

The slaves unrespited of low pursuits,  
Living amid the same perpetual flow  
Of trivial objects, melted and reduced  
To one identity, by differences  
That have no law, no meaning, and no end.

W.H.Auden

A few years back an acquaintance of mine half-jokingly, half-condescendingly poured into my ears: ‘ But why can’t these poor people wash themselves? Water, at least, costs nothing?’ He was a perfect dandy and, this question of filth, if nothing better, was his implicit argument-not actualized in language, but implied-for being self-righteous.

He thanks God daily  
That he was born and bred  
A British Pharisee.

W.H. Auden

‘Ok, society is *also* to blame for the condition of the poor, but can’t the poor use whatever is available to them to keep up appearance’, this was what he wanted his utterance to communicate to me. A person must wash and go clean because s/he is a human being. This is ‘natural’, ‘obvious’, ‘a forgone conclusion’, ‘what-goes-without-saying’, a given, a proposition that already has become a conclusion by the time it has been articulated. A conclusion that needs no explanation.

One may know it or not, but this is an ideological position. Our social milieu becomes a myth the moment it forgets, blurs, dilutes, mystifies, metamorphoses, transposes, projects itself into something ‘natural’, ‘obvious’, ‘existing-that-is-why-eternal’, ‘way-of-the-

world', *ad infinitum*.

The dandy is no less alienated than the poor, smelly peasant. This smelly poor does not keep himself tidy because he works to feed this body and, may be, many such smelly bodies back home. He works through this body to feed this same body. This body of his is a burden he carries for his struggle for bread, daily. The very body as a source of labour power is a commodity to be sold to an owner of money for a few crumbs to feed this body on. He does not love his body, he curses it. The purchaser of labour power is not interested in the appearance of the body but its ability to turn things into capital. The smelly poor does not prostitute his body, but he prostitutes his body's ability to make commodities. This is the difference between a prostitute and a proletariat, and this difference accounts for everything that a proletariat can and must do to become a really free human being. His very ability to make commodities is itself a commodity. A whore, instead prostitutes her body, her looks, not her ability to turn things into commodities.

Ronald Barthes, a little known French leftist thinker, had undertaken to debunk the naturalness, obviousness, 'what-goes-without-saying' ethos of the bourgeoisie. His seminal work *Mythologies* is a trailblazer in its own right. I think it would be silly to talk about social science without first acquainting oneself with Ronald Barthes: an acquaintance here includes both, agreement as well as disagreement.

Ronald Barthes writes:

'To instill into the established Order the complacent portrayal of its drawbacks has nowadays become a paradoxical but incontrovertible means of exalting

it. Here is the pattern of this new-style demonstration: take the established value which you want to restore or develop, and first lavishly display its pettiness, the injustices which it produces, the vexations to which it gives rise, and plunge it into its natural imperfections; then, at the last moment, save it in spite of, or rather by the heavy curse of its blemishes...'

'It is a kind of homeopathy: one cures doubts about the Church or the Army by the very ills of the Church and the Army. *One inoculates the public with a contingent evil to prevent or cure an essential one.* To rebel against the inhumanity of the established Order and its values, according to this way of thinking, is an illness which is common, natural, forgivable; one must not collide with it head-on, but rather exorcise it like a possession... A little 'confessed' evil saves one from acknowledging a lot of hidden evil... The moral at the end is well known: 'Here you are, rid of a prejudice which cost you dearly!' It is in the same way that the Established Order relieves you of your progressive prejudices... What does it matter, after all, if Order is a little brutal or a little blind, when it allows us to live cheaply? Here we are, in our turn, rid of a prejudice which cost us dearly, too dearly, which cost us too much in scruples, in revolt, in fights and in solitude.'<sup>1</sup>

If my memory does not fail me, the opinion of our nationalists of all shades remained blatantly pronounced against the Lahore resolution of 1940. Almost all of them, save a few, have been cured of this *progressive* prejudice of theirs. The newly fangled political wisdom has shown them the light not at the end, but at the very beginning of the tunnel, i.e. the Lahore resolution. They have been making

many fantastic readings into this sacrosanct document. 'I failed to do away with the essential evil, now I am trying my luck at the contingent one, but I never forget to enlighten the public that this contingent evil is in fact the necessary evil. A am a nationalist despite myself!' This is the dilemma our nationalists who want a Pakistan as was promised (?) in 1940's resolution. It is to be noted that most of them have not only outgrown the old 'freedom, self-determination' prejudice, they have also rid themselves of socialist utopia. They have come of age, they are mature politicians and thinkers now. Experience has taught them to bite just exactly what they can chew.

They have learnt to speak precisely the language acceptable to the state. They are no different from our dandy who curses the smelly poor for his smell, our autonomy heroes curse the peasants for being dumb to follow the PPP! 'I do not understand you, therefore you are idiots'.

L. K. Advani has made a number of wonderful comments in his book *My Country, My Life*. 'How can Hindus and Muslims belong to two separate nations just because they belong to two different faiths?..I looked at the social fabric and cultural milieu of Sindh, in which the Hindu could not be separated from the Muslim, and vice versa'<sup>2</sup> And the same Advani goes on to say: 'Indeed, our province [Sindh] at the time had the highest number of [RSS] *parcharaks* per district in all of India'. It is very important for us to note the inherent contradiction of this communal ideology presented in the idiom of nationalism and secularism. If 'Hindus' can be a nation because they are Hindus, then the Muslims can be a nation just because they are Muslims. The Mahasabha and the Sangh have always emphasized Hindutva (Hinduness) as the sole criterion of a Hindu nation. By the same token Muslimness

of the Muslims was paraded as the sole criterion of a Muslim nation. There are certain politicians and intellectuals in Sindh who just cannot discriminate between a Nationalist Hindu and a Communalist Hindu and a socialist/communist Hindu. Hindu for them is an essence and this essence, Hindu, is then stigmatized and dismissed as communally motivated, treacherous, anti-Sindh and fifth columnist. Jinnah, the vanquisher of the Hindu Congress is hailed as an epitome, a champion of secularism.

This is just a beginning, a tentative and by no means an exhaustive account of the historic things. As they say in German: Aller Anfang ist schwer- every beginning is difficult.

This work has been written as an attempt to debunk certain myths and essentialist categories like ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’. The mistakes in the text and the argument are all mine. Criticism is welcome.

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15, Whitaker Place, Auckland Central,  
New Zealand

**Shafqat Kadri**

<sup>1</sup> Ronald Barthes, *Mythologies*. Vintage Books, London 2009 pp39-41

<sup>2</sup>Advani, op.citd. pp.3-4

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“Society is a growth in time, not a syllogism in logic; and when the part is put out through the door it comes in at the window.”

\_ Voltaire

I

# Passive Revolution of Capital

GESCHRIEBEN steht: “Im Anfang war das Wort!”

Hier stock ich schon! Wer hilft mir weiter fort?

Ich kann das Wort so hoch unmöglich schätzen,

Ich muß es anders übersetzen,

Wenn ich vom Geiste recht erleuchtet bin.

Geschrieben steht: Im Anfang war der Sinn.

Bedenke wohl die erste Zeile,

Daß deine Feder sich nicht übereile!

Ist es der Sinn, der alles wirkt und schafft?

Es sollte stehn: Im Anfang war die Kraft!?

Doch auch indem ich dieses niederschreibe,

Schon warnt mich was, daß ich dabei nich belibe.

Mir hilft der Geist! Auf einmal she ich Rat

Und schreibe getrost: Im Anfang war die *Tat*!<sup>1</sup>

Goethe



The text reads: "In the beginning was the Word"  
I am already puzzled! Who will further help me?  
I can hardly set so high value on the Word,  
I must translate it differently, if the soul gives me the right illumination.  
The text reads: "In the beginning was the Mind".  
Think deep about the first line; let not your pen run so fast!  
Is it the Mind that does and works all?  
It should read: "In the beginning was the Power".  
Again, noting this down,  
Warning comes not to leave it there.  
The soul helps me! Suddenly I saw the advice,  
And boldly write: **IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE DEED!**

*My translation*

## Europe is literally the creation of the Third World.

Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of The Earth*

But the category, 'the Third World' is literally the creation of Europe. This implies the attempts of the metropolitan world (the capital of the centre) to *create* 'a Third World' (the capital of the periphery). Do we have an inventory of such attempts? An inventory rendered directly impossible by the very metropolitan, post-Enlightenment (bourgeois/civil society) epistemological categories. How can the tables be turned, if the very syntax of what is to be said has already been decided by those categories, then, will one ever be able to redraw the whole epistemological sketch and rebuild the edifice, in order to do away with this categorization and the social system which engenders these categories; and this in a radically opposite way? The emergence of nationalism, a category transplanted by the centre into the periphery; in the colonies, against, and yet subject to the colonial syntax, is a case in point.

What is nationalism qua nationalism of the colony? How does it engage with the colonial state? Or in other words, what are the socio-political aspects of the movement of the peripheral capital in its fight against the metropolitan capital. Can one locate moves within this movement? What are its limitations and possibilities of expansion? How does it acquire and then exercise hegemony over a largely peasant population of the colony? What is its nature? In short, how does it bring in the Passive Revolution of the peripheral capital in the age of advanced monopolistic capitalism or imperialism?

The Indian anti-colonial nationalist struggle, precisely in the character of nationalism, furnishes the

biggest example of such a struggle, involving as it did millions of peasants and other subaltern classes of society led by an emerging national and nationalist capital. Nationalism qua nationalism in this particular example became hegemonic-not in popular or dictionary sense of the word, but in Gramscian sense. But, how? Could this particular capital exercise hegemony without changing its aspects to nationalism? Could bourgeoisie nationalism succeed without appropriating a part of its negation? How did it achieve this? We will try to understand this hegemony of the Passive Capital against imperialism and its various stages of political development.

I am thoroughly indebted to the Italian Communist leader/thinker Antonio Gramsci and the West-Bengali political scientist Partha Chatterjee for the present work and its theoretical foundation. It is indeed quite amazing that Antonio Gramsci stands neglected in this part of the world and especially among our ‘would-be’ theorists and alchemists of change. I have, as of yet, never come across even an elementary sort of work on Gramsci’s thoughts and his approach published in either Sindh or Pakistan. The ease with which such eminent thinkers are dispensed with bears witness to our political/theoretical self-complacency and inertia. One finds a plethora of “studies and analysis” these days, mostly anemic because they are afraid of the red colour.

‘They believed in Reason as the Catholics believed in the Blessed Virgin’

Roman Rolland

One of the commonest totems is the belief about everything that exists, that it is ‘natural’ that it should exist, that it could not do otherwise than exist.<sup>2</sup> Post-Enlightenment bourgeois-liberal rationality is one such

totem of the intellectuals and this exists; precisely, they would say, because the bourgeoisie exist. It is always observed that nationalism qua nationalism in engagement with imperialism reinvents its past history and symbolism. This nationalism is in struggle against the very foundations of the colonial state, its ethico-political formations/formulations, its sense of right and wrong, its sense of duty and service, its sense of nation and nationalism, and even education. One may, then, rightly ask: will it be possible to understand this type of nationalism within post-Enlightenment, rational categories of thought, when the very struggle is against the rational bourgeoisie ruling the colony as empire-builders? The English imperialists were the harbingers of 'rationalism', 'science', 'modernity', in India. So, are we to use these 'rational', 'scientific', 'modern' theoretical girds for our analysis of the struggle which was against the very Englishman and his ethos? Are these 'naturally' existing theoretical forms the only theoretical form and the only valid—in other words successful—theoretical forms? (For liberals the only criterion for validity is success!). One may argue that the bourgeoisie (or to use the latest jargon of the corporate intellectual market, Civil Society) has proved itself resilient and has withstood attempts. But one never can tell for how long!

This bourgeoisie/civil society came into existence dripping blood from all of its pores. But, the myth reads that it came into being 'for the greatest good of the greatest number.' (The same slogan in the colonies subjugated by civilizing bourgeoisie meant greatest enslavement of the greatest number). The answer precisely lies in the question itself: The bourgeoisie exist and is the very reason it will *pass* from existence. All that exists has a *history*. It exists because it *has* come into being *historically*, and for that reason *will* cease into being *historically*. All that Marxism

has done is to show the grave-digging elements of this 'has' and its passing into 'will'. A true 'ought' is never foisted on an 'is', rather a true 'ought' comes shining out of 'is'. 'Is' is not merely an 'is', it is an 'ought' simultaneously. Is-ness or 'being' always involves a determination. And all that determinates also negates. A thing exists and will exist for the very reason because it exists as a social myth. And the bourgeois is the greatest myth builder of all history. The French thinker Ronald Barthes has written a seminal work '*Mythologies*' on this myth-building of the bourgeois.

One does not think (cognize the world) in a vacuum, nor does one interpret the world in isolation. Interpretation-*reading of or reading into* of an event or a text-is a political question. Every interpretation has got bearings on Power and its social manifestations, the very process of creating minds (education, for instance) is entwined with social structures of Power. There is no such thing as impartial reading of or reading into, as there is no impartial Power or Politics. I am decidedly partial in my interpretations.

This is not a superficial rejection of things Western, for such a rejection is no rejection at all. This is neither a criticism of one brand of 'rationality' by another brand of 'rationality' for this, then, is not criticism but hypocrisy of criticism. Criticism is a total negation dialectically; one brand of 'rationality' cannot totally negate another brand of 'rationality' because the two brands emerge from the same theoretical milieu. They share the core assumption, that is, a phenomenon can be divided into 'rational' and 'irrational' components. This involves a duality in essence. Certain things are essentially 'rational', while certain others are essentially 'irrational'. 'Rationalism' has not overcome this duality. 'Rational is real, and real is rational', as Hegel puts it and dialectics admits of no duality. Knowledge is

Power, was the slogan of the bourgeoisie. And 'irrational' is the thing that does not become a part, or militates against this Power. If a 'knowledge' is against Power, it is called 'irrational'. Ours is an attempt to look for other ways where knowledge is against Power or 'rationality' and yet it is knowledge. 'Rational' is some thing that is understandable, cognizable by the dominant discourse of power. All that defies this dominant discourse, or fails to trim itself to the point where it becomes fit for cognizance by dominant power discourse is dismissed as 'irrational'. That is why the dominant power discourse ('rationalism' in our age) carries an ethical aura around itself. 'Ethics' too has got bearings on the dominant power structure. 'Rational' is ethical, 'irrational' is unethical. The bourgeois sense of duty with which they built the empire was very much 'rational', therefore, 'ethical'. The natives, the blacks, the aborigines were 'irrational' and their way of life was 'unethical'. Bourgeoisie-euphemistically called real democracy by the liberals-is 'rational' and 'ethical'; whereas, Communism is 'irrational' and 'unethical, 'totalitarian'. But just look at the mass murderers from the vantage point of natives, the Indians, the aborigines! Cognize the American 'real' democracy from the point of view of the Vietnamese, the Cubans, the Iraqis. The things would look quite different, and different they are. This 'rationality-ethical' was what that infused a sense of mission into the empire-builders; that they were not out to conqueror the world for the sake of commerce, but for rationalizing the world and ethicalising it; that their way of life was the only 'rational' and, for that reason, the only 'ethical' way. The empire was a 'rational-ethical' state too. 'Rational Citizenry' was one of the basic tenets of Enlightenment. Those 'rational citizens' of the metropolis were the people who would build the empire. Rationality got inseparably mixed with Power and empire-building.

Philosophers don't have a role in society. Their thought cannot be situated in relation to the current (actual) movements of a group. Socrates is an excellent example: Athenian society could see in him only a subversive man, because the questions he raised were not acceptable to the established order. In reality, a philosopher's role is acknowledged only after a certain period of time; it is, in short, a retrospective role.<sup>3</sup> Hegel was tolerated by the German power as long as his dialectics was slumbering in mysticism. Marx always fought to divest thought from power.

'Rationality', 'knowledge', 'science', 'technology', 'democracy', 'culture', 'education', 'race', 'development' and 'growth', etc. became elements of a discourse of a Power that was anything but what these words signified. Let us learn concretize things and to say 'bourgeois' science, 'bourgeois knowledge, 'bourgeois' education, 'bourgeois' concepts of development and growth. Let us not forget that the empire-builders justified their brutal rule precisely in these words, without concretizing them or situating them in history.

*Whatever happens, we have got  
The Maxim Gun, and they have not<sup>4</sup>*

The age of Empire was a peaceful age, only in the western world. What was happening in the world where the empire was being built? In terms of production and wealth, not to mention culture, the differences between the major pre-industrial regions were, by modern standards remarkably small; say between 1 and 1:8. Indeed a recent estimate calculates that between 1750 and 1800 the per capita gross national product in what are today known as the 'developing countries' was substantially the same...whose average standard of living may at that stage have actually been superior to that of Europeans...But in

the nineteenth century the gap between the western countries, base of the economic revolution which was transforming the world, and the rest widened, at first slowly, later with increasing rapidity. By 1880 (according to the same calculation) the per capita income in the 'developed' world was about double to that in the 'Third World', by 1913 it was to be over three times as high, and widening. By 1950 (to dramatize the process) the difference was between 1 and 5, by 1970 between 1 and 7. Moreover, the gap between the 'Third World' and the really developed parts of the 'developed' world, i.e. the industrialized countries, began earlier and widened even more dramatically...Technology was a major cause of this gap, reinforcing it not merely economically but politically.<sup>5</sup> This is not just a thing of the past. What neo-imperialism is doing in the world can be understood from the experience of a country like Sweden which has successfully kept this monster at the bay. Sweden had just 10% educated population in 1850 and it was as rural as India. But it was not denied the same growth which India was denied in the name of 'rational' and 'responsible government'.

The increase in human height, which makes each generation today taller than its parents, had probably begun in 1880, or even later. But was that true of India? The English connection, under the Company, reduced India to poverty, and dislocated her industries and that under the Crown, the Government still hampered her industries, made a cruelly severe drain upon the country, and by their arrangement prevented the return of prosperity...Between 1770 and 1900-103 years-there had been twenty-two famines. In 1770, as we have seen, there was a famine in Bengal with *10,000,000* deaths.<sup>6</sup> The ideals of the liberal bourgeois were neatly expressed in Anatole France's ironic phrase 'The Law in its majestic equality gives every man the same right to dine at the Ritz and to sleep under the



bridge'. Still, in the developed world it was essentially *money or the lack of it* rather than *birth* or differences in legal freedom or status, which determined the distribution of all but the privileges of social exclusiveness...However in countries outside Europe political democracy effected the elimination of the former indigenous population, Indians, Aborigines, etc. Where they could be eliminated by expulsions into 'reservations' or by genocide, they were not part of the political community.<sup>7</sup> Humanity was divided by 'race', an idea which penetrated the ideology of the period almost as deeply as 'progress'...Biology was called upon to explain inequality, particularly by those who felt themselves destined for superiority.<sup>8</sup> The profits from the overseas trade made possible for the first accumulation of fluid capital, that is of capital invested in productive enterprise and not only in Land. The greed for more profit led to a rapid development of shipbuilding and navigation, of which the latter was to have a decisive influence on the birth of modern science. With paid soldiers instead of feudal levies, wars could be maintained for longer, but they cost more. Hence, a demand for iron and bronze, for silver and gold. Mining and metal-working boomed, so did the manufacture of the gunpowder and the distillation of strong spirits...Even magic acquired a new interest as a means to wealth and power, as we find in the story of Faust.<sup>9</sup> The world neither progressed nor was it supposed to progress...'Progress' outside the advanced countries was therefore neither an obvious fact nor a plausible assumption, but mainly a foreign danger and challenge. Those who benefited from it and welcomed it were small minorities of rulers and townsmen who identified with foreign values. Those whom the French in North Africa typically called-*évolvés*-persons who had 'evolved', were at this stage, precisely those who had cut themselves off from their past and their people; who were sometimes compelled to cut themselves off if they were to enjoy the benefits.<sup>10</sup>

Historians of India have frequently observed that the social, political, cultural and economic buoyancy of India in the eighteenth century was not just forgotten but suppressed by a narrative in which the decay of India became the primary reason for the ease, and inevitability, of European conquest...But while most historians have also been aware of the scandals of early empire, the implications of these scandals, either for the impoverishment of India's own history or for the history of Britain itself in the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries, have been little noted of late.<sup>11</sup>

Their prey is lodged in England, and the cries of India are given to sea and winds...In India, all the vices operate by which sudden fortune is acquired; in England are open displayed, by the same persons, the virtues which dispense hereditary wealth. Arrived in England, the destroyers of the nobility and gentry of a whole kingdom will find the best company in this nation, at a board of elegance and hospitality. Here the manufacturer and the husbandman will bless the just and punctual hand, that in India has torn the cloth from the loom, or wrested the scanty portion of rice and salt from the peasants of Bengal, or wrung from him the very opium in which he forgot his oppressor and his oppression... our Indian government is in the best state a grievance<sup>12</sup>.

-Edmund Burke *'Speech on Mr. Fox's East India Bill', 1783*

It will be of our interest to note particularly that the difference of status, legal as well as social, depended on money or the lack of it in the western societies by this time, but this would not be the case in India. But more of this in the coming pages.

This is not about the cruelties of the empire-builders, or the macabre tales of the primitive accumulation of capital, nor is it a social, cultural exposé. Not only were the landmass and the peoples of India conquered, but its very history was, first annexed and then, conquered. Imperialism of stereotypes and categories was one such way of annexing and conquering Indian history. ‘Oriental lust’, ‘despotism’, ‘decay’, ‘backwardness’, ‘poverty’, ‘religious fanaticism’, ‘otherworldly world outlook’ of the Indian people and ‘Hindoo’, ‘Muslim’ segregational categorization purely on the basis of birth, are almost forgotten things in liberal narratives. These phenomena were not new to the Indian society, as they are still to be found in many ‘developed’ societies as well. The novelty was that these things were annexed by the legal and procedural and then political imperial discourse as fixed, unchanging, determinate, natural, obvious and existing. They imperialists had not only brought a different sort of socio-economic structure, but also a mind. This mind could not help but view India through post-Enlightenment socio-political, epistemological and ethical categories. India was what the imperialists thought India to be, not the real India of flesh and blood. India was the India which could be annexed by the imperialist mind and discourse-either through the orientalist or later modernist categories. And this precisely was the discourse which was then transplanted not only into minds of the future empire-builders but, into the ‘evolved’ natives too. Now, the masters and the native near-masters were either ‘orientalists’ or ‘modernists’ there was no third category involved. Education and politics were the two main manufactories of imperialism of categories and stereotypes. Education was the hallmark of British rule.

*We of the East break our opponent's head*

*They of the West change their opponent's nature  
The guns have gone, and now come the professors  
The adze has done its work; now comes the plane  
They give us learning-just enough for us to sell our services  
And understanding-just enough for the governmental purpose.*

Akbar Allahabadi

By invitation selected Indians were to be shown the ways of political leadership and responsibility so that they could some day, far in the future, govern themselves.

There was no guarantee that the same people who began this political training would be the ones in command, but somehow the level political experience would permeate the whole of Indian life...Political education was not meant to cause intrusions in existing system; pupils are taught what *is* or *was* and rarely what *may be*. Reform of government was thus superfluous to political education<sup>13</sup>. Politics was not supposed to create responsible leadership (one may ask here: responsible to whom? To the people or to the state?), it was meant to drive wedges into the body politic of the country. Social groups were first categorized, encouraged, created and then politically, legally recognized. This made them contest for the state patronage only if the members of divers groups could represent their interest not as citizens (as in the west) but as a group defined, categorized and legalized by the canons of the state. Hindus became 'Hindus' in political sense; the Muslims became 'Muslims' in the political sense. This is not a purely religious divide but a communal-political divide. Culture, religion (active consciousness of the world in Gramsci's words) acquired political and legal connotations. Religion qua religion (or religion-as-faith) may be only religiously divisive. Religion-as-faith is not politically divisive. But religion as a community/communalism, fixed and determinate, unchanging and admitting of no self-negation; in short, a stereotype, is communal and politically divisive. Not

sharing a meal with a Hindu is one thing, not being able to vote a Hindu is a totally different matter.

Why is it so that an emerging nationalism raises its head in cultural arena? The self-assertion of an emerging nationalism-weak and conscious of its weakness *vis á vis*, the state politically-this emerging nationalism, without failing, engages with the oppressor in the language of culture-its history, its past, sometime its religion. This is not a mere revival, but a reformism. Inspiration from the past makes it self-confident in the present. But culture as a political discourse is dominated by the oppressor. The weak, emerging nationalism cannot yet engage with its masters politically and digs deep into its own history to discover new forms in its present contest with the state.

I have traveled across the length and breadth of India and I have not seen one person who is a beggar, who is a thief. Such wealth I have seen in this country, such high moral values, people of such caliber, that I do not think that we would ever conquer this country, unless we break the very backbone of this nation, which is her cultural and spiritual heritage, and therefore, I propose that we replace her old and ancient education system, her culture, for if the Indians think that all that is foreign and English is good and greater than their own, they will lose their self esteem, their native culture and they will become what we want them-a truly dominated nation.<sup>14</sup>

-Lord Macaulay's remark in the British Parliament  
(2 February, 1835)

This surely inspires an emergent nationalism to contest for its culture precisely because the oppressor *poses* the question of oppression in cultural form. And the

nationalist mind thinks that culture is something still not penetrated by the oppressor. So, this mind would become the savior of culture from the encroaching hand of the imperialist. But, are a people in the state of subjugation because of its culture? Or are they a subject people because of their socio-economic conditions that are a creation of their oppressors? India was an oppressed country, not because of the superiority of the English culture but because the English had brought a different socio-economic system in India-Capitalism. Imperialism could not annex the whole people, and specially when the people, prior to conquest, were advanced to the degree that they had developed their state structures prior to conquest. The Indians could not be annihilated physically like the Red Indians, thanks to the 'despotic' Mogul state. The Empire has to annex the whole people if it wants to rule indefinitely, but it cannot do so. This precisely is the limitation and negation of the Empire. A people cannot help but exist, and the Power has its limitations.

### The story begins...

When He had ruled five years, and they informed us  
That He who claimed to have been sent by God  
Was ready for His promised war, the steelworks  
Had forged tank, gun and warship, and there waited  
Within His hangers aircraft in so great a number  
That they, leaving the earth at His command  
Would darken all the heavens, then we became determined  
To see what sort of nation, formed from what sort of people  
In what condition, what sort of thoughts thinking  
He would be calling to His colours. WE STAGED A  
MARCH-PAST.

-Bertolt Brecht -- *Fear and Misery of the Third Reich*

The postcolonial condition is inaugurated with the

onset rather than the end of colonial occupation...the perverse longevity of the colonized is nourished, in part, by persisting colonial hierarchies of knowledge and values which reinforce what Edward Said calls the 'dreadful secondariness' of some peoples and cultures. So also the cosmetic veneer of national independence barely disguises the foundational economic, cultural and political damage inflicted by colonial occupation. Colonialism, as Said argues is 'a fate with lasting, indeed grotesquely unfair results'<sup>15</sup>. What is needed is not so much of an interpretation of the Empire, but the interrogation of the Empire. Interrogation is more dangerous than interpretation-it can be muting or muted, mutilating or mutilated- interrogation on the other hand is a bold step-throwing question in the face of the Power. But this presupposes the Power (domination plus intellectual-moral leadership) to be on the defensive which, yet at least, it is not.

The European bourgeoisie had come of age through convoluted course of history, through peasant rebellions, class wars, reformation and secularization of the Church, manufacture and a degree of urbanization. Though, the degree of its development, economic and political, was not the same throughout the Western Europe. Above all, it was a class which had not risen from the womb of Imperialism; rather this was the class which became imperial at a later stage of its development. This must always be kept in mind in analyzing middle class/civil society of the centre Capital and that of the peripheral Capital. That is the main reason why this class, this ascending class, had set its eyes on state power in Europe. The middle class/civil society in India (starting with Bengal) was not an independent middle class like its European counterpart; rather it was a fractured, broiler civil society. It had not come into being and formed out of a social upheaval or any 'natural' socio-economic

change in its native soil. This class was a creation of imperialist education-(the broiler always would remain conscious of its stunted stature vis-à-vis the roaster). The avenues denied to our broiler middle class politically, were offered to it educationally, and through education to the state employment. This is the decisive characteristic of the early Indian middle class. Independent economic development was directly denied, so was politics based on defined/definite economic aims. The only way left to it was culture and politics in cultural terms, somehow acceptable to the master. This started, first of all in Bengal, the first swathe of the Indian land to be colonized by the English. Gramsci in 'Prison Notebooks', outlines an argument about the Passive Revolution of Capital...*(of) new claimants to power, lacking the social strength to launch a full-scale political assault on the old dominant classes, opted for a path in which the demands of a new society would be 'satisfied by small doses, legally, in a reformist manner' in such a way that it was possible to preserve the political and economic position of the old feudal classes, to avoid agrarian reforms, and specially, to avoid the popular masses going through a period of political experience such as occurred in France in the years of Jacobinism, in 1831 and in 1848. Thus in situations where an emergent bourgeoisie lacks the social conditions for establishing complete hegemony over the new nation, it resorts to a Passive Revolution, by attempting a molecular transformation of the old dominant classes into partners in a new historical bloc and only a partial appropriation of the popular masses, in order first to create a state as the necessary precondition for the establishment of capitalism as the dominant mode of production*<sup>16</sup>.

Can we understand various phases of the Passive Revolution of the Indian bourgeoisie through this approach? I think we can. The Indian nationalism qua nationalism was the greatest nationalist struggle in its own



right, involving millions of peoples, a number of races and nationalities and linguistic, denominational, cultural and class particularities. This indeed was the largest bourgeois nationalist struggle the world has yet seen. It is quite amazing that the people of this part of South Asia have not spent brains to analyze and understand this struggle adequately-thanks to Pakistani intellectual cretinism. History in Pakistan is still a dangerous discipline, no less for the writer than for the reader. Policing of thought through state ideological apparatus has denied the people such an open analysis and understanding. Ideological myth-building-first generalize and then reductively impose these generalizations on the minds of the people through the school, the academy, the media and the party. The power discourse becomes so dominant that nationalists too are... using the very legality to subvert the state! A day dreaming! The power discourse cannot be subverted through the categories of power discourse. Mr. Paliyo's recent interview on Express tv is a case in point. The 'revolutionary' leader could not say that Jinnah had indeed 'betrayed'. The helplessness of Mr. Paliyo was visible and crushing. It is not just he alone, but all would-be change-bringers who use the language of the dominant power to dispute with the power end in such helplessness. But why can't our 'leaders of sorts' learn to speak a new language, and create a new political discourse with which to engage with the state? Surely, there are certain lessons for us in understanding the Indian nationalist struggle.

As noted earlier, the emergent bourgeoisie seeks to rediscover its culture because this is the only arena, it thinks, open to it. But should we forget that the mind with which this emergent bourgeoisie rediscovered its India (its past-for-the-present), had been forged in the crucible of the imperialist academy? It is the first contradiction that faces this bourgeoisie. One should remember that while

discovering India, primarily through the analysis of ancient texts, the interpreters were also defining Indian tradition in a particular way, for it was legitimized by the power of the colonial state.<sup>17</sup> There is consequently, an inherent contradictoriness in nationalist thinking, because it reasons within a framework of knowledge whose representational structure corresponds to the very structure of power which the nationalist thought seeks to repudiate. It is this contradictoriness in the domain of thought which creates the possibility for several divergent solutions to be proposed for the nationalist problematic. Furthermore, it is this contradictoriness which signifies, in the domain of thought constructed within 'rationalist' framework, the theoretical insolubility of the national question in a colonial country, or for that matter, of the extended problem of social transformation in a postcolonial country, within a strictly nationalist framework<sup>18</sup>. The challenge of the empire is to be accepted, at this stage, culturally. Attitudes may differ. Assimilationist and dissimilationist tendencies may surface- *Arya Samaj* and *Bhramo Samaj*, pro-English education and boycotters of English are the signs of the birth of culture-as-politics. The lack of autonomy of nationalist discourse is simply that it puts forward certain propositions about society and politics whose syntactic and semantic structures-more generally, whose meaning-is fully governed by the rules of the language of post-Enlightenment rational thought. In other words, nationalist texts are meaningful only when read in terms of the rules of that larger framework of thought: the former, therefore, merely, consists of particular utterances whose meanings are fixed by the lexical and grammatical system provided by the latter. The burden of the nationalist thought is to oppose colonial rule. It must argue in favor of political possibilities which colonist thought refuses to admit<sup>19</sup>. The nationalist thought will try to devalidate the very basis of colonial thought, by using the same thought processes it has

learnt from the latter. But the tables could not yet be turned. The age of politics has not yet come. The empire is still denying India her politicians. India could have her educators and reformers, even thugs and dacoits, but not politicians. This opening will come when it will.

Passive Revolution emerges as a historical necessity through which a 'national' development of capital can occur without overcoming, or resolving the contradictions *en route*.

Partha Chatterjee using Antonio Gramsci's theoretic grid seeks to locate the two inseparably related movements: *the historical impediments to bourgeois hegemony and the possibilities of marginal changes within those limits*. These are very important issues as these are central to our understanding of the passive revolution of the Congress in India.

The *first* is the objective structure 'independent of human will'...the level of the development of the material forces of production and the relative positions and functions of the different classes in production were not such as to favor the rapid emergence of a fully developed system of capitalist production. The political position of the older ruling classes, a backward agrarian economy, the weakness of the national capitalist class in relation to the advanced levels of productive organisation in the world capitalist economy—all these were the constraints at the level of the objective structure. The *second* is the relation of political forces, the degree of homogeneity, self-awareness and organisation attained by various social classes. Here the question of ideology and organisation is not simply that of the economic-corporate organisation of particular productive groups or even the solidarity of interests among all members of a social class. The crucial level is the most purely political one where one becomes aware that one's own corporate interests, in their present

and future development, transcend the corporate limits of the purely economic class, and can and must become the interests of other subordinate groups too. It is at this level that previously germinated ideologies become 'party', and come into confrontation and conflict, until only one of them, at least a single combination of them, tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself throughout society-bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a universal plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups<sup>20</sup>.

Considering the above conditions, the inescapable conclusion to be drawn is that a bourgeoisie aspiring of hegemony, in conditions of advanced world capitalism, cannot hope to launch a 'war of movement or maneuver' in the traditional sense i.e. a frontal attack on the state. For such a bourgeoisie, a full scale, concentrated and decisive attack on the existing structure of political rule in the fashion of the French Revolution or the Revolution of 1848 is impossible. It must engage in a 'war of position', a kind of political trench warfare waged on number of different fronts. Its strategy would be to attempt a molecular transformation of the state (Indianisation of the colonial state in the example of the Congress), neutralizing opponents, converting sections of former ruling classes into allies in a partially reorganized system of government, undertaking economic reforms on a limited scale so as to appropriate the support of the popular masses but keeping them out of any form of direct participation in the process of governing. This is the Passive Revolution, a historical phase in which the war of position coincides with the revolution of the capital. Its function of representing the national-popular has to be shared with other governing

groups and its transformative role moderated to reformist and molecular changes. It is thus that the passive revolution acquires the dual character of revolution/ restoration.

Gramsci says “India’s political struggle against the English...knows three forms of war, war of movement, war of position, and underground warfare. Gandhi’s passive resistance is a war of position, which at certain moments becomes a war of movement and at others underground warfare”. Chatterjee has broken down the nationalist thought in its engagement with the state into the three main moments: The moment of *departure* the moment of *maneuver* and the moment of *arrival*. The moment of departure lies in the encounter of a nationalist consciousness with the framework of knowledge created by post-Enlightenment rationalist thought. (This is because the nationalist thought at the moment of departure seeks to subvert the dominant rationality that this thought, at this particular moment, seems a revival-reform in essence-or an outright irrationality to the colonist or to the intellectual who is drenched with rationality). It produces the awareness-and acceptance-of an essential cultural difference between East and West. Modern European culture, it is thought, possesses attributes which make the European culturally equipped for power and progress, while such attributes are lacking in the traditional cultures of the east, thus dooming those countries to poverty and subjection. (It nevertheless does not negate its culture but tries to differentiate it from the western culture). It asserts that the superiority of the west lies in the materiality of its culture, exemplified by its science, technology and love of progress. But the east is superior, it argues, in spiritual aspect of culture. True modernity for non-European nations would lie in combining the superior material qualities of the west with the spiritual greatness of the east.

This is culture-as-politics, the moment of departure of nationalist thought. But as noted earlier, the colony is not

unfree due to any reasons of its culture, but because of monopolist/colonist stage of world capitalism. Nationalist thought, distancing itself from the western discourse of culture, yet assimilating it for the purpose of rediscovering its-past-in-the-present, does not question, it appears, the very basis of the material superiority of the western culture i.e. colonial socio-economic formations. This project, culture-as-politics, implies an extremely elitist programme. For there always be a limited number of people able to re-interpret the culture and can do the politics of cultural symbiosis. Chatterjee has analyzed Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay as a specimen of this stage of nationalist thought. I would include the leadership from Gokhale to Jinnah and Annie Besant of the pre-Gandhi Congress into this category.

Let us first see what the empire was thinking about this Congress.

The Indian national Congress, even with its *patient and sensible* resolutions, could not help but accuse the existing Government. To desire to secure the modifications of such changes as may be unjust or injurious, assumed the need for changes, and some inadequacies in the status quo. Could a party which took a critical view towards the Government have legitimate status? A disagreement over policy, if pursued with tenacious *logic*, would lead to the question of by what right did the official view prevail? What was the basis of sovereignty? In order to avoid such *philosophical and impractical* arguments, the Government looked to keep Congressmen on the periphery of affairs by giving them no *locus standi*. When the Congress held its annual meeting in Madras in 1903, Curzon advised the Governor, Lord Ampthill, of his and the Government's views of the Congress: 'In so far as it is innocent, it is superfluous, and in so far as it is hostile to the Government

or seditious, it is a national danger. My policy ever since I came to India has been to reduce the Congress to impotence, (a) by never taking notice of it, (b) *by carrying out such reasonable reforms as to deprive it of reasonable ground of complaint*, (c) by showing such sympathy with and tolerance towards the Natives as to give no excuse to the Congress to revive racial issues, but (d) by never in the smallest degree trucking to its leaders or holding any communion with the unclean thing'.<sup>21</sup>

The limitations of the bourgeois nationalism vis-à-vis the empire are apparent from this. The empire was ahead in implementing 'reasonable reforms' than the Congress of the educated demanding them- this again shows that the demands of nationalism at this stage must have been limited. Nationalism if its 'innocent' is ignorable, if 'seditious', still more ignorable, because it was not 'seditious' enough either to launch a war of maneuver, or a frontal attack on the state and over throw it. This was the real dilemma of the Indian National Congress and the nationalists, be they intellectuals or Bengali 'terrorists'. Reform from above itself is the negation of nationalism, for that sort of reform presupposes the subject nation to be passive, unresisting, dense and unchanging, a historical, inert and hence to be activated by external force. Yet it (nationalism) cannot help welcoming reforms. This is nationalism on the defensive. It is born out of the encounter of a patriotic consciousness with the framework of knowledge imposed upon it by colonialism. It leads inevitably to an elitism of the intelligentsia, rooted in the vision of a radical regeneration of natural culture. It, at this stage, could not find viable political means to actualize itself. Instead, it becomes a dream, a utopian political community in which the nation was the Mother, once resplendent in wealth and beauty, now in tatters. Relentlessly, she exhorts a small band of her sons, those of

them who are brave and enlightened; to vanquish the enemy and win back her honor<sup>22</sup>. This condition gives birth to either intellectual movements or mass inertia or terrorism. The problem, however, lay precisely in the insurmountable difficulty of reconciling the modes of thought characteristic of a peasant consciousness with the rationalist forms of an enlightened nationalist politics. Either peasant consciousness has to be transformed (a revolution like China which indeed was developing side by side with the Indian nationalism) or, else, it would have to be appropriated (as the Congress did). The former would require a total transformation of agrarian economy, the abolition of pre-capitalist forms of production (feudalism) and the virtual dissolution of the peasantry as a distinct form of social existence of labour (industrialization). The possibility for the bourgeoisie was an appropriation of peasant support for the historic cause of creating the nationalist state in which the peasant masses would be represented, but of which they would not be a constituent part. In other words, a Passive Revolution. This is where the moment of maneuver occurs<sup>23</sup>. Here enters Gandhi in Indian politics. This exactly is the situation where ‘the thesis appropriates a part of the antithesis’.

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***“The chief representative or the chief social bulwark of this Asian bourgeoisie that is still capable of supporting a historically progressive cause is the peasant”.***<sup>24</sup>

--Lenin

Partha Chatterjee calls the moment of maneuver or the Gandhian intervention in Indian politics ‘Gandhi’s Critique of Civil society’. Gandhi ‘threatened the internal legitimacy of the ruling culture<sup>25</sup>, a fundamental critique of the entire edifice of the bourgeois society. Manfred Steger has called it a critique of liberalism, while Bikhu Parekh calls it a critique of Modern civilization, which while providing an ideology to confront imperialism,



overlooked some of its great achievements<sup>26</sup>. Some have called it a “revivalism”, especially the officers of the empire were eager to reject the ‘half naked fakir’, who was using ‘religious’ symbolism to delude the ‘ignorant and superstitious peasants’.

Napoleon is said to have described the English as a nation of shop keepers. It is a fitting description. They hold whatever dominions they have for the sake of their commerce. Their army and their navy are intended to protect it. When the Transvaal offered no such attractions, the late Mr. Gladstone discovered that it was not right for the English to hold it. When it became a paying proposition, resistance led to war. Mr. Chamberlain soon discovered that England enjoyed a suzerainty over the Transvaal. It is related that someone asked the late President Kruger whether there was gold on the moon. He replied that it were highly unlikely because, if there were, the English would have annexed it. Many accept the above statement; it is proved that the English entered India for the purpose of trade. They remain in it for the same purpose...They wish to convert the whole world into a vast market for their goods. They will leave no stone unturned to reach the goal.<sup>27</sup>

--Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj* 1910

Discussing with Maurice Frydman, Gandhi said: ‘Industrialization on a mass scale will necessarily lead to passive exploitation of the villagers as the problem of competition and marketing come in. Therefore we have to concentrate on the village being a self-contained manufacturing unit mainly for use’.<sup>28</sup>

The intellectuals always face the crucial dilemma of

choosing between ‘westernizing’ and a *Narodnik* tendency...But the dilemma is quite spurious: ultimately the movements invariably contain both elements, a genuine modernism and a more or less spurious concern for local culture...By the twentieth century, the dilemma hardly bothers anyone: the philosopher kings of the underdeveloped world all act like as westernizes and all talk like Narodniks.<sup>29</sup>

This reminds one of the Russian *narodniks* who wanted to make the village commune the centre of future development of Russia. Indeed the main debates raging during 1890’s in the Russian revolutionary circles were on the role of capitalism and the peasantry. Capitalism was making inroads into hitherto relatively immune rural Russia. Two of Lenin’s earliest works ‘*Friends of the People*’ and ‘*The Development of Capitalism in Russia*’, were on the question of capitalism in Russia. The initial split in the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party was on the question of capitalism and the future course of the revolution. Lenin had fought the narodnik tendency tooth and nail, but there was no Lenin in India. Nor was Lenin blind to the real content of the rural question expressed in Tolstoyian and narodnik tendencies of the Russian revolutionaries. This itself was not then, and now, a no nonsense question.

Though hundreds of thousands had done their very best to disfigure the small piece of land on which they were crowded together, paving the ground with stones, scraping away every sprouting blade of grass, lopping off the branches of trees, driving away birds and beasts, filling the air with the smoke of coal and oil. Still spring was spring, even in the town.<sup>30</sup>

Lenin did not define off Tolstoy as ‘reactionary and revivalist’ as our liberals are fond of describing Gandhi. Lenin in 1908 wrote his famous article, ‘Leo Tolstoy As the Mirror of the Russian Revolution’, subsequently, Lenin’s ‘LN.Tolstoy’, ‘L. N. Tolstoy and the Modern Labour Movement’, ‘Tolstoy and the Proletarian Struggle’, were published in 1910. Lenin noted that the legal press was least of all interested in analyzing Tolstoy’s works from the point of view of the character of the Russian revolution and its motive forces. If the monarchist authors baited the great writer or depicted him as an inveterate enemy of the progressive people, no less harmful were the attempts made by the liberals and Mensheviks to represent him as hardly less than the teacher of life, the ‘conscience of his time’. What was thereby brought into the foreground were Tolstoy’s weak, reactionary aspects, while strong ones were passed over in silence. The posing of great questions in the life of his time imparted to Tolstoy’s work a high social significance and efficacy. Lenin writes:

Tolstoy in his works-both as an artist and as a thinker and preacher-embodied in amazingly bold relief the specific historical features of the entire Russian revolution, its strength and its weakness. One of the principal distinguishing feature of our revolution is that it was a peasant bourgeois revolution in the era of the very advanced development of capitalism throughout the world...It was a bourgeois revolution because its immediate aim was to overthrow the tsarist autocracy, the tsarist monarchy and to abolish landlordism, but not to overthrow the domination of the bourgeoisie. The *peasantry in particular* was not aware of the latter aim and the closer and the more immediate aim of

the struggle. It was a peasant bourgeois revolution because the objective conditions put in the forefront for the peasantry, of breaking up the old, medieval system of land ownership, of clearing the ground for capitalism, the objective conditions were responsible for the appearance of the peasant masses on the arena of more or less independent historic action. Tolstoy's works express both the strength and the weakness, the might and the limitation, precisely of the peasant mass movement...His unending accusations against capitalism-accusations permeated with most profound emotion and most ardent indignation-convey all the horror felt by the parochial peasant at the advent of the new, invisible, incomprehensible enemy coming from somewhere in the cities, or from somewhere abroad, destroying all the pillars of rural life, bringing in its train unprecedented ruin, poverty, starvation, savagery, prostitution, syphilis-all the calamities attending the epoch of primitive accumulation. His struggle against the feudal police state, against the monarchy turned into a repudiation of politics, led to the doctrine of 'non-resistance to evil'...the fight against official church was combined with the preaching of a new, purified religion, that is to say, of a new, refined, subtle poison for the oppressed masses. The contradictions in Tolstoy's views are not contradictions inherent in his personal views alone, but are a reflection of the extremely complex, contradictory conditions, social influences and historical traditions which determined the psyche of various classes and various sections of the Russian society in the post-reform, but pre-Revolutionary era...Tolstoy castigated, and justly castigated bourgeois science...Tolstoy's criticism of

contemporary institutions differs from the criticism of the same institutions by representatives of the modern labour movement in fact that Tolstoy's point of view was that of the parochial, naïve peasant, whose psychology Tolstoy introduced into his criticism and his doctrine. ..Tolstoy's indictment of the ruling classes was made with tremendous power and sincerity; with absolute clearness he laid bare the inner falsity of all those institutions by which modern society is maintained: the church, the courts, militarism, 'lawful' wedlock, bourgeois science. But his doctrine proved to be in complete contradiction to the life, work and struggle of the grave-digger of the modern social system, the proletariat. Whose, then, was the point of view reflected in the teachings of Leo Tolstoy? Through his lips there spoke that multitudinous mass of the Russian people who already detest the masters of modern life, but have not yet advanced to the point of intelligent, consistent, thoroughgoing, implacable struggle against them... Tolstoy's works express both the strength and the weakness, the might and the limitations, precisely of the peasant mass movement...The great human ocean, agitated to its very depths, with all its weaknesses and all its strong features found its reflections in the doctrine of Tolstoy...in examining the doctrine of Tolstoy, the whole Russian people will have to understand where their own weakness lies, the weakness which did not allow them to carry the cause of their emancipation to its conclusion. *This must be understood in order to go forward.*

This advance is impeded by all those who declare Tolstoy a 'universal conscience', a 'teacher of life'...The Russian people will secure their emancipation only when they realize that it is not

from Tolstoy they must learn to win a better life but from the class the significance of which Tolstoy did not understand, and which alone is capable of destroying the old world which Tolstoy hated.<sup>31</sup>

Many people know about Gandhi's correspondence with the Russian legend, yet a few know that Tolstoy had a keen interest in India. He had written '*Letter to a Hindoo*'-413 pages long-in 1908, the letter was yet unpublished and Gandhi in England found a typed manuscript copy. There he found the inspiration for his non-violent ideals as against the usual Bengali 'bombs for independence' ideals.

'A commercial company enslaved a nation comprising 200 million people! What does it mean that 30,000 people, not athletes but rather weak and ill-looking, have enslaved 200 millions of vigorous, clever, strong, freedom loving people? Do not the figures make it clear that not the English but the Indians have enslaved themselves?'

Tolstoy

Gandhi wrote to Leo Tolstoy for permission to publish the 'Letter'. Tolstoy sent his blessings. Twenty thousand copies of the 'Letter' were printed in England by Gandhi, with the money provided by his friends. Later on, Gandhi translated the 'Letter' into Gujrati. Gandhi was a politician, as against 'non-resistance' he opted for 'passive-resistance'. David Henry Thoreau (1817-1862) and Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910) had a formative and lasting influence on Gandhi; it was from the former he had learnt 'non-cooperation' as a moral duty. Gandhi named his ashram in South Africa after Leo Tolstoy.

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For the majority of the Third World peoples, the experienced alternative to the past is a limbo-of alienation from the soil, of living in shantytowns, of immigration into foreign lands, and, at best, of permanent expectancy. Learning on and yearning for recovery of an emasculated but idealized past in one escape from the limbo, breaking out in protest and anger is another. At times, the two are mixed, at others, they are separated in time but historically, organically linked. In our time, peasant millenarian rebellions have been the harbingers of modern revolutions. The process of modernization begins, writes Barington Moore Jr, with peasant revolutions that fail. It culminates during the 20<sup>th</sup> century with peasant revolutions that succeed<sup>32</sup>. Gandhianism must be understood within the bounds of the bourgeois-peasant revolution. This position has been explained by Lenin, though Lenin does not use the expression 'passive revolution' which was coined by Antonio Gramsci. The spearhead of the Russian Bourgeois-peasant revolution was the modern proletariat. This was not so in India. Here, the movement was spearheaded by the bourgeoisie. But the bourgeoisies could achieve political freedom only, and that too only if the masses came under its fold and hegemony. The character of the Russian revolution was not passive because the bourgeois was not at the head of the movement; long before the Russian bourgeoisie could shake itself into action, the labour leaders of various shades were at the helm of the movement. The proletarians launched a war of movement, a frontal attack on the state in Russia. This again was not so in India. I remember having read somewhere that comrade Ho Chi Minh, when asked as to why the Communists had not been able to exercise leadership of the Indian liberation movement as in they did in Vietnam. Comrade Ho replied "There was Gandhi in India, here I am Gandhi". The aim of the Indian nationalist struggle was to free India, politically, so as capitalism in India could be developed freely. This

nationalist struggle acquired peasant-popular character. The real cause of the misery of the peasant masses was not just feudalism, but the modern imperialist economy, thanks to which the feudals could hold on to power and the state. The state-the institution of repression and an expression of organized force of the ruling class-was not done away with, rather the colonial state was indianised. The state does not mean roads, railways, the parliament, the courts and schools; as our liberals take it to be, rather the state is an institution and an expression of the organized force of the ruling class.

In an interview to Francis G. Hickman, Gandhi said: 'Pandit Nehru wants industrialization because he thinks that, if it is socialized, it would be free from the evils of capitalism, my own view is that evils are inherent in industrialism, and no amount of socialization can eradicate it.'<sup>33</sup>

Mechanization is good when the hands are too few for the work intended to be accomplished. It is an evil when there are more hands than required for the work, as is the case in India...The problem with us is not how to find leisure for the teeming millions inhabiting our villages. The problem with us is how to utilize their idle hours, which are equal to the working days of six months in the year...spinning and weaving mills have deprived the villagers of a substantial means of livelihood. It is no reply to say that they turn out cheaper, better cloth, if they do so at all. For, if they have displaced thousands of workers, the cheapest mill cloth is dearer than the dearest khadi woven in villages<sup>34</sup>.

No political movement can lead to socialism if the forces of that movement are not fighting on those lines. If



the classes which are fighting for the liberation for the country are not the classes who would benefit from socialism, then this imposition of socialism upon an explicitly non-socialist struggle is a utopia. Nehru was such type of a utopian socialist as we shall see. We in Sindh too had such socialists in plenty, mostly in our nationalist camp (they cannot sympathize with the feudals and the capitalists, yet they do not talk about a struggle that aims at abolishing the very base of feudalism and capitalism, i.e. property in its feudalist and capitalist forms!). Their argument runs: Let us first liberate the country, we will have our own state and then we will decide about the mode of economy. As if state power can be won by ignoring class composition of the existing order and also the class composition of the forces fighting for liberation! This naïve argument cannot be called an argument; at most, it is a notion and an expression of people's inherent, utopian hatred, the hatred they feel for mass misery and capitalist plunder. Socialism is not a matter of passing a decree by the state, as Nehru thought or our nationalists think. Socialism is itself a state, the state power of the working people. But nationalists love the nation-state and take it to be supra class. A state always belongs to a class. And if the nation-state does not belong to the working people, it will not just pass a decree and abolish itself and become a socialist state. The working people will have to fight against this nation-state, and we have seen many such fights, for instance, in Russia, where a Russian Bolshevik fought against a Russian royalist, and in China where a Communist Chinese fought against a Nationalist Chinese. If our nationalist think that our bourgeoisie is independent and can liberate Sindh, let us all support it, but if this bourgeoisie is not independent politically as well as economically, then wage a peoples struggle and liberate ourselves without using the political idioms of the bourgeoisie (civil society, democracy, good governance,

house of commons, and what not). A scientific analysis of our bourgeoisie is urgently called for, whether this ruling class is or is not a go-between, collaborationist class. What are its political aims and economic aspirations (apart from corruption, graft and pilferage of the funds of the public institutions), in the age of neo-liberal imperialism? What sort of liberation strategy it proposes, if at all. At the moment this bourgeoisie is hunting with hounds and running with hares; making fortunes out of people's misery and lamenting about the misery of the people in newspaper columns and TV talk-shows! Another important question here is the real role of the bourgeoisie as a class vis-à-vis the army. Can this class launch a frontal attack on the army? It cannot because this would involve a complete change in property relations of society. Can it launch a passive revolution, a war of position now? This road is again blocked, for today's struggle is not against the colonial capital, but neo-liberal capital. Even the Indian, Argentinean, Mexican, Brazilian bourgeoisie could not withstand this intrusive neo-imperialism. The fate of our corrupt, broiler bourgeoisie is sealed for good.

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The political ideal of Gandhi's was "Enlightened Anarchy" or, against the system of representative government, an undivided popular sovereignty, this was his *Ramarajya*, the concept which has baffled many a liberal.

The power to control national life through national representatives is called political power. Representatives will become unnecessary if national life becomes so perfect as to be self-controlled. It will then be a state of enlightened anarchy in which each person will become his own ruler. He will conduct himself in such a way that his behavior will not hamper the well-being of his neighbors. In such

an ideal state there will be no political institutions and therefore no political power<sup>35</sup>.

Did the Indian politicians accept Gandhi unresistingly? Some, like Gokhale, saw a great politician in him. Shortly before Gokhale died, he told Jayaker, 'Gandhi is going to be the vanguard of a great movement, when some of us are gone. Remember that on occasions when the passions of the people have been raised to great heights of emotion and sacrifices are to be brought into close visions of high ideals, Gandhi is an admirable leader'<sup>36</sup>. While to others like Sarojini Naido, who in 1917 wrote that Gandhi was a 'fanciful dreamer of inconvenient and impossible dreams. For surely, the sudden appearance of Saint Francis of Assisi in his tattered robes in the fastidious purlieus of London or Milan, Paris or Petrograd today will be scarcely more disconcerting than the presence of this strange man with his bare feet and coarse garments'<sup>37</sup>. He was at his provocative best (or worst) on February 1916, when he spoke in Benares at the founding of the Hindu University for which Annie Besant had laboured hard. Invited to the occasion along with several aristocrats and dignitaries, Gandhi spoke of the filth he had seen in the city and also compared 'the richly bedecked noblemen' seated on the dais with 'millions of the poor'. There would be no salvation for India, he declared, unless the aristocrats stripped themselves of their jewelry. India would be rescued not by 'the lawyers, not the doctors, nor the rich landlords', but by 'the farmer'. Referring next to the surfeit of police posted in the streets to protect the Viceroy who had opened the university, Gandhi said that life under such security would be a 'living death', to which 'assassination might be preferable'. Mrs Besant and the noblemen were all shocked, Gandhi was asked to stop and the meeting abruptly closed<sup>38</sup>. There were other politicians who had been challenging the holier-than-thou demeanor of the

British, but identifying oneself with the peasantry, telling the noble and lofty that they were politically superfluous, was a novelty which many of the old guard in the nationalist camp could not bear, and there really were many such noble nationalists! He would be telling to the caste Hindus ‘as for untouchability, every infliction that we labour under in this sacred land in a fit and proper punishment for this great and indelible crime that we are committing<sup>39</sup>. In first week of November 1917, Gandhi had given politics in Gujrat a new character while chairing, as the head of the Gujrat Sabha, a conference in Godhra in north Gujrat. First, he tore up the draft of the resolution of loyalty to the King with which every political conference in India began. Pointing out that gathering in England did not pass ‘loyalty’ resolution, ‘loyalty could be presumed until they declared themselves rebels<sup>40</sup>. Second, affirming that Swaraj was dependent on ‘widespread peasant backing’ (his initial political activity during 1917-18, and his first political fast was for the peasantry of Kheda district of his home state Gujrat), he urged every speaker, including Tilak and Jinnah, to speak in an Indian language. Tilak spoke in Marathi, and the anglicized Jinnah unwillingly stammered out a speech in Gujrati<sup>41</sup>. This intrusive stance of the new comer was sure to put off many of the leaders. When the viceroy passed the notorious Rowlatt Act, Gandhi forwarded to the Congress to endorse: ‘We solemnly affirm that in the event of these Bills becoming law and until they are withdrawn we shall refuse civility to obey these laws and such other laws as a Committee to be hereafter appointed may think fit, and we further affirm that we will be faithful to truth and refrain from violence to life, person and property’<sup>42</sup>. Some twenty people present at his ashram signed the pledge that Gandhi had drafted, he said, ‘*Indians have publicly proclaimed their defiance of British laws for the first time after 1857*’<sup>43</sup>. The political atmosphere was tense, Jinnah resigned in protest from the Legislative

Council against the 'Black Law', yet no section of the Congress endorsed Gandhi's call.<sup>44</sup>

With or without Gandhi's pledge, India was out in the streets. Black Sundays were observed against the 'Black Act', the masses were astir, the political world, unbeknownst though to the routine leaders, was changing too. Jallianwala incident precipitated the change.

Gandhi drafted a resolution on the massacre that condemned the carnage and also the violence of the Indian mobs. K.M. Munshi, a delegate present in the Congress session describes the situation:

The hearts of most of us revolted at the letter part of the resolution...This must have been Mrs Besant's work, many thought; she was after all British. One Punjab leader gave expression to the feeling rather crudely: no one born of an Indian mother, said he, could have drafted this resolution. Lokmanaya Tilak too was indignant and so were Pal and C. R. Das and the latter part of the resolution was lost by an overwhelming majority. The next day the President wanted the committee to reconsider the resolution as Gandhiji, he said, was very keen on it. There were vehement protests. Ultimately Gandhiji was helped to the table to move that the resolution be considered. He spoke sitting. Out of respect, the house sat quiet but with ill-concealed impatience. referring to the remark that no son born of an Indian mother could have drafted the resolution, Gandhiji stated that he had considered deeply and long whether as an Indian he could have drafted the resolution, for indeed he had drafted it. But after long searching of the heart, he had come to the conclusion that only a person born of an Indian

mother could have drafted it. And then he spoke as if the whole life depended upon the question. ‘The Government went mad, but our people also went mad. I say, do not return madness with madness but return madness with sanity, and the situation will be yours’...When he stopped, we were at his feet...The resolution was reconsidered and accepted in its original form .<sup>45</sup>

Munshi first had different views regarding Gandhi’s politics, ‘When Gandhiji forced Jinnah and his followers out of the Home Rule League and later also from the Congress, we all felt, with Jinnah, that a movement of an unconstitutional nature [civil disobedience] sponsored by Gandhiji with tremendous influence he had acquired over the masses would inevitably result in widespread violence, thus barring the progressive development of self-governing institutions based on partnership between *educated* Hindus and Muslims<sup>46</sup>. The *educated* Hindus and Muslims have not yet forgiven Gandhi for this crime, H.M. Seeravai and very recently Jaswant Singh are just two examples.

This was the defining hour. The old Congress was waiting the constitutional struggle to run its course, Montagu-Chemlsford reforms were just nuts, the new era of mass politics had dawned. The Congress now asked Gandhi to change its constitution; he sat to restructure the Congress as he had restructured Gujrat Sabha two years earlier. An adult who can pay the four *anna* membership due and who endorsed Swaraj could become a Congress member. Unlike the Raj’s provinces, Congress’s provinces would be linguistic and include adjacent princely states. These were the main features of the new constitution.

The Hunter Commission spelled out its report on Jallianwala carnage. The Commission absolved the Punjab

Governor, Michael O'Dwyer, of all responsibility. General Dyer was held guilty of 'a grave error of judgment' and deprived of his command, but that could not soothe the injured feelings and outraged honor of the people. To add insult into injury the House of Lords gave Dyer a vote of Approval and British admirers presented him with a Sword of Honor and 20,000 pounds. On 5<sup>th</sup> May, Gandhi outlined a four-stage strategy for non-cooperation against this decision and his open support for the Khilafat Movement. He urged the leaders to boycott the elections due in November. The salient features of his strategy were: Indians should return titles and honorary posts. Indians should think of quitting the government jobs, the third stage would be the withdrawal from the police and the military, and non-payment of taxes<sup>47</sup>. The last two, the forces and taxes, were the main pillars of the empire.

Earlier, recognizing an ominous undercurrent of anti-British anger, Montagu wrote in his diary that it was 'an outrage' that a man like Jinnah 'should have no chance of running this country'<sup>48</sup>. Walker, correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, told Montagu: [Jinnah] believes that when Mrs Besant and Tilak have disappeared, he will be the leader<sup>49</sup>. But the times had changed; politics was making new demands on the leaders.

Gandhi on 30 April 1920 wrote a letter to Mrs. Ruttie Jinnah: 'Please remember me to Mr. Jinnah and do coax him to learn Hindustani or Gujrati. If I were you, I should begin to talk to him in Gujrati or Hindustani. There is not much danger of you forgetting your English or your misunderstanding each other, is there?'<sup>50</sup> The Congress was still chary of the Gandhian strategy and to kill time informed him that its decision about the his propositions would be announced in its special session in September. Not waiting for the Congress' decision, Gandhi went forward with his programme and announced that non-

cooperation would begin on 1<sup>st</sup> August.

Many in the Congress were willing to take part in the coming elections and mounted a bid to thwart Gandhi's non-cooperation, Mrs Besant, Motilal Nehru, C.R.Das, Pal, Pandit Malaviya, Lala Lajpat Rai and Jinnah were in this camp. The old guard was ranked against Gandhi, but the youth, (Patel, Parsad, Jawaharlal, Azad) and the Congress rank and file were with Gandhi. Seeing the mood, Motilal balked out and voted for Gandhi's resolution. The decision was carried with 1855 votes in favor and 873 against non-cooperation. The Muslim League also passed the same resolution. Sensing the political temper, Jinnah spoke in the League meeting about the Black Act, Jallianwala carnage, the Khilafat Movement and said that a measure of non cooperation was unavoidable, '...I would still ask the government to not drive the people of India to desperation, or else there is no other course left open to the people except to inaugurate the policy of non-operation, though not necessarily the programme of Mr. Gandhi'. Jinnah thus moved as close as ever he dared to the far side of his personal faith in British justice and the noblest principles of Western civilization. He could not take the final stride into the vale of total rejection, for that would have been a repudiation of himself, of all he stood for and had become<sup>51</sup>. He belonged to the first generation of the modern intelligentsia who are described as de-nationalized (*évolvés*). Their religion was that of Spencer and of Comte, their philosophy that of Bentham and the Mills.<sup>52</sup> Jinnah belonged to the class, 'Indian in blood and colour but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and intellect'<sup>53</sup>. However, Gandhi and tens of millions who followed him would take the step. Jinnah's break with Gandhi came on the latter's proposition on changing the Home Rule League's constitution and name. Here again Gandhi's move got the majority votes 42 and 19 against. The party would



hence forth be called Swaraj Sabha and would seek Swaraj instead of home rule *within* the empire. Jinnah insisted that the reference to the empire be retained. All the outvoted, including Jinnah, resigned<sup>54</sup>.

Nagpur Session 1920 of the Congress was decisive in many ways. Campaign against untouchability was enshrined in the Congress constitution here. The aim of the party henceforward would be *Swaraj as against home rule within the empire*. Mrs Besant was not present in Nagpur session; Jinnah was emphatic in his disapproval of the move. The delegates did not take him seriously and when he used the words 'Mr. Gandhi' and 'Mr. Muhammad Ali' (Maulana Muhammad Ali), he was howled down. His very presence was in strong contrast to the new Congress. An anglicized handsome man, a monocle dangling on the lapel of his London-tailored double-breasted suit, with matching two toned shoes, addressing the delegates in English. This was not the sort swadeshi leader the new congressmen had come to look for.

Was it a clash of personalities as many of our liberal, conspiracy mongering theorists would have us believe? Or was it a new era in the Indian freedom struggle which demanded a new sort of leadership? How would the bourgeois achieve and utilize to the utmost its moment of maneuver if the demands of the youth, the rank and file and the peasantry are not some how incorporated into its programme? The Indian National Congress in its Nagpur session on 26-31 December, 1920 passed the following resolution;

*-whereas, in the opinion of the Congress the existing government of India has forfeited the confidence of the country and*

*-whereas the people of India are now determined to establish Swaraj and*

*-whereas the methods adopted by the people of India prior to the last special session of the Indian National Congress have failed*<sup>55</sup>.

*'Constitutional struggle' would not now be the method, but 'passive resistance'.*

Jinnah was *alone* to stand in opposition but was drowned among catcalls and slogans and shout, “shame”, “shame”, “political imposter”<sup>56</sup>. A resolution of the Muslim League convened concurrently in Nagpur, under the presidentship of Dr. M. A. Ansari affirmed League’s support for non-cooperation...The Ahmadabad session (1921) of the Congress, under the *de facto* leadership of Gandhi was finally the great watershed. In that session there were no chairs or tables for the delegates. Everyone had to sit on the ground. People wore khadi and were lodged in khaddar tents, all required to spin khadi. Jinnah was also present at Ahmadabad where he was attending the Congress session for the last time. *He was perhaps the only individual to be seen in foreign clothes, complete with color, tie, and was found not spinning the charkha*<sup>57</sup>. Gandhi invited him to share in the ‘new life’ that has opened before the country. Jinnah’s reply showed how worried he felt over Gandhi’s agitational politics:

If by ‘new life’ you mean your methods and your programme, I am afraid I cannot accept them; for I am fully convinced that it must lead to disaster...Your extreme programme has for the moment struck the imagination mostly of the *inexperienced youth and the ignorant and the illiterate*. All this means complete disorganization and chaos<sup>58</sup>.

Jinnah was of the view that the British government had led the country towards renaissance and progress. Its

contribution had been ‘the birth of great and living movements for the intellectual and moral regeneration of the people’, the British government had maintained ‘unbroken peace and order in the land, administered evenhanded justice...brought the Indian mind in touch with the thought and ideals of the West, and thus led to the moral regeneration of the people’<sup>59</sup>. Interesting to note here are Mr. Jaswant Singh’s remarks: ‘Gandhi differing with Jinnah on the working of these reforms (i.e. Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms) carved his own path and went to civil disobedience and the agitational methodology of Satyagraha. *Until 1929, though, Jinnah had successfully kept the Indian political forces together, simultaneously exerting pressure on the government. With this new Gandhian methodology, that pressure dissipated and the British Raj remained for three decades*’<sup>60</sup>. Jaswant Singh and the kindred suffer from a crisis of approach. He actually means to say: had Gandhi not taken the road he did, the empire would have vanished long ago! He wants to locate causes of the events which involved not only the designs of the world imperialism but also the class configuration of the freedom struggle; its changing dynamics, into brains of personages. This is reductionism, but this reductionism is also well-targeted. With eulogizing the old guard of nationalism, Singh wants to show to the Indians that the path chosen by the old guard was the *only* viable one, and the Gandhian interlude resulted in a long detour towards the attainment of freedom and partition on communal lines. It is a *given* for him that India would surely have been *granted* freedom by the empire, that is why there was no need of *winning* freedom. The fact is the Congress quite slowly drifted towards Gandhi’s methods as seen earlier. The catalyst here was not the Hunter Commission Report but the announcement of the so-called Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. Self-Rule, as many in the old camp dreamt of gaining only and precisely through

exerting pressure on the government by speech making in imperial legislative councils, was not to be granted to the pressure exerters, instead, the Reforms proved to be a sad realization of their cherished dreams and belief in putative British 'evenhanded' justice and fairplay! This was decisive in the emergent bourgeois passive revolution's movement of maneuver as can be seen from the Nagpur resolution '*whereas the methods adopted by the people of India prior to the last special session of the Indian National Congresses have failed*'. This open admission of the failure and the changing dynamics of the passive revolution still perplex many. This is mainly due to our liberal intelligentsia's crisis of approach. The liberals when faced with exacting crises, either bury their head in the bush or try to locate the causes of the historical dynamics in Individual Will. Like the Prussian king Sigismund, who when told about a grammatical mistake in his talk replied with authority and pomp: *Ich bin König und stehe über die Grammatik*-I am a king and I am beyond grammar. Likewise, our liberals and the ubiquitous Jami stand head and shoulders above the grammar of thought!

Wolpert, Seeravai, Jaswant Sing just remember Jinnah and reproduce him to be the only 'sensible' opposition to Gandhi's plunge into the politics of the 'illiterate'. But there were many such 'sensible' leaders who were horrified at the prospect. The great patriot Mrs Annie Besant too failed to understand the new times. She published her book '*The Future Indian Politics*' in 1922 and it will be very beneficial if we could see what the old guard of nationalism was thinking about this new turn in political life. She quotes Lord Macaulay, who had said:

'it may be that the public mind of India may expand under *our* system till it has outgrown that system; that by *good government* we may *educate our*

*subjects into a capacity for better government; that having become instructed in European knowledge, they may on some future age, demand European institutions. Whether such a day will ever come... Whenever it comes, it will be the proudest day in English history. To have found a great people sunk in the lowest depths of slavery and superstition, to have so ruled them as to have made them desirous and capable of all the privileges of citizens, would indeed be a title to glory all own. Unforeseen accidents may derange our most profound schemes of policy. Victory may be inconsistent to our arms. But there are triumphs which are followed by no reverse. Here is an empire exempt from all natural causes of decay. Those triumphs are the pacific triumphs of reason over barbarism; that empire is the imperishable empire of our arts and our morals, our literature and our laws'*

. Mrs. Annie Besant calls this imperialist chest-thumping 'a fine note'. She was not alone, almost all reason-loving leaders of her day used to think in these terms. Mr Dadabhi Naoroji said:

*'The introduction of English education, with its great, noble, elevating, and civilizing literature and advanced science, will for ever remain a claim to gratitude upon the Indian people. This education has taught the highest political ideals of British citizenship and raised in the hearts of the educated Indians the hope and aspiration to be able to raise their countrymen to the same ideal of citizenship. This hope and aspiration as their greatest good are at the bottom of all their present sincere and earnest loyalty, in spite of disappointments,*

discouragements and despotism, of a century and a half... *The English education has made them loyal*, because they believe that the best realization of their aspiration is in becoming a self-Governing unit in the federal Empire of which Great Britain will be the centre, and because they thus desire, they are fighting for that Empire today'<sup>61</sup>

The Congress would exactly do what Macaulay predicted but only after subverting 'the empire of arms'. This defeat could not be effected without involving the peasantry. The same liberal democratic institutions would be established in the independent India by the native bourgeoisie, but how to achieve political freedom? Gandhi was the return of the barbarian which the imperial reason had been trying to banish. He refused to be educated *a la British*. Mrs Besant writes, 'If India is, as so often pointed out, the most poverty-stricken country in the world, there must be a cause for this. If the most poverty-stricken country in the world is also the most costly Government in the world, there is obviously a need for retrenchment....The time has come of which Macaulay prophesied, when India shall be free and Self-Governing<sup>62</sup>. No nationalist could have been in two minds on the question of self-rule. But what would that self-rule be and how would that be arrived at, were the reasons for political controversy and disagreement. Mrs Besant further writes, 'We come finally to the question; shall India become an isolated and independent country, or shall she remain as part of a world-wide empire, or better a part of a world-wide commonwealth, of free nations?...I would most strongly and earnestly pray both India and Britain to remain linked hand-in-hand, for the good of the world, for the sake of Humanity in the present and still more in the future...I submit that India, independent and alone, will recommence the old story of invasions and subjections. As part of a great

Commonwealth, the strength of the whole Commonwealth is her defense...To break the British connection would mean not freedom but only a change of masters, for Japan is armed...To declare independence now would be madness, and Britain would not be foolish enough to protect, while independent India was preparing for future defense<sup>63</sup>. Castigating Gandhi, she continues, 'Under the Gandhi raj there is no free speech, no open meeting, (as if there were such things under the English rule! writer), unless for non-cooperators. Mob support is obtained by wild promises, such as the immediate coming of Swaraj, when there will be no rent, no taxes, by giving to Mr Gandhi high religious names such as mahatma, avtara, assigning to him supernatural powers, and the like... Foreign cloth is boycotted or burnt. If there is not cloth enough to go round-and there is not-what there is must be cut up, and each man must have only a loin-cloth; Mr Gandhi promptly sheds his clothes and goes about in a loin-cloth only. Husbands and wives must live apart, to prevent slave children being born into the world...*All this midsummer madness has caught fancy of boys and illiterate, and they shout down the rationals...*It is the greatest revolution that ever was, since Gandhi replaced Tilak, has had the queerest leader, and has now the queerest collapse. *And meanwhile the legislatures are justifying themselves by work. By the time Mr. Gandhi comes out, all his rational followers will have returned to politics, and it is quite likely that we may have reached Home Rule*<sup>64</sup>

The editor of the Communist International documents offers the following interpretation:

There were many reasons for the subjective understanding of Gandhianism by M. N. Roy and the Sixth Congress of the Communist International .The nationalist bourgeoisie of different parts of the

world, including India, has shown itself to be capable of heading anti-colonial struggle. This is also a fact that this bourgeoisie has made compromises with imperialism, because the bourgeois wanted to keep this struggle confined within the bounds of freedom struggle and did not let the struggle develop into an agrarian revolution and social struggle of the proletariat. Ahimsa is a sign of this conciliatory attitude. The bourgeoisie on the one hand tried to scare the imperialist by peoples struggle, and on the other hand were ready to do compromises with them. Or in other words, it can be said that the Indian bourgeoisie was successful in implanting itself at the head of the freedom, movement. They adopted Gandhianism but it would be wrong to suggest that Gandhianism was an expression of the interest of the bourgeoisie. It is doubtless that had Gandhianism got no ahimsa, passive resistance elements, then the Indian bourgeoisies would never have accepted Gandhi.(Remember the reluctance of the Congress in endorsing the non-cooperation pledge, writer)...Gandhianism is the expression of the Indian peasant's concept of social justice. It is a utopian outlook but it is different form the bourgeoisie outlook. This is the expression of a peasant who has not yet detached himself from the village, and who hates all kinds of exploitation, the trader, the moneylender, the landowner and the monopolistic government. This is a religious ethical ideology against Capitalism. Gandhi wanted a village socialism, lacked a clear-cut class outlook and also headed the bourgeoisie nationalist movement. It cannot be suggested that Gandhi was unaware of the character of the Congress, but he emphasized the anti-imperialist views of the



Congress...Compromise is the main element of the petty-bourgeoisie ideology. The Seventh Congress of the Comintern (1940), tried to understand this alliance of Gandhi and the big-bourgeoisie. *The Indian bourgeoisie and Gandhi were together at a certain stage of the nationalist struggle.* Not only the struggle, but the proximity between the big-bourgeois and the petty-bourgeois outlooks brought them nearer. Yet there were many contradictions inherent in this compromise as in all democratic struggles. And these contradictions came to the fore when the Congress got the state power. Another strong element in Gandhianism was that Gandhi was akin to the masses and did not alienate them with neologisms and incomprehensible methods. *Gandhianism was nearer to the traditions of India; an important element that contributed to political inability of the Indian communists was their aloofness from the Indian traditions.* Total rejection of ahimsa and calling it a reactionary strategy also contributed to non-comprehension by the Indian leftists of Gandhianism. *One must not forget that Gandhi's politics was not limited to constitutionalism and petitions but it was to a large degree a peoples' struggle...* Because of the negative and dismissing attitude towards Gandhianism, the socialist struggle in India has been facing many hurdles. But by recognizing the peoples' struggle elements and criticizing conciliatory, compromising and metaphysical aspects, the Indian socialists could have developed their struggle. The masses would have also developed critical attitude towards conciliatory aspects of Gandhianism. Indian communists and communists in the Soviet Union have openly admitted their limited and one-sided understanding

of Gandhianism, but the Indian politicians, for their political ends, are still quoting Gandhi in their struggle against the communists. *Marxism and Gandhianism are irreconcilable, but it does not mean that true followers of Gandhianism and the Marxists must oppose each other in their struggle against imperialism.* There are sure signs of proximity between Gandhi's followers and Marxists in their struggle against neo-imperialism and the Indian bourgeoisie<sup>65</sup>.

M. N. Roy writes in his 'Memoirs', about the Colonial Question:

Immediately on the capturing power, Lenin put the principle (of the right of self-determination of subject nationalities) into practice, and recognized the right of the national minorities, suppressed by Tsarist Imperialism, to secede from the Socialist republic. The new national states carved out of the Tsarist Empire from their very birth became so many thorns on the side of the Russian Workers and Peasants Republic which had given birth to them. Even after the defeat of Germany, large formations of the Prussian (German) army remained in occupation of the newly found Baltic States and utilized them as bases of interventionist operations against the Soviet Republic...Before the Revolution, Lenin had insisted that socialists must support the movement for the autonomy of the national minorities subjugated by the Russian as well as the Austro-Hungarian Empire. But Socialists belonging to those minorities opposed him with the argument that the separatist movement was led by the nationalist bourgeoisie; and therefore it could not have the sympathy and support of the

working class...They argued that by conceding the right of self-determination of subject nationalities, the Soviet Government deprived their homelands of the benefit of the great social revolution...but the doctrinaire Lenin would not admit a mistake...after the Revolution, Lenin acted not as a doctrinaire but as practical politician, for opportunist and diplomatic considerations...Lenin's Theses on the National and Colonial Question were meant to justify the policy on the old doctrinaire ground. A corollary to the policy in Europe was a demand for the liberation of the peoples subjugated by colonial Powers. In the Congress of the Second International the Bolsheviks had put forth the demand, but the Socialists in the homelands of the West European colonial countries had mixed feelings. Inheriting the tradition of the nineteenth century liberalism they sympathized with the national aspirations of the subject peoples; at the same time, they could not ignore the fact that colonial expansion had considerably contributed to the improvement of the economic conditions of the working class at home--(opportunism par excellence, Kautsky and the kindred were of this school of thought, writer). Therefore, they advocated *self-government of the subject nationalities within the Empire*....Socialist parties in the leading imperialist countries of Europe, viz. Britain, France, and Holland, passed resolutions from time to time expressing sympathy for the aspiration of the colonial peoples and advocacy *self-government to be introduced gradually and peacefully*....*Russian Bolsheviks denounced the attitude of the West European socialist leaders as reformists defense of colonialism*...It encouraged the so-called "revisionism" of Eduard Bernstein and led to the

rejection of the idea of dictatorship [of the proletariat] by Kautsky and Hilferding. Even Rosa Luxemburg's famous work "Accumulation of Capital" tended to be theoretically 'reformist'. She also rejected the idea of dictatorship [of the proletariat]...Lenin's orthodox defense of the infallibility of Marxism was that the revisionists relied on the rise of a 'proletarian aristocracy' in the imperialist countries...The exploitation of the colonial masses yielded a super-profit; capital exported to countries where labour could be purchased at a very low price earned a much higher profit than at home. A part of this super-profit could be conceded to a thin upper stratum of the metropolitan working class to secure their support for colonialism. *From this analysis of imperialism Lenin drew the conclusion that successful revolt of the colonial people was a condition for the overthrow of capitalism in Europe.* The strategy of world revolution should therefore include active support of the national liberation movement...He declared that the socialist Second International was not a really international organisation, because it excluded the oppressed masses of Asia and Africa. By including in its programme the promotion of the national-revolutionary movements in the non-European countries, the Third (Communist) International would be a true world organisation. ...He argued that Imperialism had held the colonial countries back in feudal conditions, which hindered the development of capitalism and thwarted the ambition of the native bourgeoisie. Historically, the national liberation movement had the significance of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. Every stage of social evolution being historically determined, the colonial countries must have their bourgeois

democratic revolution. The Communists, therefore, must help the colonial liberation movement under the leadership of the national bourgeoisie, regarding the latter as an objectively revolutionary force.

I pointed out that the bourgeoisie even in the most advanced colonial countries, like India, as a class, was not even economically and culturally differentiated from the feudal social order; therefore, the nationalist movement was ideologically reactionary in the sense that the triumphs would not necessarily mean a bourgeois democratic revolution. *The role of Gandhi was the crucial point of difference. Lenin believed that, as the inspirer and leader of a mass movement, he was a revolutionary. I maintained as a religious and cultural revivalist, he was bound to be reactionary socially, however revolutionary he might appear politically.* Remembering my own past, I saw that Plekhanov's famous judgment of the Russian Populist and Socialist Revolutionary Movements was applicable to Indian nationalism, particularly of the extremist and Gandhi schools...By quoting Plekhanov's authority I shook his [Lenin's] theoretical position. After several discussions, he suggested that I should draft an alternative thesis. I was reluctant to oppose Lenin publicly...But Lenin's attitude was very kind and tolerant...He could refuse to waste his precious time in discussing with a young man of no importance. I would have no choice to make myself heard in the International Congress.

Lenin finally amazed me by proposing that, after a general discussion in the Commission set up to examine the question, he would move that his Theses as well as mine should be recommended for adoption by the Congress...pending the clarification

of theoretical issues in the light of future experience, the discussion in the Commission brought out one practical point of difference between Lenin and myself. I concretized his general idea of supporting the colonial liberation movement with the proposal that Communist parties should be organized with the purpose of revolutionizing the social character of the movement under the pressure of organized workers and peasants. That, in my opinion was the only method of concretely helping the colonial peoples in their struggle for national liberation. I maintained that, afraid of revolution, the nationalist bourgeoisie would compromise with imperialism in return for some economic and political concessions to their class. The working class should be prepared to take over at that crisis the leadership of the struggle for national liberation and transform it into a revolutionary mass movement....Lenin reported the discussion in the Commission to a plenary Session of the Congress, and recommended the adoption of both the Theses<sup>66</sup>

Two things are strikingly conspicuous here: First, the revisionist and reformist attitude of the socialists of the imperialist countries, and the educated nationalist elite of colonies had the same thoughts and attitudes as regards to independence; second, the different, Bolshevik way of understanding the colonial question. Lenin's attitude towards Gandhi was also in total opposition to that of Roy. Roy's view resembles the *educated* natives. Lenin had made major changes in Roy's 'Supplementary Theses' on the question of role of the bourgeoisie in freedom movement. Lenin criticized the 'Left' position of Roy's position. The result was to delete the ultra-leftist points in Roy's document, which failed to value the national liberation movements and the need for communists to

support them. The stage of the class struggle of the proletariat and peasantry in the East was overestimated by Roy, as well as the East's role in bringing about a victorious proletarian revolution in the West. Roy contended that the *socialist revolution* in the colonies was an indispensable precondition for the abolition of capitalism in the metropolitan countries, and sought to prove that a *bourgeois-democratic stage* in the revolutionary struggle in the East was unnecessary. Lenin's proposal prevailed to create a militant anti-imperialist alliance of the revolutionary proletariat and the national liberation movement. Roy's original position was that only by a socialist revolution would the East be well prepared for overthrowing foreign domination along with native capitalism. Roy's *Tenth Thesis*, completely deleted by Lenin said that the Communists should not support the bourgeois-democratic movements in the colonies; as such support would be conducive to 'fostering a nationalist spirit, which would of course hinder the awakening of consciousness of the masses [Roy thought]. Instead, it was suggested that encouraging and 'supporting revolutionary mass action through a Communist Party of the proletarians' would induce the 'real revolutionary forces to action that would overthrow not only foreign imperialism but also forestall the growth of local imperialism.<sup>67</sup>

Roy admits having been out of touch with the situation in India, yet he emphasized his first-hand knowledge of the situation before Lenin and challenged his position. That his was a vague thesis is proved by what he himself writes in the chapter "*Appeal To the Ahamadabad Congress*" of his '*Memoirs*', Roy adds:

The newspaper Borodin brought [from Spain] carried the reports of the Nagpur Session of the Indian National Congress, which adopted the

resolution to non-cooperation with the British Government until 'the Bureaucracy' responded to the popular demand. According to that resolution and that of the Special Calcutta Session of the Congress, the visit of the Prince of Wales had been boycotted, and the non-cooperation movement spread throughout the country... There were reports of big demonstrations in towns and cities throughout the country. Responding to the Congress call... thousands of students had left their schools and colleges. Some lawyers had abandoned their practice. Many government employees had also resigned their jobs, depriving their families of the only source of livelihood. It was a magnificent demonstration of patriotism, which in those days was inspired by the slogan: 'SUFFER AND SACRIFICE'... But... what would be attained by the sacrifice and suffering of the middle class people whose life was a tale of suffering and who could ill afford to make any sacrifice of their meager material comforts? Students leaving schools and colleges *en masse* appeared to be a futile and indeed a harmful gesture (It seems Roy wanted his proletarian revolution with students in their classes and the petty-bourgeoisie clinging to their routine life of subordination, his heart goes out to them and yet he wanted a full-scale revolutionary assault on colonialism and opposed Lenin's stand for that purpose, now he is all tears for the 'sufferings' of the middle class. His hatred for the big-bourgeoisie and 'religious' Gandhi was enough to numb his senses, writer)... *All of a sudden a nationalist movement attained mass proportions.* That was a remarkable fact, which was noted not only inside the country, but abroad also... previously, *until the beginning of the First World War, the Nationalist*



*Congress was an upper-middle class movement. The revolutionary nationalists, who disdained the constitutionalism of the pre-Gandhi Congress and declared their intention to derive out the foreign rulers with violent means, also had no connection with the masses* (Roy should have counted himself among these revolutionaries as he himself had no connection with the masses at that time, yet wanted a revolution of the masses, writer)...I analyzed and understood it was a potentially revolutionary movement restrained by a reactionary ideology...I had been out of direct touch with India for years. The contemplated appeal would mark the resumption of my modest role in the revolutionary drama of the Indian people's fight for freedom. Both Lenin and Stalin enthusiastically welcomed the idea. I drafted the appeal and submitted it for their approval. *Stalin suggested an amendment, which increased my understanding of the realities of the Indian situation.* In the list of demands which I would recommend the Congress to advocate for the peasantry, I had included abolition of usury, which notoriously was, and still is, the greatest curse in the life of the peasant masses. Stalin remarked that, if all the money-lenders were driven out of the Indian temple, where would the peasantry get the money required for cultivating their lands? They lived hand to mouth and there were no cheap credit available to them. If usurers disappeared, the peasantry would be greatly damaged. I had thought that abolition of usury would be a resounding revolutionary measure, which would enthuse the peasantry. But Stalin's remarks were an eye-opener. He suggested that the item on the programme should be amended as 'control of usury'; the rate of interest should be fixed at 6 per cent. He clinched

his point with the age-old dictum: “Don’t kill the goose that lays the golden egg”.<sup>68</sup>

This was Roy’s position at that time; he boasted of having more first-hand knowledge of the Indian situation, rejecting an alliance with native capitalists, and was submitting appeals to the same party which he had denounced earlier. The question of independence or self-government was an important question at that time and even the socialists of the Second International were in two minds as to what was the real character of imperialism. This was the issue which gave birth to opportunist trends in the socialist movement and revisionism, reformism in the Marxism of the metropolitan proletarian struggle. Pointing out the condescending attitude of the European socialists of the Second International towards the anti-colonial and national liberation question, Comrade Ho Chi Minh writes:

I used to support the October Revolution, but that support was an expression of my hatred towards colonialism. I loved and praised Lenin because, as I thought at that time, he was a great patriot. I had not yet studied even a single of his books. I joined the French Socialist Party because *those ladies and gentlemen-I used to address my comrades that way-viewed the struggle of the colonial peoples sympathetically...* A controversy was brewing in those days on the question of joining the Third International or forming a second-and a half one. I did not know what became of the First International. Revolution could have been brought about anywhere! Why so much hair-splitting? *What I wanted to know and what precisely my French comrades never discussed was that which “International” was on the side of the colonial people.* For me this was the most important question

and I raised it in some meetings. A friend of mine said the Third International was for the liberation of the colonial people and gave me Lenin's 'Theses on national and Colonial Question' for reading. There were some difficult political expressions in the book, but after several readings, I got the basic point of the book. The book dispelled my ideological confusions and filled me with self-confidence. I was weeping with joy. There was no one else in the room, I shouted to the clouds in the sky. 'Our martyrs! This is the road to our freedom.'<sup>69</sup>

The position of the ladies and gentlemen of the Second International and the native ladies and gentlemen as regards to the colonies, was markedly similar. The constitutionalist-nationalist old guard was precisely limited by its upbringing and was not able to understand the 'illogical' turn which the national movement had taken in India. They were quick to denounce it as a movement of the illiterate, superstitious masses, who had been enthused by the (mis)use of religious, superstitious symbolism. Their outlook was limited by the very bounds of the society which had given birth to them, i.e. civil society. (Interestingly the imperialists too denounced the movement in these terms). India, they argued, would not be able to sustain her existence if she severed her ties with the empire, even though the Congress had not yet adopted "*Purna Swaraj*" as its goal, yet the drift of the movement was all there. For those ladies and gentlemen, severance of the ties with the empire was some thing incomprehensible, and even if India managed to free herself of the yoke, she would not be able to defend her freedom!

What we must keep in mind is that the Gandhian interlude in the national movement was a necessary, historically determined phase in the course of the Passive

Revolution of Capital in colonial India. This interlude was not destined to last for long, and Gandhi was effectively and decidedly sidelined as the movement matured, as we shall soon see. Lenin very well understood it when he pointed out that the nationalist bourgeoisies was revolutionary to the extent, and only to the extent, where it opposes the independent development of the native capital, or foreign domination politically. The age of comprador bourgeois was yet to come. It is a different story, the story of capital in the age of neo-liberal globalization. One must also remember that the US had exerted immense pressure on the monopolist capital of the imperial Britain to free the colonies so as it could reformulate the world according to the “New World Order” of the neo-liberal capital.

Gandhi was ambiguous and contradictory. But Civil Society which he was critiquing was, and still is, no less contradictory. An economic system based on naked exploitation and a system of charity and altruism are thoroughly contradictory, yet these features are always to be found in every bourgeoisie/civil society. (Let us not be in two minds as to what ‘civil society’ means to the Marxists. Civil Society is another name, a nick name of the bourgeoisie society, but the terms ‘bourgeoisie’, ‘capitalism’ have been completely put to shame by progressive movements, so the ruling classes have found this intriguing neologism, and have made a fetish of the term, a panacea, a cure-all, a universal remedy. Marx, and every communist writer after him, including Antonio Gramsci, have used the terms bourgeoisie and civil society interchangeably, almost synonymously, enharmonically, denoting the same thing i.e. Capitalism.

The critique of civil society which appears on the pages of *‘Hind Swaraj’*, does not emerge out of a consideration of the historical contradiction of civil society

as perceived from *within* it. Quite unlike any European romantics, Gandhi is not torn between the conflicting demands of Reason and Morality, Progress and Happiness, Historical Necessity and Human Will. His idealization of peaceful, a non-competitive, just and happy Indian society of the past could not have been a romantic longing for the lost harmony of the archaic world, because unlike romanticism, Gandhi's problem is not conceived at all within the thematic bounds of post-Enlightenment<sup>70</sup>. A romantic is romantic only in relation to a rationalist. Romanticism was a revolt against rationalism and it was torn asunder by the bounds and dictates of rationalism. Or in other words, one can be a reformist, revisionist, or a laborite socialist within the theoretical confinement of bourgeoisie thought, but can one be a Marxist within the theoretical confinements of bourgeoisie thought? One cannot be a Communist or a Marxist within the framework of bourgeoisie thought. Because, above all, Marxism is a method of cognizing and revolutionizing the world. If a would-be Marxist does not acquire this method, and keeps on cognizing the world in the manner of the bourgeois methods and categories of thought, then this would-be Marxist would always be only a would-be Marxist. That is the reason communists appear to be bloodthirsty to the peace-loving, god-fearing bourgeoisie. This also applies to Gandhi. He was 'irrational', 'revivalist' at what not besides *viz-á-viz* post-Enlightenment bourgeois rationality and the old rational nationalism of the speech makers. The critique of civil society which forms such a central element of Gandhi's moral and political thinking is one which arises from *an epistemic standpoint situated outside the thematic of post-Enlightenment thought...* the correct perspective for understanding Gandhian ideology as a whole would be to study it in relation to the historic development of elite-nationalist thought in India. It was an ideology conceived as an intervention in the elite-nationalist discourse of the

time and was formed and shaped by the experience of a specifically nationalist movement, its ability to open up the possibility for achieving perhaps the most important historical task for a successful nationalist revolution [of capital] in a country like India, viz., the political appropriation of the subaltern classes by a bourgeoisie aspiring for hegemony (moral leadership of the movement) in the new state<sup>71</sup>. This ideology and this critique of civil society lie wholly *outside the post-Enlightenment thought and hence, outside the elite- nationalist thought of the times as well.*

The nationalist movement, the Indian passive revolution of capital had to pass through the moment of maneuver and proceed further and capture the state power. During the last months of his life, Gandhi repeatedly spoke of his helplessness:

Whatever the Congress decides will be done; nothing will be according to what I say. My writ runs no more. If it did the tragedies in the Punjab, Bihar, and Noakhali would not have happened. No one listens to me any more. I am a small man. True, there was a time when mine was a big voice. Then everyone obeyed what I said; now neither the Congress nor the Hindus nor the Muslims listen to me. *Where is the Congress today? It is disintegrating.* I am crying in the wilderness<sup>72</sup>.

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### The Moment of Arrival:

“I used to be troubled sometimes at the growth of this religious elements in our politics...I did not like it at all...[The] history and sociology and

economics[of Gandhi's] appeared to me all wrong, and the religious twist that was given to everything prevented clear thinking. Even some of Gandhiji's phrases sometimes jarred upon me—thus his frequent reference to Rama Raj as a golden age which was to return. But *I was powerless to intervene*, and I consoled myself with the thought that *Gandhiji used the words because they were well known and understood by the masses*. He had an amazing knack of reaching the heart of the people...He was a very difficult person to understand, *sometimes his language was almost incomprehensible and average modern*. But we felt that we knew him well enough to realize he was a great and unique man and a glorious leader, and having put our faith in him *we gave him an almost blank check, for the time being, at least*. Often we discussed his fads and peculiarities among ourselves and said, half-humorously, that when Swaraj came these fads must not be encouraged<sup>73</sup>.

A novel ideological undercurrent was emerging in the final, decisive and fully mature stage of the development of the passive revolution: its moment of arrival<sup>74</sup>. It was an ideology which would be situated as a state ideology, or *statism*. Nehru, who was the principal architect of the new state, used to think himself to be a socialist, albeit of a different sort. Political Socialism—dictatorship of the proletariat and a struggle on class lines—did not appeal to him, what appealed to him was the moral aspect, the concepts of social justice of socialism. But, nothing could be done for the downtrodden as long as the colonial government was in power. The nationalist state, as an expression of the collective will of major strata of society, will stand above the class differentiations and will come to the succor of the peasants and the poor. Hence, the

main task at this stage is to capture the state power. Once in power, the state would take an over all view of the situation and as it would stand above narrow class interests, will be able to plan the course of development and generate enough wealth and social justice for all. Nationalists like Nehru found in partial appropriation of Marxism, in 'the primacy of the economic' a particular useful theoretical foothold from which they could reach out and embrace the rationalist and egalitarian side of Marxism, leaving its political core well alone.<sup>75</sup> The ideological reconstruction undertaken by nationalist thought at its moment of arrival placed the idea of the national state at its very heart. It is a state which must embrace the whole people, give everyone an equal right of citizenship... This was the central political objective of the Indian movement in its mature phase. It was Nehru who presented a resolution on fundamental rights before Karachi Congress in 1931. This resolution was accepted and was later on enshrined in the Indian constitution.

Peasants were 'ignorant and 'subject to passion'. They were dull certainly, uninteresting individually', they needed to be led properly, not by force or fear but by gaining their trust, by teaching them their true interests. The critical point of Gandhian ideological intervention was now pushed back into zones of 'religious', 'incomprehensible', 'metaphysical' ;only its political consequences were real . Thus it now became possible for Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, to inaugurate on Gandhi's birthday a new factory for making railway coaches and say, 'I am quite sure that if it had been our good fortune to have Gandhiji with us today he would have been glad at the opening of this factory.'<sup>76</sup>

Gandhian interlude was a *necessary* stage, a stage where the thesis incorporates a part of antithesis. But the



thesis remains. This is how Nehru remembers Gandhi: *What a problem and a puzzle he has been not only to the British Government, but to his own people and his closest associates*<sup>77</sup>.

Nationalist thought has not emerged as the antagonist of universal Reason in the arena of world history...Ever since the age of Enlightenment, reason in its universalizing mission has been parasitic upon a much less lofty, much more mundane, palpably material and singularly invidious force, namely, the universalist urge of capital. To the extent that nationalism opposed colonial rule, it administered a check on a specific political form of metropolitan capitalist dominance. In the process it dealt the death blow to such blatantly racist slogans such as 'civilizing mission', 'whiteman's burden', etc. That must be counted as one of the major achievements of nationalist movements. *But this was achieved in the very name of Reason. Nowhere in the world has nationalism qua nationalism challenged the legitimacy of the marriage between Reason and Capital...*[The] Nationalist State now proceeds to find a place in global capital, while trying to keep the contradiction between capital and the people in perpetual suspension. The state now represents the nation so every thing must be subsumed in the requirements of the state. Any movement which questions the nation-representing character of the state is denounced as illegitimate politics. The political success of nationalism in ending colonial rule does not signify a true resolution of the contradictions between the people and capital. Rather there is a forced closure of possibilities, a false resolution, or revolution/restoration.<sup>78</sup>

**II**

**Historic**  
**Letters**

Lucknow,  
October 16, 1939.

My dear Mr. Jinnah,

Please do not misunderstand me regarding the Hindu-Muslim problem. I do not wish for a moment that I should carry the laurels of having attained the communal unity, nor I had any such desire when I met you in 1937-8, and tried for Congress-League settlement. My only wish and attempt is centered round the idea that a decent agreement may be reached between the Congress and the League; as I am sure it is urgently needed for the Muslim and the country. Delay is detrimental to the interests of the both. Here I may mention that under no circumstances would I like to bring to the notice of the public any one of my efforts in this connection. I only wish to perform my duty according to my belief. Perhaps an occasion may arise in future which may unveil the reality to you. Then alone will you be able to find out that you have been labouring under misunderstandings about me.

As soon as the war news began to pour in during the end of the August last, the very first idea which crossed my mind was to utilize the occasion for this purpose. Accordingly I have been trying to achieve this and since then. I wired to you yesterday, because the situation created by the Delhi talks has progressed no further, and the matter is at a standstill after a certain point. It should proceed on immediately. But what should be the proper procedure in this respect? Should the Congress President write a letter to you? Or, should some such other method be adopted? I wish to know your opinion in this connection, so that I may get the matter proceed on accordingly.

Yours sincerely,

A.K. Azad<sup>1</sup>

February 19, 1939

Mr. Jinnah's Reply

“Your telegram cannot reciprocate confidence. I refuse to discourse with you, by correspondence or ‘otherwise’, as you may have completely forfeited the confidence of Muslim India. Can't you realize you are made a Muslim “show-boy” Congress President to give it colour that it is National and deceive foreign countries? You represent neither Muslims nor Hindus. The Congress is a Hindu body. If you have self-respect resign at once. You have done worst against the League so far. You know you have hopelessly failed. Give it up.”

Jinnah<sup>2</sup>

TELEGRAM

Bombay. 12 July, 1940.

From Maulana Azad to Mr. Jinnah,

“Confidential. Your July 9 statement: The Congress Delhi resolution definitely means by national government a Composite Cabinet not limited to any single party. But it is the position of the League that she cannot agree to any provisional agreement not based on the two-nation scheme? If so, please clarify by wire.”

A.K. Azad<sup>3</sup>

Bose, Subhas Chandra

May 14, 1938

Confidential (1)

In the course of the talks between the Congress President and Mr. Jinnah, President of the All -India Muslim League, Mr. Jinnah suggested that any agreement that might be arrived at should be based on a clear understanding of the position of the Congress and of the Muslim League. He proposed that the conversation should proceed on the following lines:

The All-India Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organization of the Indian Muslims and the Congress as the authoritative and representative organization of the solid body of Hindu opinion have hereby agreed to the following terms by way of a pact between the two major communities and as a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question.

After further consideration a somewhat different wording was suggested by him as follows:

The Congress and the All-India Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organization of the Mussalmans of India have hereby agreed to the following terms of a Hindu-Muslim settlement by way of a pact.

This second statement, though shorter, apparently embodies the same idea which is given in the first-that is, that the Congress should represent the Hindus and the Muslim League the Mussalmans.

The Congress cannot possibly consider itself and function as if it represented one community only even though that might be the majority community in India. Its doors must inevitably be open to all communities and it

must welcome all Indians who agree with its general policy and method. It cannot accept the position of representing one community and thus itself becoming a communal organization. At the same time the Congress is perfectly willing to confer and co-operate with other organizations which represent minority interests.

It is obvious that the Mussalmans of India, though a minority in the whole country, form a very considerable part of the population and their wishes and desires must be considered in any scheme affecting India. It is also true that the All-India Muslim League is an organization representing a large body of Muslim opinion which must carry weight. It is for this reason that the Congress wants to come to an understanding with it. The Congress, however, would be bound to consult other existing Muslim organizations which have co-operated with the Congress in the past. Further, in the event of other group or minority interests being involved, it will be necessary to consult representatives of such interests<sup>4</sup>.

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Note handed over by the Congress President to  
Mr. M. A. Jinnah on May 14, 1938<sup>4</sup>

Marine Drive, Bombay,  
15<sup>th</sup> May, 1938

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Last night I gave you a note explaining our position. You asked me what constructive proposals we had to make. I think the note is self-explanatory. Having made known the Congress reaction to your suggestion, according to us it remains now to proceed to the next stage, namely appointment of respective committees which will jointly settle the terms of understanding.

Yours sincerely,  
SUBAS C. BOSE

5<sup>th</sup> June, 1938

Dear Mr. Bose,

I am enclosing herewith the unanimous opinion of the Executive Council of the All-India Muslim League as promised by me letter dated 16<sup>th</sup> of May with reference to the note given to me by you on behalf of the Congress on the 15<sup>th</sup> May, 1938

Yours sincerely  
M.A.JINNAH

### **RESOLUTION NO. 1**

The Executive Council of the All-India Muslim League has considered the note handed over by the President, Mr. Subhas C. Bose, on behalf of the Congress to Mr. Jinnah, the President of the Muslim League, on the 14<sup>th</sup> may and his letter of the 15<sup>th</sup> May, 1939, and find that it is not possible for the All-India Muslim League to treat or negotiate with the Congress the question of Hindu-Muslim settlement except on the basis that the Muslim League is the authoritative and representative organization of the Mussalmans of India.

### **RESOLUTION NO. 2**

The Council have also considered the latter of Mr. Gandhi, dated the 22<sup>nd</sup> May, 1939, and are of opinion that it is not desirable to include any Muslim in the personnel of the proposed committee that may be appointed by the Congress.

### RESOLUTION NO .3

The Executive Council wish to make it clear that it is the declared policy of the All-India Muslim League that all other minorities should have their rights and interests safeguarded so as to create a sense of sense of security amongst them and win their confidence and the All-India Muslim League will consult the representatives of such minorities and any other interest as may be involved when necessary<sup>5</sup>.

Wardha  
25 July, 1938

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

The working committee has given all the attention it was possible for it to give to the resolutions of the Council of the Muslim League which you were good enough to enclose with your letter of the 6<sup>th</sup> June, 1938. The first resolution of the League Council defines the statues of the League. If it means that before we proceed to set up machinery for considering for the terms of settlement of the communal question, the Congress should recognize status as is defined in that resolution, there is an obvious difficulty. Though the resolution does not use the adjective “only”, the language of the resolution means that the adjective is understood. Already the Working Committee has received warnings against recognizing exclusive statue of the League. There are Muslim organizations which have been functioning independently of the Muslim League. Some of them are staunch supporters of the Congress. Moreover, there are individual Muslims who are Congressmen; some of them exercise no inconsiderable



influence in the country. Then there is the Frontier province which is overwhelmingly Muslim and is solidly with the Congress. So will you see that in the face of these known facts, it is not impossible but improper for the Congress to make the admission, which the first resolution of the League Council apparently desires the Congress to make. It is suggested that status of organizations does not accrue to it by any defining of it. It comes through the service to which a particular organization has dedicated itself. The working committee, therefore, hopes that the League Council will not ask the Congress to do the impossible. Is it not enough that The Congress is not only willing but eager to establish the friendliest relations with the League and come to an honorable understanding over the much vexed Hindu-Muslim question? At this stage it may perhaps be as well to state Congress claim. Though it is admitted that the largest number of persons to be found on the numerous Congress registers are Hindus, the Congress has a fairly larger number of Muslims and members of other communities professing different faiths. It has been an unbroken tradition with the Congress to represent all communities, all races and all classes to whom India is their home. From its inception it has often had distinguished Muslims as its presidents and as general secretaries who enjoyed the confidence of the Congress and of the country. The Congress tradition is that although a Congressman does not cease to belong to faith in which he is born and brought up, no one comes to the Congress by virtue of faith. He is in-and-out of the Congress by virtue of his endorsement of the political principles and policy of the Congress. The Congress, therefore, is in no sense a communal organization. In fact, it has always fought the communal spirit because it is detrimental to the growth of pure and undefiled nationalism.

But whilst the Congress makes the claim, and has

sought, with more or less success, to live up to the claim, the Working committee would be glad if your Council would come to an understanding with the Congress in order that we might achieve national solidarity and whole heartedly work for realizing our common destiny.

As to the second resolution of the Council I am afraid that it is not possible for the Working Committee to confirm the desire expressed therein.

The third resolution, the working committee is unable to understand. So far as the Working Committee is concerned, the Muslim League is a purely communal organization, in the sense that it seems to serve Muslim interest only and its membership too is open only to Muslims. The Working Committee also has all along understood that so far as the League is concerned, it desires, and rightly, a settlement with the Congress on the Hindu-Muslim question and not on question affecting all minorities. So far as the Congress is concerned, if the other minorities have a grievance against the Congress, it is always ready to deal with them, as it is its bounden duty to do so being by its very constitution representative of all-India without distinction of caste or creed.

In view of the foregoing I hope that it will be possible for us to take up the next stage in our negotiations for reaching a settlement.

It is suggested that as the previous correspondence has been published, it would be wise to take the public into confidence and publish the subsequent correspondence between us. If you are agreeable, these documents will be immediately released for publication.

Yours sincerely  
S. C. BOSE<sup>6</sup>

Malabar Hill, Bombay  
AUGUST 2, 1938

Dear Mr. Bose,

I am desired to state that in defining the status the council was not actuated by any motive of securing an admission, but had merely stated an accepted fact.

The council is fully convinced that the Muslim league is the only authoritative and representative political organization of the Mussalmans of India... Besides the very fact that the Congress approached the Muslim League to enter into negotiations for a settlement of the Hindu Muslim question, is presupposed the authoritative and representative character of the League and as such its right to come to an agreement on the behalf of the Mussalmans of India... These Muslims in the Congress do not and cannot represent the Mussalmans of India for the simple reason that their number is very insignificant and that as members of the Congress they have disabled themselves from representing or speaking on the behalf of the Muslim community... So far as the Muslim League is concerned, it is not aware that any other Muslim political organization has ever made a claim that it can speak or negotiate on the behalf of the Muslims of India. It is, therefore, very much to be regretted that you should have referred to "other Muslim organizations" in this connection.

...the council wishes to point out that it considers undesirable the inclusion of Mussalmans in the committee that might be appointed by the Congress, because it would meet to solve and settle the Hindu-Muslim question and so in the very nature of the issue involved, they would not command the confidence of either Hindus or the Mussalmans and their position indeed would be most

embarrassing

As regards your desire for the release of the correspondence, including this letter, for publication, the council has no objection to your doing so.

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH<sup>7</sup>

Delhi  
October 2, 1938

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

...the substance of your letter seems to be that the League does not expect the Congress either implicitly or explicitly to acknowledge its status as the authoritative Muslim organization of India. If this is accepted by the League, I am authorized to state that the working Committee will confer with the committee that may be appointed by the league to draw up the terms of settlement. The Working Committee will be represented by at least five of its members at the sitting of the conference.

Yours sincerely,  
SUBHAS C. BOSEE

Karachi  
October 9, 1938

Dear Mr. Bose,

...The Muslim League is still ready to proceed with negotiations for a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question on the basis defined in my letter referred to above and would appoint its representatives to meet a committee that

may be appointed by the Congress on the footing indicated by us in our three resolutions of June 5, already communicated to you.

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. JINNAH<sup>8</sup>

Gandhi to Jinnah

Segaon, February 24, 1938

... So far as I am concerned, just as one the Hindu-Muslim question I was guided by Dr. Ansari, now he is no more in our midst, I have accepted Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as my guide. My suggestion, therefore, to you is the conversation should be opened in the first instance as between you and the Maulana sahib. But in every case regard me as at your disposal<sup>9</sup>.

Jinnah to Gandhi

New Delhi, March 3, 1938

...I find that there is no change in your attitude and mentality when you say that you would be guided by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as Dr. Ansari is no more. If you pursue this line you will be regretting the same tragedy as you did when you expressed your helplessness because Dr. Ansari, holding pronounced and die-hard views, did not agree, and you had to say that you were willing, but what could you do.

...We have reached a stage where no doubt should be left that you recognize the All-India Muslim Leagues as the one authoritative and representative organization of the Muslims of India and, on the other hand, you represent the

Congress and other Hindu throughout the country. It is only on that basis that we can proceed further and devise a machinery of approach<sup>10</sup>.

Gandhi to Jinnah

Segaon, March 8, 1938.

...You expect me to be able to speak on the behalf of ‘the Congress and other Hindus throughout the Country’. I am afraid I cannot fulfill the test. I cannot represent either the Congress or the Hindus in the sense you mean; but I would exert to the utmost all the moral influence I could have with them in order to secure a settlement<sup>11</sup>.

January 16, 1940

Dear Quaid-i-Azam

...Abul Kalam tells me that in the League circles you are always called “Quaid-i-Azam”

...The purpose of writing this letter is to send you the enclosed advance copy of the article I have sent to the *Harijan*. I have written it to further the end I have read in your recent messages and actions. I know that you are quite capable of rising to the noble height required for the noble motive attributed to you. I do not mind your opposition to the Congress. But your plan to amalgamate all the parties opposed to the Congress at once gives your movement a national character. If you succeed you will free the country from communal incubus, and in my humble opinion give a lead to the Muslims and others for which you will deserve the gratitude not only of the Muslims but of all the other communities. I hope that my interpretation is correct. If I am mistaken you will please correct me.

Yours sincerely  
M.K.Gandhi

**Enclosed Article:**

“A WELCOME MOVE”

On the Deliverance Thanks-giving Day, declared by Jinnah Sahib, I had the following wire from Gulbarga Muslim:

“Deliverance Day greetings: Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah Zindadad”.

I took it as a message sent to ruffle my feelings. The sender little knew that the wire could not serve its purpose. When I received it, I silently joined the sender in the wish. ‘Long Live Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah’. The Quaid-e-Azam is an old comrade. What does it matter that to-day we do not see eye-to-eye in some matters? That can make no difference in my goodwill towards him.

But the Quaid-i-Azam has given me the special reason for congratulating him. I had pleasure of writing him congratulations on his excellent Id-day broadcast. And now he commands further congratulations on forming pacts with parties who are opposed to the Congress policies and politics. He is thus lifting the Muslim League out of the communal rut and giving it a national character. I regard his step as a perfectly legitimate. I observe that the Justice Party and Dr. Ambedkar’s party have already joined Jinnah Sahib. The papers report too. That Shree Savarkar, The President of the Hindu Mahasabha is to see him presently. Jinnah Sahib himself has informed the public that many non-Congress Hindus have expressed their sympathy with him. I regard this development as thoroughly healthy.

Nothing can be better than what we should have in the country mainly two parties—the Congress and non-Congress or anti-Congress—if the latter expression is perfect. Jinnah Sahib is giving the word ‘minority’ a new good content. The Congress majority is made up of a combination of caste Hindus, non-caste Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Parsis and Jews. Therefore, it is a majority drawn from all classes and the proposed combination becomes a minority representing another body of opinion. This may any day convert itself into a majority by commending itself to the electorate. Such an alignment of parties is a consummation devoutly to be wished. If the Quaid-i-Azam can bring about the combination, not only I but the whole of India will shout with one acclamation: “Long Live Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah”. For he will have brought about permanent and living unity for which I am sure the whole nation is thirsting<sup>12</sup>.

Mount Pleasant Road,  
Malabar Hill,  
January 21, 1940

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

...I, however, regret to have to say that your premises are wrong as you start with the theory of an Indian nation that does not exist, and naturally, therefore, your conclusions are wrong. I should have thought that, however, that you at least would not be led away by one-sided newspaper reports and canards. There is so much in your article which is the result of your imagination. It is due partly to the fact that you are living a secluded life at Segaon and partly because all your thoughts and actions are guided by “inner voice”. You have very little concern with realities, or what might be termed by an ordinary mortal “practical politics”. I sometimes wonder what can be common between practical politics and yourself, between



democracy and the dictator of a political organization of which he is not even a four-anna member. But that is, I suppose, because you do not consider the Congress worthy of your membership.

...It was indeed noble of you to join in the silent prayer: Long Live Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah". Although these are trivial matters, I nevertheless appreciate that you have realized the significance of the "Deliverance Day".

...I have no illusions in the matter, and let me say again that India is not a nation, nor a country. It is a sub-continent composed of nationalities, Hindus and Muslims being the two major nations.

Today you deny that religion can be a main factor in determining a nation, but you yourself, when asked what your motive in life was, "the thing that leads us to do what we do, whether it was religious, or social , or political," said: "purely religious". This was the question asked me by the late Mr. Montagu when I accompanied a deputation which was purely political. "How you, social reformer", he exclaimed, "have found your way in this crowd?" My reply was that it was only an extension of my social activity....I do not know any religion apart from human activity. It provides a moral basis to all other activities which they would otherwise lack, reducing life to a maze of "sound and fury, signifying nothing".

...Events are moving fast, a campaign of polemics, or your weekly discourse in the *Harijan* on metaphysics, philosophy and ethics, or your peculiar doctrines regarding "khaddar, ahimsa" and spinning are not going to win India's freedom. Action and statesmanship alone will help us in our forward march. I believe you might still rise to your stature in the service of our country and make your

proper contribution towards leading India to contentment and happiness.<sup>13</sup>

Yours sincerely  
M.A. JINNAH

May 4<sup>th</sup>, 1943

Dear Quaid-i-Azam,

When some time after my incarceration, the Government asked me for a list of newspapers I would like to have, I included the Dawn in my list...Whenever it comes to me, I read it carefully. I have followed the proceedings of the League as reported in the Dawn columns. I noted your invitation to me to write to you. Hence this letter.

I welcome your invitation. I suggest our meeting face to face rather than talking through correspondence. But I am in your hands.

I hope that this letter will be sent to you and, if you agree to my proposal, that the Government will let you visit me.

One thing I had better mention. There seems to be an "if" about your invitation. Do you say I should write only if I have changed my heart? God alone knows men's hearts. I would like you to take me as I am.

Why should not both you and I approach the great question of communal unity as men determined on finding a common solution and work together to make our solution acceptable to all who are concerned with it or are interested in it?<sup>14</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
M. K. Gandhi.

DILKUSHA (Panchgani),  
July 17, 1944.

BROTHER JINNAH,

There was a time when I was able to induce you to speak in the mother tongue. Today I venture to write to you in the mother tongue. I have already suggested a meeting between you and me in my invitation issued from jail. I have not written to you since my release. Today I am impelled to do so. Let us meet whenever you wish. Do not regard me as an enemy of Islam or of Indian Muslims. I have always been a servant and friend to you and to mankind. Do not disappoint me.<sup>15</sup>

Your brother,  
M. K. Gandhi.

September 10, 1944.

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

With reference to our talk yesterday (September 9), I understood from you that you had come to discuss the Hindu-Muslim settlement with me in your individual capacity, and not in any representative character or capacity, on the behalf of the Hindus or the Congress; nor had you any authority to do so...

As you know, I can only speak on the behalf of Muslim India and the All-India Muslim League, as the

President of the organization which I represent, and as such I am subject to and governed by its constitution, rules and regulations. I think you will realize and will admit that a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question is the foremost and major hurdle, and unless the representatives of these two nations put their heads together, how is one to make any headway with it?

Nevertheless, I explained to you the Lahore resolution of March, 1940, and tried to persuade you to accept the basic and fundamental principles embodied in it, but you not only refused to consider it but emphasized your opposition to the basis indicated in that resolution, and remarked that there was “an ocean between you and me”, and when I asked you what is then the alternative you suggest, you put forward a formula of Mr. Rajgopalachari approved by you...

After some discussion, you requested me to formulate in writing my points that I thought required or called for explanation and clarification, and to communicate with you and that you would reply in writing before our next meeting on Monday, September 11, at 5-30 p.m. I am, therefore, submitting to you the following points which require clarification:

- (1) With regards to the preamble: In what capacity will you be a consenting party if any agreement is reached between you and me?
- (2) Clause 1: With regard to “the constitution for a free India” referred to in this clause, I would like to know first, what constitution do you refer to, who will frame it and when will it come into being?

...for you know the Muslim League has made it clear not only by its resolutions but by its creed, which is embodied in its constitution, that we stand for freedom and independence of the whole of this sub-continent, and that applies to Pakistan and Hindustan<sup>16</sup>.

Yours sincerely,  
M.A. Jinnah

September 11, 1944

Dear Quaid-i-Azam,

...I have stated publicly that I have approached you as an individual. My life mission has been Hindu-Muslim unity which I want for its own sake but which is not to be achieved without the foreign ruling Power being ousted. Hence the first condition of the exercise of the right of self-determination is achieving independence by the joint action of all the parties and groups composing India. If such joint action is unfortunately impossible, then too I must fight with the assistance of such elements as can be brought together.

...It is true that I said an ocean separated you and me in the outlook. But that had no reference to the Lahore resolution of the League. The Lahore resolution is indefinite. Rajaji has taken from it the substance and given it a shape.

...The constitution will be framed by the provisional government contemplated in the formula or an authority specially set up by it after the British power is withdrawn. The independence contemplated is of the whole of India as it stands. The basis for the formation of the provisional interim government will have to be agreed to

between the League and the Congress.

...The power is to be transferred to the nation, that is, to the provisional government. The formula contemplates peaceful transfer by the British Government. So far as I am concerned I would like to transfer to take place as early as possible<sup>17</sup>.

Yours sincerely,  
M. K. Gandhi

September 11, 1944

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

...I proceed to discuss matters with you naturally because I am anxious to convert you to my point of view if possible (urged on you that the only solution of India's problem is to accept the division of India as Pakistan and Hindustan as briefly laid down in the Lahore resolution of March 1940, and proceed to settle the details forthwith. You say the Lahore resolution is indefinite...I would, therefore, like to know in what way or respect the Lahore resolution is indefinite. I cannot agree that Rajaji has taken from it its substance and given it a shape. On the contrary, he has not only put it out of shape but mutilated it, as I explained in my speech which I delivered at the meeting of the Council of the All-India Muslim League at Lahore on July 30, 1944.

...In order to achieve the freedom and independence of the people of India, it is essential, in the first instance, that there should be a Hindu-Muslim settlement<sup>18</sup>.

Yours sincerely,

M. A. Jinnah

September 15, 1944.

Dear Quaid-i-Azam,

...You must admit that the resolution itself makes no reference to the two-nation theory. In the course of our discussions you have passionately pleaded that India contains two nations, i.e., Hindus and Muslims...

...The more our argument progresses, the more alarming your picture appears to me. It would be alluring if it were true. But my fear is growing that it is wholly unreal. I find no parallel in history for a body of converts and their descendents claiming to be a nation apart from the parent stock. If India was one nation before the advent of Islam, it must remain one in spite of the change of faith of a very large body of her children.

You do not claim to be a separate nation by right of conquest but by reason of acceptance of Islam. Will the two nations become one if the whole of India accepted Islam? Will Bengalis, Oriyas, Andhras, Tamilians, Maharashtians, Gujratis, etc., cease to have special characteristics if all of them become converts to Islam?

These have all become one politically because they are subject to one foreign control. They are throwing off that subjection.

You seem to have introduced a new test of nationhood. If I accept it, I would have to subscribe to many more claims and face an insoluble problem.

The only real though lawful test of our nationhood

arises out of our common political subjection. If you and I throw off this subjection by our combined effort we shall be born a politically free a nation out of our travail. If by then we have not learnt to prize our freedom we may quarrel among ourselves and, for want of a common master holding us together in his iron grip, seek to split up into small groups or nationalities. There will be nothing to prevent us from descending to that level and we shall not have to go in search of a master. There are many claimants to the throne that never remains vacant.

With this background I shall present you with my difficulty in accepting your resolution:

- (1) Pakistan is not in the resolution. Does it bear the original meaning the Punjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Sindh and Baluchistan?
- (2) Is the goal of Pakistan pan-Islamism?
- (3) What is that distinguishes an Indian Muslim from every other Indian, if not his religion? Is he different from a Turk or an Arab?
- (4) What is the connotation of the word “Muslims” in the resolution under discussion? Does it mean the Muslims of the India of geography or of the Pakistan to be?
- (5) Is the resolution addressed to the Muslims by way of education or to the inhabitants of the whole of India by way of appeal or to the foreign ruler as an ultimatum?
- (6) **Are the constituents in the two zones to constitute “independent states”, an undefined number in each zone?**
- (7) Is the demarcation to take place during the pendency of British rule?
- (8) If the answer to the last question is in the



affirmative, the proposal must be accepted first by Britain and then imposed upon India, not evolved from within by the free will of the people of India.

- (9) Have you examined the position and satisfied yourselves that these” independent States” will be materially and otherwise benefited by being split up into fragments?
- (10) Please satisfy me that these independent, sovereign states will not become a collection of poor states, a menace to themselves and to the rest of India.
- (11) Pray show me by facts and figure or otherwise how independence and welfare of India as a whole can be brought about by the acceptance of the resolution?
- (12) How are Muslims under the Princes to be disposed of as a result of this scheme?
- (13) What is your definition of “minorities”?
- (14) Will you please define the “adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards” for minorities referred to the second part of the resolution?
- (15) Do you not see that the Lahore resolution contains only a bare statement of the objective and does not give any idea as to the means to be adopted for the execution of the idea and the corollaries thereof?

For instance:

- (a) Are the people in the regions falling under the plan to have any voice in the matter of separation and, if so, how is it to be ascertained?
- (b) What is the provision for defense and similar matters of common concern contemplated in the Lahore resolution?

- (c) There are many groups of Muslims who have continuously expressed dissent from the policy of the League. While I am prepared to accept the preordering influence and position of the League and have approached you for that very reason, is it not our joint duty to remove their doubts and carry them with us by making them feel that they and their supporters have not been practically disfranchised?
- (d) Does this not lead again to placing the resolution of the League before the people of the zones concerned as a whole for acceptance?

As I write this letter and imagine the working of the resolution in practice, I see nothing but ruin for the whole of India. Believe me, I approach you as a seeker though I represent nobody but myself, I aspire to represent all inhabitants of India. For, I realize in my own person their misery and degradation which is their common lot irrespective of class, caste or creed. I know that you have acquired a unique hold on the Muslim masses, I want you to use your influence for their total welfare, which must include the rest.

In this hastily written letter I have only given an inkling of my difficulty<sup>19</sup>.

Yours sincerely,  
M. K. Gandhi

September 15, 1944

Dear Quaid-i0Azam,

...Independence means as envisaged in the A.I.C.C. resolution of 1942. But it cannot be on the basis of a united India. If we come to a settlement it would be on the basis of that settlement, assuming of course that it desires general acceptance in the country. The process will be somewhat like this. We reach by joint effort independence for India as it stands. India, become free, will proceed to determine plebiscite and partition if the people concerned vote for partition. All this is implied in the Rajaji formula.<sup>20</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
M. K. Gandhi

September 17, 1944

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

...It is my duty to explain the Lahore resolution to you today and persuade you to accept it, even though you are talking to me, as you have often made it clear, in your individual capacity. I have successfully converted non-Muslim Indians in no small number and also a large body of foreigners, and if I can convert you, exercising as you do tremendous influence over Hindu India, it will be no small assistance to me, although we are not proceeding on the footing that you are carrying on these talks in your representative character, or capacity and my difficulties remain until you are vested with a representative status and authority in order to negotiate and reach an agreement with you.

...The third paragraph of your letter is not seeking clarification but is a disquisition and expression of your views on the point whether the Mussalmans are a nation. The matter can hardly be discussed by means of correspondence. There is a great deal of discussion and literature on this point which is available, and it is for you

to judge finally, when you have studied this question thoroughly, whether the Mussalmans and Hindus are not two major nations in the sub-continent. For the moment I would refer you to two publications, although there are many more,-Dr. Ambedkar's book and "M.R.T.'s" '*Nationalism in Conflict in India*'. We maintain and hold that the Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. We are a nation of a hundred million, and what is more, we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions-in short we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all canons of international law we are a nation. Now I shall reply to your various points.

- (1) Yes, the word "Pakistan" is not mentioned in the resolution and it does not bear the original meaning. The word has now become synonymous with the Lahore resolution.
- (2) This point does not arise, but still I reply that the question is a mere bogey.
- (3) This point is covered by my answer that the Mussalmans of India are a nation. As to the last part of query, it is hardly relevant to the matter of clarification of the resolution.
- (4) Surely you know what the word "Muslims" means.
- (5) This point does not arise by way of clarification of the text of Lahore resolution.
- (6) **No. They will form units of Pakistan**
- (7) As soon as the basis and the principles embodied in the resolution are accepted, the question of demarcation will have to be

- taken up immediately.
- (8) In the view of my reply to (7), your question (8) has been answered.
  - (9) Does not relate to clarification.
  - (10) My answer to (9) covers this point.
  - (11) Does not arise out of clarification of the resolution. Surely this is not asking for clarification of the resolution. I have in numerous speeches of mine and the Muslim League in its resolutions have pointed out that this is the only solution of India's problem and the road to achieve freedom and independence of the peoples of India.
  - (12) "Muslims under the Princes": The Lahore resolution is only confined to British India. This question does not arise out of the clarification of the resolution.
  - (13) The definition of "minorities": You yourself have often said that minorities means "accepted minorities".
  - (14) The adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards for minorities referred to in the resolution, are a matter for negotiation and settlement with the minorities in the respective states, viz. , Pakistan and Hindustan.
  - (15) It does give basic principles and when they are accepted then the details will have to be worked out by the contracting parties.
    - (a) Does not arise by way of clarification.
    - (b) Does not arise by way of clarification.
    - (c) The Muslim League is the only authoritative and representative organisation of Muslim India.
    - (d) No. See answer(c).

...It is quite clear that you represent nobody else but Hindus, and as long as you do not realize your true position and the realities, it is very difficult for me to argue with you, and it becomes still more difficult to persuade you, and hope to convert you to the realities and the actual conditions prevailing in India today. I am pleading before you in the hope of converting you, as I have done with many others successfully.

...I am convinced that true welfare not only of the Muslims but the rest of India lies in the division of India as proposed by the Lahore resolution<sup>21</sup>.

Yours sincerely,  
M.A JINNAH

September 19, 1944.

Dear Quaid-i-Azam,

I am sorry to say that your answers omitting 1, 2, and 6 do not give satisfaction.

It may be that my questions do not arise from the view of mere clarification of the Lahore resolution. But I contend that they are very relevant from the standpoint of a seeker that I am. You cannot expect anyone to agree to, or shoulder the burden of the claim contained in the Lahore resolution *without, for instance, answering my question 15 (a) and 15 (b) which you brush aside as not arising by way of clarification.*

... I hope you do not expect me to accept the Lahore resolution without understanding its implications. If your letter is the final word, there is little hope. *Can we not agree to differ on the question of "two nations" and yet solve the problem on the basis of self-determination? It is this basis that has brought me to you. If the regions holding*

*Muslim majorities have to be separated according to the Lahore resolution, the grave step of separation should be specifically placed before and approved by the people in that area.*

Yours sincerely,  
M.K .Gandhi

21 September 1944.

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I am in receipt of your letter of September 19 and I have already given you my answers to all your questions relation to clarification of the Lahore resolution or any part of it, and I am glad that you admit when you say that “all my questions do not arise from any view of mere clarification of the Lahore resolution”, but you particularly emphasize your points 15 (a) and 15 (b).

I regret to say that it has no relation to the context of the resolution or any part thereof. You have brought so many matters into our correspondence which are entirely outside the matter requiring clarification, so I have perforce to deal with them. Let me first deal with your letter of September 11.

You say: “My life-mission has been Hindu-Muslim unity which I want for its own sake but which is not to be achieved without the foreign ruling Power being ousted. Hence the first condition of the exercise of the right of self-determination is achieving of independence by the joint action of all the parties and groups composing India. If such action is unfortunately impossible, then I must fight with the assistance of such elements as can be brought together”.

The gist of your letter up to date is that you are wedded to this policy and will pursue it. In your next letter of September 14, while you were good enough to furnish me with the clarification of the Gandhi-Rajaji formula, you were pleased to observe: "I have, at any rate, for the moment, put it out of my mind and I am now concentrating on the Lahore resolution in the hope of finding a ground for mutual agreement".

In your letter of September 15, you say: "Independence does mean as envisaged in the A.I.C.C. resolution of 1942". It is therefore clear that you are not prepared to revise your policy and that you adhere firmly to your policy and programme which you have persisted in and which culminated in your demand, final policy, programme, and the method and sanction for enforcing it by resorting to mass civil disobedience in terms of the 8<sup>th</sup> August, 1942 resolution, and you have made it more clear again by stating in your letter of September 19 as follows:- "As to your verdict on my policy and programme, we must agree to differ, for, I am wholly unrepentant". You know that the August 1942 resolution is inimical to the ideals and demands of Muslim India.

... I have already given you all the clarifications you require so far as the Lahore resolution goes and its text is concerned. You again raise further arguments, reasons and grounds and continue to persist in a disquisition on the point, amongst others, whether Muslims of India are a nation, and then you proceed further to say: "Can we not agree to differ on the question of 'two nations' and yet solve the problem on the basis of self-determination?"

It seems that you are laboring under some misconception of the real meaning of the word 'self-



determination”. Apart from the inconsistencies and contradictions of the various positions that you have adopted in the course of our correspondence, as indicated above, can you not appreciate our point of view that we claim the right of self-determination as a nation and not as a territorial unit, and that we are entitled to exercise our inherent right as a Muslim nation, which is our birth-right? Where as you are laboring under the wrong idea that “self-determination” means merely of “a territorial unit”, which, by the way, is neither demarcated nor defined yet, and there is no union or federal constitution of India in being, functioning as a sovereign Central Government. Ours is a case of division and carving out two independent sovereign states by way of settlement between two major nations, Hindus and Muslims, and not of severance or secession from any existing union, which is non set in India. The right of self-determination, which we claim would be the self-determination of the Muslims, and they alone are entitled to exercise that right.

I hope you will understand that your question 15(a) does not arise out of the Lahore resolution or any part thereof. As to 15(b), again it does not arise as a matter of clarification, for it will be a matter for the constitution-making body chosen by Pakistan to deal with and decide all matters as a sovereign body representing Pakistan vis-à-vis the constitution-making body of Hindustan or any other party concerned. There cannot be defense and similar matters of “common concern”, when it is accepted that Pakistan and Hindustan will be two separate independent sovereign states. I hope to have given all satisfactory explanations, over and above the matter of clarification of the Lahore resolution in the hope of converting you as an individual “seeker”<sup>22</sup>.

Yours sincerely,  
M.A.JINNAH

September 22, 1944.

Dear Quaid-i-Azam,

...I think I see somewhat clearly what you are driving at. The more I think about the two-nations theory the more alarming it appears to be. The book recommended by you gives me no help. It contains half-truths and its conclusions or inferences are unwarranted. I am unable to accept the proposition that the Muslims of India are a nation distinct from the rest of the inhabitants of India. Mere assertion is no proof. The consequences of accepting such a proposition are dangerous in the extreme. Once the principle is admitted there would be no limit to claims for cutting up India into numerous divisions which would spell India's ruin. I have therefore suggested a way out. *Let there be a partition as between two brothers. If a division there must be.*

*You seem to be averse to a plebiscite. In spite of the admitted importance of the League, there must be clear proof that the people affected desire partition. In my opinion, all the people inhabiting the area ought to express their opinion specifically on this single issue of division. Adult suffrage is the best method, but I would accept any other equivalent.*

...We seem to be moving in a circle. I have made a suggestion. If we are bent on agreeing, as I hope we are, let us call in a third party or parties to guide or arbitrate between us<sup>23</sup>.

Yours sincerely,  
M. K. Gandhi

September 23, 1944.

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

... I am really surprised when you say there is no proof of what you characterize as a sweeping statement of mine, that the August 1942 resolution is inimical to the ideals and demands of Muslim India.

*...immediate grant of complete independence and setting up immediately of a federal central Government on the basis of a united, democratic government of India with federated units or provinces, which means a Hindu Raj.*

*...This demand is basically and fundamentally opposed to the ideals and demands of Muslim India of Pakistan, as embodied in the Lahore resolution, and to enforce such a demand by means of resort to mass civil disobedience is inimical to the ideals and demands of Muslim India; and if you succeed in realizing that demand, it would be a death blow to Muslim India<sup>24</sup>.*

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. Jinnah

September 26, 1944.

Dear Quaid-i-Azam,

Last evening's talk has left a bad taste in the mouth. Our talks and our correspondence seem to run in parallel lines and never touch one another. We reached the breaking point last evening but, thank God, we were unwilling to part. We resumed discussion and suspended it in order to allow me to keep my time for the evening public prayer.

*In order that all possible chance of making any mistake in a matter of this great importance may be*

*removed, I would like you to give me in writing what precisely on your part you would want me to put my signature to.*

I adhere to my suggestion that we may call in some outside assistance to help us at this stage<sup>25</sup>.

Yours sincerely,  
M. K. Gandhi

September 23, 1944.

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

...I have nothing new or fresh to add, but I may say that it is not a case of your being asked to put on signature as representing anybody till you clothe yourself with representative capacity and are vested with authority. We stand by...the basis and fundamental principles embodied in the Lahore resolution of March 1940. I appeal to you once more revise your policy and programme, as the future of this sub-continent and the welfare of the people of India demand that you should face realities<sup>26</sup>.

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. Jinnah

September 24, 1944.

Dear Quaid-i-Azam,

...I proceed on the assumption that India is not to be regarded as two or more nations but as one family consisting of many members of whom the Muslims living in the north-western zones, i. e. Baluchistan, Sind, North West frontier province and that part of the Punjab where

they are in absolute majority over all other elements and in parts of Bengal and Assam where they are in absolute majority, desire to live in separation from the rest of India.

Differing from you on the general basis, I can yet recommend to the Congress the acceptance of the claim for separation contained in the Muslim League resolution of Lahore of 1940, on my basis and on the following terms:

*These areas should be demarcated by a Commission approved by the Congress and the League, The wishes of the inhabitants of these areas demarcated should be ascertained through the votes of the adult population of the areas or through some equivalent method.*

*If the vote is in favor of the separation it shall be agreed that these areas shall form a separate state as soon as possible after India is free from foreign domination and can therefore be constituted into sovereign independent states.*

...Immediately on the acceptance of this agreement by the Congress and the League the two shall decide upon a common course of action for or the attainment of independence of India.

The League will however be free to remain out of any direct action to which the Congress may regard and in which the League may not be willing to participate.

*If you do not agree to these terms, could you let me know in precise terms what you would have me to accept in terms of the Lahore resolution and bind myself to recommend to the Congress? If you could kindly do this, I shall be able to see, apart from the difference in approach,*

what definite terms I can agree to. In your letter of September 23, you refer to the “basic and fundamental principles embodied in the Lahore resolution” and ask me to accept them. Surely this is unnecessary when, as I feel, I have accepted the concrete consequence that should follow from such acceptance<sup>27</sup>.

Yours sincerely,  
M. K. Gandhi

September 25, 1944.

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

You do not accept that the Mussalmans of India are a nation.

You do not accept that the Mussalmans have an inherent right of self-determination.

You do not accept that they alone are entitled to exercise this right of self-determination.

You do not accept that Pakistan is composed of two zones, North-West and North- East, comprising six provinces, the Punjab, Bengal, and Assam, subject to territorial adjustment that may be agreed upon, as indicated in the Lahore resolution. The matter of demarcating and defining the territories can be accepted, and for that purpose machinery may be set up by agreement.

...I have already clearly explained to you that the August resolution so long as it stands, is a bar, for it is fundamentally opposed to the Lahore resolution...I am not at present concerned with the British, but the August resolution, as I have already stated, is against the ideal and

demands of the Muslim League.

Now let me take your main terms:

- (a) “I proceed on the assumption that India is not to be regarded as two or more nations but as one family consisting of many members of whom the Muslims living in the north-western zones, i. e. Baluchistan, Sind, North West frontier province and that part of the Punjab where they are in absolute majority over all other elements and in parts of Bengal and Assam where they are in absolute majority, desire to live in separation from the rest of India”. *If this term were accepted and given effect to, the present boundaries of these provinces would be maimed and mutilated beyond redemption and leave us only with the husk, and it is opposed to the Lahore resolution.*
- (b) *That even in those mutilated areas so defined; the right of self-determination will not be exercised by the Muslims but by the inhabitants of those areas so demarcated. This is opposed to the fundamentals of the Lahore resolution.*
- (c) *That if the vote is in favor of separation they shall be allowed to “form a separate state as soon as possible after India is free from foreign domination”. Whereas we propose that we should come to a complete settlement of our own immediately...do every thing in our power to secure the freedom and independence of the peoples of India on the basis of Pakistan and Hindustan.*
- (d) ...as regards the safeguarding the rights of

minorities, I have already explained that this question of safeguarding the minorities is fully stated in the Lahore resolution.

...Why not then accept the fundamentals of the Lahore resolution and proceed to settle the details?<sup>28</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. Jinnah

September 25, 1944.

Dear Quaid-i-Azam,

...I would like to think fifty times before throwing away an offer which has been made entirely in the spirit of service in the cause of communal harmony. Do not take, I pray, the responsibility of rejecting the offer. Throw it in the Council. Give me an opportunity of addressing them. If they feel like rejecting it, I would like you to advise the council to put it before the open session of the League. If you will accept my advice and permit me I would attend the open session and address it.<sup>29</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
M.K. Gandhi

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

...Let me inform you that only a member or a delegate is entitled to participate in the deliberations of the meetings of the Council or in the open session, respectively. Besides it is a most extraordinary and unprecedented suggestion to make. However, I thank you for your advice.



...However, I regret I have failed to convince you and convert you as I was hopeful of doing so<sup>30</sup>.

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. Jinnah,

September 26, 1944.

Dear Quaid-i-Azam,

...you keep on saying that I should accept certain theses which you call the basis and fundamental principles of the Lahore resolution, while I have been contending that the best way for us who differ in our approach to the problem is to give body to the demand as it stands in the Lahore resolution and work it out to our mutual satisfaction. It is on this plan that I understand Rajaji's formula to be conceived, and it is on the same plan that I have tried to work it out in the course of, and as a result of, our talks. I contend that either gives you the substance of the Lahore resolution. *Unfortunately you reject both. And I cannot accept the Lahore resolution as you want me to, especially when you seek to introduce into its interpretation theories and claims which I cannot accept and which I cannot ever hope to induce India to accept.*

Your constant references to my not being clothed with representative authority are really irrelevant. I have approached you so that, if you and I can agree upon a common course of action, I may use what influence I possess for its acceptance by the Congress and the country. *If you break, it cannot be because I have been unwilling to give you satisfaction in regard to the claim embodied in the Lahore resolution.*<sup>31</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
M. K. Gandhi.

New Delhi  
13<sup>th</sup> June, 1947.

Dear Quaid-i-Azam,

His Excellency the Viceroy writes saying that “you will accept my suggestion and put the case of Pakistan to the leaders and the people there, provided I can obtain an undertaking from the Congress that they will not interfere”.

I do not know what you mean by the undertaking from the Congress they will not interfere.<sup>32</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
M. K. Gandhi.

New Delhi  
13<sup>th</sup> June, 1947.

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I am in receipt of your letter of 13<sup>th</sup> June and I thought it was quite clear *what I meant that the Congress should undertake that they will not interfere with the people of the Frontier in any way whatsoever.*<sup>33</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. Jinnah.

Wardha, February 4, 1938

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

...I might mention some relatively minor matters which have apparently led to misapprehension. In one of your speeches you referred to being told by some one that a cheque for rupees five lakhs was recently given to the Congress. I am not aware of this and presumably I ought to know. Indeed, to my knowledge, no one has given even a cheque for Rs. 5,000 to the Congress for a considerable time.

In the same, or possibly another, speech you referred to the non-cooperation days and stated that while the Aligarh University was forced to close down and many non-cooperated from it, not a single student non-cooperated from the Benares University. As a matter of fact a very large number of students did in fact non-cooperated from the Benares University. As a result of this a non-official university, the Kashi Vidyapitha, was established in Benares, as also the Gandhi Ashram. Both of these still exist. In the same way the Jamia Millia came into existence in Aligarh and this now flourishes in Delhi.

You have referred in your speeches to the Congress imposing Hindi-Hindustani and trying to crush Urdu. I presume you were misinformed for I am not aware of any attempt on the part of the Congress to injure Urdu. Some time back I wrote an essay on "*The Question of language*", which represents, I believe, the Congress view point. It was approved by Mr. Gandhi and by many people unconnected with the Congress in the advancement of Urdu, including Maulvi Abdul Haq, the Secretary, and Anjuman-e-Taraqqi-e-Urdu of Hyderabad. I do not know if you have come across this essay. In any event I am asking my office in Allahabad to send you a copy if you disagree with the argument or conclusion of this essay, I shall be grateful to have your criticism.

I might mention that the Congress Ministry in Madras is endeavoring to introduce the study of Hindustani in the state schools in the province. They are having primers and text-books prepared especially for the purpose by the Jamia Millia. These primers, etc., are to be in two scripts—Devnagri and Urdu—but in identical language the students having the option of script.

*I mention these instances to show how misapprehensions arise. But the real questions at the issue are more important and it in regard to these that clarification is necessary. I presume you are acquainted with the Congress resolutions and statements on the minority and fundamental rights and regarding communal questions. If you so wish it, I can have these sent to you.*

...The Congress policy as laid down in these resolutions may be incomplete or wrong. If so we shall gladly consider suggestions to complete it or rectify it. Personally I do not see what more can be done by the Congress regarding religious or cultural matters. As for political (communal) questions, the Communal Award, unsatisfactory as it is, holds the field for the present and till such time as it may be altered by mutual agreement of the parties concerned.

*...I was very glad to find from Nawab Ismail Khan and Chowdhury Khaliqzaman that the U.P. Muslim League or the U.P. Muslim League Parliamentary Board accepted this programme. This included our objective of independence, our demand for a constituent assembly, our general attitude to the Constitution act and the Federation, and our methods of work inside and outside the legislature...Thus there appeared to be a very large measure of agreement between us not only in regard to fundamentals, but even regarding many details.*

...It is true that in reading your speeches I have come across various statements to the effect that the Congress is trying to establish Hindu Raj. I am unaware of how this is being done or who is doing it. If any Congress Ministries or the congress organisation have made mistakes these should be pointed out to us.

A report of your Calcutta speech appeared in the newspapers ...in this you state that you are fighting the Congress, that you are fighting the Congress leadership which is misleading Hindus. Further you have said that you want to bring the Congress High command to its senses. May I suggest that those who are privileged to advise or lead the Congress have no desire to fight any body except British Imperialism? In any event, if we mislead or misbehave we have a right to enquire from our critics where and how we have done so.

Further in your Calcutta speech you have said that: "I have long, long ago, months ago now, thrown out a challenge to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and I throw out a challenge to let him come and sit with us and let us formulate a constructive programme which will give immediate relief to the poor". I do not remember on which previous occasion you had issued a similar challenge to me.

It is always helpful to discuss matters and problems face to face and, as I have said previously, we are always glad to do so...correspondence helps in this process and sometimes is even preferable as it is more precise than talk. I trust therefore that you will help in clarifying the position by telling us where we differ and how you would like difference to end. *You have criticized the Congress in vigorous language, as you were no doubt entitled to do. But are we not entitled to ask you to substantiate those*

*criticisms in private at least, if not in public?*<sup>34</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

New Delhi, February 17, 1938..

Dear Pandit Jawaharlal,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 4<sup>th</sup> February.

You have now flung at me more complaints and grievances of trifling character. Evidently you rely on the section of the press which is bent on misrepresenting and vilifying me, but I am glad that you say I mention these instances to show how misapprehension arises ‘but the real question at issue is more important and it is in regard to this that clarification is necessary’. Therefore I don’t think any useful purpose will be served to carry on correspondence with regard to the various matters mentioned in your letter. *You will please not introduce matters which you may have discussed with Nawab Ismail Khan and Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman or anybody else.* These will lead to references and cross references and the matter will never end.

As regards my Calcutta speech, the word “challenge” is obviously due to the imagination of the reporter for the very context shows that it was an invitation. However, the discussion of all these matters in correspondence will lead us nowhere. I do not believe in the doctrine which you lay down “but are we not entitled to ask you to substantiate all these criticisms in private at least, if not in public?” I for my part make no such distinction. I am prepared to substantiate anything that I have said publically, provided it is correctly reported. The

crux of your letter in the real vital point of the Hindu-Muslim unity is a repetition of what you said in your previous letter, namely, that you want me to note down “the point of difference” and discuss them through and by any means of correspondence—a method, which I made it clear in my last letter, is highly undesirable and most inappropriate. I welcome your suggestions when you say: whenever necessity arises every one of us would willingly welcome a talk”. If you think that necessity has arisen and any one of you is willing, I shall be glad to see you and equally welcome a talk. The thing is that you prefer talking at each other whereas I prefer talking to each other. Surely you know and you ought to know what are the fundamental points in dispute.

I have received a letter from Mr. Gandhi and I have replied to him, a copy of which I am enclosing herewith<sup>35</sup>.

Yours sincerely,  
M.A.JINNAH

Bombay, February 25, 1938.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

...I had no intention of flinging any complaints and grievances at you. In my attempt to find out what your complaints were I read your speeches as reported in the newspaper (usually reported through a news agency) and note down some of the points on which you had laid stress. *I am glad to know that you have been misreported but you have not pointed out where the misrepresentation comes in nor, so far as I know, have issued any statement to the press correcting the misrepresentation. May I suggest that it will be worth while to correct these errors so that the public might not be misled? A clear and authoritative*

*statement from you will help us also in understanding what you stand for and what you object to.*

*I note that you do not wish me to introduce in our correspondence any matters which we may have discussed with Nawab Ismail Kahn or Chowdhury Khaliqzaman. I did not know that they represented any different view-point from yours. I thought it necessary to draw your attention to the repeated attempts I have been making to find out what the political and communal policy of the Muslim League is and wherein it differs from that of the Congress.*

*...If you have made no criticisms of the Congress, and the press reports are entirely wrong, then of course no question of substantiation arises. All that need be done is to contradict the press reports. But if criticisms have been made, as presumably they have been made, then I would request you to justify them publicly or privately as you might choose. Personally I would prefer the former method.*

...when we meet what are we to discuss? Responsible people with organizations behind them can hardly discuss anything in the air. Some clarification of the issue, some clear statement of what is wanted is and what is objected to, is always desirable otherwise we may not come to grips with the subject...there is surely nothing undesirable or inappropriate about this defining of issues by correspondence. It is the usual method adopted between individuals and organizations. May I beg of you to enlighten me?<sup>36</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru



New Delhi, 3<sup>rd</sup> March, 1938.

Dear Pandit Jawaharlal,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 25<sup>th</sup> February. *I regret to find the same spirit running through of making insinuations and innuendoes and raising all sorts of matters of trifling character which are not germane to our present subject* with which you started, namely, how to find the basis of approach to the most vital and prominent question of Hindu-Muslim unity. You wind up your letter by insisting upon the course that I should formulate the points in dispute and submit to you for your consideration and then carry on my correspondence with you. This method, I have already stated in my considered opinion, is undesirable and inappropriate. The method you insist upon may be appropriate between two litigants and that is followed by solicitors on behalf of their clients, but national issues cannot be settled like that.

When you say “that I am afraid I must confess that I do not know what fundamental points in dispute are” I am only amazed at your ignorance. This matter has been tackled since 1925 right up to 1935 by the most prominent leaders in the country and so far no solution has been found. I would beg of you to study it and do not take up a self-complacent attitude and if you are in earnest *I don't think you will find much difficulty in realizing what the main points in dispute are, because they have been constantly mentioned both in the press and public platforms even very recently.*<sup>37</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
M. A. Jinnah.

Allahabad, March 8, 1938.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

...I have carefully followed press statements and your public speeches. In my effort to discover these points of dispute I enumerated some of the criticisms which you were reported to have made in public speeches. *In your reply you stated that you were misrepresented, but you did not say what the correct report should have been. Further you said that these were minor and trifling matters, but again you did not point out what the major matters were...* But what are these matters which are germane? It may be that I am dense or not sufficiently acquainted with the intricacies of the problem. If so I deserve to be enlightened. It is not my desire, may I repeat, to carry on controversy by correspondence, but only to find out what the main points of discussion and dispute are...my mind demands clarity before it can function effectively or think in terms of any action. *Vagueness or an avoidance of real issues cannot lead to satisfactory results. It does seem strange to me that in spite of my repeated requests I am not told what issues have to be discussed.*<sup>38</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

New Delhi, 17<sup>th</sup> March 1938.

Dear Pandit Jawaharlal,

...you in your reply of the 4<sup>th</sup> February formulated a catalogue of grievances with regard to my supposed criticism of the Congress and the utterances which are hardly relevant to the question for our immediate consideration. You went on persisting on the same line and you are still of the opinion that those matters, although not germane to the present subject, should be further discussed,

which I neither do nor propose to do as I have already explained to you in my previous letter.

The question, with which we started, as I understood, is of safeguarding the rights and the interests of the Mussalmans with regard to their religion, culture, language, personal laws and their political rights in the national life of the country. Various suggestions have been made which will satisfy the Mussalmans and create a sense of security and confidence in the majority community...

Yours sincerely,

M. A. Jinnah

Excerpts of the article Jinnah attached with letter to Nehru.

## **THROUGH THE MUSLIM EYES**

By Ain-e-Mulk (12 February, 1938)

...any acceptable formula or pact that may be evolved by the leaders of the Congress and the League, one may guess, involve the acquiescence of the Congress in *separate electorates (at least for a certain period), coalition ministries, recognition of the League as the one authoritative and representative organisation of Indian Moslems, modification of its attitude on the question of Hindi and its script, scraping of Bande Mataram altogether, and possibly a redesigning of the tri-colour flag or At least agreeing to give the flag of the League an equal importance...*

...The only thing for the Moslems to do in the circumstances is to wait and hope for the best, without relaxing their efforts to add daily to the strength of the League, for it will not to forget that it is the growing power and the representative character of the Muslim league which has compelled Congress leaders to recognize the necessity for an understanding with the Moslem

community.<sup>39</sup>

Calcutta, April 6, 1939

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

*...I have found, chiefly in the Urdu press, the most astounding falsehoods about the Congress. I refer to facts, not to opinions, and to facts within my knowledge. Two days ago here in Calcutta, I saw a circular letter or a notice issued by a secretary of Muslim League. This contained a list of the so-called misdeeds of the U.P. Government. I read this with amazement for there was not an item of truth in the most of the charges. I suppose they were garnered from the Urdu press. Through the press and the platform such charges have been repeated on numerous occasions and communal passions have thus been roused and bitterness created. This has grieved me and I have sought by writing to you and to Nawab Ismail Khan to find a way of checking this deplorable deterioration of our public life, as well as a surer basis for co-operation. That problem still faces us and we hope we shall solve it<sup>40</sup>.*

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

Bombay, April 12, 1938

Dear Pandit Jawaharlal,

*...I have publicly stated so often, that unless the Congress recognizes the Muslim League on a footing of complete equality and is prepared as such to negotiate for a Hindu-Muslim settlement, we shall have to wait and depend upon our inherent strength which will “determine the measure of importance or distinction it posses”, Having*

*regard to your mentality it is really difficult for me to make you understand the position any further.*

...with regard to your reference to certain falsehoods that have papered about the Congress in the Urdu press, which, you say, have astounded you, and with regard to the circular letter referred to about the misdeeds of the U.P. Government, I can express no opinion without investigation, but I can give you number of falsehoods that have appeared in the Congress press and in statements of Congressmen with regard to the All-India Muslim League, some of the leaders and those who are connected with it.<sup>41</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
M.A. Jinnah

Allahabad, April 16, 1938.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

...Our viewpoints might differ, but I do believe that the margin of difference can be lessened by frank approach on either side. I have sought to make this approach in all sincerity and with every desire on my part not to say anything that might come in the way.

...You point out to me that the Congress press has contained numerous falsehoods in regard to the Muslim League and some of its leaders...I entirely agree with you that falsehoods, misrepresentations and insinuations are to be deprecated and countered whenever they might occur, in the Urdu, Hindi, of English press, or whatever the political complexion of the news paper. There is no such thing as the Congress press over which the Congress has control, but it is true that many newspapers generally support the Congress. But whether we can influence them or not, we certainly want to stop all such false and misleading

statements and to express our disapproval of them. *In this matter I can only beg to you to point out specific instances that we might take necessary action.*<sup>42</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

Allahabad, December 9, 1939.

My dear Jinnah,

Two days ago sent you a letter informing you that I intended to going to Bombay soon and hoped to meet you there. Yesterday morning I read in the newspapers of your statement fixing December 22 as a day of deliverance and thanksgiving as a mark of relief that the Congress Governments have at least ceased to function. I have read this statement very carefully more than once and have given twenty-four hours thought to the matter. It is not for me, in this matter, to enter into any controversy about facts or impressions or conclusions. You know my views about these, formed, I hope, in all earnestness and with all desire to find the truth. It may be that I am mistaken, but I have sought more light and that light has not come.

But what has oppressed me terribly since yesterday is the realization that our sense of values and objectives in life and politics differ so very greatly. I had hoped, after our conversation that this was not so great, but now the gulf appears to be wider than ever. Under these circumstances, I wonder what purpose will be served by our discussing with each other the problems that confront us. There must be some common ground for discussion, some common objective aimed at, I owe it to you as well as to myself to put this difficulty before you.<sup>43</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

Bombay, 13<sup>th</sup> December 1939.

Dear Jawaharlal,

...I quite agree you that “there must be a common ground for discussion, some common objective aimed at for that discussion to yield fruit”; that is the very reason why I made it clear in our conversation in Delhi in October last to Mr. Gandhi and yourself. First, *that so long as the Congress in not prepared to treat the Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Mussalmans of India, it was not possible to carry on talks regarding the Hindu-Muslim settlement as that was the basis laid down by the All-India Muslim League, and second, that we cannot endorse the Congress demand for the declaration as laid down in the resolution of the Working Committee confirmed by the All-India Congress committee of 10<sup>th</sup> October 1939*, apart from the nebulous and impracticable character of it, till we reach an agreement with regard to the minority problem.

...in my judgment the whole working of the constitution and our charges against the Congress government must be thoroughly examined by a Royal Commission.<sup>44</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
M.A. Jinnah.

Charmichael Road,  
Bombay, December 14, 1939

My dear Jinnah,

...I sent you my last letter from Allahabad after reading and giving full thought to your statement about the celebration of a “day of deliverance and thanks-giving” by the Muslims. This statement had distressed me greatly as it made me realize that the gulf that separated us in our approach to public problems was very great.

...In your letter you have emphasized *two other preliminary conditions before any common ground for discussion can arise. The first is that the Congress must treat the Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Mussalmans of India.* The Congress has always considered the League as a very important and influential organisation of the Muslims and it is because of this that we have been eager to settle any differences that may exist between us. But presumably what you suggest is something more and involves some kind of repudiation by us or dissociation from other Muslims who are not in the League, who have been and are our closest colleagues. There are, as you know, a large number of Muslims in the Congress...There are Muslim organizations like the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, the All-India Shia Conference, the Majlis-e-Ahrar, the All-India Momin Conference, etc., apart from trade unions and peasant unions which have many Muslims as their members. As a general rule, many of these organizations and individuals have adopted the same political platform as we have done in the Congress. We cannot possibly dissociate ourselves from them or disown them in any way.

*You have rightly pointed out on many occasions that the Congress does not represent every body in India. Of course not. It does represent those who disagree with it, whether they are Muslims or Hindus. In the ultimate analysis it represents its members and sympathizers. So also the Muslim League, as any other organisation, represents its own members and sympathizers.* But there is



this vital difference that while the Congress constitutionally has its membership open to all who subscribe to its objectives and methods, the Muslim League is only open to Muslims. Thus the Congress constitutionally has a national basis and it cannot give that up without putting an end to its own existence. There are many Hindus, as you know, in the Hindu Mahasabha who oppose the idea of the Congress representing the Hindus as such. Then there are the Sikhs and others who claim that they should be heard when communal matters are considered.

*I am afraid therefore that if your desire is that we should consider the League as the sole organisation representing the Muslims to the exclusion of all others, we are wholly unable to accede to it. It would be equally at variance with facts if we made a similar claim for the Congress. But I would venture to say that such questions do not arise when two organizations deal with each other and consider problems of mutual interest.*

*Your second point is that the Muslim League cannot endorse the Congress demand for a declaration from the British government. I regret to learn this for this means that, apart from communal questions, we differ entirely on the political grounds. The Congress demand is essentially for a declaration of war aims and more especially for a declaration of Indian independence and the right of the Indian people to frame their own constitution without external interference. If the Muslim League does not agree to this, this means that our political objectives dissimilar are wholly.*

*...What led me to write my last letter to you also remains the prospect of a celebration of a day of deliverance by the Muslims as suggested by you. That rises very vital and far-reaching issues, in which, I need not go now, but which must influence all of us. That approach to the communal problem cannot be reconciled with an*

*attempt to solve it.*

...It has been our misfortune that charges are made in one-sided way and they are never inquired into or disposed of. *You will appreciate that it is very easy to make complaints and very unsafe to rely upon them without enquiry*<sup>45</sup>.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal. Nehru

Bombay, December 15, 1939.

Dear Jawaharlal,

...This resolution of the Congress cannot be modified in any way and...as you make it clear that *you are wholly unable to treat the Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Mussalmans of India, may I know in these circumstances what do you expect or wish me to do.*<sup>46</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
M.A. Jinnah



**III**

**No**  
**Comments!**



## **FOREWORD**

India of modern conception with its so-called present geographical unity is entirely the creation of the British who hold it as one administrative unit by a system of bureaucratic government whose ultimate sanction is the sword and not the will or the sanction of the people or the government so established. This position is very much exploited by the Hindu Congress and another Hindu organisation, the Hindu Mahasabha. India is a vast sub-continent. It is neither a country nor a nation. It is composed of nationalities and races, but the two major nations are the Muslims and the Hindus. Talk of Indian unity as one constitutional government of this vast sub-continent is simply a myth.

...fortunately the Muslim homelands are in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of the sub-continent where they are in a solid majority with a population of nearly 70 millions and they desire that these parts should be separated from the rest of India and constituted into independent sovereign states....Hindu machinations and all proposals and schemes suggested by them are intended to and calculated to bring a hundred million Muslims under the subjugation and hegemony of the Hindu Raj.

...The present books are a collection of articles which had appeared in different newspapers and had thrown a great deal of light on the demand of Muslim India. And hence I agreed to their being collected and published in the form of two books as they explain the Muslim position regarding many current political issues which have

been agitating the Muslim mind. The author Mr. M.R.T. has given his consent that these books should be issued on behalf of the Home Study Circle. He has marshaled facts and figures which are very valuable and he has done a great service already by periodically publishing them in various newspapers. In the first book, entitled Pakistan and Muslim India, he has placed in a very impartial way the exposition of many factors which clearly demonstrate that the only solution of India's constitutional problem is by means of partition of India and by accepting the fundamental principles of Pakistan scheme, laid down in the Lahore resolution of the All India Muslim League, passed in March, 1940.

The second book entitled Nationalism in Conflict in India...will show that India is not a national state, that India is not a country but a sub-continent composed of nationalities, the two major nations being the Hindus and the Muslims whose culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, name and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, laws and jurisprudence, social and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions, outlook on life and of life are fundamentally different, nay in many respects antagonistic.

...I have undertaken to write this foreword in order to commend these two books to all readers who want to understand the problem of India's future constitution and its solution and I feel confident that anyone who reads them dispassionately and with an open mind will find by the sheer facts and figures and historical and political arguments advanced that partition of India is in the interest of both the major nations, Hindus and Muslims<sup>1</sup>.

24<sup>th</sup> December, 1942

10, aurangzeb Road

The author, Mr. M.K.T has thanked M. A. Jinnah, “I shall be failing in my duty if I do not acknowledge help from friends in the work entrusted to me by the Quaid-i-Azam”<sup>2</sup>

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If one reads the last lines of ‘Foreword’ carefully, one must find that there is a qualification attached with the reader’s mind-that if the reader is dispassionate and open-minded, he will be swayed by the “the sheer facts and figures and historical and political arguments”. What if the reader does not get convinced? It follows from the qualification attached that his/her mind is not open to “the sheer facts and figures and historical and political arguments”, and his/her reading of these books is anything but dispassionate. Can one read things with such qualifications attached? Why has M.A. Jinnah sought to disarm the reader even before he/she has read the books? This is an ideological, and for that reason, an epistemological, question. One daily comes across such words “open minded”, “dispassionate”, “rational” “enlightened”, “civil”, humane”, “logical” etc.-all carry socially approved connotations and signify socially accepted way of living or that of thinking. This gets more baffling when an ignoramus like me, ventures to ask: socially approved by and socially accepted to whom? The things are getting cloudy; “we” seem to digress! “We” are so ignorant that “we” do not even know what everyone else knows, for these are the words everybody presumes he knows and accepts. Hence nobody tries to dig deeper and ascertain as to what is the ideological content of these words. This is how ideology works as ‘inverted’ social



consciousness.

I remember reading Karl Popper's "The Open society and Its Enemies", Not only the content of the book but the title itself is ideologically loaded. Popper assumes that the society he is trying to defend is "open", and those who stand against this "open" society are, to be sure, on the rack, dead bent on creating an "unoppen" society because the "openness" of Herr Popper's society is a given and not to be disputed with.. How is the reader to proceed with such sort of qualified contents? And a more basic question, how many of the readers know that a given is always constructed and there is no given as such? Every fact (given) has a history and that history is the key to understanding of the fact.

The reader does not live in a vacuum, nor does his mind. He and his mind are not a given but a construct (not a mere fact but a fact with a history). Before I can compare my idea of a thing with the thing, I must also be aware of the thing, i.e. must transform it into an idea<sup>3</sup>.

This book (in fact two books published in one volume) is not only important for the fact that Jinnah had the book compiled and published, but what makes the book more important is the fact that this book was recommended to Gandhi for understanding the so-called two-nations theory by none other than Jinnah himself in one of his letters to Gandhi. This letter has been included in our book.

Lets us drop the qualification Jinnah had attached, and proceed even at the risk of not being "open minded and dispassionate".

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### **Federation or Separation**<sup>4</sup>

The most important political question before a Muslim is whether his interests can best be served by an assurance of “full protection of his religion, culture and language” on the part of the Congress, or a complete separation and independence of those parts of India where Muslims form a majority...it is needless for me to remind here that Hindus and Muslims do not represent mere religious majorities and minorities, they are also politically, economically and socially divided.

...He [common Muslim] still believes that if Islam had been the dominant religion in Europe, the world would not have seen the rise of a narrow and aggressive form of nationalism which has dragged the whole world into a state of chaos and disorder<sup>5</sup>

...The Muslim middle class in cities has no choice left except to work as laborers and to seek petty jobs in government service. The Hindu middle class is prosperous and flourishing and controls all the internal and external trade of the country...Another danger to which Muslim are exposed is the peaceful penetration of the Hindu shopkeeper in purely Muslim areas. The Hindu has no landed interest in the western Punjab, the Frontier and Sindh, and yet he forms a majority in all the towns and dominates the entire public life<sup>6</sup>...The interests of the Muslim peasant as well as of the Muslim middle class man in the city directly clash with those of the Hindu money-lender and shopkeeper.<sup>7</sup>

...Protection of religion, language and culture is out of question where a minority can easily be converted into a permanent majority by a readjustment of geographical frontiers.

Undoubtedly, the Muslims in Hindu-majority provinces are a real minority and have no other alternative but to accept Congress assurances of goodwill for their future but they are not bound by any such consideration to leave their ultimate political and economic interests in provinces where they are a majority, to the mercy of a hostile Hindu majority at the centre

...Now it is a simple conclusion that if the Muslim provinces remain part of a future Indian National State, they will undoubtedly enjoy a limited kind of provincial autonomy, but the final voice in the army, navy air force and other important subjects will be held by a Central Cabinet responsible to a Central Legislature which will be dominated by a Hindu majority<sup>9</sup>.

...Both in the North-West and North-East, with adjustments in frontiers the proportion of the Muslim population will be raised to 80 % and the minorities will be reduced to 20 %. These minorities will be given full protection in regard to their religion, language and culture like the Muslim minorities in Hindu India, and will no longer cause unnecessary annoyance to Muslim governments for fear of provoking Muslim minorities in Hindu India to similar action<sup>10</sup>.

...The Muslims have become conscious of the facts that they form a separate nation by themselves and that they cannot lose their identity under any circumstances to merge into the so-called “nationalism” which is not only opposed to the best interest of Islam but is also foreign to the conception of Hindu religion and society, based on caste and exclusive social customs<sup>11</sup>

...The Muslims have learnt from past experience that the Congress has done nothing so far to win Muslim

goodwill and has been secretly laying plans to disrupt Muslim solidarity and to crush political awakening among them. The adoption of Gandhian philosophy as a political creed by the Congress and its immediate results such as Non-violence, Wardha Scheme of education, Harijan upliftment, promotion of Hindi language, Muslim mass contact campaign etc. have convinced the Muslims that the Congress is aiming a death blow at Muslim political thought and is working for the regeneration of the old Hindu civilization and culture<sup>12</sup>.

...The people of Pakistan differ from the rest of India in religion, race and language, and possess all the necessary essentials which go to form a nation. Among themselves, the Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs have more in common than they have with the people living in rest of India. In religion, the Sikhs and the Arya Samajists have more identical views on the unity of God and belief in a revealed religion than with the Hindus elsewhere. By race, the people belong to the same Aryan stock while Urdu with its Persian script is treated as court language through this area. Untouchability, the caste system, music before the mosque and cow protection do not present such difficult problem as in the rest of India...The Muslims and Sikhs will be quite helpless minorities in bigger India where their interests will not be properly safeguarded at the centre on account of the preponderance of Hindu influence. In Pakistan, however, there will be no danger that the Muslims or Sikhs will lose their culture as they have lived together for centuries and understand each other's viewpoints<sup>13</sup>

...without Karachi, Pakistan will not be able to maintain its economic independence...by remaining a part of India, Pakistan will be at the mercy of the factory owners of Bombay, Ahmadabad and Cawnpore who will influence

the Indian Government to adopt a policy of protection, which will necessitate the imposition of heavy taxes upon imports<sup>14</sup>.

...Pakistan is the home of the martial races who can defend their liberties against any foreign aggression. In no other part of India, military traditions play such important part in giving the people a sense of pride and superiority in their physical strength and in developing their martial spirit<sup>15</sup>.

...The main idea underlying this formula (i.e. Lahore resolution) was that a minority which occupies a compact part of territory with well-defined limits, and can be converted into a real and effective majority by a reasonable adjustment of geographical frontiers, should be conceded the right of an independent national state.<sup>16</sup>

...The Muslims, they (i.e. the Congress) profess, will be provided with safeguards for the protection of their religion, language and culture, but for all political and economic questions, they will be considered as part and parcel of the Indian nation, hence will not be entitled to claim special representation.

The Muslims and Sikhs of the North-West will lose their present privileged position in the army. They supply at present more than 59 % of the recruits to the Indian Army, but under the Congress scheme of India, their quota will be fixed at 1/10<sup>th</sup> of the whole or less.<sup>17</sup>

### CONFEDERATION IS IMPOSSIBLE

There is general consent in all quarters in India on the need to a territorial redistribution of provinces. The

Congress favours the scheme on a linguistic basis, the League on the religious and cultural basis. In practice there is not much difference between the Congress and the League schemes of redistribution except in regard to the Punjab and Bengal...The All-India Muslim League more truly...sticks to its Lahore resolution...laying down 'that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial adjustments as may be necessary'...Some, however, suggest a confederation of autonomous zones or provinces, voluntarily agreed upon by the participating units on a basis of equality of status...A federal government at the centre responsible to an elected legislature has been unequivocally rejected by the Muslim League and even saner elements among non-party Hindus have begun to see the force of the Muslim viewpoint<sup>18</sup>

...proposals more or less of a similar nature have been made in India by Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, the Punjab Premier...The Punjab Premier in reply to a question in the assembly to clarify his position in regard to Pakistan scheme admitted that he was responsible for the original draft of the Lahore Resolution... but he did not agree with the amended form which demanded complete separation for Muslim zones.<sup>19</sup>

... Muslims will not accept any constitution which is imposed upon them against their will. The advantages of a strong or a weak centre do not appeal to them. The areas in which they form a numerical majority are well marked regions and have nothing to gain by their confederation with the Hindu centre.<sup>20</sup>

...The Pakistan scheme does not involve any large scale transfer of population nor it substantially disturb the present administrative units of India...The question of

minorities that will still remain unaffected by the adoption of Pakistan scheme will be determined on a reciprocal basis. In the proposed Muslim states with a total population of 80 millions, non-Muslim minorities will number 20 millions while in India the Muslims will form 25 millions out of a total population of 260 millions. The present conflict between the congress and the league which has strained the of the two communities will come to an end, and all the political differences will be finally reconciled. The two peoples will settle down to a life of peace and prosperity, absorbed in the pursuit of their own activities in their respective national states.<sup>21</sup>

...In Ireland, the British maintained the political unity of the island for centuries under their rule but when the popular demand for independence made its influence felt, the island was divided in two separate states merely on grounds of differences in history and religion. The Protestant Irish though a minority of 29 % did not agree to accept the unity of their common motherland...The same principle was at work in Palestine which has so far been deprived of responsible government on account of religious differences. The Jewish minority does not wish to live under the rule of Muslim Arabs. Thus if small peoples like the Protestant Irish ...and the Jews in Palestine do not wish to live or wish to lose their separate political identity, and are supported in their desire for separate existence by two of the foremost democratic nations, there is no reason why Indian Muslims should be forced to accept the position of a minority.<sup>22</sup>

...the Sikhs are minority in the Punjab, numbering 3 million, and can only be assured of protection of religion, language and culture like minorities in European countries. If they are conceded the status of an independent nation, the Muslims in Hindu Provinces like U.P. where they are

double the number of the Sikhs, in Bihar and Assam where they exceed Sikhs and in Madras and Bombay where they are slightly lower in population than the Sikhs in the Punjab, will also have to be conceded the status of independent nations.<sup>23</sup>

The Punjab can play no important part in a United India where its interests will be inadequately defended at the centre and where it will lose its present position as an independent economic unit. The creation of a bigger Punjab with natural expansions the North-West and South, so as to include Kashmir, the Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan, is in reality the regeneration of the old historical kingdom which the Sikhs tried to keep united in their time of glory and which now will be supported by the combined might of Muslims and Sikhs. A true Punjabi should always try to place the interest of his country first and should never agree to see his country fall from its real position. The Punjab as a dominant partner in a federation of the North-West will be the master of its own house and will exert her full force at the centre.

It will have a commanding voice in determining the problems that will affect its own future and will control the army, the navy, the air and other defense services in proportion to its population. Can it be expected in case of a united India, that the Punjab will play the dominant part? Already the present monopoly of the Punjab in the army has been challenged and time is not far when the Sikh and Muslim elements in the army will be reduced to insignificance. Similarly the economic interest of the Punjab is bound to come into conflict with Hindu India. The Punjab's future lies in the pursuit of an economic policy which will pay due regard to the interest of its agricultural population composed mainly of Muslims and Sikhs and also encourage industry and trade so as to



prevent these from becoming the sole monopoly of a single class i.e. the Hindu Bania. The country (i.e. the Punjab) will be loser all round and will be at the mercy of the capitalists of Hindu India if it accepts a system of government at the centre where its voice will be comparatively ineffective...Whatever Punjab wants from the west, it can get through Karachi. Its exports have a natural outlet in the southwest. It is in fact a complete well-defined geographical unit raising no administrative difficulties on its separation from the rest of India.<sup>24</sup>

...Dr. Moonji, a prominent Mahasabha leader, defined in a speech at Bezwada on December 24, 1910, the objects of Hindu nationalism in these words. "The nationalism hitherto preached by the National Congress is hybrid and unscientific and the Hindu Mahasabha holds before the Hindu nation the prospect of the Hindu nationalism, Hindu rule and Hindu Kingdom. To achieve this, the Hindu Mahasabha rightly believes that violence is the effective weapon." The Congress Scheme also presupposes a united India, but it differs from the Mahasabha Scheme in its approach to the minority problem. Whereas the Mahasabha admits that Hindus and Muslims are separate nations and that Hindus being in a majority in India are alone entitled to possess the rights of a sovereign nation, the Congress ignores that there is any minority in India in the political sense and openly asserts that Hindus and Muslims, being members of a common Indian nation, must work together for a federal government at the centre which will control such important matters as defense, communications, foreign affairs, customs, currency, etc.<sup>25</sup>

The League resolution reduces the Muslim minority of 90 millions to less than 30 millions by assigning to the rest separate homelands where it will be master of its own

house...Is this not a tremendous gain for Hindu India? The stability and peace of India can only be best assured if the discontent parts are separated from it. India is too big to suffer any appreciable material loss by the separation of one fourth of its total area and population. Thus it is apparent that the League resolution does not aggravate the minority problem rather it removes the sting from it and reduces it to the narrowest possible limits.<sup>26</sup>

...The Muslim minority of Hindu India will in due course become content with its lot, and cease to look to the Muslims beyond for help. It will have the mental satisfaction that the Muslims in their majority provinces are in unfettered control of their destinies and that it must accept the role of a minority as there is no other moral or legal alternative to it.<sup>27</sup>

...Trust begets trust. If Hindus can trust the Muslims for the protection of non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan states, Muslim can equally trust the Hindus for the protection of Muslims and other minorities. The League resolution rests on the mutual goodwill of the two nations...The Congress, on the other hand, wants Muslims as a whole to be satisfied with the constitutional safeguards.<sup>28</sup>

The zone includes many Indian states of which the most important are Kashmir, Bahawalpur, Kalat, Khairpur, Chitral, Chamba, Mandi, Suket, Bilaspur, Kapurthala, and Malerkotla. Of minor importance are the states or tribal agencies in the N.W.F.P and Baluchistan. All these states will be represented in the Pakistan Federal Assembly as independent and autonomous units. The Pakistan Government will not interfere in their internal affairs and will only exercise control over matters specially delegated to it with the consent of their rulers. These matters will

include defense, foreign affairs, communications, customs and currency.<sup>29</sup>

..The Muslim League demands on the principles of self-determination two sovereign Muslim states, in the North-Western and North-Eastern zones of India...The oil-wells recently discovered in Baluchistan and Sindh if properly worked, will be sufficient to meet the demand of whole Pakistan.<sup>30</sup>

If the Muslims can be a party to any readjustment of frontiers, that can only be in the exclusion of Ambala Division from the Punjab, as it does not form really a part of it. The Punjab proper is the land of the five rivers which fertilizes the vast stretch of territory between the Indus and the Sutlej rivers.<sup>31</sup>

...I refer to Babu Rajendraprasad's statement in which he says. "One could have thought Pakistan suggested a solution of the communal problem. It does not touch that question at all as it leaves Muslim minorities in the so-called Hindu India and Hindu minorities in the so-called Pakistan as they are to-day". This statement shows a deliberate misunderstanding of the whole minority problem of India. The Pakistan Scheme provides national homelands in the Northern and eastern zones of India for more than 2/3<sup>rd</sup> of Indian Muslims and reduces the Muslim minority of 90 millions to that of 25 millions under the Hindu India, and yet Babu Rajendraprasad had the hardihood to say that the Pakistan scheme does not touch the minority question at all! Even a fool can decide whether to choose full independence for 65 millions of his co-religionists or a permanent enslavement and subjection of 90 millions of them. Does Babu Rajendraprasad suppose that Muslims do not understand what is vital to their own interests/? Has he any other alternative proposal as a panacea for India's ills?

...If the Muslim states will have minorities, it will be solely because there is no other course open to convert them into majorities. Similarly the Muslim minorities in Hindu India will have to suppress their aspiration for independence simply because they are not entitled to claim independence on the principle of self-determination. A true minority, which is scattered over a country and does not muster strong in any part so as to form majority, cannot claim independence on any modern test.<sup>33</sup>

...On two occasions as stated by Mr. Jinnah, opportunities for a communal settlement were only frustrated by the refusal of the Congress to recognize the Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Muslims of India....On the second occasion when Babu Rajendraprasad was the president of the Congress, the League was to support the resolution of the Congress Working Committee concerning the demand for immediate independence of India and the declaration of the right of the people to frame their own constitution by means of a constituent assembly which was to be elected on the basis of adult franchise. But when the League put forth its claim for equal status with the Congress as a representative organ of the Muslims, the congress was unable to agree.<sup>34</sup>

...Mr Amery has repeatedly refused to acknowledge Congress as the only party that counts in India, as he believes that the Congress wants an India to be governed by Congress for Congress on Congress lines. He challenges its representative character on the ground that it does not command the confidence of the League and other interests.<sup>35</sup>

Sir Tej Bahadur offers two criticisms against the demand for Pakistan... Firstly, he says, "It hardly occurred to the speaker (Mr. Jinnah) there were others... who could say that they never agreed to it. Are they to be forced?"... Did it ever occur to Sir Tej Bahadr, when he appealed to the British Parliament to frame a constitution for India, that there were 90 millions of Muslims who would never agree to it? His second criticism is, "And what is to happen to the very appreciable number of Muslims outside these independent states in the South-West and eastern zones of India? Are they to take apprehended risks of submission to the majority rule of Hindus for the sake Muslim majorities in these two favoured parts of India?". Here again we may ask Sir Tej Bahadur, if one-third of Indian Muslims are to remain as minorities in a scheme of partition, will it offer a better alternative if all of them, in their full strength, are to accept a minority status in India as it is at present? If for the idea 90 millions of Indian Muslims can be persuaded to take risks of submission to the majority rule of Hindus, there is no reason why 30 millions of them should not take a similar risk, when there is the additional consolation to them that 60 millions of their brothers will be in full political power in their two independent states.<sup>36</sup>

...If the Hindu race has one history and homogeneous institutions and Muslims have an alien religion and homogeneous institutions, then evidently both represent separate nations. Conclusive evidence on this point is further furnished by the writings of Mr. Savarkar, President, All-India Hindu Mahasabha, who at present commands, equally with the great Congress leaders, immense influence among the Hindus. In a speech at Hindu Mahasabha session held in Ahmadabad in 1937, he said, "several infantile politicians commit the serious mistake that India is already welded into a harmonious nation of

that it could be welded thus far for the mere wish to do so. These our well meaning but unthinking friends take their dreams for realities. That is why they are impatient of communal tangles and attribute them to communal organizations. But the solid fact is that the so-called communal questions are but a legacy handed down to us by centuries of a cultural, religious and national antagonisms between the Hindus and the Muslims. When time is ripe, you can solve them; but you cannot suppress them by merely refusing reorganization of them. It is safer to diagnose and treat deep-seated disease than to ignore it. Let us bravely face the unpleasant facts as they are. India cannot be assumed to-day to be a Unitarian and homogeneous nation but on the contrary there are two nations in the main the Hindus and the Muslims in India”

Defining the aims of the Hindu Mahasabha as representative of the Hindu nation, Mr. Savarkar says, “It has come to my notice that a very large section of English-educated Hindus hold back from joining the Hindu Mahasabha under the erroneous idea that it is an exclusively religious organisation, something like a Christian Mission...it is not a Hindu dharma Mahasabha, but a Hindu national Mahasabha. As a national body, it will of course propagate and defend the National Hindu Church comprising each and all religions of Hindustani origin against any non-Hindu attack or encroachment. But the sphere of its activity is far more comprehensive than that of an exclusively religious body. The Hindu Mahasabha identifies itself with the National Life of Hindustan in all its entirety, in all its social, economical, cultural and above all political aspects and is pledged to protect and promote all that contributes to the freedom and glory of the Hindu nation”.

...Mr. Savarkar concludes his statement with clear words which admit of no ambiguity of meaning. He says,

“We Hindus in spite of our thousand and one differences within our fold, are bound by such religious, cultural, historical, racial, linguistic and other affinities in common as to stand out as definitely homogenous people as soon as we are in contrast with any other non-Hindu people—say the English, or Japanese or even the Indian Muslims. That is the reason why today we Hindus from Kashmir to Madras and Sindh to Assam will be a nation by ourselves”.

In face of the above lucid and frank exposition of the Hindu case as a separate nation, there is not the least doubt to think that Muslims form a separate nation by themselves. Indeed in this respect both Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Savarkar are in full agreement. Both insist that there are two nations in India but they differ in regard to the conditions on which the two nations should live.

Dr. Ambedkar thus criticizes the attitude of Mr. Savarkar in regard to Muslim demand for Pakistan. “Mr. Savarkar admits that Muslims are a separate nation. He conceded that they have a right to cultural autonomy. He allows them to have a national flag. Yet he opposes the demand of the Muslim nation for a separate national home. If he claims a national home for the Hindus nation, how can he refuse the claim of the Muslim nation for a national home?”<sup>37</sup>

...non violence has practically curbed the martial spirit of the Muslims in the Frontier province and has removed the danger of an effective resistance from the Pathans once Congress rule is established in India. If you keep on infusing into the mind of people bred in military traditions and acquainted with the use of arms that their rights can be defended by non-violence, that it is a sin to fight violently for the protection of their rights and that they should look to Mr. Gandhi alone for guidance and advice in

all political matters, you are actually turning them into cowards and isolating them from past traditions. The Hindus have nothing to lose by the adoption of non-violence for they have remained a subject race for so long that they cannot learn the art of self-defense through violence in a day. They must have a period of training before wresting power, and this they can only do by uniting and consolidation on the basis of common allegiance to Mr. Gandhi.<sup>38</sup>

...Muslims can never agree to accept their domination. The League has given them a new hope, a new ideal, new hope, and a new programme in life. Pakistan has furnished them an ideal which reconciles their religious and national sentiments. There is no longer any conflict in their mind as to their duty towards their country and their religion....the rest of Hindu India is no concern of theirs.<sup>39</sup>

...It is interesting to note here that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru feels sympathy for the poor lot of these Kurds and wishes to see an independent Kurdish state. Beyond India a Congress nationalist is prepared to support jail movements for separation and independence, though they may stand no comparison with a similar movement which the Indian Muslims are sponsoring under Pakistan... This shedding of crocodile tears for the cause of Kurdish independence does not impress an Indian Muslim. The Kurds are an insignificant minority of a million in Turkey; they do not occupy a compact area with distinct geographical limits; they are assured of full political and economic rights in the Turkish State. Their religion and culture stand in no danger in Turkey as the Turks are Muslims by religion.<sup>40</sup>

...Here it is necessary to refute an objection as to whether change of religion implies change of nationality. If nationality is determined by religion, change of religion certainly implies change of nationality.<sup>41</sup>

...The point which Mr. Gandhi has ignored is that



religion alone is a cohesive force for the idea of nationality...In Germany, the Christians and Jews have lived together for centuries and yet have failed to weld together into a single nation. The Nazis have only recently discovered a remedy, by concentrating them in a separate homeland in the central part of Poland.<sup>42</sup>

...Mr. Jinnah has done a real service to Islam by representing before the Indian Muslims the ideal of a separate independent nation which in due course will lead to formation of two sovereign States on the eastern and western borders of Hindu India. This movement for independent Muslim states will give a tremendous encouragement to similar movements in China and Russia where Muslims have so far been assigned the status of minorities.

...Liberation of one Muslim country will directly affect another. The fate of Muslims in India will have direct repercussions in other parts of the world, particularly in the western province of China and the Central Asia where Muslims are a majority. Acceptance of a minority status within the sub-continent of India will besides sealing once for all the fate of 90 million Muslims in India, lead to permanent enslavement of 30 millions of Muslims in Soviet Russia and 50 millions in western China.<sup>43</sup>

The loss of political power meant to Muslims the loss of their cherished traditions of virtue, honour and chivalry and they sank gradually into the position of an illiterate poverty-stricken and neglected minority.<sup>45</sup>

...difficulty in enforcing Soviet system of government in India is religion. Both the Hindus and Muslims, the two major communities, are strictly speaking, religious minded people. An entirely materialistic conception of life will never be engrained in their minds. Real happiness according to the Muslim ideas is not to be attained by a blind pursuit of worldly objects; it lies in possession of a contented mind which believes in virtue

and piety...Conservatism of the Indian masses is another great setback. Social customs have taken such a firm root in the minds of the people that nothing less than a revolution can change their mentality. Despite the rapid assimilation of western influences the Hindu society is still caste-ridden and preserves all its ancient traditions intact...The Muslim, too, is not prepared to change his outlook on life. He believes the good of humanity to lie in the observance of those laws and principles which his religion has fixed for him. A form of government where religion is given no place, marriage is held to ridicule, and family life deprived of its harmony will not appeal to him.<sup>45</sup>

...In fact, if religion were not to create any difficulty in the way of his acceptance of Soviet principles, he [the Muslim] would be the first to become their most ardent preacher...It [USSR] has suppressed religion, which is regarded as the cause of ignorance and superstition, but this has been accompanied by a materialistic conception of life and a mystic exaltation of socialism and its prophet Lenin who is actually worshipped like a saint.<sup>46</sup>

The Muslim attitude is misunderstood and their insistence on Pakistan scheme is considered equivalent to putting a veto on all constitutional progress. One may ask the British statesmen if the partition of Ireland has impeded the progress of Ireland and has created a political deadlock in the relations of the two communities. The present state of friendly relations between Ulster and Irish free state is the proof of the good effects of partition...the India problem is running exactly on the parallel line with Ireland...Great Britain's past experience has not been acquired in vain, it should apply the same methods in India as it did in dealing with the Irish problem...If separation has failed to destroy peace and order of Ireland, there is no reason to suppose that it will plunge India into chaos and civil war. Again, if the strong hand of Great Britain as the Protector of both Northern and Southern Ireland can guarantee their internal

and external security from danger and encroachment, a similar protection in case of India will safeguard the Muslim and Hindu states from internal and external aggression. The experience tried in Ireland can alone solve the tangled problem of India and establish goodwill and amity between two major communities.<sup>47</sup>

In a previous statements reported in the same paper of October 26, 1939 of a letter from Mr. Jinnah to the *Manchester Guardian* is reproduced. It reads thus “it is difficult to make an average Englishman understand fully the position which is facing us Muslims today. The Muslims have always had their fears and apprehensions of even a representative form of government, and far more of democracy in its strict application to India. Since the time of Minto-Morley Reforms of 1908 and the historic Lucknow Pact between Hindus and Muslims in 1916 their insistence on separate electors, weightage and statutory safe guards have been a clear indication of their fears. But since the inauguration of the new provincial constitution, it has been established beyond doubt that the Congress High Command has pursued its policies and programmes the sole aim and object of which is to annihilate every other political party and to set itself up as a Fascist and authoritarian organisation of the worst type. Having regard to the 35 million voters, the bulk of whom are totally ignorant, illiterate, and untutored, living in centuries-old superstitions of the worst type, thoroughly antagonistic to each other culturally and socially, the working of the constitution has clearly brought out that it is impossible to work a democratic parliamentary government in India...Therefore in my judgment, apart from other reasons into which I need not go in detail, democracy can only mean Hindu Raj all over India. This is a position to which Muslims will never submit”<sup>48</sup>.

...The Congress claims that Hindus and Muslims are member of the same nation and that the minorities are

not entitled to any safeguards except those meant for the protection of their religion, language and culture. The Mahasabha claims that the Hindus are the dominant people and constitute the real Indian nation and that the Muslims and other communities can only be assigned the status of permanent minorities only...The Muslims are told that religion is a private matter that concerns the personal relations of a man with his Creator. It has nothing to do with political and or economic affairs that come entirely within the function of a modern state. To confound them still, unity conferences are held and various plans are discussed to attain Hindu-Muslim unity. The underlying idea is that India is a one indivisible country and Hindus and Muslims can sink their differences to unite for common ends. To make propaganda effective, Muslim quislings have specially been engaged who under inspiration from the astute Mahatma or purely for their own personal ends vie with one another in winning the favors of their Congress masters... The Congress may hire Muslim quislings or it may overawe Muslim opportunists to sing to it tune, but it will never succeed in suppressing the Muslim demand for Pakistan.<sup>49</sup>

...The Congress socialist of India are really wrong in thinking that by presenting a common front against religion and by diverting public attention to a socialistic programme in which religion will be assigned a permanently subordinate position, they can win over the confidence of the Muslim masses and create in them the desire for India's political unity. The Congress rightists too are equally wrong in thinking that if religion is considered as a matter of private belief, freedom of worship is permitted, and a spirit of toleration is encouraged, Hindu-Muslim differences will be made up...Religion alone is not responsible for the present strained relations of the two communities. We must seek for real causes elsewhere.<sup>50</sup>

...the majority community has utterly failed to win

the confidence of the Muslims. The opportunity that was given to it under the new constitution (i.e. 1935), in the Congress governed provinces was simply wasted in pursuit of a so-called nationalist programme which included among other things the singing of the 'Bande Matram' song, hoisting of the Congress tricolor flag, promotion of Hindi and the Wardha Scheme of education, the deliberate exclusion of the Muslim League from provincial cabinet and the encouragement of Muslim mass contact campaign.<sup>51</sup>

...The late Ahrar leader, Ch. Afzal Haq tried to minimize the political issue by emphasizing the economic issue..."Partition of India is in fact the cry of the upper classes of all the three communities. It is not a communal demand but a stunt in order that the poor classes may not concentrate their thoughts and energies on all important questions of social and economic justice"...The essential difference between the Ahrar programme and the Muslim League programme lies in fact that whereas the latter aims at the political solidarity and integrity of Indian Muslims and claims for them an independent place in a future India where they will be free to develop to the best traditions of Islam, the Ahrars still repose their trust in the goodwill of the Hindu community and hope that the latter will remove the economic and social inequalities of the Muslims after they have attained independence. The Ahrars are further under the impression that the social and economic interests of the masses of both the communities being the same, they will be able to create a united front against a future Government of India by an appeal to the masses...The Ahrar programme includes the equal distribution of wealth, removal of untouchability and complete autonomy to live ...but they fail to understand that without the political emancipation of Muslims as an independent nation, they cannot put this programme into practice...the Hindus with... their exclusivist outlook on life cannot be expected

to follow a socialistic programme which may do evenhanded justice to all...Partition may be an upper class affair at present, as Ch. Afzal Haq alleges, but so is the Congress demand for independence The Hindu masses are absolutely as uninterested in the politics of the Congress as the Muslim masses in those of the Muslim League. A handful of Congress leaders in each province mostly drawn from urban middle classes, supported and financed by Hindu mill-owners and bankers, is clamoring for independence and exploiting the masses in their own interests. For according to Ch Fazal Haq, the masses cannot be stirred up unless they promised social and economic equality and both these things are beyond the conception of the Hindu society at present.<sup>52</sup>

If any community should feel aggrieved against the British rule it is the Muslims alone. Prior to British rule, they held under them the most fertile parts of India which accounted for more than two-thirds of the population. Bengal, Orissa and Assam were ruled by a Muslim Nawab; Oudh and Rohilkhand were under their respective Muslim rulers; the Carnatic, Hyderabad, Mysore and southern parts of Madras Presidency still acknowledge the sway of Muslim princes, while Sindh was governed by its own Amirs.<sup>53</sup>

...None but a fool can believe that if communal electorates are abolished, Hindus and Muslims will fraternize as brothers and forget their political rivalries. The Hindus must realize that the communal differences are bound to grow with the growth of political consciousness among the people. As long as power was in the hands of the British officialdom and masses had not yet been stirred by modern education, the Hindus and Muslims were content to pull on together smoothly...But with the inauguration of the reforms and the possibility of a gradual wresting of power from the British, competition between the two communities has grown keener. Every educated

person knows what the possession of political power means these days.<sup>54</sup>

M. Amery himself has admitted in a speech in the House of Commons on November 21 that the Congress picture wants itself an India governed by the Congress lines and he forewarns the Muslims, and the British government of the dangers that will result from accepting a united India under Congress domination. I repeat once again his actual words... "To accept that position or even to move towards it would at once create infinite troubles in India and would go far towards threatening all hopes of bringing about a self-governing India, united in some measure at any rate within itself".

Mr. Jinnah has truly said that the British government does not want to part with power and is playing one party against the other. He is again right in saying that "the failure of the Viceroy's and Mr. Amery's efforts is due to the weak, vacillating and indecisive policy of the British government."<sup>55</sup>

...Under the guise of the Muslim mass contact movement the Congress tried to seduce the Muslims from their allegiance to the League and set on foot various schemes to further its cause among them...The Muslim intelligentsia saw through the game and clearly perceived that the Congress was side-tracking the main issue, which was to come to a definite settlement with the Muslims.<sup>56</sup>

The Congress...demanded declaration of complete independence and also, as a temporary measure, for the duration of war, the handing over of all executive power to a ministry responsible to central legislature.

The Muslim League's demands were diametrically opposed to the Congress. It offered co-operation to the Viceroy on the distinct conditions (1)that the Federal Act would be completely considered null and void (2)that no new constitution would be devised without Muslim consent. (3)And that as an expression of sincerity the

Viceroy should transfer his executive functions to an enlarged cabinet representative of the two major communities in equal strength.<sup>57</sup>

Some extracts are given below from the Viceroy's announcement dated August 8, 1940:-

His Majesty's Governments' concern, that full weight should be given to the views of the minorities in any revision has been brought out. That remains the position of His Majesty's Government".

"It goes without saying that they could not contemplate the transfer of their present responsibilities, for the peace and welfare of India, to any system of Government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life, now could they be parties to the coercion of such elements into submission to such a Government".

The above declaration by the Viceroy was confirmed by Mr. Amery's statement in the Parliament dated August 14, 1941: "Agreement, consent is indeed the foundation of all government, of all true democracy. Decision by majority is not so much of the essence of democracy as a practical convenience which presupposes for its proper working an antecedent general consent to the constitution itself. It has indeed in the most federal constitution been limited in various ways in order to safeguard the separate interests of the federating units. Mr. Churchill when interpreting the 'self-determination' clause of the Atlantic Charter, plainly stated in the house of commons that it did not apply to India, as the British Government has already committed to the August Declaration. To repeat his actual words "the joint declaration (of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt) does not qualify in any way the various statements on policy which have been made from time to time about the development



of constitutional government in India, Burma and other parts of the British Empire. We have pledged by the declaration of August 1940 to help India obtain free and equal partnership in the British Commonwealth of Races, subject off course to the fulfillment of the obligations arising from our long connection with India and our responsibilities to its many races and interests”.

For a time the Muslim doubted as to whether the British government would keep true to its own pledges in the face of the whirlwind propaganda of Hindus to get them dishonored. Even Mr. Amery had fallen victim to Congress machinations and had made certain ill-advised remarks practically prejudicing and condemning the Muslim League scheme of partitioning India. The Muslim League gave vent to its resentment in a special resolution passed in a meeting of the Working Committee in August 1941. The resolution ran as under:

“The Committee of the League are amazed and alarmed that Mr. Amery the Secretary of State for India and a responsible Minister of the Crown, should be permitted to make pronouncements which amount to a breach of faith with the Muslim India and to resile from the declared policy of the British Government, viz. that the constitutional issue will in no way be prejudiced by His Majesty’s Government and that the solution of the constitutional issue will be dependent upon an agreement between the parties...The Working Committee call upon His Majesty’s Government to reassure the Muslims of India that His Majesty’s Government will stand by their declaration and pledges solemnly given by the Viceroy and the Secretary of the State for India on behalf of His majesty’s Government.” The Government was further warned: “If this reassurance is not forthcoming within a reasonable time, the Muslim League will be compelled of

necessity to revise the policy and to adopt such measures as it may deem necessary to resist any departure from the solemn pledges and assurances”

Exactly four months after the resolution, the Viceroy was obliged to recognize the force of the Muslim voice and stressed in unequivocal words the validity of promises. On December 15, 1940, the Viceroy while addressing the annual general meeting of the Associated Chambers of Commerce at Bombay referred to his pronouncements of August 8, 1940 and said that he would repeat that the guarantees, undertakings, pledges, intentions, and attitude of His Majesty explained in his statement, towards the future constitutional development of India and the machinery in which it was to be brought through were as valid today as when they were first spoken.

Despite this clear statement of the Viceroy to allay Muslim fears, danger is still lurking that the Congress may play the old game to deceive the Muslims. Various tactics are being used to coerce the British Government to bow before the Congress.<sup>58</sup>

The British Government is faced with a situation which admits of no easy solution. If it effects a compromise with the Congress, the League will naturally turn antagonistic, and the situation will further deteriorate in so far as the war effort of the Muslim community is concerned. With the Muslim League driven into active opposition, the British government, besides losing sympathies of 100 million Muslims in India and the effective help of the recruitment areas in Muslim provinces, will incur unpopularity in Muslim countries...By winning over the Muslim League to its side, the British government will stimulate war efforts in directions hitherto unknown. The attitude of the League will have direct repercussions in Muslim countries beyond India. Sixty millions of Muslims in China and another 60 millions in the Dutch East India

will be heartened by the news that the Indian Muslims have thrown their full weight on the side of the Allies. The Muslim leaders in the three countries will work in close cooperation and bring to bear on the side of the Allies, the resources of a combined population of 220 millions of peoples. The League attitude will again have a tremendous effect on the chain of Muslim countries west of the Indus, extending right up to the Atlantic Ocean. Afghanistan and Turkey in particular, which are still pursuing a policy of neutrality, will gain additional strength in resisting pressure from Axis powers. The Arabs, Turks, Iranians, Afghans-all will become virtual allies in this war. Muslim goodwill missions will tour all over the Muslim world and the Allies cause will receive immense support.

Let Great Britain choose a path which is best in the furthering of her war effort. The Indian Muslims hold the key to any future solution. Ignored, they will be the storm centre of the British Empire, but conciliated, they will be the most earnest supporters of the common cause<sup>59</sup>.

IV

IMPERIALSIM  
OF  
CATEGORIES

All religion, however, is nothing but the fantastic reflection in men's minds of those external forces which control their daily life, a reflection in which the terrestrial forces assume the form of supernatural forces.<sup>1</sup>

-Friedrich Engels, *Anti Dhüring*

With well-armed thugs to lead them  
And nothing much to feed them  
Their grins rose to the sky  
We asked, all unknowing:  
Poor things, where are you going?  
They said 'to Victory.'<sup>2</sup>

--Bertolt Brecht

Dr. Safdar Mahmud in his book, '*Iqbal, Jinnah Aur Pakistan*' [Iqbal, Jinnah and Pakistan] prattles: **Various aspects of the Establishment of Pakistan and Sure Signs of Divine Will.** Reading the centuries old Indo-Pak history, opens up new vistas and one feels as if the basis of Pakistan had been laid centuries ago...Prithivi Raj was considered as a symbol of Hindu strength in Hindustan, and Hindu rajas supported him. In the letter which Ghori had sent to Prithivi Raj prior to the war, the former [Ghori] had demanded the territories of today's Punjab, NWFP and Sindh should be handed over to him or else be ready for the war. Baluchistan was not in this scheme because there already existed a Muslim government there...This letter of Ghori's has got a great value for us and many of its contents demand ratiocination....When we think on this then we come to the conclusion that there were...clear signs of the Divine Will. One must consider the fact that, though Muslim preachers/dervishes were to be found all over India, in places like Delhi, Sirhand, Ajmeer Sharif, but the Muslims are not numerous in these places. Secondly, the Muslims are in majority in geographically contiguous provinces. Had the Muslims been in majority in NWFP and in UP and scattered all over India, then would it have been possible to demand Pakistan? In other words, it is the Divine Will that the Muslims are in majority in geographically united part. In realty, the foundations of Pakistan had been laid on the day Shahb-ud-Din Ghori demanded those areas. It was in this context that the Quaid-i-Azam in his speech Of 1944 in Aligarh said that Pakistan had come into being on the day the first Muslim had set his feet in India...Have you ever thought about what happened to the three characters who

were responsible for the breakup of Pakistan? Their unnatural death and the death of males of their next generation. Indra Gandhi had two sons, one was killed in an air crash, and the other died in a bomb attack. Mujib-ur-Rehman's male family members were mowed down with him. Bhutto's young son died an unnatural death in France and the other was killed in Karachi when his sister was the PM. Is this all accidental? I say with all sincerity that there was the Divine Will working behind the creation of Pakistan, and our Holy Prophet too had prophesied the same [i.e. the creation of Pakistan] on several occasions.<sup>3</sup>

The son of the man who is supposed to have dreamt the dream of Pakistan, Javed Iqbal extends: Pakistan claims to be an ideological state because it is founded on the Islam. It came into being because the Muslims of Indo-Pak sub-continent developed a specific attitude of mind...

Since the establishment of Pakistan, the existence of provincialism, sectarianism, and tribalism have set barriers to the growth and evolution of a single nationhood<sup>4</sup>...

The gentleman then quotes Jinnah who said: "as long as you don't throw off this poison [provincialism] in our body politic, you will never be able to weld yourself into a real nation...Islam has taught us this, and I think you will agree with whatever else you may be and whatever you are, you are a Muslim. You belong to a nation now you have carved out a territory a vast territory, it is all yours, it does not belong to a Punjabi, or a Sindhi or a Pathan or a Bengali, it is yours."<sup>5</sup>

But the people were either Punjabis, or Sindhis, or Pathans, or Baluchis, or Bangalis. The corollary of the above was simple: as long as you keep being what you are Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans, Baluchis, Bengalis, the state would not tolerate you.

Please note that the other corollary of the above is that if you oppose the prevalent state of things, or even criticize it, you run the risk of provoking Divine Curse. Because it was the same Divine Curse which killed hundreds of thousands Bengalis, the Balochis, Z. A. Bhutto was also a victim of the same Divine Curse, and not only he, but almost the whole of his family. One dare not oppose the Divine Power which works wonders here.

Then there are those who know that the people, especially in Sindh, will not accept this version of things. So, they have secularized the whole thing and are presenting the same idea in palatable format. The same inevitability runs in this discourse, but in secular garments. A nice remix!

This is nothing but leave taking of sense, and having taken leave of sense, one can spin whatever yarn one wishes and present it before unassuming readers in the name of research. The phenomenon is not limited to our local thinkers of thoughts, but is, at times, sanctioned by world-famous academies, for instance;

Khalid- Bin Sayeed who worked in Canadian universities has to say this:

Our central proposition or thesis...is that in an Islamic community the federal problem of maintaining unity or harmony between diverse regional or ethnic groups under a federal government is not achieved primarily or exclusively through a just or acceptable allocation of political power and economic resources in such a way that each constituent community is autonomous with certain central powers and resources being given to the federal government. In an Islamic community



the problem has to be approached first from a moral or ideological standpoint. Citizens of each constituent unit should feel that...the first commitment of all citizens is to Islam...In other words, if all Pakistanis were sincere Muslims, they would make sure that the conduct of the ruling groups as well as other groups would be such as that as far as possible no Baluchi or Pakhtun group would feel disadvantaged...

The professor then quotes I. H. Qureshi "If we face facts we are a mass of heterogeneous men and women held together only by our common allegiance to Islam. Weaken this allegiance and we are lost...We have to create in our people a grim determination to live honorably like men, with some purpose greater the purpose of daily bread, higher than mere existence...So far as political and economic matters are concerned our universities, our academic societies and organizations, our teachers and students have to think out these problems. We cannot, leave the masses to their fate. We cannot leave matters to our *Ulama*, because however learned they might be in principles of Jurisprudence, they have neither the training, nor the vision to be of any use. We may know our shortcomings but we are the only people to do it."<sup>6</sup>

Another example of such a leveling myth is to be found in a study by Karl von Vorys, published by Princeton University press in 1965, with active collaboration of peoples belonging to University of Iowa, John Hopkins University, Stanford University, University of Pennsylvania, -such big academic trademarks!

Von Vorys writes;

The emergence of newly independent states in

former colonial territories has generally been greeted with enthusiasm. Certainly most people in Asia and Africa were elated. Americans felt pleased and flattered that other people were following the example of 1776. Western Europeans quite probably sighed in relief. Enthusiasm engendered an atmosphere of optimism. Mankind, many believed fervently, was on the threshold of a brave new world. With the shackles of colonialism removed, progress was assured; democracy was sweeping the globe.<sup>7</sup>

And then the writer goes on to lament *à la Dr Safdar Mahmud*: 'Fate was unkind to Pakistan. Its Great Leader (Quaid-i-Azam) Mohammad Ali Jinnah died a little more than a year after independence was achieved. Before another three years had passed, an assassin removed its first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, from the new government. In consequence, the top leadership that had *unified the masses of Muslims in India behind a common purpose* and created the sovereign state of Pakistan was no longer present to guide the people in the task of converting the temporary unity into the massive solidarity of a nation-state.'<sup>8</sup>

It seems that all these prominent institutions could not hit upon a better idea for explaining the crisis of the state than the proverbial waste bin of history, FATE.

The bourgeois is past master at myth building. Read the above passages and you will find that the writers are laboring hopelessly to find something which is never to be found, yet they are trying, not only to find the thing, but in the course also to convince the reader that the thing is there and even if it is not there, it will be created somehow.

This is how things are forged. And our story begins with this sort of forging; first, of a minority and then the upgrading of the minority to the status of nationhood: a nation without the people.

Secularism in legal sense, that is, the state legal statutes would not discriminate, or give preferential treatment to any social group on confessional or denominational basis, was never to be found in colonial India. The Congress, though constitutionally defined its memberships on 'citizenship' basis, was also open to the persons who were also members of communal parties, such as Hindu Mahasabha, or the Muslim League. The uneven growth of nationalism in India not only in various parts of the country but also among various communities of India was a stumbling block in the formation of citizenship-based nationalism. The colonial capitalism was essentially monopolistic, and as a result, the capitalism created in India in the womb of monopolistic colonial capitalism relied heavily on the support of the colonial state; permits, grants, quota, government contracts. It was again the colonial state which defined the otherwise diverse Indian peoples according to denominational lines. It was this definition, this communal nomenclature, which helped forge communities of interests on permanent basis. There was to be no level playing field open to the Indians on the basis of being subjects or citizens of British Empire; rather these subjects were stuffed into various categories, religion or faith being the main, and then were asked to stipulate their denominational allegiance before the state. Legal secularism invariably means progressive receding of confessional distinctions from the public space to the private. But just the opposite happened in India. In pre-reform India, there was no public space for the Indians, and when the public space was opened to the people in a slow, reformist manner, it was already demarcated, defined and

categorized by the state. The smaller the gamut of reforms, the smaller was the communal difference, the larger the reform, the larger became the communal question. Freedom of India was the largest reform, and it saw the largest communal riots, and the partition. One must always be mindful of the role of these categories which had predefined the public space, before the opening up of the public space itself. In other words, the very grammar of the Indian legal politics was defined by the colonial state. There was not much left for the politicians to do if they followed the constitutional process. This was the reason why Jinnah who had denounced the separate electorate, nevertheless fought all elections, starting from 1910 on separate Muslim constituency

The most important thing our analysts mostly fail to analyze is that right from the establishment of the British supremacy to 1947, the Indian masses had never enfranchised. Only property holders, or 'the educated' could vote and contest elections. The bulk of the masses was outside this paradigm. When someone says, 'The Muslims were not adequately represented', one must keep in mind here that 'The Muslims' here means propertied Muslims. The party which was fighting for the cause of the Muslims had not included the most important question of universal adult suffrage on its agenda. Rather, it had always been cautious of such an eventuality. The disfranchised masses were dismissed by the very leader as 'illiterate and superstitious'. Then there was a 1/3<sup>rd</sup> Indian population of princely states. They again were outside the electoral paradigm and the struggle thereof.

## **STREETYPING**

When Jinnah in 1940 declared that the Muslims of

India are not a minority, but a nation and want a separate statehood, did he bother to ask the Muslims of India if they really thought so? Or was it just the opinion of the Muslim League? Then, the correct expression would not have been 'the Muslims of India', but 'the All-India Muslim League'. But he, as many of the leaders of the age, was working mainly through stereotypes. A party can speak on the behalf of its members. But then the Muslims of India were subsumed into the All-India Muslim League, the All-India Muslim League became the Muslims of India at least for Jinnah and the British. This precisely is what I call stereotyping and imperialism of categories.

D.D Kosambi writes: 'a dispassionate observer who looks at India with detachment and penetration would be struck by two mutually contradictory features: diversity and unity at the same time. The endless variety is striking, often incongruous. Costume, speech, the physical appearance of the people, customs, standards of living, food, climate, geographical features all offer the greatest possible differences'<sup>9</sup>

It was this diversity which was in itself so diverse as to exclude disputes on the basis of particularity. The very diversity discourages particularism and leveling. The English, in the false claim of recognizing this diversity, in fact fractured it. The diversities they generated in India were legal and procedural. Provinces were created on the basis of administrative felicity. The administration could recognize such diversities which the administration itself has brought into being. Or, the people were encouraged to bring their diversities into such an order and shape so as for them to be recognizable by the state. 'Hindus' and 'Muslims' were the main ordered diversities. Diversities only in name; crushing and leveling categories in essence.

One may...doubt whether there was even an identifiable 'Muslim', 'Hindu', or 'Sikh' identity which could be abstracted from the particular circumstances of individual events or specific societies<sup>10</sup>. This clearly means that it was highly unlikely that peoples belonging to various faiths could have been made communities on the basis of abstraction of 'faith'. One must always distinguish between *religion-as-faith* and *religion -as-community*. Whatever communities there were prior to colonialism, were fuzzy in their essence, that they did not exhaust the range of selfhood of an individual. The Hindus, the Muslims and the Sikhs were so in religious sense, and they might have differentiated themselves on this basis, yet they were neither Hindus, nor Muslims nor Sikhs in legal or political sense. In other words, Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism, and innumerable range of religious orders within these were *confessions, not communalisms*. The domain of modern classificatory politics in the age of colonialism impoverished this 'fuzziness' of the sense of community and insisted upon the identification of community in enumerable sense, or strength of a religious community on the basis of the number of its adherents. The new institutionalized 'sense and knowledge of belonging' to 'a' community and the process of social taxonomy that colonial rule offered and the new public space it created based primarily on such cultural constructions and social taxonomy, could easily be converted into wider political groupings and divisive projects. The major premise of colonial cognition of Indian society was the theme of differentiation which was traced, mapped and enumerated through various official ethnographic studies and finally since 1872, through decennial census reports. *The Indian colonial census, unlike its British predecessor, made religion its fundamental ethnographic category for ordering and classifying demographic and development data.* Each census report sought to give concrete and

recognizable shape to religious communities, by discussing the numerical size of such groups, their percentage to the whole population, relative or absolute decline and geographic distribution, indicating their majority or minority status in each region and the country as a whole. The result of this census taxonomy was the new concept of religion-as-community (i.e. communal belonging as against religion-as-faith). Religion no longer meant just a set of ideas, but came to be identified with an aggregate of individuals united by formal official definition.-of interest here is to note that prior to colonialism, the individual was not a legal or political category, the whole village was required to pay whatever taxes in kind to the officials of the Nawabs, or those of the King. But the British land revenue system made 'individuals' taxable, that is , individuals were required to pay taxes on individual property basis—The formal official definition made the people conscious of their supposed common characteristics based on religion, and also of the numerical strength or the lack of it *vis-à-vis* other communities in a particular area<sup>11</sup>. This consciousness of 'numbers' will have far-reaching effects on the political power sharing process in India as a whole.

It was this abstracted, and then universalized categorization-form-above based mainly on redefined religion in public space, which then was incorporated into every structure of the state, every opportunity that the state offered to the colonized subjects was to be filtered through this abstraction and categorization and would go to them through this taxonomy. People were communities and without stipulation this community, they could not possibly get access to any thing that the state might offer.-form education, employment to representation in local or other bodies. Election to these local bodies is always highly number conscious -as has been our experience in Pakistan. Every tin-pot dictator in Pakistan has tried to break the

higher sense of belonging by means of localizing the sense of community. Franchise (as voters) was limited to just 4 % of the population on the basis of property/tax qualifications , but the same qualifications for candidates were much higher which means virtual exclusion of even this meager number from candidacy.

This taxonomy was not accepted without putting up a fight, Bankimchandra of Bengal, for instance, anticipating Edward Said writes:

Search through all the vast written literature of India and you will not, except in modern writings where the Hindu has sought obsequiously to translate the phraseology of his conquerors, meet with any mention of such a thing as the Hindu religion. Search through all the vast records of pre-Mohammedan India, nowhere will you meet with even a word as Hindu, let alone Hindu religion. Nay more. Search through the whole record, and nowhere will you meet with such a word as religion. The word *Dharma*, which is used in the modern vernaculars as its equivalent, was never used in pre-Mohammedan India in the same sense as Religion...There is no Hindu conception answering to the term 'Hinduism', and the question with which I began this letter, what is Hinduism, can only be answered by defining what it is that the foreigners who use the word mean by the term<sup>12</sup>.

...Suppose a Hindu, ignorant of European languages, traveled through Europe and like most Europeans in his situation, set about writing an account of his travels. What would be his account of Christianity? Observing the worship of the Virgin and the Saints in catholic countries, he would take Christianity to be polytheism. The worship of



images would lead him to believe, that Christianity was idolatry also, and the reverence paid to the crucifix would induce him to think that there was also a leaven fetishism in it. Protestant Christianity he would account to be a dualism, religion of the good and evil principles- a religion of God and Devil. And if he mixed with well enough with the ignorant peasantry of Christendom, he would meet with that tangled jungle of ghosts and demons which it has been Sir Alfred Lyall's lot to meet with in India. And who shall say that the Hindu's account of Christianity would be wider of the truth than many an account of Hinduism be European or native? <sup>13</sup>

This imaging by the other (in our example the English and the natives taught according to the English methods) results in stereotyping the object and then, if the knowledge thus generated is also sanctioned and sanctified by the power, then this fractured account becomes the real account and a sure basis of future reflection. The lens through which India was supposed to be reflected was the one which generated an image of India and that image was taken to be the real India. The image then was imposed on every aspect of the native's life and he was asked to conform to the image if he does not want to be excommunicated.. Most of us have not yet questioned the very structure of the lens; we have been fighting over the image that has been generated by the lens without ever seriously analyzing the nature of the lens. That is the main point of our thesis. This is the central handicap of every liberal methodology.

A significant scholar Francis Robinson writes in his book "Islam, South Asia and The West":

By the 1920s the British Empire embraced substantially more than half the Muslim peoples of the world. For much of the twentieth century Britain

was the greatest influence over their development. Imperial security in large part dictated which territories of former Muslim empires or petty Muslim states the British came to rule. Imperial interests in combination with those of rival empires and local forces dictated precisely, and sometimes not so precisely, where the boundaries of new states were to fall. *By the same token they dictated which peoples would have to learn to live together, or not as the case may be, in the increasingly demanding environments of the modern economy and modern state.* Imperial techniques of government shaped the developing politics of these dependencies; often leaving major legacies to years when the British had gone. *The British Empire was the context in which many Muslims experienced transition to modernity.* ...The period of British rule, which eventually became British Empire, brought distinct new strands, indeed firmer edges, to Muslim identities. *There was a sharpening of distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim, which was, in part, an outcome of the impact of British understanding of India and, in part, that of religious revivalism...From the very beginning of the serious study of India in the eighteenth century, Warren Hastings and the orientalist around him-Jones, Halhed, Wilkins-thought of India in terms of Hindus and Muslims...When the British came to place a framework of interpretation over India's past, they divided it into Hindus, Muslims, and British periods. When, from 1871, they began the decennial census of their Indian empire, they tabulated its peoples under religious headings. When they described their empire in imperial and provincial gazetteers, they gave substantial consideration to their Indian peoples as religious groupings down to*

*the level of the district and small town...* In this context the category Muslim become a major part of the discourse of the colonial state, both within itself and with society at large. Much social action, whether it be competition for jobs in government offices or riots in town and countryside, was interpreted in terms of Muslim and Hindu rivalry. While *Muslims, themselves, when they came face to face with the state, more often than not had to define themselves primarily as Muslims.* They did so to the census enumerator and when they signed up to join the army; they did so when they went to school or hospital; they did so when they came to vote. The outcome was that men and women, whose Muslim-ness might not have been prominent in their consciousness of themselves, came to find it increasingly to be so. In the process they became more aware of what might distinguish them from non-Muslims-as for instance, those Bengali Muslims of the late nineteenth century who stopped invoking God as Sri Sri Iswar in favour of Allah-o-Akbar and who dropped their Hindu surnames (Chand, Pal, Dull) in favor of Muslim ones (Siddiqui, Yusufzai, Qureshi)

...If for the Indian nationalist historian the British privileged religious identities, in general, and the Muslim identity in particular, they are regarded as being even more responsible for the emergence and continuance of a Muslim political identity. The case might begin by showing how the colonial construction of knowledge helped to establish religious categories of thought in the mind of the Raj and then how setting these groupings against each other was a policy some had very much in mind. “ ‘Divide *et impera*’ was the old Roman motto’, declared Elphinstone, the distinguished

early nineteenth century governor of Bombay, “and it should be ours.”

...In 1860s and 1870s the British were particularly concerned about their failure to attract Muslims to their rule; it was a concern summed up in the title of W.W Hunter’s notorious tract, *‘The Indian Mussalmans’* (1871), which was written in response to viceroy Mayo’s question, ‘Are the Indian Mussalmans bound by their religion to rebel against the queen?’. This meant that when a group of north Indians, led by the gifted and energetic Sayyid Ahmad Khan, strove to build bridges between Indian Muslims and the colonial state, they were looked upon with approval. When this group went on to found MAO College Aligarh in 1877 and the All-India Mohammedan Educational Conference in 1886 to carry the process forward, it received moral and material support from the government. When this group, known as the Aligarh movement, made a point of not supporting the Indian National Congress, the organisation of Indian nationalism, the British were not displeased. Moreover, when representatives of this movement went in deputation to the viceroy in 1906 to ask for special representation for Muslims and recognition of their importance in the new legislative councils announced by the secretary of state, they were received with sympathy. Furthermore, when they applied enormous pressure as the Minto-Morley council reforms were going through Parliament, they were granted separate electorates for Muslims with extra seats, over and above their proportions of the population, in those provinces where they were ‘politically important.’<sup>14</sup>

Historians have recorded this fact that it was due to a sort of ‘pressure’ that was exerted on the British that they

came to recognize the Muslims as a separate political category, and granted them separate electorates. This act was commented upon by the Agha Khan, , the leader of the delegation, as the recognition of 'a nation within a nation'.<sup>15</sup> But what has not been sufficiently recorded is the fact that The Indian Councils Act of 1892 was very significant in that for the first time it recognized-not so much in word as in practice-the principle of separate representation for the Muslims. Commenting upon this constitutional innovation, Ambedkar observed in 1942: 'It is a mystery as to who was responsible for its introduction. This scheme of separate representation was not the result of any demand put forth by any organized Muslim association'<sup>16</sup>. Rather it was a device hit upon by viceroy Lord Dufferin, who was convinced that popular representation in India could not follow the model practiced in Britain, but needed necessarily to provide for the distinctness of communal interests.<sup>17</sup> People having certain similar set of religious ideas were defined to be 'Muslims', then a 'religious Community', and after that 'a communal Minority', in the last phase they were recognized as a 'separate nation'.

Up to this moment, the Muslims had been conceived as a community as distinct from other communities on religious/confessional basis. And this distinctiveness was just that: perceived differences between religious communities, or conflicts arising therein, were not termed 'communal'. Nor was the term attributed as a quality inherent to Muslims. It was in the course of the debates that preceded the constitutional reforms of 1909 that this transition took place. A delegate of 35 self-appointed saviours of community took upon themselves to see the viceroy, Minto and demanded separate political categorization. The viceroy was not unresponsive to the demand. It was on the basis of the viceroy's not being unresponsive to the demand that the League was found in

1906. It was during this period that a corporate Muslim identity was formalized by the colonial state in Indian politics. As all bourgeois reform in essence is nothing but a restoration, so was this reform, apparently a delegation of powers to responsible Indians. The viceroy Minto in reality was activated by a strategy of creating allies in stable sections of society in order to offset the effects of the recent militancy-Bengal was up in rebellion against the partition of Bengal on communal lines, one must never forget that it was a partition of India in miniature. The viceroy believed that there existed a 'great body of conservative opinion amongst men still loyal to the government'. It was by sustaining the allegiance of this conservative element—represented by 'great agricultural classes', namely the landlords—with which Minto felt, the current pace of political change could be stemmed. It was the representation of their interests that should be made central to any political reform. Minto's overriding concern, then, was preservation rather than change. The purpose of this reform was to ensure stability...Minto thus sought a framework that would reflect the institutions of Indian society and at the same time reassert British control. These institutions were the broadly community based, 'or communal interests' be they landholding, commercial, educational, or, religious, which were seen to comprise Indian society. The failure of attempts at reforms had reinforced for Minto the idea that not just anybody could represent the interests of any group. Indians were not yet able to set aside group affiliations—the affiliations which the empire itself was trying hard to reinforce—to represent the interests of others, and so 'the multifarious groups...which make up the people of India can be represented in the fullest sense of the word only by persons who actually belong to them'<sup>18</sup>

The categories imposed on India might well not have been just an external imposition and the native, to a

certain degree might well have negotiated the imaging, yet the final say in the process was that of the state and not that of the native. It is quite disquieting that most of our liberal thinkers still think and analyze the questions of 'minority', 'majority' 'religion', 'politics' in terms of the imperialism of categories. People might have been aware of cultural differences and their different set of religious ideas, yet minoritizing and majoritizing the people on denomination basis is a totally different story. A Hindu might not have liked sharing the cup with a Muslim religiously, but not doing so on the basis of politics is a different matter, and the two must not be confused with each other. Sindhi *topi* is a mark of cultural identity but when the people don the cap on particular day and assert the cultural mark, then this *topi* acquires political connotations. Sindhi as a linguistic community becomes now a political community based on self-consciousness of its cultural symbolism. Denominational self-consciousness and the politics thereof is what I call communalism.

How this 'communal' consciousness, was first created and then reinforced has been amply shown by Tariq Ali: The Moplah revolt of 1921. The Moplahs were amongst the most heavily exploited peasants in the entire subcontinent...Peasants unions had sprung up throughout Malabar. On 8 August 1921 the authorities issued warrants for the arrest of the peasant leaders. A subsequent armed raid on a mosque where it was presumed the leaders were hiding acted as a spark for the revolt. Thirty thousand peasants armed with primitive weapons (such as hammers and scythes) descended on the area. The police opened fire and nine peasants were killed, in retaliation the peasants killed a British civil servant and police and army officers. The peasant rebels destroyed bridges, removed railway lines, dismantled telegraph wires and occupied railway stations. For ten days they reigned supreme. The British press portrayed the rising as a communal war of Muslim

against Hindu...Kunna Amed haji, a peasant chief, sent a communication to the Madras daily *The Hindu*, rebutting charges of communalism and accusing government agents of attacking Hindu temples to sow division between communities.<sup>19</sup>

Ayesha Jalal in her book '*Modern South Asia*' writes:

A powerful revisionist school of modern South Asian historiography has been suggesting lately that Indian social tradition, as we know it today, was largely a nineteenth-century British colonial invention. British social enumerators of the later nineteenth century invested the great religions of the subcontinent, Hinduism and Islam, with a degree of supra-local significance and cohesion never achieved before. While serving the purpose of subverting the mythology of millennia old traditions –for instance, the ‘two-nations’ theory and its obverse the ‘composite nationality’ theory–arguments about the British construction of social identity in South Asia are much in need of analytical desegregation. For one thing, colonial initiatives may have been more successful in creating political categories out of local religious affiliations than in moulding the mental world of their subject peoples. For another, identities were redefined not simply as a function of skillful social engineering by the colonial masters but also as part of a process of multifaceted resistance against colonial rule.

So were the Muslims of India after the late nineteenth century an artifact of British colonial imagination? To be sure, the definition of Indian Muslim as an all-India political category for purpose of limited electoral politics triggered all manner of contradiction between Hindu and Muslim as well as Muslim and Muslim, and influenced the



course of Muslim politics in the first half of the twentieth century.<sup>20</sup>

There is an obvious difficulty with this sort of methodology. When we use the term 'British' we do not simply and only mean a race of Europeans who came to rule us. On the contrary, 'British' for us is advanced colonial capitalism, a socio-economic system rather than just a race of rulers. It was this British socio-economic system which had created certain legal/political categories. These categories would remain operative as long as that socio-economic system was in place. A sort of mitigation did take place when the local Indian bourgeoisies took over the state from the colonial masters but the basic socio-economic system has remained the same. For from symbolizing a race of rulers, the British for us symbolizes a social system. This social system is still ruling the sub-continent. Jalal's assertion that the British might have created the categories but they [the British] could not have moulded the minds of the people, is unwarranted as there is no socio-economic system without corresponding minds. Our method does not believe in any such duality. And the identities created in struggle against the colonial rule were against the colonial communal categorization. So, whatever those identities might have been they were at least not communalistic. There had been two main communalistic identities: the 'two-nations' and 'one Hindu nation'. These identities were peddled by the two main communalist parties: the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha. Jalal's expression 'Muslim politics' is again fabulous. What does she mean by 'Muslim politics'? The Muslim League? Or the Jamat? Or the nationalist Muslims? Or the leftist Muslims? There was, for instance, a Muslim politics of the League type, and there was a Muslim politics of Haari Tahreek type. As we cannot call the Congress politics, or the Communist politics as Hindu politics, so we cannot safely describe the League politics as Muslim politics. The

politics of the League was communalist not Muslim politics, as was the politics of the Mahasabha. Both were invoking Islam and Hinduism but these were communal not religious organizations. Nor were they nationalist or social-egalitarian parties as membership to these parties was again exclusivist and denominationally-defined [the League and the Mahasabha were restricted to Muslims and Hindus, whereas membership to the Congress and the Socialist Party or the Communist Party was constitutionally national].

Even today most of liberal writers demonize the Moplah rebellion and following the colonial description of the revolt, call it a major turning point in Hindu-Muslim relations. Another much misunderstood movement, usually dismissed with little understanding, is the *Khilafat Tahrik*. It was the first largest movement against the Raj after 1857, and like the first great revolt, this movement was also a high watershed in Hindu-Muslim unity. But our unfortunate liberals would not have any thing of ‘religion’ and dismiss this movement as futile. I wonder when our writers and historians try to look for the causes of deterioration of Hindu-Muslim relations in this movement. Jaswant Singh has probably done only one good job in his book by writing ‘ It is instructive that communal riots were confined to only the British territory, whereas, Indian states were almost entirely free from them-a riot in 1924 at Gulbarga in Nizam’s territory possibly being the only unfortunate exception.’<sup>21</sup>

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It would be very interesting to discuss the question of secularism, secularization and communalism, communalization in the Indian context. The question invariably arises: what are the specificities of secularism, secularization the Indian context? And are there any identifiable specificities?

Secularism is freedom *of* religion, not freedom *from*

religion as Marx puts it. This, in other words, means that secularism is an ideology specific to a certain social-political organisation. And this also presupposes a degree of social development. Secularism as an ideology developed hand in hand with the growth of civil/bourgeois society in Europe. Secularization, as the actual process of separation of the sacred from the worldly, was a long project. The Church as a state was directly attacked and its gamut confined to the sacred aspect of public life. The individual was not supposed to stipulate his/her confessional allegiance before the law or compulsorily confirm his /her identity with any of the accepted religions by the law- people make much of the Jewish question in Germany, the fact is that the European Jews were thoroughly assimilated in European democratic social setup. It was the eastern Jews, harassed out of Russia and other Slavic territories in the late nineteenth century, came to settle in the Western Europe and asserted their confessional identity. Some of the early revolutionaries and scientists in Europe belonged the assimilated Jewry, where as, the Zionists were mostly new settlers.

Neither secularism as an ideology, nor does secularization as a social process oppose religion *per se*. Religion is opposed inasmuch as it attempts to define the public life of the people. The private and the public spheres are separated on the basis of citizenship. The Sacred will not have any defining sway over the public sphere. This is how secularization of the public space took place in democratic polities of the West. The antonym of the secular in the West is the Sacred or Religious.

In contradistinction to this, secularism in Indian context acquired a different connotation. The antonym of the secular (i.e., religion as a personal matter or religion-as-faith) is not religion as such, but the communal (i.e. religion as a matter of public concern, or religion-as-community).

A prominent Indian historian Romila Thapar writes:

The argument that secularism is inappropriate to South Asia because the majority of South Asians are adherents of a religious faith implies that a secular society is an atheist society which of course is never the case. Religious faith does not debar secularism since society gives space to religion but does not make it primary. It is also said that secularism is incapable of countering religious fundamentalism. However, religious fundamentalism is primarily a political condition—especially in the contemporary world—and can be countered if the political inducement to fundamentalism is terminated....The statement that secularism denies religion derives from the notion that the process of secularization is embedded in the confrontation between the church and the state as has been projected in the history of medieval Europe emerging into modernity...The interface of religion and society in Europe during the last millennium should not be applied indiscriminately to India where the experience of such an interface has been fundamentally different. This difference is ignored in discussions on secularism and religion. Where there is no church of a kind similar to the Christian church—as in Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam...The need for mass political mobilization required that religion be converted into something other than what it is. In many ways the emergence of Hindutva, defined as ‘Hinduness’ is a reformulation of the Hindu religious system...a significant difference between Hinduism and Hindutva is that the latter curbs diversity, and this makes the ethics of tolerance, and therefore of non-violence and of equality, unacceptable to it...*There is also the question of differentiating between a*

*personalized, virtually private religion and the social and political forms of religion that enables it to be used as a force for political mobilization. This kind of distinction has parallels to what has been called religion-as-faith and religion-as-ideology.* Perhaps the distinction would be clearer if it was expressed as religion-as-faith and religion-as-mobilization...The two are not therefore versions of the same religious articulation and there is a point when faith can sometimes be converted to ideology and where this happens, the point in time has to be viewed historically...The colonial state recognized only the formal religions of what it called Hinduism and Islam and put everyone in either one or the slot...The rhetoric of the colonial interpretation of Indian society as constituted of two monolithic communities was all pervading.<sup>22</sup>

The main criterion here is the induction of faith into political space (religion-as-ideology and mobilization) and debarring it from that space. Maulana Ubedullah Sindhi, Maulana Barkatullah Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Gandhi, etc. were religious to the core, but their religion was non-communal. Communalism is all about the adoption of communitarian identity (defined and enumerated on confessional basis) by the politics of the community. Hindu Mahasabha and the All-India Muslim League were the two most influential communitarian political organizations. This was the application of the same leveling imperialism of categories of 'Hindu' and 'Muslim' to the Indian political space. Such frankly communalist organizations and their leadership can not be called secular.

Communalism does not mean theocracy, nor does it envisage a virtual overthrow of secular state setup, a theocratic state is governed by divine laws directly administered by a priestly order claiming a divine

commission. The Islamic Republic of Iran run by Ayatollah is an obvious example. On the other hand, a state that establishes religion, grants its official, legal recognition. Here, religion benefits from a formal alliance with government. The sacerdotal order does not govern a state where religion is established...*A secular state is to be distinguished not only from theocracy but also from a state where religion is established.* A non-theocratic state is not automatically secular because it is entirely consistent for a state not to be run by priests inspired by Divine Laws, but to have a formal alliance with one or more religions. Remember I.H. Qureshi's remarks: *"If we face facts we are a mass of heterogeneous men and women held together only by our common allegiance to Islam. Weaken this allegiance and we are lost...We have to create in our people a grim determination to live honorably like men, with some purpose greater the purpose of daily bread, higher than mere existence...So far as political and economic matters are concerned our universities, our academic societies and organizations, our teachers and students have to think out these problems. We cannot, leave the masses to their fate. We cannot leave matters to our Ulama, because however learned they might be in principles of Jurisprudence, they have neither the training, nor the vision to be of any use. We may know our shortcomings but we are the only people to do it."*

The Nazi campaigns against Jews and other minority groups did not call for an abandonment of the secular state in Germany. If anything, Nazi rule was accompanied by an attempt to de-Christianize public life and to undermine the influence of the Catholic as well as the various Protestant churches. Fascist ideology did not seek the union of state and religion in Italy, where the presence of a large peasant population and the hold of Catholicism might be supposed to have provided an opportune condition for such a demand-and this despite the

virtually open collaboration of the Roman Catholic Church with Mussolini's regime. Nazi Germany and fascist Italy are, of course, only two examples of a feature that has been noticed many times in the career of the modern state in many countries of the world: namely, that *state policies of religious intolerance, or of discrimination against religious and other ethnic minorities, do not necessarily require the collapsing of state and religion, nor do they presuppose the existence of theocratic institutions.*<sup>23</sup>

Jinnah probably hit the mark when he declared from the floor of the assembly:

“If you change your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no matter to what relations he had with you in past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make.

I cannot emphasize it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community-because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khatri, also Bengalees, Madrasis, and so on-will vanish. Indeed if you ask me this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain freedom and independence and but for this we would have been free peoples long ago. No power can hold another nation, and specially a nation of 400 million souls in subjection; nobody could have conquered you, and even if it happened nobody could have continued its hold on you for any length of time but for this. Therefore, we must learn a lesson from this. You are free; you are free to go to

your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any or any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or any caste or creed-that has nothing to do with the business of the state...We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State...*in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslim would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.*

Cease being Hindus and Muslims not in religious sense but in political sense (i.e. majoritarianism and minoritarianism based on communal differentiations or cease being majority and minority based on communal allegiance), was the fundamental thing and the sole criterion of secularism in Indian context. One is sorry to say that it was the All-India Muslim League which was doing a sort of politics based not on 'citizenship', but rather on confession, that it was an organisation which consistently was reminding the Muslims to not cease being Muslims in political sense. Was Jinnah repudiating his own past when he used the word 'a nation of 400 million souls' for India? It was he who had been telling the people that India was not a nation and those 400 millions souls were Hindus and Muslims in political sense. It was an implicit repudiation of his own political stand when he called India a 'nation of 400 souls', and offered the same rights of citizenship that the Congress was offering to the peoples of United India.

Another important thing that has been the major factor in Pakistani politics is the question of contested citizenship, or equal citizenship as Jinnah said. He had been



doing politics of a leveling category 'Muslims' now he recognized that those Muslims were also Punjabis, Pathans and Bengalis. But the right of equal citizenship for these was never accepted by Jinnah himself and the state structure after his demise. If the Bengalis were equal citizens then their language should have been given an equal status, but this was not conceded to by Jinnah. If Sindhis were equal citizens, then the resolutions of Sindh Muslim League and Sindh Assembly against the separation of Karachi from Sindh should have been honoured by Jinnah. The resolution of Baluchistan Assembly against the merger of Baluchistan with Pakistan should have been honoured by Jinnah. But that was to be. On 15<sup>th</sup> June, 1948, Jinnah was telling to the people in Baluchistan: 'Local attachments have their value, but what is the value and strength of a 'part' except within the 'whole'? Yet this is a truth people so easily seem to forget and begin to prize local, sectional and provincial interests above and regardless of the national interests. *It naturally pains me to find the curse of provincialism holding sway over any section of Pakistanis. Pakistan must be rid of this evil.* It is a relic of the old administration when you clung to provincial autonomy and local liberty of action to avoid control-which meant- British control. But with your own central government and its power, it is a folly to continue to think in the same terms<sup>25</sup>. It was probably in order to weed out this provincialism that Jinnah had dismissed the elected Sindh premier Khuhro and snatched Karachi from Sindh against the Sindh Assembly resolution. He would be warning the Bengalis against 'fifth-columnists' [i.e. communists] and dazzle them with his words: 'The State language, must obviously, be Urdu, a language that has been nurtured by a hundred million Muslims of this sub-continent, a language understood throughout the length and breadth of Pakistan and above all, a language which, more than any other provincial language, embodies the best that

is in Islamic culture and Muslim tradition and is nearest to the language used in other Islamic countries.<sup>26</sup> On 19 December, 1947, when asked whether the Muslim League of Pakistan would eventually transform itself into a national organization open to members of all religious communities, Jinnah the realist replied: ‘The time has not yet come for a national organisation of that kind. Public opinion among the Muslims of Pakistan is not yet ready for it. We must not be dazzled by democratic slogans that have no foundation in reality.’<sup>27</sup> Sindhis and Baluchis are still fighting for equal citizenship rights and no one knows how long this fight will go on. By making ‘citizenship’ and being Hindu and Muslim religiously compatible Jinnah himself implicitly admits that being Hindu or Muslim in political sense was, and is, anti-citizenship and incompatible with secularism, hence communal. The debate around Jinnah and the Muslim League just misses the essential point. The question is not if Jinnah was secular or religious, unless we define secularism in Indian context, the real debate is if he was secular or communalist. The real debate is not if the League was a religious or a secular organisation, this type of debate misses the essential point. The League was or was not a communal organisation like Hindu Mahasabha, is the main point. But our liberal prattlers do not do debates on these lines. God bless these liberals!

There is another group of ideologues whom God would be equally pleased to bless! This group is not overtly liberal. Rather, this group is progressive in idiom but liberal in essence. This higgledy-piggledy progressivism is more dangerous than silly liberalism for this liberalism is shrouded in progressive garments. This cloaked liberalism is hard to recognize. The hero of this group is Herr Hamza Alvi. ‘Salariat’ and ‘Ethnicity’ are his stock in trade categories. That Pakistani nation is an accomplished fact, is Alvi’s point of departure. Now there are certain

‘ethnicities’ within this nation who have not been able to shed their territorial identities. Alvi in a bout of sympathy with these ethnicities admits that the state too has played a role in forging these territorial identities. Better sense with the state could not prevail and it has lost a part of its territory to the politics of ethnicity. The salariat class is the mouthpiece of this ethnic-territorial identity because the salariat class wants jobs and state patronage. He writes:

‘This is the class which had come into being under colonial system in the nineteenth century in India. This class comprised the people who had managed to get modern education so that they could get state jobs. At various levels, such as clerks and managers...[along with this class] another class which plays an important role in ethnic politics is the urban petty-bourgeoisie...Certain other elements which influence territorial politics or nationality based politics, are those elements who want to capture power and because of this they advocate territorial autonomy. For instance, big landlords and *sardars* in Pakistan. They see their benefit reflected in ethnic politics of the salariat class and with their support they win power at provincial level. They again get benefited when the slogans of ethnic unity are raised; thanks to this [raising of ethnic unity slogans] the class question is put on the back burner and loses its charisma. In contrast to these [the salariat class, feudals], the subaltern class, such as proletariat and hunger-stricken peasants get only nuts in the bargain.’<sup>28</sup>

...The argument that Pakistan had been established on the basis of a religious ideology is wrong, because almost all religious groups or organizations of the subcontinent were at logger heads with

Jinnah and the League and had strongly opposed Pakistan. Among those organisations, Jamiat Ulama-e-Hindh was the robust of all...Such a claim that Pakistan was founded on Islamic ideology, is in contradiction with the modern education, lifestyle and aspirations of the Muslim League leaders... [The notion] that Pakistan is an embodiment of the centuries-old Islamic aspirations of the Indian Muslims...is against the Pakistan movement's leaders' commitment to secular politics.<sup>29</sup>

The founding of Pakistani nationalism on territorial basis would have been a suitable alternative to ethnic loyalties... the reason why 'Pakistani nationalism' could not be forged is to be sought in the needless use of religious ideology in politics. Language and territorial loyalties had remained dominant in our nation...The people who raised ethnic demands also had a reason to complain, but the context of those ethnic movements was quite weak. They [the people who raised ethnic demands] did not realize that if the country were to be industrialized and made progress in economy, they would gain more than their territorial or ethnic demands. For by doing so the country would have enough resources for all ethnic and territorial elements in the country. But, these ethnic movements are parasitic in nature, they insisted on a share in government jobs. Ethnic demands have always been the centre of political debate in Pakistan and because of this the more important questions like class problems or national development could not find due attention...Nor was the feudal roiling group interested in these problems because national industrial and economic development was not in their favor. Because of

these reasons Pakistani nation could not sufficiently utilize its resources and had to rely on foreign aid. Ethnic movements, the foundation of which was provided by the salariat class, were disappointed by the centralist state. Therefore, these movements took on the demand of provincial autonomy. When the clash between territorial movements and the centralist state emerged, the revolutionary elements naturally had to support these [ethnic] movements. These revolutionary elements unconditionally supported the regional ethnic groups motivated by the salariat class; therefore, the leftists also did not pay much attention to national development and failed to realize that our ruling class was unable to lead the nation on the path to progress. The feudal-bureaucracy nexus had got complete control over the state, whereas the pro-revolution leftist elements took the state to be an institution of plunder and exploitation and they did not even wish to consider that [the state] could have been utilized for national progress. Neither the liberals nor the progressives ever thought of it. They just blindly followed the way of ethnic and territorial movements...The ideology of Pakistani nation is not just limited to the confines of the state, it is larger [than the state ideology]. The ruling class must think about it seriously...Mr. Jinnah had quite persistently upheld the secularist point of view. He disapproved of the Mullas' ignorance and expressed his disapproval [of the Mullas and Maulavis] by calling them 'an unnecessary element'. *Jinnah's definition of the 'Muslim nation' was political not religious.* His successor, Liaqat Ali Khan too quite commendably continued the secularist tradition...The Muslim League under the leadership of Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan never adopted any theological ideology

for state-making...Jinnah time and again expressed his views about secularist foundation of the state, most important of all was his 11<sup>th</sup> August, 1947 speech...Even after using Islam, politics in Pakistan still circles around ethnic elements and ethnic identities. The struggle of the salariat class for more jobs has been the main motive of politics here. The left and pro-revolution elements have allied themselves with this ethnicity-based politics mechanistically. That is why the more important problems like class question have not received much attention. However, by doing so the foundation of national economic development could have been laid and this would have resulted in prosperity for all...Here, on the one hand, the ethnic elements have been agitating for their narrow-minded demands; and, on the other hand, the ruling class is busy consolidating its control over the centrist state. Our attention, in these conditions, gets diverted from class realignment especially when this question of class realignment is a must for economic prosperity and the absence of which blurs our vision of a common prosperous future. Therefore, the ethnic contradiction and religious extremism push the question of economic development to the wall...The Muslims belonging to the minority provinces, who had given immense sacrifices for propagation of Muslim nationalism in Hindustan were forgotten...We have failed to become a nation because of the confusion [created by] ethnic and territorial movements and religion. *But now we have to make ourselves one nation. Usually, national consciousness is formed by national movements, but ours is a different case. We already have a national state; all we have now to do is just form a national ideology because a national*

*ideology is very necessary for a nation-state.*<sup>30</sup>

This is our would-be Marxist Hamza Alvi and these are his words, words, and just words!

Another progressivist, Dr. Sayed Jaffar Ahmad has this to say:

...It is quite correct that the demand for Pakistan was based on the two-nations theory, the documents of the Muslim League and Quaid-i-Azam's statements prove that for him the two-nations theory was a political point of view which was adopted at a certain stage for ensuring the rights of the Muslims. The two-nations theory was presented in an age self-determination for nations. And the concept of national sovereignty was increasingly gaining recognition in the world...He tried a lot to have the rights of the Muslims safeguarded in a united India...At the time of propounding the two-nations theory, Quaid-i-Azam was, in fact, giving a new political formation to the cultural identity of a minority. It was not a new thing in ethnic politics of the world; one can give dozens of examples of this where cultural identities were used for political group formation...By doing so Quaid-i-Azam was neither expressing any religious bias, nor was he claiming a religion to be superior. He was just of the view that Muslims and Hindus are different...He was always away from religious tangles. He had started his career by being an exponent of the rights of the Muslim minority. He very clearly knew the difference between a 'religious politics' and a 'politics for the rights of a religious minority'...He was very clear about the question of sovereignty in Pakistan. Although he

had used the expression 'Islamic system', and 'Islamic state', but this did not signify a theocracy for him...Quaid-i-Azam's 11 August speech causes trouble for those who wanted to make Pakistan a theocratic state.<sup>31</sup>

This is nothing but Pakistani meta-narrative. Hamza Alvi suffers from the illusion that Pakistan is a national state. Now, all they have to do is to create a nation for this national state. He believes in this illusion, and he has got the guts to call himself a Marxist! He tries to play down the basic fact of this country's political life that there are five nations here. And Pakistan far from being a national state is, in reality, a prison house of nations. Alvi does not define as to what he means by 'ethnicity'. But, proceeds on to dismiss every demand of the oppressed nations as 'ethnic demands for jobs'. There are ethnicities in every nation, but an ethnicity does not have a separate economic and cultural life apart from the nation whose ethnicity it is. Mostly, ethnicities within a nation acquire national culture and are a natural part of its economy. Baluchis, Siraikis, etc. in Sindh are linguistic ethnicities but they are a part of Sindh's national economic and cultural life. Likewise, various clans and tribes in Sindh too are different ethnicities. Ethnicities naturally shed their particularities as the national life progresses. Capitalism accelerates this process. Ethnicities do not have their own separate states and parliaments; they may be represented in these institutions on reservation basis or on the basis of common citizenship if the national life is advanced and democratic. Let us see the modern age. Sindh had a state structure of its own when the British conquered it. It was not a state of the Talpur ethnicity, but it was a Sindhi state. It was the imperialists who made Sindh a province. A nation aspires for statehood, but the imperialists could not fulfill this demand. They could only grant provincial assemblies to the



various nations of India. These provincial assemblies were by no means autonomous, and provincial autonomy was a mere bogey. The governor had all the powers, including the power to dismiss the assembly. Franchise was limited, so that provincial assemblies could by no means represent the peoples of India. A more democratic structure like the USA, Canada, and today's EU was unthinkable as long as India was held in subjugation by the imperialists. Even then, various ethnicities of Sindh—from Sayeds to Talpurs and Hindus (Sindhi Hindus, like Sindhi Muslims, were not a single ethnicity), were represented in the provincial assembly. There were political parties like the Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha, Haari Committee, the League, the Communist Party, religious parties; people belonging to various ethnicities subscribed to those parties not on the basis of ethnicity but on the basis of their political programs, slogans and activity. Anyone with sufficient strength, or blessings of the masters, could be the head of the state, and he was called the Prime Minister. I have never heard of a Prime Minister of an ethnicity like the Sayeds or Mirbahars, the Parsis, Khujas, etc. There was a stable political state structure in Sindh, as in the Punjab, Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan Bengal, Madras, Gujrat, etc. and their respective provincial assemblies were an expression of this political structure. *23 March, 1940 cannot just bury this. Alvi would have us believe that the very creation of Pakistani state in 1947 demoted these nations from the status of nations to that of ethnicities!* The reason: because Pakistani state is a national state so it must have one nation. Sindhi, Punjabi, Baluchis, etc. are for him just territorial identities. Let us remind him what a territorial identity is. *Utradi, Laari, Thari*, etc. are territorial identities of Sindhi nation but these territorial identities do not disrupt the political texture of Sindh. The Bengalis, which for Alvi is a territorial identity, disrupted the political texture of Alvi's 'national state' and won their own independent political

formation, whatever independence might signify in the age of neo-globalization. Alvi's point of departure is 'national state of Pakistan', and he just brushes aside everything connected with the rights of oppressed nations a reactionary demand of the salariat class and feudals. The leftists who ally themselves with these movements are dubbed 'mechanistic' by this pseudo-Marxist liberal ideologue. He and the kindred are statist, not Marxists!

Our heroes of provincial-autonomy are also responsible. They want *provincial* autonomy. Please keep in mind that a province is just a territory. That is why the builders of mega Pakistani-meta-narrative are quick to dismiss the demands of the oppressed nations as nothing but a provincial bogey, just a territorial, ethnic, provincial problem. *The problem is not provincial, but nation. Nations fight for their rights as nations not as provinces and if they cannot, shame on them! Provincial autonomy is basically a shamefaced demand, a demand born out of weakness rather than strength. This politics of weakness would not be able to win us laurels of national liberation.* The basic, the first and foremost right of a nation is political self-determination, or the right to have its own state all your empty talk amounts to nothing. You are liquidating the cause of the oppressed nations by presenting it in the idiom of provincial autonomy. Or may be the fact is that you are afraid of doing politics in the name of Sindh as a nation. Herr Alvi is all tears for the 'sacrifices of the Muslims of minority provinces' and has only contempt for the sufferings for the oppressed peoples! He deliberately insults the oppressed nations. Alvi's Marxism is a mockery, a caricature of Marxism. We have seen the Marxists of the Second International who were quite eager to bury Marxism by using Marxist idiom! This case here is no different. Let us see what the real Marxist position is on the question of national liberation.

## **Engles to Marx**

Manchester, 24 October, 1869

‘Irish history shows one how disastrous it is for a nation when it has subjugated another nation’<sup>32</sup>

## **Marx to Engles**

London, 29 November, 1869

‘...my further proposal to the General Council to discuss the relation of the English working class to Ireland and to pass resolutions on it, have of course other objects besides that of speaking out loudly and decidedly for the oppressed Irish against their oppressor. I have become more and more convinced-and the only question is to bring this conviction home to the English working class-that it can never do anything decisive here in England until it separates its policy with regard to Ireland in the most definite way from the policy of the ruling class, until it not only makes common cause with the Irish, but actually takes the initiative in dissolving the Union established in 1801 and replacing it by a free federal relation. And, indeed this must be done not as a matter of sympathy with, but as a demand made in the interest of the English proletariat. If not, the English people will remain tied to the leading-strings of the ruling classes, because it must join with them in a common front against Ireland. The primary condition of emancipation here-the overthrow of the English landed oligarchy-remains impossible because its position here cannot be stormed so long as it maintains its strongly entrenched outposts in Ireland. But there, once affairs are in the hands of the Irish people itself, once it is made its own legislator and ruler, once it becomes autonomous, the abolition of the landed aristocracy (to a large extent the same persons as the English landlords) will be infinitely

easier than here, because in Ireland it is not merely a simple economic question, but at the same time a national question, since the landlords there are not like those in England, the traditional dignitaries and representatives, but are the mortally hated oppressors of a nation...In fact England never has and never can-so long as the present relation lasts-rule Ireland otherwise than by the most abominable reign of terror and the most reprehensible corruption.’<sup>33</sup>

### **Engles to Marx**

Manchester, 9 December, 1869

‘...Ireland still remains the Holy Isle whose aspirations must on no account be mixed with the profane class-struggle of the rest of the sinful world.’<sup>34</sup>

### **Marx to Engles**

London, 10 December, 1869

‘As to the Irish question...quite apart from all the phrases about ‘international’ and ‘humane justice for Ireland’-which are to be taken for granted in the International Council-it is in the direct and absolute interest of the English working class to get rid of their present connection with Ireland. And this is my most complete conviction...for a long time I believed that it would be possible to overthrow the Irish regime by English working class ascendancy. I always expressed this point of view in the *New York Tribune*. Deeper study has now convinced me of the opposite. The English working class will never accomplish anything before it has got rid of Ireland. *The lever must be applied in Ireland*. That is why the Irish question is so important for the social movement in general.’<sup>35</sup>

## **Lenin's Pamphlet on the Self-Determination of nations:**

*The policy of Marx and Engels in the Irish question furnished powerful example, which has retained its highly practical significance up to the present day, of the attitude which the proletariat of the oppressing nations must adopt towards nationalist movements. If the Irish and English proletariat had not accepted Marx's policy and had not issued the slogan of the separation of Ireland this would have been the worst opportunism on their part...How the proletariat solves the national question in practice. In its struggle for emancipation the attitude of the proletariat towards the movement for national liberation is not one of indifference, like that of Rosa Luxemburg...the proletariat supports the national movement in the most determined and active way because that movement is objectively revolutionary and leads to rebellion against imperialism in the very place where it has its 'greatest reserve and most important source of strength, thus furthering the proletarian revolution. **Stalin's Remarks On Lenin's Pamphlet:** 'Lenin is absolutely right when he says that the national movement of the oppressed countries must be regarded not from the standpoint of formal democracy, but from that of the real results of the struggle against imperialism, i.e. not in isolation but on a world scale.<sup>36</sup>*

This briefly is Marxist-Leninist position on national question and nation movements.

The liberal vulgarizers of Marxism always emphasize the subjective factors in a national movement: the petty-bourgeoisie in Bengal, the *sardars* of Baluchistan, the feudals of Sindh etc. and by doing so try to discredit these movements and raise the slogans of the proletarian unity. This proletarian unity itself demands that the present union (Pakistan in its present shape) be replaced with a voluntary and equalitarian structure. But 'there is poverty

in the Punjab' sort of dialectics forgets that there are poors in USA and England!

One can only laugh at Alvi's calling Pakistan 'our national state'! How can he identify himself with *this* state? Did he claim to be a Marxist or not? Was it the same state which deported many Marxists from Sindh to India, killed many Marxists and progressive peoples? Dr. Jaffar Ahmad has tried to secularize the two-nations theory by trying to show us senseless mortals that the two-nations theory was a new meaning to 'cultural minority'. Muslims in India had never been a 'cultural minority' as religion is not the sole criterion of cultural difference and similarity. Calling the Muslims of India a 'cultural minority' is a gross misreading of facts and a misnomer. This is the usual British attitude of categorizing peoples on the basis of their faiths.

Alvi and Dr. Jaffar have made it quite clear that Pakistan was not demanded in the name of religion, and that Pakistan was a political demand. . Jami Chandio has very recently announced the same good news! We must thank them for this great piece of information! They want to absolve the League leadership from all charges and prove them to be secularists. The very question has been wrongly posed here. As has been discussed earlier, religion-as-faith is quite different from religion-as-politics, or religion-as-ideology or mobilization. Communalism does not mean big beards, long robes. Communalism does not mean theocracy. Israel is a communal state, and it is also a developed bourgeois democracy, not a theocracy. Zionism was not a religious movement; various Jewish religious organizations had opposed Zionism. The Zionists were western-educated English, German, French, Russian speaking gentlemen and by no means bearded Rabbis. The implications of Jinnah's 11 August speech have been discussed earlier. The three gentlemen will like us to digest

their personal fractured notions in the name of Marxism! They peddle their alchemy of progress in the name of social science in this part of the world.

The same bald narrative is also to be found in the works of eminent progressive thinkers like Sibte-e-Hassan. In his book, 'The Battle of Ideas in Pakistan', he repeats the same secularist projection of the League in general and Jinnah in particular. We have traced the history of Jinnah's 'Fourteen Points' and his surrender to the provincialism of the Punjab in particular as the Government of India Act, 1935, had shifted the centre of political contest to the provinces. Hassan calls these 'points', 'an important stage in the development of Muslim consciousness'.<sup>37</sup> One is at liberty to ask what 'Muslim consciousness' is comrade Hassan talking about. These fourteen points were in fact a proof of Jinnah's surrender to the future designs of the Punjab politicians. Can there be any thing like 'Muslim consciousness'? And it is also to be noted that this 'important stage in development of Muslim consciousness' did not win votes for the League in 1937 elections. The 'Muslim consciousness' that might have been formed by these 'Fourteen Points' won Jinnah only a paltry 4 % Muslim reserved votes. He and his League would have been routed in a joint-electorate election on the basis of universal adult suffrage.

Sibte-e-Hassan then quotes Iqbal who, reflecting the expansionist tendency of the urbanite communal Muslim Punjabis, endorsed Jinnah's 'Fourteen Points' –the fact is that those were the Fourteen points of the Shafi League whose Secretary was none other than Iqbal himself! Iqbal said: 'Personally I would go further than the demands embodied in it. I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or

without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of the North-West India.<sup>38</sup>

Can one tell this ‘dream’ of Iqbal’s from that of Sikandar Hayat Khan which he had shared with Churchill in Cairo? Can one find an iota of dissimilarity between what Mr. M.R.T says about Pakistan ‘a bigger Punjab’ to lure the Sikhs into joining the League scheme and the ‘dream’ of the poet-philosopher Herr Iqbal? This is the same theme doing rounds. Comrade Hassan writes: ‘It is tragedy that the Lilliputian minds of Hindu and Muslim leadership failed to appreciate the revolutionary significance of the words of their great thinker.’<sup>39</sup> Iqbal’s ‘revolutionary’ idea, according to comrade Hassan, was Iqbal’s insistence on the recognition of diversity of India by the supporters of a united India. Before praising Iqbal’s ‘revolutionary’ idea, one must take his idea’s wider implications in to account. Diversity for Iqbal was nothing but the recognition of the Punjab’s right to have a dominion of its own, as we have seen above. There was a fly in the ointment, and that fly was, ‘the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of the North-West India.’ It is not for nothing that Pakistani state projects Iqbal as the man who dreamt the dream of Pakistan, for today’s Pakistan is exactly what Iqbal had desired as ‘the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of the North-West India’, minus Kashmir and Bengal. Then there are the same ‘secularist’ projections of Jinnah also to be found in Sibte-Hassan’s book! He quotes Jinnah: ‘what are we fighting for? What are we aiming at? It is not for a theocracy, nor for a theocratic state. Religion is there and religion is dear to us. All the worldly goods are nothing to us when we talk of religion but there are other things which are very vital-



our social, our economic life'.<sup>40</sup>

He, along with others of the ilk, fails to understand the difference between religious politics and communal politics and poses the question the wrong way as Alvi and Dr. Jaffar have done. Communalism is not theocracy; communalism is a fight for the same 'other things which are very vital-our social, our economic life'. Our theorists just forget this and in order to fight the Islamic ideological onslaught of the Jamat-e-Islami, resurrected the secularist myth of Jinnah and the League. Why is it so that none of these eminent writers have ever talked about communalism? The title of Ibrahim Joyo's book "Save Sindh, Save the Continent-From Feudals, Capitalists and Their Communalisms", speaks volumes about the communal politics of 'feudals and capitalists'-other things as Jinnah calls them. This single sentence throws more light on the problem of communalism than all the words of our eminent progressivists.

How is one to understand this attitude of these 'progressivists'? Antonio Gramsci writes: 'It is obvious that it is impossible to abolish a 'pure' form, without radically abolishing its content'.<sup>41</sup> This is the dilemma of our progressivists. They want secularize this state without bothering much about the abolishing of the communal content of this state. Rather, they are using the same tools as had been used by Jinnah. This is not criticism but hypocrisy of criticism. Pakistan cannot be just criticized in its pure form, if we do not first criticize its content. But our alchemists find this 'national state' beyond criticism and instead criticize its political form. This is what Gramsci calls 'statolatory'. Gramsci writes: This 'statolatory' is nothing other than the normal forms of 'state life', or at least of initiation to autonomous state life and to the creation of a 'civil society' which it was not historically

possible to create before the ascent to independent state life.<sup>42</sup> The establishment of Pakistan was not the result of a political movement. Whatever politics was done for its establishment was communal in its essence. Our liberals, and progressivists-the ideologues of civil society- did not like this past political standpoint. Now, a civil society 'nation' is being formed ever since the creation of the state. The main task before these thinkers is to exorcise the communal spirit. They do not call this 'spirit' communal; they call it religious and then compare this 'religious spirit'-which they want to exorcise- with the supposedly original secularism of the leaders of the state. By doing so, these thinkers show themselves to be direct heirs to the founding fathers of Pakistan who were secular and democratic! If the army establishes dictatorship and suspends the constitution, these heirs would quote the founding fathers of the state and try to show that the founding fathers wanted a democratic Pakistan. If the Mullhas give these heirs tough time, they quote the 'secularist' views of the founding fathers. They can churn out any thing out of 'founding fathers' *chaunrri*.

Our liberals and progressivists are at a loss. They cannot revolutionize this society on the basis of Marxism. So just in order to make their demands legal and legitimate, they put their demands in the language acceptable to the state. But societies are never revolutionarised legally and legitimately. Legal/legitimate language or revolutionary language, there is no third option here.

Our heroes of provincial autonomy too have learned their 'abc' of progressivism, as seems, at the feet of our progressivists. Now, they too are heard speaking legal/legitimate language: (please grant us provincial autonomy because it is our legal,democratic demand and it was promised to us in the Lahore resolution!). But who

takes their legal/legitimate outpourings seriously? Who takes a document suited only for historical consolation?

V

## Sindh Suffers

TO CALL SINDH A PROVINCE IS A MISNOMER.  
SINDH IS A COUNTRY AND SINDHIS A NATION,  
EVEN SO ARE PUNJABIS AND BENGALIS NATIONS.

Hyder Bux Jatoi<sup>1</sup>

‘We have been collected on a platform (i.e. the League). We hoped that this would lead us to unity of purpose and we would be able to join hands and work for collective good. Alas! There seem no signs that the hope will work....the League as an organisation is just like a man who collects the whole humanity under one roof and then will have the roof bombarded in order to finish off the

people underneath.’<sup>2</sup>

I. I. Kazi’s words which were not published  
by ‘*Qurbani*’ on 22 February, 1947.

‘The demand for making the Bengali as one of the state languages is a demand for national rights of the Bengali nation. This demand is a birth right of the Bengali nation and a demand for democratic rights. Therefore, the movement for establishing the rights, and democratic rights, of the Bengali nation. The state language movement is a movement for giving equal status to all spoken languages of Pakistan Bengali, Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushtu, Baluchi, etc. It is a movement for giving equal status to the language and culture of all nations; it is a movement of all the people speaking different languages against a small reactionary ruling-clique’<sup>3</sup>

Resolution of Secretariat of  
the East Bengali Organizing  
Committee of the Communist  
Party, 11 February, 1952

‘We too had been invited to the independence day celebration on 14<sup>th</sup> August, 1947 by the Muslim League in Karachi. We too had raised slogans, ‘Pakistan Zindabad!’, ‘Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Zindabad!’, though we had raised our own slogans, like ‘Communist Party, Zindabad!’, ‘Hindu-Muslim Unity, Zindabad!’ A communalist party, a party which was founded on communal hatred, and we took that party, the Muslim League, to be the party of the Muslim masses. This was a sure sign of our political immaturity. The Communists thought that the Congress had failed to attract the Muslim masses and by working in the

shadow of the League, they [the Communists] would be able to attract the masses to their programme. On many an occasion, I debated with Sobho, he too was not happy at this. But since the question of the discipline of the party of revolution was involved, it had to be right at all cost'.<sup>5</sup>

Keerat Babbani



Did the 'ruling clique' of various Indian peoples play traitors to their motherlands? Yes they did. And what is more, they did so with impunity and a sense of mission, of a higher duty. For instance, the Bengalis who started hollering for the rights of their language when Pakistan of the Lahore resolution became reality, had been so numbed with frenzy that they wanted to have Urdu,' the language of the Muslims' in Bengal as a medium of instruction. The Hindu –Muslim imbroglio had become so much poisonous that just in order to incommode the Hindus, a large section of the Bengali Muslims was willing to acquire Urdu... M. K. M. Zakrya, who had been elected to the Calcutta mayoralty on the support of the Bose brothers, pointed out in his speech that the Bengali Muslims should feel ashamed at not having adequately learnt Bengali...Maulvi Fazul Qaq, Khwaja Nazimudin and Abdur Rahman Siddique opposed him and said they had wanted to ask the Muslims to adopt Urdu as their mother tongue.<sup>4</sup>

Why did Jinnah want the Congress to declare the Muslim League as the only authoritative and representative organisation of the Muslims of India? (these Muslims, who were, and are, ideologically, politically, linguistically, socially and economically and historically divided). Jinnah was well aware that the Congress will never submit to such

a bizarre demand, he was fully aware of this. The acceptance of this demand by the Congress would have made the League a party of the Indian Muslim overnight (those who were franchised at least). Jinnah was finding it very difficult to keep the League in bounds-as we have seen in Jinnah-Nehru correspondence where Nehru points out Nawab Ismail Khan and Chodhary Khaliqzaman being responsive to the Congress. The Punjab still was for Jinnah, 'a hopeless place'. Bengal was slippery as ever, and Sindh still did not feel sufficiently involved with the League. All the aspiring politicals would have made a bee line joining the League if Jinnah really could get the 'category' accepted by the Congress. The League was left with in ramshackle conditions after the polls of 1937 (it could manage to get a mere 4 % of total reserved Muslim votes, no seat in Sindh, just one in the Punjab, only 108 seats out of 485 seats reserved for Muslims<sup>6</sup>). It was this 4 % League which wanted to be categorized as the 'only authoritative and representative organisation of the Indian Muslims'. Jinnah is routinely described as a constitutionalist, and votes are the only weapons a constitutionalist has. But on account of votes, the League was a miserable disaster. 377 elected representatives of the Muslims would be demonized as 'quisling', 'traitors'. Sooner than later, the 'quisling' would join the League and strengthen the cause of the Muslims! Most of them had been elected from various platforms and organizations, but horse trading if done in the name of wider Muslim interests, was legitimate then as now! The policy was that of zero tolerance, Jinnah himself refused to shake hand with Maulana Azad, because the latter was a non-Muslim League Muslim leader. What a democratic principle to set! What precedence!

This demand was unprecedented in the annals of the Indian political history. The MQM is doing almost the same sort of exclusivist politics. It would not tolerate any political organisation in its midst.

The politicians who found it convenient to do politics of 'categories', could not do otherwise. It would have been a boon for the League if it could manage to extract such an admission from the Congress. Peoples of India are 'Hindus', 'Muslims', 'Sikhs', etc. 'Hindus' are a 'majority', so the 'minority' needs extra care and protection from the 'majority'-as if the only business that had brought the British in India was saving the 'minority from 'majority'. Now, the 'majority-minority' had reached such a point where they both cannot be entrusted with the responsibilities of saving India. What would become of India if 'we' leave the scene in such conditions? Categories first and then let the people fight the things out among themselves. You be a disinterested onlooker!

Jinnah in his 'Toast' to the British king on 13<sup>th</sup> August, 1947 misinterpreted history in these words:

'Since the assumption of the reign of the Government of India by Queen Victoria, a great and good Queen (this 'great and good Queen' became India's ruler when India's First War of Independence of 1857's had been brutally crushed, the number of people hanged by their necks from trees was simply beyond count! the writer),by the Proclamation and the very Act that was enacted for the assumption of power and authority of the British crown and parliament, it was made clear that it will be the deep concern and definite objective of the British nation to lead India ultimately to the goal of its becoming self-governing and independent state. In the pursuit of that policy since the days of Macaulay there never was any question about the principle, but there remained always the question of how and when. In that process during the reign of



four generations of the British crown there were controversies and differences of opinion as to the pace for realization of freedom and independence. There have been many acts of commission and omission, but at the same time we cannot help recognize that the British genius and those Britishers who ruled India for over a century did so to the best of their judgment and have left their marks in many spheres of life and especially the judicial system, which has been the greatest bulwark and safe guard for the rights and liberties of the people.<sup>7</sup>

Indeed! The empire was erected to lead the natives to the promised land of democracy and self-governance. True! The British law was the last hope of the poor Indians. Jinnah seemed to have forgotten that some 3 million people had died in Bengal due to an unheard of famine, and some 2 million succumbed to another famine during the last days of the reign of the 'great and good' British crown. The empire had been inaugurated with a famine and millions of deaths, the empire receded with another famine and millions of death in famine and communal carnage. But all this did not count!

A liberal prattler has dug out an idea to resuscitate the myth by making Jinnah a hero of provincial autonomy<sup>8</sup>. Jinnah's reluctance to discuss any thing related with the question of plebiscite on the partition and Pakistan is a proof enough and an eye-opener. Perhaps, Jami has heard about the leading Indian Marxist Aijaz Ahmad who writes:

...One need not lump together all 'reform' movement as being uniformly progressive. Two things can be said, however. One is that the early

history of Indian communism is replete with instances of people who abandoned bourgeois nationalism and joined the then developing communist movement because they were disaffected with the inconsistencies of that kind of nationalism as regards the question of radical redistribution of economic power and social prestige that could truly benefit the oppressed castes and classes. In other words, the pursuit of reform took not only liberal and conservative forms but also led to radical and revolutionary politics. Secondly, it needs also to be said that among the more progressive elements in Indian bourgeois nationalism there was a common perception that India could not really become a modern nation without profoundly changing itself and renouncing some of the worst aspects of its own past, and that the battle of modern nationhood for India was a battle not only against the colonial oppressor but also against the anachronism and cruelties of many of its own social structures and practices. *One positive result of this commitment to progressive reform was that, unlike so many colonies oppressed by the arrogance and racism of colonial rulers, revivalist tendencies never became dominant in anti-colonial movement...* This accounts for the fact that whereas the far right remained utterly isolated in Indian politics in the early decades of the Republic, the communist left was widely perceived as the main ideological alternative to liberal bourgeois nationalism at that time, while, at the same time, the communist left and the Nehruvian state shared the secular and democratic values of the Indian Constitution... Let me now turn to the character of that state as it arose out of the independence movement. First, India became a

secular republic, not a Hindu Rashtra, despite the communal holocaust that had developed the partition itself, and in sharp contrast to neighboring Pakistan. Second, *the Republic was conceived not as a unitary nation state which has been the norm in the western Europe but as a 'union of nationalities'; state boundaries had been drawn during the colonial period for administrative convenience and were now redrawn according to principle of nationality. Third, a 'union of nationalities' can only be a federation with considerable power vested in the federating units*<sup>9</sup>

All this had been decided in 1931 Karachi Congress resolution on 'Basic Rights'. None other than Chodhary Khaliquzaman, the man who would second the Lahore resolution, writes in his 'Pathways to Pakistan':

Khaliquazaman then writes about the Congress 1931 session , Karachi in which a resolution on 'Fundamental Rights' was passed. The resolution offered to the provinces and the minorities, in words of Khaliquazaman:

'The Nehru Report was drowned in the Ravi....The Congress now hit upon the following solution:

1. The basic rights of the minorities stand guaranteed.
2. The minorities will have the guarantee of their religious laws.
3. Protection of the political rights of minorities in their provinces.
4. Adult franchise.
5. Joint electorates.
6. If the population of a minority is less than 25% in a province, then the minority will have additional allocated representation and they will also be

allowed to contest on other seats.

7. Appointment of a public service commission on non-party basis.
8. Reforms in Baluchistan.
9. Sindh be separated from Bombay and made a province, provided it can manage its financial matters.
10. The constitution will be federal, and the residual powers will reside with the provinces.’<sup>10</sup>

The cooing liberal has included Ian Talbot’s book “Pakistan: A Modern history” in bibliography of his ‘research, without having read the book, it seems. Because Ian Talbot writes in this book:

‘Sindh Muslim League in 1920s and 1930s was only nominally interested in the two most important political movements with far-reaching effects in Sindh. The first was that of the Khilafat Movement, while the second was the movement of Sindh’s separation from Bombay presidency. All-India Muslim League only after 1925 started to take interest in Sindh’s separation, not because the All-India Muslim League loved Sindhi Muslims, but because the central League organisation wanted to use the issue of Sindh’s separation to pressurize the Government for constitutional reforms. That was the reason why the Sindhi Muslims turned away from the League and formed in 1932 Azad Sindh Conference.’<sup>11</sup>.

Talbot has written another very important book on the question of the League’s role in the provinces, ‘Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement: The Growth of the Muslim League in North –West and North-East India’, published in 1988. But the liberal bigwig seems

to have forgotten to read this more important book.

Jinnah stood, if at all, for ‘Muslim’ provinces. As if there was anything like the Hindu provinces! But liberals usually prefer to remain immune to facts. Jami’s fact-free assertion that the Congress *strongly* opposed Sindh’s separation from Bombay is another example of his immunity. This we will discuss later in this chapter.

We have seen that the Punjab was against a federation with India where it would lose its monopoly over defense forces (see Mr. M.R.T’s arguments to woo the Sikhs).

### **RUN UP TO 1940**

The Punjab Premier, Sikandar Hayat, on 11 March, 1941, explained his position in these words:

‘It has been said that I am the author of the Lahore resolution. I have no hesitation in admitting that I was responsible for drafting the original resolution. But let me make it clear that the resolution which I drafted was radically amended by the Working Committee, and there is a wide divergence in the resolution I drafted and that was finally passed. *The main difference between the two resolutions is that the latter part of my resolution which related to the Centre and co-ordination of the activities of various units was eliminated.* It is, therefore, a travesty of fact to describe the League resolution as it was finally passed as my resolution. It must be taken as the official resolution of the Muslim League which was ratified by the Muslim League...it is my fixed conviction that the future of India lies in accepting a position of freedom within the British

Commonwealth (*which means that Britain will be responsible for India's defense against foreign aggression, and this would give the English a sense of relief as the Bolsheviks would not be allowed to penetrate into the oil-rich region, writer*), ...which is the main and the only safeguard against aggression so far as we are concerned...It is fortunate that the population of India is so distributed in the various units that in four out of the eleven British Indian Provinces Muslim are in majority, though in two of these they are just a bare majority (Punjab and Bengal, writer)-while in the remaining seven provinces Hindus are in the majority (*these provincial boundaries were the creation of the British Government, the Congress had passed resolutions to redraw the provincial boundaries, so this stupid talk of 'Muslim minority' or 'Hindu majority' was based on an acceptance that these boundaries were eternal and minority, majority too are eternal, writer*), -it provides the fullest opportunity and scope to the two major communities, within their respective territorial spheres to exercise and enjoy the rights of a majority, subject, of course, to the rights and privileges of the minorities. If we accept this principle, which to my mind is a rational principle, then all those difficulties which are of our own making, and which obstruct our constitutional progress will disappear *as if by a magic wand*...I say, give complete autonomy and freedom to the units and let them be demarcated into regions or zones on a territorial basis.<sup>12</sup>

Who was listening to Sikandar Hayat Khan? Surely, there was someone; it was the English ear. The Cripps Mission (March, 1942) sent to India was a ditto copy of

what Sikandar Hayat Khan was offering from the floor of the assembly a year ago. The Punjab had to be accommodated. But how? Amery, the Secretary of State for India, informed the viceroy, Linlithgow on 10 March, 1942, a fortnight before Cripps landed in Delhi:

‘As for the Congress their adverse reaction may be all the greater when they discover that the nest [Cripps’ offer] contains Pakistan Cookoo’s egg.<sup>13</sup>

The ditto copy, grouping and zoning of provinces on communal lines, was the main feature of Cripps’ offer, and this was exactly what sir Sikandar Hayat wanted and called this ‘a magic wand’.

Little wonder, the Congress rejected the offers, Jinnah, while welcoming the secession clause as ‘a recognition of Pakistan by implication’, too rejected the scheme because it gave the provinces and princely states and not ‘the Muslim nation’ the right to separate.<sup>14</sup>

Sikandar Hayat had the opportunity to see Churchill, accompanied his trusted allies in the Punjab cabinet including Choto Ram, in Cairo, Egypt in 1941. He raised two points before the imperialist mad man. 1. *It is the Punjab which helps the British win their battles. And in the Punjab, the group which is most helpful is Punjab’s martial races. If, in the name of India’ freedom, a constitution is devised that brings the Congress’ pundits in the Central government and rule over the martial races, then this would be injurious to our interests.* 2. *Loyal Punjab deserves a favor: a dominion including Sindh, Baluchistan, and NWFP, ruled by the Punjab.* This dominion will be friendly to the British. That this dominion will be self-sufficient economically is beyond doubt. Churchill noted these demands and the Cripps’ offer, sent

to India after a few months, was the reflection of this thinking.<sup>15</sup> But why did Amery called the offer an anticipation of Pakistan? Is it that the offer and Sir Sikandar's demand were almost identical: a Pakistan from Punjab's point of view?



Ayesha Jalal writes: 'The viceroy's decision to postpone all constitutional advance gave Jinnah and the League an opening [laying low after the 1937 election disaster]. Once the Congress had spelt out its terms for cooperation in the war effort, namely independence here and now, it became urgently necessary for the viceroy to justify keeping things as they were for the duration of the war. The League's claim to speak for all Muslims seemed a convenient excuse with which to challenge the Congress' claim to speak for the whole of India. So the viceroy pressed Jinnah to outline the League's *'Constructive Policy.'*<sup>16</sup>

### **Background:**

Jinnah met the viceroy on 4 September 1939. He pledged 'the loyalty of the Muslim community everywhere (after all he was the only authoritative representative of Muslims in India wherever they were and whatever they were, even the Muslims who were in the Communist Party!). The viceroy then asked Jinnah about his opinion of the Congress. Jinnah replied 'Turn them out at once. Nothing else will bring them to their senses. Their object, though many not believe it...is nothing less to destroy both you and us Muslims. They will never stand by you.'<sup>17</sup> Jaswant Singh, who has become a hero of Urdu media, notes the incident in these words:



On 4 September, 1939, the viceroy saw Jinnah. Before the interview he had received a message from Sikandar Hayat Khan, who asked that nothing should be done to inflate Jinnah or make him more difficult to deal with. Sikandar Hayat Khan also repeated what he had already said in public 'that the Punjab and Bengal were wholly behind the government in the prosecution of the war whatever Jinnah and his friends might say'. The viceroy conveyed to Jinnah, as he had already to Gandhi, the need of suspending federal negotiations. Jinnah said he regretted that Sikandar Hayat Khan had rushed in front of his colleagues in the Muslim League to pledge co-operation. He [Jinnah] had no feelings against Sikandar Hayat Khan, but as Sikandar alone could not deliver the goods, Jinnah asked the viceroy to strengthen his [Jinnah's] hands. He wanted something positive to take back to his followers, preferably a complete re-shaping of the constitution. Linlithgow asked if he wanted that the Congress ministries be turned out? *'Yes! Turn them out at once. Nothing else will bring them to their senses. Their object, though many not believe it, and though I did not believe it till two years [back], is nothing less than to destroy both you British and us Muslims. They will never stand by you'*. The viceroy then asked Jinnah to explain a statement he had recently made in public that he no longer believed in democratic government for India (the constitutionalist Jinnah?!) How was India to obtain self-government if not by democracy? Jinnah replied that the escape from this impasse lay in partition.<sup>18</sup>

Jinnah's exact words, not given in Jaswant Singh's book, were: Muslim areas should be separated from Hindu

India and run by Muslims in collaboration with Great Britain.<sup>19</sup>

In fact Jinnah had spoken candidly to the viceroy on the partition issue, because his lieutenant, Khaliqazaman, had met Lord Zetland (Secretary of State for India) a few months earlier. According to Khaliqazaman, when he had conveyed to Zetland the desirability of the creation of autonomous Muslim states in the subcontinent that would remain linked with Britain for defense, the British minister showed enough interest to prolong the talk for an hour and a half! The answer Khaliqazaman gave to Zetland, when asked about defense, needs to be quoted because it was to make the minister feel that the Muslim League would remain dependent upon, and subservient to Britain: 'If you want to know about defense for the period that you are not in any way connected with the administration of the country, then I beg your Lordship not to put that question to me, for God only knows what will happen to us then.'<sup>20</sup>

Jaswant Singh notes: This was perhaps the first occasion where Jinnah mentioned a partition of India formally. The viceroy saw Jinnah again...and found him more friendly and co-operative than earlier. Jinnah began by thanking Linlithgow for helping him (Jinnah) keep the Muslim together; 'Jinnah', the viceroy reported, 'began by 'expressing his great gratitude for what I had done to assist him in keeping his party together'. Jinnah was referring to the pressure Linlithgow had applied on Sikandar Hayat Khan, the premier of the Punjab, to fall in line;<sup>21</sup> to which the viceroy somewhat self-righteously responded that it 'was in public interest that the Muslim point of view be fully and competently expressed.'<sup>22</sup>

The same media hero Jaswant Singh further writes: there is enough evidence...that Jinnah at this stage was

working in collaboration with the viceroy. In an interview with Linlithgow, Jinnah admitted that Gandhi had enquired of him whether it was possible for the Congress and the Muslim League to jointly demand the declaration for which the congress had been pressing the British government [declaration of independence after the war], Jinnah was thus placed in an embarrassing position and had difficulty in refusing to support Congress demands. The Congress leaders warned that unless Jinnah was prepared to join them in putting up a demand, he would be exposed before the public as the real obstacle to India's independence. In this situation Linlithgow decided to call off the idea of an all-parties conference which he had planned to convene in order to expose the 'hollowness' of the Congress claim to speak for the whole of India. The viceroy realized that while such a conference could perhaps, compromise the Congress' claim of representing all of India but it would then also confirm the Congress allegation that Jinnah was working for the British government. While reporting to Zetland the summary of his interview with Jinnah, Linlithgow candidly admitted: 'He [Jinnah] had given me very valuable help by standing against the Congress claims and I was duly grateful. It was clear that if he, Mr. Jinnah, supported the Congress demand and confronted me with a joint demand, the strain upon me and His majesty's Government would have been very great indeed. I thought therefore, I could claim to have a vested interest in his position'...in the third week of December 1939, while corresponding with Nehru for exploring means for a détente between the Congress and the League, Jinnah did suddenly veer of uncharacteristically and called upon the Muslims to celebrate 'Deliverance Day'<sup>23</sup>

Linlithgow...began to urge the Muslim League to put forward *concrete proposals* to counteract the Congress' demand for independence...Reporting to Zetland on this

subject Linlithgow wrote: 'I again put forward the familiar argument for formulating and publishing *constructive policy* and in the light of our discussion he [Jinnah] said that he was disposed to think that it would be wise for his friends and himself to make public at any rate outlines of their position in good time.

These were the same '*constructive proposals*' to which Ayesha Jalal has alluded to in her book *The Sate of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political economy of Defense*<sup>24</sup>

At a meeting of the league's Working Committee in February 1940 in Delhi, on the viceroy's suggestion a proposal was moved to send a League delegation to London to plead its case before the Prime Minster and the Secretary of State. Jinnah, in fact, suggested that Khaliquazaman should form part of that delegation (remember the gentleman had met the secretary of the state for India a few month ago). The members of this delegation were Fazl-ul-Haq, Sikandar Hayat Khan, Khwaja Nazimuddin and Khaliquazaman<sup>25</sup>

Eleven days before he gave the call for the partition of India (Jaswant Singh gives the wrong date here of 6 February, 1940), Jinnah took the viceroy into confidence regarding his plans on 13 March 1940. According to Linlithgow's report to Zetland, Jinnah told him:

Given the development of the war [its possible extension into Asia] there was much to be said for our [British and Muslims] getting together...[but] if we [British] wished their [Muslims] definite and effective help we must not sell the pass behind their backs...He and his friends were clear that Muslims were not a minority but a nation, that democracy(i.e. majority rule) for India was impossible, and they were anxious not to let us get

ourselves in a position in which our hold over India was deliberately and progressively withdrawn so that in the end the control of the country would be handed over to Hindu Raj. *He [Jinnah] was quite prepared to contemplate the possibility that we might have to stay here much longer than was anticipated for the job of keeping the ring...* He wanted Muslim areas to be run by Muslims in collaboration with Great Britain (remember Khaliquazaman, writer), and that Muslims would be able to safeguard [these areas] ‘because’, he [Jinnah] said ‘of their military power even those of their community who were domiciled in the Hindu areas.’<sup>26</sup>

Military Might!? Indeed! But it was only the Punjab which had got, and still has got, the military might! These words have a great historical value.

Khaliquazaman writes:

At this stage (that is before sending the delegation to England for the final approval of 1940 resolutions, writer), Sir Sikandar who was sitting to the right of Mr. Jinnah started pleading for the nonfederal scheme and Mr. Jinnah opposing it. The discussion went on for about two hours when, finally, with the concurrence of the members, Mr. Jinnah rejected Sir Sikandar’ scheme and entered in his notebook my suggestion with approval. The League Working Committee continued to meet on 3-4 February and decided to send a delegation to England to explain the Muslim point of view.<sup>27</sup>

Khairi also notes that the viceroy had asked Jinnah for ‘*constructive proposals*.’<sup>28</sup> Sensing the Leagues mood, the Viceroy on 16 March, 1940 wrote to Zetland : If we could not improve on our present solution for the problem

of India's constitutional development, he [Jinnah] and his friends would have no option to fall back on some form of partition<sup>29</sup>.

The imperialists never wanted to lose the initiative, they had been complaining in public about the India leaders' lack of amity and fellow-feeling and were propping various petty-puppet groups to ensure no such agreement is ever reached at. It is well recorded here that whatever the sentiments of Jinnah on his ability to manipulate the viceroy, the latter [viceroy] was quite sure that he was using the former [Jinnah].

The viceroy noted: 'He represents a minority [the Muslim League] and a minority that can only hold on its own with our assistance.'<sup>30</sup>

Ayesha Jalal writes:

So for the time being neither Jinnah nor the British were ready to negotiate with the Congress. But they were ready to come to an accommodation with each other which offered prospects of setting Jinnah and the League on the road to recovery. But from the British point of view such an accommodation required the League to spell out its policy in public. During the course of his talks with Jinnah, the viceroy had: 'again put forward the familiar argument for formulating and publishing a *constructive policy* and in the light of our discussion, he [Jinnah] said that he was disposed to think it would be wise for his friends and himself to make public at any rate the outlines of their position in goodtime'. *Since Jinnah and the League were to be used to alleviate a problem of propaganda, Linlithgow pressed Jinnah to state the League's 'constructive policy' as a counterweight to the*

*Congress' demand for the independence and a constituent assembly.* There was public opinion in Britain; there was the need to get America to join the allies and to counter the threat in Asia of the Japanese, portraying themselves as the champion of Asian nationalism; and above all there was the need to maintain existing system of collaboration in the provinces (specially in the Punjab as 50% of the army hailed from this province, writer). So it was mainly a matter of finding reasonable grounds for carrying on under British management while avoiding a serious backlash, whether in India, Britain or abroad. *The complexities of the Indian communal problem seemed to offer the best pretext for doing nothing.* Since Jinnah also needed time in which to build the League's case, he was ready to recognize this conformity of interest between the League and the Viceregal Lodge, and to proceed on that basis for the time being.<sup>31</sup>

1935 Act had shown that provinces would be the centre of future power struggle. It was precisely in the provinces where Jinnah was finding it increasingly difficult to get a foothold, especially the Muslim majority provinces. The interests of these provinces were far from being identical, Sindh was particularly apprehensive of the Punjab's intrusions and its thrust southward.

Read these important words:

'Opposition to a Muslim state of 'Pakistan' dominated by the Punjab was not confined to non-Muslims. At the height of the public debate on the separation of the province from Bombay presidency, the Sindhi Muslim leader Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah dismissed the idea of one

large Islamic province in the north-west. In July 1934 he told a meeting of the Sindh Azad Conference that it would be a political blunder for Sindhi Muslims to group with Punjabi Muslims. 'Our interest in the separation of Sindh', Hidayatullah remarked, was 'only this that we should be owners of our own home.' There was much ado in 1938 when the Sindh Muslim League, a mere label for an assortment of individuals, met at Karachi and passed a resolution calling for the division of India into Muslim and non-Muslim states. While invoking the religiously informed communitarian affiliations of Sindhi Muslims, the resolution was an expression of their regional aspirations...It was this disjunction between religious and territorial identity which hampered Jinnah's efforts to build a solid Muslim phalanx against the Congress's aims at the all-India level.<sup>32</sup> But Hidayatullah and the kindred will soon renege and do everything at the bidding of their imperial masters. Haroon was the man behind the 1938 resolution. Remember, viceroy-inspired Sir Shafi's Conference and its demands. Haroon was also among the signatories to those demands.

The October, 1938 Sindh Muslim League (?) stunt was a spectacle, a fantastic séance. Here the league stalwarts roared against the Hindus, the Congress and Allah Bux. The conference set-up was a comic-opera, complete with Arab sands, date trees and horsemen in the Arab head-dress, *Iqaal*. They even adopted a resolution which talked of self-determination for the two nations of Hindus and Muslims...The real object was to topple Allah Bux somehow, anyhow. They got 29 MLAs to join the League. With the help of 3 European MLAs, they could have formed a government of their own. When, however, a no-



confidence motion was moved, only 7 of them voted for it. And the League leader Hidayatullah himself quit the party and joined the Allah Bux ministry. Indeed the league was so rootless in Sindh that when they announced a public meeting for Jinnah in Jacobabad, nobody turned up. Rashidi had to request his local friend Hakim Kaimuddin to ask his Hindu friends to produce an audience. The Hindus, as good friends, obliged. They even put their ‘Gandhi caps’ into their pockets to avoid embarrassment to Jinnah; but they refused to shout ‘Jinnah Sahib Zindabad’ with any gusto.<sup>33</sup>



Linlithgow’s call to Muslim (strangely, Ayesha Jalal here uses the word ‘Muslims’ as if the viceroy had asked all the Indian Muslims to produce *constructive policy*, this is a very serious issue and one must be chary of using super-generalization like this, instead of using the word ‘Muslim’ Ayesha Jalal should have used ‘the Muslim League’, because Linlithgow had given a call only to the League, writer), to produce a ‘*constructive policy*’ was an opportunity for Jinnah, the potential spokesman for Muslims at the centre, but it was also something of an embarrassment. Such a policy would have to walk a tight-rope between the conflicting requirements of the divided constituents on whose behalf he was purporting to speak.<sup>34</sup>

The mere apprehension of an all-India centre was not enough to huddle the conflicting interest groups and the conflicting provincial/territorial affiliations. It would require more than just this apprehension. It needed a ‘*magic wand*’, and who else had that magic wand if not the white masters? Ubiquitous liberal babblers refuse to understand this point. The provinces like Sindh and NWFP were

rightly apprehensive of a union or a dominion or a zone where Punjab would be calling the tunes. The ‘constructive policy’ could only make everyone feel at home and less apprehensive, if and only if, this ‘constructive policy’ was deliberately, widely, consciously, calculatedly and cunningly vague and vacuous. Everyone would be free to read into it whatever one wished to, but this policy itself uncommitted to anyone, in short, a paragon of subterfuge.

Sindh (Sindh, the living Sindh, not the Sindh of living corpses), never wanted to an affiliation, let alone a subordinate union, with the Punjab. The Government of India in 1888 recommended to the British Government that Sindh be taken away from Bombay Presidency and handed over to the Punjab administration. But Sindh Sabha, Hassan Ali Afindi was its vice president, wrote to the viceroy and opposed the recommendation in strong words. The reason was that the Punjab administration was dominated by the army men who were virtual dictators. For Sindhis, the regulated colonialism of Bombay Presidency was a lesser evil than the unregulated one of the Punjab.<sup>35</sup>



There were a number of important constraints upon Jinnah in formulating a policy...The new policy had to make a break with the past.<sup>36</sup> Jinnah of the new policy will now be the champion of the cause of the Muslim majority provinces, even though these provinces will keep on repelling the League right up to 1947.

Jinnah on 12 January, 1940, had written an article in ‘*Time and Tide*’ of London: ‘...democratic system in India based on the concept of a homogeneous nation such as England is very definitely not applicable to heterogeneous country such as India. *Hindus and Muslims are in fact two*

*different nations, because their respective religions have definite social codes which govern not so much man's relation with God, as man's relation with his neighbour*<sup>37</sup>

The words 'religions...which govern not so much man's relation with God, as man's relation with his neighbor' are quite important here. A religion which governs a man's relation with God is faith, but a religion which governs a man's relation with his neighbor is more than faith, it is faith-as-ideology, communalism. A religion which governed man's relation with God never came in the way of secular or nationalist politics in India, but a religion which governed man's relation with his neighbor saw the birth of the two-nations theory of the League, and the 'one-nation theory' of the Hindu Mahasabhaite fascism.

Ayesha Jalal writes:

When Linlithgow pressed Jinnah, the League's Working Committee decided that it had to give its sub-committee a brief. That took it four days of constant meeting between 3-6 February 1940...In constructing a brief, the Working Committee had to bear in mind that Muslims were a nation, not a minority and to reject constitution-making based on the counting of heads. Of course the real problem was to steer a path between majority Muslims and somehow give Jinnah a hand at the centre. The new balance of power in Muslim politics was reflected in the Working Committee's brief to its sub-committee: *it contained an uncompromising version of the Punjab thesis-both in the west and east Muslim majority provinces were to constitute two 'Independent dominions in direct relationship with Great Britain'. Moreover, the 'various units each zones shall form component parts of the federation*

*in that zone as autonomous units'. This was the assurance which had to be made to the Muslim politicians of Sindh and the NWFP. Minority Muslims had to be content with unspecified assurances of 'adequate' safeguards...Sikandar was later to deny that the resolution was based on his draft; the resolution, he claimed, was the League's view, not that of the Punjab. But the Punjab thesis was a powerful-perhaps the most powerful-influence on the making of the resolution. Zafarullah Khan's paper (which he gave to Linlithgow) shows the lines of Punjab's thinking. Zafarullah, a distinguished lawyer from the Punjab, and a member of the viceroy's Executive Council (he had lands in Sindh, writer), wrote it in the later half of February 1940, that is, after the Working Committee's brief, but some time before the Lahore resolution...in it, Zafarullah was looking for a constitutional scheme acceptable to Muslim opinion generally. He considered three schemes. The first was the 'Pakistan scheme 'Rahmat Ali's lines which he swiftly dismissed as 'utterly impracticable'. The second, closest to the League Working Committee's brief, envisaged two Muslim federations, in the north-west and the north-east, in 'direct relation with the Crown', but with treaty agreements with the non-Muslim federation to cover matters of common interests. ...the 'separation scheme', as Zafarullah understood it, demarcated the 'Muslim federations' not on communal lines, but along the boundaries of existing provinces...Zafarullah knew the British,; he knew the Congress; he knew the real interests of the Punjab; but above all he had the measure of Jinnah...Zafarullah's note was seen by Jinnah. Indeed, Linlithgow thought it had been written*

specifically ‘for adoption by the Muslim League with a view to bring the fullest publicity’. It is reasonable to assume that the League’s constitutional sub-committee also considered it, and the Lahore resolution bears some marks of this note. *But the resolution as cast shows Jinnah’s dilemma, the delicate balance between what he wanted, and what the majority provinces, specially the Punjab, were after but which he could not afford to accept.* If the League accepted Zafarullah’s all-India federal scheme, it would had to accept forever its role as a cipher at an impotent centre, the mere agent of provincial forces which it did not control. The federal scheme denied the need for a strong party at the centre capable of negotiating for all Muslims, in particular those in minority provinces...Jinnah now decided to make virtue out of his weakness. He took out the logic of the provincial demand to its extremes, decided to espouse some features of the ‘separation scheme’ and made no mention at all of the centre, its future shape, and how it was to be arrived at<sup>38</sup>

But then why Sir Sikandar was furious and disowned the whole resolution in his speech? Was the Punjab anticipating something? Sikandar further said something very important in the same speech, which most of the local writers prefer not to mention in their book:

‘We do not ask for freedom that there may be a Muslim Raj here and a Hindu Raj elsewhere. If this is what Pakistan means I will have nothing to do with it. Let us join hands in order to preserve and maintain peace and harmony within the province and unite with the rest of India to face with courage and confidence the danger from without. *And let us*

*above all show to the rest of India that we in the Punjab stand united and will not brook any interference from whatever quarter it may be attempted. Then and then only will we be able to tell meddling busybodies from the outside, 'Hands off the Punjab!'. If you want real freedom for the Punjab, then that Punjab will not be Pakistan, but just Punjab, the land of the five rivers. Punjab is Punjab and will always remain Punjab whatever anybody may say.*<sup>39</sup>

Any division of India on communal lines would also involve the division of the Punjab on the same lines. This was what the Punjabi leaders did never come accept, never up till the partition in 1947. They wanted Sindh, Baluchistan, and NWFP as a war booty, the wars they had been fighting for the British, but any talk or even a hint of 'territorial readjustments'-as said in the Lahore resolution-made them fly in the face of the League and Jinnah. He was now 'outsider', 'meddling busybody', the League became a threat to 'the peace and harmony' of the united Punjab. This was the eventuality that Jinnah was anticipating and which made him shudder. Please note here that in his letter to Gandhi, Jinnah emphasized that the provinces should be handed over to a Muslim federation as they are. Or they must be economically viable; in other words-let us have the division of the whole, but not the division of the parts. After the Lahore resolution, the Punjab Muslim Unionist leaders would not have any thing the League in the Punjab; Bengalis will soon do the same. But the English wanted what they badly needed: a constitutional deadlock on communal basis.

Pointing out that the resolution did not name the provinces that would constitute the new state, a delegate at Lahore expressed the fear that its imprecise wording would

justify vivisectioning the Punjab and the Bengal. In his answer, Liaquat Ali Khan, the League's General Secretary, defined the vagueness:

If we say Punjab that would mean that the boundary of our state would be Gurgaon, whereas we want to include in our proposed dominion Delhi and Aligarh, which are centers of our culture...*Rest assured we will not give away any part of the Punjab.*<sup>40</sup>

Remember Mr. M.R.T's arguments of resuscitating the old Sikh Kingdom to entice the Sikhs, *our mard-e-mujahids* were ready to part only with just Ambala division.

Poor Bengal was never to be found in all such schemes for 'the Indian Muslims', the interesting fact was that Bengal had the largest Muslim population in India. 'Pakistan'

had no 'b' of Bengal, 'Pakistan' only included those parts of the territories where the Punjab could exercise direct suzerainty. Allama (?) Iqbal too had simply forgotten the Bengalis. They had to be squeezed out of the Lahore resolution and left alone to fend for themselves. A move aimed at centralizing or rather de-provincializing the peoples was launched at Delhi Convention of Muslim League legislators in 1946. The principle that the zones, namely Pakistan zones where the Muslims were in dominant majority, be constituted in to 'a' sovereign independent state. The change was proposed by Suhrawardy and seconded by Khaliqzaman. Abul Hashim (he was an over-enthusiastic, pro-peasantry Bengali Muslim Leaguer, he had hopes for the peasantry in Pakistan!) raised the voice of protest against the resolution on a point of order. He maintained that the Lahore resolution envisaged two sovereign states. He claimed that

the convention of the League legislators was not competent to alter or modify the contents of the Lahore resolution. Well, Hashim was absolutely right and his was a democratic, constitutionalist demand. Wasn't it? Jinnah the constitutionalist, at first called the plural 's' of the Lahore resolution as an '*obvious printing mistake*' But when, on Hashim's insistence, the original minute book was checked, Jinnah found under his own signature the plural 's'.<sup>41</sup> Hashim was assured that the 'original' resolution would not be changed, but the Pakistan which was founded on 14<sup>th</sup> August, 1947 reflected the aims and objectives of the Jinnah and the Muslim League of the Delhi, 1946 resolution and not those of the Lahore resolution, 1940. Jinnah's subsequent activities and speeches against what he called 'provincialists' after the establishment of Pakistan proves his true credentials as a constitutionalist and a democrat!

The secret (now declassified) Transfer of Power documents on the Punjab contain a letter to the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, dated: 29 April, 1947.

...had last night dinner with Liaquat Ali Khan...who said that he was not in the least worried about Bengal, as he was sure in his mind that Bengal would not be divided. He thinks Bengal would be a dominion in its own right and will not be a part of Pakistan. Then he turned towards the Punjab, and said he could not understand the Sikhs, he said the Muslims have offered better conditionalities to them than the Hindus. According to him, the Sikhs are stupid and the main problem with them is that do not have a leader. Sikhs can not claim majority in any district of the Punjab, he thought, so they cannot claim Sikhstan. He was hopeful to win the Sikhs over to join the Muslims and then there will



be no reason to divide the Punjab.<sup>42</sup> Jinnah said ‘the League will fight every inch to stop the proposed partition of the Punjab and Bengal.’<sup>43</sup>

But what Punjab lost in the partition, it got, even more than it lost, in Pakistan. Surely, Bengal (up to 1971), Sindh, Baluchistan and Pakhtunkhwa are more than what Punjab had sacrificed for Pakistan.

Let us see what Khaliqazman says about the Lahore Resolution:

The resolution...shied away from using the word ‘province’ and instead double-meaning and inexact words like region, unit and zones had been used. Probably, using a clear word like ‘provinces’, would have left little room for maneuver. Let us turn towards ‘territorial readjustment’, all the provinces in the north-west were Muslim provinces, Hindus were not in power in any of these provinces, what could the Hindus have given us [in these provinces]? ...Yes the drafters of the resolution could have said that the area extending from Delhi to Amritsar has a Hindu-Sikh majority, and the Punjab should be divided...But what would then happen to the 4 crore Muslims? They would be totally imprisoned by the Hindu majority and they would have no chance even of running away, because a divided Punjab would not be big enough to assimilate this population...Even today after 26 years, when I read the resolution, it makes my hair stand on roots. *We were out to claim the whole Punjab and in our [resolution] we lost the half of it...* I could not sleep that night. I became silent and thought my resistance would split the League. May be after some time we would be able to see a way-

out...I tried hard to find out the man who wrote this resolution, but even to this day I have not been able to locate the man. I asked Abdurrahman Siddique, but he told me I should ask the League president [Jinnah] and the secretary. I think Abdurrahman was right. This resolution was not written by any Indian or any Muslim, because all the League resolutions were usually written by Rahman and Nawab Ismail Khan.

Next day, that is, on 23 March, Fazal Haq proposed the resolution before the open session. He just talked about Calcutta and the first para of the resolution and did not speak a word about the second part. At the end of his speech, Mr. Jinnah looked backwards and told me to second the resolution. Unwillingly, I obeyed the order of the president...I made a brief speech...Alluding to Maulan Azad's speech in Ram Garh, I said...we are afraid now because in the past matters were managed by the sword, now it is the government of votes, and in this we will fail.

...the Muslims came into India by the force of the sword, and when the British took away this sword, then the Muslim felt themselves foreigner in India...God forbid, if Pakistan had not come into being, the Muslims would have still been feeling foreigner in India...The first premise of Pakistan was that we should make our government in those parts of India where we do not feel ourselves to be foreigner.<sup>44</sup>

So secretive that even the main leaders did not know the fine-points of the resolution (democracy on the sly?!), what is more, the leaders themselves were in the dark as to who had fathered the resolution. The clique was

playing traitors to their motherlands. Feeling foreigners in their own homeland! What could be more treacherous?



‘I am sure that the common Muslim does not envisage the complexities involved in Pakistan and he does not even know which scheme he is supporting. The result is that the political fortune-makers have got a big opportunity to befool the gullible common man.

Everyone tries to exploit the people for his own political ends...Mr. Jinnah too, like others, finds using this expression [Pakistan] profitable. If the Hindus and the Sikhs use this expression for their ulterior purposes, so the Muslim League should also do the same. The Muslims like this expression that is why this slogan is the easiest way to win their support.’<sup>45</sup>

Perhaps, Sikandar was right, superlatively right.

**FULL OF SOUND AND FURY,  
SIGNIFYING NOTHING.**

**THE LAHORE IR-RESOLUTION**

While approving and endorsing the action taken by the Council and the working Committee of All-India Muslim League, as indicated in their resolution dated the 27<sup>th</sup> of August, 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> of September and 22<sup>nd</sup> of October 1939, and 3<sup>rd</sup> February 1940 on constitutional issues, this Session of the All India Muslim League emphatically reiterates that the scheme of Federation embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, is totally

unsuited to, and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India.

It further records its emphatic view that while the declaration dated the 18<sup>th</sup> of October 1939, made by the viceroy on the behalf of His Majesty's Government is reassuring in so far as it declares the policy and the plan on which the Government of India Act 1935, is based will be reconsidered in consultation with the various parties, interests and communities in India, Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is reconsidered de novo and that no revised plan would be acceptable to the Muslims unless it framed their approval and consent.

**RESOLVED** that *it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, viz, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be 'autonomous and sovereign'*

**That** adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specially provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them and *in other*

*parts of India where the Mussalmans are in a minority* adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specially provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.

**The** Session further authorizes the Working committee to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defense, external affairs, communication, customs and other such matters as may be necessary.<sup>46</sup>

Jinnah in his address said: ‘...It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are in fact distinct social orders and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality, and this misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of most of our troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise the notion in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literature. They neither intermarry (this was Mr. Jinnah who himself had married a Parsi girl, please note the sophistry, writer), nor interdine (this was the same Jinnah sahib whose dietary habits are known to everyone, writer), together and, indeed they belong to two civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Mussalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, their heroes are

different, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other and, likewise their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to a growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state.<sup>47</sup>

Stanley Wolpert, the writer of '*Jinnah of Pakistan*', writes in his new book, '*Shameful Flight*': The resolution was ambiguous probably initially meaning two Muslim states: Pakistan and Bangladesh, though when Jinnah was questioned on this point by journalists the next morning he insisted it meant *one* Pakistan.<sup>48</sup>

What right had the League to speak on behalf of the Indian Muslims? Jinnah simply wanted to make his League synonymous with Muslims of India, a near monopoly over the people who professed Islam in India, divided on sectarian, linguistic, cultural, class lines, but somehow 'Muslims'-Muslims of India means the Muslim League and the Muslim League meant Jinnah!

When Jinnah asserted that the Muslims of India will not accept any constitutions unless it follows the lines envisaged in the Lahore resolution, did Jinnah, or the Leaguers know that the Muslims of India were with them solidly? They were not sure as to what their real position was. Else, Jinnah would not have *brushed aside* the question of plebiscite as offered in Rajaji's formula as urged by Gandhi in his letters to Jinnah. Muslim League's defeat in election was certain, not only in Sindh and NWFP, but also in the Punjab, as the feudals had created a 'divide-the-spoils-among-equals' sort of political platform in the Punjab, i.e. the Unionist Party. If, the feudals and capitalists could forge a cross-communal political alliance

to perpetuate their rule, why could the peasants and workers not do them same? But the masses were told that since ‘you do not intermarry, since you do not interdine, you are two nations.’

All politics of the League at this point depended upon the assurances of the British, as stated in first para of the Lahore resolution itself. The League virtually overtook the Muslims of India, and became its only authoritative and representative organisation, the Muslim League became the Muslims of India when, on 8 August, 1940 the viceroy, Linlithgow appreciated the concern of ‘minorities’ and committed that the British really are there to save the ‘minorities’ from the hellish designs of ‘majority’; the imperial monster said:

‘...His Majesty’s Government’s concern that full weight should be given to the views of the minorities in any revision has also been brought out. That remains the position of His Majesty’s Government. It goes without saying that they could not contemplate the transfer of their responsibilities for the peace and welfare of India to any system of Government whose authority is directly denied by large and powerful elements in India’s national life. Nor could they be parties to the coercion of such elements into submission to such government.’<sup>49</sup>

Let’s decode the viceroy’s proclamation: The ‘minorities’ here actually means the Muslim League; ‘responsibilities’ means the brutal imperial rule; ‘peace and welfare of India’ actually means the continuation of the British Raj- as if the **British** had taken pains to come all the way from so forlorn a corner as England to India to do us favor and restore peace and ensure welfare of India? ‘Whose’ here refers to the Congress because it was the Congress ‘whose’ authority

was denied by the British on the one hand and, 'large and powerful elements,'-these elements were the Muslim League and the Indian princes mainly.

This gave Jinnah and his League a veto to stymie the Congress demand for independence and constitution. By ensuring that the League is the Muslims of India, the English, in return, got from the League an assurance that it would not come to an understanding with the Congress subject solely to the consent of the English masters. Henceforward, the Muslim League would be the real, actual, sole and only authoritative and representative organisation of the Muslims in India-at least up to the partition. The League would vanish from the political scene of the sub-continent after the partition, exactly like all makeshift structures which disintegrate because of their very nature of being makeshift structures!



Jinnah's two-nations theory means the Muslims are not a minority but a nation. But then why on earth have the Muslims been referred to as 'minorities' in the second para of the resolution? And 'adequate and effective' safeguards have been asked for their protection? That means there were some Muslims who were a nation (6 million), whereas, some were a minority (3 million)! Leave the 3 million Muslims in India after the separation of the land to face a hostile population. Because in any event, the leaders of the League were not so numb as to not realize that the partition would actually add its toll to communal animosity. But 'they', the three or 3 millions were not the League's headache! They were a minority and must be happy being so. The Lahore resolution did not solve the minority problem; rather it concerned itself more with creating a 'Muslim nation' *ex nihilo*.



Now come to the rest 6 million Muslims of the north-west and north-east 'zones'. It is only these Muslims who actually were 'a nation' in the light of Jinnah's cerebrations and the Lahore resolution. Just *these*? Were there any further fluctuation, fine-tunings and variations? Yes there were. Remember, Jinnah had written to Gandhi that the Muslims living in princely states are not part of his scheme and the Lahore resolution does not apply to them. That means the Muslims of Khairpur Mir's, Bahawalpur, Kashmir, Chitral, Swat, and most importantly, Kalat state which comprised most of Baluchistan, were also not parts of 'a nation' because they were not living in British-administered India. Then they were not a minority either. Because the category of 'minority' is applied to the Muslims living in the British-administered areas. So what were those princely states Muslim? Nobody knows. They were Muslims but they were neither a minority nor were they a nation! The 'actual' Jinnahite Muslim nation means the Muslims living in 'zones' under direct British rule, only just these. But then why Jinnah said that he represented the aspirations of all Indian Muslims and the League was the sole authoritative and representative organisation of the Muslims in India and the sole representative of the League was Jinnah? This makes Jinnah and the Indian Muslims one and the same thing. This veto, denied to him by the Congress, was granted by the White masters. Had the Whites made it clear that the power would be transferred to a majority party in the assembly, all the Leaguers would have found themselves in political wilderness without support from any quarter. The only political strength they had at that time was this single assurance of the HMG, and just that.

It was easy for the League to well-advertise this assurance and to show the way to the provincial politicals

to jump on to the League's bandwagon if they wished to remain in power. These elements, mostly, decorated, knighted, khanbahadurs. Sahib-bahadurs, Nawab-bahadurs, sirs and pirs of all shades and sizes soon would join the League ranks to serve the cause of Islam and the Muslim 'nation'. One can feel the working of Dr. Safdar Mahmud's Divine Will here!

How would the politicals read it in the provinces? What would they read from this? (*The viceroy himself has assured! Hmmm!*). They were given to understand that the League would be the sole and authoritative representative organisation of the Muslims in India, so better join it sooner than later. The viceroy's assurance was a kiss of life to a floundering League and our provincial politicals. But this even was not enough. Indeed, the government will not leave a stone unturned to prop up the League in the provinces, (for example a League ministry was installed in NWFP!) as we, for example, see in Sindh.

### **SINDH:**

Mr. Jinnah was to come to Karachi. Mr. Usuf Haroon hired *Makranis* from Lyari and came to the port to welcome Jinnah. The *Makranis* were given half of the wages and were told the remaining half would be reimbursed soon. On another occasion Mahmud Haroon went to Lyari to hire the *Makranis* again. Jinnah had not yet become the Quaid-i-Azam, he was still just Jinnah. When he emerged out of the plane, Usuf Haroon shouted "Mr. Jinnah Zindabad!", but the *Makranis* did not return the slogan. They said 'give us the remaining money first'. Haroon paid the money and then the slogan was raised, ;'Mr. Jinnah Zindabad'<sup>50</sup>



Did the Congress Oppose Sindh Separation from Bombay?

Contrary to what certain section of politicals in Sindh hold and repeat vehemently, the findings are just the opposite.

Jinnah: ‘So for as I remember, it was the Sindhi Hindus who, first of all, demanded Sindh’s separation from Bombay...Sindh’s Congress leader Harchandrai raised the same demand before the Indian national Congress resolution’.

Chintamani: Where?

Jinnah: In Indian National Congress.

Chintamani: A resolution was passed on Sindh?

Sir Shahnawaz Bhutto: Yes, in Karachi, in 1913.

Jinnah: Yes, it had happened at that time. But let me explain it further. When the constitution of the Indian national Congress was being formed, the Sindhi representatives of the Congress demanded that Sindh should be treated as a province in the Constitution of the Indian National Congress. If you see the Constitution of the Indian national congress, you will realize that Sindh was treated as and given the status of a full province in the Congress Organisation.<sup>51</sup>

What does it mean? It means Sindh was given a status of a province in the Constitution of the Congress long before Sindh was actually separated from Bombay. This goes contrary to what our fact-free liberal Jami Chandio claims.<sup>52</sup>

Dr. Mazharudin Soomro in his PhD thesis writes: The name of Seth Harchandrai Vishindas is very important in the movement of Sindh's separation from Bombay. It was this patriot who for the first time in 1908 in "Sindh provincial Conference" raised the question in public. He and his friend, Ghulam Mohammed Bhurgri, who was a staunch opponent of imperialism, worked together and raised this question before the Government<sup>53</sup>...In March, 1918 Sindh Provincial Conference under presidentship of Murlidhar Jeramdas, passed the resolution of Sindh's separation from Bombay. Harchandrai Vishindas, Ghulam Ali Chagla, B. Heeranand Khemsingh, Lokumal Cheelaram, Mukhi Jeethanad Preetamdas, Santdas, Mangharam, R.K. Sidhawa, and Dr. Choithram ( Dr. Choithram was a longstanding president of the Congress in Sindh, writer) were the main leaders of this conference...At this moment, the movement of Sindh separation from Bombay was a joint struggle of Hindus, Muslims and the Parsis, but even when conflicts erupted, the patriotic leaders of the both communities worked jointly for the cause. In 1928 Sindhi Hindus, Muslims and Parsis made a joint declaration for Sindh's separation. The leaders who signed the declaration were:

Santdas Mangharam, Jamshed Nisaarvanji Mehta, Naraindas, Maulvi Mohammad Sadiq Khadiwaro (he was then the vice-president of the Congress in Sindh, writer) K. PanyaQazi Abdurahman, Haji Abdullah Haroon, Shaikh Abdulmajeed Sindhi, Jeethmal Parasram Gulrajani, Chitomal Kandhani, Qazi Abdul Qayoom, Vishnu Sharma, Mir Allah Bux Talpur, Swami Govindanand, Parasram Tahlramani, Lokumal Preetamdas, Lalchand Amardino Mal Jhagtiyani, Rustam Khurshid Sidhawa, Kewalram Motwani, Sayed Jamaludin Hassan Bukhari, Ghulam Hussain Ghafoor bhai, Teekamdas Wadhmal, Din Muhammad Aleg, M.M.Kirpalani,

Maulana Din Mohammad Wafai, Mukhi Harkishndas.<sup>54</sup>

...When Shaikh Abdulmajeed Sindhi's paper '*Al-Waheed*' started publishing articles on the issue of Sindh's separation from Bombay in 1924, then certain Hindus started opposing it. Prominent in this camp were Veerumal Begraj, Prof. Chibhani, Khemsing, Mukhi Gobandram...because of this conflict the movement became for the first time became a target of Hindu Mahasabhaites. N.C. Kelkar in 1925 'All-India Hindu Mahasabha' session opposed the separation...But many Hindus and Parsis jointly stood against this onslaught, among others, Swami Govandanand, Mr. Jeethmal Parasram, Santdas Mangharam, K.Panya, Vishnu Sharma, Teekamdas, Wadhmal, Rustam .K. Sidhwa and Jamshed Nisrwanji Mehta were prominent.<sup>55</sup>

...Nehru Report noted that: On the occasion of this constitution becoming operative, Sindh, considering the financial matters, will be made a province. Sindhis will be required to bear financial burden. Hindus will be given 40% representation in the provincial assembly'. Certain communalist Hindus opposed this move...Sindh Hindu Panchyat and Sindh Hindu Mahasabha took exception to the issue and the Hindu Mahasabha made it a question of life and death...Anti-Sindh Separation Committee was formed and Diwan Murlidhar, Nolchandrai, Prof Chibhani, C.K.Thadhani were the main leaders of this section.<sup>56</sup>

Indian National Congress session of Kanpur in 1925, and the Congress Madras Session in 1927 passed the resolution for Sindh's separation from Bombay.<sup>57</sup>

Dr. Soomro too has noted that long before Sindh's separation from Bombay, the Sindh Congress had been working as a full-fledged provincial Congress body. 'Sindh was at that time a part of the Bombay presidency, so Sindhi

Congress leaders thought of separating Sindh Congress from Bombay Congress' subordination. [Sindhi Congress] leaders were successful in getting Sindh separated from Bombay Congress. Sindh Congress was working as a separate provincial autonomous body of the Indian National Congress. The following were the main Congress leaders in Sindh:

Esardas. Thakurdas Khamsingh, Gopaldas, Jeethmal, Durgadas Adwani, Jeeramdas Daultram, Jamsehnd Nisrvanji Mehta, Mukhi Jeethanand, Jeethmal Parasram, Chatrbujh Tejmal, Dr. Choithram, Mr. Abduljabbar, Ghulam Ali Chagla, Mansingh Choharmal, Prof. Naraindas Malikani, Laldino Amarchand Mal, Prof. Waswani, Sadhu Waswani, Heeranand Karamchand, Herchand Vishandas, Prof. Ghansham Jeethanand, Keesumal Tekchand, Koluram Vasanmal.<sup>58</sup>

Mr. Mohammad Qasim Soomro in his M.Phil thesis '*Muslim Politics in Sindh-1938-1947*' writes: '...the issue of separate status for Sindh, first came into the minds of the people in 1908 when in Sukkur a meeting of Sindh provincial Conference, an off-shoot of the Indian National Congress, was called under the presidentship of Seth Harchandrai Vishindas...The second Sindh Provincial Conference was held in 1909 at Hyderabad under chairmanship of Divan Himat Singh Guja Singh. The separation movement gradually gained momentum and became popular countrywide. The All Indian Congress held its annual session at Karachi in 1913; Seeth Harchandrai Vishindas in the capacity of Chairman Reception Committee, put forth the demand of separation of Sindh from Bombay in most forceful terms....The Indian national Congress in its 42<sup>nd</sup> session held at the end of 1927 passed the following resolution on the subject of Sindh separation: This Congress is...of the opinion that ...readjustment of provinces be immediately taken in hand and that any

Province which demands...*reconstruction on linguistic basis* be dealt with accordingly. This Congress is further of the opinion that a beginning may be made by constituting Sindh into a separate province.<sup>59</sup>

...Hindus and Muslims entered into a Hindu-Muslim Pact on July 17, 1928, and twenty-eight prominent politicians of both communities affixed their signature to the pact. This pact was termed as “Sindh Hindu-Muslim Pact” by Nehru Report.

We hereby declare that **i)** the introduction of joint electorates and the separation of Sindh from Bombay Presidency should be effected simultaneously; **ii)** The province of Sindh (so constituted) shall enjoy full measure of provincial autonomy as shall be accorded to other major provinces of India and further it shall not be attached to any other province (the fear of being attached with the Punjab was clear here, writer), **iii)** as regards the feasibility of separation from the financial point of view, we declare that we shall cut our coat according to our cloth.<sup>60</sup>

[It is rewarding to remember that this compromise, the Nehru Report was drowned in the *Ravi* as Khaliqazaman has put it he has also written about the way they were manhandled and driven out of the *pindal* where they had gathered to do speeches in favor of the Nehru Report. Khaliqazaman was a leader of the Jinnah faction of the League. ‘ When we were thrown out of the League like that –(the incident which happened immediately after Jinnah-Shafi patch up, the writer)-most people suspected Mr. Jinnah’s hand in it, why else the Muslim League secretary was leading the group who

attacked?]

‘Sindh Observer’ a leading Hindu daily in Sindh wrote an editorial:

The Hindu opinion on the issue believed that constitution of Sindh into a separate province will stimulate in a variety of ways the growth of the province. It also said that the tendency of Indian nationalism was towards the development of a distinct type of provincial patriotism. The industrialism, irrigational and commercial development of the province has been ignored because Sindh is treated as nobody’s child.<sup>61</sup>

Round Table Conference was held in London on 12 November, 1930. Sir Shahnawaz Bhutto (who at an earlier stage had opposed Sindh’s separation from Bombay) said in the Conference:

This demand [Sindh’s separation from Bombay] should be considered as the demand of Sindhis and not as a communal question. When this question was taken up by the Muslim League, in my public speech at Hyderabad, presiding over the meeting of ten thousand people, I protested and...said it was not fair to us at all...because it was not a minority demand; but it was a demand made by the Sindhis.<sup>62</sup>

The main difference between the League and the Congress was that the League was talking of ‘Muslim majority areas and provinces’, while the Congress was in favor of redrawing the provincial boundaries on purely linguistic basis. Whose stance what right? The reader should judge.



Hameeda Khuhro also says the same thing. <sup>63</sup>

The witnesses in the Irwin Financial Committee, July-September, 1931, included Ayhub Khorhro, Syed Miran Mohammad Shah, Prof. Gohkle were in support of separation. While, Prof. Chibhani, Devan Bhojrajsingh and Dr. Hingorani were against the separation of Sindh...This alignment was in no sense communal because many of the Congress Hindus and Parsis had adopted the view that the province was financially strong. Devachand Thadhani, Rustam Sidhwa and Prof. Bhateja were also in support of the separation. <sup>64</sup>

A cacophony raised particular from an *ex-Marxist-ex-Leninist-ex-Maoist-now-Jinnahist-cum-somnambulist* camp is quite strong in demonizing ‘Hindus’ in general and ‘the Congress’ in particular. It was the communalist Hindus who opposed Sindh separation from Bombay, as there were Muslim communalists who wanted a separate Sindh only because Sindh was a Muslim majority province. It was this clash of communalisms that is being repeated to-day and categorized as ‘Hindu-Muslim’ clash in Sindh. The clash, if any that ever was, in the whole of India was between Hindu communalism and Muslim communalism. This clash of communalisms cannot safely be termed as Hindu-Muslim clash.

Hindu Mahasabha was quite strong in Sindh, the 1937 election show this very clearly:

Sindh Ittehad Party	18
Sindh Hindu Mahasabha	11
Congress Party	08
Sindh Muslim Jama’at	04
Independent Muslims	09

Sindh Azad Party	03
Independent Hindus	02
Labour	01

Hindu Mahasabha is prominent here, its counterpart, the Muslim League is totally absent from the scene, but not for long.

Comrade Sobho Gyanchandani has very recently written: ‘I hated the ideology of the *Sanghis*’. This logic [of confessional harmony] could not amuse the RSS, they [communalist Hindus] with money and the *Sanghs*’ strength wanted to perpetuate their power...They [the RSS/*Sanhgis*] did not have the guts to fight the Muslims in Sindh, so from 1941 onwards started targeting the Congress and the Communist activists.<sup>65</sup> This shows the ideological configuration of politics in Sindh.

### **Pakistan meant many things to many people**

The conjectural character of the demand for the establishment of a ‘Pakistan’ can be judged by the fact that it not only meant different things to different groups, it meant different things at different times to the same person: Mohammad Ali Jinnah. In the period 1940-46 Jinnah had become the undisputed leader of the League, but he was still not sure what bargain he would finally accept or reject...Jinnah was undecided on the character of the new Muslim republic. He told an Associated Press correspondent in 1945 that ‘Politically Pakistan would be a democracy’. Mr. Jinnah said that he ‘personally hoped that its major industrial and public services would be socialized’. A few days later he reassured a religious leader in the NWFP: ‘It is needless to emphasize that the Constituent Assembly, which would be predominantly Muslim in composition, would not be able to enact laws

inconsistent with the *Shariat* [Islamic Code].<sup>66</sup>

Qazi Faiz Mohammed in his autobiography notes that when he complained before Jinnah about the League ministers' corruption (by this time G.M.Sayd had left the League), Jinnah asked:

Jinnah :	‘Who is responsible?’
Faiz Mohammad:	‘You are responsible’.
Jinnah:	‘How?’
Faiz mohammd;	‘Had you not given them the tickets, they would not have been here to exploit Sindh.’
Jinnah (thinking for a while):	‘Who would have the Sindhis elected if not these influential men?, you? I want Pakistan. What can I do?’

Then Jafar Khan whispered to me in Sindhi: ‘Do not tease the old man’<sup>67</sup>

On another occasion Qazi Faiz recounts: “In the morning, the Subject Committee held its session in the District Local Board Hal, I wrote a resolution there that, we want Pakistan and its government should be like that of the Four Caliphs (Khulfa-e-Rashdeen) type. Maulana (Hasrat Mohani) snatched the pen from me and said: ‘Qazi you know nothing’. Then he wrote, ‘We want a socialist Pakistan, and its programme should be like the Russian constitution.’”<sup>68</sup>

G.M.Sayad writes: what was the idea behind launching the movement for Pakistan. For instance see the poster we published:

## Poster

The Muslim league wants Pakistan,  
Pakistan means Islamic Government

Where people will have equal political, social, economic  
rights.

True and practicing Muslims will be in government.  
The first duty of the government will be eradication of  
poverty, oppression, illiteracy, and exploitation of the  
masses for class interests.

Gambling, *Zina* (illicit sexual relation), wine, usury will be  
strictly prohibited.

Law will not be for sale. The people will get justice free of  
cost. Etc<sup>69</sup>

It is also quite interesting to note that despite being unceremoniously thrown out of the League, G.M.Sayad did not become a nationalist Sindhi. Rather he became an upholder of the 'original' Muslim League ideology. He was even at that stage a true Muslim Leager outside the party! Nor did he make his own party or a group to counter the communalist League in 1946 elections, but he entered the contest as an defender of 'the true, real ideology of the Muslim League' as against the people who had thrown him out from the party!<sup>70</sup>

[The Lahore resolution] was deliberately vague in its territorial definition in order to leave Jinnah room for maneuver, and to provide a rallying call for Muslims from both the minority and majority areas. The League faced an uphill struggle to sell the idea to the majority areas' politicians. They did not feel so threatened by the Sikh and Hindu communities as did their brethren elsewhere in India.<sup>71</sup> Sindh became very important as the Punjab Unionist party was not giving a chance to the League in the

province. *Sindh was so much important that Jinnah wrote to Ayub Khuhro, 'Nationalist government in Sindh would bury Pakistan in Sindh.'*<sup>72</sup>

We have seen that Sindh Ittehad Party emerged victorious in the 1937 election, but the governor asked the *Ibn-al-Vaqt* (Son of the Moment) Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah to form the ministry (so much so for provincial autonomy!). He had just three members with him. But this ministry was not destined to survive, because such sort of a government could only survive if it gives the ministers and supporter *carte blanche* for corruption. Allah Bux Soomro with the support of ten Hindu members, and eight members of the Ittehad Party and other seventeen plus three European members formed the government on 23 March, 1938.

Khohro and Hashim Ghazdar were in the opposition. It was this Ayub Khohro, whom Hyder Bux Jatoi called 'class conscious anti-peasant feudal', and Ghazdar who sought to strengthen the League in order to face the Congress. They passed a resolution in the meeting and termed Allah Bux soomro a 'traitor' to the Muslims and a stooge of the Congress and the Mahasabha. G.M.Sayed and others in return held a meeting in Khaliq Dino Hal and told the people that Hidayatullah's ministry was dismantled for general good and the people will soon see the results of this move.<sup>73</sup>

**An Incident:** Ghazdar became minister in the League ministry during 'Quit India' movement time; the man went to visit Karachi prison. There he saw a fellow Congressite MLA Jeethi Sipahimalani in jail for opposing the British. He, in a bout of sympathy, ventured to offer Jeethi Sipahimalani: 'Sister why in prison? What is the use? Now ask clemency of the government'. On hearing this, Jeethi

threw her *chappal* in his face.<sup>74</sup>

Linlithgow termed the 'Quit India' movement as 'the second largest and dangerous upheaval after 1857'. While Jinnah called it a move to make the British government come to its knees before the Congress and the League press termed the movement as 'the biggest historical blackmail and shamelessness.'<sup>75</sup>

This was the ideological divide that too reflected itself in Sindh and this was the moral of the Leaguers who went for Pakistan

The League used the issue of *Manzil Gah*, 1939 to strengthen itself in Sindh. In order to oust the Soomro ministry, the League raised the slogan of 'Islam in danger!' August 18, 1939 was declared as *Manzil Gah* Day. The League took up the matter with the sole object of strengthening its political position and of driving the Allah Bux ministry out of power-as the Lahore resolution date was approaching-so a League ministry in Sindh would be an additional boon for the claim. One must read the *Manzil Gah* incident with this background in mind. Niyaz Humayooni writes: 'The main eyewitness of the incident, who was SHO in Sukkur at that time, recounts that the charges of riots were proved, the Muslim League leaders were guilty of the riots, the government sought to manage the matter in a friendly way but the 'purveyors of Islam' would not have anything of this.'<sup>77</sup> Some 164 Hindus were killed and the city was looted by mobs hired by the League leaders. Sukkur Hindus backed out from supporting the Allah Bux ministry and Bandhali Talpur was installed in his place. Talpur was supported by the League.

The Court of Inquiry Commission, under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Weston, observed in the report

that the objective of the Muslim League in taking up the *Manzil Gah* matter was purely political. Indeed, it was designed to drive the Allah Bux ministry out of office. He further stated that *Manzil Gah* dispute was the main cause of the Sukkur riots.<sup>78</sup> It is a sorry chapter of Sindh's history where such leaders who claimed themselves to be humanists, progressive were to be seen in cahoot with feudals in saving Islam and sowing communalism in Sindh, just to have power. G.M.Sayed was also responsible. Khohro, when he was parliamentary secretary, had turned down the matter of the masjid, but it would be same man to take up the issue when the time was ripe to do politicking. *Manzil Gah* remains the sole incident of Hind-Muslim communal killings on a major scale. Bhagat Kunwar Ram was also murdered because of some thing to do with this incident. This was how the League began its politics in Sindh, the savour of mosques and vanquisher of Hindus!!  
*Tafo bar tu e charkh gardaan, tafo bar to.!*

For Hameeda Khohro this was a 'major and revolutionary' decision of the League.<sup>79</sup>

Jinnah saw the viceroy who noted: ...after that he [Jinnah] took up the matter of Sindh. He said that he was not sure about the matter yet, but the Sindh premier (Soomro) had made certain speeches. It has become impossible for the premier to remain in power anymore.<sup>80</sup> On 18<sup>th</sup> march, 1940, just five days before the Lahore resolution, Mr. Bandhali Talpur became the Sindh premier. G.M.Sayed was a minister in this government.

But even this was not enough! The League-sponsored Sindh ministry in April 1940, just a few days after the Lahore resolution, ditched the All-India Muslim League and passed a historic *JOINT ELECTORATES BILL*.<sup>81</sup> This Bill did away with separate electorates in the local and district boards. The Sindh League even up to this time was concerned with the local politics more than

Jinnah's all India Muslim politics.

Jinnah once told the Governor Sindh: I can buy all these [Leaguers] in five lacs. The governor then replied, 'I can do so with less amount'. The governor noted: 'I will be in Karachi on 24<sup>th</sup> [December 1943], and will attend the Muslim League session...I think the premier (Hidayatullah) just to spite Mr. Khohro's Punjabi friends, will invite a big number of leaders from Bengal. So Mr. Jinnah will have once again to decide if to fill the bellies of the Bengalis or the pockets of the Punjabis.'<sup>82</sup> Mohammad Ibrahim Joyo has noted the dastardly and corrupt politics of the League and the machinations of the white masters to promote a typical pattern of politics in Sindh.<sup>83</sup>



A few days after the Lahore resolution, a conference of Nationalist Muslims (Communalist Leaguers were always against nationalist Muslims; Iqbal reviled the nationalist Muslims in March, 1938 and compared the upholders of nationalism with those who rejected the finality of the Prophet Muhammad<sup>84</sup>) was called in Delhi, Allah Bux Soomro was the President of this conference. A.G.Uttam writes: the main aim of this conference was to fight the mentality reflected in the Lahore resolution. This conference was in fact a challenge to Jinnah and his lords, the English. Allah Bux said 'we the nine crore Muslims are the descendents of the Indian people, are also the sons of this soil. Change of religion does not make us a separate nation.'<sup>85</sup>

Maulana Azad recounts: I told the viceroy to send invitations to various leaders, the late Allah Bux was also among them...He came to Delhi on the invitation of the viceroy and was waiting for an interview with Sir Cripps,



but he was not given the time for interview. It was an unpleasant situation .I told Cripps who promised to call Allah Bux for meeting but nothing happened....Eventually, Allah Bux had had enough of that and said he would be leaving Delhi soon. When I came to know this, I told Cripps in strong words that it was not only an insult to Allah Bux (he was the premier of Sindh at that time, writer), but also an insult to a vibrant Muslim association whose head he was...The next day Allah Bux was called for a meeting which lasted just one hour. Cripps just talked about common things and did not touch the core issues in the meeting.. This incident left a bitter feeling in me.<sup>86</sup>

G.M.Sayed writes : I asked him [Allah Bux] about the recent Lahore resolution, specially the issue of provincial autonomy, who could oppose it? He replied, ‘you are living in a fool’s paradise that is why you do not know the real workings of practical politics. Practical politics never cares about promises, resolutions and principles. Read history and see that even religious commandments have been sacrificed for power, personal and class affiliations. These good slogans are just for public consumption. Politics is under the influence of the powerful’. It is said that love is blind, obsession is a narcotic...this was my mental state at that time. I could not understand his ideas, rather blamed him that he had forgotten the Muslims.<sup>87</sup> Allah Bux had told Bacha Khan that he was against Pakistan because he did not want any union with the Punjabis, however, he was ready for a union with NWFP, Sindh and Baluchistan<sup>88</sup>.

Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, the first Sindh premier, could not face Allah Bux and who became the premier in his place. It was the age of the League’s renaissance. Hidayatullah took full advantage of this emerging situation. He was not interested in the League; he

just wanted to face Allah Bux. For this he needed an all India political platform. So he with Haroon organized the League branches in Sindh. Those who attended these sessions know very well that Hidayatullah never discussed any tangible issues, but just used the forum to fulminate against Allah Bux. A Muslim League party was formed in the assembly, with only 7 or 8 members. A no-confidence resolution was moved by them in the assembly, but were plainly defeated.<sup>89</sup> The only way left for them was a massive communal riot with which to oust him. The multipurpose slogan 'Islam in danger' was a creation of that time.<sup>90</sup>

A biography 'India's Nationalist No. 1' was published in 1943 just a few months after Allah Bux inexplicable assassination. The writer, Jagat S. Bright writes:

A man may be a nationalist without being a Congressman. A man may be a Congressman without being a nationalist. Many a Congressman wears silk in the heart, although all the time clad in Khaddar. Many a silk-dressed gentleman is nationalist to the backbone; without being even a four-anna member of the Indian National Congress... National circle in India is wider than the Congress orbit... It is a thousand pity that the Congress weighed the greatest man of Sindh too much in the balance. Of course, they did not find him wanting. Only the Congress High command valued this rather late. For long it shilly-shallied. Its offers of help were halfhearted. The Congressmen were wary of coalition. They were not grumbling for power. The field was untried. They wanted time. And more time. Allah Bux sped from capital to capital... The Congress did not want a biscuit of

Sindh. While the Muslim League sat in one corner like a fox with its jaws wide open. The fire and faith awoke the sleepy Congress High Command to the realities of time and tide...he made the Congress go a head in spite of its 'yes', 'no' policy. That makes him a unique leader. A peerless patriot<sup>91</sup>

### **A Historic Letter.**

Churchill made a speech on 11 September, 1942. He said that the Japanese fifth column was aiding the Indian National Congress...the Indian Congress party does not represent all India. It does not represent the majority of people of India. It does not even represent the Hindu masses. It is political organisation built around a party machine and sustained by certain manufacturing and financial interests. Many martial races, divided by unbridgeable gulfs from Hindu Congress, will never consent to be ruled by it.' –One will certainly finds a strong reverberation of the League stance in Churchill's words!

Allah Bux consulted his imprisoned Congress friends and then decided to give a fitting reply to the mindless imperialists. On 26 September, 1942, Allah Bux, O.B.E (Order of the British Empire), wrote a letter to the viceroy. Every Sindhi must feel proud of the letter.

I beg to inform your Excellency that I have decided to renounce the honour I hold from the British Government, as I feel I cannot, consistently with my views and convictions, retain them any longer.

India has been struggling for her national freedom for a long time past. Upon the outbreak of the present war, it was hoped that, under the very principles and ideology in defense of which the

Allies were waging a titanic conflict, India would be made free to participate in the world struggle as a free country.

Convinced as I am that India has every right to be free and that people of India should have conditions in which they could live in peace and harmony, the declaration and action of the British Government have made it clear that, instead of giving co-operation to various Indian parties and communities in settling their differences and parting with power to the people of the land and allowing them to live happily in freedom and mould the destinies of their country according to their birth-right, the policy of the British Government has been to continue their imperialistic hold on India and persist in keeping her under subjection, use political and communal differences for propaganda purposes and crush the national forces to serve their own imperialistic aims and intentions.

The latest speech delivered by Mr. Winston Churchill in the House of Commons has caused the greatest disappointment to all men of goodwill who wish to see justice rendered to India-which is long due to her.

As that hapless pronouncement withholds such justice from India and adds to the volume of evidence that Britain has no desire to give up her imperialistic hold on India, I feel I cannot retain the honors I hold from the British Government which, in the circumstances that have arisen, I cannot but regard as tokens of British Imperialism”.

Allah Bux was told to resign from the premiership. He said that he was an elected premier. The governor might dismiss him, but he would not resign. On 12 October, 1942, the Government House Karachi issued an order: ‘His

Excellency the Governor of Sindh has discussed with Mr. Allah Bux his recent renunciation of honors and the reasons of that renunciation given in his published letter. In the light of that discussion he had no option but to inform Mr. Allah Bux that he no longer possessed the Governor's confidence and that he cannot in consequence continue to hold office'.

The Free Press Journal commented: 'Mr. Allahbux, the former 'Prime Minister of Sindh bore a title. He was a 'Khan Bahadur'

What that meant no one could definitely say.

Many are Khans without being Bahadur and many are Bahadurs without being Khans. But 'Khan Bahadurs' are British made. Mr. Allahbux was a Khan Bahadur. He renounced the title and the renunciation cost him his job.

Allahbux said: 'I believe in two things: defeating British Imperialism, at the same time resisting Nazism and Fascism. It is birth-right to fight both.'<sup>92</sup>

In October the Governor Hugh Dow, dismissed Allah Bux and called Ghulam Hussain to form ministry. Although Ghulam Hussain had been an outspoken enemy of the Lahore resolution (he even attended the nationalist Muslim Conference in Delhi under presidentship of Allah Bux), the Sindh Muslim League now welcomed him with open arms, because he had more votes with him than Khohro who wanted the job for him. Getting Ghulam Hussain to acknowledge the League on his own terms was the only way Jinnah could pretend in the future that his Pakistan policy has even the most tenuous hold over the Muslims of Sindh. As for the provincial Muslim League, it was a rag-tag branch of squabbling factions and rival personalities...Adjectives failed the governor in describing its leading lights-Khohro, the 'dishonest rascal and

careerist', Mir Bandhali Khan, who 'has so far let down every one of his political associates...G.M.Sayed, the dangerous demagogue.'<sup>93</sup> Governor Dow told the viceroy 'There are really two parties in Sindh, those who are in and those who are out, and the main question is how those who are out can get in.'<sup>94</sup>

Now Listen!

Surely, if the stars are lit  
There's somebody who longs for them,  
Somebody who wants them to shine a bit,  
Somebody who calls it, that wee speck  
Of spittle, a gem.

Mayakovsky

The ministry was granted to the League. G.M.Sayed who disagreed with the policy of the central League was driven away from the presidentship of the League and even his basic membership was canceled. Ian Talbot comments: Although the official League candidates routinely denounced G.M.Sayed as a traitor, their outlook was, in fact, far closer to his [G.M.Sayed's] '*Sindhi Pakistan scheme*' than Jinnah's demand. For in essence all Sayed wanted was a hands-off Sindh by the central leadership. No Sindhi leader could disagree with sentiment.<sup>95</sup> It is also said that G.M.Sayed wanted to make the League a Sayed League. Sarah Ansari on the contrary says: Care was taken to enlist the support of *pirs* and make them members of the League. The Muslim League was not anti-British, so many British-backed *pirs* became its members, had the League been anti-British, *pirs* would have surely avoided it. *Pirs*

were to be seen in the front ranks of the League in Sindh, and were elected office bearers of the provincial League. One can realize the predominance of *pirs* in the League from the fact that in 1938 in all India Muslim League Council session, some 60% of the delegates from Sindh were *pirs* and Sayeds.<sup>96</sup>

Syed's expulsion did not, however, end the dissension within the League's ranks. Ghulam Hussain complained to Jinnah that Khohro and his agents worked against him. Pir Illahi Bux supported him in this accusation, and called for Khohro and his friends to be ejected from the League. The Mir group of Talpurs meanwhile had enlisted the backing of the *Khaksars* in order to ensure that they formed a powerful group in the assembly. This incongruous action was still further evidence that Pakistan meant little to the Sindhi leaders who were more concerned with winning office.<sup>97</sup>

Sindh saw two elections in 1946. The reason was that the Muslim league could not bag enough seats to form a ministry. The governor then dismissed the assembly and to prove the white masters' partiality towards the league, appointed the same League peoples in care-taker ministry! Ibrahim Joyo was a personal witness of the second elections. He writes:

The 1946's last elections created new records in rigging and one could find parallels of such methods with the methods used by Hitler in the Nazi Germany to ascertain the will of the people.<sup>98</sup>

This corruption, jobbery, nepotism, and somersaulting went on till the very last and then all of a sudden they realized that the time has come: Hameeda Khohro says that up to the 3<sup>rd</sup> June, the Sindhi leaders were given to thinking that

Pakistan was just a bargaining chip vis-à-vis the Congress. None of them had ever thought of a separate Pakistan. Never in the Muslim League's resolution was the question of Pakistan seriously discussed. In 1940, no commission was set to determine as to what Pakistan would be. Khwaja Nazimuddin had to admit that nobody in the League ever knew the meaning of Pakistan. Whenever the question was raised for serious discussion, the High Command put a stop to discussion. Khohro raised this question before Liaqat Ali Khan in Karachi, who in reply said that he publicly advocated partition but in his heart though the partition to be against the interests of the Muslims, and admitted that Pakistan, at most, was a bargaining chip to squeeze more concessions.<sup>99</sup>

Before the 3<sup>rd</sup> June Plan, Sindhi leaders, both Hindus and Muslims, never took it seriously until Jinnah summoned Hidayatullah and told him that Karachi would be the capital of Pakistan.

When Pakistan cabinet was formed, none from Sindh was included in it-interestingly; the PM-designate did not represent anybody but himself, as he had won elections in the UP. He represented the people there, but he was made the PM of a Pakistan where he represented none—After two months, Sindh Muslim League assembly party called a meeting and showed its concern over the fact that Sindh had not been represented in the Central Cabinet...After one month the PM voiced his view that Karachi be given to the Central Government. He said:

The Central Government lives here like foreigners. Everything we want, we have to request the provincial government, especially Mr. Khohro. He is the ruler of the city. We have no authority in Karachi. For finances I have to request Mr. Khohro,



if I want water for the park, I have to request Mr. Khohro. He own everything, we own nothing. Sindh Government should vacate Karachi; the price of the city will be paid to the Sindh Government.

*Go! And shift your capital to Hyderabad or to any other city”.*

Khohro was astounded at this sentence and especially at the behavior of Jinnah.

Sindh Provincial League passed a resolution against taking away of Karachi from Sindh. ‘Karachi has been since centuries a natural and integral part of Sindh. The city is the hub of industrial, educational, cultural, commercial, activities in Sindh. The city is the nerve centre of Sindh. Taking the city away from Sindh will ruin Sindh and its development. Sindh assembly also passed a resolution against this decision on 10 February 1948.

This assembly wants to highlight its concern over the move of separating the administration of Karachi from Sindh government to handing over of it to the central government. This assembly also wants to express to the leader of the House and his cabinet to make it clear before the Pakistan Government that any such decision will not only ruin Sindh’s commercial life, but this move it against the 1940 Lahore resolution.

MSF students protested against this decision outside the Governor-General residence. Jinnah was very annoyed at this and scolded Khohro. Hidayatullah was asked to take measures to have Khohro removed from the premiership, constitutionally!...The Governor Hidayatullah, along with two ministers, met Jinnah and informed him that they had been unsuccessful so far. Jinnah thought of removing

Khohro through constitutional means. He called Khohro and told him to resign. "Go abroad for six months. I will myself call you later on. Khohro replied that he would resign but would not go abroad for six months. Jinnah gave 24 hours to Khohro to review his decision. On 26 April, Jinnah phoned Khohro and told the former that he was very dear to him and Jinnah did not want to lose him. "It is matter of just six months". Khohro was dismissed. Pir Illahi Bux was installed as the new premier, in 24 hours decisions were taken to steal Karachi away from Sindh, and to invite additional refugee population from Punjab. Collector Masood specially went there [Punjab] and came back with two train-loads of the refugees.<sup>100</sup> Those unconstitutional, undemocratic and overtly fascistic measures were well-calculated. Riots had been engineered which resulted in more than a thousand deaths of Sindhi Hindus. These decisions were in fact the biggest shock of life for Sindh as a nation. We are still being crushed by what had been done to us in those days.

Khohro was not only dismissed but he was debarred from contesting for any public office. This was a novel development which even the British could not have thought of. Mr. Ayub Khohro was left with nothing but a paper resolution, euphemistically called Lahore resolution, a panacea, a cure-all, a weapon with which to beat the onslaught and virtual imperialism of interests that had come dominate the life our motherland, Sindh.

**The Old Song:** Strange as it does seem, the communists who had clearly condemned the Lahore resolution when it was passed and denounced it as a communitarian move, after a few years turned to give it an implicit go ahead. But, the Communists, since then, have learned to behave, at least in India. But our comrades still stipulate the Lahore resolution and reading 'original', 'true' meanings into it (for instance, the Communist Party Pakistan handbill of 12

November, 2009).

Should we not understand, at least now, that it was a fatherless resolution? A trick played in bad faith to lure those who could be lured with whatever means available to the masters and their punters! Must we still look for 'original', 'true' meanings in the Lahore Irresolution?

### **Maulana Azad's words to the UP people immigrating to Pakistan:**

#### **What would be the result?**

The daily 'Watan', Dehli, March 1948

You are abandoning you motherland. Have you ever thought what would be the result? The Muslims in India would become weaker. A time would come when the peoples of Pakistan will stand up to assert their territorial identities-Bengalis, Punjabis, Sindhis, Baloschis, and Pathans. Will your position then not become just that of uninvited guests?

Hindus may be your religious opponents, they are not your national opponent or your opponents on the grounds of motherland identity.

But in Pakistan you will, at any time, face this sort of opposition (national and motherland identity), and you will then be helpless.

*Maulana Abulkalam ne Pakistan Ke Bare Men Kiya Kaha* (edt. Ahmad Hussain Kamal (Maktaba-e-Jamal, Lahore, 2008. P-108

۱۹۴۸ء  
 کیا خوشامد ہو رہی تھی دل کے لیے توکل یا کسی آنکھیں کھیریں مطلب نکل جائے کوئی  
 ہمدون



۱۹۴۸ء  
 ہندوستان سے ہندو نکل جائیں گے  
 ہندوستان سے ہندو نکل جائیں گے  
 ہندوستان سے ہندو نکل جائیں گے

That Azad’s words proved to be prophetic is quite clear from this cartoon published in ‘Jang’ in Feb, 1948.

## Notes

### I

#### PASSIVE REVOLUTION OF CAPITAL

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6. Beasant, Annie. *The Future of Indian Politics*. Theosophical Publishing House 9S. Martins St. London, W.C., 1922. p-17. An estimated 2/3<sup>rd</sup> population of Bengal was wiped out of existence due to this first non-natural famine in Indian history. Two Cheers for rational government!
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Permanent Black, Ranikhet, 2006.pp-xii-xiii.

12. Quoted in Dirks, B. Nicholas. *The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of the Imperial Britain*. Permanent Black, Ranikhet, 2006. p-37.

The early years immediately following the conquest of India were the 'orientalist' years. That is to say that much of India was defined by the body of discourse called orientalism. There was enthusiasm and the need to learn the 'Indian' culture, tastes, habits and world outlook. But all this was approached by the liberal epistemological categories of the English. India was there to be learnt but it was never a direct, immediate learning of India. A cognized India was the India cognized by the orientalist categories of thought. Another important factor here is that this period does not denigrate every and any thing Indian. This denigration of 'the Indian' was a product of a period, at least, a few decades after the conquest of Bengal. With the arrival of the Governor-General Richard Wellesley the scenario changed completely. His first priority was to rid India of French influence, which entailed extensive military action in the south and west of the country, but his long-term plans were based on a total disengagement from Indian culture and the way of life which was held to be decadent, over-fond of luxury and above all pagan. Wellesley had brought the European Enlightenment in his suitcase and was determined that India should benefit from it, whether the people like it or not. The new slogans were 'progress', 'improvement', and 'change', based on modern scientific knowledge and its practical application (A.P.

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  14. Advani , L.K. *My Country, My Life*. Rupa & Co., Delhi, 2008.p-133
  15. Gandhi, Leela. *Postcolonial Theory*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1998. p-7
  16. Quoted in Chatterjee, Partha. *The Omnibus*. Oxford University Press, New Delhi 1999.pp 29-30
  17. Bandyopadhaya, Sekhar .*From Plassey to Partition*. Orient Longman, 2004.p-67
  18. Chatterjee, Partha. *The Omnibus*. Oxford University Press, New Delhi 1999.pp 38-39
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  20. Chatterjee, Partha. *The Omnibus*. Oxford University Press, New Delhi 1999. pp 43-44
  21. B.L. Grover, British Policy Towards Indian Nationalism, p, 213 quoted in Golant op.cited.p-144.). Note here that the government was at this stage always in a step ahead of the nationalists. As long as the government remains a step ahead of a nationalist movement, the nationalist movement can neither win hegemony and freedom. For this a nationalist bourgeoisie had to win the initiative a always be a step ahead of the state at least politically.
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  43. Gandhi, Rajmohan . *Mohandas*. Penguin Books India, 2006.p- 220
  44. Gandhi, Rajmohan . *Mohandas*. Penguin Books India, 2006.p-221
  45. Munshi, K.M. *Pilgrimage to Freedom*. Bombay. Bhavan, 1967.pp.16-17
  46. Quoted in Singh, Jaswant. *Jinnah: India, Partition, Independence*. Rupa & Co., New Delhi, 2009. p-124
  47. Gandhi, Rajmohan . *Mohandas*. Penguin Books India, 2006.p-241
  48. Montagu, Edwin. *An Indian Diary*. London Heinemann, 1930. pp.57-67
  49. Gandhi, Rajmohan . *Mohandas*. Penguin Books India, 2006.p-206
  50. Gandhi, Rajmohan . *Mohandas*. Penguin Books India, 2006.p-242
  51. Wolpert Stanley. *Jinnah of Pakistan*. Oxford University press, Karachi,1999.p- 68
  52. Roy, M.N. *India in Transition*. Calcutta, 1945.p-167.
  53. Shakir, Moin. *Khilafat to Partition*. Ajanta Publications, Jawahar Nagar, Dehli,1983.p-172,
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  55. Bandu, Deep Chand. *History of the Indian National Congress:1885-2002* Kalpaz Publication New Delhi.p-100
  56. Wolpert Stanley. *Jinnah of Pakistan*. Oxford

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57. Wolpert Stanley. *Jinnah of Pakistan*. Oxford University Press, Karachi,1999.p- 91
  58. Burke, S. M & Qureshi, Salim. *Quaid-i-Azam M. A. Jinnah: His Personality and Politics*. Oxford University Press, Karachi,2003.p-130
  59. Shakir, Moin. *Khilafat to Partition*. Ajanta Publications, Jawahar Nagar, Dehli, 1983. pp. 173-74
  60. Singh, Jaswant. *Jinnah: India, Partition, Independence*. Rupa & Co., New Delhi, 2009. p-99
  61. Besant, Annie .*The Future Indian Politics*. 9s. Martin's St. London W.C.2 1922.pp-22-24
  62. Besant, Annie .*The Future Indian Politics*. 9s. Martin's St. London W.C.2 1922.p-107
  63. Besant, Annie .*The Future Indian Politics*. 9s. Martin's St. London W.C.2 1922.pp-194-5. Note the liberal nationalist dilemma. India if wins freedom would slide back to barbarism and will not be able to sustain itself! Was the British Empire sustaining India or India was sustaining the British Empire? The bourgeoisie connection with British would not be snapped but it would be established on a different basis rather than on the old basis of metropolis-colony status.
  64. Besant, Annie .*The Future Indian Politics*. 9s. Martin's St. London W.C.2 1922.p-259. See the use of categories, the Gandhian 'illiterate and boys' against 'the rationals' who justify themselves by doing speech-making in the imperial councils. This was an elitist nationalism because this nationalism divides the nation into two camps: one that of the illiterate masses and the other of the rationalists. Elitist nationalism believes that freedom 'within

empire' would be won by the educated elites who have learned to be rationals and responsible. Any intrusion into the political domain of the educated nationalists was an irrational attempt by the superstitious peasants or the ridiculous boys!

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66. Roy. M.N. *Memoirs* Ajanta Publications, 1984.pp.375-82
67. *History of the Communist Movement in India –I The Formative Years* CPI(M) Publications, New Delhi, India, 2005.pp.43-44,
68. Roy. M.N. *Memoirs* Ajanta Publications, 1984.pp.540-546
69. Minh, Ho. Chi. *The path whicht led me to Leninism*, translated into Sindhi by Shafqat Kadri, *Adarsh-5* Sep-Oct, 2004, Adarsh publications, Hyderabad, Sindh. pp.33-34
70. Chatterjee, Partha. *The Omnibus*. Oxford University Press, New Delhi 1999.p-99
71. Chatterjee, Partha. *The Omnibus*. Oxford University Press, New Delhi 1999.p-100
72. Gandhi, M.K. *Speech at Prayer Meeting*, New Delhi, 1 April, 1947 CW. Vol. 87
73. Nehru, Jawaharlal. *An Autobiography*, London: Bodley Head, 1936.pp. 72-3
74. Chatterjee, Partha. *The Omnibus*.Oxford University Press, New Delhi.1999.p-132.
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## II

### **Historic Letters**

1. S. Qasim Hussain Jafri, (edit.). *Congress Leaders Correspondence with Quaid-i-Azam*, Aziz Publishers, Urdu Bazaar, Lahore, pp.1-2
2. *ibid*, p-4
3. *ibid*, p-4
4. *ibid*, pp-5-6
5. *ibid*, pp8-10
6. *ibid*, pp-11-14
7. *ibid*,pp15-18
8. *ibid*,p-21
9. *ibid*,pp-36-38
10. *ibid*, pp-37-38
11. *ibid*, pp. 38=39
12. *ibid*, pp.42-46
13. *ibid*, pp. 46-49
14. *ibid*, pp. 50
15. *ibid*, p-51. This letter was written in Gujrati, the common mother tongue of Gandhi and Jinnah. Jinnah this letter in English.
16. *ibid*, pp. 53-56
17. *ibid*, pp-56-58
18. *ibid*, pp-69-61
19. *ibid*, pp-68-73
20. *ibid*, pp-73-75
21. *ibid*,75-80
22. *ibid*, pp 82-86
23. *ibid*, pp 87-89
24. *ibid*, pp 89-91

25. *ibid*, pp 92
26. *ibid*, pp 93
27. *ibid*, pp 94-96
28. *ibid*, pp 96-102. Jinnah was loath to any talk of holding a referendum or a plebiscite to ascertain the will of the people of the areas called ‘North-West and East’, because he was sure that the Muslim League will not be able to win any such referendum. Especially in the Punjab and Bengal, where the population of the Muslims in these provinces was just slightly higher than that of the Hindus. And not all the Muslims were ready to accept separation. Secondly, Jinnah wanted to have a separation of India on communal lines, but was trying to avoid tearing up of the Punjab and Bengal provinces of communal basis! The fact was that the Bengalis and the Punjabis more so than the Bengalis, were against any vivisection of their provinces. It was this fear of the Punjab’s fury that Jinnah never tried to precisely define the boundaries of his Pakistan, nor was he ready to let anyone define it in concrete terms. It was this eventuality that had angered the Punjab politicians and because of this, the League was never able to form a government in the Punjab until after the establishment of Pakistan. He even did not wish to know the demands of the people affected by separation, as asked by Gandhi several times in his letters. But Jinnah ‘brushed aside’ this most important issue. He just wanted a Pakistan which could be imposed upon the peoples of Sindh, Punjab Baluchistan, Pakhtunkhwa and Bengal. This is the real story of Jinnah the democrat and the lover of provincial autonomy. Plebiscite or referendum

would have saved 2 million of lives consumed in communal flames during the partition. When Gandhi requested Jinnah that his formula must not be rejected out of hand and he [Gandhi] be allowed to address the League council to persuade them, his request was again ‘brushed aside’..

29. *ibid*, pp 103-4

30. *ibid*, pp 104-6

31. *ibid*, pp 109-10.

**Rajgopalachari’s Draft Formula for Settlement between the Congress and the Muslim League (rejected by Jinnah)**

- (1). Subject to the terms set out below as regards the constitution for free India, the Muslim league endorses the Indian demand for independence and will co-operate with the congress in the formulation of a provisional interim Government for transitional period.
- (2). After the termination of the war, a commission shall be appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the north-west and east of India, wherein the Muslim population is in absolute majority. In the areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of all the inhabitants, held on the basis of adult franchise, shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from Hindustan. If the majority decides in favor of the formation of a sovereign state separate from Hindustan, such decision shall be given effect to, without prejudice to the right of the districts on the border to choose to join either state.
- (3). It will be open to all parties to advocate their

- points of view before the plebiscite is held.
- (4). In the event of separation, a mutual agreement shall be entered into for safeguarding defence, commerce and communications and other essential purposes.
- (5). Any transfer of population shall only be on absolutely voluntary basis.
- (6). These terms shall be abiding only in case of transfer Britain of full power and responsibility for the governance of India.

32. *ibid*, pp 111-12.

33. *ibid*, pp 111. The viceroy had written to Gandhi to stop the Congress 'interfering' in NWFP. Strange, as there was a Congress government/ministry in the province. Jinnah was quite clear and emphatic that the Congress '*should undertake that they will not interfere with the people of the Frontier in any way whatsoever*'. Asking political parties to stop doing politics and leaving the field open for the League really makes Jinnah a true and genuine democrat! One must not forget that this new demand of Jinnah was made during the most crucial phase of India's independence struggle and the last days of united India. This was how the people of the NWFP were made a part of Pakistan: by making the Congress undertake to not 'interfere' in the province. Even MQM has never demanded such an exclusive right. Strangely, the demand was met by the English and the Congress boycotted the referendum in the NWFP in protest.

34. *ibid*, pp 116-121. Important to note here is that

the UP League leaders had accepted the Congress position on minority and had endorsed the Congress' resolution on 'Fundamental Rights' passed in 1931 at Karachi. Secondly, Nehru has very candidly offered himself for criticism on the question of alleged promotion of Hindustani at the cost of Urdu. Nehru demanded that Jinnah must substantiate his criticism against the Congress. Let us see what Jinnah says in reply.

35. *ibid*, pp 121-23. Jinnah is eschewing the question of substantiating his criticism against the Congress policies by calling it 'complaints and grievances of trifling character'. It would be Jinnah who on 22 December, 1993 would give the call for a 'Day of Deliverance' to mark the end of anti-Muslim Congress Hindu Raj. Secondly, he requests Nehru to not mention the issue of Ismail Khan and Khaliqazman. They as leaders of the UP Muslim League had accepted the Congress resolution on Fundamental Rights of 1933, passed in Karachi.
36. *ibid*, pp 123-126
37. *ibid*, pp 133-134. Jinnah's words '*I regret to find the same spirit running through of making insinuations and innuendoes and raising all sorts of matters of trifling character which are not germane to our present subject*', and '*I don't think you will find much difficulty in realizing what the main points in dispute are, because they have been constantly mentioned both in the press and public platforms even very recently*' are very important here. He was saying in his previous letters that he had been misrepresented by the press and had said no such things about the Congress as was reported



in the press. But he did not seem willing to issue a statement to the press to contradict the press reports! Now he was asking Nehru to read about what really was the central bone of contention in the papers!

38. *ibid*, pp 134-138. Despite Nehru's repeated queries, Jinnah would neither issue a statement to the press that he was misrepresented in the press as regards his criticism on the Congress government in the provinces, nor would he ever tell Nehru what Jinnah really wanted, or put his demands in black and white before them. Gandhi, in one of his letters as we have seen, had written to Jinnah to put his position in black and white, but got the usual dressing down instead of concrete demands and proposals to be considered by the Congress.
39. *ibid*, pp 138-141. The central issue that is to be taken note of here is 1. '*recognition of the League as the one authoritative and representative organisation of Indian Moslems*', and, 2, '*possibly a redesigning of the tri-colour flag or at least agreeing to give the flag of the League an equal importance*'. This letter was written on 17<sup>th</sup> March, 1938 by Jinnah to Nehru. He wanted the League to be made overnight the 'only, sole, authoritative and representative' party of the Muslims, but his league had only managed to get just 4 % of total Muslim votes, in Sindh the League got 4.6% Muslim votes. It was this League which just in a year's time was asking the Congress to recognize it as the only party of the Muslims and by doing so, grant a complete monopoly to the League over Indian Muslims. This surely was a fantastic demand! And the League was also asking the Congress to

‘redesign’ its flag or ‘to give the League’s flag equal importance’! Again fantastic! How could League, representing as it did only a portions of Indian Muslims (just 4%) demand equal status vis-à-vis the Congress? But this is how Jinnah was proceeding with his politics.

40. *ibid*, pp 144-160. Today’s Urdu press is no different from that of the 1939. No wonderful!

41. *ibid*, pp 161-164. It is quite clear from Jinnah’s words: ‘*I have publicly stated so often, that unless the Congress recognizes the Muslim League on a footing of complete equality and is prepared as such to negotiate for a Hindu-Muslim settlement*’, that it was not the question of Hindu-Muslim settlement that was on Jinnah’s mind. Rather the League be made the only representative of the whole Muslim India was the real issue with Jinnah and was his only interest. The 1946 elections were fought on the basis of two slogans: 1. Pakistan and 2. the League is the only authoritative and representative organizations of the Muslims in India. But even with the whole official machinery behind it, the League could manage to get 27 seats in Sindh out of 60, and when the rest of Sindhi Muslims, Hindus, and others members of the assembly joined hands to block the League from making ministry in Sindh, the English governor DISMISSED the elected assembly and invited the same League leaders in his caretaker ministry. Another election was held and it was of the IJI and Q-League type of election. G. M. Sayed too lost his seat in those polls! This is how the League was made ‘the only authoritative and representative organisation of the Muslims in India-at least in

Sindh and Bengal- not by the efforts of the League, but by the British support and the Congress' bourgeois limitations. Even then Jinnah's dream of exclusively representing the Indian Muslims did not come to fruition as the league was not able to form ministry in the Punjab and the NWFP. The Punjab ministry went to the Unionist Party and the NWFP to the Congress. It needed a bloodbath to out Khizr Tiwana's Unionist ministry from the Punjab. All this has been well-documented in Ian Talbot and Ayesha Jajal and other neutral writers and historians. But the difficulty is that our 'liberals' find it easy to talk in generalities than concretize their claims with facts!

42. *ibid*, pp 164-167

43. *ibid*, pp 169-171. Jinnah had been in contact with the British ever since the eruption of the second world war in September, 1939. The Congress had categorically refused to help the British in war efforts if the empire would not come out clear with a pledge to set India free after the termination of the war. The English had never been willing to accept this. The Congress played its card and its provincial ministries resigned. This was the opening the League was waiting for. Jinnah had called the Congress decision to resign , 'a Himalayan blunder!'. The League ministries would now be formed not only in Sindh but also in the NWFP with the active support and encouragement of Linlithgow, the then viceroy. Though Gandhi wanted to support the government somehow, but the hawks in the Congress would have nothing of this. The English never forgot that the Congress had launched 'Quit India'

movement when the empire was in the most vulnerable situation ever.

*'Freedom immediately, this very night, before dawn if it can be had...Congress must win freedom or be wiped out in the attempt. Here is a mantra, a short one that I gave you- DO OR DIE. We shall not live to see the perpetuation of our slavery', Gandhi.* (Patric French, *Liberty or Death: India's journey to independence and division*, Harper Collins London, 1995, p 154

Fifty seven battalions of the army were deployed to crush the uprising. Wavell, who was the commander of the Indian army before becoming the viceroy, noted:

I can never entirely rid my mind of the recollections that in 1942 at almost the most critical period of the war in India, when I was endeavoring as Commander-in-Chief to secure India with very inadequate resources against Japanese invasion, the support of the Congress made a deliberate effort to paralyze my communications to the eastern front by widespread sabotage and rioting (Wavell, *The Viceroy's journal* (OUP, London, 1977, 463).

What then was the solution? Churchill, Linlithgow and co., had a solution. 'Churchill had come to see the congress – Muslim league conflict as a pillar of the Raj 9R. Moore, *South Asia*, University of Canberra, Vol. XXIII, No.2, 2000, pp 66 and 76.

44. *ibid*, pp 171-173. The same demand of the League being recognized as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Muslim in India. Second, this is Jinnah's signal to the British. The Congress had demanded that the British should declare its policy of freeing India

after the war. Jinnah writes in this letter that the League opposes this resolution! This was the music the British ear!

45. *ibid*, pp 173-177. This letter of Jawaharlal Nehru is very important and lays bare certain facts which have never been discussed by ‘our’ historians.
46. *ibid*, pp 177-178

### **III**

#### **No Comments!**

1. M.R.T. *Pakistan and Muslim India & Nationalism in Conflict in India*, Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore. 1<sup>st</sup> edition 1942, reprinted 2005. pp.5-7
2. *ibid*, p147
3. Ilyenkov, E. V. *Dialectical Logic. Essay on its History and Theory*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977. p-17
4. M.R.T op cited.p-17
5. *ibid*, p-18
6. *ibid*, p-19
7. *ibid*, p-20
8. *ibid*, p-21
9. *ibid*, p-22
10. *ibid*, p-23
11. *ibid*, p-25 (interestingly, this is the very argument the Hindu Mahasabha used to promote its concept of communal nationalism as against the Congress’ stance and policy of communal conciliation).
12. *ibid*, p- 27. (Liberal-progressivist raconteur Jami Chandio has made the same comment about the Hindu revivalism. ‘...the Congress did not accept multi-national, multi-cultural reality of

India and stood for a strong center. This created a sense of insecurity among religious minorities, specially the peoples of the Muslim majority areas. This means that the Congress' secularism was nothing but the revival of Ram Raj', *Sindh Case-2*, Centre for peace and Civil Society, B-98, Qasim Nagar, Qasimabad, Hyderabad. Sindh, 2009. p-130

13. M.R.T, op. cited. p-27
28. 14, *ibid*, p-28
14. *ibid*, p-28
15. *ibid*, p-28
16. *ibid*, p-34
17. *ibid*, p-43
18. *ibid*, p-46
19. *ibid*, p-47
20. *ibid*, p-51
21. *ibid*, p-53
22. *ibid*, p-67
23. *ibid*, pp. 71-72
24. *ibid*, pp.73-74
25. *ibid*, p- 75
27. *ibid*, p-76
28. *ibid*, p- 77
29. *ibid*, p- 82
30. *ibid*, p-94
31. *ibid*, p-103
32. *ibid*, p-112
33. *ibid*, p-112
34. *ibid*, p-113
35. *ibid*, p-114. (One would wonder as to who was Mr. Amery? He was the Imperialists secretary of the sate for India).
36. *ibid*, p-122. "Consider for one moment what can happen if the English were to withdraw all of a sudden and there was no foreign usurper to rule.

It may be said that the Punjabis, be they Muslims, Sikhs, or others, will overrun India ”  
Gandhi. *ibid*, p-123

37. *ibid*, pp.150-153
38. *ibid*, p-161
39. *ibid*, p-162
40. *ibid*, pp.165-66
41. *ibid*, p-169
42. *ibid*, pp-171-172
43. *ibid*, p-177
44. *ibid*, p-182
45. *ibid*, p-209
46. *ibid*, pp.210-211
47. *ibid*, p-231
48. *ibid*, p-235
49. *ibid*, pp.240-41,45
50. *ibid*, p-247. (But Mr. M. R. T had just said ‘if nation is defined on the basis of religion, then change of religions affects one’s nation’.
51. *ibid*, p-249. (Mr. M.R.T considers it to be a sin for the Congress to contact the Muslims).
52. *ibid*, pp.248-49-50. (The Congress had launched ‘Quit India ‘movement on 8<sup>th</sup> August, 1942. 90000 Indians were incarcerated and some 1000 were killed by the imperialists. 57 army battalions had been deployed to suppress this mass rebellion. But to this writer, all this was just a middle class affair.
53. *ibid*, p-256
54. *ibid*, p-257
55. *ibid*, p-264
56. *ibid*, p-271
57. *ibid*, p-271
58. *ibid*, pp. 274-76-77
59. *ibid*, pp.279-80-82-83.

## IV

### IMPERIALSIM OF CATEGORIES

1. Marx, Karl & Engles, Friedrich, *Marx and Engles on Religion*. Progress Publishers, Moscow, USSR, 1966. p-131
2. Brecht, Bertolt. *Fear and Misery of the Third Reich*. Collected Plays. Eyre Methuen, London 1980. p-146
3. Mahmud, Safdar. *Dr. Iqbal, Jinnah, Aur Pakistan* (Iqbal, Jinnah and Pakistan), Khazeena-e-Ilm-wo-Adab, Lahore, 2004.pp.9-32
4. Iqbal, Javed. *Ideology of Pakistan*. Sang-e-Meel Publication, Lahore, 2005.p-11
5. *ibid*, p-71
6. Sayeed, Khalid Bin. *Regional/Ethnic Identity and Islamic Identity in the Development of Pakistan*, Islam in south Asia, proceedings of International Seminar on Islamic History, Art and Culture in South Asia, Islamabad, Pakistan, 1986. published by Maktaba-e-Jadeed Press, Lahore, 1995.pp.234-242
7. von Vorays, Karl. *Political Developments in Pakistan*. Princeton University Press, 1965.p-3 (This work had been written to build the myth of strong man around Ayub Khan).
8. *ibid*, p-107
9. Quoted in (Sitaram Yechury. *The Idea That is India: Celebration of Its Deversity, After Ayodhya: Reclaiming the Secular* SAHMAT, New Delhi, August 2009.p- 231



10. Bayly. C.A. *The Pre-History of Communalism: Religious Conflict in India 1700-1860*. Modern Asian Studies, 1985-p 202
11. Bandyopadhaya, Sekhar .*From Plassey to Partition*. Orient Longman, 2004.p-263
12. Chatterji, Bankim Chandra. *Letters on Hinduism*. Bankim Racanbali (English Works), p-230 quoted in Chatterjee, op. cited.
13. Chatterjee, op. cited. P-235. The Indians knew the river as *Sindhu*, and the Persians, who found difficulty in pronouncing an initial *s*, called it *Hindu*. From Persia the word passed to Greece, where the whole of India became known by the name of the river. The ancient Indians knew their sub-continent as *Jambudvipa* (the continent of the *Jambu* tree) or *Bhāratavarṣa* (the land of the sons of Bharat, a legendary emperor (according to *Ramayana*, Bharat was Ram's half-brother and his mother *Kekai* was from Sindh). The latter name has been in part revived by the present Indian government. With the Muslim invasion the Persian name returned in the form of *Hindustān*, and those of its inhabitants who followed the old religion became known as Hindus (Basham, A.L. *The Wonder That Was India*, Sidgwick & Jackson Limited, I Tavistock Chambers, Bloomsbury Way, London WCIA 2SG, reprinted 1988, p-1
14. Robinson, Francis. *Islam, South Asia and the West*. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2007.pp.9-130
15. Quoted in Sekhar, op. cited. p- 274
16. Ambedkar, B.r.Dr. *Pakistan on the Partition of India*, 1940, p-239
17. Murlidharan, Sukumar. *Patriotism without people, Milestones in the evolution of the Hindu*

*Nationalist Ideolog*. After Ayodhya: Reclaiming the Secular, SAHMAT, New Delhi, August 2009.p-107

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23. Chatterjee, op. cited, p-229. *Secularisms and Toleration: A Possible India. Essays In Political criticism*
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25. Jinnah, Mohammad. Ali. *Provincialism: A Curse*, 15 June, 1948. Jinnah Speeches & Statements 1947-48. Fifth Impression, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2009. p-227
26. *ibid*, p-158
27. *ibid*, p-85
28. Alvi, Hamza. *Pakistan Riyasat Aur Us Ka Buhran* .Fiction house Lahore 2002. pp.55-58
29. Alvi, Hamza. *Pakistan Riyasat Aur Us Ka Buhran*. Fiction house Lahore

2002. p-183

30. Alvi, Hamza. *Pakistani Quomiyat Ki Illaqai Bunyaden*, Tareekh-2, edt, Dr. Mubarak Ali, second edition, June, 2005, Fiction House Lahore.pp. 146-165
31. Tareekh -31, edt. Dr. Mubarak Ali.October, 2996, Fiction House Lahore, 16-43
32. *The Correspondence of Marx and Engles, 1846-1895*, National Book Agency, July 1945, Calcutta.p-235.
33. *ibid*,p-247
34. *ibid*, p-248
35. *ibid*,p-249
36. *ibid*, pp.257-8
37. Hassan, Sibte. *The Battle of Ideas in Pakistan*. Pakistan Publishing House, Lahore, 1986.p-168
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39. *ibid*,p-176
40. *ibid*,p-182
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## V

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  11. Talbot, Ian. *Tareekh-e-Pakistan*. Urdu translation of 'Pakistan: A Modern History', Takhleeqat, Lahore,2005.p-127
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  13. TOP, Vol.I.S.No.296. Quoted in Sarila, op.cited, p-102
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