


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Zambia Handbook

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W A R N I N G

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INTRODUCTION

Zambia, a landlocked country in south central Africa, has attained a fragile political stability under its able and popular President, Kenneth Kaunda. Although colonized at the turn of the century, Zambia remained almost totally undeveloped, except for its rich copper deposits, until just before Great Britain granted the country independence in 1964. Since then, a determined government leadership has given high priority to an ambitious economic and social development program. About three fourths of the country's four million people remain tradition-bound rural dwellers, but the influences of education and urbanization are beginning to have a significant impact.

Zambia's mineral wealth gives the country a better base for economic growth than most African countries, but for the indefinite future the economy will remain vulnerable to the uncertainties of the world copper market. Economic growth has been hampered by the lack of skilled manpower, inadequate planning, and inflation. The government is trying to diversify the economy, and has had some success in creating a small manufacturing sector. But subsistence farming is still the occupation of most Zambians.

Domestic politics are dominated by President Kaunda and his ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP). Kaunda has tried to ride herd on disparate factions within the party. Despite his dogged attempts to forge an acceptable balance of party factions, however, tribal infighting has resulted in the desertion of various groups that have come to believe that their interests could no longer be protected by the party. Political strains have also arisen between the relatively prosperous people with cash employment and the poorly educated urban unemployed and rural villagers who have few opportunities for a higher standard of living. Nevertheless, the UNIP still enjoys the support of a popular majority, and Kaunda should be able to keep his government and party in power, even if it becomes necessary to engage in harassment or legal action to quash his political opposition.

Kaunda, who is devoted to the advancement of majority rule in southern Africa, has gradually increased Zambian assistance to southern African insurgents. This has occasionally prompted the white governments to undertake economic reprisals against Zambia and to threaten possible military retaliation. Although Zambia's white neighbors have not engaged in significant subversive operations against Kaunda's government, the Zambians remain seriously concerned over national security.

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The defense budget has mushroomed since 1969, although the slowly expanding security forces still had just over 7,000 men in late 1971. The government has concentrated on building an air and paramilitary defense against cross border raids. The Zambian military appears loyal to the government.

Developments in southern Africa have influenced Zambia's foreign policy. Zambia's relations with Western countries, especially with the UK and US, have cooled because the West has failed to intervene strongly against the white governments. On the other hand, Zambia has strengthened its ties with Communist countries because they have supported the southern African guerrilla movements and because such countries as Yugoslavia and China have provided Zambia substantial bilateral assistance that in effect supports Zambian political goals. By far the largest aid project is the Tanzania-Zambia railroad, that is being financed and constructed by the Communist Chinese and will free Zambia from its dependence on white-ruled countries for access to the sea.

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I. GEOGRAPHY

Location

Zambia, an independent black-ruled southern African country, is deeply involved in efforts to bring black majority rule to neighboring white-ruled states. It borders the black African countries of Zaire (formerly Congo Kinshasa), Tanzania, Malawi, and Botswana; the white-ruled territories of Angola and South-West Africa to the west and southwest, and Rhodesia and Mozambique to the east and southeast.

Zambia is irregularly shaped and has an area of 288,000 square miles. If superimposed on the United States, it would extend from Washington, D. C., to New Orleans.

Climate

Zambia has a tropical climate, with pronounced rainy and dry seasons. Temperatures are strongly moderated by the relatively high elevations. During the rainy season (mid-November through March) moist northerly to northeasterly winds produce moderate to heavy rainfall. Temperatures are generally higher during the rainy season than during the dry season (mid-April through October). The highest temperatures of the year usually occur in October.

Topography

The terrain consists mostly of flat to gently rolling high plains ranging between 3,000 and 5,000 feet above sea level. The plains are covered by open to moderately dense deciduous forests that have numerous grassy areas. A narrow belt of low hills covered by savanna and forest extends across the eastern part of the country. Hill areas are also found along most of the Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique borders. Marshes occur in a northern lake region east of Zaire and along the Kafue River in central Zambia. The principal rivers are the Zambezi, Kafue, Luapula, and Luangua.

Natural resources

Agriculture—Although at least 75% of the population depends on farming, only about 10% of Zambia's land is cultivable. About half of this is

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normally planted at one time while the other half lies fallow. An additional 10% of the total land area is used for grazing. Most agriculture is of the subsistence type, although there is some cash-crop production—amounting to 6.4% of the Gross Domestic Product in 1968. Enough rice, cassava, sorghum, and millet is grown to meet domestic needs, but most other food products must be imported. Tobacco and peanuts are exported, but make up only a small part of total export earnings.

Fuel and power—Zambia formerly depended on Rhodesia for much of its power and for all its industrial fuels. Following Rhodesia's declaration of independence, however, Zambia began to seek alternate sources. The most important effort has been the development of domestic coal mining to replace imports from Rhodesia. The government hopes to produce enough high grade Zambian coal to enable the country to forgo imports from Rhodesia in the near future.

Zambia has no known petroleum deposits. Most of the country's petroleum needs are now obtained through a pipeline from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to the Zambian Copperbelt. The government plans to build an oil refinery at the Zambian terminus of the pipeline to supply the full range of the country's petroleum needs.

About 80% of electricity consumed comes from the Kariba hydroelectric complex located on the Rhodesian side of the Zambezi River. The Zambian Government currently is constructing two new hydroelectric plants, one at Kariba on the Zambian side of the Zambezi and the other on the Kafue River. When completed, perhaps in the mid-1970s, these two sources are expected to have a capacity of 1,200 megawatts, sufficient to meet Zambia's expanding consumption for many years.

Metals and minerals—Mining, predominantly copper, is the backbone of the country's economy. In 1970 the total value of mineral production was \$943 million, with copper accounting for about 97%. Approximately one fifth of the non-Communist world's known copper ore reserves are in Zambia—some 763 million short tons. Zambia also mines significant quantities of coal, zinc, lead, and cobalt as well as small amounts of manganese, limestone, silver, selenium, amethyst, gold, and gypsum.

Human resources

Zambia has approximately 4,250,000 people, about 99% of whom are from Bantu-speaking Negroid groups. About 43,000 whites, 11,000 Asians,

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and 2,700 coloreds (persons of mixed ancestry) also live in the country. Zambia's black Africans are divided into some 73 tribes speaking about 40 languages or dialects. Almost all Zambians can speak at least one of the seven major languages, however, and a large minority possesses a working knowledge of English, the official language. Population density is about 14 persons per square mile, and varies widely from area to area. A substantial migration from rural to urban areas is taking place; in 1971 one in four Zambians lived in or near urban population centers along the north-south railroad which bisects the country.

Although the labor force—persons between the ages of 15 and 60—consists of just over 2 million people, only about 350,000 worked for wages in 1969. Almost 40% of the wage-earners were employed in the industrial copperbelt. Most of Zambia's labor force possess few skills and little education. Manpower surveys indicate that not until the late 1970s is it likely that there will be enough Zambians with the technical skills and post-secondary education necessary for many jobs. Zambia now must recruit foreigners, primarily whites from Western Europe, to fill most skilled positions in the government and economy. The government has been trying to improve the capabilities of its African population by expanding primary and secondary education. By 1968, every 7-year-old in the country could enter first grade. School enrollment and literacy—28% of the total population was considered literate in 1968—were growing rapidly. Because preindependence society was dominated by whites, many of whom sympathized with the Rhodesian Government's refusal to accept majority rule, relations between whites and blacks in Zambia occasionally become tense, and true interracial cooperation is rare.

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II. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Growth rates and trends

Throughout most of the 1960s and into 1970, copper earnings contributed significantly to economic growth. Between 1965 and 1968, the gross domestic product (GDP) grew almost 50% to \$1,310 million. Per capita GDP was about \$327. In 1970, rising inflation that had accompanied the economic growth was at least temporarily checked, but copper earnings fell as a result of declining prices and of a mine disaster which disrupted production. The government is promoting manufacturing and agriculture in order to reduce the economy's dependence on copper.

Income distribution

There is a wide disparity of income between the white population, regularly employed Africans, and the great bulk of Africans engaged in subsistence agriculture. The average annual earnings of non-Africans in 1970 were about \$7,115, reflecting both the predominance of non-Africans in highly paid, skilled positions and the need for special inducements in order to recruit qualified foreigners. The average annual earnings for regularly employed Africans in 1970 were about \$1,231, well above the approximately \$150 per capita income for all black Zambians. The gap between the standard of living of whites and employed Africans is narrowing, but the disparity between the living standards of employed and unemployed urban and rural Africans is widening.

Structure of the economy

Zambia's modern economy is dominated by the copper industry. Copper normally contributes about 95% of the country's export earnings. In 1968 it accounted for 42.5% of the GDP and over half the central government's revenue. Trade made up 11.5% of the GDP and manufacturing 9.7%. All other sectors of the economy, including agriculture, contributed less than 7% each. Despite its relative unimportance in the modern sector, agriculture—mostly subsistence farming—provides a livelihood for over 75% of the Zambian population.

Transportation and telecommunications

The transportation and telecommunications systems of Zambia are among the best in independent black Africa. Railroads are the most

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important means of transport and carry the bulk of the country's export-import traffic. Most of Zambia's 664 miles of railways form the center section of the 2,900-mile Trans-African route connecting the Atlantic and Indian oceans via Angola, Zaire, Rhodesia, and Mozambique. Political considerations have prompted the Zambian Government to seek an end to its reliance on routes that cross white-ruled territories and it, along with the Tanzanians and Communist Chinese, is now constructing a 1,100-mile railroad to the Indian Ocean at Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Although highway transport is of secondary importance, it provides essential feeder services to the railroads and is the only means of transport in many parts of the country. The highway system totals about 21,110 miles, of which 1,500 miles are bituminous, 3,120 are crushed stone or gravel, and 16,600 are improved or unimproved earth, which are often unusable during the rainy season.

Excluding Lake Tanganyika, Zambia has 770 miles of navigable waterways, most of which are only of local importance. The principal navigable waterways are the Zambezi River, including Lake Kariba, and the connecting lakes and rivers in the north near the Zairian border.

Air facilities in Zambia consist of about 100 usable airfields and 30 sites suitable for landings. The quality of the airfields is generally fair. Only five have hard-surfaced runways, the most important of which are located at Lusaka and Ndola. The government-owned Zambia Airways operates modern aircraft and has a training and management agreement with the Italian airline, Alitalia.

The telecommunications system possesses a wide range of facilities. Radio-relay links provide high-capacity facilities on all the domestic main trunk routes, most of which parallel the north-south railroad. The radio-relay links are paralleled on most routes by carrier-equipped open-wire lines. Remote towns to the east and west of this axis are connected to the basic network by radio-communication stations. The country will have complete coverage of medium-wave AM radiobroadcasting with the completion of transmitters now under construction. There is one FM station at Lusaka, and television can be seen in Lusaka, the Copperbelt, and Kabwe. Zambia has 100,000-250,000 radios and about 17,500 television sets. It also has 48,650 telephones or 1.17 per 100 population, placing it just within the top fifth of African countries.

Government economic policy and financial system

Economic policy—The government has repeatedly stated that its primary duty is to promote economic development that will raise and equalize

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the living standards of all Zambians. Economic development plans have given priority to the modernization of agriculture, the promotion of food crops leading toward self-sufficiency, and diversification of the country's copper-oriented industrial sector. The government also has encouraged the replacement of foreign skilled personnel with Zambians as soon as Zambian citizens have received training for the job, even though they may lack the experience needed to make them as fully competent as the foreign jobholder.

The government has decided that it must directly control the country's economic life in order that Zambia's resources can be effectively directed to national development. As a result of the government's nationalization program, it owns at least a 51% interest in virtually all businesses in the country. Land has been vested in the hands of the government, which in turn leases it to individuals on a long-term basis with little restriction on its use.

In order to facilitate economic development, the government has taken measures to regulate the labor movement and to end labor indiscipline and declining productivity. Regulatory legislation has been passed and presidential decrees have been issued dealing with wage levels and strikes. Labor councils are to be established to give workers greater participation in negotiations on wages and workers conditions.

The government is giving priority to rural development in order to eliminate economic and social disparities between urban and rural Zambians. Lacking the money and personnel for comprehensive programs throughout rural Zambia, the government hopes to generate local initiative and self-reliance. Direct assistance is concentrated on extension and credit services, marketing facilities, and the distribution of agricultural tools and consumer items. Small and remote settlements are required to consolidate and relocate on good land within reach of government services to qualify for assistance.

Financial system—The Bank of Zambia serves as the country's central bank and oversees the issue and redemption of notes and coins and the administration and regulation of credit in the banking system. Commercial banking facilities are provided by two government-controlled banks—the National Commercial Bank and the Commercial Bank of Zambia—and three foreign-owned private banks. In 1971 the government temporarily retreated from its announced intention to nationalize the private institutions. The Kwacha, which equalled \$1.40 in October 1970, is stable. It is subject to rigid exchange controls, but can be converted into other currencies.

Foreign trade and investment

Exports—In 1970, exports totaled \$1 billion. Copper normally accounts for more than 95% of total exports. Other minerals, tobacco, and timber

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make up most of the rest. More than two thirds of Zambia's exports go to Western Europe. Japan is growing in importance as a market for Zambian goods and rivals the United Kingdom as the largest single export market. In 1970 the United States purchased only \$2.0 million worth of Zambian goods.

Imports—The country's imports totaled \$502 million in 1970. The United Kingdom and South Africa were the leading sources of Zambian imports in 1970 providing, respectively, about 23% and 17% of the total. The large volume of South African imports is the result of a government decision to give high priority to the replacement of Rhodesian goods, which once accounted for over half of Zambia's imports. Imports from Rhodesia were down to about 6% of total imports in 1970, and should fall even further as Zambia develops its own sources of coal and hydroelectric power. The Zambian Government has now begun a search for alternate sources for goods now coming from South Africa, and South African imports have begun to decline. In 1970, the United States was the third largest source of Zambian imports, totaling \$51.8 million or about 9% of total imports.

Foreign investment—The government encourages foreign investment but prefers it to be in the form of minority participation in selected government-controlled enterprises. The government now owns at least a 51% interest in virtually all businesses in Zambia. It has announced that future private investment will be subject to similar nationalization procedures whenever a private firm reaches a certain size (so far undetermined). American investment, concentrated almost entirely in one of Zambia's two copper companies, slightly exceeds \$50 million in book value and \$200 million in market value.

Balance of payments

Zambia maintained annual balance-of-payments surpluses through 1970. Rapidly growing payments for international transactions were more than compensated for by unusually high copper prices which boosted government revenues. A deficit was expected for 1971, however, because of a fall in copper prices and a loss of production caused by a mine disaster. Although production may return to normal by early 1972, world copper prices remain unsettled. Consequently, Zambia's future balance-of-payments position is unclear. The country's foreign exchange holdings totaled about \$386 million at the end of June 1971, the equivalent of about nine months' imports.

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III. POLITICAL SITUATION AND TRENDS

History

Most African Zambians are descendents of ethnic groups that entered the country in several waves between the 16th and 18th centuries, probably from a common eastern Congo homeland. Before the arrival of the white man, the country sustained only a small population because of the tsetse fly, scarce rainfall, and infertile soil.

Zambia's colonial history began in 1889 when Cecil Rhodes, a South African financial and industrial magnate, received a Royal Charter from the United Kingdom Government granting his British South Africa Company economic rights over a large area, including what is now Zambia. The company was made responsible for maintaining peace and order, with the proviso that African rights would be respected and that the British Government retained the right to supervise company activities.

The UK assumed full administrative responsibility for the territory in 1924, and created the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia. The political history of the protectorate was marked by strains between a small but growing white population and Africans seeking an end to white colonial exploitation. Copper mining, especially after the early 1920s, attracted white immigrants who enjoyed a favored status and a relatively comfortable standard of living. The mines and white-owned farms also attracted a large number of Africans despite often harsh living and working conditions. Most whites considered organized African efforts to obtain reforms as threats to their way of life. By the mid-1930s, white Northern Rhodesians were openly calling for amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia, then a self-governing colony dominated by local white settlers.

In 1953, the UK and Rhodesian governments formed the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, incorporating what is now Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi. The federal government was dominated by white Rhodesians who sought to safeguard their privileged status. Meanwhile, the Northern Rhodesian Africans had already become politically conscious with the formation of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1950.

In 1958, Kenneth Kaunda and other militant leaders broke from the ANC to form what eventually became the limited National Independence Party (UNIP). As a prelude to Zambia's independence, the British dissolved

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the federation in December 1963 and, one month later, held general elections which swept Kaunda and UNIP to power.

Since the country's independence on 24 October 1964, Zambian politics has been dominated by President Kaunda and UNIP. Party and government structures have been centralized to enable Kaunda to push his economic and social development programs as well as to contain divisive domestic factionalism among tribal and other groups. Kaunda's deep personal commitment to the advancement of majority rule into neighboring white southern Africa has impelled him gradually to increase government assistance to insurgent organizations working against the white-ruled governments. These governments have responded to Zambia-based guerrilla warfare with increasingly frequent warnings that Zambia is risking severe economic and military reprisals. The Zambian Government has been slowly expanding ties with Communist countries, partly as a result of its dissatisfaction and disillusionment with Western support of southern Africa.

Structure of the government

The Zambian constitution, promulgated in 1964, combines features of the British and US governmental systems. It provides for a strong president (who heads the cabinet), a unicameral legislature, an independent judiciary, and a unitary system of provincial and local government. The concentration of political power in the hands of UNIP, which considers itself the legitimate arbiter of political activity, however, has restricted the ability of the legislature or judiciary to function as independently of the executive as envisioned by the constitution's founders. Moreover, sweeping security legislation that was enacted in the late 1960s undermines some constitutional provisions guaranteeing civil rights.

Executive—The president is both head of state and head of government. He is elected by universal suffrage and holds office for 5 years or until elections for the National Assembly, whichever occurs earlier. The president can summon, address, or adjourn the assembly at any time. If adjourned, the assembly must convene again within 12 months. The constitution places no restrictions on the freedom of the president to organize the executive as he sees fit.

Legislative—The National Assembly has 105 popularly elected members and 5 nominated by the president. The members represent single-member constituencies, approximately equal in population, and all Zambian citizens over 18 years of age are eligible to vote. The term of the National Assembly

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is 5 years unless it is dissolved by the president, in which case new elections must be held within 3 months. Debate in the National Assembly has been occasionally lively, but because of the overwhelming majority of UNIP representation in the assembly since independence, that body almost never has voted against the wishes of the UNIP leadership.

Judiciary—The professional judiciary is appointed by the president and may be removed only by the president after due cause has been established by a special tribunal. In rural areas, most civil litigation and minor infractions of the modern penal code are handled by local courts in which tribal chiefs enforce indigenous customary law over their tribesmen, subject to minimal government regulation.

Local government—Local government is administered by a descending hierarchy of provincial, district, ward, and village units. A variety of laws and presidential decrees has been designed to ensure that guidelines established by the UNIP leadership are followed. Within these broad parameters, however, President Kaunda intends that technically qualified civil servants, traditional chiefs and village headmen, and other respected and prominent local figures play a prominent role in the administration of government policies.

The district governor is the lowest ranking official and a presidential appointee. Subject to general supervision by provincial ministers and ultimately the national leadership, the district governor directly oversees ward and village operations. He has the personal responsibility to ensure that appointments and, in the case of elected officials, nominees to positions at the lower levels are politically and technically qualified.

Political dynamics

The ruling UNIP party led by President Kaunda dominates the political scene. Most political competition in the country is among factions in UNIP rather than between UNIP and other parties or special interest groups. The composition of political groups both inside and outside UNIP is generally characterized by an overlapping of rival tribes or closely related tribes and of interest groups that arose from modernization. These politically conscious groups—including party leaders, civil servants, labor leaders, students, and semieducated and underemployed youth—are developing in the rapidly growing cities, towns, and mining centers. The great majority of the population, which still lives in rural areas and is largely outside the struggle for political power, tends to be more responsive to traditional tribal authority.

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President Kaunda, the man most responsible for the maintenance of Zambia's fragile political stability, takes an active role in directing all national activities. His policies and style reflect an innate traditionalism, a Christian upbringing by missionary parents, and a strong exposure to Western political values.

Kaunda emphasizes government by consensus, in part to prevent any of Zambia's disparate groups from dominating the others. The President constantly juggles the membership of leading UNIP and government bodies so as to maintain a balance of tribal, political and economic groupings that is consistent with changing power realities and national needs. He tends to tolerate lengthy palavers and considerable dissension in party and government organs, and he prefers to guide his subordinates and the public by persuasion, education, and good example. To win popular support for the party and government decisions, he employs parliament as a forum for making sectional and local views known, particularly on national development policies. He also tries to distribute development funds to all areas of the country and advocates local participation in their administration.

At the same time, Kaunda believes that the gradual establishment of a one-party state is necessary to guide all political, economic, and social activities in the country and to prevent debate and competition from getting out of hand. Increasingly, the President believes that greater control by him over UNIP and greater party influence in national affairs is required. Infighting among UNIP leaders along tribal lines almost split the party in 1969 and impelled Kaunda to take decisive steps to consolidate political power. In addition, he announced measures designed to discipline an unruly rank and file in UNIP. He also has nationalized most businesses in Zambia and has strengthened UNIP influence in local government, both actions designed in part to increase the ability of the national leadership to implement development programs.

Loath to provoke widespread dissension, however, Kaunda is cautious in the use of his growing personal and party powers. He has acted firmly against tribal political factions that threaten to prevent him from building national unity, and occasionally has taken arbitrary action against unpopular minorities—most notably foreign residents, small religious sects, and opposition political parties—none of which has significant influence in Zambian affairs.

Kaunda recently has stressed the need to mobilize the Zambian population against security threats presented by Zambian dissidents or foreign

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agents organized by neighboring white-ruled countries. Parliament passed unusually harsh security legislation in 1969, and Kaunda has ordered local officials to maintain a permanent registry of all Zambian and foreign residents and visitors in their areas. In 1971 the government announced plans to build a National Service administered by the military. The National Service apparently will be designed to produce an awareness of security problems and, in the last resort, to act as a reserve popular militia.

Domestic political problems

Tribalism is Zambia's most contentious political issue, but President Kaunda has been able to keep it a manageable problem. No single tribe in Zambia wields a predominant influence in the party, government, armed forces, intellectual elite, or in the economic life of the country. Consequently, none enjoys a power base that could easily be translated into political power.

Tribal politics currently focus on a Bemba tribal grouping under former vice president Simon Kapwepwe. Blatant politicking by members of this group antagonized most of UNIP's other political factions in the late 1960s. Although President Kaunda willingly demoted Kapwepwe and his Bemba cohorts in the party and government hierarchy, he rebuffed pressure from the UNIP majority to remove the Bemba from all important positions. Nevertheless, Kapwepwe resigned from the cabinet and UNIP in August 1971 to lead a newly formed Bemba-based opposition party. Kapwepwe was unable to persuade other leading Bembas in UNIP to defect with him, however, and one month later the government dealt him another severe blow by arresting virtually the entire national and local leadership of his party. Kapwepwe was allowed to remain free in order to prevent him from becoming a martyr.

The most serious problem that Kapwepwe's defection could create is the permanent disaffection of the Bemba population from UNIP. The Bemba's desertion would reduce UNIP's once large popular majority to a narrow margin and might make the government less able to manage tribal and other problems. Although Kapwepwe himself was elected, his party did poorly in the December 1971 parliamentary by-elections.

Since early 1971, many prominent Zambians in UNIP have begun openly to debate basic national priorities. Moderates have argued that extensive nationalization of businesses and other economic reforms have given an already hard-pressed government more to administer than it can

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properly handle. Others, including Kapwepwe, have contended that the government reforms are moving the country too slowly toward socialist goals and that additional regulatory powers would enable the government to overcome economic and administrative inefficiency. But most Zambians have remained firmly loyal to Kaunda and to UNIP. To a large extent, the debate has reflected little more than a realistic appreciation of the difficulties that the country faces in achieving political unity and national development.

Political parties

United National Independence Party (UNIP)—UNIP was formed in 1960 to unite all the political groups which demanded that Britain grant the country early independence. Since universal suffrage was instituted in 1964, the party has received the support of at least 80% of the voting population. There seems little chance at present that the party will be voted out of power. In many respects Zambia has been governed as a de facto one-party state.

African National Congress (ANC)—The ANC is primarily a regionally oriented party and draws its strength almost completely from the two tribal groupings that predominate in southern and western Zambia. The party's lack of positive leadership has reduced the ANC to little more than a parochial obstructionist party which seeks to limit the powers of the central government as much as possible.

United Progressive Party (UPP)—Support for the UPP comes almost entirely from Bemba-speaking tribal groups living in northeastern Zambia and the urban copperbelt. The party also has the backing of a few leftist intellectuals who are attracted to the socialist leanings of UPP leader Simon Kapwepwe. The government detained almost all UPP national and local officials except Kapwepwe in September 1971, only one month after the formation of the party was formally announced. President Kaunda apparently hopes that this action will be sufficient to destroy the party without having to move directly against Kapwepwe.

Elections

Under the constitution, all citizens 18 years old or over who previously have been registered in their constituencies are eligible to vote. Election procedures are designed to forestall any stalemate between the president and the National Assembly. Elections for the president and the legislature are

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held concurrently, and each candidate for the National Assembly must announce which presidential candidate he supports. Both names then appear together on the ballot. Each voter must choose among the two-man slates and thus is effectively prevented from voting for a president from one party and a legislator from another.

Elections for the full National Assembly were held in December 1968. Seventy-seven percent of the registered voters cast valid ballots; of these, UNIP received 73%, ANC 25%, and independents just over 1%. UNIP won 81 of the 105 seats, 30 of them uncontested. The ANC won 23 seats (mostly in southwestern Zambia, where UNIP won only a few seats), and an ANC-backed independent took another seat. After by-elections were held in 12 constituencies in December 1971, UNIP held a total of 82 seats, the ANP had 21, the UPP one, with one independent.

The most recent local council elections were held in August 1970. UNIP won a majority on all local government councils outside southwestern Zambia and on about half of the councils in that region. Nationwide, 968 seats were at stake. UNIP won 832, 609 of them unopposed and the remaining 223 against ANC and independent opposition. The ANC won 124 seats, and independents took 12.

Police 

Police--The 7,800-man Zambia Police Force has primary responsibility for internal security, as well as for normal law enforcement. The regular police establishment of 6,370 men makes up the bulk of the force. Two battalion-sized special units are organized to respond to serious security problems. The 780-man Mobile Police Unit is responsible primarily for civil disturbances which exceed the capabilities of local regular police units. Based primarily in urban areas, the mobile unit is trained in riot control and related problems. The 650-man Paramilitary Police Battalion is trained in counter-insurgency warfare and is designed to be a rapid-strike force against limited cross-border incursions and organized internal disturbances. It also assists the Zambian Army in patrolling the frontiers and protecting vital installations. The paramilitary battalion is better equipped, but not as well trained as the mobile unit. Both special units, with army support, are capable of coping with riots and internal disturbances unless the uprisings are widespread and simultaneous. They probably could not effectively counter cross-border raids by regular armed units from neighboring white southern Africa.




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SUBVERSION

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IV. SUBVERSION

Internal

Zambia has many of the domestic social and political problems contributing to instability that are common to African states. By the end of 1971, however, neither subversion nor insurgency had posed serious threats to the government. The only severe violence in recent years occurred in 1964 when several thousand members of the fanatical Lumpa religious sect rebelled. The uprising was put down with considerable bloodshed in a few weeks, and most Zambians who remained loyal to the sect fled to Zaire where they eked out a living as refugees. Many have returned, but they have been required to disperse in small groups to minimize the possibility of new disturbances. The bitter political rivalries that often plague Zambia have evolved out of tribal and regional competition for influence at the highest levels of the government, but the political factions that are engaged in this competition have preferred to operate legally.

In poor and remote border areas, where people remain rooted in tribal traditions, some small groups have been suspicious of government efforts to extend its authority in their area and have at times considered defiance of the central government. In the mid-1960s, the leadership of the Lozi tribe in western Zambia toyed with leading a secessionist movement in order to protect the Lozi paramount chief from the abrogation of special prerogatives granted him by the British colonial administration. Most of the population in western Zambia supported the central government, however, and the Lozi chief reluctantly accepted his loss of power.

Disgruntled members of one of the country's smallest and poorest tribes, the Lunda of northwestern Zambia, have twice organized minor armed resistance movements. The first effort, in the mid-1960s, involved only about 15 men and never got off the ground. The second, organized in 1970 and probably operating with less than 200 men, has been given sanctuary in neighboring Portuguese Angola. In May 1971 some of these Lunda dissidents mounted a few cross-border raids, but the attackers found little popular support even among their fellow tribesmen, and they appear incapable of becoming more than a nuisance to Zambian security forces along the border.


Several predominantly urban groups—notably industrial workers, intellectuals, and poorly educated and semiskilled urban youth—occasionally

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show signs of unhappiness with the roles envisaged for them by the national leadership. Small numbers of these groups have been responsible for sporadic violent incidents, but, in general, they have not shown any interest in opposing the government. Indeed, incidents of violence have usually been the result of overzealous expressions of support for national leaders.

A recent exception was a student protest in July 1971 that was clearly antigovernment in tone. Ten militant university student leaders wrote an insulting letter that questioned President Kaunda's sincerity in opposing white minority rule in southern Africa because he had banned demonstrations against French arms sales to South Africa after an initial protest had turned violent. When UNIP party leaders took it upon themselves to discipline the ten students, a large part of the student body rallied behind the militants, charging that UNIP was improperly intervening in university affairs. The student protesters, who generally are opposed to UNIP's goal of a one-party state, briefly closed the university campus before Kaunda sent in troops and sent the students home for the rest of the term.

External

Subversive activities directed or abetted from abroad have increased in recent years but do not appear likely to grow to serious proportions. Zambia's white-ruled neighbors have tried to undermine Zambian stability with modest assistance to leaders of Zambian opposition groups and occasionally have been responsible for minor acts of sabotage. The Portuguese have been the main source of training and small arms for the Lunda dissidents living along the Zambia-Angola border. Although the Lundas are insignificant by themselves, the Portuguese could use them as a cover for attacks of their own.

Communist countries have gradually increased their official presence in Zambia, but they seem more intent on trying to influence Zambian policies than on subverting the government. The Chinese have gained a decided advantage over other Communist missions in Zambia by agreeing to build the high-priority TanZam railroad. Some interest in Chinese Communism has developed in student circles, but the limited propaganda conducted by embassy personnel or railroad construction teams has studiously avoided criticism of Zambian leaders. The less popular Soviets are engaged in a low-key effort to expand their influence. The USSR has shown a special interest in the labor movement, although until 1971 the Soviets relied on the East Germans to play the more active role in establishing contacts and in making available a few scholarships for trade union officials. In 1971, the

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Zambian Government closed down the East German mission, probably because of the East Germans' meddling in labor activities and of rumored East German assistance to the opposition UPP party. The Soviets are also interested in Zambian university students and have reached agreements with the Zambian Government to provide a few teachers for the local university as well as some scholarships in the Soviet Union. There is no Communist party or Communist front organization in the country.

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
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ARMED FORCES

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VI. ARMED FORCES

Defense organization and manpower

The Zambian defense forces, including all components of the army, air force, and special police units, total about 7,100 men. Its mission is to ensure internal security and to defend the country against foreign attack. The defense forces would be able to maintain internal security except in the case of widespread and simultaneous disorders, but it could not offer sustained resistance to modern military forces such as those in white southern Africa. Consequently, the government has given high priority to the establishment of an air-defense system designed to deter its white-ruled neighbors. Zambia has no organized reserve forces, but the government is creating a National Service intended to serve in part as a reserve militia for use against Zambian dissidents or foreign agents trying to foment trouble in rural areas.

Military personnel are highly regarded by the Zambian population. Most support the domestic and foreign policies of the government, but some leading army officers resent the growing intervention of the government and UNIP politicians in military affairs.

The army's personnel strength is 5,000. Its major role is to serve as a reserve force to supplement the police in the event of major domestic disorders. Protection of the national borders is generally considered to be a secondary mission. Army units regularly patrol the country's frontiers with white southern Africa, and the government is organizing one or two anti-aircraft batteries to protect selected installations. The army has virtually completed a program to replace foreign officers and technical personnel with Zambians. As a result, the army suffers from a severe shortage of qualified and experienced officers and technicians, and operational efficiency has declined seriously—most notably in the areas of planning, logistics, and military discipline. Army equipment is mainly of British origin and is in fair condition.

The fledgling 700-man air force is equipped primarily to provide airlift for the army and police. The air force has the capability at present of transporting a 150-man company and its equipment to any place in Zambia. The government is now trying to develop an air-defense capability, by supplementing and replacing aging British planes with more modern craft. By mid-1971 Zambia had purchased or ordered 35 planes and helicopters,

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
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primarily from Italy, West Germany, and Yugoslavia; and by the end of 1971, 70-100 Zambians had at least begun jet pilot training.

Military budget

The military budget for the fiscal year ending December 1971 is estimated to be at least \$70 million. The government began to conceal defense and public security spending within the budget in 1970, and precise estimates for defense expenditures are now unavailable. It is estimated that defense spending represents 10% of the total budget and about 4.3% of the estimated gross national product for 1969. Military budgets have increased significantly since 1969 in response to growing apprehension over possible armed attacks from white southern Africa.

Logistics

Until 1969, Zambia had been dependent on the United Kingdom for arms, equipment, and training. Since then, the Zambian Government has begun to diversify its sources of supply. The government has turned to Italy, Yugoslavia, and West Germany for most of its sophisticated equipment, including modern aircraft and anti-aircraft guns. Zambia continues to rely on British firms for most basic military items, but it has begun testing small arms from various Communist countries and may consider switching its source of supply for these items as well. Zambia has negotiated agreements with Italy and Yugoslavia to provide training and advisory personnel for the Zambian security forces, almost all of them assigned to the air force.

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VII. FOREIGN RELATIONS

Southern Africa

The overriding concern of Kaunda's foreign policy has been the elimination of minority rule in neighboring white-ruled southern Africa. Although Kaunda would like to see peaceful, cooperative, international action depose the white minority regimes, he actively supported southern African insurgents after international efforts to topple the Rhodesian Government had failed in 1965. Insurgents have been allowed to store arms and equipment in Zambia, to transit the country, and in some cases to use Zambia as a base for guerrilla operations.

Because of its support for Zambian-based insurgency, the government has been faced with a mounting threat of economic and military reprisals by the white states. Even after the government has reduced its economic dependence on the white-ruled states by completing the TanZan railroad and by other programs, Zambia will remain vulnerable to military and paramilitary retaliation. Since 1966 over a dozen acts of sabotage have occurred in Zambia, most of them probably committed by agents or sympathizers of the white regimes. The white governments have warned Kaunda that his support of insurgent organizations could result in strong retaliatory measures.

Zambia's concern over southern Africa has shaped its relations with Western and Communist states. Disappointed and disillusioned with Western policies toward southern Africa, Kaunda and other Zambian leaders have bitterly attacked Western governments, especially the United Kingdom. Communist China and Yugoslavia have exploited anti-Western themes and have shown a willingness to assist Zambia in a number of development projects. As a result, they have gained considerable good will, and official relations have expanded. Kaunda abhors Maoist ideology, however, and most Zambians remain aloof from all foreigners, thus seriously restricting the ability of Communist governments to influence Zambian affairs. The Soviet Union has kept its activities in Zambia in low key partly because the Zambians regard it as an aggressive great power.

In affairs outside Africa the Zambian Government pursues a policy of nonalignment. According to the government's interpretation, nonalignment does not mean neutralism but the freedom to determine foreign policies without being restricted by ties with any nation or bloc. In practice, the

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


government frequently criticizes both the Soviet Union and the United States and other Western governments for being insufficiently responsive to the national interests or development needs of smaller states. Zambia considers the United Nations an important forum because it provides one of the best opportunities for smaller states—through publicity and diplomatic pressure—to influence the major powers and because Kaunda believes that the organization provides a moral basis for international relations.

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VIII. US INTERESTS

US policies

The US has encouraged Zambia to adopt foreign and domestic policies that will promote regional political stability and healthy national development. The US has cooperated with the Zambian Government on constructive peaceful approaches to southern African issues. American aid has been channeled toward the development of Zambian transportation links with other black African countries in order to reduce the country's economic dependence on white southern Africa. The US has also encouraged the Zambian Government to establish an economic climate favorable to private foreign investment consistent with Zambia's insistence on a substantial degree of government participation in the economy.

US Government assistance

Because Zambia enjoys rich mineral resources, the US has almost entirely limited direct financial assistance to regional development projects and to emergency and humanitarian relief. The largest project involves paving a Tanzanian section of the highway that connects Zambia with the Indian Ocean at Dar es Salaam. The project is scheduled to be completed by early 1972 at an estimated cost of about \$40 million. The US also organized a 4-month emergency air lift, at a cost to the US of \$3.7 million, when Zambia lost the use of Rhodesian railroads for petroleum products in late 1965. Bilateral aid programs provided Zambia with about \$1 million annually until 1968 and with about half that amount since then. In late 1971 most bilateral aid was given in the form of grants under the PL-480 program and funds for refugee programs administered under UN auspices. In 1970, UN agencies and the IBRD granted \$11.7 million in assistance to Zambia, about \$4.7 million of which was contributed by the US.

Resident US citizens

In 1971, 1,087 Americans were living in Zambia, including 17 US Government officials and 62 of their dependents. Most of the remaining 1,000 Americans residing in the country were missionaries and their families.

Trade with the US

In 1970 Zambian imports from the US amounted to about \$51.8 million, while exports to the US were \$2.0 million. The US is the third

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largest supplier of goods to Zambia, ranking behind the UK and South Africa. The value of imports from the US, primarily capital goods, has remained fairly steady since 1966. In 1970 about 9% of Zambia's slowly growing imports came from the US. Zambian exports to the US, primarily copper products, which vary considerably in value from year to year, reached a high of \$33.5 million in 1967.

US investment

American shareholdings in Roan Selection Trust—one of two major private firms connected with the copper industry—were estimated in 1970 at \$51.9 million in book value and \$208.6 million in market value. These holdings far exceed the total value of all other American investment in Zambia.

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