. The Australian colonies came together with their individualities strongly developed, and the present Constitution was the only way of uniting them. With all its faults it has worked, and it does represent a principle of growth and of genuine healthy development. To urge Imperial Federation, with the Dominions as illustrations of a definite tendency, may be justified as argument; but in the Pacific so many pressures have been shaping the Empire that only time will show how far the larger process can be helped by relieving or augmenting them. Certainly in Australia no good will come by forcing unification to serve an Imperial purpose. The States must be reckoned with, and, as in America, they must be studied and humoured. When the cattle tick had to be fought in the United States it was found that the Federal Department of Agriculture could not exercise powers large enough; and agreements for action in unison had to be made with the States specially concerned. This has been the experience in many directions in America, and unless the Colonial Office in particular, and the British Government in general, are careful the Australian States may become a difficulty when a greater unity is sought after the war. In the matter of

immigration to Australia this will become a question of moment; and the position is indicated here to show how something may be done to prevent friction.

On the problem of helping to find labour for the development of our tropical possessions in the Pacific, it may be said at once that the Indian seems to be the way out. But he cannot be employed unless radical alterations are made in the terms and details of his service. Indian public opinion has already been roused upon the matter, and we cannot blink the fact that Fiji is not a good illustration at present of the British possessions in process of being developed along the best lines. Yet the group in question has proved that in future the Indian is the man to serve the Empire, if he can be brought from India with his womenfolk and can begin to live in the Pacific the life he has known at home. At one time it was thought that the Chinese were certain to prove more satisfactory. A small draft was made to Fiji, with the idea of paying double the rates given to the Indians, who were receiving the equivalent of a shilling per day. Since the war began the latter wage has been raised by threepence, but even now it is declared to be too little. But the Chinese not only refused to work for two shillings per day, they scouted the idea of working at all under the conditions endured by the Indians. The latter are docile and cannot combine against the white man; but the Chinese showed themselves quite capable of arguing, and acting, when asked to accept terms not up to their own ideas of fair play. It was altogether a curious object-lesson, and incidentally a great surprise to the white employers. How, then, is the labour problem to be solved? To collect a multitude of men to work in the plantations, with so few women that the decencies of ordinary home

life become impossible, and marriage itself is in danger as a binding force, is to dig deep the grave of tropical industry. Moreover, the British Government is faced with this dilemma that in Fiji it has secured to the Fijians undreamed-of wealth by giving them their lands in undisputed possession, while Indians, who are British subjects, have been brought in under conditions which certainly raise half a dozen awkward issues at once. Again it must be urged that the Indian is the hope of the Pacific. He is specially suited for tropical agriculture, and he can be used under the flag which has made life possible for him in India. But the oversight and jealous care of the British Government for the millions of people under its charge in India must be extended to them in the Pacific also. That, or its equivalent, seems the essence of any contract for developing British territories in the tropics where aboriginal native labour is insufficient.

IV

India should have a place in this summary of a century's history; and the fact that Indians have been allowed to go to Fiji under indenture shows how far the Governments concerned have gone. A halt has been called, it is true, and indentured Indian labour is no longer allowed to leave for Fijian plantations. The Government of India is not satisfied; and a new and better system must be introduced if Indians are again to enter the group. But this may only be a matter of some fresh agreement, for under existing conditions the fertile lands of Fiji will not be developed as they should be, and labour must be obtained. Australian colonies, before federation in 1901, had passed legislation

to the same end, but it was not brought into force for several reasons. Public opinion had begun to move the Colonial Governments, so that no action was taken to introduce Indian labour. A vague uneasiness developed, and the conviction grew that it would be a mistake to introduce Asiatics at all. The possibility of turning tropical and semi-tropical Australia to profitable use by India's help was ignored and forgotten. India had insisted upon certain definite provisions in any agreement for allowing her people to go to Australia. Queensland, for instance, wished to provide that Indians refusing to re-engage or to leave the colony, when their term of employment was ended, were to be imprisoned. This the Indian Government would not countenance. Altogether the first advances to some system of indentured Indian labour, though favourably received and resulting in the passing of laws permitting and regulating the traffic, did not lead anywhere; and since then India and Australia have not drawn any closer. There has apparently been little wish on either side to find common ground, and misunderstandings have arisen because of the " White Australia " policy. But this surely must now give way to better thoughts and feelings. The war is binding the Empire together, and India has borne her share of its burdens and obligations. Indian soldiers have fought and died for the same flag; and the King has commanded an equal loyalty from both great sections of the Empire. Lord Carmichael, formerly an Australian Governor, in an address delivered recently at the Royal Colonial Institute, said that when he discussed India with Australians they knew and cared little about her. They thought that Australia should not be entangled in Indian affairs; while in India he found a universal conviction

that it would be calamitous to give Australians any voice in matters concerning India. Yet Lord Carmichael admitted that a change might take place. "The colonies," he continued, using a term no longer applicable to Australia, "are more clearly appreciating the value of India. Many well-informed Indians are curiously similar, in their attitude toward public problems, to typical Australians. Any success I had in understanding a leader of Bengal thought was largely due to what I learned in Melbourne. I often wished that the more thoughtful Indians could discuss matters with members of the Australian Natives Association." *

It is this beginning of a sympathetic discussion of India and Australia which may lead to something fruitful. And here opens an aspect of the question of India's relation to the self-governing Dominions of the Empire well worth a word, if only to stimulate thought. It is useless to talk of the labour needs of the Pacific, with the Indian as a convenient solution of a difficult problem, unless the great land of his birth is given some serious consideration; and thoughtful minds are already pondering the best way of bringing India into the foreground, not merely as a reservoir of labour, but as the home of highly civilized peoples, with their own matured outlook upon life. China and Japan no doubt represent the same need for better knowledge and for a more sympathetic understanding. If they are to be placed outside the range of closer competition in industry, how can India be discussed from a different standpoint? The reply, of course, is that incoming Indians would create as serious difficulty, in Australia for instance, as Japanese and Chinese in unrestricted numbers; but

* Cable report in *Sydney Morning Herald*, November 16, 1917.

British possessions are in a different category in the tropical parts of the Pacific where the natives are dying out, or are being found incapable of developing groups of islands or great island areas of wonderful potential productiveness. The white man will not be able to do the manual work required in the coming days, and the Indian or some one else must be given a chance. Moreover, India is a part of the Empire, and closely interested in the Pacific. Its history and traditions should give it a place in general regard which would make approach easy, if attempted in the right way; but the immediate need for this approach is so great that there must be a sedulous search for the right way. Cannot Australia and India begin with some interchange of thought and opinion? Why should not Indian students go to Australian universities instead of to Europe, where the climate does not suit them as well as would the clear skies and continued sunshine of a continent almost next door by comparison? These questions have not risen from the inkpot, as one writes, but have been discussed with a lover of India and an intimate friend of Sir Rabindranath Tagore. Australian universities have already begun to think of possible lines of co-operation, and when the war is over there should be some effort to give theory a practical turn. Germany will be closed to Indian students for a long time, one would think; and the Empire should prove self-sufficient in this as in many another particular. It is worth noting in this connexion, that a good deal of the unrest in parts of India may be traced to the activities of Indian students who have returned from German universities. They did not go to Germany because German Kultur called them, but because they could live more cheaply there than in England; and

they took back to India the material for incendiarism in definite German teaching to that end. It became part of the German plan to infect India with revolutionary ideas, and to spread hatred of British rule. Can we wonder that the result should be unrest, and an irritation ready to be inflamed by ill-advised words and acts, in Australia, Canada, and India itself? The natural advantages of a proximity to Asia are recognized by dwellers in the Dominions of the British Empire in or upon the Pacific Ocean; but the mass of thoughtless folk would exploit these as if nothing else mattered. India is so close to Australia that if it were merely a question of markets, merchandise, and industries, minus the irritating but always dominant human factor, there would be little to say. Indian labour that could be bought and sold like silk and tea, and treated as a commodity, not as a human responsibility, would raise no very serious issues. But Fiji has already shown that the responsibility of human life and needs must come first, and that India is very much awake to the fact. Nearly 60,000 Indians are there, increasing fast, and the less than 90,000 native Fijians do not multiply in proportion. Out of sharpening difficulties are arising demands and denunciations which cannot be ignored. If the beginnings of a better understanding could be laid, by getting Indian and Australian universities into touch, the ignorance which is so mischievous might gradually disappear; and public opinion in both countries would soon unite to force a way for the settlement of immediate outstanding differences. Indian students in Australia would probably find it as easy to live economically as similar students did in Germany; and indeed they would be likely to do better. In a land free from the rigour of a European climate,

they could live more nearly their own life. Moreover, the interchange between Australian and Indian university life would be aided by the seasons. In the reciprocal conditions, research work on both sides would become a pleasure. The Australian summer is the Indian winter, and vacations in one hemisphere are working weeks in the other. India and Australia are so close, comparatively, and the opening of the Australian East and West Railway has given such a life to possible intercourse along shortened routes, that one may well grow enthusiastic over the outlook.

The way is already open by arrangement between the Australian and Indian Governments. Sir Rabindranath Tagore had refused to visit Australia because, he said, she had driven a dagger into his heart by her treatment of Indians of every class; but the only restriction placed upon tourists, traders, and students from India is that they shall come to Australia accredited. This was settled in 1904 by correspondence between Melbourne and Simla, without any circumlocution through the British Colonial Office—although copies of all letters were forwarded later on to London—and Lord Ampthill as Viceroy of India expressed his pleasure at the arrangement. In a letter to Lord Northcote, Governor-General of Australia, dated October 17, 1904, he wrote: "We cordially concur with your Ministers in hoping that this exemption of the educated classes of India from the restrictions imposed on ordinary immigration will result in more frequent intercourse and in an improvement of trade relations to the mutual advantage of both countries." * It is unfortunate that this amicable understanding between India and

* Parliamentary Paper, Commonwealth of Australia, No. 61 of 1905; see Appendix B.

Australia should not have been kept prominent by the Government of India, for much of the ill-feeling which has grown since 1905 would have been prevented. That Sir Rabindranath Tagore knew nothing of it until 1918 is sufficiently impressive; but, now that the truth is known, the way of the Indian student to Australia should be clear of prejudice and misunderstanding.

But all this does not amount to much unless the facts of Pacific needs and experiences are kept in mind. Already there has been a constant coming and going of Indian, Chinese, and Japanese students across the oceans, largely to Europe, but also in increasing numbers to the United States. Across the Pacific they have been received in the universities as comrades. In the American West they have been specially encouraged, and, where unable to take the university courses from resources of their own, they have been assisted with work to enable them to make ends meet. Nothing of the sort has been attempted in Australia, where the conditions and proximity should give a greater encouragement. It is true that Indian students from American universities in the Western States have returned to India full of ideas as explosive in many ways as those collected or forced upon them in Germany; and it is possible that the stimulating air of Australian university life would have the same results. In the United States and Australasia, however, the ferment of freedom is a natural product and can be trusted to work out its own results. In Germany a poison was being instilled which could kill, but never invigorate or stimulate honest thought. Germany would destroy, while the fruit of Australian and American enlightenment should be a larger life. India would also be brought much nearer, and would be inter-

preted more truly, to the British communities of the Commonwealth; and when Indian thinkers like Tagore visit Australia, and the interchange of views and visions becomes increasingly helpful, it will be easier to discuss the true India and the true Australia for purposes of a larger co-operation. It is not difficult to debate such questions from an arm-chair; and the present writer's conclusions and suggestions may be challenged at once as covering very little of the real ground. But the idea is rather to leave questions open than to find immediate answers for them. It is desired to provoke opposition, if that is the only way of making a survey of the true Pacific, and to prompt individual inquiry and investigation. Let the light be thrown upon a great subject from every quarter, and in the end the Empire will be immensely benefited. While some things may have to wait, the main purpose of English-speaking peoples in spreading the blessings of real liberty will be greatly served.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

1899

QUEENSLAND

LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

ADMISSION OF JAPANESE INTO QUEENSLAND

Ordered by the Legislative Assembly to be Printed
31st May, 1899

RETURN to an Order made by the Honourable the Legislative Assembly of Queensland, dated 30th May, 1899, That there be laid upon the Table of this House—

"A copy of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty as amended and signed by the Queensland Government."

A COPY OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE TREATY AS AMENDED AND SIGNED BY THE QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES *to* THE GOVERNOR OF QUEENSLAND

Queensland—*Confidential.*

DOWNING STREET,
18th June, 1897.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Dispatch No. 19 of the 9th of March, enclosing copy of a

letter from your Prime Minister on the subject of the adhesion of the Colony to the Treaty with Japan.

Your Ministers will have gathered from the enclosure in my confidential Dispatch of the 27th of November that the acceptance of the adhesion of Queensland was not made subject to the adhesion of the other principal Australian Colonies.

Her Majesty's Minister at Tokio assumed that the only condition stipulated for by your Government was full liberty to legislate in regard to the immigration of artisans and labourers, and as the draft Protocol submitted to him by Count Okuma provided fully for this, as you will see from the enclosure in Sir E. Satow's dispatch of the 5th of November, he decided to sign on behalf of Queensland, and in his dispatch of the 16th of March (copy enclosed) reports that he did so on that day.

I regret that through an oversight in this Department this information was not communicated to you at an earlier date, but I trust that the action taken will fully meet the views of your Ministers.

I have, &c.,
J. CHAMBERLAIN.

Enclosure No. 1

SIR E. SATOW *to* THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

(Received 8th December)

TOKIO, *5th November*, 1896.

MY LORD,—In continuation of my Dispatch No. 184 of the 8th ultimo, I have the honour to report that Count Okuma was disinclined to accept the draft Protocol enclosed in that Dispatch, and stated his preference for a distinct understanding in the case of each Colony. His Excellency consequently submitted to me the annexed draft Protocol which it is proposed should be signed as regards Queensland. In order to obviate any future discussion in the case of other Colonies, I stipulated that an exchange of notes should take place at the same time as the signature of the Protocol dealing with Queensland. A copy of my proposed draft note is herewith enclosed, and this I have communicated to Count Okuma.

I have, &c.,
ERNEST SATOW.

Sub-enclosure 1 *in Enclosure No.* 1

COUNT OKUMA'S COUNTER-DRAFT OF PROTOCOL

Whereas , a Colony of Her Britannic Majesty, has this day, in due form, acceded to the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and Great Britain, signed in London, on the 16th day of the 7th month of the 27th year of Meiji, in accordance with the provisions of Article XIX thereof:

The undersigned, , duly authorized, &c., have agreed:—

1. That the stipulations contained in the 1st and 3rd Articles of the above-named Treaty shall not in any way affect the Laws, Ordinances, and Regulations with regard to trade, the immigration of labourers and artisans, police and public security which are in force, or may hereafter be enacted, in Japan or in said Colony of

2. That the said Treaty shall cease to be binding as between Japan and the said Colony of at the expiration of twelve months after notice shall have been given on either side of a desire to terminate the same.

In witness, &c. &c.,

Done at Tokio, &c. &c.

Sub-enclosure 2 *in Enclosure No.* 1

DRAFT NOTE TO COUNT OKUMA

M. LE MINISTRE,—With reference to the Protocol signed by us this day providing for the accession of the Colony of Queensland to the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between our respective countries, signed in London on the 16th July, 1894, I have the honour to inquire whether the Japanese Government agrees that any of the British Colonies and Possessions enumerated in Article XIX of that Treaty which have not already declared their accession, may do so under the same terms and conditions as Queensland.

Enclosure No. 2

Japan: Treaty Revision—*Confidential.*

SIR E. SATOW *to* THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

(Received 27th April)

TOKIO, *16th March*, 1897.

MY LORD,—With reference to my Dispatch No. 208, of the 5th November, 1896, I have the honour to forward, in original, the Protocol signed this day by Count Okuma and myself, recording the accession of the Colony of Queensland to the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce between Great Britain and Japan of 1894, together with copies of the notes exchanged between us at the same time, by which the Japanese Government undertake that any of the Colonies and Possessions mentioned in Article XIX of that Treaty desiring to accede to it may do so under the same terms and conditions as Queensland.

Notifications of such desire would have to be made to the Japanese Government not later than the 25th August of the present year.

I have, &c.,
ERNEST SATOW.

Sub-enclosure 1 *in Enclosure No.* 2

PROTOCOL SIGNED 16TH MARCH, 1897

Whereas Queensland, a Colony of Her Britannic Majesty, has this day, in due form, acceded to the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and Japan, signed in London on the 16th day of July, 1894, in accordance with the provisions of Article XIX thereof:

The Undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, and His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have agreed:

1. That the stipulations contained in the first and third articles of the above-named Treaty shall not in any way affect the Laws, Ordinances, and Regulations with regard to trade, the immigration of labourers and artisans, police and public security which

are in force, or may hereafter be enacted in Japan or in the said Colony of Queensland.

2. That the said Treaty shall cease to be binding as between Japan and the said Colony of Queensland at the expiration of twelve months after notice shall have been given on either side of a desire to terminate the same.

In witness whereof the undersigned have signed the present Protocol and affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Tokio this 16th day of March, 1897.

(*Seal*) ERNEST SATOW.

(*Seal*) Signature of Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sub-Enclosure 2 *in Enclosure No.* 2

SIR E. SATOW *to* COUNT OKUMA

TOKIO, 16*th March*, 1897.

M. LE MINISTRE,—With reference to the Protocol signed by us this day, providing for the accession of the Colony of Queensland to the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between our respective countries, signed in London on the 16th July, 1894, I have the honour to inquire whether the Japanese Government agrees that any of the British Colonies and Possessions enumerated in Article XIX of that Treaty which have not already declared their accession, may so do under the same terms and conditions as Queensland.

I take, &c.,
ERNEST SATOW.

Sub-Enclosure 3 *in Enclosure No.* 2

COUNT OKUMA *to* SIR E. SATOW

Translation. TOKIO, 16*th March*, 1897.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of to-day's date, in which, with reference to the signature by us to-day of a Protocol providing for the accession of the British Colony of Queensland to the Treaty of Com-

merce and Navigation between our two countries, concluded in London on the 16th July, 1894, you ask me whether the Imperial Government will consent to the accession on the same conditions as Queensland of any British Colony or Possession mentioned in Article XIX of that Treaty which has not yet declared its intention to accede.

In reply, I beg to state that the Imperial Government will consent to the accession to that Treaty on the same conditions as Queensland of any of the British Colonies or Possessions in question which have not yet declared their intention to accede.

I take, &c.,

COUNT OKUMA SHIGENOBU,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

APPENDIX B

1905

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

IMMIGRATION RESTRICTION ACT, 1901

Correspondence respecting proposal to modify the Administration of the Act in regard to visits of Asiatic Merchants, Travellers, etc. (Dated 16th April, 1904, to 1st August, 1905.)

Presented by Command; ordered by the House to be printed, 5th December, 1905.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
MELBOURNE, *16th April*, 1904.

DEAR SIR,—In the opinion of the Prime Minister, the operation of the Immigration Restriction Act has now been observed for a sufficient time to permit the consideration of means by which British Subjects and the subjects of friendly Powers might be placed upon a footing which would enable the Commonwealth, without altering either its law or its general practice, to afford special treatment in such instances.

2. I am directed by Mr. Deakin to communicate with you, informally at first, in order that after the opinion of your Government has been confidentially ascertained, a proposal may be submitted acceptable to all those to whom this privilege would be extended.

3. The present suggestion is that merchants and travellers,

natives of British India, may be allowed to enter the Commonwealth temporarily without being subjected to any restrictions. It is thought possible that when these arrangements are completed, they might be extended so as to apply to the people of Japan. This appears to Mr. Deakin the more probable after reviewing the correspondence which took place between Mr. Eitaki and this Government, particularly his letters of the 3rd May and 11th September, 1901, extracts from which are attached for your greater convenience.

4. May I inquire whether you think it would be possible for your Government to arrange that all Japanese of the merchant, student, and tourist classes intending to visit Australia should be provided with passports sufficiently identifying them, and specifying the purpose and duration of their visit. If that could be arranged, such passports might be accepted by this Department as entitling the holders to freely enter and pass through Australia, the only condition being that the documents should be examined at the first port of call. As it is recognized that it is not always convenient for intending visitors to give notice of their intention to visit Australia in sufficient time for the necessary Certificates of Exemption to be prepared, this measure would perhaps be of even greater convenience to your countrymen than the practice now in force, and in respect to which Mr. Deakin wrote officially.

5. Of course, the arrangement would be tentative, and all the powers of the Immigration Restriction Act would be preserved, but so long as the system continued without abuse it might be fairly presumed that it would be approved by both countries.

6. On the subject of possible abuse, I may perhaps be allowed to inform you that certain persons recently gained admission to Australia on exemption certificates furnished to holders of passports from the Chinese Government. Those passports had been issued by the Viceroy of Canton to Chinese gentlemen of rank, and had been duly *visé* by the British Consul-General, but when presented in Australia it was found that the holders were merely working men to whom the passports had been transferred. It is not supposed that any such imposition would be allowed to be practised by Japanese, but I mention the matter to show that fraud is possible unless much care is exercised.

7. It would be of additional assistance both to this Government and the intending visitors if the passports could be made out

in English as well as Japanese That course would save difficulties in regard to obtaining the services of an interpreter in every case.

8. Having in view the Japanese Act of 1901 alluded to by Mr. Eitaki, the issue of such passports would appear to be quite within the statutory powers of your Government, and I should be glad to have your opinion in regard to the matter, in order that I may submit it to Mr. Deakin to enable him to frame a formal communication to you on the subject.

Yours faithfully,

(*Signed*) ATLEE HUNT.

K. Iwasaki, Esq.,
Acting Consul-General for Japan,
Sydney.

Extracts from Communications addressed by THE CONSUL FOR JAPAN, SYDNEY, *to* THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

3rd May, 1901.

. . . My Government recognize distinctly the right of the Government of Australia to limit in any way it thinks fit the number of those persons who may be allowed to land and settle in Australia, and also to draw distinction between persons who may or who may not be admitted. Corresponding rights belong to the Empire of Japan.

As Japan is under no necessity to find outlet for her population, my Government would readily consent to any arrangement by which all that Australia seeks, so far as the Japanese are concerned, would be at once conceded.

Might I suggest, therefore, that your Government formulate some proposals which, being accepted by my Government, would allow of the people of Japan being excluded from the operation of any Act which directly or indirectly imposed a tax on immigrants on the grounds of colour. . . .

11th September, 1901.

. . . An impression appears to exist in some quarters, and to find voice in certain sections of the Australian press, that Australia is in danger of an influx of Japanese immigrants. I have already endeavoured to show that this impression is altogether erroneous,

and in support of this position I have been requested by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Tokio to bring under your notice some clauses of the Japanese Act (passed in 1896, and amended this year, 1901) for the regulation and control of emigration and the protection of Japanese immigrants.

Under this Act it is provided that no Japanese may go abroad without first applying to the Government (in writing) for permission to do so, and his application must be accompanied by a guarantee, signed by two or more responsible sureties, for the good conduct of the emigrant while abroad.

On receipt of such application, the Government may grant a passport, provided that it is satisfied as to the character of the applicant, the position of the sureties, and also that there is no danger of the emigrant's presence being in any way offensive to the people of the country whither he intends to go. . . .

H.I.J.M.'s CONSULATE-GENERAL,
SYDNEY, 18*th April*, 1904.

DEAR SIR,—I beg to acknowledge receipt of your confidential communication of the 16th instant, and in reply to your query respecting the possibility of my Government arranging that all Japanese of the merchant, student, and tourist classes who intend visiting Australia should be provided with passports sufficiently identifying them, and specifying the purpose and duration of their visit, in which case such passports might be accepted by your Department as entitling the holders to freely enter and pass through Australia, the only condition being that the documents should be examined at the first port of call, I have much pleasure in confirming the letters of my predecessor, Mr. Eitaki, of the 3rd May and 11th September, 1901, upon this subject, and in supplementing the same by informing you that the passports referred to in the Japanese Emigration Act of 1896 (amended 1901) are printed in English and French as well as Japanese.

I shall await, with much pleasurable anticipation, the promised formal communication from your respected Chief upon this matter.

Yours faithfully,
(*Signed*) K. IWASAKI.

Atlee Hunt, Esq.,
Department of External Affairs,
Melbourne, Victoria.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
MELBOURNE, 10*th August*, 1904.

SIR,—I have the honour to inform you that this Government has had under consideration for some time the question of so administering the Immigration Restriction Act as to afford an opportunity for Japanese merchants, students, and tourist travellers to enter the Commonwealth temporarily without being subjected to any restrictions.

2. It has now been decided that any persons *bona fide* of the classes mentioned above desirous of visiting Australia will be admitted to the Commonwealth provided they are in possession of passports from your Government sufficiently identifying them, and specifying the purpose and probable duration of their visit. Such documents will be accepted by this Government as entitling the holders to freely enter and pass through Australia, the only condition being that the passports shall be examined at the first port of call.

3. Persons of the classes mentioned should have their passports *visé* by a British Consul or other British Government officer at the port of departure, who should satisfy himself that the holder of the document is the person to whom it was issued.

4. On arrival in the Commonwealth, the education test prescribed by the Immigration Restriction Act will in these cases not be imposed, and such persons will be permitted to land without restriction, but in the event of their wishing to stay longer than twelve months an application for a Certificate of Exemption for the desired term should be lodged before the expiry of such time, and the reason for such exemption stated. It must, of course, be understood that in any such cases none of the rights of the Government of the Commonwealth under the Immigration Restriction Act are to be considered as abandoned, and that, should it be found that this concession is being abused, the practice will be subject to review at any time.

5. An undertaking will be required from all such persons to advise the Customs officer at the port of departure when they are about to leave the Commonwealth.

6. I shall be glad if you will be so good as to communicate with your Government in the terms of this letter, and ask whether arrangements can be made in Japan accordingly. If there is on difficulty on this point, these proposals might take effect

from an early date, say the 1st October next. Your Government might take the necessary steps to give the requisite publicity to the matter at the seaports and in the principal towns of Japan.

7. It is hoped that this exemption will be the means of promoting intercourse and improving trade relations between the Commonwealth and your country.

I have, &c.,

(*Signed*) W. M. HUGHES.

The Acting Consul-General for Japan,
Sydney.

PRIME MINISTER, MELBOURNE,
15*th August*, 1904.

MY LORD,—I have the honour, at the instance of my colleague, the Minister of State for External Affairs, to inform Your Excelleney that he has had under consideration the question of so administering the Immigration Restriction Act as to afford an opportunity for Indian merchants, students, and tourist travellers to enter the Commonwealth temporarily without being subjected to any restrictions.

2. Mr. Hughes has now decided that any person *bona fide* of the classes mentioned above desirous of visiting Australia will be admitted to the Commonwealth, provided they are in possession of passports from the Indian Government sufficiently identifying them, and specifying the purpose and probable duration of their visit. Such documents will be accepted by this Government as entitling the holders to freely enter and pass through Australia, the only condition being that the passports shall be examined at the first port of call.

3. On arrival in the Commonwealth the education test prescribed by the Immigration Restriction Act will in these cases not be imposed, and such persons will be permitted to land without restriction, but in the event of their wishing to stay longer than twelve months, an application for a Certificate of Exemption for the desired term should be lodged before the expiry of such time, and the reason for such exemption stated. It must, of course, be understood that in any such cases none of the rights of the Government of the Commonwealth under the Immigration Restriction Act are to be considered as aban-

doned, and that, should it be found that this concession is being abused, the practice will be subject to review at any time.

4. An undertaking will be required from all such persons to advise the Customs officer at the port of departure when they are about to leave the Commonwealth.

5. I shall be glad if Your Excellency will be so good as to communicate the contents of this Dispatch to the Viceroy of India, and ask Lord Curzon to advise Your Excellency whether arrangements can be made in India accordingly. If there is no difficulty on this point, my colleague's proposals might take effect from an early date, say the 1st of October next. The Indian Government might take the necessary steps to give the requisite publicity to the matter at the seaports and prinicpal towns of India.

6. It is hoped that this exemption will be the means of promoting intercourse and improving trade relations between the Commonwealth and the great Indian Empire.

I have, &c.,

(*Signed*) J. C. WATSON.

His Excellency the Govenor-General,
Commonwealth of Australia.

H.I.J.M.'s CONSULATE-GENERAL,

SYDNEY, 19*th August*, 1904.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge receipt (on the 16th instant) of a letter, No. 04.3386, dated the 10th inst., signed by the then Minister for External Affairs, notifying the conditions upon which the Commonwealth Government is prepared to afford an opportunity for Japanese merchants, students, and tourist travellers to enter the Commonwealth temporarily without being subjected to any restrictions.

Immediately on receipt thereof I cabled to my Government, and have to-day received a cable authorizing me, on behalf of my Government, to accept the terms and conditions referred to.

I shall be glad to learn from you that the arrangement may take effect from the date mentioned in the letter under reply, viz. 1st October next, and I cordially re-echo the hope that this exemption may be the means of promoting intercourse and

improving trade relations between Japan and the Commonwealth of Australia.

I have, &c.,
(*Signed*) K. IWASAKI,
Elève-Consul in Charge of J.I.J.M.'s Consulate-General, Sydney.

The Right Hon. G. H. Reid, P.C., &c.,
Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs,
Melbourne.

GOVERNOR-GENERAL,
MELBOURNE, 12*th October*, 1904.

Memorandum.

The subjoined cablegram, dated Simla, 11th October, 1904, time 19.40, received this day by the Governor-General from His Excellency the Viceroy of India, is transmitted to the Prime Minister.

NORTHCOTE,
Governor-General.

'The Right Honourable the Prime Minister.

"I am replying your letter dated 18th August, regarding relaxation Immigration Restriction Act, in terms of cordial appreciation. Have you any objection to my publishing? I think it would be well to. Please do so."

PRIME MINISTER,
MELBOURNE, 12*th October*, 1904.

MY LORD,—With reference to Your Excellency's memorandum of the present date, I have the honour to invite you to be good enough to inform the Viceroy of India by telegraphic dispatch that this Government has no objection to the publication of the conditions under which Indian merchants, students, and tourists may enter the Commonwealth temporarily without being subjected to any restrictions.

I have, &c.,
(*Signed*) G. H. REID.

His Excellency the Governor-General.

SIMLA, *17th October*, 1904.

To HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

MY LORD,—The Government of India have received with much pleasure the intimation conveyed in Your Excellency's letter of the 18th August, 1904, that the Government of the Australian Commonwealth have decided to so far relax the provisions of the Immigration Restriction Act as to permit Indian merchants, students, and tourist travellers to visit Australia under passports granted by the Indian Government. I have the honour to ask you to convey to your Ministers our cordial acknowledgments for this valuable concession and for the sympathy it evinces with the wishes and feelings of the people of India. We cordially concur with your Ministers in hoping that this exemption of the educated classes of India from the restrictions imposed on ordinary immigration will result in more frequent intercourse and in an improvement of trade relations, to the mutual advantage of both countries.

2. In accordance with the suggestion made in paragraph 4 of your letter, the necessary steps have been taken to make known throughout India the relaxation of the present regulations conceded by the Commonwealth Government, and instructions have been issued with the object of securing that the privilege is granted only to those to whom it is intended to apply. We have arranged to bring the regulations for the grant of passports into effect from October 22nd.

3. Your Excellency's recent participation in the Government of India must make it no less gratifying to you than it is to me to have been the means of communicating to our Indian fellow-subjects this evidence of the regard for their interests felt by the Australian people.

I have, &c.,
(*Signed*) AMPTHILL,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

Memo.—Transmitted for the information of the Prime Minister.
NORTHCOTE. 17.11.04.

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